Proceedings of

the 5th World Humanities Forum

THE
HUMAN
IMAGE
IN A
CHANGING WORLD

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### 변화하는 세계 속의 인간상

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# Keynote Lecture

# White Freedom and the Lady of Liberty

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According to a persistent rumor among African Americans, the sculpture that rises grandly from Liberty Island in New York Harbor is not the original Statue of Liberty. The true original was modeled after a black woman and had African features. In addition, the point of the statue was not to honor immigrants but rather the abolition of slavery in America by the Civil War, in particular the service of black Union soldiers. The statue carried broken chains to symbolize emancipation. Furthermore, the legend goes, the current white statue was substituted for the original when American politicians objected to portraying Liberty as a black woman. Some have even argued that the original black statue still exists, either in France or hidden somewhere in the catacombs of New York.[1]

No evidence exists to verify this legend, but its mere existence underscores the racialized nature of America's most famous monument. Of all memorials to freedom throughout the world, none is more important or widely known than the Statue of Liberty. Towering majestically over the entrance to New York Harbor since 1886, the great statue has become, more than any other monument or physical site, the symbol of both human freedom and American national identity. Originally a gift from France to the United States, it also represents the historical ties between the two great republics and the significance of liberty as a global phenomenon. Endlessly reproduced as a tourist object, commercial symbol, and political icon, the Statue of Liberty is one of the great monuments of the modern world.[2]

Today I consider a little-explored aspect of the Statue of Liberty's history, its role as a symbol

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1. Rebecca M. Joseph, "The Black Statue of Liberty Rumor: An Inquiry into the History and Meaning of Bartholdi's *Liberté éclairant le Monde,*" National Park Service, 2000; David Glassberg, "Rethinking the Statue of Liberty: Old Meanings, New Contexts," National Park Service, 2003; "Making the Case for the African-American Origins of the Statue of Liberty," *Journal of Blacks in Higher* Education, Spring 2000.

2. On the history of the Statue of Liberty see in particular Marvin Trachtenberg, *The Statue of Liberty* (New York: Penguin, 1986); Edward Berenson, *The Statue of Liberty: A Transatlantic Story* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2012); Yasmin Sabina Khan, *Enlightening the World: The Creation of the Statue of Liberty* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2010); Wilton S. Dillon and Neil G. Kotler, eds., *The Statue of Liberty Revisited* (Washington and London: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2010); John Bodnar, Laura Burt, Jennifer Stinson, and Barbara Truesdell, "The Changing Face of the Statue of Liberty," unpublished paper, National Park Service, Indiana University Center for the Study of History and Memory, 2005.

of whiteness, and more particularly of the whiteness of freedom. In general, I contend that race and racism are not just central aspects of Western society, but that they have shaped and permeated the very idea of freedom as we understand it. Moreover, freedom has been closely entangled with ideas of whiteness and white racial identity in modern history, so that to be free has often meant to be white, and vice versa. The Statue of Liberty symbolizes this perfectly: most obviously the statue's European physical features, but also the lack (indeed, as we shall see, the suppression) of any markers identifying it with rebel or freed slaves give it a strong sense of racial identity. Moreover, the symbolic role played by the Statue of Liberty in allowing European immigrants to the US to claim white status underscores its racial character, as does its complicated but largely exclusionary or at best irrelevant relationship to African Americans and other peoples of color. In particular, the Statue of Liberty embodies both racial difference as well as an unparalleled representation of human liberation. It is thus the perfect symbol of white freedom.[3]

## A Domesticated Vision of Republican Freedom in France

Conceived by French scholar and activist Edouard De Laboulaye and wrought by French sculptor Frédéric Auguste Bartholdi, the Statue of Liberty represents not only the admiration of the people of France for America but equally illustrates the changing nature of liberty, including its racial dimensions, in French history. The idea of France as a land of freedom has been central to modern French identity, summarized by the famous slogan of the French Revolution, *liberté, égalité, fraternité*, in which liberty takes pride of place.[4]

In particular, the ideal of freedom has taken the political form of republicanism, emphasizing popular sovereignty and the rejection of aristocratic rule. Emerging out of the cauldron of the French Revolution, republicanism espoused a new vision of France, and indeed of all humanity, centered around individual liberty and political democracy. By the beginnings of the twentieth century republican ideology dominated French political culture, and continues to do so to this day.[5] The creation of republican hegemony took decades, however, involving a series of tumultuous political struggles throughout the nineteenth century. The Statue of Liberty was conceived and constructed during this era of republican apprenticeship in France, eventually symbolizing not just freedom in America but also the triumph of the republican ideal in the land of Liberty's birth.

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3. Sieglinde Lemke, "Liberty: A Transnational Icon," in Winfried Flock, *et. al., Reframing the Transnational Turn in American Studies* (Hanover: Dartmouth College Press, 2011). Berenson; Joseph Klaits and Michael H. Haltzel, eds., *Liberty/Liberté: The American and French Experiences* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991).

4. One important aspect of this, dating back to the medieval era, was the freedom principle, according to which all slaves brought onto French soil should become free. See Sue Peabody, *'There Are No Slaves in France:' The Political Culture of Race and Slavery in the Ancien Regime* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

5. Patrice Higonnet, *Sister Republics: The Origins of French and American Republicanism* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1988); Sudhir Hazareesingh, *Intellectual Founders of the Republic: Five Studies in Nineteenth Century French* Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Edward Berenson, *et. al. The French Republic: History, Values, Debates* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2011); Emile Chabal, *A Divided Republic: Nation, State, and Citizenship in Contemporary France* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

Throughout the 19th century republicanism in France struggled with its revolutionary heritage. French political history in the 1800s seems like a crazy quilt of republics, dictatorships, and empires, constantly interrupted by revolutionary upheavals: rebels overthrew the national government in 1830, 1848, and 1870.[6] At the base of the turmoil, however, was the core tension between republicanism and liberalism, between the emphasis on democracy and the stress on individual freedom. Not for nothing did the liberal prime minister of the July Monarchy, François Guizot, scornfully dismiss those campaigning for universal suffrage by saying that if they wanted to vote they should get rich.[7] How could the radical vision of democracy championed by the Jacobin republic and the *sans-culottes* of the French Revolution coexist with property rights, the rule of law, and civil liberties?[8]

The contrast between these two visions of republicanism formed part of the broader struggle throughout Europe and beyond to reconcile popular sovereignty and private property, one that would ultimately create the powerful compromise we know as liberal democracy. In order for republicanism to win the allegiance of the affluent bourgeoisie in particular and the majority of the French population in general, it ultimately had to shed its revolutionary trappings and come to terms with the nation's established order. The ideal of "the social republic", a republicanism that emphasized social equality and justice, had to be suppressed, by force of arms if necessary.[9] Not until the creation of the Third Republic in 1870 did French republicanism succeed in making this key ideological shift, and not until the republicans' victory in the Dreyfus Affair at the end of the century did republicanism become the uncontested dominant political ideology and culture in France.

The idea of the Statue of Liberty took shape in this France wracked by empire, republicanism, and revolution. The life and politics of Edouard de Laboulaye, the man who more than any other conceived of the idea, illustrates the ways in which the political turbulence of mid-nineteenth century France shaped the statue that would come to dominate New York harbor. Laboulaye was born in 1811, at the end of Napoleon's First empire, and spent his childhood and youth under the Restoration, the July Monarchy, and the Second Republic. An ardent republican whose hero was the Marquis de Lafayette, Laboulaye was in his early forties when Louis Napoleon smashed the French republic, replacing it with the Second Empire.[10]

Bitterly disappointed by this new turn to despotism in France, Laboulaye focused on the United

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6. Jardin and Andre-Jean Tudesq, *Restoration and Reaction, 1815-1848* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Maurice Agulhon, *The Republican Experiment, 1848-1852* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

7. Sarah C. Maza, *The Myth of the French Bourgeoisie* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 148.

8. William H. Sewell, *Work and Revolution in France: The Language of Labor from the Old Regime to 1848* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980).

9. Michel Borgetto and Robert Lafore, *La république sociale: contribution à l'étude de la question démocratique en France* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2000); Tyler Stovall, "The Myth of the Liberatory Republic and the Political Culture of Freedom in Imperial France," *Yale French Studies*, #111 (2007).

10. On the life of Laboulaye, see Walter D. Gray, *Interpreting American Democracy in France: The Career of Édouard Laboulaye, 1811-1883* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1994).

States as a successful example of republican government and popular sovereignty. A professor of law at Paris' prestigious Collège de France, he became one of the nation's first and most prominent specialists in the study of the United States. Like a fellow Frenchman who he greatly admired, Alexis de Tocqueville, Laboulaye saw in the United States a successful example of moderate and stable republicanism that could serve as a model for France and the rest of Europe.

The 1865 triumph of the North in the American civil war was followed five years later by the collapse of the Second Empire in France and the advent of the Third Republic. The defeat of the Confederacy removed Laboulaye's one major criticism of the United States, slavery. Like many French liberals a strong abolitionist, Laboulaye had struggled to understand how a regime as noble as the American republic could tolerate such an abomination against human rights. During one of his celebrated lectures at the Collège de France, Laboulaye commented "Why is it that this friendship [between France and America] has cooled? Why is it that the name of American is not so dear to us as it was in those days? It is due to slavery."[11] For Laboulaye, the civil war and the emancipation of America's slaves reaffirmed his faith in that nation's republican vision. The overthrow of the Second Empire brought the end of a regime that had antagonized the United States and made France once again a republic. As a result, Laboulaye ardently hoped for an alliance of the two great sister republics, one that would bring liberty and enlightenment to all the peoples of the world.[12]

By the beginning of the 1870s Laboulaye had developed the idea of a giant statue symbolizing liberty that France would give to the United States in honor of the centennial of the American Revolution.[13] At the end of the 1860s he met Frédéric-Auguste Bartholdi, an ambitious young French sculptor devoted to monumental public art who would make his vision a reality. Bartholdi had long been interested in larger-than-life sculptures, influenced by classical works like the Colossus of Rhodes and the great statues of Thebes in Egypt. In the late 1860s he had designed a great statue, "Egypt Bringing Light to Asia" for the Egyptian viceroy, Ismail Pasha, to stand at the entrance to the new Suez canal. The project never came to fruition, but in many ways it represented a first exploration of the themes that would culminate with the Statue of Liberty. Most important, the image of a female colossus symbolizing liberty and progress inspired Bartholdi's creation of the American statue.[14]

Why would one give the ideal of liberty a female form? There is a long history of female

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11. Édouard Laboulaye, *Paris in America*, translated by Mary L. Booth (New York: Charles Scribner, 1863), Translator's Preface, v.

12. Lawrence C. Jennings, *French Anti-Slavery: The Movement for the Abolition of Slavery in France* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Françoise Vergès, "The Slave Trade, Slavery, and Abolitionism: The Unfinished Debate in France," in W. Mulligan and M. Bric, eds., *A Global History of Anti-Slavery Politics in the Nineteenth Century* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); John Oldfield, *Transatlantic Abolitionism in the Age of Revolution* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

13. Historians have long contended that Laboulaye and Bartholdi first conceived of the Statue of Liberty at an 1865 dinner party in Laboulaye's home. This idea has since been refuted. Joseph, *op. cit.*

14. Khan, *op. cit.*, 53*; Berenson, *op. cit.*, 16-23.

representations of nations and political ideas, one which, as many feminists have trenchantly noted, has often coincided with the political exclusion and suppression of women in real life.[15] The ancient Romans celebrated the goddess *Libertas*, and during the early modern era in Europe the idea of freedom as a woman challenged the masculine authority of kings. The French Revolution gave birth to the idea of Marianne as the great symbol of the Republic, and throughout the modern era she has represented both republicanism and the nation of France in general.[16] No painting of modern liberty is better known, or more powerful, than Eugène Delacroix's *Liberty Leading the People*. Created in the year that the 1830 Revolution overthrew the Restoration monarchy, Delacroix's great work portrays Liberty as a powerful woman, armed and bare-breasted, leading the insurgents of Paris in the fight for freedom.[17]

Marianne is the direct ancestor of the Statue of Liberty, but the American monument incorporated some very important changes, symbolizing a different vision of freedom. Most notably, the classic image of Marianne united republicanism and revolution, emphasizing the overthrow of oppression. Key to this vision was the presence on so many Mariannes of the Phrygian cap, the ancient Roman symbol of the freed slave. Throughout the modern era in Europe, as the *Marseillaise* itself demonstrates, the struggle against monarchism and capitalism often adopted the metaphor of the slave uprising.[18] Marianne thus represented not just resistance to oppression but more specifically freedom as the end of slavery. As in Delacroix's painting, many Mariannes also bore weapons, emphasizing that the fight for liberty was a violent struggle. Finally, Marianne often bore a torch of some sort, symbolizing both illumination and also the fires of revolution.

One of the most dramatic (and for its opponents, horrific) images of the Commune was the *pétroleuse*, or female incendiary; persistent rumors suggested that working class Parisian women would fill empty bottles with gasoline and use these homemade bombs to attack the forces of order and set fires throughout the city.[19] The *pétroleuse* was Delacroix's *Liberty* come to life, a revolutionary woman holding a flame in her hand. She symbolized everything bad about republicanism, and the French troops that suppressed the Commune summarily executed women

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15. Marina Warner, *Monuments and Maidens: The Allegory of Female Form* (New York: Atheneum, 1985); Barbara A. Babcock and John J. Macaloon, "Everybody's Gal: Women, Boundaries, and Monuments," in Dillon and Kotler, *op. cit.*

16. See Maurice Agulhon, *Marianne into Battle: Republican imagery and symbolism in France, 1789-1880* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

17. Gilles Néret, *Eugène Delacroix, 1798-1863: the prince of Romanticism* (Köln: Taschen, 1999).

18. For example, the little-known second verse of *The Marseillaise* runs thus:
    "What do they want this horde of slaves
    Of traitors and conspiratorial kings?
    For whom these vile chains
    These long-prepared irons?
    Frenchmen, for us, ah! What outrage
    What methods must be taken?
    It is us they dare plan
    To return to the old slavery!

19. The *pétroleuses* were in fact a myth, no convincing evidence of their existence ever came to light.

throughout the city suspected of being *pétroleuses*.[20]

The new Third Republic sought to craft a more peaceful, less revolutionary image of Marianne after 1870; like the Second Empire before it, it sought to ban the Phrygian cap as part of this symbol.[21] More important for the purposes of this study, the turmoil of the 1870 revolution and the Paris Commune reinforced the belief of Laboulaye and Bartholdi in moderate republicanism and the need to represent it in a monumental symbol. For them, the French civil war underscored the dangers of the revolutionary republic, which must be suppressed symbolically as well as in actual combat. Their vision of the Statue of Liberty consequently emphasized freedom's moderate virtue. The statue is fully clothed, both majestic and modest, unlike the radical harridans of Paris. It also does not bear a Phrygian cap: as we shall see, the suppression of any links with anti-slavery also had an important American dimension, but in the French context it represented the rejection of freedom as insurrection, so violently embodied by the Paris Commune. In addition, the Statue of Liberty's torch is carefully contained, a light and not a fire, or as Laboulaye put it, "a torch and not a flame", to illuminate, not destroy.[22] The French vision of the Statue of Liberty thus represented a domesticated version of the *pétroleuse*, weaponless and shorn of all revolutionary intent.[23][FIGURE 1]



The evolution of the image of Marianne, and the contest between moderate and radical visions of republicanism, formed part of the struggles around social class that so profoundly shaped life

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20. Carolyn Eichner, *Surmounting the Barricades: Women in the Paris Commune* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004); Gay L. Gullickson, *Unruly Women of Paris: Images of the Commune* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Edith Thomas, *The Women Incendiaries: The Inspiring Story of the Women of the Paris Commune* (Chicago: Haymarket Publishers, 2007).

21. Agulhon, *Marianne, op. cit.,* 158-159.

22. "She is not liberty with a red cap on her head and a pike in her hand, stepping over corpses," Laboulaye, cited in Don H. Doyle, *The Cause of All Nations: An International History of the Civil War* (New York: Basic Books, 2014), 311.

23. See Maurice Agulhon, "Bartholdi's *Liberty* in the French Political Context," in Klaits and Haltzel, *op. cit.*

and politics in nineteenth century France. The moderate republic was to an important degree a bourgeois republic, whereas the ideal of the social republic often symbolized by Marianne wearing a red Phyrgian cap played an important role in working class politics and culture. French officials after 1870 struggled against popular and working-class desires for a Marianne with a Phrygian cap on the official buildings of the republic.24

At the same time, such conflicts based in social class and class ideologies had an important racial dimension. Differences of race and class have often interacted in modern history, so that working-class Europeans have frequently been racialized as Other.[25] During the nineteenth century many leftists portrayed workers as slaves, and their struggles as a kind of slave uprising; Karl Marx himself called the Paris Commune a revolt against "the would-be slaveholders of France!" and compared it to the American Civil War.[26] Others considered the Communards savages, viewing them and Parisian workers in general as unfit for civilization and liberty. For Count Arthur de Gobineau, France's most prominent racial theorist, the Commune and French workers in general represented racial degeneration and debasement analogous to blacks and other peoples of color.[27]

Perhaps most important, the triumph of bourgeois republicanism in France coincided with imperial expansion overseas. It is one of the ironies of French history that the regime which overthrew the Second Empire would foster the nation's greatest period of imperial expansion. The Third Republic created a massive new empire, expanding and consolidating colonies in Africa, Indochina, and the Pacific, and it did so in the name of republicanism. It presented the strange contradiction of a republican empire without an emperor. The essence of this contradiction was of course racial difference, so that republican France became an empire of black and brown natives ruled over by white citizens.[28]

The great statue France bequeathed to the United States in 1886 was therefore far more than a straightforward symbol of liberty. It represented the changing view of republicanism, and freedom in general, in France during the 19th century. In particular, it underscored the triumph of a new view of freedom, one which increasingly rejected the concept's more radical history in favor of the rule of law and respect for the rights of property. This bourgeois vision of liberty also had a significant racial component, especially noteworthy because the Third Republic would not only emphasize conservative republicanism but also go on to create the greatest overseas empire in French history,

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24. Maurice Agulhon, *Marianne, op. cit.*

25. See Catherine Hall, *et. al., Defining the Victorian Nation: Class, Race, and Gender and the British Reform Act of 1867* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

26. Cited in Katz, *op. cit.*, 98.

27. Michael D. Biddis, *Father of Racist Ideology: the Social and Political Thought of Count Gobineau* (New York: Weybright and Talley, 1970); George Mosse, *Toward the Final Solution: a History of European Racism* (New York: H. Fertig, 1978).

28. On race and colonialism in France, see among many studies Alice Conklin, *A Mission to Civilize: the Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa, 1895*-1930 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997); Gary Wilder, *The French Imperial Nation-State: Negritude and Colonial Humanism between the Two World Wars* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); Richard Fogarty, *Race and War in France: Colonial Subjects in the French Army, 1914-1918* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012).

When Liberty came to America's shores, this racial dimension already prefigured in France would become more important than ever.

## Republicanism and Race in the United States

The America that welcomed the Statue of Liberty stood poised on the edge of global prominence, while at the same time haunted by the shadows of the recent Civil War. To an even greater extent than in the case of France, the political life of the United States centered around republicanism: the birth of the American nation constituted a definitive break with monarchy, and the United States had always been a republic. As in France, however, there were different visions of republicanism in America. America also faced a choice between more and less inclusive visions of the republic, radical versus conservative republicanism. In America the key issue dividing republicans (which is to say political thinkers in general) was slavery, and behind it, racial difference.[29]

Unlike France, the United States began not just as a republic but as a slave republic, and the intimate entanglement of freedom and race lay at the heart of the American experience from the beginning. The 1790 Alien Naturalization Act limited citizenship to whites, a legal tradition reinforced by the Dred Scott decision of 1857 which held that even free blacks could not be US citizens. The conflict over slavery led directly to the Civil War, the greatest military conflict in American history which cost the lives of 600,000 Americans, more than any other war before or since. The importance of the war to American history cannot be overstated: in a sense the true American Revolution, the Civil War made the United States one nation, and set the stage for the unprecedented economic growth of the late nineteenth century and the world dominance of the twentieth.[30] Most notably for our purposes, in abolishing slavery and making the freed slaves American citizens, the victory of the Union spelled the end of the white republic.[31]

Or did it? The Republican Party had been founded in 1854 as a political movement opposed to slavery, yet as became clear such opposition could take different forms. For many, including the first Republican president Abraham Lincoln, opposition to slavery meant hostility to the presence of blacks, slave or free, on American soil. The republic must reject slavery, but the best way to do so was to get rid of the slaves themselves.[32] Lincoln and many other Republicans had only come to support the abolition of slavery reluctantly, and the Emancipation Proclamation provoked furious

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29. Gordon S. Wood, *Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Scott J. Kester, *The Haunted Philosophe: James Madison, Republicanism, and Slavery* (Lanham MD: Lexington Books, 2008)

30. For a general history of the Civil War see Allen C. Guelzo, *Fateful Lightning: A New History of the Civil War and Reconstruction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

31. On nineteenth century black struggles for equality and citizenship, see Stephen Kantrowitz, *More Than Freedom: Fighting for Black Citizenship in a White Republic, 1829-1889* (New York: Penguin, 2012).

32. One result of this attitude was the practice of freeing slaves by settling them in Africa. See Eric Burin, *Slavery and the Peculiar Solution: A History of the American Colonization Society* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2008); Claude Andrew Clegg, *The Price of Liberty: African Americans and the Making of Liberia* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004).

hostility throughout the North during the war.[33] By 1865 the Republicans were clearly divided not only as to how to rebuild a bitterly divided nation, but more generally about the shape of the American republic in the future. Moderate and conservative Republicans, like Lincoln's successor Andrew Johnson, wanted not only to reconcile with the defeated South but also to prevent social or political equality for African Americans. In contrast, the Radical Republicans insisted on a thoroughgoing political overall of the South, one that would give the freedmen full status as American citizens based on the principle that all Americans were equal regardless of race.[34]

The conflict between these two perspectives haunted the Reconstruction era, and ultimately brought it to its end. During the decade after the end of the Civil War the Radical Republicans controlled the US Congress, using that control to pass sweeping legislation (including the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the US Constitution) that sought to empower the former slaves as equal citizens of the republic. Most important, they deployed Federal troops throughout the former Confederacy to ensure the freedmen's right to vote, so that during Reconstruction black legislators often controlled the state governments of the South. These efforts were fought tooth and nail not only by white Southerners and the Democratic Party which represented them, but also by Andrew Johnson and other moderate Republicans. Resistance to Reconstruction frequently turned violent, especially after a group of ex-Confederate soldiers founded the Ku Klux Klan in 1866, unleashing a wave of white terror against black and white Republicans throughout the South. In 1873 white vigilantes massacred some 150 blacks in Colfax, Louisiana. Two years later similar terrorists killed hundreds of black men in Mississippi as the Democrats retook control of the state by force.[35]

1877, the year that saw the triumph of the moderate Republic in France, also witnessed the end of the radical Republican Reconstruction in the United States. In 1876 the moderate Republican Rutherford B. Hayes won a very closely contested presidential election, partly on his promise to stop meddling in the affairs of the South. He won southern Democratic support by agreeing to withdraw Federal troops from the region, a promise he kept in 1877. With their departure, little prevented white Democrats and the racist terrorists who supported them from ending Reconstruction and the promise of an egalitarian Republic. Blacks continued to exercise their right to vote for a while, but starting in the 1890s southern state legislatures passed new constitutions using the poll tax and other means to effectively disenfranchise them. By the first decade of the

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33. Eric Foner, *The Fiery Trial: Abraham Lincoln and American Slavery* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2010)

34. Hans L. Trefousse, *The Radical Republicans: Lincoln's Vanguard for Racial Justice* (New York: Knopf, 1968); Philip B. Lyons, *Statesmanship and Reconstruction: Moderate vs. Radical Republicans on Restoring the Union after the Civil War* (Lanham MD: Lexington Books, 2014); Deborah Beckel, *Radical Reform: Interracial Politics in Post-Emancipation North Carolina* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2011).

35. On the history of Reconstruction see Eric Foner, *A Short History of Reconstruction* (New York: Harper, 2015); A. J. Langguth, *After Lincoln: How the North Won the Civil War and Lost the Peace* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2015); Douglas R. Egerton, *The Wars of Reconstruction: The Brief, Violent History of America's Most Progressive Era* (London: Bloomsbury, 2015); David Roediger, *Seizing Freedom: Slave Emancipation and Liberty for All* (London: Verso, 2015); Allen W. Trelease, *White Terror: The Ku Klux Klan Conspiracy and Southern Reconstruction* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995).

twentieth century white supremacy had destroyed Reconstruction and the dream of an inclusive republic.[36]

The end of Reconstruction was perhaps the most obvious example of the increasingly racialized nature of American republicanism in the late nineteenth century. In 1882, little more than a decade after laborers from China had helped build the nation's first transcontinental railroad, America passed the first of several Chinese Exclusion Acts, making it a crime for workers to immigrate to the United States from China.[37] The decades after the Civil War also witnessed the final stages of the American wars against Native Americans in the Great Plains, culminating with the Wounded Knee massacre of 1890.[38] The Civil War and Reconstruction had brought the hope that republicanism in America could embrace all peoples, but by the dawn of the twentieth century it was clear that America would remain a racialized white republic for the foreseeable future. Racial difference no longer existed as a function of slavery, but now assumed center stage in American political and social life. As a result, by the turn of the twentieth century liberty in America was to an important extent for whites only.[39]

The nation that welcomed the Statue of Liberty in 1886 was thus one that had embraced its own version of conservative republicanism, one even more than in France grounded in racial difference. The image of a Marianne shorn of references to insurgent politics found a ready audience in America. Correspondingly, while Laboulaye and Bartholdi personally supported the abolitionist cause, they designed the statue not to irritate what had become increasingly a sore subject in the United States. By the 1880s the Confederate narrative of the Civil War and Reconstruction, viewing them as an unfortunate mistake at best, a crime against civilization at worst, had gained traction throughout the country and remains influential to this day.[40]

During his tour of the US to explore support for the statue, the new political context became clear to Bartholdi and influenced his design of his magnum opus. He had originally planned to have the statue hold broken chains in her hand as a symbol of slave emancipation, but replaced them with a book of law. The Statue of Liberty does in fact include broken chains at her feet, but they are effectively hidden both by her robe and by the pedestal on which she stands. Like the Phrygian cap, therefore, the effective absence of the broken chains distanced the statue not only from slave emancipation but from radical Republicanism in general.[41]

36. C. Vann Woodward, *Reunion and Reaction: The Compromise of 1877 and the End of Reconstruction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).

37. Andrew Gyory, *Closing the Gate: Race, Politics, and the Chinese Exclusion Act* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998); Erika Lee, *At America's Gates: Chinese Immigration during the Exclusion Era, 1882-1943* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003).

38. Dee Brown, *Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee: An Indian History of the American West* (New York: Bantam, 1972); Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, *An Indigenous People's History of the United States* (Boston: Beacon, 2015).

39. Roediger, *op. cit.*; Alexander Saxton, *The Rise and Fall of the White Republic: Class Politics and Mass Culture in Nineteenth Century America* (London: Verso, 1991).

40. David Blight, *Race and Reunion: The Civil War in American Memory* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Belknap Press, 2002).

41. Khan, *op. cit.*, 104-109.

Political dynamics in both France and the United States thus served to distance the Statue of Liberty from republican egalitarianism, and in doing so gave it an important racial meaning. The resplendent white lady standing above New York harbor turned her back on the racialized working masses of Europe and the increasingly marginalized blacks and other peoples of color in America. When Americans celebrated the inauguration of the Statue of Liberty in 1886 they celebrated a racialized vision of liberty; the original statue may not have been black, but the one they embraced was certainly white. Right from the beginning of its history in America, therefore, the Statue of Liberty was a powerful representation of white freedom.

### White Woman on a Pedestal

As is well known, the United States met France's gift of the Statue of Liberty by funding and building a giant pedestal upon which to place it. Funded by a popular subscription launched by American newspaper magnate Joseph Pulitzer, the massive pedestal and base rise 154 feet from the soil of Liberty Island, slightly taller that the statue itself. The lady of liberty thus stands high above New York harbor, lifting her torch to a height of over 300 feet and to this day dominating the maritime approach to America's largest city.[42]

This image of the woman on a pedestal corresponds to increasingly conservative images of gender and womanhood during the nineteenth century, in America and throughout the world. We have already seen how the design of the Statue of Liberty represented a more conservative vision of Marianne, illustrating the shift in republicanism in both the United States and France. This shift corresponded to a broader transformation of the image and reality of women's lives during the nineteenth century, one historians have characterized as the rise of domesticity. Briefly stated, with the spread of industrial society and bourgeois culture middle class women found themselves removed from the world of paid labor and increasingly relegated to the home. While this new idea of femininity certainly did not reflect the lives of working class women, the bourgeois standard of female behavior and status increasingly characterized what it meant to be a woman in the modern age.[43]

The image of the woman on a pedestal closely corresponded to the new model of domesticity. It was the image of a woman prized and cherished, even venerated, but also controlled and fixed firmly in place. Many feminists thus saw in this image an attempt to masquerade the oppression of women in a gentle guise, praising them as symbols instead of recognizing them as human beings.[44]

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42. *Ibid.*, 147-176; Berenson, *op. cit.,* 69-89.
43. Mary Ryan, *Cradle of the Middle Class: The Family in Oneida City, New York, 1790-1865* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Nancy Cott, *The Bonds of womanhood: "Women's Sphere" in New England, 1780-1831* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997).
44. As Gloria Steinem famously quipped, "A pedestal is as much a prison as any small, confined space." "Gloria Steinem Tells Health Experts: Reproductive Freedom Called Most Basic Liberty, Kathy Duncan, *York Daily Record,* April 12, 1977.

They thus rejected arguments of men like Senator George Vest of Missouri, who in 1887 declared on the floor of the Senate that:

> "It is said that suffrage is to be given to enlarge the sphere of women's influence. Mr. President, it would destroy her influence. It would take her down from that pedestal where she is today, influencing as a mother the minds of her offspring, influencing by her gentle and kindly caress the action of her husband toward the good and pure."[45]

Scholars have commented on the ambivalent appearance and symbolism of the Statue of Liberty. Perhaps most famously, historian Marvin Trachtenberg observed that not only did it represent a powerful, monumental image of woman, a "great lady," but that at the same time "for a fee she is open to all for entry and exploration…"[46] This incongruity corresponded more generally to new bourgeois ideas of femininity which rendered the ideal woman sexless and subservient, while at the same time struggled to repress sexual desire. Freud's madonna-whore complex, a powerful representation of this ambivalence about women, thus found expression in the great statue dominating New York harbor after 1886.[47]

As many feminist historians have noted, these new ideals of domesticity often intersected with and were mutual reinforced by the new racial hierarchies and racism. In both Europe and America, the proper lady was a white woman who not only kept her distance from subaltern classes and races, but whose presence could also foster the hegemony of white bourgeois civilization. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries European colonial regimes began promoting the emigration of white women to their empires as wives and mothers. They would not only prevent the need for interracial liaisons between European men and native women, but also domesticate colonial society by centering it around white family life. Creating white domestic life meant, among other things, segregated white neighborhoods and social spaces in colonial cities. Imperial life thus placed the European woman on a pedestal, coming in contact with the natives below only as a benevolent but distant mistress.[48]

In the United States as well the presence of the white woman stood for bourgeois domesticity and freedom. Very similar to the European colonies, white pioneer women in the American

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45. Cited in Elizabeth Cady Stanton, *et. al., History of Women's Suffrage…1883-1900* (1902), p 107.

46. Marvin Trachtenberg, 196.

47. Michael Mason, *The Making of Victorian Sexual Attitudes* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986); Judith R. Walkowitz, *City of Dreadful Delight: Narratives of Sexual Danger in Late-Victorian London* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Anne McClintock, *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest* (London: Routledge, 1995).

48. Margaret Strobel, *European Women and the Second British Empire* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995); Margaret MacMillan, *Women of the Raj: The Mothers, Wives, and Daughters of the British Empire in India* (New York: Random House, 2007); Julia Clancy-Smith and Frances Gouda, eds., *Domesticating the Empire: Race, Gender, and Family Life in French and Dutch Colonialism* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1998); Ann Laura Stoler, *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010).

West were seen as crucial to transforming the region from a wilderness populated by savages into a settled and domesticated part of the United States. Wives and mothers, farmwomen and schoolteachers, not saloonkeepers, prostitutes, or cowgirls, were instrumental to the civilizing of the West.[49] In no area did the racialized cult of domesticity prove more important than the American South, both before and after the Civil War. Rendered famous by *Gone with the Wind*, the cult of Southern womanhood has a complex history, involving both the embrace of patriarchal society and the emphasis on white women's empowerment in a variety of spheres ranging from the church to the plantation. The ideal of the Southern plantation mistress in particular underscored how white women created and symbolized civilization in a society dependent upon the labor of enslaved black women and men.[50]

The image of the lady on the pedestal was crucial for white Southern women; their gentility depended on an isolation from the realities of slave society. Above all, it meant the complete absence of sexual relations between white women and black men. During the late nineteenth century this emphasis on white biological and sexual purity became a key component of the form of racial terror known as lynching. White segregationists lynched black men and women as a way of reestablishing white supremacy throughout the South. It soon, however, also became linked to a defense of white womanhood against the threat of black rapists. As South Carolina Senator Ben Tillman argued,

> "We of the South have never recognized the right of the negro to govern white men, and we never will. We have never believed him to be the equal of the white man, and we will not submit to his gratifying his lust on our wives and daughters without lynching him.[51]

Although, as contemporary anti-lynching activists like Ida B. Wells pointed out, most lynchings had nothing to do with sexual contact at all, let alone attempted rape, the idea that white men lynched black men to preserve the honor of white women became a central theme of Southern life under Jim Crow. At a time when the image of liberty was enshrined in New York harbor as a white woman on a pedestal, racial terror became an important means of preserving that ideal in the states of the former Confederacy. Freedom and racial segregation, and the violence needed to preserve racial segregation, went hand in hand in the idealized female white body.[52]

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49. Linda Peavey, *Pioneer Women: The Lives of women on the Frontier* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998); Julie Jeffrey, *Frontier Women: "Civilizing the West? 1840-1880* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998).

50. Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, Within the Plantation Household: Black and White Women of the Old South (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988); Catherine Clinton, The Plantation Mistress: Woman's World in the Old South (New York: Pantheon, 1984); Drew Gilpin Faust, Mother's of Invention: Women of the Slaveholding South in the American Civil War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004).

51. Cited in Bob Herbert, "The Blight That Is Still With Us," *The New York Times,* January 22, 2008. See Stephen Kantrowitz, *Ben Tillman and the Reconstruction of White Supremacy* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).

52. Ida B. Wells, *Southern Horrors and Other Writings: The Anti-Lynching Campaign of Ida B. Wells, 1892-1900*, edited by Jacqueline Jones Royster (New York: Bedford/St. Martin's, 1996); Crystal N. Feimster, *Southern Horrors: Women and the Politics of Rape and Lynching* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2011).

As the ultimate representation of the white woman on a pedestal, the Statue of Liberty could thus symbolize not just freedom but also racial conflict, the pure female needing protection from the black rapist and at the same time standing for retribution against black men in general. In one instance a replica of the Statue of Liberty did play a role in an actual lynching. In the early years of the twentieth century a series of racial assaults forced many of the African American residents of Missouri's Ozarks region to flee for their lives. These culminated on April 14, 1906, when an enraged mob of thousands of whites lynched three black men, Horace Duncan, Fred Coker, and Will Allen, for having sexually assaulted a white woman, Mina Edwards. The crowd dragged the three men to the Gottfried Tower, one of the city's tallest structures topped by a replica of the Statue of Liberty, and hung them from it. An editorial cartoon in the *Saint Louis Post-Dispatch* entitled "O Liberty, What Crimes Are Committed In Thy Name!" commemorated the grisly event.[53]

As the cartoon's title suggests, the use of the Statue of Liberty in a lynching prompted widespread outrage among both black and white Americans. There was a sense that the very notion of freedom had been defiled. The governor of Missouri not only condemned the crime but also argued that the statue should be removed from the Springfield public square until justice was done.[54] At the same time, the incident corresponded to a certain symbolic meaning of the Statue of Liberty, notably the role played by ideals of white womanhood in violence against black men. The image of three black men lynched by the Statue of Liberty dramatically underscored the racialized dimension of America's greatest monument.[55]

## Immigration, Race, and the Statue of Liberty

For most Americans, the Statue of Liberty symbolizes above all the history of immigration to the United States, particularly immigration from southern and eastern Europe during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In the classic narrative of American history, it represented the nation's welcome to the oppressed from throughout the world, and its ability to turn them all into loyal citizens grateful for the freedom they had found on its shores. As an article for the National Park Service has put it, "Between 1886 and 1924, almost 14 million immigrants entered the United States through New York. The Statue of Liberty was a reassuring sign that they had arrived in the land of their dreams. To these anxious newcomers, the Statue's uplifted torch did not suggest "enlightenment," as her creators intended, but rather, "welcome." Over time, Liberty emerged as the "Mother of Exiles," a symbol of hope to generations of immigrants.[56] In a sense, the Statue of

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53. *St Louis Post-Dispatch*, April 17, 1906, p. 12.
54. See the discussion of this incident in Bodnar, op. cit., 186-188.
55. Jenny Fillmer, "1906 lynchings grew from tensions, racism – Thriving black community died," *The Springfield News-Leader*, April 14, 2006; Harriet C. Frazier, *Lynchings in Missouri, 1803-1981* (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland Press, 2009); Kimberly Harper, *White Man's Heaven: The Lynching and Expulsion of Blacks in the Southern Ozarks, 1894-1909* (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2010).
56. "The Immigrants Statue", National Park Service, https://www.nps.gov/stli/learn/historyculture/the-immigrants-statue.htm

Liberty was herself the most famous immigrant in American history.

A closer analysis of the famed statue's relationship to American immigrants reveals a somewhat different story. In the late nineteenth century many Americans viewed and portrayed the Statue of Liberty as a symbol of anti-immigrant sentiment.[57] Those Americans who embraced Nativism and saw the immigrant masses as a religious, racial, and political danger to the Republic feared they would overwhelm not only the statue but the country as a whole. Not until well into the twentieth century did the idea of the statue as a welcoming beacon to immigrants become dominant in American society.

In exploring the reasons for this transformation, I focus on the racial identity of the Statue of Liberty, its representation of the ideal of white freedom. Historians of whiteness have studied the ways in which European immigrants were gradually accepted as white in America, and their relationship with the Statue of Liberty is part of this history.[58] In sum, the Statue of Liberty became a welcoming symbol of immigration when European immigrants became white. Those immigrants who gazed rapturously at the magnificent statue upon their arrival in New York harbor may have seen a symbol of freedom and prosperity, but they also saw a vision of whiteness, ultimately one of what they could become in America.

From the 1880s until the First World War the United States witnessed a wave of immigration unprecedented in both size and origins. During this period over twenty million immigrants journeyed to America: whereas in the early 19th century roughly 125,000 arrived per year, by the 1880s and 1890s the number jumped to nearly half a million. In 1907 alone almost 1.3 million came to the United States.[59] Moreover, they came from different places. Before the late nineteenth century most American immigrants were natives of the British Isles (including Ireland), Germany, and Scandinavia. The new immigrants still came mostly from Europe, but starting in the 1880s they mostly left the eastern and Mediterranean parts of the continent. Some four million Italians journeyed to American in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; between 1910 and 1920 alone, over 3.5 million came from the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires. Many of these latter were Jews, some 2 million of whom came to the United States from the 1880s to the 1920s.[60]

Thanks to her location in New York harbor, the Statue of Liberty had a front row seat to witness this massive human drama. Most European immigrants traveling to America by steamship first

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57. Berenson, 104.

58. David Roediger, *Working Toward Whiteness: How America's Immigrants Became White: The Strange Journey from Ellis Island to the Suburbs* (New York: Basic Books, 2006); Noel Ignatiev, *How the Irish Became White* (London: Routledge, 2008); Karen Brodkin, *How Jews Became White Folks, and What That Says About Race in America* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1998).

59. John Higham, *Coming to America*, 124; Berenson, 105.

60. On the history of European immigration to the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see Roger Daniels, *Coming to America: A History of Immigration and Ethnicity in American Life* (New York: Harper, 2002); Leonard Dinnerstein and David M. Reimers, *Ethnic Americans: A History of Immigration* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009); Vincent J. Cannato, *American Passage: The History of Ellis Island* (New York: Harper, 2010); Marianne Debouzy, ed., *In the Shadow of the Statue of Liberty: Immigrants, Workers, and Citizens in the American Republic* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992).

came to New York. In 1892 federal authorities turned Ellis Island, just upriver from the statue's home on Bedloe's Island, into the nation's largest immigrant processing center. The immigrant ships passed by the Statue of Liberty en route to Ellis Island where they would formally enter the United States. The sight of the great monument to the left was for many their first sight of America, and one of the most dramatic and enduring.

> "To the immigrants who battled tough times and rough seas, the Statue of Liberty was a welcoming beacon, a mystical madonna who made the homeless newcomers weep, pray and dance for joy.
>
> Swathed in a morning's mist, the mesmerizing lady of the harbor appeared off to the left of their ships, hailing their entry to the new world. For many, it was the first time they dared to hope.
>
> 'The people were screaming and some of them were crying. It was all kind of a joyous feeling of coming to the land of freedom and a land of love,' recalled Clara Larsen of New York City who came from Russia in 1911 at age 13.[61]

By no means all Americans considered the Statue of Liberty a symbol of welcome to the new immigrants, however. As historian Peter Schrag has pointed out, if America is a land of immigrants it is also one of anti-immigrant hostility and prejudice.[62] The massive new waves of immigration horrified many Americans, who frequently looked down upon the newcomers as ragged, dirty, ignorant, criminal, and in general unfit to be citizens of the United States. Many turned to Nativism, a tradition of hostility to foreigners and immigrants that experienced a major rebirth during this era. Led by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, the Nativists sought to keep foreigners out of the United States, seeing them as a mortal danger to the country.

World War I and the Russian Revolution increased fears of immigrants, now also suspected as dangerous Communists and anarchists. In 1924 Nativism triumphed with Congress' passage of the Johnson-Reed Act sharply limiting immigration to America.[63]

Nativists, like many others in American history, adopted the Statue of Liberty to represent their own ideas. If the statue did in fact symbolize America, then it could not belong to the despised immigrant masses thronging into New York. Many argued that in fact Liberty stood opposed to the immigrants, struggling to protect the integrity and purity of the American people. A series of cartoons in the late nineteenth century portrayed Liberty as under siege by motley hordes of foreigners, violent anarchists, or other undesirables. In 1895 Thomas Bailey Aldrich published the poem "Unguarded Gates, summing up the Nativist fear of the immigrant threat:

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61. Eileen Putnam, "Immigrants Wept for Joy As They Saw The Statue," *The Dispatch*, Lexington, North Carolina, June 18, 1986.
62. Peter Schrag, *Not Fit for Our Society: Nativism and Immigration* (Berkeley: University of California, 2010), 1.
63. *Ibid.*, see also John Higham, *Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism 1860-1925* (Westport CT: Greenwood Publishers, 1981).

"Wide open and unguarded stand our gates,

And through them presses a wild motley throng…

Flying the Old World's poverty and scorn…

Accents of menace alien to our air,

Voices that once the Tower of Babel knew!

O Liberty, white Goddess! Is it well

To leave the gates unguarded? On thy breast

Fold Sorrow's children, soothe"[64]

In this interpretation, and from the perspective of the Nativists in general, the Statue of Liberty did not welcome the new immigrants but in contrast sought to protect America against them.

So how did "the white goddess" end up embracing the immigrants from Europe in the twentieth century? In answering this question, it is important to note that southern and eastern European immigrants were never entirely bereft of white status or privilege. Albeit reluctantly, until 1924 they were allowed into the United States in large numbers, unlike the Chinese, for example. The Johnson-Reed Act imposed strict limits on them, but even stricter ones on hopeful immigrants from Asia or Africa. Nonetheless, it took several decades before European immigrants were fully accepted as Americans, worthy of the benevolent gaze of the Statue of Liberty.

The immigrants themselves, and their descendants, played a key role in this symbolic transformation. Starting with that first spectacular view of the statue rising above New York harbor, many took it as a symbol of all that America had to offer, and those that succeeded in their new land remembered this initial vision of Liberty with gratitude. Joseph Pulitzer, who had arrived penniless in New York during the Civil War and become a leading newspaper publisher, took the lead in launching the campaign to raise funds for the statue's pedestal, calling it "the people's statue."[65] The descendants of the immigrants would in their own turn champion the statue; Lee Iacocca, the chairman of the Ford Motor Company and the son of Italian immigrants, led the planning of the one hundredth anniversary celebration of the Statue of Liberty in 1986.

Nothing more famously symbolizes the idea of the statue as "Mother of Exiles" than the famous poem by Emma Lazarus, "The New Colossus." Lazarus herself came from a well-established German Jewish family in New York, and by her early thirties had carved out a substantial reputation as a poet. Starting in the early 1880s she became aware of and horrified by the anti-Semitic pogroms in eastern Europe and the flight of many Russian Jews to America. Their plight inspired in Lazarus a new attention to her own Jewish identity as well as a determination to do what she could to aid her impoverished co-religionists in New York. Asked by friends to contribute to an art exhibition raising funds for the Statue of Liberty's pedestal, she responded by writing the sonnet

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64. Thomas Bailey Aldrich, "Unguarded Gates," *The Atlantic Monthly,* 1895.
65. Cited in Khan, *op. cit.,* 172.

that would both become her most famous work and firmly link the statue to the history of European immigration.

> "Keep, ancient lands, your storied pomp!" cries she
> With silent lips. "Give me your tired, your poor,
> Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
> The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.
> Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me,
> I lift my lamp beside the golden door!"

"The New Colossus" received little attention at the time, and played no role in the formal inauguration of the Statue of Liberty in 1886. In 1903, however, it was engraved on a bronze plaque and mounted on the base of the statue.[66]

Emma Lazarus' great sonnet, and the fond memories of millions of new Americans who passed through New York harbor, would ultimately turn the Statue of Liberty into the Mother of Exiles, a symbol of the United States as a nation of immigrants. It took decades, however, before this new vision of the statue would become dominant; Lazarus' poem was largely ignored by the American public until the late 1930s.[67] By then major changes in national life had facilitated this transformation. During World War I the Statue of Liberty became more popular than ever, competing with Uncle Sam as the symbol of American national identity. Pictures of the famous statue were featured prominently on Liberty bonds, at times appealing directly to former immigrants. In August 1918 thousands of American soldiers in Iowa posed for a picture as a living Statue of Liberty before being shipped off to the war in France.[68] With the onset of the Second World War the desperate plight of Jewish refugees from Nazi Europe brought new attention to "The New Colossus" and America's welcome of an earlier group of immigrant Jews. With the US entry into the war, the idea of welcoming the tempest-tossed huddled masses once again became important to American identity.

Most important, however, was the change in the immigrants themselves. John Higham has argued that the transformation of the Statue of Liberty only became feasible with the end of mass immigration in 1924.[69] Americans could only romanticize European immigration once it had largely receded into the past, and was no longer present in the shape of millions of people speaking strange languages, eating strange foods, and crammed into miserable slums. By the 1930s, a nadir of immigration into the United States, not only were there few newcomers in America's cities

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66. On Emma Lazarus see Esther Schor, *Emma Lazarus* (New York: Schocken, 2006); Daniel Marom, "Who Is the 'Mother of Exiles'? An Inquiry into Jewish Aspects of Emma Lazarus's 'The New Colossus.'", *Prooftexts*, vol. 20/#3 (Fall 2000). My thanks to Bruce Thompson for this reference.
67. See Esther Schor, *Emma Lazarus* (New York: Schocken Books, 2006).
68. Reproduced in Tony Allan, *Paris, The Glamour Years, 1919-1940* (New York: Gallery Books, 1977), 24.
69. *Cite John Higham

and mill towns, but those who had come earlier had adjusted to American life politically, socially, and culturally. Many had learned English, and most of their children had grown up speaking the language fluently. World War II brought new opportunities for national service, and acceptance as equal citizens. By the war's triumphant end in 1945, the former immigrants were now Americans.[70]

To an important extent, as Matthew Frye Jacobsen and other historians of whiteness have observed, that meant being accepted as white.[71] This new acceptance of immigrants, and of the Statue of Liberty as a symbol of immigration, took place as a part of the process in which immigrants from Europe were gradually accepted as and transformed into white Americans. In 1941 the *Detroit Free Press* published a cartoon, "Americans All!" about the statue. The cartoon, by Arthur Pronier, shows a maternal, smiling Statue of Liberty embracing a variety of happy children identified as coming from different immigrant backgrounds. Strikingly, all the children are of European origin and white. In this interpretation, Lady Liberty would welcome immigrants, and consider them Americans, as long as they had white skin.[72]

The years after World War II reinforced both the broad acceptance of the descendants of European immigrants, now known as white ethnics, and the centrality of their history to the Statue of Liberty as a national symbol of freedom and American identity.[73] In 1956 Congress changed the name of the statue's site from Bedloe Island to Liberty Island, and began planning for a national museum of immigration.[74] In 1965 the federal government passed a new immigration law overturning the Johnson-Reed Act of 1924 and removing that laws racial and geographical restrictions. President Lyndon Johnson signed it into law on Liberty Island at the base of the Statue. During the early 1980s the statue underwent a massive facelift and cleaning, which included equipping it with electric lights, in preparation for its one hundredth anniversary in 1986. That year the Reagan administration orchestrated a huge four-day celebration, "Liberty Weekend," in honor of the centennial. The theme of immigration occupied pride of place during the ceremony, highlighted by Chief Supreme Court Justice Warren Burger's naturalization of 16,000 immigrants *en masse*.[75]

Some commentators at the time and since noted that these celebrations took place in a period when the United States was debating new restrictions on immigration, calling into question the symbolism of the statue as the Mother of Exiles. To call this hypocrisy is, however, to miss the point, for in a very real sense the Statue of Liberty never celebrated immigration. Rather, as the 1941 cartoon made clear, it honored the descendants of immigrants who had become Americans,

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70. David Roediger, *Working Toward Whiteness, op. cit.*

71. Matthew Frye Jacobsen, *Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).

72. *Detroit Free Press*, June 19, 1941. Ironically, the cartoon appeared on Juneteenth, the African American holiday celebrating the end of slavery.

73. David Roediger, *Working Toward Whiteness: How America's Immigrants Became White: the Strange Journey from Ellis Island to the Suburbs* (New York: Basic Books, 2006).

74. That museum opened on Liberty Island in 1972, then closed in 1991 following the opening of the Ellis Island immigration museum in 1990.

75. Richard Stengl, "The Party of the Century," *Time*, July 7, 1986. See the discussion of Liberty Weekend in Berenson, *op. cit.,* 181-193.

not the immigrants themselves. The centennial apotheosis of the Statue of Liberty took place in a time when most immigrants were coming from Asia and Latin America, not Europe. The statue saluted those of European immigrant background who had achieved whiteness in America while at the same time turning a cold shoulder to those who had not. No one proposed building similar statues on the US/Mexican border, in Miami, or on Angel Island in San Francisco Bay, to mark these new waves of immigration, and certainly no one suggested building a similar memorial in Charleston South Carolina or other ports (including New York itself) involved in the Middle Passage. As a symbol of both liberty and European immigration, the Statue of Liberty has to this day remained America's leading icon of white freedom.

## Conclusion

Nothing compares to the Statue of Liberty as a symbol of freedom in the modern world. In many different contexts, from the French struggle for republicanism to American debates about immigration, it has stood for human liberty and prosperity. Standing in New York harbor, at the gateway to the United States from Europe, it has become the quintessential representation of American national identity while equally exemplifying America's transnational and global presence. The Statue of Liberty has been instrumental in underscoring the belief that liberty is the essence of America's national life as well as its promise to all the peoples of the world.

In this article I have argued that this promise is shaped by race and racial difference. The Statue of Liberty throughout its history has represented a white vision of freedom, one shaped by developments in France, the United States, and elsewhere. In France Laboulaye's vision of the statue emphasized a rejection of revolutionary politics in favor of a moderate republicanism that largely excluded a racialized working class and embraced an imperial vision of the nation-state that created a massive new colonial empire structured by racial difference. In the United States the statue's roots in antislavery were largely hidden, and it became a symbol of European immigration once, and only once, the descendants of those immigrants had won acceptance as white Americans. The fact that the Statue of Liberty completely ignores what was arguably the greatest freedom story in American history, the struggle to abolish black slavery, is telling. In both countries the very idea of freedom had a racial component, one that helped shape its most monumental representation. In a sense, the Statue of Liberty's European facial features were no accident, expressing instead the racial aesthetics and politics of liberty in the modern world.

# The Human Image in the Global Age: Homo Non-Clausus

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## 1. Two Approaches to Human Beings

The question "what is a human being?" can be explored in two ways. One is to ask what is the nature of a human being beyond time and space, and the other is to ask what is the nature of a human being in given circumstances in a special time and space.

Many philosophers have talked about the nature of being human from an eternal point of view. For example, Plato in ancient Greece defined human nature as an "idea" based on dualism, while Karl Marx viewed man as a "working being," and Ludwig Wittgenstein defined man as a "linguistic animal." For Immanuel Kant, the question "what is human?" should be asked last, covering all philosophical inquiries: "what can humans know?", "what should humans do?", and "what may humans hope for?"

However, the metaphysical pursuit to define human nature is too abstract and so is unrealistic in view of the fact that human nature itself has been formed and transformed over the course of history. Against this context, Kant also separately envisioned anthropology from a practical point of view. "Practical" here means "useful in reality" or "useful to humans." Therefore, "practical anthropology" is not a supersensible or metaphysical inquiry into the nature of human beings, but a search to understand human beings living in specific social-cultural relationships. In this empirical inquiry, the concrete situation discussed has crucial significance. The human image I present today belongs to this practical anthropology.

## 2. Information Revolution and a Global Village

We are in the midst of an information revolution that began about a generation ago. The information revolution is also referred to as the third revolution, after the agricultural and industrial revolutions. The development of information technology, which enabled the information revolution, has dramatically improved storage and processing capabilities related to information, primarily due to semiconductor technology representing the microelectronic revolution. With the addition of

telecommunication technology, information technology has become synonymous with technology for storage, processing, and transmission of information.

The information revolution has caused tremendous social transformation, and it has an overwhelming and inclusive influence on every aspect of people's lives. The most noticeable change due to the information revolution has been the de-emphasis of time and space. With the advent of the network society, the meaning of time and space has changed greatly. Long distances lose impact and long spans of time seem short. In a nutshell, the world has shrunk sharply. We are exposed to news from the "global village" all the time and communicate with people on the other side of the world as if they were close neighbors. As a result, the world has literally become a global village. We call this phenomenon globalization.

What does the phrase "global village" mean? It means humanity has become a neighborhood. Living together in one neighborhood means not only knowing and being close to each other, but also sharing ideas, collecting opinions, and cooperatively solving the problems of the village.

The greatest feature of globalization is the full-scale encounter and exchange between various civilizations. There have been encounters between civilizations in the past. However, these were intermittent and limited to adjacent civilizations. On the other hand, the encounter of civilizations in the era of globalization is an inevitable, holistic exchange that all civilizations are facing simultaneously. Approaches to understanding globalization can differ depending on how such an encounter is defined. Samuel Huntington advocated clashes between civilizations, and Harald Miller suggested the coexistence of civilizations, but I insist on the fusion of civilizations as a new paradigm to explain globalization. Clashes and coexistence theories not only fail to explain reality well, but also do not suggest any solution to the problem we face.

Just as we have become global citizens, the challenges humanity faces now should be considered global problems rather than local ones. Climate change, interception of infectious diseases, suppression of war risk, crime prevention, and economic growth are all problems that cannot be solved by one nation or one civilization. These issues cannot be solved easily, but a solution must nonetheless be found in any way possible. If these problems are not resolved, civilization may be at risk.

In order to solve these difficulties, all nations and all civilizations should share the knowledge and wisdom that human beings have accumulated so far, building a cooperative system together. Ultimately, we must establish a system to deal with these situations, but first we need to review our understanding of own consciousness and existence and change the image of humanity that we pursue.

## 3. Open Human Beings

Based on the logic of this situation, I would like to present homo non-clausus as a human image that we should pay attention to in our time. An "open" human being has three characteristics.

First, it takes an anti-dogmatic attitude. Dogma refers to a claim by authority that transcends logic. In the religious realm, this means the doctrines established by the Catholic church on the basis of supernatural revelation. Such doctrines does not permit criticism via reason. In the philosophical sphere, this indicates propositions claimed without justification by any philosopher or school. In other words, a proposition or argument that is uncritically and blindly believed by the authority of a dominant ideology constitutes dogma. Dogmatism refers to the attitude of claiming a particular doctrine as truth without a rational basis.

Religious or ideological fundamentalism is a typical form of dogmatism. In religious fundamentalism, only our own religion is believed to be right and good, while all other religions are false and evil. Ideological dogmatism not only promotes the ideology it advocates as truth but rejects critical discussion of the topic.

Second, an open human being takes an anti-exclusive attitude. In many cases, adopting dogma represents exclusion, and maintaining such a position is exclusivism. Why do we deny others? We think we are superior, and at the same time, view others as infringing on our own existence and interests.

The ideological roots of exclusivism can be traced back to the doctrine of "the chosen people." The original meaning of "the chosen people" is based on the idea that God chose a particular people to rule the world. Today, this is reflected when people think of themselves as superior, even without reference to the religious root. Religious exclusivism and ethnocentrism are typical forms of exclusivism.

Ethnocentrism refers to the attitude of interpreting and evaluating the nationality or culture of other countries on the basis of their ethnicity or national culture. The term "ethnocentrism" first appeared as a term referring to a "personality that views his group as the center of everything, and measures and evaluates everything else on the basis of that group." Ethnocentrism is used to distinguish between inner and outer groups and defined in a similar to a combination of patroutism and chauvinism. From a civilizational point of view, orientalism, which degrades and distorts oriental civilization, and occidentalism, which devalues western civilization, are representative examples of ethnocentrism.

The third hallmark of an open human being is an anti-fanatical attitude. A fanatic is someone with irrational, blind faith. The fanatical is similar to a crazy madness. If you are in a fanatical state, you will be indifferent to all but you own beliefs and willing to sacrifice any life, not to mention morality or social values, to accomplish what you believe. Losing reason and tolerance by being overconfident in beliefs is fanaticism.

Chauvinism and closed nationalism are kinds of fanaticism. Chauvinism maintains that the inherent traditions and cultures of one's country are superior to other cultures, and closed nationalism devalues other nations with an emphasis on the excellence of one's own nation. Today, chauvinism appears in various forms according to collective consciousness, expressing irrational aversion to opponents with extreme emphasis on the values of gender, race, and ethnicity.

## 4. Rediscovery of an Open Mind

I have defined the characteristics of an open human being as embracing anti-dogmatism, anti-exclusivism, and anti-fanaticism. These factors combine to form one personality trait. On the other hand, a closed human being is characterized by dogma, exclusion, and fanaticism. Since dogma, exclusion, and fanaticism are commonly referenced properties, I defined an open human image, usung the negative attributes, anti-dogmatism, anti-exclusivism, and anti-fanaticism.

This distinction is very important because only an open human can create an open society and open civilization. Closed human can be said to have been necessary as a human image in the days when we lived in competition, divided as nations and civilizations. However, it cannot be stressed enough that the present situation is the opposite of this.

Also, I am not talking about open human beings on a purely categorical imperative level. Rather, I insist that we should rediscover such a potentiality for human beings.

Openness and closeness are original psychological terms used to describe the characteristics of an individual's mind or personality. If a person exhibits authoritarian, uncompromising, exclusive, and dogmatic characteristics in relation to others, we usually define him as having a closed personality. On th contrary, if he shows respect for equality, willingness to compromise, tolerance, and acceptance of criticism, he is defined as having an open personality. People with closed personalities tend to be more prone to impulse, lack logical consistency, and only evaluate others according to their own belief systems. On the other hand, people with open personalities are more rational, consistent in logical thinking, and positive despite differences in beliefs.

In this sense, open and closed minds represent two types of human mind that are incompatible with each other. Therefore, the struggle between open and closed minds began with the history of humanity. Open criticism and closed dogma have maintained a relationship of mutual confrontation and conflict from ancient to modern times.

Discussions on personal and psychological aspects of openness and closeness may be extended to socio-cultural dimensions. That is, open societies and civilizations are based on open minds, whereas closed societies are based on closed minds, Historically, whenever human beings encountered a crisis, dogmatism, exclusivism, and fanaticism stood out because they were thought to solve problems, as violence is sometimes thought of as a quick solution to a problem.

Nonetheless, it seems to be because open minds have triumphed over closed minds that human being has solved many problems and expanded from small local civilizations to a universal civilization. The difference between mankind and the apes is that we were able to create partnerships to solve problems. We won the competition against Neanderthals, who were better than us in some ways, by applying the ability to create lagger communities. Now, we must apply this historical capability for the global community and create an open human image to overcome dogma, exclusion, and fanaticism.

Just as there is a well-known national mindset in the history of Korea called "Hongik," which

stands for and open human image, it is presumed that a basis for open mind and humanitarian thought is latent in each country and each civilization. I think finding, reinterpreting, and spreading these open minded images is one of the most important missions of humanists in our time.

# Humanities in China

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## The Birth of the University

When I met Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) in a Parisian café in June 2001, I could sense both his excitement and his unease regarding his pending visit to China, a country which was for him almost a continent comparable to the whole of Europe in its expansive territory, immense crowds, and diverse cultures—a familiar yet strange world that had been involved into the same historical process. On the morning of his arrival in Beijing in early September, right before 9/11, he headed to Tiananmen Square and the Beihai Park after check-in and a brief rest at the hotel. While he was taking photos near the Mao Memorial Hall, his camera broke down. The philosopher commented humorously that Mao was truly a powerful figure, as his negative capacity could negate everything, including photography. Derrida's words reminded me of the image of China in the minds of European intellectuals in 1968. In Beihai Park, an elderly woman practicing calligraphy guided his hands and taught him to write a Tang dynasty quatrain on the stone-paved ground with a mop dipped in water. He was fascinated by the "writing for disappearance" of this elderly lady. Perhaps fascination is derived from unfamiliarity, but it is also an opportunity to break through such unfamiliarity.

The next afternoon, Derrida sat in the editorial conference room of the journal *Dushu*(*Readings*) and discussed with Beijing intellectuals the question of the university. One of his basic arguments was that "in principle the university ought to be a site where questions regarding truth, the nature of man, humanity, the history of mankind, and so on should be raised with independence and without condition, namely, a place where one can unconditionally resist and differ." The absolute independence of the university manifests itself in this process of questioning without condition. This is apparently an ideal university, an idea that in practice attempts to assert itself but has been negated repeatedly. Hence the university is not only a place for professional training but also a belief, a duty, and responsibility. For Derrida, the true way to redeem democracy lies in this idea and practice of the university. The university must insist on its independence as it participates in social life. Since the understanding of the university and the humanities is premised on the "inquiry

without condition," these two concepts diverge from the types of institutions and disciplinary division we normally refer to. He talked about how philosophy separated itself from the sphere of theology through inquiry without condition and elucidated that deconstruction was in this sense not a negation of the Enlightenment. The university is a site where people not only pursue truth, but question various kinds of "truth" as well; the humanities is the medium for such inquiry. In his talk, Derrida mentioned the transformation of the university in the age of Internet and questioned what democracy could be in such an era.

At dusk, after his talk and the roundtable discussion, we sat in a courtyard near Ritan Road and talked. The topic was the university in China and its historical tradition. Derrida, as a deconstructionist philosopher who persistently questioned the tradition of the European Enlightenment within which he was situated, made the following inquiries: From what cultural tradition did the university emerge in China? Does Confucianism contain the sort of inquiry without condition of the European university?

After briefly introducing the characteristics of Song Dynasty Confucianism, I explained the three origins of the university in China. Firstly, it was derived from the official system of imperial academy (*taixue*). The name *taixue* originated in the Zhou Dynasty, but as a system of higher education it was founded during the reign of the Emperor Wu of the Han Dynasty (Liu Che, 156-87 BC) based on the advice of Dong Zhongshu (179-104 BC), whose *Three Disquisitions on Heaven and Human Beings* (*Tianren sance*) urged the emperor to "set up an imperial academy and select wise masters to nurture the literati (*shi*)." In 135 BC, Emperor Wu had an imperial academy build in the capital, established positions for Erudites (*boshi*) of the Five Classics (*wujing*) and enrolled 50 disciples of the Erudites. In later historical periods, the subjects studied in the imperial academy expanded to include *The Book of Changes*, *The Book of Poetry*, *The Book of Documents*, *The Book of Rites*, *The Three Commentaries on the Spring and Autumn Annals*, *The Rites of Zhou*, *The Erya* and so on. The number of students increased from about 10,000 during Wang Mang's reign (45 BC-23 AD) to roughly 30,000 in the late Eastern Han Dynasty (25-220). Other schools such as the School of Four Gates and the School of Local States were also gradually added to the official education system. The official school system aimed at preparing qualified officials for the country, and the subjects studied centered on the Confucian classics. With imperial colleges, however, the tradition of resistance and questioning is deeply rooted. In the Han Emperor Ai's reign (25-1 BC), for instance, over a thousand imperial college students gathered together to protest the imprisonment of an upright official. When Neo-Confucianism spread to the imperial college in the Song Dynasty, students submitted treatises to the throne and became involved in political struggles.

Secondly, a tradition of private learning that predated the imperial college system. As far as the "inquiry without condition" is concerned, the tradition of private learning(*sixue*) and academies of classical learning(*shuyuan*) was a more fertile resource for the development of the modern discipline of humanities than the imperial college. So-called private learning is contrasted with the official education system, often traced back to the Spring and Autumn period (770-476 BC), when

Confucian, Moist, Daoist and Legalist learning were most influential. Confucius, Laozi, Mozi, and others taught their disciples and can be considered as the founders of private learning. Among these, Confucius left the most important legacy. After the rites and music of the Zhou Dynasty had collapsed and the literati class divided into groups that represented different interest groups, different schools of thought arose and disputed with one another. The Han Emperor of Wu elevated the status of Confucianism above other schools and established the imperial college, but he did not ban private learning. Although it also centered on Confucian ideas, private learning of this period provided other schools the opportunity to survive.

In the Tang Dynasty (618-907), Buddhism thrived so that temples also functioned as schools. *The Great Tang Dynasty Record of the Western Regions* by Xuanzang(or Hsüan-tsang, Hvenasāṃga, 602-664) notes that the Nālandā Vihāra temple in India (present-day Bihar) was a center for scholarship with about 1,500 teachers, where over ten thousand monks, including Xuanzang and others from China, studied the Buddha Dharma. They learned the Hetuvidyā logic, Sabdavidya linguistics, medicine, astronomical and calendric studies, craftsmanship, agriculture, etc. while explicating the sutra and engaging in scholarly debates. Nālandā Vihāra is hence regarded as the origin of the university in India. This tradition of learning, explication, and debating in Buddhism converged with the classical tradition of private learning in China and significantly influenced the formation of academies in the Song Dynasty (960-1279). The legacy of the four major academies founded in the early Song served as models for later academies. One most prominent distinction between the official and the private learning system lies in the latter's disregard of the boundaries of social status, region, age, or level of intelligence. Sons from commoners' households could enter temple schools; community schools taught morality and agriculture. The forms of teaching of private learning included "periodic debates" and "inter-school debates." The contents taught in private learning schools spanned a wide range: from classics, history and literature, and poetry, to Daoism, erudition in things or phenomena (*bowu*), law and politics, and so on. Even in the modern era after the examination system was abandoned, the legacy of private learning not only merged into the university system, but also played a significant role in the development of local educational practice, in particular the development of teachers' colleges, agriculture schools, and engineering schools.

Lastly, the university of modern China was neither developed directly from the tradition of the imperial academy nor a direct inheritor of private learning. As the fruit of the Westernization Movement and reforms in modern China, it aimed at preparing students with practical skills and replacing the examination system, seeing no need for humanities. Before the examination system was terminated in the late Qing in 1905, both the official- and the private education systems were inextricably linked with the system, which began in the Sui Dynasty in 605, fully developed in the Tang, matured in the Song, and prospered in the Ming and the Qing before its decline was brought about by the boats and cannons of Western powers. 18th-century European Enlightenment scholars celebrated the examination system in China as it replaced aristocratic systems for selecting

officials. In history, many talented people were able to pass through the examinations to become capable officials. It was precisely because the examinations aimed at official selection, however, that many schools of scholarly thought lost their vitality in becoming officialized. In the late Qing, Neo-Confucian education centered on the classics, and the eight-legged essay could no longer meet the demands of the time.

The new system of education, however, was not the result of an enlightenment as the event in European history but originated from the need for modern military technology. The first university in the history of modern Chinese education was the Beiyang Naval School (also called Tientsin Naval College), founded in August 1881 following the recommendation in Li Hongzhang's (1823-1891) memorial to the throne, with Yan Fu (1854-1921), the future president of Peking University, as its Instructor-in-Chief. The Beiyang Naval School had a clear military orientation, and many naval officials who died in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) were its alumni. Besides 6 hours plus Sunday spent on Chinese classics each weeks, its students first learned the English language and then took courses taught in English on science and technology, military affairs, ship operation, and so on.

Capital University (*Jingshi daxuetang*, later Peking University) was established during the Hundred Days' Reform in 1898 according to the principles of "national learning as the substance, western learning the function; use national and western learning together to observe their way of cooperation." Courses were divided into two categories: general courses and specialized courses. In 1910, there were seven disciplines including classics (*jingke*), law and politics, literature and history (*wenke*), science (*gezhi),* agriculture, engineering, and business. Under these seven disciplines were 13 subdivisions: *The Book of Poetry*, *The Rites of Zhou*, *The Zuo Commentary*, Chinese literature, Chinese history, politics, law, banking and insurance, agriculture, geology, mining, and metallurgy. There were no divisions such as humanities, social sciences, or natural sciences, but the discipline of classics and the discipline of *wenke* belong to what we today consider as the humanities.

In modern China, military, industrial, and political motivations facilitated the birth of the university, the product of national "salvation and survival" (*jiuwang tucun*). As such, it is not possible to elucidate the birth of the university in modern China using the framework of "inquiry without condition" of the Enlightenment that was contained within European theology. Perhaps we can compare the New Culture movement of 1919 to the "inquiry without condition" of European enlightenment, but its momentum was derived initially from concerns for national destiny and not inquiry into the knowledge of God. At its very origin, the birth of the university and of the humanities in modern China were closely associated with concerns for national destiny and with the clash of the East and the West. The inquiries that were raised largely derive from the persistent debates on why China had become backward and defeated, why the West was prosperous and powerful, and how the civilizations of China and of the West differed. The birth of the modern university was closely linked with science and technology and the formation of its disciplines was also inseparable from the notion of "science" (*kexue*).

The extensive application of the concept of science is one of the main characteristics of Chinese thought in the twentieth century. Since the late Qing dynasty, science has served as a symbol of and a call for liberation, as well as an objective criterion for all social and cultural reform. As a stand-in for a universalist world outlook, science has provided not only arguments for the necessity of the reforms hoped for by advocates of a new culture, but also objectives and paradigms for such reform. The power of science lies in the fact that it established an intimate connection between a universalist worldview and a kind of cosmopolitan/nationalist social system, and, through a rationalized classification of knowledge and social division of labor, incorporated in its broad genealogy human life in all its forms and tendencies.

## "Branches of Learning" and the Question of Taxonomy

The word science (*kexue*) is one of the most widely used key words in twentieth century China. Its earliest source comes from the Japanese Meiji scholar Nishi Amane (1829-1897) who in 1874 in the *Meiroku zasshi* (*Meiroku Journal*) translated the English word "science" using the Chinese characters for *kexue.* Nishi was deeply influenced by the positivist philosophy of August Comte and John Stuart Mills, and the term *kexue* was produced under the influence of Comte's "branches of learning." Besides the natural sciences, it also included religion, morality, art and society-together providing a universal method that was generally applicable. He translated "philosophy" respectively as the "study of nature and principle"(*xinglixue*), "study of principle"(*lixue*), "study of exhausting principle"(*qionglixue*), "study of the strivings of the wise"(*xixianxue*), "study of strivings for wisdom"(*xizhexue*), and finally came to settle upon the "study of wisdom (*zhexue*)." The first part of "Shōhaku sakki " (Sundry Notes of Shōhaku) states: "All of the sciences and techniques have one thread running through them, which is very critical," because having established a unified outlook in study and technique, people's activities can be organized, society's order can be stabilized, family and state can become powerful and rich, and study typifies the superior man, thus "establishing a unified outlook and exhausting the subtleties of study and technique." But one man cannot do all of this, "therefore for establishing a unified outlook, it is the philosopher's role to construct discussion and explication, whereas to exhaust the subtleties of a particular study and technique, this function belongs to the expert in that field." [1]

In a manner similar to early Meiji Japan, during the late Qing dynasty, "science" (*kexue*), "various studies" (zhuxue), and other concepts that indicated fields of knowledge were related to Western knowledge or Western studies, and these specialist fields of knowledge had been introduced for the purpose of political reform and self-strengthening. Therefore, the usage of scientific terms and the translation of Western knowledge are intimately connected. In 1890, when Chinese scholars began to use the word "*kexue*" (science), its direct source was from a Japanese catalogue. [2]

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1. Nishi Amane, "Shōhaku sakki" [Sundry Notes of Shōhaku], in *Nishi Amane zenshu*, v. 1, 165-166.

2. For example, in the spring of 1898 Kang Youwei edited the Catalogue of Japanese Books published by the Datong

It is worth noting that the titles entered under "Schools of Principle" (*Lixue Me*n) in the Catalogue of Japanese Books mostly included physics, chemistry, calendrics, meteorology, geography, mineralogy, biology, philosophy, religious studies, psychology, logic, and morality. Among the other volumes were separately arranged categories for physiology, religion, history, politics, law, agriculture, industry, commerce, education, literature, linguistics, aesthetics, novels, military works; the divisions are not very strict, but it is truly categorized according to the nature and function of "various studies" or "branches of learning". In 1902, Liang Qichao in a note on "The Relation between Geography and Civilization," defined science (*kexue*) in this way: "anything which becoming a field (*ke*) of study is called science (*kexue*), this is like 'investigating things and extending knowledge' (*gezhi)* and 'various studies (*zhuxue*).'" [3] Here, the extent of a field of study is comparatively broader than the extent of "*gezhi*." And the notion of "various studies" or "branches of learning" is also related to the late Qing reform of the educational system.

As with the difference of position in Nishi's "philosophy" or "unified vision" with his "science of sciences," late Qing Chinese scholars were prone to use the concept of "groups" (*qun*) and the category of "sociology" to unify the fields of knowledge, thus placing the classification of the study of fields of knowledge within the frame of an ideal model of society. This pattern is derived from Comte and Herbert Spencer's sociology, while also drawing upon the concept of the "group" in ancient Chinese thought; thus the branches of learning are closely related to the overall view of society, the universe and nature. This also implies that science and its system have a close relationship with the concept of a new social community.

According to Confucian thought, the "group" is "the law under Heaven" and "the common nature of all things," it involves "not studying but knowing, not worrying but being able to do," that is the principle (*li*) of nature and it is one with the principle of morality. Because of this, the term "various studies" is not a mixed-up hodgepodge of knowledge classification, but is directly connected with the technique (*shu*) of the "sociology" of politics and education. The general outlook of science embodies the modern state's politics, the ethical and technical structure in an organic whole. Following Spencer's concepts in sociology, Yan Fu used the structure of heaven, earth, and man to establish a system of knowledge related to nature, society and morality. Within this discipline the highest position is "metaphysics," or the study of "refining the mind and controlling affairs," while situated at the bottom are mathematics, chemistry, electricity, botany, and belonging to the middle level are agriculture, military science, navigation, mechanics, medicine, and mining.[4]

Yan Fu's "metaphysics" (*xuanxue*) is closely connected to "sociology" (*qunxue*), the former

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Translation Bureau, in which some titles of books use the term "*kexue*". See Kang Youwei, "*Riben shumuzhi* zixu" [Self-preface to *Catalogue of Japanese Books*], in *Kang Youwei quanji* [Complete Works of Kang Youwei] (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 2007), vol. 3, 263-64.

3. Liang Qichao, "Dili yu wenming zhi guanxi" [The Relationship between Geography and Civilization], in *Yinbingshi heji* [Collected Works from the Ice-Sipper's Studio] (Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1936), vol. 10, 113.

4. Yan Fu, "Yuan qiang xiudinggao" [Corrected Manuscript of "On Power"], in *Yan Fu ji*, vol. 1, 22-23.

mainly includes mathematics and calculus, and is a type of knowledge which can comprehensively hold an object's "principle of inevitability (*biran zhi li*)," while the latter is capable of applying inductive and deductive methodology to politics, criminal law, finance, historiography, and other fields of sociology. [5]According to Yan's understanding, through the methods of classification and primary evidence, science provided a new social model and a new principle of morality.

From the late Qing up to the May Fourth New Cultural Movement (1919), "science" was translated into Chinese in many ways, with *kexue* being one among them. *Gezhixue, gewuxue, qionglixue, lixue, like*, and others all came from Confucianism, particularly from the Song-Ming school of principle's discussion of "the study of things to acquire knowledge," which during the Ming and Qing eras had become connected with knowledge of nature. This kind of translation had its origins in missionary writings. The missionaries used Confucian terms to translate the Western concepts of science and technology, some examples include W. A. P. Martin's 1868 publication "*Gewu rumen*" (Introduction to the Sciences), Alexander Williamson's 1876 publication "*Gewu tanyuan*" (The Origin of Natural Science), and others. All used *gewu* as a translation of science. In 1874 the British consulate located in Shanghai proposed establishing a *Gezhi shuyuan* in the manner of a reading room. Afterwards on John Fryer's proposal and the board's approval, it was established as an industry and technology school and a natural sciences research and educational institution. Its English name was The Chinese Polytechnic Institution and Reading Room. The use of *gezhi, gewu* and other concepts was not limited to missionary writing and practice, Chinese scholars and modern intellectuals also used these terms widely. Before 1902, the use of the word *kexue* was rare. For example in 1861, Feng Guifen initiated subjects in Western learning "such as mathematics, mechanics, perspective, optics, chemistry, all of which concern the investigation of things to reach the underlying basic principle (*gewu zhili*)."

The reason that the Confucian category "*gewu zhizhi* " could be used to translate the modern concept of science lies in the transformation of the concept of *wu* (things), which is a crucial point. Within the context of classical ritual and music, *wu* was not an isolated, objective fact, but was a "thing" within a certain relationship, system, order, and norm. Under the "Great Officer" in the "Offices of Earth" section of *The Rituals of Zhou* there is a passage, "in the district they use the three merits (*wu*) to teach the multitudes, and to treat them as guests and recommend them." The "three merits" refers to the six virtues (knowledge, benevolence, sageliness, righteousness, loyalty, and harmony), the six aspects of conduct (filial piety, friendliness among brothers, accordance with neighbors, harmonious relations with your wife and mother's relations, being trustful, being sympathetic) and the six arts (ritual, music, archery, charioteering, calligraphy, mathematics).

*Wu* was the demonstration of a natural order, while ritual and music were also the direct embodiment of the natural order, therefore the *wu* is also the model of ritual and music.

In Song-Ming Neo-Confucianism, the relation of *wu* and the ordering of ritual became distant,

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5. Yan Fu, "Yi *Qunxueyiyan* zixu" [Preface to the Translation of *A Study of Sociology*], in *Yan Fu ji*, vol. 1, 123.

when *wu* no longer directly presented a norm for ritual, but had to pass through an "investigation of things" in order to render up "principle." Song-Ming Confucians saw the "Heavenly principle" as a characteristic of all things, the source of ethics and the norm for implementation, and took it as the basis for the integration of nature, ethics, politics and other fields. Similarly, the concepts of modern science and *gezhi* centered on the research into and application of nature. Moreover, they often had mutual liaisons with the categories of politics, ethics and social ordering. Therefore, the fall of the Heavenly (i.e. religious) view of the world and the rise of the scientific world view in late Qing times was not a simple relationship of rise and decline, but they existed at the same time, permeating each other.

The concept of science from the late 19th century to the early 20th century had a very close relationship to the categories of evolution, progress and natural change (*jinhua, jinbu, tianyan*). By means of an intense critique of thought, the scientific worldview ultimately replaced the Neo-Confucian outlook of the heavenly principle (*tianli*) and, established on the basis of the knowledge of objective laws, became the new public principle (*gongli*),. As it is evidenced in a great number of documents dating from the late Qing Era to the May Fourth Movement, we can summarize the sharp opposition between the heavenly principle worldview and the public principle worldview from several perspectives. First, the public principle worldview reversed the historical outlook of the heavenly principle worldview: the future replaced the past as the root origin of ideal politics and morality put into practice. Second, the public principle worldview, through a concept of linear time, replaced the heavenly principle worldview based on the circumstances of the times or the condition of reason. Third, the public principle worldview used the method of atomic theory to construct a category of facts, and this unsettled the extant metaphysics of the heavenly principle worldview, by attempting to construct the basis of ethics and politics upon the logic of facts and the rules of nature. Because of the final establishment of the factual concept of atomic theory, any subsequent resistance to the logic of facts or the laws of nature had to recognize the precondition of the dualism of facts and values.

## The Emergence of Two Cultures

Just as the different branches of orthodox Confucianism used a variety of different explanations for the heavenly principle and its "investigation of things to acquire knowledge," modern Chinese thinkers also included different paths to the understanding of science. Yan Fu and Liang Qichao represent the direction of two main streams: As the fusion of the school of *Lixue* and monism (*yiyuan lun*), Yan Fu's public principle outlook stressed the world's innate uniformity, emphasizing that one can understand the innate laws of the universe, the world, and man himself by means of investigating things and exhausting their principle, or through empirical methods. On the other hand, Liang Qichao's thought, which combined the mind-and-heart school, the new learning of classics school, and philosophical dualism (particularly in German idealist philosophy), stressed

that there exists a profound chasm between the natural world and the moral world, and that the only method that can connect these two worlds is the implementation of the unity of knowledge and practice (*zhixing heyi*). Yan Fu believed that one could establish a cognitive relationship between man and things by way of the experimental method. By a cognitive process, one reaches the ultimate truth. Whereas Liang Qichao attempted to rebuild the ultimate concept of truth (heavenly principle, *tianli* or instinctive moral knowledge, *liangzhi*), on the basis of the concept of practice (unity of knowledge and practice) for the purpose of fundamentally uniting man's social and moral practice with the problem of public principle.

As for Zhang Taiyan (1868-1936), "public principle" was only a power for oppression and domination. Zhang Taiyan's exposure of scientific public principle was based on two fundamental principles. Firstly, he used the principle of subjective epistemology to differentiate two kinds of concepts of nature: nature as studied by science is not self-existing nature, but is a nature brought into a specific horizon and category (that is, nature that is constructed by science), and this nature lacks an innate essence (it does not have any characteristics of itself), it shows itself only in the pattern that is [as the result of] the law of causality. Secondly, he liberates the dynamics of nature from the framework of teleology, negating any moral connotation of evolution, and thus rejects associating individuals with an historical teleology of evolution. He thus refused to admit that the individual's ethical orientations are based on the laws of movement for the whole of society, rejecting that an individual should be looked upon as an instrument of group evolution. [6]

If we were to compare the dissemination and practice of science among late Qing intellectuals with the practices of scientific communities of the Republican period, we would find a distinct shift: Chinese science organizations and other scientific bodies, together with the appearance of specialized academic periodicals, indicate that Republican China's cultural field embodied a clear-cut difference between scientific culture and the culture of the humanities. By contrast, during the late Qing the dissemination of science was an organic part of the spread of reform and revolution. As a result of the shift, two clear gaps opened up between scientific culture and other cultures. Science itself or "science" as a vocabulary item became closely associated with the objective or the concept of the objectivity. Scientific bodies and their activities, using their special discipline, training, method, and accurately defined concepts reconstructed man's basic understanding of nature and humanity itself. Not only did the new concepts arising from scientific activities such as time, space, elements, atoms, molecules, electricity, steam, energy, geologic systems, etc. expand man's view of the universe and nature, but such concepts also fundamentally changed man's imagined picture of the world. Therefore, the influence of science and its interrelated concepts far surpassed the division of two cultures in becoming a universal law by which to measure progress and backwardness, truth and falsity, right and wrong.

During the late Qing, civilizations and the competition between them held important historical

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6. Zhang Taiyan, "Sihuolun" [Essay on Four Confusions], in *Zhang Taiyan quanji* [Complete Works of Zhang Taiyan], (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1984), vol. 4, 443-44.

meaning for China's scientific concepts. People believed that scientific research and the resultant social rules were the major reason that Western society had won in the competition of civilizations. According to this paradigm, the importance of science originated from the judgment concerning the new circumstances at that time, and did not originate in science itself. With such a backdrop, late Qing scientific publications developed a method for understand science during the debate on civilizational conflicts, with a major characteristic of this understanding being the situation of science within the relations of Eastern and Western civilizations, spiritual or material, so as to investigate the significance of science.

After the May Fourth East-West cultural debates, science and its association with a specific historical culture gradually was replaced by a type of universal narrative about "scientific era". Chen Duxiu said, "Today the world has two roads: one is a bright road that goes toward a republic, science, atheism; the other is a dark road that goes toward dictatorship, superstition, and the divine rights of kings…"[7]

## From the Debate on East/West Civilizations to the Debate Science/Metaphysics

The New Cultural Movement of May Fourth, particularly the journals *New Youth* (*Xinqingnian*), *New Tide* (*Xinchao*), and other radical publications, caused an intense debate in the cultural world concerning Western and Eastern civilizations. The concept of science as an understanding of objective truth endowed the New Culture Movement's advocacy of social historical reform with a sense of inevitability that could transcend the dichotomy between fact and value. The "scientific interests" of mainstream intellectuals of the New Culture Movement, such as Chen Duxiu, Hu Shi, Wu Zhihui, Ding Wenjiang, and others, who collectively were the radical intellectuals of the time, were sparked by a concern for society, politics, economy, and culture. For example, under the influence of pragmatism, Hu Shi equated science with methodology, but he did not realize that when this method was applied to politics, ethics, and humanities, it already served as an epistemological model. In this context science represents the public principle-all public principle must be consistent with the laws of science, we can call this the making of the public principle of science.

The making of science into the public principle provides a premise for the extensive use of the adjective "scientific." The debate over Eastern and Western civilization started in the style of historical/cultural narratives, and both sides' discussion of the legitimacy of Eastern and Western civilizations relied on the historical narratives of the respective cultures. This debate took "culture" (*wenhua*) and "civilization" (*wenming*) as its key points; the focus of the argument was over which culture and its values could be taken as a standard or goal for establishing the changing direction of China's society, culture and nation. We can largely summarize the basic views of Liang Shuming in

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7. Chen Duxiu, "Kelinde bei" [Monument to Kettler], *Xinqingnian* [New Youth], vol. 5, no. 5 (Oct 15, 1918), 458.

the following schematic:

> Eastern = metaphysics = art = opinion = metaphysical talk = noumenon = private
> morality= returning to the past = the second, third directions
> Western = science = learning = knowledge = ethics = phenomenon = public morality =
> modernization = the first direction

In Liang's discussion of culture, "science" is not only a problem of knowledge, and "metaphysics" is not only a problem concerning ethics, but they indicate two different civilizational problems represented by science and metaphysics. In scientific civilizations, all science, politics, economics, ethics, law, and philosophy belong to science, rationalized and understood, but in metaphysical civilizations, all science, politics, economics, ethics, rituals, and thought are metaphysical, artistic, and intuited.[8] Therefore, in scientific civilizations, there does not exist an incommensurability between science and ethics, because there exists an ethics of science; in a metaphysical civilization, there does not exist an incommensurability between science and knowledge, because there exists a knowledge of ethics. Incommensurability exists only between the two kinds of civilizations.

It was much the same with more marginal groups of the New Culture Movement. Intellectual orientations that questioned the absolute dominant position of science were also incorporated into a rationalized knowledge system. Whether challenges to the Western scientific civilization were informed by "cultural differences," efforts to preserve the independence of the fields of ethics, aesthetics, or affection were all transformed by their incorporation into an institutionalized, rationalized, and scientific framework of knowledge classification and institutional frameworks. The intellectual, educational, and social efforts made by Liang Qichao, Liang Shuming, Zhang Junmai, and the Xueheng School transformed categories such as culture, morality, aesthetics, and feelings into specialized fields at modern educational and research institutions. Science, and the changing view of nature that it triggers, not only dominates our knowledge of nature but also prescribes our awareness of society and ourselves.

In 1923, Zhang Junmai's talk, "Philosophy of Life," delivered to a class of Tsinghua University students preparing to study in the United States, set off the great debate concerning "science and the philosophy of life." [9]From the debate over "Eastern and Western civilizations" to the debate over "science and the philosophy of life," the most important change was that the former's east/west dualism was transformed in the latter into a dualism between science/metaphysics. Against

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8. See Liang Shuming, "*Dongxiwenhuaji qi zhexue* daoyan" [Introduction to *Eastern and Western Cultures and their Philosophies*], in *Liang Shuming quanji* [Collected Works of Liang Shuming] (Jinan: Shandong renmin chubanshe, 1989), vol. 1.
9. Zhang Junmai, "Zai lun renshengguan yu kexue bing da Ding Zaijun" [Once more Speaking of a Philosophy of Life and Science. A Response to Ding Zaijun], in Zhang Junmai (ed.), *Renshengguan zhi lunzhan* [Debate on the Philosophy of Life](Shanghai: Taidong tushuju, 1923), vol.1, 64-65.

the background of the First World War, people from two different directions launched a critical debate over scientific civilization. From a cultural direction, they established Chinese culture as the mainstream through a comparison with Western civilization, and rejected the universal claims of Western civilization; from the direction of knowledge, through the differentiating the dualism of "science and philosophy of life," they separated ethics, psychology, and other social sciences from the complete system of natural sciences. Therefore they rejected the universal idea of scientific common examples (*gongli*) or scientific rules (*guize*). In truth they reestablished man as a main force in the field of knowledge.

Using the diversity of the spirit to oppose the universality of science, using the diversity of culture and history to oppose the universalism of "scientific civilization" (Western civilization), using the differences in principle of the subject to oppose the united principle of the common standard (*gongli*) principle of "science," this is the historical connotation of "science and the philosophy of life" as a pair of opposing rhetorical modes in the debate in 1923. By opposing science with the philosophy of life, the problem of history and culture was ultimately transformed into a problem about abstract and universal knowledge. It was not the difference of Chinese essence and Western function, or the confrontation of Eastern and Western civilization, but rather an opposition of science and metaphysics, physics and psychology, reason and intuition, which structured the center of the discussion. With this as the axis, the system of universal scientific knowledge began to split apart into incommensurate, differing, independent fields, that is, the field of science and the field of the spirit. The differences between psychological studies and natural subjects did not prevent Mills from promoting in his methodology the scientification of psychology and sociology, while the orientation of Zhang Junmai's efforts were in the opposite direction, with Zhang clearly striving to strictly differentiate psychology, sociology and political science from physics, astronomy, and other scientific fields.

Changes in sovereignty and the legal basis of the modern state cannot be separated from the production of new knowledge and ideology. Hence reconstituting the educational institutions and system of knowledge is an important aspect of the construction of modern sovereignty. In 1906, with the abolition of the civil service examination system, which had been maintained for thirteen hundred years, a new educational system, and the scientific knowledge to go with it, was legally established. After the founding of the Republic of China in 1912, academic reform was carried out in 1912, 1915, and 1923, modeled, respectively, on the academic systems in Japan, Europe, and the United States. Since then, every national reform has been accompanied by changes in educational institutions and the system of knowledge.

The educational system in modern China included two orientations: through the professional division of labor and a new knowledge classification system, it brought together in one process the national and global educational systems, and, at the same time, it provided institutional protection for a new division of labor in society and its mode of social operation. Within this system, the production of knowledge gradually became professionalized. In the new knowledge system, the

traditional worldview and its epistemology (morality, traditional education, etc.) lost their status as a defining worldview, and continued to exist only as elements of the new knowledge.

From "the debate over Eastern and Western cultures" (1918) to "the debate over science versus metaphysics" (1923), the affirmation of the autonomy, special status, and internal values of culture was incorporated into a rationalized classification of knowledge. Defense of the autonomy of ethics, aesthetics, feelings, and culture finally secured their positions in the rationalized knowledge system or the empire of science. National education and professional education based on a new social division of labor constituted the basic framework of the educational system. From this perspective, the process by which a scientific "worldview based on universal secular principles" (*gongli shijie guan*) reformed and replaced the traditional "worldview based on heavenly principles" (*tianli shijie guan*) constitutes the basic aspect of the transformation of modern thought. This new worldview paves the way for the division and specialization of knowledge and the institutions of modern society.

From the late Qing to the early Republic, atomism was at the core of the new and fashionable scientific positivism, and dissolved the Confucian worldview that hitherto had provided legitimation for the dynasty's political, religious, and geographic relations. During the May Fourth era, the scientific worldview justified attacks on the family system and its ethical presuppositions, providing a rationale for the legitimacy of atomistic individualism, marriage, and other social affairs. All these show that the scientific worldview is not only the banner of a cultural movement but the legitimate groundwork for modern states. Its theory of rights and legal basis are premised upon an atomistic idea of abstract individuals. The historical connection between abstract individuals and atomism shows that atomism is not based on positivist principles but on abstract assumption. The conflict between the atomistic view of nature and the Neo-Confucian worldview was born in the transformation from consanguineous and geographical community relations into the abstract legal relations of the modern state.

## Humanities as "Inquiry without Condition"

The contemporary humanities in China gradually formed after the end of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). Perhaps we can use two "departures" to describe the establishment of this new humanities. The first departure was a break from the school system of the Cultural Revolution; it was symbolized in the formal reinstatement of the college entrance exam (*gaokao*) system in 1977. This departure can also be explained as a return to the pre-Cultural Revolution system. The Cultural Revolution erupted in 1966, and from 1966 to 1969 institutions of higher learning stopped enrolling students. Starting in 1970, in accordance with Mao Zedong's order for a revolution in education, some schools resumed enrolling students. These students were not admitted directly from high school; rather, they were recruited from groups with a certain social experience such as workers, peasants, and soldiers. The university disciplines that were rehabilitated were primarily science

and engineering. In 1977, under the guidance of Deng Xiaoping, the system of "laborer, peasant, and soldier students" was abandoned, and all those who had graduated from middle school during the decade-long suspension of the entrance exam could again participate in the higher education entrance exams. Concurrently, in May of 1977, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) was founded, which included thirty-one institutes of research in the human social sciences (today it is thirty-five institutes, and forty-five centers). The predecessor of CASS was the Philosophy and Social Science Section of the Chinese Academy of Science (CAS). Institutionally speaking, the system of the Chinese Academy of Science is a combination of Soviet-style institution (from which it derives its basic framework) and Academia Sinica of the Republican Period. The foundation of CASS also symbolized China's attempt to locate a "break" from the Soviet system while still remaining within the bounds of Marxism. Within this new frame, disciplines such as philosophy, history, and literature were not replaced within the humanities, but rather constituted a peculiar element within the broader array of social sciences. From the close of the 1970s through the entire 1980s, despite the fact that scholars maintained a certain delineation between social science and the humanities, and viewed disciplines such as literature, history, and philosophy as different from social sciences such as economics, nonetheless it is the case that the academic system of the time did not clearly differentiate between the humanities and social sciences. Put differently, the humanities disciplines were treated as a specific category of social science. In 1984, when I entered CASS to pursue a doctorate degree, my PhD cohort within the entire academy was a mere twenty-three people, who were respectively classified into the various social science and humanities disciplines. Except for the specialized studies we pursued under our advisers, all the interactions between classmates were completely transdisciplinary.

The second "departure" was the break away from or transformation of the traditional socialist system of disciplines. According to Marxist theory, social science (including the humanities) is ultimately a superstructure, and falls within the realm of ideology. However, as regards the departments of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, in actuality the organizational system of these disciplines was deeply influenced by the arrangement and membership constitution of pre-1949 institutions such as Academia Sinica, Peking University, and Tsinghua University. The CAS faculty divisions (*xuebu*) were founded in 1955; before this, in 1952, under the direction of Mao Zedong, all the institutes of higher learning in China underwent revolution and the so-called "institutional adjustment." Accordingly, the entirety of Tsinghua University's Humanities and Social Sciences were merged with Beijing University and then again with the faculty division (*Xuebu*) of Philosophy-Social Science at Chinese Academy of Sciences after it formed. At the same time, despite their deep scholarly attainments, on account of their political positions an older generation of scholars at the universities were collectively moved into a department with favorable conditions but that did not enroll students. It was precisely this generation of scholars, such as Gu Jiegang and Chen Yinke (who didn't accept the transfer) in the field of history, Yu Pingbo and Qian Zhongshu in the field of literature, and He Lin and Jin Yuelin in the field of philosophy, who were appointed

to researcher positions within various offices of the *Xuebu*. Consequently, the older generation of scholars at the *Xuebu* included not just prominent leftist scholars such as Guo Moruo, Fan Wenlan, and He Qifang, but also outstanding non-leftist scholars. The *Xuebu* became an advanced research organ composed of an older, middle, and younger generation. After the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences was formed in 1977, it was this generation, together with the generation of scholars who had matured after 1949, who constituted the core force of social sciences and humanities in China.

The 1980s has been called an era of the "second enlightenment" which continued the enlightenment project of the May Fourth Movement (1919). This era can also be roughly separated into two stages: the first, beginning in 1978 until around 1984, was a period in which occurred a "liberation of thought movement." This movement's most active participants were the older generation of Marxist theorists who used the terminology and propositions of Marxism to enter into discussions about areas such as economics, politics, and culture. For example, they used the notion of "law of value" to mount an attack on ideas of planned economy, or the philosophical proposition that "actual practice is the sole criterion for judging truth" to attack the framework of orthodox Marxism and Maoist thought, or the method of reevaluating history to revise classical Marxist historiography. In the second stage, after 1985, the large scale translation and introduction of modern western philosophy, economics and other classics of theory had become a tidal wave, and from this time onward, European, American, and Japanese research on China were also imported in great quantities. In this period, for the most part the introduction and importation of humanities and social sciences knowledge, as well as the attacks on old propositions, did not originate as a result of methods internal to the discipline system; rather it is better to say that they were symbolic of the criticism and attacks on older disciplinary frames, notions, categories, and subjects, while also symbolizing "inquiry without condition."

From the disintegration of old norms in the 1980s, to the establishment of new norms in the 1990s, humanities scholars played a crucial role. In the 1990s, although quite a few scholars bemoaned the fall of the humanities, [in actuality] the debates and transformations of the field of humanities were extremely lively. Despite this, there is a great difference between the two decades. The critiques of old frames during the 1980s were accompanied by a great many translations and introductions of foreign thought, from Kantianism to Neo-Kantianism, from Hegelianism to Neo-Hegelianism, from existentialism to phenomenology, from Nietzsche to Freud, from literary realism and romanticism to modernism, from structuralist historiography to poststructuralist historiography, from systems theory and cybernetics to information theory, all were imported into China under the name of "the new" (in actuality they were non-Marxist orthodoxies). Before this swath of translations and introductions could be thoroughly sorted out and digested, it was put to use as a method for reappraising various historical and cultural phenomena. In the 1990s, the Chinese scholarly field's translation industry had reached mature form, and a process of disciplinary development that looked to American humanities and social science—including research on China—as a fundamental standard was just unfolding. Indeed, the course of the Americanization of

humanities and social sciences is a phenomenon of this era.

Just as the "inquiry without condition" period of the 1980s passed, beginning in the 1990s, a kind of movement attempting to reconstruct the academic and disciplinary standards of fields of humanities and social sciences began to develop both within and outside the establishment of academies and universities. The first to take up this mission of reconstructing the standards were the two non-governmental journals, *Scholar* (edited by Chen Pingyuan, Wang Shouchang, and myself) and *Chinese Social Science Quarterly* (edited by Deng Zhenglai). Within the space of about ten years, these two journals firmly established scholarly standards which in truth came ever closer to contemporary standards in the west, and which were gradually taken up by the scholarly systems of university and research organs. Given the trends and resistance that *Scholar* and *Chinese Social Science Quarterly* elicited in the 1990s, their effect on the subsequent formation of the fundamental standards of humanities and social sciences should not be underestimated. The majority of contributors to *Scholar* were born in the 1950s and '60s, and the journal proved a platform for the most outstanding humanities scholarship in China at the time. Centering on Chinese intellectual history and the Chinese history of scholarship, this group of scholars turned their interests and gaze from translating and introducing western scholarship toward the changes in knowledge in China since the Qing Dynasty in an attempt to subsume into their own scholarship and research this very long historical thread. This effort resonates with American China studies' "discovery of history in China," and its turn toward local histories, and we can say it passed through a search for local knowledge and led a new trend. *Chinese Social Science Quarterly*, on the other hand, synthesized the proclivities for "local knowledge" and the standardization of scholarship, calling out for the "localization of Chinese social science." The efforts of this kind of return to historical tradition and search for local knowledge was a response to the new state of globalization and Americanization, which, at the same time, in its standardization it accommodated the needs of globalization and Americanization. This dual strategy—which wasn't completely self-conscious—won them a reputation. In a certain sense, the decline of these two unofficial journals does not come from a decline in the new standards they championed, but rather it is the outcome of the establishment of these new standards as a new orthodoxy. At present, in terms of the organizational system of the academic disciplines, the divisional differences and standards of disciplines in China's universities and research organs do not differ significantly from those of the western academic system.

Compared to these two academic journals, the humanities journal that was most representative of the spirit of "inquiry without condition" of the 1980s, while at the same time facing toward the new conditions of globalization in the subsequent, post-cold war period was *Dushu* (*Readings*). Founded in 1979, its inaugural essay, "Reading has no Forbidden Zone," embodied the "movement to liberate thought" and its spirit of eradicating old barriers. "Reading has no Forbidden Zone," like the "inquiry without condition" of the European Enlightenment, unceasingly transcended its own era, pointing its spear at various kinds of naturalized propositions and verdicts of the post-cold war period, even going so far as to target the conditions that had given birth to itself. *Dushu* possessed

the following several characteristics: first, it was geared toward providing a forum for all the intellectuals in society, even in the entire world. It gathered together domestic and foreign scholars from all different generations, surpassed disciplinary boundaries, covered the entirety of the fields of humanities and social sciencea, and even included some content on natural science. Second, this journal attempted to combine [political] questions of the time along with different fields of knowledge. Such contemporaneity and scholarly nature are expressed through a relatively free writing style that was not overly influenced by the norms of scholarly journals. Third, in striving toward intellectuality, this journal was separate both from the consumption-oriented popular journal, and also from conventional academic journals. Precisely because of this, in the 1990s this journal served as an important birthplace for various intellectual debates. In 1994, *Dushu* published a collection of discussions regarding "the spirit of the humanities" in an attempt to establish a value coordinate for contemporary thought within the larger tide of globalization and marketization. After 1996, it extended critical and interrogatory feelers to an even wider field: from critiquing developmentalism to highlighting ecological diversity, from debates about the "three rural issues" [agriculture, rural areas, farmers] crisis to reviews of [China's] social inequality, from analyses of the rise of finance capitalism to the investigation of various forms of contemporary terrorism, from joint reflection over historical wars to the theorization and consideration of contemporary war, from deliberation over democracy and feminism to a rethinking of Chinese history and world history, from new discoveries in archeology to new methods in human geography . . . . . . This journal's contemporaneity did not let it turn into a news outlet, rather, just the opposite: through confronting, interrogating, and distancing itself from various kinds of trends, it strove to bring reflection to bear upon the newest advances in various knowledge fields, thereby arousing within its readers an "inquiry without condition." This journal placed importance on unearthing China's and Asia's traditions, but it was never limited to this, and instead worked to broadly take the pulse of the contemporary world; in order to attain this goal, it also broke through cultural and national barriers by inviting numerous scholars from different countries to directly participate and contribute to the discussion. The roundtable discussion with Derrida I mentioned above is one example. In China's modern history, it was common for journals to translate or publish essays by foreign scholars, but few are those that continuously invited foreign scholars to directly participate in discussions about China's or world problems. *Dushu* thus represents the birth of a kind of transnational public space.

## Humanities as "Soft Power"

Since 2001, non-official journals like *Scholar* and *China Social Science Quarterly* have successively stopped publishing, and since 2007, the journal *Dushu* has no longer played any role in "inquiry without condition." The reason for the decline of such non-official scholarly organs lies both in the lack of economic support, and, more importantly, in the increasing narrowness of the university system, where the quantified success of scholarship depends on the digital statistics

system, CSSCI, which is modeled after American indexes such as the SSCI and A&HCI. Various schools clearly rank the different academic journals, stipulating which journals are central to their related disciplines; scholarship results that can't be inputted into this statistical system therefore cannot be scored as scholarship results. In regards to journals that aren't included in the statistical system such as *Scholar* and *China Social Science Quarterly*, many scholars, particularly those young academics who haven't yet been promoted [to professor], have no choice but to submit their work elsewhere. *Dushu* is part of the CSSCI index, but not as a central journal of scholarship. There are other, more complex reasons for the decline of these journals during this century, but the expansion of the scholarly system is one obvious element. Put differently, the decline of these scholarly journals does not indicate the decline of the humanities scholarship in China, but the obverse: following the rise of China's economy, and the expansion of the scale and budget of China's institutions of higher education, the system of humanities scholarship has also expanded in an unprecedented fashion. According to the Education Ministry's statistics, which run through June of 2013, there are altogether 2198 colleges and universities (not including military schools) in China, including 877 undergraduate institutions, 1321 advanced occupational or specialized schools, and 292 independent institutions. The number of higher education institutions, enrolled students, and discipline categories is unprecedented in China's history. Compared with the eminent position in Chinese culture, politics, and social life enjoyed by literature, history, and philosophy in the twentieth century, the contemporary field of humanities is increasingly limited to a position as a [particular] discipline. As such, on the one hand the contemporary field of humanities has lost its former avant-garde position, and on the other hand it has enjoyed the increase in research and publishing resources brought about by the expansion of universities and the rise in budgets.

After the 1990s, in the short period of standstill after the discontinuation of *Scholar*, with the support of various governmental scholarship funds, more and more journals edited by scholars or by scholarly organs have entered into the CSSCI electronic statistical index; the subsequent scale of scholarly pieces and translated articles is unprecedented. If before we could distinguish between publication types along the lines of governmental scholarly journals and non-governmental scholarly journals, then now we can only use its inclusion or exclusion from the CSSCI. Within all of the state funds for scholarship, the National Social Science Fund is the largest in scope, and the most authoritative. Based on the National Natural Science Fund that was created in 1986, the National Social Science Fund was founded in June of 1991. The former fund is managed by the National Planning Office of Philosophy and Social Science, also founded in 1991; the latter fund is run by the administrative organization of the National Planning Office, whose "main function/ duty is to formulate the long term and annual plans for China's philosophical and social science research, manage the National Social Science Fund, organize works such as reviews of projects, the management of process of them, the monitoring of results, publication and promotion, etc."[10]

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10. http://baike.baidu.com/view/4901712.htm?fr=aladdin. The below information about the Fund comes from this page.

Besides the central unit, each province and autonomous region, directly governed city [Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Chongqing], and the Xinjiang Region all have an Administrative Committee for the Planning of Philosophy and Social Science, as well as a Planning Office of Philosophy and Social Science. The National Social Science Fund includes twenty-three planning and appraisal groups on Marxism, scientific socialism, Party history, philosophy, theoretical economics, applied economics, political science, sociology, legal studies, international studies, Chinese history, world history, archaeology, ethnic studies, religious studies, Chinese literature, foreign literature, linguistics, journalism and communications, library, information, and document science, population studies, statistics, physical education, management, etc., as well as three separate groups for pedagogy studies, art studies, and military science. It also has an already-formed project-launching system for initiatives on major projects, annual projects, specially commissioned projects, late-stage subsidized projects, western projects, and projects on translating Chinese scholarship into foreign languages. The National Social Science Fund also emphasizes support for young social science researchers, as well as social science research in peripheral and ethnic zones."[11] From its establishment until 2010, the National Social Science Fund has expanded from 5,000,000 *yuan* to 600,000,000 *yuan*, the number of annual report items has developed from under 3000 to 27,171, and number of annually subsidized projects from less than 500 to 2285. In this period, the fund has in total provided 2,650,000,000 *yuan* to a total of 24,283 projects, with a production result of more than 45,000 items. I did not find the data for between 2010 and 2014, but it's certain that in this period the increase in the country's investment in the humanities rose even more rapidly.

As a state project, the National Social Science Fund clearly takes its intellectual cue from Marxism, Mao Zedong thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, and the viewpoint of "Three Represents" and "Scientific Development" [credited to Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, respectively], and obviously differs from the unofficial journals mentioned above. The ideology of the National Social Science Fund has its limits, [so] from the beginning quite a few of its projects have had no real scholarly value. Within the framework of the Fund's intellectual guidance, it is difficult for the spirit of "inquiry without condition" to develop fully. But it must also be said that the Fund's "thought guidance" is very jumbled, and lacks internal coherency, and moreover, given that the scope of projects supported by the Fund is incredibly broad, it might best be described as a case of "fish and dragons jumbled together," for there is no shortage of excellent achievements by fine scholars who have been supported through the Fund. As such, it's an oversimplification to call these research achievements merely a form of official ideology.

Resonant with the growth of the National Social Science Fund is the growth in official support for the "going abroad" of Chinese cultural products under the rubric of "soft power." The notion of soft power was developed in the 1990s by the Harvard Professor, Josheph S. Nye, Jr. Nye uses the concept within the field of international relations in order to remind people that besides paying

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11. Ibid.

attention to forms of "hard power" like territory, arms, military might, technological progress, economic development, regional expansion, and military strikes, we must also consider forms of "soft power" such as culture, values, ability to influence, ethical norms, and cultural hegemony. He moreover wrote an article reminding his readers that the Chinese people are fostering soft power alongside their developing economy, though he deeply believes that America has a soft power advantage. For China and its rapid economic ascension, it proved to be a timely reminder for politicians, intellectuals, and even the impatient entrepreneurs of international trade, who all came to follow with interest the imbalance between China's "hard power" and "soft power." This concern gave the extant state of the humanities discipline a new capacity, while creating a new, deeper crisis: as a form of "soft power" the discipline of the humanities has been elevated to a form of national strategy, in the process shoving aside questions about whether as a form of soft power the humanities can maintain the quality of "inquiry without condition," or whether or not [the notion of] "soft power" can truly embrace and conserve the value of enlightenment through education and the fostering of a holistic form of human development.

"Soft power" extends to many fields. One field that has attracted attention and debate in the international academic community is China's system of Confucius Institutes, which is organized and led by the Office of Chinese Language Council International (known as "*Hanban*"). Since the first Confucius Institute opened in Seoul in 2004 through the end of 2013, 440 Confucius Institutes and 646 Confucius Classrooms were opened across the globe, distributed amongst 120 different countries. The Confucius Institute focuses on language teaching while also taking on other cultural projects. It does not belong to specific field of the humanities discipline per se, but its creation is mutually resonant with the new domestic emphasis on the teaching and research of traditional culture, which is another cultural phenomenon worthy of attention. If, as a project of raising "cultural soft power," the Confucius Institute has attracted the misgivings of the west, and America in particular (which is itself in the habit of exporting "cultural soft power"), then another effort however has not aroused the same sort of nervousness. In 2002, the State Council's News Office and the General Administration of Press and Publication organized events such as "Public Lecture on Chinese Books, the Presentation of Chinese Books Copyright" at the Moscow and Frankfurt book fairs; in 2003, the "Year of Sino-French Culture," it recommended 300 books to the French press, and in March the following year, with financial assistance for translation, 70 French versions of Chinese books were presented at the 24th Annual Salon du Livre exhibition in Paris. That same year, building off of these initiatives, the State Council's News Office and the General Administration of Press and Publication initiated its "Plan for Popularizing Chinese Books Abroad," and in 2006 it established a working committee for implementing the plan. Since its beginning, this program of dissemination has only been strengthened and renovated. Besides financial support for the expenses of translation, it also supports the expenses of publishing and even marketing, thus attracting the interest of a great number of foreign academic- and non-academic publishers. In 2013, a unit within the working committee relinquished 3754 copyrights to more than ten countries

and publishing organs, including a few well-known international scholarly publishers.[12] What is worth noting is that, since the end of the 20th century, following China's entrance into the Universal Copyright Convention (Berne Convention) in 1992, Chinese translations and publications of foreign works—particularly western and Russian—and China's international copyright exchange has run at a deficit, but between 2010 and 2013, the margin of this deficit greatly shrunk (although it has again grown in 2014), which has an obvious connection to the Chinese government's "Plan for Popularizing Chinese Books Abroad."

## The Return of Confucius and the General Education in a Digital Age

In the 20th century China experienced a continuous and violent anti-tradition movement, but starting in the 1980s, this wave had quietly reversed course. We might say that the birth of *Scholar* in the 1990s emblematized a self-conscious return to tradition, and, after entering the new century, this trend that began in the scholarship of a small number of intellectuals gradually developed into a tidal wave. Ultimately this new rise of cultural conservatism is due to various complex elements, about which it is ultimately hard to generalize. In the field of humanities scholarship, two separate strands are the tradition of Neo-Confucianism as well as the recent spread from America of Strauss's school of venerating the classical tradition.

Within this new wave of traditionalism there are two phenomena that have particularly attracted people's attention. The first is the return of "national studies" [*guoxue*]. The concept of national studies arose in early 20th century Japan, and rapidly spread to late Qing China; both concepts of national studies and "national essence" (*guocui*) seek to preserve the national spirit, and are obvious outgrowths of the rise of modern nationalism. But, from the "Debate over Eastern and Western Civilization" that erupted during World War I, to the "Science versus Metaphysics debate" that emerged at the end of the May Fourth period, Chinese civilization had already come to be seen as an ethical civilization in opposition against scientific civilization. In the new division of the disciplines, "national learning" was subsumed by the category of humanities. In this sense, national studies and the recent flourishing of its research organs (quite a few major schools such as Peking University, Tsinghua University, and Renmin University have formed national studies research institutions) have constructed a new landscape alongside contemporary humanities scholarship in China.

The second phenomenon is the rise of general education. The concept of general education also spread to China from America, with Hong Kong post-secondary education serving as a broker. The Chinese university system has typically emphasized specialized education. For example, in vocational education fields such as law or economic management, once one has taken the entrance

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12. This data comes from an essay by Zhang Hongbo (the Secretary-General of the China Written Works Copyright Society), "The Fundamental Transformations Brought About by Chinese Publishing's Going Abroad." See http://data. chinaxwcb.com/epaper2014/epaper/d5850/d9b/201408/48404.html.

exam and started the vocational training there is a lack of any corresponding cultural education. Since the 1990s, the Ministry of Education has begun advocating experimentation with "education in inner qualities" [*suzhi jiaoyu*], which, against entrance exam education (*gaokao*) system, takes as its fundamental objective the reaffirmation of comprehensive personal development. Around 2006, the notion of "education in inner qualities" was gradually updated with the more current concept of "general education," which is also more conformant with international standards of education. All the top-ranked universities, including Tsinghua University, Peking University, Fudan University, and Sun Yatsen University, have created dedicated schools or centers for the advancement of the general education of their undergraduate students. In a general education class, the reading and appreciation of both Chinese and foreign classics, along with a training in the techniques of classical culture, constitute the core of the course. Universities are also giving unprecedented resources to general education, either in the form of personnel or material support. Accompanying the rise of general education, formerly required courses on Marxism and Leninism, Mao Zedong thought, Deng Xiaoping theory, etc. continue apace, but are not included within the category of "general education." Now these politics courses have come under the jurisdiction of another independent institution, "Academy of Marxist Thought" (in Chinese, shortened to simply *Mayuan*). Though it officially enjoys a high position, when compared to the modishness of "general education," it is evident that such academies' ability to attract young people has long since declined.

This is a new era, a new kind of atmosphere. In an era defined by the pursuit of soft power, how can we excavate the spirit of "inquiry without condition" and "reading without barriers" in the discipline of the humanities? In an atmosphere that measures success financially, how can we reaffirm the objective of cultivating personhood via the humanities? In a world easily dominated by parochial identity politics, how can the humanities provide a ground for interaction between- and coexistence of different cultures? Answering these questions has become an urgent duty. In appraising the condition of the humanities discipline in China, we are at once both pleased and anxious, the former contains the latter.

# What Are the Posthumanities

**Rosi Braidotti**

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Title Slide

## Definition

Contemporary posthuman scholarship is a **convergence phenomenon** unfolding at the intersection between post-humanism on the one hand and post-anthropocentrism on the other.

The former criticizes the idea of 'Man' as the allegedly universal standard-bearer for the human, whereas the latter objects to species hierarchy and human exceptionalism.

Their convergence affects both the definition of the subject of knowledge and the modes of knowledge production.



Convergence Phenomenon

Post-humanism and post-anthropocentrism are equally powerful discourses, but they refer to different theoretical and philosophical genealogies and engender different political stances.

These two strands neither follow logically from each other, nor do they occur simultaneously as world-historical events.

They are rather discrete and separate events that are currently converging, producing <u>not so much</u> a harmonious synthesis, as a contested qualitative leap in new directions.



Leonardo da Vinci
*L'Uomo Vitruviano*
ca 1490

The Vitruvian Man



Has Gone Cyborg

### The Anthropocene

Considering the state of the public debate about climate change, it is important to situate the posthuman predicament firstly in the context of the **Anthropocene,** which is a popular but also controversial notion in the scientific community. In other words, just referring to the Anthropocene begs the question.

We need to address social justice and political concerns at the core of the geo-centered discussions, in order to operationalise the Anthropocene, notably some social-political analyses of the combination of fast technological advances on the one hand and the exacerbation of economic

and social inequalities on the other. The Anthropocen is not complete without an analysis of socio-politicl conditions.

## THE ANTHROPOMEME

- Capitalocene          (Moore, 2013)
- Chthulucene          (Haraway, 2015)
- Anthrop-obscene      (Parikka, 2015)
- Plastic-ene          (Macfarlane, 2016)
- Plantationcene       (Tsing, 2015)
- Mis-anthropocene     (Clover&Spahr, 2014)

Anthropomeme

Moreover, even as a relative neologism, the Anthropocene has already become another **'Anthropomeme'** (Macfarlane, 2016), spawning several alternative terms, such as 'Chthulucene' (Haraway, 2016.), 'Capitalocene' (Moore 2015), Anthrop-obscene' (Parikka, 2015a). And there are yet others: Plastic-ene, 'Plantationcene' (Tsing, 2015) and 'Mis-anthropocene' (Clover & Spahr, 2014).

The terminological vitality here reflects the accelerationist discursive economy of our times, and expresses both the excitement and the exasperation involved in accounting for the posthuman predicament within the Anthropocenic frame.

I propose therefore to look more broadly and widen the picture. My focus throughout the reading of the posthuman in the Anthropocene will be on the issue of subjectivity, that is to say what kind of subjects of knowledge we are becoming and what kind of knowledge we are producing in this context.

Clearly "we" are in this together, but in a secular frame of reference, I cannot and will not endorse an ontological kind of humanism that sacralizes the human and flattens out the structural differences that separate us. We are in this posthuman predicament together, but we are not One, because we are positioned in dramatically different power relations.



Plastic soup: Garbage filled river in Manila, 2015
© Agence France-Presse/Noel Celis

Sea of Garbage

Following on from the critiques of European humanism from within Europe, from Nietzsche to Deleuze, I want to see differences as resources and approach the making of humanity as a political project, as well as an ethical endeavor.

"we"can only become "we" together.

This project is a concrete political praxis, to be implemented collectively, through the patient construction of alliances and assemblages.

## What are the Posthumanities?

So let me give you some examples of what is happening in the field of posthuman knowledge production.

### The Critical Posthumanities (1)
- Ecological Humanities
- Environmental humanities
  - Blue Humanities
  - Green Humanities
- Sustainable humanities
- Interactive humanities
- Organic humanities
- Greater Humanities

Critical Posthumanities 1

### The Critical Posthumanities (2)
- Medical Humanities
- Bio-humanities
- Neural-Evolutionary Humanities
- Translational Humanities
- Community Humanities
- Resilient Humanities
- Public Humanities
- Civic Humanities

Critical Posthumanities 2

### The Critical Posthumanities (3)
- The Posthumanities (Wolfe, 2010)
- The Inhuman Humanities (Grosz, 2011)
- The Digital Humanities (Hayles, 1990, 2005)
- Transformative Humanities (Epstein, 2012)
- Nomadic Humanities (Stimpson, 2016)
- Adjectival Humanities (de Graef, 2016)

Critical Posthumanities 3

- Ecological Humanities
- Environmental humanities
  · Blue Humanities
  · Green Humanities
- Sustainable humanities
- Interactive humanities
- Organic humanities
- Greater Humanities

- Neural-Evolutionary Humanities
- Entrepreneurial Humanities
- Global humanities
- Medical humanities
- Bio-humanities
- Public humanities
- Civic humanities
- Community humanities
- Translational Humanities
- Resilient Humanities
- Posthumanities (Wolfe, 2010)
- The Inhuman Humanities (Grosz, 2011)
- The Digital Humanities (Hayles, 1990, 2005)
- Transformative Humanities (Epstein,2012)
- Nomadic Humanities (Stimpson, 2016)
- Adjectival Humanities (de Graef, 2016)

## Comments

Firstly, let me say that, far from being the symptom of crisis and fragmentation, these new discourses are a sign of great vitality and innovation.

They open up new eco-sophical, posthumanist and post-anthropocentric dimensions for the Humanities. And – crucial for my materialist cartographic method – these developments are empirically verifiable; they are already here.

Moreover, it would be intellectually lazy to take the on-going proliferation of new discourses as the mere expression of relativism, let alone the much-despised postmodernism. And it may be tempting - but equally fallacious - to take the fast growth of the Critical Posthumanities as self-generating, in a sort of

schizoid spin. The fact that rhizomic, web-like, knowledge production backed by Internet may

be going viral does not make it spontaneous.

The Critical Posthumanities today are rather the result of the hard work of communities of thinkers, scholars and activists – alternative collective assemblages – that reconstitute not only the missing links in academic knowledge practices: it is a collective praxis.

In other words, being posthuman is not a mark of contempt for mankind. It rather expresses the belief that the human is its own overcoming, because the human is a relational entity that becomes in and with the world.

## Some Defining Features

The Critical Posthumanties assume that the knower – the knowing subject - is neither *homo universalis* nor *Anthropos* alone, but a more complex – embodied and embedded, non-unitary, but relational and affective subjects – collaboratively linked to a material web of human and non-human agents –the subject of knowledge is *zoe*/geo/techno-mediated.

### THE POSTHUMANITIES
Assume that the knowing subject is
neither *homo universalis*
nor *Anthropos*
but a more complex – embodied and embedded, non-unitary, but relational and affective transversal subject
collaboratively linked to a material web of human and non-human agents

The Posthumanities

Posthuman scholarship celebrates the diversity of *zoe* – non-human life - in a non-hierarchical matter, recognizing the respective degrees of intelligence, ability and creativity of all organisms. This implies that thinking and knowing are *not* the prerogative of humans alone, but take place in the world, which is the terrestrial, grounded location for multiple thinking species – we are all eco-sophically connected. It is a becoming-world of knowledge practices.

Adopting non-anthropomorphic thinking is especially difficult for the Humanities, in that it positions terrestrial, planetary, cosmic concerns, as well as the conventional naturalized others, animals, plants and the technological apparatus, as serious agents and co-constructors of collective thinking and knowing. *Zoe*/geo/techno-bound perspectives indeed.

## THE POSTHUMANITIES

Assume that the knowing subject is
neither *homo universalis*
nor *Anthropos*
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Natureculture Continuum Zoe/Geo/Techno

The objects of research and enquiry of the Humanities have ceased to be focussed exclusively on "Man" and his anthropomorphic others. Today, on top of human diversity, we will find have animal studies, eco and geo-criticism. In terms of object of study, today the Humanities are covering forests, fungi, bacteria, dust and bio-hydro-solar- techno powers.

We have meta-objects and the hyper-sea, while 'human/imal' and algorithmic studies ignite the imagination of our graduate students. Many papers in this conference have made this point abundantly clear.

But it is not just a matter of adopting **new objects of enquiry** - something else has changed, at the conceptual level. The evolution of "Media studies" is the best way to illustrate what' s happening, because the field posits human-technological relations as its core question. The position of media technologies shifts dramatically from the postmodern to the posthuman eras.

Whereas issue of representation, surfaces and images are central to postmodern discussions – down to the early debates on the simulacrum, today the agenda is about data processing, code, algorithms and network circulation.

This is **a materialist shift,** which brings the information technology to the core of the posthuman discussion about intelligent, self-organizing non-anthropomorphic life-forms- the onto-genetic capacities of networks.

What we have to confront today is vital materialism, the life-making capacities of inorganic devices. In my work I draw inspiration for this philosophical neo-materialism from Spinoza, that I re-read with my teachers Gilles Deleuze and Michel Serres. They teach us how to think the vitalist immanence of non-anthropomorphic life-systems.

This grants respectively to the earth and to the computational networks the same role and agency as the human subjects that inhabit them, while

acknowledging embodied and embedded, relational and affective differences in degrees and intensity of what they are made of and what they can do.

Of course there is a qualitative difference between accepting the structural interdependence among species and actually treating the non-humans as knowledge collaborators. But my point is

that, in the age of computational networks and synthetic biology on the one hand; climate change and erosion of liberties on the other, this is precisely what we need to learn to do, in addition to all that we know already. We need to de-familiarize our mental mental habits.

The conventional Humanities are too anthropo-centric and suffer from a lack of adequate concepts to deal with the ecological environment, media-nature-cultural continuums and non-human others – although we provide most of the metaphors and representations for them.

There is a methodological issue as well: the social constructivist approach does not always help to deal with the challenges of our nature-culte continuum and the zoe/ge/techno- mediated milieus.

**Analysis**

Let me push the analysis further and focus on the pillars of the Posthumanities, namely the Digital Humanities and the Environmental Humanities, also known as "Green Humanities" if they focus on the earth, and 'Blue Humanities' if they focus on the sea and water.

Two Pillars of
Critical Posthumanities

1. Digital Humanities
2. Environmental Humanities:
   - Green Humanities
   - Blue Humanities
   - Sustainable Humanities
   - .....

Two Pillars

What are their defining features?

Well, the first striking feature is that both the Environmental & the Digital Humanities claim to be the real New Humanities, and to be best attuned to the times, being immersed in urgent contemporary socio-political concerns.

The Environmental Humanities are in the middle of the Anthropocene debate and the Digital Humanities reflect on new forms of technologically mediated sensibility, enhanced modes of perception, as well as issues of community and security.

Both are pragmatic and materially-based discourses, with a strong historical and literary component on the side of the conventional Humanities, but also a strong link to "science studies" and to cultural studies of science and technology.

Both are extremely popular in the corporate sector and management studies.

**What is critical as well as posthuman about the Digital and Environmental Humanities?**

It is a question of thematic, methodological and conceptual changes.

**Thematically,** both of them deal with non-human objects/subjects of study: the Digital with network culture and new media and the Environmental with Gaia or the planet as a whole.

**Methodologically,** they overcome the vision of a de-naturalized social order somehow disconnected from its environmental and organic foundations. They call for more complex schemes of understanding the multi-layered inter-dependence between "naturecultures" today.

**Conceptually,** the defining feature of the Posthumanities – which makes them critical – is <u>their 'supra-disciplinary' character.</u> The driving force for their knowledge production is not the policing force of disciplinary purity, or the zeal of minority politics, but rather the modes of relation and cross-hybridization these discourses are able and willing to engage in. They prosper to the extent that they show the ability and the willingness to move on.

The strength of the Critical Posthumanities is their relational ability to open up to the world. The acknowledgment of the porous nature not only of their institutional boundaries, but also of their epistemic core.

In this respect, the zoe/geo/techno-mediation that sustains the Critical Posthumanities, does not only take the form of a quantitative proliferation of new fundable fields, but also qualitative and methodological shifts.

The Critical Posthumanities represent both an alternative to the neo-liberal governance of academic knowledge and <u>a re-negotiation of its terms.</u>

The Critical Posthumanities as a supra-disciplinary, relational field of knowledge that is contiguous with, but not identical to cognitive capitalism. It functions at different speeds, moves on different time-lines and is fuelled by different ethical affects. It involves social and cultural movements, new kinds of economically productive practices and multiple curiosity-driven knowledge formations, that do not always coincide with the surplus-value profit motive.

In other words, the Critical Posthumanities design a horizon of becoming that the contemporary university and especially the academic Humanities will benefit from.

Please note that this is not a relativistic scheme here, but rather a multi-layered and multi-directional account of what is already happening. The word I would use is "perspectivism", different nomadic viewpoints from equally materially embedded and embodied locations, expressing the degree and quality of experience of different subjects. We need to acknowledge the multiple and internally contradictory aspects of our own knowledge practices by adopting a <u>diversified materialist approach,</u> which I would propose as the antidote to relativism. The difference is a matter of ethics: becoming as the realization of affirmative, collaborative ethics, as opposed to the axiom of profit and maximalization of consumers' quantitative options.

Affirmative ethics must guide our politics.

Far from calling for a new order, a new mode of global governance, these fields of research

show the self-regulating force of situated knowledge, Of multiple heterogeneous assemblages, inter-connections that plunging headlong into a post-disciplinary world.

## Neo-Humanisms

This does not mean however that all analytically post-anthropocentric discourses are automatically post-humanist. On the contrary, one of the paradoxes of the current situation in the Humanities is a normative return to Humanism, coupled with a growing post-anthropocentric analytical framework.

- Single most important is non-European humanism, of the African (Ubuntu/humanitude) Buddhist and Hindu kind. Sartre, in his preface to Fanon's *Les damnés de la terre* did foresee that the future of Humanism was not in Europe.
- 'compensatory neo-humanism', as in Peter Singer's animal rights theory (1975),
- And Martha Nussbaum's moral liberal philosophy (2006), post-anthropocentric analytic premises are combined with a reassessment of a number of humanist values, notably empathy and solidarity.

Post-anthropocentric neo-humanists converge on the need to uphold and expand on these values across all species and to practices an ethics of affirmation based on species-equality (Braidotti, 2006).

But post-anthropocentric neo-humanism is an internally contradictory position, that leads to aporia and to the tensions of combining the flawed legacy of European humanism with more vibrant, but less institutionalized non-Western traditions of humanism.

I would propose affirmative posthumanist values instead. Turning the differences into grouds of encounter, re-reading Bergson and Spinoza with Deleuze and Glissant.

## Future Perspectives

The key word remains: **convergences.**

Although I am perfectly aware that the dominant institutional model of the Environmental and Digital Humanities is a combination of corporate and academic interests, backed by public policies and funds, I wish to approach these emergent studies as the seeds of what they are in the process of becoming: their virtual capacity. What kind of knowing subjects are emerging here, whose potential for understanding and knowledge has not yet been realized?

What I aspire to is to combine the Environmental and Digital Humanities – as prototypes of the Critical Posthumanities – with practices and theories of subjectivity, that combine 'species thinking' and 'network thinking', within post-anthropocentric configuration of the subject of knowledge and affirmative ethics.

We need to work towards a culture of mutual respect between the hard and the subtle sciences,

pushing their respective complexity to explore multiple potential visions, while resisting the pitfalls of relativism. Towards the actualization of shared, commonly held, community-oriented technological mediation.

They can mobilize the capital of knowledge of the conventional Humanities, notably literature, music, poetry, science-fiction, cinema and media, but they also draw from the original sources provided by many generations of critical "studies", which have grown all around and in-between the disciplines.

The Critical Posthumanities are uniquely placed to encourage people to reflect upon and possibly change their living habits in order to confront the current challenge. They can steer the process in an affirmative direction away from flat consumerism, in order to make the most of this incredible opportunity. The posthuman subjects of knowledge need to want to change, i.e: <u>they need to become subjects who desire otherwise.</u>

**How to Criticize Them?**

## HOW TO ASSESS  THEM?

2 premises:

–the human is not a neutral term

–cognitive character of advanced capitalism

2 Premises

2 premises:
• The human is not a neutral term
• Cognitive character of advanced capitalism

**The Human is Not a Neutral Term**

## THE HUMAN IS NOT A NEUTRAL TERM

• humanity is not a neutral term but rather one that indexes access to specific powers, values and norms, privileges and entitlements, rights and visibility
• critical questions about the limits of humanist universalism were raised from the 18th century onwards

Not a Neutral Term

Humanity is not a neutral term but rather one that indexes access to specific powers, values and norms, privileges and entitlements, rights and visibility.

Critical questions about the limits of humanist universalism were raised from the 18$^{th}$ century onwards.

- Olympe de Gouges
- Toussaint l' Ouverture

No amount of universalism can conceal the fractures, the internal contradictions and external exclusions that have always composed a notion of the human.

And leaving the question of the subject out of the posthuman picture altogether just begs the question (ANT).

## Cognitive Capitalism



Cognitive Capitalism

The frame of cognitive and bio-genetic advanced capitalism and media and information technologies. What constitutes capital value today is the informational power of living matter itself, its immanent qualities and self-organizing capacity, which enhances the ability to generate profits from the scientific and economic comprehension of all that lives. The systemic exploitation of living matter through advanced technological mediation is at the core of a political economy of "bio-piracy" (Shiva, 1997), which is the norm in advanced capitalism.



*Greenhouse, El Ejido Spain,* 2013 © Armin Linke

Greenhouse

What this means is that there is as much if not more knowledge and scientific research produced today outside the university and academic institutions as inside. This is the cognitive character of advanced capitalism. It provides ammunitions for the many political forces who want to dismantle the university as we know it and reduce the humanities to a museum function.

The so-called "advanced" aspects of contemporary bio-technological developments paradoxically contain archaic components, in terms of the de-humanizing impact they exercise on many humans, as well as in the systematic depletion of non-human life-forms. In other words, these bio-technologies create as many problems as they solve, particularly if you broaden the picture to include the issue of anthropomorphic subjectivity.

Thus, the greenhouses – as other bio-technologically mediated agricultural fields – may look like Moon stations, but their produce is mostly picked by unregistered migrants who move from one site to another during the harvest season. They constitute the proletariat of today – economic fodder vulnerable to widespread vilification and xenophobic rejection. Disposable bodies, invisible but indispensable, they compose the necro-political face of bio-power.



*New Degrees of Freedom,* Act 3: Water, 2014
© Jenna Sutela et al.

Blue Bodies



*Syrian Refugees,* 2016 © Espen Rasmussen

Refugees

There is no room for technophobia or Luddire rage: we ARE our technologies: or trains, planes,

iphone and laptops… we are co-extensive with the very conditions we are also critical of, but technology is NOT the enemy.

**Planetary Differential Humanities: The Emerging Missing People**

Another way of saying all this will take me to the last stage of my argument, namely that the Critical Posthumanities, by tracing a different mode of relational subjectivity, through affirmative ethics, help us to compose a new humanity, as a virtual project, that is to say a PRAXIS – a "missing people".

That is to say a: "we-are-in-this-together-but-we-are-not-one-and-the-same" kind of people. posthuman subjects of knowledge.



we-are-in-this-together-but-we-are-not-one-and-the-same

to become in and with the world

World Map

This "we-are-in-this-together-but-we-are-not-one-and-the-same" kind of people is a subject that acknowledges it is intertwined with the totality of things – including *zoe*/geo/techno "things". A subject that aspires to compose missing alliances and relations by actively working towards the creation of milieus and planes of encounter.

This is what I mean by a 'missing people', a people in the process of becoming not-One – a complex multiplicity – held together by shared ethical passions for and a social imaginary supportive of affirmative alternatives.

Historically, all sorts of communities were already empirically missing. Whether we look at women and LBGT+, indigenous knowledge systems, at queers, otherwise enabled, trailer-parks, non-humans or technologically mediated existences, these are real-life subjects whose knowledge never made it into any of the official cartographies. Their struggle for visibility and emergence also affects the knowledge they are capable of generating.

But the other missing people are the virtual ones, those that can emerge only as the result of a

neo-materialist praxis of affirmation, aimed at constructing the plane of composition for such an assembly. This composition requires affective and <u>relational alliances</u> of a high degree of subtlety and complexity. They need to go beyond identity claims, not by denying them, but by expanding them into diversified embedded &embodied materialist platforms of different "missing people" creating – in their own ways – different methods of creating knowledge.

The transversal alliance of the missing people today is technologically mediated and it always involves non-human agents (land, water, plastic, wires, information highways, algorithms, etc.). New border-crossings are being set up that aim at actualizing the virtual knowledges and visions of these missing peoples.

The energy of the field is already providing some answers. The Critical Posthumanities are in constant process, inter-breeding through multiple alliances, topics and missing links. Which does not mean that anything goes, but rather that rhizomic multi-directionality is the rule.

## Planetary Differential Humanities / Critical Posthumanities

PLANETARY DIFFERENTIAL HUMANITIES

- Indigenous Environmental and Digital Humanities
- Postcolonial Green
- Decolonial Futures of Digital Media
- Transnational Environmental literary studies
- Indigenous knowledges and cosmologies

Planetary Differential Humanities 1

- Intersection of the 'classical' Environmental Humanities and indigenous epistemologies
- Postcolonial Environmental Humanities
- Postcolonial Digital Humanities
- Decolonial Futures of Digital Media
- Transnational Environmental literary studies knowedges and cosmologies
- Indigenous

PLANETARY DIFFERENTIAL HUMANITIES (2)
- Non-nationally Indexed Humanities
- Feminist/Queer Humanities
- Black Humanities
- Migrant/Diasporic Humanities
- Poor/Trailer Park Humanities
- De-colonial Humanities
- A Child's Humanities
- Otherwise-abled/Disabled Humanities

Planetary Differential Humanities 2

- Non-nationally Indexed Humanities
- Feminist Humanities
- Queer Humanities
- Migrant/Diasporic Humanities
- Poor/Trailer Park Humanities
- Post/De-colonial Humanities
- A Child' s Humanities
- Otherwise-abled/Disabled Humanities

And the list is open.....

## No Pan Humanity

We should avoid hasty reconstructions of 'Humanity'. The focus must remain on changing perceptions of the human as an effect of our globalized, technologically mediated and ethnically diverse world, the differential politics of location and how they affect the production of knowledge. "We"- the dwellers of this planet at this point in time- are confronted by a number of painful contradictions: an electronically linked pan-humanity which however is more fragmented than ever and split by convulsive internal fractures, xenophobic fears and violence. Humanity is re-created as a negative category, held together by shared vulnerability and the spectre of extinction, but also struck down by environmental devastation, by new and old epidemics, in endless 'new' wars, that innovate on ways of killing, in the proliferation of migrations and exodus, detention camps and refugees' centres. The staggering inequalities engendered by the global economy make for violence and insurrection; the appeals for new forms of cosmopolitan relations or a global *ethos* are often answered by necro-political acts of violence, destruction and assassination.

We must beware of re=compositions of corporate humanism, which is just a pretext for consumerism.



Benetton

Starting from philosophies of radical immanence, vital materialism and the feminist politics of locations, I want to argue against taking a flight into an abstract idea of a "new" pan-humanity, bonded in shared vulnerability or anxiety about survival and extinction.

**What we need instead is embedded and embodied, relational and affective cartographies of the new power relations that are emerging from the current geo-political and post-anthropocentric world order. Class, race, gender and sexual orientations, age and able-bodiedness are more than ever significant markers of human "normality." They are key factors in framing the notion of and policing access to something we may call "humanity".**

Yet, considering the global reach of the problems we are facing today, in the era of the 'Anthropocene', it is nonetheless the case that "we" are indeed in *this* anthropocenic crisis together. Such awareness must not however obscure or flatten out the power differentials that sustain the collective subject ("we") and its endeavor (*this*). There may well be multiple and potentially contradictory projects at stake in the re-composition of 'humanity' right now.

It may be more useful to work toward multiple actualizations of new transversal alliances, communities and planes of composition of the human: many ways of becoming-world together.

**We Need Planetary Differential Posthumanism**

PLANETARY DIFFERENTIAL
POSTHUMANISM


"we"-are-in-this-together-
but-we-are-not-one-and-the-
same

# Plenary Session 1

## Others, We, and Homo Non-Clausus

# Witnessing the Distant Other in the 21$^{st}$ Century

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On September 2, 2015, the photo of Aylan Kurdi, a three-year old Syrian refugee lying dead on the Aegean coast, has been widely distributed in social media and drew international attention. When his photo overpowered Western media depicting him as if in a deep state of sleep on a famous Turkish touristic town, I was in the US working on my book titled "Witnessing Stories of Distance" and thinking about the process of bearing witness to atrocities. As a Turkish national educated in the US, I have spent numerous beach vacations on the town which Aylan's corpse was found and suddenly found myself in this problematic stance between the urge to know more about this boy who died in my home country and yet the relief to have witnessed his dead body through a third medium rather than seeing it on the beach during one of my vacations. After the dissemination of Kurdi's photo, feelings of guilt and complicity surfaced and international aid organizations started campaigns for Syrian refugees. However, a couple of weeks later, despite arising sympathies towards refugees that began with Kurdi, European countries decided to take stricter measures to prevent the refugee flux to Europe. Although the image of Aylan Kurdi stroke us with a profound sense of empathy, it still did not move Western individuals to acknowledge the possibility of becoming neighbors with the very same refugees. Their heightened compassion on social media failed to stretch to real life, probably due to their short-sighted motivation to know more about his victimization and to remain distant from it simultaneously.

Western idea of humanitarianism revolves around helping and protecting the needy. With the advancement of social media, which is mostly utilized by the educated and urban populations, people find it even easier to help others and provide a safe sanctuary for the victimized albeit virtually. Likewise, as the publication of human rights narratives about atrocities that occurred elsewhere proliferate in the US, human rights abuses in Guantanamo Bay is less of a subject of inquiry except in academic circles. The tendency to keep a safe distance between an act of atrocity and oneself coincides with a likeminded approach to turn a blind eye to sites of suffering at home while showing a genuine interest to abuses committed elsewhere, outside the borders of homeland. This newly emerging interest in witnessing the victimized other has become a novel form of neo-colonialism.

In today's world, witnessing the suffering of distant others and visiting sites of memory and victimization abound. Every year, millions of tourists travel to Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum in Japan, the Killing Fields in Cambodia, Auschwitz, the 9/11 Memorial in New York and other similar memorials and museums to commemorate past atrocities.[1] What draws us to these sites of suffering and to memories of the past is still a big question. This attraction to suffering and witnessing emerges in multiple forms: an inclination to view violence on media and popular culture, engagement in dark tourism, sharing photos and posts of vulnerability on social media, and an increasing interest in reading and watching stories of survival and victimization. This problematic stance locates *human rights consumers* in an ambivalent spatial relation with the distance others. While mostly white, Western, educated consumers have a thirst for having a first-hand experience of violence and suffering, they maintain a safe distance between themselves and distant others simultaneously.

Human rights narrations provide an ambiguous spatial relationship to Western audiences. On the one hand, by approximating stories of victimization and suffering, writers attract attention to human rights abuses elsewhere and by witnessing that incident, readers are expected to generate compassionate responses. As the photo of Aylan Kurdi is shared widely, an immediate and an empathetic bond between us and the object of victimization is created. On the other hand, this connection is a simulated one since it is delivered through a third party, a remote medium – be it social media or storytelling - and it maintains a safe distance between the victim and the audience.

Likewise, theatre posits a similar idea of performance and imitation on stage. Theatre goers are intrigued by the events and actions put on stage and feel compelled by them with the knowledge that what is happening is being staged; a simulated reality is being displayed. Theatre employs the very same ambivalent spatial relation that witnessing human rights atrocities has in common. As Carol Martin states, "[t]he bona fide and the counterfeit, the authentic and the forged, the real and the fake continue to be close partners" (13). The self-referentiality inherent in dramatic literature focuses on this very same tendency to remain at a safe distance and yet to be close to the site of suffering at the same time.

In my book, I utilize the immediacy of theatre and discuss this concept of ambivalent spatial relation that human rights abuses and theatre have in three aspects: 1) how gender-based violence is performed and simulated on stage, 2) the ways in which humanitarian travel and dark tourism maintain a safe distance to the female traveler, 3) the self's engagement with the distant other's testimony of survival. Thanks to these spatial distinctions between distance and proximity, the self and the other, real and fiction, home and abroad, I argue, contemporary plays on witnessing and humanitarianism displace the Western viewers in an ambiguity in which they strive to change the theatrical space into a stable place or to despatialize the space – recall Michel de Certeau – in order to create an empathic bond with the distant other. In this presentation, however, I am going

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1. Michelle Baran lists these four dark tourism sites as being the most popular ones in "Dark Tourism" (20).

to particularly focus on the ambiguity of witnessing and the ambivalent spatial distance that theatre goers and witnesses share in common by providing specific examples from contemporary plays. The first part of the paper focuses on the intricate relationship between Western self and the distant other and the ways in which their interaction necessitates an ambivalent spatial relation in which they maintain a safe distance to one another. The second section discusses this ambivalence in self's spatial relation to the distant other in regards to Turkish theatre ensemble *Dostlar Tiyatrosu*'s staging (and adapting) of Matei Visniec's *Migraaants* in Istanbul. As the plights of Syrian refugees in Istanbul are being performed, the secular and urban elite audience are forced to re-conceptualize their biased view of the refugees and to re-spatialize Istanbul as a sanctuary as opposed to their concept of the city as one of the most chaotic cities to live.

## I. Self's Approximation to the Distant Other

In "*Violence: Six Ways Reflections*" Slavoj Zizek highlights the distance that one maintains to their neighbor, reveals the social-constructed nature of this relationship and explicates one's capacity to bear the other as longs as he maintains his distance from the self. He writes: "The tortured subject is no longer a Neighbor, but an object whose pain is neutralized, reduced to a property that has to be dealt with in a rational utilitarian calculus" (45). Through the objectification of the other, the self, according to Zizek, is protected from getting into a close contact with the other. Moreover, he furthers states: "Today's liberal tolerance towards others, the respect of otherness and openness towards it, is counterpointed by an obsessive fear of harassment. In short, the Other is just fine, but only insofar as his presence is not intrusive, insofar as this Other is not really other. … My duty to be tolerant towards the Other effectively means that I should not get too close to him, intrude on his space. In other words, I should respect his *intolerance* of my over-proximity" (41). Zizek's emphasis on proximity clearly marks the distance that should be kept between the self and the other within contemporary context. In that sense, theatrical productions play a significant role in reshuffling this safe distance between the self and the other as they both share the same location but take on different roles through acting.

On another level, the safe distance that one wishes to maintain towards the other is also considered to empower the individual with a more effective and genuine compassion and to prevent the so-called compassion fatigue. In her definition of compassion fatigue, Susan Moeller places the role of humanitarianism as such: "[Compassion fatigue] is at the base of many of the complaints about the public's short attention span, the media's peripatetic journalism, the public's boredom with international news, the media's preoccupation with crisis coverage. … Compassion fatigue abets Americans' self-interest" (2). Thanks to the display of victimization through a third medium, visual images of suffering delivered from a distance tend to feed more interest and empathy among the consumers. This safe distance is what draws the human rights consumer's attention and enables them to be closer to the site of suffering. Ironically, the safe distance that is established between

the site of suffering and home precipitates the Western self to literally travel to the site to have an authentic experience.

Dark tourism and travelling to sites of suffering not only compels the Western self to take action, but also prevents her from compassion fatigue. It is through their encounter with the other in his native land that they feel the urge to intervene. Through the act of traveling, the proximity between the self and the distant other takes a novel shape. On the one hand, they are literally closer to the other. On the other hand, her status as a tourist, not a local, allows her to maintain a safe distance to the atrocity and its aftermath. To have the possibility of returning to a safe homeland is what gives a humanitarian traveler that relief to be near to the site of suffering. As Foley and Lennon underline, "the politics, economics, sociologies and technologies of the contemporary world are as much important factors in the events upon which this dark tourism is focused as they are central to the selection and interpretation of sites and events which become tourism products" (3). Aylan Kurdi's photo debunks the paradigm in this dilemma in which his presence shattered this exotic experience of a beach vacation in Turkey when tourists woke up to see his dead corpse on the beach. Similarly, in French-American playwright Catherine Filloux's plays, a similar interest in visiting the dark and gruesome details are at work. In *Killing the Boss*, for instance, the American playwright, Eve, a semi-autobiographical character, who travels to Cambodia to teach playwrighting, stands out as a tourist woman, who is engaged in dark tourism. Likewise, Devrim in *The Beauty Inside* is enticed to visit her client Yalova, a young girl is sexually abused in her southeastern Turkish village and escapes an honor killing. Although Devrim and Yalova are two young women who are born and raised in the same country, their being worlds apart, Devrim, a Westernized woman from Istanbul, and Yalova, a country girl from southeastern Turkey, labels their encounter as a semi-touristic encounter in which one party maintains her superiority to the other.

In his article on purposeful otherness in *The Darker Side of Travel,* Tony Seaton locates the Western tourist's fascination with the other in self-interest and explains the underlying reasons beneath a tourist's infatuation of the other:

> This brief escape [the tourist's temporary release from his/her own cultural identity through contact with the othered] is a safe one, since like the western traveler and anthropologist in the past, the tourist, having experienced a release from everyday self into a world of temporary Otherness, returns with his/her identity confirmed and intact. … The tourist's quest for the Other may be seen as self-indulgence, … an exercise in self-exploration and individuation by contrast and comparison with the perceived Otherness of indigenous populations encountered abroad. (78)

Seaton argues that this act of self-indulgence ignores the detrimental effects on humanitarianism and connects this motivation to the neo-imperialist tendencies of the West to keep the other at a distance so that his privileged position is sustained.

In *Distant Suffering,* Luc Boltanski underscores the newly changing role of theatre in this act of bearing witness to distant suffering. Making a clear-cut distinction between the roles of the actor and the spectator in early modern drama versus contemporary drama, he argues: "From anywhere, the new spectator observes the actors and their spectators both of whom are involved in a common scene since the actors know themselves to be observed by the spectators and the spectators know that they know this. He is not absorbed by what takes place on the stage in that state of 'participation' or 'identification' so often described in the innumerable commentaries arising from the ambiguous notion of 'catharsis.' Nor does he identify or thrill with the other spectators, but instead keeps control of his emotions" (26). It is this newly-adopted role of the spectator and his anti-cathartic stance to the site of suffering that makes theatre align with witnessing and proximity to suffering. Dramatic action along with metatheatrical devices help the audience to be liberated from the boundaries of a cathartic experience and locate them in the middle of this ambiguity of witnessing. This close affinity between witnessing atrocities in theatre and the urge to know more about human rights abuses, dark tourism sites, sites of suffering, and the suffering of the distant other is further explored in contemporary plays. To name a few examples, Catherine Filloux's *Silence of God*, Gillian Plowman's *Yours Abundantly, From Zimbabwe*, Christine Evans' *Trojan Barbie*, and Sonja Linden's *I Have Before Me a Remarkable Document Given to Me by a Young Lady from Rwanda*, Eve Ensler's *Necessary Targets* all utilize metatheatrical tools to pinpoint this ambivalent spatial distance and the spectator's role in reconceptualizing the theatrical space into a site of suffering.

## II. Re-figuring Istanbul as a site of refuge in *Dostlar Tiyatrosu*'s *Migraaants*

Turkish playwright, actor, and director Genco Erkal's *Dostlar Tiyatrosu*, a theatre ensemble that was founded in 1969 in Istanbul, is renown for its leftist and political productions and its adaptations from Bertolt Brecht and Turkish communist poet Nazim Hikmet. In line with the changing socio-political dynamics in the last decade in Turkey, the audience of Erkal's productions have become the newly-marginalized secular urban elites, who oppose Erdogan's dictatorial regime. Although his company was previously considered to be fringe and non-conformist, his new audience is now the former mainstream and newly marginalized Turkish elite. Having lost his theatrical space due to urban transformation projects orchestrated by the government, he and his company tour the secular and anti-Erdoganist sections of Istanbul where they almost take refuge from the outer world that is filled with religion, autocracy, and bigotry.

In 2017-2018 season, he adapted and staged French-Romanian playwright Matei Visniec's *Migraaants* portraying the plight of Syrian refugees in Istanbul. Organized in small vignettes from their lives in the fringes of the city along with their interactions with smugglers and city dwellers, the play delineates a darker side of Syrian refugee problem that the majority of Erkal's audience has been unaware of. Some of these anecdotes include an elderly woman seeking her grandson's cemetery in the Aegean coast, two refugees fleeing from their mercenary smuggler, two prostitutes

trying to make their ends meet at a brothel in Istanbul, a young man who is being convinced by organ traffickers to pay off his debts through organ donation. With real-life images and videos of refugees being screened while the actors play their roles, the spectators are almost forced to witness +how a group of people whom they have so far ignored and called with derogatory terms actually live side by side in their city. Erkal's inclusion of real-life video footages shatters their widespread misconceptions about the Syrian refugees of being lazy, of having a vacation in Turkey, of receiving social security that is twice more than a Turkish national.

*Dostlar Tiyatrosu*'s production has two remarkable roles in challenging the spectator's witnessing the distant other. First and foremost, by delineating the predicament of refugees in Istanbul and combining them with documentary drama tools, it disputes the common prejudices against the Syrians in Istanbul. In the last decade, Genco Erkal and his theatre have become the champion of the secular urban elite and the emblem of anti-Erdoganism through their resistance to government's policies and political plays. However, his real-life depictions of Syrian refugees in Istanbul challenged his audience, who is inclined to categorize Syrian refugees as followers and potential advocates of Erdogan, and denote them as *lazy, dark, mercenary, rapist, traitor, a parasite*.[2] Erkal's outstanding staging combined with the metathetical tools he used debunk the paradigm of a well-off Syrian refugee who feeds off the resources of the country and occasionally takes a touristic vacation to Syria.

Last but not least, by adapting the play to contemporary Istanbul (thus underscoring that Syrian refugees are actually neighbors to the audience) and by portraying Istanbul as a site of sanctuary, Erkal accentuates the city as a site of a shared space that could embrace empathy, diversity and multiculturalism. Recognizing their proximity to their neighbors, the audience inevitably re-spatializes Istanbul as a haven rather than a chaotic city, from which the secular urban elite dreams migrating. The theatrical space, which highlights both parties proximity to one another, enables a reconfiguring of the neighbors. In Emma Willis's words, theatrical space precipitates this awareness of one's engagement with the distant other and his suffering. She writes:

> An ethics of spectatorship to such sights might be said to begin with the acknowledgment that, despite an arrival that is never completed, and a lack of presence, we are nonetheless located within a shared ethical space. That is, by our own emplacement – our appearance – we acknowledge our responsibility towards the disappeared, towards those who have exited. Furthermore, by our presence we are dramaturgically implicated in the ethical and representational breaches that mark the sites. (Willis 8)

Through a similar shared space that *Dostlar Tiyatrosu* provided for its audience, this ambivalent spatial relation between the elite Istanbulites who begin to acknowledge their neighbors and the

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2. These are some of the derogatory terms that are frequently used for Syrian refugees in Turkey.

actors playing the role of the Syrian refugees is further highlighted as real-life images intervene and through the sharing of the same theatrical sphere.

## III. Conclusion

Aylan Kurdi's photo became an icon for suffering and precipitated an unforeseen social media activism, in which many users shared this image of vulnerability in September 2015. As the majority of Western social media users were busy with feeling sorry for him, a Hungarian journalist and a camerawoman, Petra Laszlo tripped a Syrian refugee named Osama Abdul Mohsen, who was carrying his seven-year old child Zaid as he was fleeing from the police on the border on September 8, 2015, only six days after Aylan's death. Though the video footage of her racist and malign act somewhat surprised the many, it also proved the far-right and xenophobic nature of the individuals, who might seemingly be interested in familiarizing themselves with the distant others, but are willing and ready to push them back on the moment they enter the territory of the self.

In *The Ironic Spectator: Solidarity in the Age of Post-Humanitarianism,* Lilie Chouliaraki coins the term "the ironic spectator" to define the Western spectator who is interested in vulnerable others (2). She underscores the ironic predicament of bearing witness to an atrocity done to the others. Furthermore, she explicates strong connections among the spectral aspect of witnessing others and theatre. By focusing on the different versions of social media such as Youtube and Twitter, she argues that "the planetary connectivity of the new media have now turned the world into a new *theatrum mundi* – a theatre whose moralizing force lies in the fact that we do not passively watch distant others but we can also enter their own reality as actors" (16). In a similar vein, *Dostlar Tiyatrosu*'s 2018 production and adaptation of *Migraaants*, creates a *theatrum mundi* in which the citizens of Istanbul acknowledge their new neighbors and are asked to extend their sympathies beyond that of a remote medium. Their sharing the same ethical space in a theatre reflects on their co-existence in the same city, which they have neglected so far. Thus, through the act of witnessing that occurs in the play, the spectators no longer witness the distant other, but rather aim to become a part of their lives by re-thinking their city and its citizens.

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# The Others as Our Betters: Case Studies from Thailand

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## Preamble

The conceptual framework provided by the organizers of the World Humanities Forum 2018 is characterized by a note of caution. The human image is susceptible to changes with the passage of time and varying spatial contexts. The position is fully justifiable in an age in which radicalism and fundamentalism are threatening to plunge our contemporary world into utter chaos. Be that as it may, it has always been incumbent upon the humanities not to acquiesce in wayward relativism, but to uphold values, especially moral values that may transcend the bonds of time and place. My contribution to the debate on the human image in a changing world draws mainly on the experience of a South East Asian country, both past and present, in order to demonstrate that socio-cultural relativism can be overcome and that conflicts can be surmounted, if the basic attitude towards the "others" is guided by cultural receptiveness that may have arisen and grown "naturally" through the ages.

Yet, these historical "accidents" have had to be supported by a religious tolerance that is based on the fundamental belief in the "image of man" as a self-reliant being capable of bettering himself/herself. The case studies which I shall be analyzing are chosen with a purpose: they tend to reaffirm the open-mindedness and sociability of these perhaps incurably hedonistic people inhabiting a legendary (according to foreigners) "land of smiles", who have been either adroit or just lucky enough to escape the yoke of colonialism which did befall their neighbours. Their guiding principle has always been: "Our door is always open, but the house is ours." Has that to do with their "image of man"? I would be inclined to respond in the affirmative. They do not look upon "others" as "aliens", but in the Buddhist way of thinking, as "beings of this world" (Pali: *satta-loka*); and as a Germanist, I would not hesitate to borrow the term "*Mit*menschen" (humans like us) to use in this context. In many cases, they are prepared to learn from those "others", because, more ofen than not, they are lucid and humble enough to realize that the latter are their "betters".

## Not from a Vantage Point

Those who may have once professed the belief in the idea of progress, if they are honest to themselves, will have to admit that material and technological progress has not made our world a happier place. If wisdom comes from looking back and reflecting deeply on the past, the twenty-first century certainly cannot cast a retrospective look from a vantage point: it has learned little or nothing from history. The human image of today might be that of a rapacious predator.

The atrocities being committed on a broad scale all over our globe, supposedly by uncouth ruffians and gangs of bandits, plagued by moral corruption, callous despotism and total absence of democratic spirit, have turned out to be proxy wars perpetrated by those self-anointed "civilized" nations and superpowers. When people now look back to, say, religious massacres in the past, they no longer have the right to take those aberrations as things past, for technology has made present-day wars even more atrocious, with more lethal weaponry that has been used in the process of ethnic cleansing and fratricidal extermination of astronomical scales. Who invokes the Geneva Conventions these days?

However, it would be unfair to dismiss as totally ineffective all those well-meant attempts to bring about international order with their appropriate international mechanisms. One can become cynical about the UN and its bureaucracies, but cannot overlook the magnitude of the problems confronting them on a global scale, which is compounded by the inhuman hypocrisy of the superpowers that remain totally insensitive to human sufferings. Let us face it, without the UN, humanitarian organizations and benevolent countries that still offer help to those destitute fellow human beings, the situation could have been worse. Take the case of the 700,000 Rohingya refugees fleeing Myanmar into Bangladesh. What would have become of them without the help of the neighbouring "host" country, the UN and other philanthropic organizations?

## Refugee Problems and the Image of Man

Before I address the issues relevant to my own country, allow me to tackle a problem that concerns our contemporary global community as a whole. I am talking about refugee problems and their concomitant predicament of migration. The hardening of migration policies on the part of certain governments in recent years is an issue that cannot be explained only in socio-economic terms, but bears on the moral-philosophical integrity of a civilized community as well. One must also be realistic and ready to face the question as to how compassion can turn into concrete actions. But at the root of the problem lies the principle of human dignity, dignity of the receiver of help as well as dignity of the giver. We are dealing with the question of the image of man here. Let me broach the subject by quoting parts of a poem entitled, "Refugee Mother and Child" (1970) by the distinguished Nigerian poet, Chinua Achebe (1930-2013)

"No Madonna and Child could touch

That picture of a woman's tenderness

For a son she soon would have to forget

…………………

                                … She held

a ghost smile between her teeth

and in her eyes the ghost of a mother's

pride as she combed the rust-coloured

hair left on his skull

                                … now she

did it like putting flowers

on a tiny grave." [1]

If an African poet and thinker was in no position to stop devastating civil wars on his continent, at least he could act a voice of conscience. Readers of imaginative literature in the 1970s must have already been familiar, through print media and television, with scenes as depicted in this poem, but what was presented as information and reporting could never match the emotional and aesthetic impact created by a work of art, in this case, a poem. The dignified human image, in this case, is man-made, shaped by an artist. It is the responsibility of the humanities to salvage such uplifting boosters from the realm of the arts in order to fuel our combat against inhumanity.

I have embarked on a journey via Africa in order to arrive home well-prepared. Our region too is threatened by atrocious inhumanity. My country was not immune from shameless exploitation of the Rohingya crisis, and the government's action was slow and not effective. But at least one Thai poet could already sense that more than a usual refugee problem was afoot and sounded a warning which finally took a metaphysical turn. I am quoting here the final part of the poem by Paitoon Thanya.

Dear friends Rohingyas, my friends Rohingyas.

What curse has been relentlessly imposed on you?

To stay means to die, to flee is to face a living death.

Or could it be that Allah has lost sight of you?

Woe to you whom Allah does not see! [2]

The Thai poet obviously had no knowledge of Voltaire's famous long poem, "Poem on the disaster of the Lisbon" (1752), but he too, like Voltaire, took "the Lord" to task. And that is where the similarity ends, for Voltaire's disaster is a natural phenomenon, whereas the plight of

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1. David Cook and David Kubadiri (Edit.), *Poems from East Africa*, (London-Ibadan-Nairobi: Heinemann, 1971), 2-3.
2. Transcribed from a video recording of the poet's reading on 23 January 2013.

the Rohingyas is man-made. Literature, whether intentionally or unintentionally, is assuming a prescient role regarding worse things to come, for what happened in August 2017 in Rakhine state, Myanmar, has been described by the most recent UN report as "mass atrocities".[3] The problem remains unresolved in the international arena, and as was the case with the African crisis, it is the arts again which are acting as a voice of conscience. That much is already pretty much at present!

If we were to look for our "betters" in this matter of refugee crises, we might have to look to Europe for some guiding light. The concept of "Willkommenskultur" (Welcoming Culture) adopted by the German Chancellor, Dr Angela Merkel, and her government in 2015 as their policy directive on immigration was at first warmly supported by most civic sectors of several counties and the international media. Some EU countries especially Austria, were initially supportive of this policy. Now highly politicized on a transnational level, and subjected to revisions, the concept has lost much of its original ethical-humanitarian character. Post-war Germany has grappled, at its own will, with the guilt of the past in succinct, complex and multifarious ways (as testified by its literature, crowned by numerous Nobel Prizes). But it is Dr Merkel herself, daughter of a Protestant pastor and former citizen of an oppressive regime, who undertook to turn national policy into an act of *atonement*. But to open up one's country to one million refugees fleeing bloody civil wars, for which her country was not directly responsible, was a political decision which required sacrifices that surpassed normal humanitarian actions. When compassion and high ethical ideals no longer remained at the level of discourse but turned themselves into engagements with concrete problems in the real world, even like-minded idealists have shown reservations. No wonder that the General Elections in 2017 have considerably weakened the position of this devout Christian turned politician! Nationalist movements marked by xenophobia have gained ground around the world; the noble "Welcoming Culture" meant to alleviate the sufferings of fellow human beings has backfired. Solving problems at their tail end can never be as effective as addressing the root cause. The humanities can no longer function at the analytical level, but must align itself with movements propelled by an awareness of possible concrete actions.

## A Religion with No Place for "Others"

I cannot help feeling that the German version of "Welcoming Culture" has a deeper ethical-philosophical root. To make amends for the misdeeds of one's father or forefathers by creating good deeds could be explained also by the Buddhist notion of *"karma"*. Every individual must be mindful of the consequences of his/her actions, be they physical, verbal or mental, but it is beyond human comprehension as to what consequence corresponds to any particular action in this life or past lives. The crux of the Buddhist teachings is that one must perform good deeds for their own sake under whatever circumstances. Buddhism is not quite explicit to what extent the urge to do

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3. Hannah Ellis-Peterson, Myanmar's military accused of genocide in damning UN report, *The Guardian*, 27 August 2018.

good is inborn, but it believes that a normal human being is able to make a choice between good and evil. The above case of encouring a "Welcoming Culture" is a demand for good deeds; it is in no way misguided, but it need not be linked with particular deeds committed in the past by forefathers. The Germans should not forget Immanuel Kant's "categorical imperative", however radical that might appear vis-à-vis more fluid and more complex situations in the present world.

It may be necessary to remind ourselves that Buddhism does not admit of the notion of "others", for human beings are not considered as a privileged divine creation and superior to other beings, but belong to the category of "beings of this world" (as mentioned above), which include animals. But only as a human being can one reach *nirvana*, the end of all sufferings. Thus, Buddhism rejects fundamentally racial distinction. Besides, it strives to demolish the caste system, which naturally provoked opposition from adherents of the original religions and beliefs of the sub-continent. From our modern perspective, the basic teachings of Buddhism should prove to be supportive of cross-cultural understanding and, above all, human rights[4]. Naturally, one cannot be blind to the deviations and aberrations on the part of some sectors of the Buddhist community, which have taken a leading role in committing crimes against humanity, but that is no reason to reject the soundness of its basic ideas.

## Not Just an Open Door Policy but a Way of Life

There is a saying in Thai that parents (traditionally) imprint into the minds of their children: "Whoever sets foot on our home, shall be received with hospitality!" It was customary that guests could drop in unannounced at any time and would be invited to have a meal with the host family (our type of cuisine being favourable to such a treatment.) Mainland South East Asia has always been characterized by multiculturalism. Situated between two great civilizations, namely Indian and Chinese, the Thai have learned to benefit from the cultural heritage of both, not subserviently, but rather with a bent for adaptation to suit practical purposes. Visitors to Thailand today may be puzzled, for example, by the coexistence of Buddhist and Brahman ceremonial practices at state functions. Though steeped in Buddhism and its egalitarian spirit, they never hesitate to embrace the hierarchical thinking of Hinduism where it becomes necessary to establish a solid power structure. Trade has always been their principal occupation, and maintaining good relations with China particularly enabled trade to flourish. Skilled in various crafts, they knew how to learn from others, and to overtake them eventually. The most telling example was the production of porcelain, a craft they had learned from the Chinese but developed to such a degree of perfection and sophistication that it was sought after by all nations of the East – I am speaking of Thai ceramic ware known as "Sangkhalok", a popular export from the 13th to the 18th century.

A trading nation has to pursue an open door policy, and the description of Ayuthya, the capital

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4. Uttamkumars Bagde, Essential elements of human rights in Buddhism, *Journal of Law and Conflict Resolution*, 6(2), May 2014: 32-38.

of old Siam, as given by the French ambassador from the court of Louis XIV, Monsieur de La Loubère, is engaging in many ways, testifying to the dynamic life of the aquatic city, much bigger than Paris of those days. One piece of information must be particular interest, even to us today: 40 different languages[5] were spoken there and then! (Does it not seem strange that our globalized world is concentrating on English only?) In spite of their belief in the Buddhist doctrine of "beings of this world", the Thai, in their practical life, must have learned to cope with different customs, habits and beliefs – and of course, what could not be easily bridged was the differences among the languages.

So take things as they are. We have had to learn to accept those people on their own terms, but if they should decide to settle in this land of smiles, they would have to accept us on our own terms too. One thing is certain: the Thai were proud that they could welcome people from such varied cultural backgrounds, and the arts strove to reflect those different characteristics. The famous temple adjacent to the Royal Palace, a repository of knowledge and wisdom coming from various sources, incorperated into "The Stone Inscriptions of Wat Pho", which are recognized as a world heritage by UNESCO, is also a gem of visual arts and architecture. The reigning monarch, Rama III (1788-1851), who turned Thailand into a wealthy country through trade with foreign nations, was adept in foreign affairs. His interests in the peoples who flocked into Thailand were genuine: he wished to give posterity a chance to know these "others" who benefited from our version of "Welcoming Culture". At his behest, the "Verses Describing Peoples Speaking 32 Languages" were composed by leading Thai poets, supported by paintings of these peoples on the windows of a religious edifice. The poets and the painters did their best to capture their particularities. Here is one example, namely France. After describing French attire for men and women (depicted likewise in the paintings), the poet goes on to give an account of her geography and political strengths.)

> Half of France is almost as big as England
> France is a country known as a great power in the world,
> Her armed forces are well equipped to protect her territory.
> It is believed that she is superior to all her enemies.[6]

The year was 1831; the French had not as yet made explicit their colonial ambitions. Thus, there was no feeling of being intimidated on the part of the Thai. Their perception of France as a powerful nation had had a long history, dating back to the good relations between King Narai and Louis XIV in the 17th century. The French were instrumental in helping to build fortifications at the second capital of Lopburi and other places, and remnants of the influence of the military architect Vauban, are still discernible today. The cooling off of the relations after the reign of King Narai does not

5. Winai Pongsripian, The Stone Inscriptions of Wat Pho: Verses Describing Peoples Speaking 32 Languages, Document No. 74, *100 Significant Documents: Compendium of Thai History*, (Bangkok: Saksopha Press, 2012), 33 (in Thai).
6. Ibid., 127.

seem to have changed the image of the French as a military power. One aspect of these relations should not be forgotten: the French were intent on converting the Thai (including King Narai) to Christianity, and this did not seem to pose a serious threat at all, as religious tolerance nurtured by Buddhism was prevalent, though the French were unsuccessful in their efforts, for those who were already tolerant towards other religions had no need to be converted. A contemporary account by none other than the great 17th century French author, Jean de La Bruyère (1645-1696), sounds quite complimentary towards Siam and other Eastern countries.

> … And yet we sail six thousand leagues to bring over to Christianity the Indies, the kingdoms of Siam, China, and Japan, and seriously to make to all these nations certain proposals, which, in their eyes, must appear as foolish and ridiculous. Yet they tolerate our friars and priests, and sometimes listen to them, allow them to build churches, and perform all their missionary duties.[7]

When you know how to acknowledge the virtues of others, they too will know how to appreciate your good qualities. Such reciprocal respects were not so frequent in the relations between the Thai and the British. Religious zealots must have appeared less hostile to the Thai than initiators of the "gunboat diplomacy"! They were to be wised up by later French colonial aggressiveness.

I would like to dwell on the domain of the arts in order to substantiate my point about the uses of the open door policy. Music provides a fitting example. Thai classical musicians love to prove their prowess by performing the composition known as "Songs in Twelve Languages". The term "languages" do not refer to the texts accompanying the melodies, but to the melodies themselves that imitate the styles of twelve nations. They are not indigenous melodies taken over from those nations, but compositions newly created by Thai artists in those different styles. Thai music gladly derives inpiration from the music of other peoples, and many instruments in a Thai classical orchestra are of foreign origins. You enrich yourselves artistically by learning from "others".

Literature too was receptive to inspirations from other Asian cultures. The *Ramayana* in the Thai version has become a national heritage, well-loved by the Thai people, especially in the form of masked theatre, the *Khon*. The struggle between good and evil seems to have captured the imagination of the predominently Buddhist society. The *Mahabharata* has not fared as well, most probably because of its all too heroic radicalism of bloody clannish divisiveness. On the Chinese front, the *Romance of the Three Kingdoms*, so well translated as to turn out to be the supreme model of literary prose, has become extremely popular, its worldly wisdom being recognized as a guide for successful social conduct that, again to devout Buddhists, may smack of craftiness. There is a saying in Thai, "Don't trust a man who has read 'the Romance of the Three Kingdoms' three times!" Javanese culture has proved to be fruitful too: the acme of the dance drama, "Inao", based

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7. *The "Characters" of Jean de La Bruyère*, (London: John C. Nimmo, 1988), 469-470.

on the Panji tales, is still regularly put on stage today in the original "royal" version, and it has been further popularized in various forms of improvised folk theatre.

## The Superior Refugees: the Mon

The Mon were an ethnic group that originally inhabited mainland South East Asia. Archaeological studies have revealed that their Dvaravatti Kingdom, (5th to 11th century) was distinguished by high civilizaion, both in material and spiritial terms. The arts flourished, whose remnants testitfy to a high degree of sophistication, and they were the first people of South East Asia to welcome Buddhist missionaries from Sri Lanka; we owe the rise of Theravada Buddhism to them. The vicissitudes of history have been such that the Mon experienced rise and fall: they succumbed to invasions, and then grouped themselved again into prosperous kingdoms, only to disintegrate subsequently. The Thai from the North and the Khmer from the East edged them out towards the West, where they had to contend with the Burmese. But whatever be their fortune or misfortune, the Mon have remained a culture-conscious people whose cultural identity has never been lost. (I think that if you want to test out the viability of the UNESCO concepts of "tangible" and "intangible' heritage, the Mon can serve as an exemplary test case!)

Conflicts with the Burmese from the late 16th century onwards have forced them to flee frequently into Thailand, and soon a historical pattern emerged, whereby the Thai were joined by the immigrant Mon to resist the expansionist belligerence of the Burmese. (But even their conquerors did not hestitate to acknowledge the cultural superiority of the vanquished: when the victorious Burmese King Tabinshwehti wanted to organize a sumptuous coronation for himself, he had to rely on Mon rituals for the august ceremony!) As far as their relationship with the Thai was concerned, they naturally found a host who was not only friendly to them, but *intermarriage*s (which is one of the hallmarks of South East Asian culture) also strengthened the bonds between the two peoples.[8] The paternal ancestors of King Rama I of the Chakri Dynasty were Mon, and some Mons who joined the service of the Thai court did advance to superior ranks, like General Cheng, who has gone into Thai history of the late 18th century as one of the defenders of the sovereignty of Thailand.

The Thai have assimilated Mon cultural heritage in many ways.The Thai royal court takes over a number of rituals from the Mon. Even their cuisine has found an inroad into the court and later adopted by the common people. We Thai enjoy visiting Mon festivals, and several practices have been integrated into Thai life. A cremation ceremony today, for example, has to be accompanied by a Mon orchestra, for Mon music, somehow, fits so well into such an occasion. But the greatest debt we owe to our "refugees" lies in the realm of Buddhism, namely the creation of the new order of *Dhammayuttika Nikaya.*

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8. Robert Halliday, The Mons in Siam, *The Mons of Burma and Thailand, Volume 2. Selected Articles*, (Bangkok: White Lotus, 2000), 3-17.

In recent years, Thai society has to tackle a very embarrassing situation with regard to the transgression of, and laxity in, monastic disciplines of Buddhist monks that have even led to criminal processes. This is nothing new. The mid- 19th century under the reign of Rama III was familiar with such problems, and the monanch himself had to exercise drastic measures in defrocking as many as 500 monks! Prince Mongkut, the future Rama IV, entered monkhood during his half-brother's reign and developed himself as a great scholar as well as reformer of Buddhism. His efforts were directed towards the teachings of Buddha in order to cull from them measures to combat deviations on the part of Thai monks. He decided to establish a new Buddhist sect, which was to be more scholarly as well as disciplined. His model was Mon monks who resided in Mon communities in Thailand, whom he had observed for a long time and with whom he had entered into exchanges of knowledge and wisdom. The refugee monks were held in high esteem, and Price Mongkut went so far as to take over from them not only their exemplary codes of conduct, but also their monastic robe! When he ascended the throne in 1851, the Dhammayuttika Nakaya was strengthened through its close relationship with the court and the officialdom. Its disciplinary seriousness and its scholarly pursuit paved the way for the new movement of "forest monks", that since the 20th century has made Thailand the centre of devout Buddhism sought after by Buddhist scholars and pratitioners far and wide. (I shall not touch on the conflicts that the establishment of the new order have brought about with the older order known as the Maha Nikaya). The point to be made is the readiness of the host country to recognize the "others" as their "betters", also in the spiritual domain. The case of the Mon substantiates the thesis that culture can thrive on its own strengths without empire building of any kind. The Mon have remained a "Kulturnation" (cultural nation) without unified territorial possession. This is a subject worthy of serious study by the humanities.

**Patriotism and the Adoptive Land**

Space does not allow me to give a full treatment of the influx of Chinese into Thailand through the centuries. But it is generally recognized that the progress of *integration* of Chinese immigrants into Thai society has been more successful than elsewhere in the world.[9] The open door policy as well as intermarriages have more than contributed towards this integration. The latter factor merits special attention, for even Thai kings were ready to marry daughters of Chinese businessmen into the royal family, though as consorts and not queens. Of course, there have been occasional measures on the part of the Thai state to stem the influence of Chinese immigrants, but these were short-lived and ineffective. The success must be attributed to the Sino-Thai themselves, who identify quickly with the adoptive land. Patriotism is not neccesarily the prerogative of the native-born; patriotism towards the adoptive country is much in evidence too. The case of King Taksin, son of a Chinese

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9. Thak Chaloemtirana, *Read till It Shatters: Nationalism and Identity in Modern Thai Literature*, (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 2018), 155-209.

immigrant and a Thai mother, has been told and retold in school history books, for this Sino-Thai provided leadership to Thai society when the kingdom was bleeding to death after the destruction of Ayuthya by the Burmese in 1767, and succeeded in wrestling back sovereignty within a matter of a few years. He could not have achieved so much in so short a time, had Thailand been plagued by racism. His supporters included many eminent Thai, including the future founder of the Chakri Dynasty.

Recent Thai history has known Sino-Thai who rejected corrupt Sino-Thai politicians that brought the country on the brink of bankruptcy. Some of the leaders of the protest movements that took to the streets to banish the then corrupt government were Sino-Thai. One of them proudly proclaimed: "I am son of a Chinaman who has come out to save Thailand!"

## The Tham Luang Rescue: the Acme of Internationalism

It could have been a tragedy, had international help not been forthcoming. The cave rescue of 12 junior football players and their 25-year-old assistant coach did make headlines in the international media. From 23 June to 10 July 2018, hundreds of volunteers and specialists from all over the world converged in the Thai province of Chiangrai to take part in a rescue operation of unheard-of dimensions. The Thai authorities realized soon enough that they did not have the expertise to cope with the problem: cave diving required sophisticated skills that the Thai Navy "SEAL" Unit did not possess, and international assistance was needed. It is almost impossible to count how many nations responded immediately to the Thai request. Inputs in terms of materials and equipment were also forthcoming both from Thailand and abroad. The entire world was following the operation as though those 13 young men were their closest relatives. The coordination work under the leadership of the Governor of Chiangrai was low-keyed, smooth-going and effective. The one casualty, that of a retired SEAL-officer, could regrettably be explained in terms of his being out of practice.

What has this success story to do with the theme of the present paper? I humbly submit that centuries of "Welcoming Culture" of this South East Asian land have made it a place favourable to international cooperation. Not internationalism caught in discourse, not a meeting of well-wishers full of compassion, but "united nations" of strong-willed, action-oriented experts, prepared to risk their lives to prove an all too banal point: action speaks louder than words. But it was a concerted action propped by individual knowledge, skills, expertise and determination. Those adventure-loving boys and their youthful coach provided an occasion for the entire world to witness a well-organized action on an international scale. Can the model be transferred to other larger arenas which I have analyzed so far (with a heavy heart)?

## Challlenges to the Humanities

What I have presented reflects the image of man capable of good and bad deeds, from which

they can make a choice of their own will. With the gravity of global problems confronting us now, the humanities can no longer remain a cloistered scholarship, bent on deep reflection and analysis. It needs to embrace global problems, propped by knowledge and information accumulated over centuries and enriched by those made available via technological media. It will have to work with other disciplines in order to form judgement from an all-round perspective. The arts remain a fertile ground which it will have to continue to explore. Yet it needs to become a streetwise discipline, action-oriented, in no way remote from the practicalities of life, but tempered by wisdom derived from multifarious ages and cultures. The "united nations" assembling voluntarily at Tham Luang have taught us that technology can be a great help, if well managed, but there is nothing to replace real contact among human beings who know how to turn compassion collectively into a susccessful concerted action.

# Heterogeneous Nations/Heterogeneous Citizens: The National Face in the Twenty-First Century

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Every country is supposed to have a national myth and, presumably, a national image, or face. For the renowned eighteenth-century German philosopher, theologian, and literary critic Johann Gottfried Herder—the supposed "father of . . . the *Volksgeist*" (Berlin 145)—the reason the nation is the most natural collective unit is that it's really "an extended family" (Herder 324). Herder of course envisaged the family as not only sharing the same language but also being ethnically homogeneous. But what happens to a family, or nation, when its members vary phenotypically? Does it still possess a quintessential face, or does its heterogeneity demand that we reconsider the widespread belief that a nation necessarily has a distinct human image? Because of the mass migration of peoples around the globe at least since the mid-twentieth century, to say nothing of internal variation, most countries today cannot even pretend that they're ethnically uniform. Yet the myth of the national physiognomy persists, both outside and within countries. People continue to believe that they know what a Brazilian, an Indian, or a Swede looks like. But if one closely examined those populations, it wouldn't be nearly so self-evident. As I will argue in my paper, focusing particularly on Canada, one of the great challenges of our time is not only to accept that humanity is diverse but that so are many nation-states-indeed, families.

Canada, as you know, sits at the northern end of the Americas. Because the Arctic makes up so much of its landmass, and it experiences a prolonged winter, it's often described as the Great White North. Whiteness, however, doesn't refer just to the snowy landscape but also to the populace. In the late 1990s, the future Canadian Parliamentary Poet Laureate George Elliott Clarke published an essay titled "White like Canada," in which he maintains that his homeland's dominant ethnocultural groups "have never had a vision of Canada as anything but a white man's country" (106 [**show his photo**]). Clarke, who is of African descent, elsewhere contends that Canadians like to see themselves as "a nation of good, Nordic, 'pure,' mainly White folks, as opposed to the lawless, hot-tempered, impure, mongrel Americans" (Foreword xii). The whiteness of Canada is clearly reflected in the faces of its most influential writers. Toward the end of the twentieth century, the lists of the "greatest" Canadian authors in English usually included such figures as Margaret Atwood, Robertson Davies, Margaret Laurence, and the 2013 recipient of the Nobel Prize for

Literature, Alice Munro [**show photos of Atwood, Davies, Laurence, and Munro**]. Those writers actually are not only white but also of Anglo-Celtic and Protestant stock. According to the novelist Matt Cohen, they all belong to "a conservative, small-town, restrained, Protestant tradition that found a tremendous echo of self-recognition across the country," and "were, in effect, writing the secret diaries of their readers" (157-58). In other words, they owe much of their appeal to Canadian readers to the fact they're perceived as being part of the national family.

Needless to say, such uniformly Caucasian faces are not truly representative of Canadian demographics, or of Canadian literature for that matter. Like other American countries, Canada has a significant Indigenous populace and writers like Tomson Highway, Eden Robinson, and Katherena Vermette have made a concerted effort to remind other Canadians and the world of their presence, as well as of their continuing cultural and political vitality. The Canadianness of Canada's Indigenous peoples obviously cannot be contested, even if they haven't long been considered full Canadian citizens, or citizens at all. Whatever else they may be, they're moulded by the geography and history of what is now Canada.

This right to belong in Canada, though, has not always been extended to so-called visible minorities, who historically have had to struggle to ensure their place in the country. As the Quebec playwright Lorena Gale captures this reality in her poetic memoir *Je me souviens*, or I Remember (Quebec's official motto): "When people ask me which island I come from,/ I say Montreal. And they look confused./ When people tell me to go back where I came/ from, I look confused" (9). A similar view is articulated by the West Coast poet and novelist Joy Kogawa. While describing the experiences of the protagonist of her novel *Obasan*, she writes that "the one sure-fire question" that the school teacher Naomi Nakane can expect when she meets people, including her own students, is where she comes from, since everyone presumes that she's "a foreigner" (7). Kogawa's 1981 novel is arguably the most cogent exploration of the whiteness of Canadian citizenship and, by extension, of Canada's national face. Centred on the ignoble treatment of Canadians of Japanese origin during the Second World War, when they were forcibly removed from a broad strip along the Pacific coast, *Obasan* documents the "desperation" of people born in Canada "to prove themselves Canadians" (33; see also Kogawa and Wilson 286). It could be argued that the animus toward Japanese Canadians by various levels of Canadian government, and Canadians in general, was a consequence of the fact that Canada was at war with Japan. Thus, as Naomi's brother Stephen remarks, Japanese Canadians became caught in "a riddle . . . . We are both the enemy and not the enemy" (76). Yet at the time Canada was also at war with Germany and Naomi can't help but notice that the ever more numerous demonstrators "are so much more vehement about Canadian-born Japanese than they are about German-born Germans," which leads her to conclude that this is due to the fact "we look different. What it boils down to is an undemocratic racial antagonism" (88). Or to phrase it differently, most Canadians have more affinities with Germans and other "white foreigners" (102) than they do with people of Japanese descent, even if they were born and raised in the country.

Admittedly, Canada's self-image has changed considerably since the 1940s. The most notable

of these developments is the Canadian Multiculturalism Act of 1988, the Canadian government's official policy to "recognize and promote the understanding that multiculturalism reflects the cultural and racial diversity of Canadian society and acknowledge[] the freedom of all members of Canadian society to preserve, enhance and share their cultural heritage" (3(1)). No less a figure than the current Prime Minister, Justin Trudeau, told the General Assembly of the United Nations in 2017 that, although "Canada remains a work in progress," it now accepts that it is "a country built on different cultures, different religions, different languages all coming together." As he underlined, "diversity has become our great strength." The transformation of the idea of Canada is certainly evident in the emergence of writers like Highway, Gale, Kogawa, and Priscila Uppal [**show their photos**], whom I'll discuss shortly. Yet there are indications that the perception that the Canadian face is Caucasian hasn't quite vanished.

The relationship between a literature and the nation in which it is produced is necessarily conflicted, since literature both legitimizes the nation and exposes its shortcomings. So perhaps it shouldn't come as a surprise that Canadian literature often reveals that Canada's multicultural vision hasn't been embraced by a sizable portion of the citizenry, including writers. For instance, in a 2018 essay, the fiction writer and poet Pasha Malla details how the country's most important prize for literary humour, the Leacock Medal, "has never been awarded to a person of colour" since its inception in 1947 (14). Malla's explanation for this statistical aberration is that the ostensibly national award "has succeeded less at celebrating the breadth of our nation's comedic writing than in substantiating a set of culturally exclusive tropes by lionizing books mostly written by a subset of our population to mollify people just like them" (15). Again, contrary to what Kogawa's Naomi Nakane maintains, not "[e]verything a Canadian does is Canadian" (61), for some Canadians are deemed to be more representative of the "national" way of life than others. If one needed more proof of this reality, one would simply have to read a much-discussed recent study of the 1960s Canadian literature Boom in which virtually every canonical work of the most significant "literary explosion" in Canadian history (Mount 5) happens to be authored by someone of European background.

The persistence of the whiteness of the Canadian face, however, is particularly manifest in literary texts, such as Jane Urquhart's *Sanctuary Line*. Published in 2010, Urquhart's novel is set on the multi-generational Butler apple orchard on the north shore of Lake Erie, right across from Ohio. Of Irish extraction, the Butlers have branches on both sides of the international line. In fact, the current owner, Stan Butler, is married to a US cousin named Sadie. Stan is a dynamic and innovative orchardist and the farm has become very successful. At the same time, he has become heavily dependent on temporary Mexican farm workers, under the supervision of his foreman Dolores. Actually, the main crisis in the novel, which will culminate in the collapse of the Butler orchard, occurs when Sadie returns unexpectedly from a visit to her Ohio relatives in the middle of the night and catches Stan and Dolores in bed. Most germane in terms of my subject, we then learn that Dolores's teenaged son Teo, who's described throughout the narrative as "the Mexican boy"

(36 ff.), is Stan's child (264-66). Tellingly, even after members of the family acknowledge that Teo shares their "genetic inheritance" (265)—that is, that he's a Butler—no one ever refers to him as a Canadian. His "brown eyes" and "brown hands" (2, 7) appear to preclude the possibility of his truly belonging in the land of the Maple Leaf. Not surprisingly, when Teo gets killed in a car accident in the aftermath of Sadie's discovery of Stan's affair with Dolores, his body his promptly returned to Mexico. Teo thus forever leaves his father's homeland, the country where he had never been able to envisage a future for himself except as a labourer (222-23).

Uppal's depiction of the Canadian face in her memoir *Projection: Encounters with My Runaway Mother* is remarkably different from Urquhart's but no less revealing. A prolific poet, fiction writer, and playwright, Uppal is the offspring of an Indian-born Canadian civil servant and of the daughter of a Brazilian military attaché to the Brazilian Embassy in Ottawa. When Uppal was two-years-old and her brother was three, their father "swallowed contaminated water during a sailboat accident in Antigua" and was rendered "a quadriplegic" (Uppal 3, 4). Their mother was unable to adjust to her new situation and six years later abandoned her husband and children and "fled" to her native Brazil, "draining all the money from the [family's] bank accounts" (5). In *Projection* Uppal relates her trip to South America to meet the truant parent she hadn't seen in nearly twenty years. Mother and daughter never really reconnect, interestingly jn part because they come to see each other not as individuals but as representatives of their birthplaces, with each of them repeatedly trying to demonstrate that her particular polity is superior to the other's (155-57).

Early on, Uppal's mother warns her about the dangers of being mugged in São Paulo, since Brazilians will think she hails from the United States. "*Everyone will assume you are an American,*" explains her mother. *"No one knows what a Canadian looks like. They will take the chance that they are robbing an American*" (67; emphasis in the original). Presumably, Uppal knows what her compatriots look like. She's very much a post-Multiculturalism Act Canadian, someone who, like her immigrant father, "love[s]" the policy's architect, former Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau (157). She's such a patriot that she discloses that even in her teens, the one day she "didn't like to work was Canada Day" and that, in truth, she "felt more Canadian than part of a family" (194). Interestingly, this is not how Uppal is perceived after she lands in Brazil. On the contrary, she remarks, "No one here thinks I'm anything but Brazilian when they set their eyes upon me. . . . With my exotic mixed heritage, my abundant curly black hair and olive complexion, high Indian cheekbones, and my penchant for vintage clothing and party hats, I am not used to this, and find it liberating to blend in" (69; see also Braz 113). The inescapable implication is that this is something that doesn't happen in Canada, that her face is not usually likened to that of her homeland.

Uppal's unexpected disclosure that she looks Brazilian, not Canadian, underscores how common still is the idea that Canada's national face is white, a view that incidentally is shared by people of all sorts of ethnoracial backgrounds. It's worth noting that "Canajun Blacks" like Lorena Gale are reproached for identifying themselves as Canadian not just by white Canadians but also by other blacks, who see their claim to Canadianness as proof that they don't know where they "come from"

or who they are (Gale 9). As a West Indian woman admonishes Gale, she's "assimilated," being "Black on de outside, White on the inside" (9). No less significant, after he asserts that writers like Atwood, Davies, Munro, and Laurence were able to earn "a dominant place in the Canadian public imagination" partly because of their ethnicity (157), the Jewish Matt Cohen proceeds to state that in the 1970s Laurence was considered not only "the best" Canadian writer, "the most universal," but also "the most Canadian" (179-80). As he recalls his jubilant reaction to the publication of Laurence's best known novel, "*The Stone Angel* was something else . . . . This is *Canadian*! I kept muttering to myself" (180; emphasis in the original). Again, Canadianness seems to be linked to a particular ethnicity.

In the end, while the notion of national physiognomies has long been dismissed as a "pseudo-science" (Flavell 8), or "race science" (Rentschler 231), the persistence of the belief that countries have homogeneous faces suggests that it remains a potent cultural and psychological force in the twenty-first century. Margaret Laurence, for one, insists that a country like Canada is a family but "a very varied family" ("Listen" 23). Yet, judging by Canadian literature, this diversity is far from being universally embraced, even—or especially—by Canadians. Of course what Canadian literature also demonstrates is the constructedness of ethnocultural identity, since categories like whiteness turn out to be extremely fluid. This is illustrated by Laurence herself. As noted, she's often perceived as the embodiment of Canada, a country whose face is supposed to be white. Yet in her account of a bus trip that she takes from a small central Ontario town to Toronto, Laurence shows that her whiteness was not at all transparent, despite her "Scots-Irish" ancestry (22). Since the bus was crowded, she had to share a seat with an older woman named Bertha, who was "sloshed" ("Letter" 358). Bertha became irritated with the fact Laurence was reading a book, which she interpreted as a sign that her travelling companion was a foreigner (Show photo of Laurence). As Bertha accosted Laurence, "I know what *you* are! You are one of those damn boat people from Vietnam or Taiwan! That's what you are. Boat people! One of *them*. Why did we let you all in? Wha language you speak, parn my curiosity? Chinese? Vie-nam-eez? Yer trying to learn English, eh?" (359; emphasis in the original). When Laurence replied that she was Canadian, Bertha immediately retorted, "I shoulda' known. Yer a halfbreed, one of those goddamn halfbreeds. Admit it! You are!" (360).To be fair, given her state of inebriation, Bertha was probably not the best judge of either human character or physiognomy. Nevertheless, the fact Bertha doesn't think that Laurence fits the national image suggests that the Canadian family is much more varied than the paradigm allows.

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# Do "We" Play God?: The Problem of "We" in Technological Society

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Whenever we hear about new technological breakthroughs, they are often described to be "our" or "human" achievement. Therefore, the story continues, "we" will live in such and such future society. Even when one worries about the negative consequences of a new technology, like in the case of the "playing God" arguments, the "we, the human" stance does not change. "We" have made something terrible, which will lead us to undesirable problems.

In his famous *The Technological Society*, Jacques Ellul said exactly the opposite. According to him, modern technology became autonomous following the principle of efficiency. According to him, it is not "we, the human" that make the final decision in the process of technological development. Technology itself, in the name of efficiency, drives the endless technological enterprise further. If technological development is autonomous, then human beings are not.

In this presentation, I will argue that the examination of who "we" are in our contemporary technological society sheds new lights into the discourse on technology. First, I will claim that the "we, the human" in the discourse on technology is largely misleading. This will lead to the second point that an effort is needed to recover the place for "we" in the process of technological development.

## 1. The Myth of Technology

Since Thales, it has been the main task of philosophy to overcome myth. As a matter of fact, all academic effort since has been the grandeur project of fighting ungrounded belief. Modern science and technology are the most outstanding result of this project, which Max Weber described as "disenchantment."

A myth is a description of reality which does not represent the reality fully. It is convincing enough to many people but without careful examination of facts. When a society is under influence of a certain myth, then it can even change the reality, as reality is partly constructed by people who live in the myth. Therefore, overcoming myth is not just unveiling reality but to change it. In other words, the transition from myth involves presenting alternative worldview which is more rational and consistent.

While most myths from the ancient time have been denied through human history, one must remember that human beings have the interesting habit of creating a new myth. That is why philosophy continues, despite its long antagonism against myth. It is not surprising, therefore, that modern science and technology themselves came to have the character of myth. The unprecedented success of modern science and technology in understanding and manipulating nature and human beings has led to mythical trust or fear of them.[1]

The myth of technology consists of two not-so-consistent, if not contradictory, ideas: namely that (i) "we, the human" are the maker and master of technology; and that (ii) technology will develop further regardless of any counter forces. I consider them to be myths, because they do not have firm grounds while widely spread among people.

### 1) Do "We" Play God?

While the modern conviction of human rationality and subjectivity is not appreciated as much as before, the idea of "we, the human" stays firm in the discourse on technology. "We, the human" is commonly considered to be the subject and master of technological innovations and their outcomes. This common idea is not completely groundless. The improvement of general human well-being since the Industrial Revolution is given as the evidence. Modern technology has caused many changes in human health, safety, and welfare, shown by factors such as the average life expectancy, child mortality rate, food production, transportation, education, etc. However, the benefit gained by technological progress does not justify the validity of "we, the human" discourse itself.

As aforementioned, Ellul's argument of autonomous technology questions whether human beings are really in control of technological development. His claim was criticized by many to be pessimistic and technophobic, but the criticism is largely based on a misunderstanding. Ellul did not mean that technology itself function as an agent, but human beings, as individuals or as a group, do not have a choice in technological decision making procedure. According to him, it is the efficiency principle that dominates those decisions. Human beings have no freedom to stop technological progress when they want, which ultimately shows the autonomy of technology.

This line of thought leads to the concern about technologies that seem to surpass a certain boundary. The so-called "playing God" argument is a representative notion representing such worries. Mainly regarding bio-engineering, many raise the question whether it is not "playing God" to manipulate human DNAs or clone human beings. While some welcome the new stage of human capacity, others warn that very radical measures are needed to control those technologies that are already available. A similar concern is raised concerning the development of the so-called killer robots. "Playing God" critique, however, still stands in the line of "we, the human" idea. As far as one seeks a way out from the current situation, it is clear that one has the hope to regain the human

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1. One might consider this as the root of the philosophy of technology, one of youngest sub-disciplines of philosophy. Philosophy of technology critically analyzes the validity of the trust and fear on the one hand and tries to provide a more balanced view on technology on the other hand.

control over technological development, however slim it might be.

A simpler counter-argument against "we, the human" discourse is that it is not "we, the human" who develop and use new technologies, but some people. Only a few people have access to various technologies and even fewer to the decision making process. The belief that "we, the human has developed such and such technology" is true very partially, at best. It is a metaphorical expression, rather than a description of the real. "We" don't play God. Some do. From this perspective, the responsibility to fix the undesirable situation, if it is ever possible, should be placed on those few who have real control over technological progress.

### 2) Eternal and Inevitable Progress

The second element of the myth of technology is somewhat contradictory to the first. Namely, many take it for granted that technological progress will continue forever and the trend is irresistible. Technology will progress, whether we want or not. Here the "we" appears again, but in a very humble manner. Technological progress is considered as something like the weather change. As one does not try to alter tomorrow's weather but to prepare oneself, people take the progress of technology and its direction for granted. In consequence, future technologies and their social influences are forecasted and people are advised to prepare or adjust to the coming future. The possibility of designing the future is not an option.

Probably this is more powerful and innocent myth than the belief in human control over technology. Some would say that this is not a myth, but reality. Technological progress is continuing at this very moment driven by irresistible market force and those who fail to prepare or adjust to the new trend are considered to be losers.

In my opinion, however, the inevitability of technological progress is a typical myth that constructs our reality. It is a self-enforcing myth which becomes true and real by believing in it. The myth itself is nullifying the fact that it is always humans who create technology. It is ironical that technology, the human enterprise to overcome the natural power, is being considered to be another kind of natural force.

### 2. The Myth of Technology in the Posthuman Era

The myth of technology expands even further, as the technological progress in our time is taking a new path. This new trend is described in different ways such as playing God, the era of the 4th Industrial Revolution, AI or posthuman. These are concepts that refer to the different features of science and technology since the end of the 20th century when compared with the previous era. Technologies such as AI, CRISPR gene scissors, big data, robot technology seem to pursue the manipulation of nature and man in an unprecedented scale and degree. As they control the power and market these technologies and relevant decisions influence the lives of all other people. Technological possibility, even when it is not widely available, changes the context of everybody's

life. Worse, some people are objectified or consumed as a part of a big technological system without knowing the fact.

The promoters of posthumanism seem to agree with the inevitability of technological progress. When compared with Ellul, they take the same position with the opposite attitude. While Ellul finds that it is problematic that human beings have lost the mastery over technology, posthumanists welcome the inevitability of technological progress. It is an irony that, because they accept the progress as something given, then the autonomy of technology in Ellul's sense is completed.

As a matter of a fact, posthumanism does not directly oppose the myth of technology in terms of human mastery of technological development. It is a meaningless issue to them because the distinction between human and non-human has been blurred. This has to do with the fact that the posthumanists take a different path concerning the first element of the myth. Namely, by raising questions about the very nature of human beings, the so-called posthumanism theories introduce variations into the issue of "we, the human." They take the possibility of radical change in human nature seriously. Human beings can overcome natural limitations that have been the given conditions of all human enterprises. The human mind could be downloaded and transferred. The human body will be enhanced without limit. Eventually, we might not be evil, we might not die. At the same time, new beings will come into the boundary of human beings. The distinction between human beings and AI robots will be minimized. In consequence, the definition of "we, the human" will be fundamentally changed.

## 3. Overcoming the Myth of Technology

### 1) The Relationship between Technology and Human Beings

The discourses on posthuman reveal us the extreme possibility of the future technology and, thus, the challenge posed by the common myth of technology. The prospect of the near future reveals the fact that there are only two options: either (i) to give up the human mastery over technology and to accept the inevitability of technological progress; or (ii) to claim the human mastery over technology and to deny the inevitability of technological progress.

The rational choice is apparently the second. The first option is contradictory in the sense that it only permits us to live along the tide of our time. The questions and reflection on our time and technology, as this paper attempts to do, presuppose the possibility of human mastery over technology. Even if the new definition of human nature is the outcome of technological progress in the future, the progress itself is still at the hands of present human beings. Human beings are supposed to choose whether to pursue progress and, if they want, which direction it should take. In this sense, Ellul's notion of autonomous technology should not be taken as the description of unchangeable fact, but as a warning. Though being rather skeptical, it is evident that Ellul wished for the human mastery over technology. If human beings can have mastery over technology in the real sense, then the one does not need to worry about autonomous technology. This goes well with

Ellul's argument that the only freedom in current technological society is to say no. As far as the possibility of saying no to technological development remains available to human beings, there is still a chance to claim the true mastery over technology.

Why does, then, the "we, the humans" discourse of our time seem to cause no problem with the belief in the inevitability of technological progress? Here comes the distortive character of myth. The current form of "we, the humans" idea hinders one from identifying oneself as the relevant agent of technological development. While knowing nothing about the context and process of given technological development, people occupied by "we, the people" idea do not bother the division between those who own technologies and who do not. As far as those technologies are "ours," one does not need to worry about it. Thus the irony that "we, the human" willingly take the passive attitude towards the new technological progress. This explains why the twofold myth can co-exist in spite of their contradictory nature.

### 2) The Influence of Technology on Human Beings

One of the valuable insights that posthuman theories provided is that the new development in technology forces us to rethink about human nature. AI makes us think about the nature of human intelligence. The prejudice and misunderstanding concerning women and people of different colors are exposed when the same robot can have a different outlook. Even the distinction between human and non-human becomes blurred, according to posthuman theorists.

This fundamental and urgent challenge, however, is difficult to be addressed when one considers oneself as the subject of technological progress. As far as being trapped in that idea of "we, the human," one would underestimate the influence of technology on human beings. The age-old assumption of technology being a neutral instrument do not pay enough attention to the fundamental changes that technology brought about in human culture.

Therefore, it is crucial to raise the question concerning who and what "we, the human" really is and on what the desirable state of human beings is. If one acknowledges the fact that human beings and the contexts of their lives are influenced by technology to the core, the philosophical reflection on the ideal condition of human beings is necessary. The fast development of technology requires more research and contemplation in humanities. Instead of trying to get ready for the coming change, we should be determined to direct the change. Human beings cannot be defined only as the subject of technological development. "We, the human" is not self-apparent any more in this era and requires discussion that will lead to a consensus.

### 4. Toward a Desirable Future

How could we still keep the mastery over technological development in its real sense? Where should be the topos of human beings in the technological society? How could we free ourselves from the dominant myths of our time?

## 1) Reality Check

First, we need to use more concrete language in describing and analyzing our technological society. Technologies do not develop in a vacuum. Often we think as if technological progress is a pure and neutral process independent of any context. We all know, however, that it is not true. Technological development is entangled with the concrete market system, political concerns, cultural preference, and various power games. Therefore, it important to address the real subject or agent of technological progress and the actual power relationship among relevant parties. This is becoming ever more significant in our contemporary high-tech society, as fewer and fewer dominate the progress. The meaningless technology forecasts rampant these days are to be avoided. They should not be consumed as a justification for pursuing an uncertain future, but examined in terms of the cost and effect of expected technologies.

## 2) Democratization of Technology

Apart from the analyzing the reality and pondering upon the desirable status of human beings, one needs to get away from the mythical form of "we, the people" and transform it into a state in which "we, the people" have real control over technology. If technology is rescued from the few who dominate it, then the human mastery over technology would become more certain and the notion of autonomous technology would be refuted accordingly.

The democratization of technology does not need to be a whole change in our economic or political system related to technology. The first step would be the recognition that technology changes the context and nature of our life, world and, eventually, ourselves. The next step would be to visualize a picture of a good society. What is the features of society that I wish to live? As a matter of fact, this question has been asked throughout years in the political realm. Now we need to ask the same question concerning technology.

## Conclusion

In order to pursue a desirable future for the human being, it is necessary to democratize the current form of technological progress. Less economic desire and more political consent are required in the area of cutting-edge technologies. It is not important in itself whether we will have a cloned baby, but it is vital whether we, the people, will have some say in the process of the decision-making process concerning how, when, why to develop and use such technology. "We" will experience a better future, only if the "we" becomes more realistic concerning who "we" are in the contemporary technological society. This is where humanities meet the cutting edge technologies of our era in a most concrete, practical, and urgent manner. If we fail to engage in this effort, the human future will be something that has nothing to do with our desire. It would not be a problem, of course, because we will be something else by then.

# Plenary Session 2

## A New Humanities and Human Image

# Can World Literature (Re)Vitalize Humanities? Conditions and Potentiality

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## World Literature Concept and Debates

As for the concept of WL, I would not go back to discuss what J. W. von Goethe might have had in mind and what not, when introducing the term at the start of the 19th century. It is obvious that our contemporary discourse on WL can hardly be fruitful beyond understanding it as the (ever oscillating and debatable) corpus of literary-creative works (traditionally called *belles lettres*) that has managed to transcend the frontiers / barriers of a national-linguistic space, to become a shared and celebrated (intimately read and enjoyed, discussed in public, professionally researched, translated, interpreted, ever vital) corpus of works, a canon that may considerably differ in its reception from one international community to another, yet still having its nucleus defended above all by factors of aesthetic-philosophic nature, now expanded, now constricted in direct or indirect dependence on changing socio-historical and cultural circumstances.

However inadequate the existing canon and whatever the faults and limitations in the attempt to make it more complete and acceptable both to 'centers' and 'peripheries', the permanent imperative for the world humanities community, as far as I see it, would be to continue to resist comfortable adaptation to fashionable currents and ideologies which have unjustly diminished the potentiality of WL, as a substantial part of humanity's culture.

How many university departments or institutes bear the name of WL? Are there any in the world, beside the Gorky Institute of WL in Moscow and the Harvard Institute of WL in the US? Maybe there are a few more, but in any case they seem to be absolutely marginal in comparison, for instance, with general cultural studies, nationally orientated departments and institutes in the home countries, of which the wide-spread extension, in the case of 'centric' cultures, can be found all around the world, including small and smaller countries. There is hardly any institution at which the 'peripheral' part of WL could be dealt with in the general context of WL.

Comparative Literature institutes and departments are by no means absent at the world's universities, but their position tends to be fragile and vague, because they are extensively plagued both by the intrusion of the fashionable interdisciplinary studies and dominating trends in literary

theory, more interested in theory for its own sake than in works of primary literary creativity. When literary works are involved, they more than often belong to commercially motivated mass ('genre') literature flourishing in 'centric' linguistic-economic areas and easily exported from there by the comfortable vehicle of their 'own' language (English). Linguistic preparation of comparative scholars is declining, because to learn theory (produced mainly in English) and to apply it to literary works produced by English-speaking authors or works translated into English is widely accepted as a fully sufficient scholarly medium for this kind of activity.

The overwhelming cultural-commercial ideology, thus, tends to alienate humanities from WL. Conformism with this tendency largely coincides with self-destructionist practices in humanities' spiritual-moral orientation. Its direct concomitants are de-aesthetization and philosophic-perceptual de-individualization of WL.

Does creative culture, with WL as one of its most substantial components, deserve to become a docile servant of commercial-economical globalization? The answer can hardly be affirmative. Just on the contrary, culture as creativity has the primary task to oppose the extremes of commercial-economic globalization, a growing destruction of the world's ecological balance, annihilation of nature' diversity (on which the world's cultural diversity and individuality are directly dependent).

The awareness of the need to preserve the world's linguistic diversity as a basic factor of our ecumene's mental equilibrium is slowly entering the world's conscience. Yet there is a wide-spread and undeniable forgetfulness of the fact that literary creativity as a whole and WL are among the basic factors that can grant linguistic diversity, languages' vitality and survival beyond the status of a mere museology object for researchers of ancient and extinct languages.

**Means and vehicles of resistance**

In this background, the first step toward a change in the reigning conformist attitudes would be to give up the idea that there should be a unique WL canon applicable equally to all nations and communities, big and small. We need to abandon the hope that our needs for WL are fully satisfied when we follow the canon evaluation and establishment patterns conceived in the biggest cultural 'centers' (coinciding with the mightiest economic-commercial superpowers). The culture of smaller, peripheral and minority nations, nationalities and communities have inevitably formed and developed under the direct or indirect impact of 'centers'. It cannot and need not avoid coincidences with 'centric' patterns. Yet the greatest challenge for all the nations and linguistic-ethnic communities beyond the 'centric' area can hardly by other in our days than trying to outline and forward their own individual vision of WL – not so much in its ideal shape than as resulting from historical practice in every concrete and individual case.

Historical practices of the reception of WL have differed from one nation to another, from a community to other. They depend directly on translation processes, but also on (vernacular, 'domesticating') criticism and literary scholarship evaluating and interpreting both the received and

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not (as yet) received WL. Let alone broader socio-political and ideological background factors. The individual canon of WL in every concrete case has its own history. It cannot be objectively reflected in the existing dictionaries and histories of world literature, because these have been for the most part composed departing from the dominant position of 'centric' nations.

There is not much use of criticizing the current deficiencies and absences in this field. A completely ideal situation can probably never be achieved, but the incipient attempts to diminish injustices and the current lack of equilibrium and dialogue could still be worth of attention.

## An Estonian experiment

In the following I will very briefly describe what has been done in the recent years in my native country, Estonia (with its autochthonous population numbering hardly one million people). Perhaps it could serve as a kind of a 'micromodel' for introducing experiments of similar kind in other places and nations.

Let me roughly resume our 'Estonian WL' history. Till the establishment for the first time in history of an Estonian independent Republic, in 1918, our young conscious culture and its idea of WL was overwhelmingly modeled after German cultural patterns. It was because the German landlords, the so called Baltic Germans had ruled the Estonian peasant population for long centuries of the past, since the Middle Age.

During the scarce twenty years of the first independence period (1918-1939) our young and small intellectual elite made valuable efforts to introduce variations to the earlier Germanic-orientated patterns. Samples of WL were translated into Estonian, now more now less successfully from other European languages (English, French, Russian, Finnish, Swedish, above all). Some awakened and talented Estonian essay writers and translators emerged (Friedebert Tuglas, Gustav Suits, Ants Oras, Johannes Semper, among others) whose activity contributed to a varied and rapidly expanding reception of WL in Estonia, in the Estonian language.

After a short German occupation during WWII, Estonia was annexed to the Soviet Union. The concept and the practice of WL crucially changed. They became abruptly and speedily orientated to the model and patterns of Russian (soviet) culture and literature. Until the 1970s only very few works of WL were translated into Estonian that did not have their precedents in Russian. Yet the great difference with the beginning of the 20th century was that most WL samples assimilated by Estonian culture were translated directly from their original languages. In other words, general cultural conscience based on a wide and intensive use and research of the native Estonian language, in parallel with the ever widening knowledge of foreign languages in their variety, attained their mature stage.

The official Russian-soviet cultural ideology rejected and repelled by all means Western contemporary philosophy, as well as Western mass literature, but in contrast older WL and more recent Western works belonging to the canon of 'critical realism' were favored. It explains the translation into Estonian of complete works (sic!) of Shakespeare and (nearly) complete works of

Balzac, not to speak of great Russian realistic writers whose work in translation predominated in the Estonian reception panorama of WL of that era.

The collapse of the Soviet empire at the start of the 1990s meant a new radical change. Western liberties and the market system (capitalist) economy were all of the sudden fully admitted. As the result, Western mass literature, artificially hold back during at least half a century, poured in and has flourished ever since. For an average Estonian of our days at the start of the 21st century it probably has become to represent 'true world literature', now in its fully re-established 'natural' rights. In this ideological context at least a part of Estonian literary and cultural scholarship inevitably let itself be guided by the fin-de-siècle fashionable trends of postmodern ideology in its noticeable acceptance of mass literature and its defiance of 'elitist' modernism.

## Literary histories

At the start of the 21st century, histories of literature might look old-fashioned and exhausted, especially in their traditional contours. Yet one has to admit that they still have served as the orientation backbone in WL at least until the end of the 20th century. After the afore mentioned social, political and ideological turn in Estonia it became an urgent task to create new histories and manuals of both Estonia literature and 'foreign literatures', traditionally taught at schools and universities. It is a topic apart. Here let me only mention briefly our effort to compose a renewed type of WL textbooks for highs schools and universities. Later, on the same basis, assembling the creative capacity of a dozen Estonian literary scholars in different sections of WL, we started to prepare a substantially broadened historical overview book of WL both for the use of the general reading public and universities. After a long toil its fruits are now emerging.

The structure of that 3-volume work could surely be criticized for its heterogeneity. Yet it is a consciously constructed lack of homogeneity. The first volume of the book titled *Maailmakirjandus muinasajast tänapäevani* (*World Literature from Ancient Times till the Present Day*) gathers historical overviews of at least all major Eastern literary traditions: ancient literatures in Near and Middle East (including Arab and Turkish literature), India, China, Japan, Korea. These traditions, each of which has its strong idiosyncrasy, have been described in the traditional system (nation by nation, language by language). The first volume's Table of Content looks as follows:

**INDIA KIRJANDUSED  (Eastern Literatures)**

**KIRJANDUS MUINAS-IDAMAADES** (Ancient Near and Middle East)
    Muinas-Mesopotaamia kirjanduse ajalooline jaotus
    Sumeri kirjandus
    Egiptuse kirjandus
    Akkadi kirjandus
    Hetiidi kirjandus

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**Kaanani ja foiniikia kirjandus**

**INDIA KIRJANDUS** (India)
    **India pärimusliku kirjanduse algus**
    **Veedad**
    **Eeposed**
    **Puraanad ja tantrad**
    **Budismi kirjavara**
    **Mahajaana kirjandus**
    **Klassikaline kirjandus**
        Luulekunst
        Näitekirjandus
        Õpetlaskirjandus
        Rahvakirjandus
    **Klassikalise ajastu lõpp ja uusindia kirjandused**
        Tamili kirjandus
        Bhakti kirjandus
        India pärimusliku kirjanduse lõpp
    **India kirjandus tänapäeval**

**IRAANI KIRJANDUS** (Iran)
    **Muinasiraani kirjandus**
    **Keskpärsia kirjandus**
    **Iraani kirjandus uuspärsia keeles**
    **Mongolite-eelne aeg**
    **Eepiline kirjandus**
    **Mongolite-järgne aeg**
    **Proosakirjandus**
    **Hilisklassika ajajärk**
    **Iraani kirjandus Läänes**

**ARAABIA KIRJANDUS** (Arab Literature)
    **Muinasaraabia beduiiniluule**
    **Koraan ja islam**
    **Beduiiniluule edasikestmine**
    **Uuenemine**
    **Naasmine muinsuse juurde**
    **Adab**
    **Sufism**
    **Araabia kirjandus Hispaanias**
    **Klassikalise kirjanduse lõpp**
    **Rahvalik jutukirjandus**
    **Nüüdiskirjanduse kujunemine**

**TÜRGI KIRJANDUS** (Turkey)

**Varasem Tšosoni dünastia periood**

**Hilisem Tšosoni dünastia periood**

**Uus kirjandus**

    Rahvusliku ärkamise periood (1894–1910)

    1920. aastad

    1930. aastate surutis ja modernsed suunad

    Korea poolsaare jagamine ning sõjajärgne

    Sõjajärgne luule

    Romaani temaatiline laienemine industrialiseerimisperioodil

The novelty of our new WL history and its deviation from the traditional compositions of older WL histories becomes visible above all in Volume II of the overview book (Western Literature from the Classical Era to Romanticism) and Volume III (Western Literature from Realism to the Present Day). In these volumes, the national-linguistic principle has been predominantly abandoned. Western (European and 'Europoide') literary traditions have been described in a common cultural space. The structural-conceptual principle could be called 'phenomenal' (generic-perceptual). The major literary-historical phenomena have been described in their germinal emergence and in the subsequent process of developing their sub-species and modifications. Thus, for example:

**BAROKK JA KLASSITSISM (Baroque and Neoclassicism)**

**17. sajandi luule**

    Donne. Góngora. Quevedo

    Luuleuuendused Saksamaal

    Milton

    La Fontaine

**Barokkdraama**

    Tirso de Molina ja Calderón

**Klassitsistlik tragöödia**

    Corneille ja Racine

**Klassitsistlik komöödia**

    Molière

**17. sajandi proosakirjandus**

    Gracián. Bunyan. Grimmelshausen

    Psühholoogilise romaani algus. La Fayette

    Väikese proosažanrid. Filosoofiline miniatuur, maksiim ja sentents

**VALGUSTUS** (Enlightenment)

**Filosoofiline ja satiiriline proosa**

    Swift

    Montesquieu

    Voltaire

    Defoe

> Rousseau
>
> Herder ning ¨Torm ja tung¨
>
> **Olustikuline ja sentimentalistlik romaan**
>
> Richardson ja kiriromaan
>
> Fielding
>
> Sterne
>
> Smollett. Diderot. Rousseau
>
> Johann Wolfgang Goethe
>
> **Valgustuslik draama**
>
> Teater 18. sajandi 1. poolel
>
> Diderot. Lessing. Beaumarchais
>
> Goethe ja Schiller
>
> **Valgustusaja luule**
>
> Satiiriline luule. Pope. Voltaire. Bellman
>
> Tundeluule algus. Burns ja Donelaitis
>
> Goethe ja Schiller

In short, it is an attempt to create a 'supra-national' Western comparative literary history, which at the same time means describing in the main lines the existing Western canon of WL.

It goes without saying that if such principles were to become introduced in teaching WL canon (and its great variety of particular sections) at the universities all over the world, it would mean a substantial 'leap' from nationally orientated 'separatisms' to a dialogical-cultural treatment of literature, a radical way of overcoming fragmentation, in parallel with making students and readers aware of World Culture in its widest and deepest possible impact (philosophical-spiritual-mental, sensual-psychological, societal-ideological, etc.).

It is true that in such a literary history, the Western centers and the work of male writers retain their traditional huge dominance. However, in parallel such a novel treatment of WL should eloquently demonstrate how a great number of male writers have prepared the spiritual-ideological ground for a gradual liberation of creative womankind and how first woman writers, defying barriers, have made more and more audible their voice in WL. Similarly, such a comparative history attempts at describing the gradual emergence of creative individuality in smaller and minor linguistic-ethnic and national areas, the process of making WL canon ever more varied and capable of uniting in a dialogue different parts of the world with its plurality of ideologies.

A special (additional) value of our Estonian overview book of WL could be seen in the fact that in parallel with presenting from the national point of view the main features of the history of WL it traces and resumes the Estonian own national story of its (translational) reception. All the basic data of translations and the names of translators have been included in the book. It appears that during slightly more than just a century a tiny European nation has managed to translate into its native Estonian language nearly all major masterpieces of the Western canon of WL – not at all a minor achievement!

On the other hand, our reception history of WL also reveals serious absences, especially in regard to WL of the Eastern part of the world. Thus from Korean literature, only one contemporary novel has been found its way into the Estonian language, whereas from contemporary Chinese literature nothing more can be read in Estonian translation besides the success book by the Nobel prize winner Mo Yan, *Red Sorgo*, and a selection of poems by Jidi Majia.

**To make smaller and minority literature visible in the WL canon**

Small and smaller nations and nationalities often tend to idealistically imagine that sooner or later the outside world would discover their literary masterpieces and include them in the WL canon. In reality, the outside acceptance has very rarely happened without an effort from the 'inside'. Thus the founding work of Estonian literature, generally considered as the Estonian national epic, F. R. Kreutzwald's *Kalevipoeg* (1861; by today translated in its integrity into a dozen foreign languages), would probably have been considerably delayed in its reception beyond Estonia and the Estonian language, had it not appeared from the very beginning with a parallel translation in German. The German translation paved the way to the incipient international recognition of the epic. Along the 20th century, the translational geography of Kreutzwald's *Kalevipoeg* has slowly but steadily expanded (with two rival translations in English), despite the fact that its translation (20 songs in the traditional Finno-Ugric folksong metric) would be a genuine heroic *tour-de-force* for anybody who dares to take it up.

Attempts to provide elementary information in English about the most successful contemporary Estonian writers have been made by the Estonian Literature Center. In recent years there have been considerable advances in widening its information and improving quality. (Cf. http://estlit.ee/elis/?cmd=writer&id) On its part, Estonian Institute publishes since 1995, twice a year, *Estonian Literary Magazine*, whose purpose is to spread knowledge outside Estonia about Estonian literature and literary activities. (http://elm.estinst.ee/)

Among the newest attempts to favor the reception of Estonian literature in the wider world and make it more visible internationally, *Estonian Writers Online Dictionary* (EWOD) could deserve a special attention (https://sisu.ut.ee/ewod/avaleht ). It is a huge task and challenge, taken up by literary scholars of the University of Tartu. At present the dictionary is still under construction. It will take a couple of years more until the task is completed in its basic shape.

EWOD aims at providing a continuation to paper printed dictionaries of Estonian literature, of which the last one in Estonian appeared almost twenty years ago (Kruus, Puhvel 2000). EWOD is meant to be polyfunctional, as its data should ideally serve both vernacular and international writers, literary scholars, translators, critics, as well as the general public in Estonia and beyond.

Literary reception can hardly be imagined as an exclusive result and merit of the work of translators. Deeper and more permanent reception is coined, as a rule, in a collective conjoint effort of translators, critics, literary scholars and writers themselves. Departing from this conviction and

conception, EWOD not only gathers the data about translation of Estonian literary works, but it also assembles all existing (as correct and complete as possible) information about the basic work of writers in Estonian and its research and criticism not only in English, but in all foreign languages.

EWOD's greatest advantage in comparison with paper printed dictionaries is that it can ever and flexibly be expanded, corrected and updated. In the future perspective, its publishing on paper as well as preparing on its basis an analogous dictionary in Estonian (including the data about criticism and research in Estonian) is not at all excluded, but looks perfectly feasible.

Finally, my personal creed is that the main source of all serious work in the name of completing the existing canon of WL and making it an efficient instrument for expanding the spirit of dialogue in the world is still predominantly an enterprise of human enthusiasm and idealism, in the faith that Sisyphos' toil would never be completely in vain.

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Jüri Talvet

Can World Literature (Re)Vitalize Humanities? Conditions and Potentiality

# What Is Human Life Worth? The Dilemma of Whom to Save in Philosophy and Literature

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## 1. The Ethical Potential of Carneades' Thought Experiment

The lecture starts from a thought experiment attributed to the Greek philosopher Carneades and recorded by Cicero and the church father Lactantius. Two shipwrecked sailors have to rely on a plank in the sea which can only support one person. Salvation for one of them would only be possible at the cost of the life of the other one.[1] Although this scenario and its variations, which I will call the dilemma of whom to save or the survival dilemma, seem to be no more than an intellectual game, it has serious juridical and ethical implications. In fact, the thought experiment has a much richer ethical potential than its original purely logical or philosophical form may suggest. Instead of two sailors of roughly equal rank, persons of different intellectual endowment and social position may be involved – one may be a president or king – or persons of different sex or age or health. The two persons concerned may be closely related, for instance in matrimony, love, kinship or friendship. A variation of this dilemma is constituted by a situation in which the capacity for salvation in an emergency situation is limited and a choice must be made whom to save among a group of people threatened by death. Part of the saving dilemma may be the feelings of guilt the survivor may have to cope with. Philosophers, especially Leibnitz, have focussed on some of these problems, but literature in particular is the domain to deal with the ethical problems of what I wish to call the survival dilemma.

Before going into my investigation of the history of the thought experiment in philosophy and literature, I would like to mention that the problem has numerous real-life equivalents, the most spectacular being the situation on the raft during the shipwreck of the Medusa in 1816, which involved fighting, killing, and cannibalism, and the wreck of the Titanic in 1912 with, as statistics show, the number of survivors being graded according to class, age, sex etc. This is, of

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1. Such thought experiments come up ever and again, for instance the prisoner's dilemma in game theory.
   There is an allusion to Carneades' plank dilemma at the end of the *Titanic* movie, when Jack does not get on the raft with Rose.
   Michael Hampe, *Die Lehren der Philosophie. Eine Kritik*. 2014 ["The Doctrines of Philosophy. A Critique"], Gottfried Gabriel, *Erkenntnis* ["Cognition"] 2015.

course, a scandal. Here the question arises "What Is Life Worth", which makes the title of Kenneth Feinberg's 2005 book dealing with his work as the head of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund. A case, which looks different, but essentially entails the same problem, is to be found in the case of Dr. Anna Pou who was together with her medical colleagues forced to leave a number of LifeCare patients in her hospital in New Orleans, when it was flooded during the hurricane in 2005. Just as in the Titanic tragedy people were saved in the order of their status. It is interesting that the love story in the Titanic film ends with an allusion to Carneadis' thought-experiment. There is a raft which has room only for one person. The lover sacrifices his life for the woman he loves. The number of comparable cases is inexhaustible. Think of two children about to get drowned and there is only one person who can rescue them, or think of the selection of the members of a death squad or think of persons asked or commanded to risk their lives for their country or for an idea.

## 2. The Transmission of Carneades' Thought Experiment in Classical Times

Cicero's *De Officiis* (Of *Duties)* contains the first extant version of the thought experiment in question (III. 23), but does not mention Carneades as its originator. At a point in his argument Cicero asks, "Supposing a man had to throw part of his cargo overboard in a storm, should he prefer to sacrifice a high-priced horse or a cheap and worthless slave?" In this case property interest (res familiaris) inclines him one way, human feeling (humanitas) the other. The ethical problem is raised, but left undecided.

At this point the criterion of the worth of a man – I of what a man is worth – is introduced. Subsequently the argument is developed to a kind of ethical aporia. What is to be done if the persons involved are of equal value. The answer is that in such a case there will be no contest, but one will take the place of the other, as if the point were decided by lot or at a game of odd and even. (quasi sorte micando victus alteri cedet alter)

An important step in the transmission of the plank exemplum occurs in the *Institutiones Divinae* ("The Divine Institutes") of the Church Father Lactantius (c. 250 – c. 325), who Christianizes the argument in question. Lactantius is the first to mention Carneades in the context of his reflections on justice. He praises him for having denied that there is "natural justice". According to Lactantius Carneades had argued "that all animals defended their own interests by the guidance of nature itself, and therefore that justice, if it promotes the advantages of others and neglects its own, is to be called foolishness." (p. 371) In this context he takes up the question of a man who "shall incur danger of his life, so that it shall be necessary for him either to kill another or to die, what will he do?" At this point he takes up Carneades'exemplum:

It may happen that, having suffered shipwreck, he find some feeble person clinging to a plank, will he thrust him from the plank in order to be able to escape? If he shall wish to be just, he will not do it; but he will also be judged foolish, who in sparing the life of

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another shall lose his own. (p. 372)

It can be noted that the candidate for death in this case physically disadvantaged, "a feeble person" clinging to a plank. This detail may imply an appeal to mercy, which belongs to Christian ethics. But basically the opposition of the earlier version of the exemplum between a "foolish" concern for another person and a "wise" care for one's own person remains, until in the next step of the argument a look at the meaning of the central words is taken. Lactantius points out that justice may be similar to foolishness, yet be not foolishness, and malice may look like wisdom, but is not wisdom. These semantic reflections then focus on the term "wisdom", which includes justice and excludes foolishness. The result is a redefinition of the alternative of caring for the other: "He is not then a foolish person who has not thrust off a shipwrecked man from a plank, because he has abstained from injury, which is a sin; and is the part of the wise man to avoid sin." (p. 372) The plank exemplum is here transplanted into a Christian context.

## 3. The Survival Exemplum in Philosophy

The philosopher who is most intensively occupied with the dilemma of whom to save is Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, however without ever mentioning the name of Carneades. He does so in his early writings on the philosophy of natural law. He goes back to the original version of the thought experiment, but his theocentric position has an affinity with Lactantius. Actually I believe that Leibniz had read and was influenced by Lactantius. A clue for is the fact that the word foolish ("stultus"), is, analogous to the church father's procedure, applied to such a person who incurs a disadvantage for the benefit of another person, who in an extreme case gives up his life for that of another human. As far as the Christian basis of Leibniz' philosophy is concerned, in extreme cases, in which the harmony of the world is jeopardised, the highest authority is God. Here is just one pertinent quotation: "All that is just represents, if one assumes the existence of God, simultaneously a duty of equity, and this is, assuming the existence of God, equally a demand of piety." [Aeqvitatis autem est, qvidqvid justum est si DEUS esset, idem posito DEUM esse est pietatis." (p. 156)] In my argumentative context Leibniz is of special importance because he goes through an incredible amount of varieties and possibilities of the survival dilemma. First, it is remarkable that Leibniz does not just focus on the two participants of the survival dilemma, but takes a position of a decision-maker outside the emergency situation:

Supposing the case that two humans are threatened to get drowned and the two cannot both be saved, but only one, is it then within my pure arbitration to support one and to desert the other. And does the person who has been forsaken, if he is saved by chance, have a cause to charge me in court. (p. 128/130)

Leibniz argues that none of the two persons threatened by death can claim a right in court except that both had been left to their fate.

> My father, my brother or my friend floating in water in danger of drowning, is it all right to pull him out and surrender the other one instead?

> Or is a good man to be preferred to a bad man or a wise man to an illiterate?

> Is it just to prefer a man who has many children, who would perish without his help, to a childless person or to a lounger, or a sovereign of the state to my father etc.

> He also refers to the numerical argument, for instance the case that one, to whom I am under obligation in one way or another, can only be saved at the cost of the lives several persons. Or are two to be preferred to a father or only ten or hundred. He also constructs the case that my father may commit treason. Is he to be spared, if he causes the death of thousands of people etc.

> To make it a little more concrete, I give you an example of my own. Imagine the situation if you can save only one of the following two persons, the president of the United States of America or a professor of ethics from the university of Shanghai or Tokyo

Many of these examples, Leibniz argues, are difficult to solve, and he refrains from fixing rules. As far as justice is concerned, a just decision is a decision which can be defended before the forum of the mankind as a whole, if one imputes that this is a wise forum. Or a just decision is what finds the approval of God. Within our context Leibniz' discussion of the varieties in which the survival dilemma emerges presents itself as a fascinating collection of examples and their ethical implications, waiting to be elaborated.

After Leibniz the survival exemplum occurs sparsely in philosophy, but it is still present. In his treatise *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals* David Hume conceives a society that has fallen into an extreme distress, so that the laws of justice are suspended:

I can only very briefly touch on the shipwreck exemplum in *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals* Section III "Of Justice", part i. Hume makes a restriction. In emergency such as a shipwreck people may provide for themselves "by all the means, which prudence can dictate, or humanity permit." In an extreme emergence criminal acts may be condoned for self-preservation, but the laws of humanity have to be respected. Immanuel Kant is stricter in this context. For him an emergency law, Notrecht (ius in casu necessitatis), is an absurdity.

His interpretation of the shipwreck exemplum occurs within his discussion of a conflict of duties. He makes a distinction between unconditional and conditional duty. To such a conflict

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of duties he opposes a crystal clear explication of our thought experiment in its original form. He rejects the judgement that the action of a man who pushes another man from a plank may be justified by the duty of self-preservation. To preserve my life is only a conditional duty, if it can be done without committing a crime, while not to take the life of another, who has in no way harmed me and does not even get me into the danger of losing my life, is an unconditional duty.

Immanuel Kant, *Werke in zwölf Bänden.* Band 11, Frankfurt am Main 1977, II. Vom Verhältnis der Theorie zur Praxis im Staatsrecht. Annotation No. 11 [p.- 155] **prüfen**

To pass from Kant's comment on the survival exemplum to William Godwin's treatment of a similar case in *An Enquiring Political Justice* (1793) can cause a shock. Godwin creates a new image, the notorious fire exemplum. He assumes the case that in the chateau of Fénelon, the bishop of Cambray, a fire broke out just when he conceived his immortal work *Télémaque*. Only he or his chambermaid could have been saved from the room. For Godwin it is a matter of course that the bishop would have precedence in the rescue. According to Godwin's concept of "first-order impartiality" only the worth or value of a human does count,[2] the fact that he has greater importance for the welfare of the community at large than a person with limited sphere of activity. This forms a sharp contrast to Kant's view that a man does not have a worth or value, but a dignity. According to Godwin "the illustrious archbishop of Cambray was of more worth than his chambermaid". (*Enquiry.* S.53)

It is interesting that the survival dilemma is used to express markedly contrasting positions in Kant and Godwin. For Kant a human has a dignity which cannot be exchanged, while Godwin as a utilitarian philosopher looks at humans in terms of their value for the society as a whole. Thus according to Kant an individual cannot be sacrificed in an emergency situation, while Godwin makes the individual's worth for society the decisive criterion. The constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany begins with a quotation from Kant: "The dignity of man is untouchable."

## 4. The Survival Exemplum in Literature

While philosophical discussions of the survival exemplum seem to have disappeared by the end of the 18th century, the topic gained new life in literature. I wish to start my discussion of literary texts by looking at the second canto, the so-called Shipwreck Canto, of Lord Byron's satiric epic poem *Don Juan* (1817-1823). After an affair in his hometown Seville young Don Juan is sent away to travel. During the voyage from Cadiz the ship is sunk by a storm in the Aegean. The crew escape in a boat. Having run out of food, lots are cast to choose who is to be eaten. Byron was probably influenced by the above-mentioned the event of the wreck of the French frigate Méduse in 1916, from which 147 persons escaped on a raft, where in need of food they resorted to cannibalism. The situation on the raft became the object of the famous painting of Théodore Géricault of 1818-

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2. Godwin. *Enquiry* (wie Anm. 12). "Introduction", S.xi.

1819, which was shown in London in 1820. In Byron's epic the shipwrecked people on the raft are criticised for not economising with their supply of victuals. Forced by "hunger's rage" (Canto II, Stanza 70) they first kill Juan's spaniel in spite of his master's initial resistance, and Juan partakes of the parts of the animal's body albeit with remorse. Byron's wit is shown in the fact that to Juan is offered the animal's most delicate part, the fore-paws, to compensate for the sacrifice he made. Then the crew draw lots, a measure that was suggested in the tradition of the thought-experiment by Cicero and Leibnitz for undecidable cases. The ill luck comes to Juan's tutor Pedrillo. To give an example of Byron's vivid narration in which the terrible tends to pass into the grotesque, here is the stanza which follows upon Pedro's being bled to death:

> The surgeon, as there was no other fee,
>     Had his first choice of morsels for his pains;
> But being thirstiest at the moment, he
>     Preferr'd a draught from the fast-flowing veins:
> Part was divided, part thrown in the sea,
>     And such things as the entrails and the brains
> Regaled two sharks, who follow' o'er the billow –
> The sailors ate the rest of poor Pedrillo. (Canto II, Stanza 87)

The juxtaposition between the sailors eating the man's body and the sharks devouring the uneatable parts such entrails and brains produces a grotesque company. Men and animals are shown to be alike. In this context it is significant that even in the "extremity of their disaster" (Stanza 88) Juan refrains from eating human flesh. The epic's protagonist is thus ethically raised to a higher level. Also Juan's conduct turns out for the best. While the sailors, who have eaten from the victim's body, are seized by deadly madness, Juan ultimately is the only of the shipwrecked people to survive. In fact the shipwreck episode is, as the construction of the plot is concerned, a kind of prelude to the protagonist's meeting Haydée, who saves him on the shore of a Greek island and becomes his lover.

My next example is Henrik Ibsen's verse play *Peer Gynt* (1867), which as the Ibsen scholar Knut Brynhildsvoll has shown, though set in a Norwegian world of peasants and landholders and fairies and trolls, negotiates central questions of identity and of attempts at self-realization and the experience of self-loss in the nineteenth century.[3] There is a shipwreck scene in this play, set at the beginning of Act V, in which the survival dilemma emerges in a way which sheds light on one aspect the protagonist's multi-faceted identity problem. Peer, now an old man, has returned from Marocco, where he was engaged in dubious business and lost almost all his money and even spent

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3. See his latest pertinent publication "The concept of «I» in Henrik Ibsen's Peer Gynt — Viewed in the light of new neuropsychological research and with a special regard to Robert Musil's Theory of Potentiality". *Ibsen and the Modern Self*, ed. Kwok-kan Tam and Terry Siu-han Yip, Open University of Hong Kong Press, 2010, 1-16.

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a time in a lunatic asylum. On his way home his ship is threatened to sink before the Norwegian coast. Before the accident there is a significant episode. Peer Gynt promises the Captain of the ship to do something for the crew, who, he says are, are really hard up. As he hears that the sailors will return to their happy family lives with wives and children – a conspicuous detail is that the lamps will be lit for their return – he withdraws his promise abruptly:

> I'm damned if I do it!
> Do you think I'm mad? Do you really expect me
> To fork out for other people's kids?
> I've slaved enough to earn what I've got!
> Nobody's waiting for old Peer Gynt.[4]

He rather vows to get the sailors drunk, so that on their return the expected happy family reunion will be entirely ruined. We see two contradictory images of the protagonist in this scene, two different identities. He vacillates between a good and a wrong self, which seem entirely unconnected. This contradiction is intensified when the ship is threatened to sink. There is a wreck nearby with three persons in highest danger on it. Peer presses the crew of his boat to rescue them: "You dogs! Cowards! Don't you realize / They're men with wives and children at home / ..." (p. 126) After a confrontation with a ghost-passenger, who asks Peer for his corpse for scientific research in case of his death in the storm, he reverts his earlier decision, not to help the cook: "Captain! / It was all nonsense, only a joke – / Of course I'm willing to help the cook." (p. 130) When it actually comes to their ship sinking, there is a situation like in the classic survival dilemma, with only place for the cook and the protagonist on a boat. Peer cries for help referring to the Christian ethic ("as the prayer-book has it") and the cook prays for help "for my children's sake". With both clinging to the keel, there is a fight, which is accompanied by vehement mutual appeals, the right of survival on the part of the childless man and the appeal to mercy on the side of the family man. The cook goes under and Peer swings himself on the board. It seems cynical that at the moment of the cook's dying Peer holds the drowning man up by the hair, so that he can say the Lord's prayer. Also it is significant that when safely at land again Peer attends a funeral, probably the cook's funeral, but does not give evidence of any remorse. From the priest's speech he retrieves the maxim, to protect one's identity, "to be your unshakeable self". (p. 137)

I will now come to one of the great novels of world literature, Joseph Conrad, *Lord Jim* (1900). The main event of this novel is a variation of the thought-experiment of Carneades. A British ship, *Patna*, with 800 Arab pilgrims on board threatens to sink shortly. The captain and the officers decide to abandon the ship. Jim, who is about to take measures for the safety of the passengers, in an apparently perilous moment inadvertently jumps into the deserters' boat. When they reach the

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4. Henrik Ibsen, *Peer Gynt. A Dramatic Poem*. Oxford University Press. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1992, 124-125.

port, they learn that the *Patna* has not sunk and that its passengers have been saved by a French gunboat. Jim is the only one to remain to be present at the inquiry. He loses his licence to sail.

In the course of the novel action Jim takes on minor jobs, but leaves abruptly, whenever the name of the *Patna* is mentioned. The novel deals with the survival dilemma in a way which transcends any juridical or philosophical considerations and opens a view on the complexities of human life and motivations. The psychological issues with which Jim has to grapple are, as the narrator remarks,

> beyond the competency of a court of inquiry […] It was a subtle and momentous quarrel as to the true essence of life, and did not want a judge. He wanted an ally, a helper, an accomplice. (75)

The protagonist's error is not condoned, but presented as the tragic hamartia of an essentially decent and good-willed person and shown within a network of factors such as family background, education, reading, character traits and personal illusions and aspirations. And it is, of course, put in perspective by the way the story is told by the narrator and various witnesses.

While the survival dilemma represents the starting point in Conrad's novel, in William Styron's novel *Sophie's Choice* (1976) the narration of such a dilemma – the most terrible of all of imaginable dilemmas of this kind – forms the novel's final climax. In the course of the novel the titular heroine's fate in the holocaust is revealed step by step as a fight for the survival of her personal life and the life of her two children, a son and a daughter. Her heaviest and most aggrieving secret, which she reveals at the novel's end, is that at Auschwitz, a camp doctor confronted her with the choice which of her two children would be killed by gassing and which would continue to live. Of her two children, Sophie chose to sacrifice her seven-year-old daughter, Eva, in a heartrending decision that filled her with guilt for the whole of her life. The novel may with its treatment of the holocaust be controversial, but the survival dilemma is here sharpened into a most heinous deed, the sin committed by the camp doctor of forcing a mother to make an unnatural decision.

## 5. Philosophy and Literature as Complementary Kinds of Cognition

In the course of our discussion we could notice that in philosophy the survival dilemma had been a topic from ancient times until the end of the 18th century. From the beginning of the 19th century literature took over, producing a great number of works in which the dilemma of whom to save in an emergency situation came up, when on account of limited resources not all of the persons threatened by death could be saved. Philosophy and literature turned out to have different approaches to the problem in question and, more broadly speaking, offer different kinds

of cognition.[5] In philosophy cognition is the result of reasoning, i.e. of argument and deduction, while in literary works cognition is the result of representation in terms of human action, i.e. to put something before the eyes (*ante oculos ponere*). Our investigation has made it necessary to expand the meaning of the term cognition or insight – German "Erkenntnis" – to include literature as a provider of insight or cognition. A more elaborate definition would determine cognition in philosophy as intellectual cognition, which subjects the world and its issues to intellectual and argumentative scrutiny in order to find out fundamental ideas and judgments, and cognition in literature as the result of representation emerging in literary-fictional renditions of life and experience, which include emotional states and processes and existential situations of life, frequently inviting readers to empathize. While a philosopher may try to define, on the level of abstraction, qualities such as fear or guilt or love or abstract concepts like justice, the literary artist represents such feelings or notions on the level of concretization as they affect invented characters, within carefully constructed plots.

To apply this distinction to ethics, there is an opposition between the theoretical discussion of ethical principles and problems in philosophy and the representation of ethical matters and issues in literature, as they arise or could arise in concrete situations in life. Literature opens a wide field of experience and brings to our minds and souls the complexities of life. To return to one of our examples, while a philosopher may explain the paradox of the plank and may weigh alternative options of action from an ethical and juridical viewpoint, a dramatist like Ibsen represents the analogous dilemma situation in a dramatic situation, in which characters are involved as part of a plot, inviting the reader or spectator to empathize and reflect and, perhaps, pass his or her judgment. Or in Conrad's *Lord Jim* the ship's desertion is itself represented as an ambiguous action on the part of the protagonist and it imposes a permanent sense of guilt on him. These are aspects that are usually inaccessible to the philosophical approach, though it must be emphasized that, as far as ethics is concerned, philosophy and literature are twins and their interdependence may be fruitful. The reason for this kinship is obvious. As distinct from moral philosophy, ethics as a philosophical discipline does not really establish and emphasize moral norms and values, but investigates into the problematic nature of ethical terms and concepts. Analogously literature, that deserves its name, does not simply proclaim truths and emphasize binding values, but stimulates its readers to engage in thinking and to form an idea of the complexities of life and ethical decisions and, in sum, to become aware of the problematic condition of human beings (*condicio humana*).

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5. I owe this idea to Gottfried Gabriel, *Erkenntnis*. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2015)

# Black Men in the American Imaginary from Slavery to Black Lives Matter

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The killings of unarmed black males by police and self-proclaimed vigilantes have become alarmingly frequent in America; prompting many to conclude that young black men have become an endangered species.[1] While several killings are not headlined and thus concealed from the public, some have provoked public indignation and condemnation. These murders keep happening with frightening frequency.[2] The occurrences of these killings seem to buttress the endangered species viewpoint. The fact that the law enforcement officers and vigilantes involved were either not charged at all, or in some cases, tried and found not guilty and acquitted, has galvanized public outrage that birthed the Black Lives Matter movement.[3] It now seems normative to see young black men murdered publicly and without repercussions. The popularized image of black men in American society and media is that of the violent, immoral, incorrigible gangsters and drug dealers who create broken homes and sire children who are then abandoned to the charge of the government and welfare agencies.[4]

Why is there no collective national outrage against the murders of unarmed black men? Why have the killings become routinized and normative? This paper attempts to answer these questions by tracing the historical dynamics undergirding contemporary disregard for the sanctity of the

1. Jewelle Taylor Gibbs, *Young, Black and Male in America: An Endangered Species*. Dover, MA: Auburn House Publishing, 1989. Earl Ofari Hutchinson, *The Mugging of Black America*. Chicago, IL: African American Images, 1990; also his *The Assassination of the Black Male Image*.

2. Earl Ofari Hutchinson, *Why Black Lives Do Matter*. Los Angeles, CA: Middle Passage Press, 2018. Kevin Alexander Gray, *Killing Trayvons: An Anthology of American Violence*. New York: Counterpunch, 2014. Wesley Lowery, *They Can't Kill Us All: Ferguson, Baltimore, and a New Era in America's Racial Justice Movement*. New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2016. Haki Madhubuti, *Taking Bullets: Terrorism and Black Life in Twenty-First Century America*. Chicago: Third World Press, 2016. Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, *From #Black Lives Matter to Black Liberation*. Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2016. Gary Younge, *Another Day in the Death of America: A Chronicle of Ten Short Lives*. New York: Nation Books, 2016.

3. Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, *From #Black Lives Matter*. Russell Rickford, "Black Lives Matter: Toward a Modern Practice of Mass Struggle." *New Labor Forum*, vol. 21, number 1, 2016, pp34-42. Christopher Lebron, *The Making of Black Lives Matter: A Brief History of an Idea*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.

4. Ta-Nehisi Coates, *Between the World and Me*. New York: Spiegel & Grau, 2015. Earl Ofari Hutchinson, *The Assassination of the Black Male Image*; also his *The Mugging of Black America*. Paul L. Wachtel, *Race in the Mind of America: Breaking the Vicious Circle Between Blacks and Whites*. London: Routledge, 1999. Earl Ofari Hutchinson, *Why Black Lives Do Matter*.

lives of black men. One has to start with examining the stereotypes embedded in the institution of slavery. Winthrop Jordan suggested that many of the behavioral patterns and beliefs responsible for the dehumanization of blacks in the twentieth century existed more than two hundred years ago.[5] Europeans who colonized the New World regarded blacks as "corporeal creatures" and fundamentally different.[6] This was also the worldview of the "Founding Fathers" of the American Republic. The only reality and future they envisioned for blacks was being slaves. Though the Constitution adopted in September 1787 did not mention the word "slavery," but instead used phrases as "such persons" or "other persons," there were almost 500,000 "such persons" (slaves) at the birth of the new nation.[7] The 1857 United States Supreme Court decision in *Dred Scott v. Sandford* affirmed the primacy of slave identity.[8] The court decided that blacks "were unfit to associate with whites…and the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit."[9] Thus, blacks were objects and denied human attributes. Carl Degler argued that from the beginning blacks were treated as chattel, and the distinguishing attribute of a chattel was being non-human.[10] Blacks would bear this stigma and identity for over two centuries, and some would argue that the long term effects and enduring legacies continue to shape the black experience in twenty first century America.[11]

As chattel, slaves could not envision family relationships. This also abrogated the male slave's ability to function as "head" of his family. Male slaves watched helplessly as whites raped and abused female slaves. However, the same system that reduced black men to this abject condition also popularized the notion that, if left alone, blacks generally were incapable of anything productive. The dominant imaginary portrayed blacks as "objects" in need of the constant supervision and guidance of whites. Such condition, many believed, would restrain the potent but dormant animalistic attributes of the black man. The plantation (Labor) defined and limited the slave's world. Slavery required the imposition of subhuman status and thus denial of the slaves' humanity.[12] This obtained from 1619 to the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment ending slavery

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5.  Winthrop D. Jordan, *White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-1812*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1968, px. Jan Nederveen Pieterse, *White on Black: Images of Africa and Black in Western Popular Culture*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992.
6.  Winthrop D. Jordan, *White Over Black*, pp34
7.  Darlene Clark-Hine, William C. Hine & Stanley Harrold, *The African American Odyssey*, vol. 1. New York: Pearson, 2014, pp112-113
8.  Ibid, p241-424
9.  Ibid, p242
10. Carl Degler, *Neither Black nor White: Slavery and Race Relations in Brazil and the United States*. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1986.
11. Joy DeGruy, *Post Traumatic Slave Syndrome: America's Legacy of Enduring Injury and Healing*. Portland, OR: Joy DeGruy Publications, 2005. Na'im Akbar, *Chains and Images of Psychological Slavery*. Tallahassee, FL: New Mind Production, 1984. Ruth Thompson-Miller, Joe R. Feagin and Leslie Picca, *Jim Crow's Legacy: The Lasting Impact of Segregation*. New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2015.
12. Audrey Smedley, *Race in North America: Origin and Evolution of a Worldview*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993. Eugene Genovese, *Roll, Jordan Roll: The World the Slaves Made*. New York: Vintage Books, 1976. Also his, *The World the Slaveholders Made: Two Essays in Interpretation*. New York: Vintage Books, 1971. Kenneth Stampp, *The Peculiar Institution: Slavery in the Ante-Bellum South*. New York: Vintage Books, 1989. Eyerman, *Cultural*

in 1865. The attainment of freedom did not obliterate the stigma of slavery. Free blacks were discriminated against and restricted to demeaning occupations.[13] Whites monopolized decent jobs and confined blacks to a life of ignorance and abject poverty.[14] Notwithstanding, free blacks tapped into and mobilized their meager individual and collective resources to create structures, institutions and movements with which they resisted dehumanization and perpetual domination.[15]

The process by which the ethnicities involuntarily taken from Africa became transformed into the aggregate "Afro-American" identity was itself an exercise in existential nullification. Africans became chattels for the primary purpose of justifying their enslavement. They became "the other" in an environment of racial demarcation. To legitimize this worldview, enslaved Africans were ascribed attributes that affirmed their sub-human status. They were associated with values that fed the American imagination with negative images of peoples of African descent as objects deserving of far less.[16] Pseudo-intellectuals and pro-slavery ideologues and writers portrayed blacks as animals, closely related to apes and monkeys.[17] With ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment and ensuing Radical Reconstruction reforms came attempts to restore the humanity of blacks. Blacks gained citizenship, the right to vote, and promise of equal protection of the law. Yet, they were not fully integrated. The end of slavery did not usher in a nation that accorded blacks full equality and dignity. Instead, blacks transited from chattel to *Jim Crow* which further subverted their humanity.[18] Legal and extra-legal strategies were introduced to reinforce their sub-human status from the 1880s through the 1960s. They retained second class citizenship, and denied civil and political rights.[19]

The association of blacks with animals became even more pronounced after the demise of slavery. Writings of leading American intellectuals as well magazines, newspapers and journals depicted blacks as, "half child, half animal," mentally impaired, dangerous and a threat to

*Trauma: Slavery and the formation of African American Identity*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Frederick Douglass, *Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, an American Slave (Written by Himself)*. Boston, 1845.

13. Leon F. Litwack, *North of Slavery: The Negro in the Free States, 1790-1860*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1965. Leonard P. Curry, *The Free Blacks in Urban America, 1800-1850: The Shadow of the Dream*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981.

14. Ibid

15. Leon F. Litwack, *North of Slavery*. Harry Reed, *Platform for Change: The Foundations of the Northern Free Black Community, 1775-1865*. East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1994. Ira Berlin, *Slaves Without Masters, The Free Negro in the Antebellum South*. New York: Vintage Books, 1974.

16. Ron Eyerman, Cultural Trauma: Slavery and the Formation of African American Identity. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

17. Idus A. Newby, *Jim Crow's Defense: Anti-Negro Thought in America, 1900-1930*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1965. George M. Frederickson, *The Black Image in the White Mind: The Debate on Afro-American Character and Destiny, 1817-1914*. New York: Harper & Row, 1972. Earl Ofari Hutchinson, *The Assassination of the Black Male Image*.

18. Jerrold M. Packard and Jerrold Packard, *American Nightmare: The History of Jim Crow*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2003. David K. Fremon, *The Jim Crow Laws and Racism in United States History*. New York: Enslow Publishers, Inc., 2014.

19. Idus Newby, *Jim Crow's Defense*. Joel Williamson, *The Crucible of Race: Black-White Relations in the American South Since Emancipation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984. Idus Newby, *The Development of Segregationist Thought*. New York: Dorsey Press, 1969. Grace Elizabeth Hale, *Making Whiteness: The Culture of Segregation in the South, 1890-1940*. New York: Vintage Books, 1998.

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society, especially white women.[20] Some of the publications represented blacks as neurologically challenged and prone to violence.[21] Charles Carroll, described the black man as a subspecies of the animal world.[22] W. S. Armstead, a Georgia theologian, referred to the black man as a beast who murderously "waylaid" white women.[23] Frank Hoffman, a German, discussed the "race trait and tendencies" of black men, and their "immense amount of immorality and crime."[24] Walter F. Wilcox, chief statistician of the United States Census Bureau alleged that blacks were "several times" more likely to commit crimes than whites.[25] Leading media and academic publications amplified the "black men as beasts and menace" theme.[26] The onslaughts on black character were meant to legitimize discriminatory policies. They also mirrored undercurrents of anxiety about the social implications of black freedom. There was unease about the alleged threat of black sexuality. Even as the slave system profited from, and thrived on, emasculating black masculinity, it did acknowledge and nurture that humanity. With foreign importation of slaves outlawed in 1808, southern planters confronted a challenge: Where to acquire slaves for their plantations? Many began to improvise by "producing" slaves domestically. They coupled male and female slaves for breeding.[27] This domestic "slave manufacturing" increased the property and enhanced the wealth of many planters, such as John Smith's master who, according to Smith "…started out wid two 'omen slaves and raised 300 slaves."[28] Nothing more exemplified the dehumanizing nature of chattel identity than slave breeding. Black men became sexual objects (tools) at the convenience and disposal of the masters. Slave breeding ultimately infused in planters gnawing and threatening image of the black man. By using black men as breeders, white planters had birthed a bogey that would haunt America for decades (the mythical black rapist).

The exploitation of black sexuality reinforced preexisting, but subdued, notions of black hyper-sexuality. It has been suggested that whites had harbored the image of blacks and of the black man in particular, as hyper-sexual and imbued with insatiable sexual desires since their first encounters with indigenous Africans. According to Winthrop Jordan, long before their formal contact, Europeans perceived Africans as "lustful and venomous" people endowed with insatiable sexual drives.[29] Earl Ofari described the myth of the rapacious black male sexuality as one of America's

20. Thomas Dixon, *The Clansman*. New York: Doubleday, 1906. Robert W. Shufeldt, *The Negro, a Menace to American Civilization: A Menace to Civilization*. BiblioBazaar, 1817.

21. Earl Ofari Hutchinson, *The Assassination of the Black Male Image*, p24. Charles Carroll, *The Negro a Beast, or in the Image of God?* Ayer Co. Publication, 1900; Robert W. Shufeldt, *America's Greatest Problem: The Negro*. Philadelphia: F. A. Davis & Company, 1915.

22. Earl Ofari Hutchinson, *The Assassination of the Black Male Image*, p21

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid, p23

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Eddie Donoghue, *Black Breeding Machines: The Breeding of Negro Slaves in the Diaspora*. Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2008. Gregory Smithers, *Slave Breeding: Sex, Violence, and Memory in African American History*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2012.

28. Gregory Smithers, *Slave Breeding*, pp1

29. Winthrop D. Jordan, *White Over Black*, pp33-35.

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most durable and early stereotypes and that it predated slavery.[30] One early explorer referred to the Mandingo penises as "Burthensome."[31] Another marveled at their "large propagators."[32] The institution of slavery and demand for plantation labor had kept the black man's sexual propensity and the fear it embodied for whites in check. After the end of slavery, this would become both emotionally and psychologically unsettling to whites who were tormented by the thought that, left unchecked, "black sexual animals and predators" would unleash their hyper-sexuality on white women.

There was thus a pervasive atmosphere of "Black Scare" across the nation: "scare" that free black men were not only seeking economic and political rights, but also white women.[33] Blacks were widely perceived as driven by the desire for "sexual equality," and an "innate fondness for white women."[34] Some blamed Civil War and Reconstruction reforms for infusing in blacks the belief that they could and should strive for social equality and intermarriage. This supposedly aroused their "animalism."[35] No southern group was more threatened by blacks' "desires" than the "virtuous and defenseless white women." There was supposedly "something alluring and seductive to the Negro in the appearance of white women…" To counteract this threat to the South's "priceless jewel of beautiful, splendid and spotless womanhood," extreme measures were introduced including violence and lynching.[36] Between 1865 and 1900, white southerners placed blacks "under an elaborate system of prohibitions and restrictions mostly associated with social conventions that symbolized their subordinate and subservient status."[37] The most frightening of the conventions pertained to the inviolability of white womanhood. If a white woman accused a black man of rape or attempted rape, "we see to it that the Negro is executed," declared Arkansas poet John Gould Fletcher.[38] Every able-bodied white man assumed the existential duty of protecting "vulnerable white women" from the menace posed by the sexual pathology of black men. White men assumed this responsibility with a crusading zealotry, reflected in the intensity and barbarism of the lynching orgies that engulfed the country from the late 1880s to the 1950s.[39] Castration was a signature ritual of the lynch mob. Some states passed laws prescribing castration for black men who attempted to rape white women.[40] This symbolized extinguishing the sexual causative object of white anxiety. It was also a subliminal message to all black men about the consequences of not respecting the sexual

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30. Earl Ofari Hutchinson, *The Assassination of the Black Male Image*.

31. Ibid, pp70-71.

32. Ibid.

33. Earl Ofari Hutchinson, *The Assassination of the Black Male Image*, pp20-25

34. Idus Newby, *Jim Crow's Defense*, pp135

35. Ibid, pp136-137.

36. Ibid, pp137.

37. Dan T. Carter, *Scottsboro: A Tragedy of the American South*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971, pp104-105.

38. Ibid, pp105

39. Dora Apel, *Imagery of Lynching*. W. Fitzhugh Brundage, *Lynching in the New South: Georgia and Virginia, 1880-1930*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993. Michael J. Pfeifer, ed., *Lynching Beyond Dixie: American Mob Violence Outside the South*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2013.

40. Ibid. See also, Evelyn M. Simien, *Gender and Lynching: The Politics of Memory*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011

boundary. The sadistic rituals and pageantry that accompanied lynchings and the characterization of lynching burnings as "barbeque" underscored the association of blacks with animals.[41] Thousands of black men were lynched. More than 80% of the lynchings was justified on the alleged rape or attempted rape of white women, and most of the accusations were later proven to be fabricated. Lynching exemplified public and national devaluation and de-legitimation of black lives.[42]

Newspapers publicized and hyped the alleged hyper-sexuality of black men. It was also a popular research theme in the Humanities, Sciences and Social Sciences. Several scholars theorized about black sexuality and the threat to white women.[43] The belief in, and fear of, black sexuality unified Americans across party and ideological lines. This gave lynching culture a national audience and acceptance. Mob violence and other forms of summary justice against black men reigned unchecked.[44] The lull in the intensity of lynching in the late 1950s did not obliterate the existential threat black men encountered daily. When lynching declined, and the lynch mod receded, the state agencies and apparatus took over. Between 1930 and 1981 four hundred and fifty-five (455) men were executed for rape. Of that number, four hundred and five (405) were black men. They were put to death "on the flimsiest evidence, mostly the word of white women."[45] The lynchings and accompanying macabre orgies reflected the depth of America's obsession with the threat of black sexuality. Lynching was not the exclusive act of the lynch mob. It had the backings of top federal and state government officials and law enforcement agencies. There appeared to be a national resolve to protect white womanhood and white civilization against the perceived threat of a "black beast" now unleashed upon the nation.[46] The black man had become America's sex bogey; ever-present danger and threat to white women. However hard they tried; anti-lynching advocates could not get Congress to act on anti-lynching legislative initiatives.

To be a black man in America, therefore, is to assume the extra burden of assumed criminality. Black and crime have become synonyms in the American imaginary to the point where many readily invoke that linkage even when a white person had committed the crime. The cases of Chuck and Carol Stuart in Boston in 1989, and Susan Smith of Union, South Carolina, in 1995 come to

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41. See lynching photos in James Allen, Hinton Als, John Lewis and Leon Litwack, *Without Sanctuary: Lynching Photography in America*. New York: Twin Palms Publishers, 2000.
42. Michael Fedo, *The Lynchings in Duluth*. St. Paul, MN: Minnesota Historical Society Press, 1984. Timothy B. Tyson, *The Blood of Emmett Till*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2017. Patricia Bernstein, *The First Waco Horror: The Lynching of Jesse Washington and the Rise of the NAACP*. College Station, TX: Texas A & A University Press, 2005. James Cameron, *A Time of Terror*. Baltimore, MD: Black Classic Press, 1982. Howard Smead, *Blood Justice: The Lynching of Mack Charles Parker*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. Dominic J. Capeci, *The Lynching of Cleo Wright*. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1998.
43. Earl Ofari Hutchinson, *The Assassination of Black Male Image*, pp70-72
44. Ralph Ginzburg, *100 Years of Lynchings*. Baltimore, MD: Black Classic Press, 1988. Stewart E. Tolnay and E. M. Beck, *A Festival of Violence: An Analysis of Southern Lynchings, 1882-1930*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1995. Dora Apel, *Imagery of Lynching: Black Men, White Women, and the Mob*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2004. Philip Dray, *At The Hands of Persons Unknown: The Lynching of Black America*. New York: Random House, 2002.
45. Earl Ofari Hutchinson, *The Assassination of the Black Male Image*, pp73
46. Ibid. Also, Dora Apel, *Imagery of Lynching*.

mind.[47]_This blame-the-black-man syndrome is embedded in American history. The tradition of whites willfully and wrongly accusing blacks of crimes they (i.e., the whites) committed is all too familiar. The lynchings mentioned earlier were not all due to the popular sexuality (rape) charge. There was also the pervasive image of the black man as incorrigible criminal. There were cases of black men lynched for allegedly murdering white women or kids, only for their innocence to be proven after their deaths.[48] It would be discovered that a white person had actually committed those crimes. A good example was the case of fourteen years old George Stinney in Alcolu, Clarendon County, South Carolina wrongfully executed for the murder of two white girls in 1944. In 2014, South Carolina publicly acknowledged that George Stinney was indeed innocent.

By the 1960s civil rights movement, the image of the black man as rapist was coupled with his image as social and economic parasite; perennially unemployed, unemployable, uneducated and uneducable, with a pathological disdain for morals, unambitious and thus a parasite. This became justification for maintaining white superiority. There is no consideration of the historical circumstance, systemic and structural dynamics that had put black men and blacks in general in such abject conditions. With young black men unable to acquire quality education, they are less likely to secure decent jobs without which they are forced into underground economies. The negative images of black men birthed a counter culture of vigilantism reflected in the epidemic shooting of unarmed black men, mass incarceration and expansion of the prison industrial complex.[49]

What the history shows is that after slavery, blacks transited into a world of other forms of un-freedoms and nullification of their humanity. They would remain 'the other,' less deserving, sub-humans, whose lives were not worthy of the protection of, and validation by, the state. The fact that freedom did not completely restore and affirm the inviolability of black humanity birthed and kept the civil rights movement alive to this day. The numerous unsolved, or solved but unprosecuted, cases of black lynchings and assassinations during the 1950s and 1960s underscored how devalued black lives had become. There is still demonstrably flagrant disregard for the sanctity of black lives. Many who endanger and extinguish the lives of young black men escape punishment. The brazen disregard for the sanctity of black lives provoked resistance that galvanized the modern civil rights movement. Let's recall the questions posed at the beginning: What precisely, in the making of American, would help us understand how and why the flagrant disregard for the sanctity of black lives does not provoke collective national outrage? Why have the killings become routine and seemingly normative?

Despite post-Civil War and Reconstruction reforms, and subsequent civil rights era reforms,

47. Earl Ofari Hutchinson, *The Assassination of the Black Male Image*, p44.
48. Jacqueline Goldsby, *A Spectacular Secret: Lynching in American Life and Literature*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006. James H. Madison, *A Lynching in the Heartland: Race and Memory in America*. New York: Palgrave, 2001.
49. Michelle Alexander, *The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness*. New York: The New Press, 2012.

there lingers in the imagination of a significantly segment of the American population, particularly law enforcement officials, those negative and nullifying images and portraits of blacks, especially young black males, as brutish, disorderly and a menace. Modern efforts to stifle civil rights and prevent implementation of welfare and social reforms are premised on age-old demonization of blacks. Portrayed as lazy and brutes who seemed comfortable with violent get-rich-quick schemes, blacks and the poor in general, are dismissed as undeserving of any government assistance. Anti-civil rights and anti-social welfare reform initiatives, and continued emasculation of black humanity, have become refrains in public discourses. This became more pronounced with resurgence of ultra-conservatism during the Reagan-Bush presidencies. Ronald Reagan, in particular, was noted for invoking age old ethos of black dehumanization to justify subverting and eroding civil rights and social welfare reforms.[50] Attempts to alleviate poverty through government reforms were denounced as unnecessary diversions of national resources to undeserving groups. Unemployed, uneducated and unemployable blacks who, in desperation sought other means of bettering themselves characterized as pests and a menace. The prison industrial complex expanded and law enforcement developed stringent, unrestrained, merciless and racist response strategies.[51]

Americans who considered blacks second class citizens not deserving of same rights were only temporarily subdued, not completely defeated, by the reform initiatives from Reconstruction to the civil rights movement. *Jim Crow* and the lynchings it unleashed, as well as the modern anti-civil rights, and anti-social welfare, reforms initiatives, and resurgence of nativism all attest to the resiliency of that segment of America that perceives blacks as less deserving. The depiction of blacks as animals remains an enduring trait of American society. Blacks who seemed to challenge established stereotypes readily earn these attributes, regardless of education and status. Being elected to the highest political office in the country did not immune Barack Obama, who was repeatedly caricatured as a monkey. For example, in 2009, *New York Post* cartoonist, Sean Delonas, depicted President Barack Obama as a monkey.[52] Studies suggest that many Americans still associate blacks with apes and monkeys.[53] The association of blacks with animalistic attributes has become widespread since the election of Donald Trump. Trump frequently demeans his black critics by depicting them as animals and questioning their intelligence.[54] After securing the Republican

50. Earl Ofari Hutchinson, *The Assassination of the Black Male Image*, pp65-78. Jewelle Taylor Gibbs, "Young, Black Males in America: Endangered, Embittered, and Embattled," in Jewelle Taylor Gibbs, ed., *Young, Black, and Male in America*, pp1-36.

51. Samuel L. Myers, Jr., ed., *Civil Rights and Race Relations in the Post Reagan-Bush Era*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997. Michelle Alexander, *The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness*. New York: The New Press, 2012. Elizabeth Hinton, *From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime: The Making of Mass Incarceration in America*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016. See also Earl Ofari Hutchinson, *The Assassination*, pp125-127. Kenneth Meeks, *Driving While Black, Highways, Shopping Malls, Taxi Cabs, Sidewalks: How to Fight Back if You Are a Victim of Racial Profiling*. New York: Broadway Books, 2000.

52. Earl Ofari Hutchinson, *Why Black Lives Do Matter*, pp123.

53. Ibid, pp124

54. He has referred to his former White official, Omorosa Manigault-Newman as "a dog", and has persistently referred to perhaps his most vocal critic in Congress, Congresswoman Maxine Waters as a person of "low intelligence".

Party nomination as gubernatorial candidate in Florida, Trump-backed Ron DeSantis warned Floridians to not "monkey up" the election by voting for the Democratic Party candidate Andrew Gillums who is black. The historic negative and dehumanizing attributes have now become coded lexicons of modern American politics that seemed to resonate with a segment of the electorate. This perhaps explains why the disregard for black lives often generates little, if any, collective public outrage.

The animalistic attributes ascribed to blacks shape the American imaginary which sustains and nurtures the blatant disregard for the sanctity of black lives. A significant segment of the American population has yet to jettison the historic and racist images and perceptions of blacks and the limitations they signify. Blacks who challenge this worldview by their demonstration of intelligence and accomplishments are bitterly resented. Some who somehow succeed in challenging the system either did not live to exercise the rights they had fought so hard for, or were subjected to abuses and caricatures that continually reminded them of the limits of their political visions and immutability of their ascribed images and attributes. Obama's accomplishments stoked the latent anger and anxiety about the successful black man, and about blacks in general, that had remained dormant. Black Lives Matter is a movement against a resilient culture of devaluing of black lives that began with the advent of slavery in America and has remained a permanent feature of American political culture. Young black men have transited from the late 19th and early 20th century image of sexually depraved beasts with insatiable desires for, and thus a menace to, white women, to the late 20th and early 21st century image of an ever-present threat and danger to the comfort and security of white America. They are presumed guilty until proven innocent, and often not given this benefit since they are usually hunted and shot like the animals they were characterized.

Like in a relay race, the baton of targeting young black males as society's menace and threat has passed from the lynch mobs to the state. Now high-tech, the lynching of black males occurs within the purview of government and law enforcement agencies. As several scholars have argued, the blatantly racist rationale for lynching has been replaced by coded phrases, fundamentally of the same meaning and intent, disguised as race neutral. Yet disproportionately, these policies target young black men. State interventions of this nature have been traced from Richard Nixon's "war on crimes" against "criminal species" who supposedly threaten urban America, down to the 1980s Reagan's "war on drugs." They shared a relentless opposition to social welfare reforms. The ultimate goal was to erode the gains of the civil rights movement, and undo other anti-poverty and racial justice programs associated with Lyndon B. Johnson's "Great Society" reforms.[55]

Urban America, where blacks are concentrated is designated "war zones," "crime prone" areas, and "gang infested," and subjected to draconian government and law enforcement policies.[56] The

55. Elizabeth Hinton, *From War on Poverty*. Michelle Alexander, *The New Jim Crow*.
56. Earl Ofari Hutchinson, *The Assassination of the Black Male Image*, pp29-33. See also, Khalil Gibran Mohammad, *The Condemnation of Blackness: Race, Crime, and the Making of Modern Urban America*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010.

fact that Americans see predominantly young black men arrested and paraded on televisions, and in pages of newspapers and magazines, as pathological and incorrigible criminals, only reinforce those historical racist attributes and stereotypes. Assaults on social welfare and get tough on crime policies only exacerbate the already bleak fortunes of black youth, pushing many even deeper into the underground economy which provokes even more stringent and often illegal law enforcement reactions. Black males have been targeted and maligned as societal menace and threats since the early eighteenth century, and the present Black Lives Matter movement is therefore a logical development.

# The Humanities in the Platform Society

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In 2011, Apple co-founder Steve Jobs started one of his product presentations by saying that "it's in Apple's DNA that technology alone is not enough, that it is technology married with liberal arts, with the humanities, that yields us the results that make our heart sing" (Apple 2011). Jobs's words are interesting, in three respects: First of all, they testify to a belief, especially prevalent in Silicon Valley, that computer technology facilitates people's creativity, and, more in general, holds an emancipatory potential. This belief has roots in turn-of-the-1970s counter culture. Think here of Stewart Brand's "Whole Earth" network (whose mix of ecology and hacking culture was an important inspiration for Jobs) or of the poem "All Watched over by Machines of Loving Grace" (handed out by its author in the streets of San Francisco during 1967's "Summer of Love"), which dreams of a "cybernetic meadow where mammals and computers live together in mutually programming harmony" (Brautigan 1967).

Second, Jobs's words illustrate that large tech companies like Apple, Google, and Airbnb think of themselves as businesses not merely driven by profit, but also by a vision of humanity. Other than Apple's ideal of a technology married with the liberal arts, one can think of Airbnb's vision of a world in which people "belong anywhere," Google's corporate credo to "do no evil," Microsoft's call for a Digital Geneva Convention, and Facebook's dream of a "Global Community."

Third and finally, Jobs's ideal of a marriage between technology and the humanities compels one to reflect about the role that the humanities play in the study of the *platform society*, a society in which for-profit online platforms increasingly mediate—and in doing so transform—practices, spaces, and social relations until recently deemed public, private, or intimate.

As far as this role of the humanities in the platform society is concerned, urgent questions that come to mind are: What methodological and conceptual frameworks do the humanities offer in response to technological developments that transform all domains of human life, and that perhaps even transform the very understanding of what it means to be "human"? How do digital and online technologies enter humanities research, not only in the emerging field of the digital humanities (which adopts quantitative methods in its approach to inquiries of study traditionally associated with the humanities), but also by transforming archives and the ways people write and interact

with texts, images, and moving images? To what extent is the ongoing integration of traditional humanities disciplines into newly-formed interdisciplinary institutional forms a development spurred by digital technologies, not only because these technologies generate new questions that demand new approaches, but also because new technologies facilitate new networks of scholarly exchange? How do the humanities engage the development that many people's writings and images nowadays function doubly as marketable data for online platforms, from pictures shared on Facebook and messages sent through Gmail to student papers submitted on Turnitin? And finally, the question most crucial for the project proposed here: *How can humanities research contribute to a more critical understanding of the platform society*, in which online infrastructures platform developed by major tech companies are integrated into all domains of life*?*

Project I'm working on responds to this last question by analysing the visions of humanity tech companies develop in the *discourses* they develop their platforms. The project's premise is that tech company discourses are not mere by-products of the platform architectures and algorithms themselves, but should be understood as an integrated part of the development of online platforms as new infrastructures that reconfigure people's practices, spaces, and relations. This premise is embedded in a more general understanding of practices and discourses as processes that develop in a continuous dialogue. That is to say, practices and discourses do not stand in simple cause-and-effect relations (in which transformations in practices precede certain discourses, or vice versa), but they stand in a relation of mutual determination. In the case of this project, this means that tech discourses should not be understood as mere branding strategies for previously-developed technologies. Instead, the vocabularies, images, and modes of understanding that tech companies produce and disseminate as part of their brands are an integrated part of their platforms. Tech companies depend on users that trust their platforms, if only because most platforms are "fuelled" by user-generated data (Van Dijck et al. 2018). In an attempt to generate that trust, the major tech companies present their platforms as neutral spaces for human interaction, addressing people not merely as consumers but also as a "public," as their digital "citizens," or as a caring "humanity." My project aims to grasp the ideological underpinnings that define the discourses through which tech companies seek to generate that trust. *What is the vision of human life that inform tech company discourses?*

For example, and to return to Apple:

## Shot on iphone: Apple's World Picture

In 2015, Apple launched its iPhone World Gallery campaign, which over a time-span of two years featured photos from hundreds of iPhone users from around the globe displayed on billboard ads in over 70 across the globe. The photographs are absolutely stunning, to paraphrase Steve Jobs. From a lonely tree in a desert landscape to a waterfall cascading into a lush valley, from air bubbles trapped in a frozen lake to a sky-full of hot air balloons, from strawberries to sunflowers,

from a black-and-white dog caught in light and shade to an equally monochrome play of lines in an underground passageway, from "a reflection on a damp sidewalk" to "the gesture of a child" . . . . In some cases these photos appear as giant standalone billboards high up in urban space, like here in NYC, or along the highway, like here in San Francisco. In other cases, the photos are part of a series that cover a subway platform or even entire station, or that keep the pedestrian company on their sidewalk travels.

My question of analysis is simple. What do these images have in common other than they were "shot on iPhone 6" (without the indefinite article)? Browsing through the campaign, a picture forms in the mind's eye of a world that, above all, is there for our contemplation, a world full of beauty, beauty in small things (a reflection, a lady bug, a lone surfer ashore watching a sunset), and beauty in sublime vistas, like on this billboard in Minneapolis. A world of beautiful people also, because in 2016 the World Gallery had a follow-up of portraits: portraits of men, women, and children simply being human and being in the moment, much like all of the World Gallery's photographers behind their phones, who were present with the beauty of the moment when they tapped their screens (or clicked the volume buttom, which functions doubly as "shutter" operator). With the exception of this picture of balancing fishermen in Myanmar, we do not see people at work in the World Gallery, or people depicted in their home situations. There are no pictures of everyday life. Instead, Apple shows us a serene timeless world, captured in high definition. It is a little bit of a cold world view, I should add, a worldview that, precisely in its universal right here and right now, lacks what Roland Barthes has called *punctum*.

What strikes us, moreover, is that we hardly find groups of people in Apple's campaign and in the few photos in Apple's World Gallery with more than one person, those persons appear as individuals scattered in the cityscape. The few exceptions are the fishermen and the spectators at the balloon show. Finally, even though the World Gallery includes a lot of portraits, we do not see selfies. This last fact also struck the two anonymous pranksters behind the alsoshottoniphone6 counter-campaign, which for a few days in 2015 in the streets of San Francisco juxtaposed Apple's serenity with a series of weird selfies framed in the World Gallery style. However, the city of San Francisco took down the posters, while online Apple killed the alsoshotoniphone blog with a cease-and-desist order due to copyright infringement.[1] Clearly, Apple doesn't want people to poke fun at the beauty of its world picture.

Finally, what strikes perhaps most in the iPhone campaign, and what makes it so blatantly brilliant in its ideology, is that Apple does not even make the remotest reference to the digital age. There is hardly any technology in the World Gallery, no phones, no screens, no media, no solar panels, no windmills (like in this contemporary Dutch landscape I shot on my iPhone), no cars also, not even self-driving or shared ones. The only means of transportation we have are the hot air balloons, a bunch of peddle boats, and an Alaskan train. There is no reference, in other words,

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1. http://alsoshotoniphone6.tumblr.com/

to the platform society and as such the images contrast starkly with the increasingly smart urban centers in which they are put up. We only have the lonely mindful photographer and, in the case of the portraits, their beautiful mindful subjects, all existing in a timeless right here and right now.

It is this blissful gaze of the mindful subject that connects Apple's world pictures. As Jeff Wilson writes in *Mindful America*, in American mindfulness the technique of mindfulness meditation is isolated from the larger Eastern cultural-religious set of practices and worldview in which it originated. Mindfulness, he writes, is "thus transformed so that it delivers cultural benefits desired by Americans."[2]

Looking at the new American Dream as it is constructed by corporations like Google, Airbnb, and Apple, one sees a subject in control: in control of their life and their profiles, and in control of their attention. Mindfulness in its recent Western and self-declared secular manifestations involves the promise that its practitioner is on the way of becoming a centered subject who experiences a true connection with the world and themselves. In this instrumentalized Western sense of the term, mindfulness is an ideology, an ideology 2.0, that exactly like the more old-fashioned ideologies, helps sustain the material relations of production and consumption. Mindfulness is a mindset, or survival technique, for precarious atomized existence in late capitalism that lets people believe they have a *true connection* with the world, even though their job and housing contracts tell a different story. Finally, as Apple's world picture illustrates, mindfulness is an exercise in being alone, and even when people come together for mindfulness practice, say in a yoga class, then they do so in order to be alone. In this respect it is no coincidence that commercial yoga studios and Apple stores feel so much alike.

Kabat-Zinn's understanding of mindfulness may seem similar to Suzuki's, but it is quite different. Whereas Suzuki, in an almost-but-not-quite tautological fashion, defines mindfulness *as* everyday life without prescribing a quality of attention with which that everyday should be lived, Kabat-Zinn develops a mindfulness *for* everyday life that tells the practitioner "to be present" in all their waking moments. In Kabat-Zinn's discourse mindfulness thus becomes a state of attention one *brings to* activities like taking out the trash or doing the dishes, *in order to* transcend the fear and the pain.

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2. Wilson, *Mindful America*, 6.

# Plenary Session 3

## Human Images in the Post-Human Era

# Our Becoming-Posthuman: the Delight of Material Entanglement

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A posthumanist material feminist philosophy allows us to challenge the anthropocentric point of view by rejecting human exceptionalism and emphasizing the material embeddedness and interconnectivity of all beings. Rosi Braidotti's notion of "zoe-egalitarianism," for example, embraces and values all life and rejects any form of exceptionalism. Posthumanists call for a new ontology and a shift in our thinking about who/what we are and how we exist with the multitude of others with whom we are always related in order to move us away from harmful Humanist ontologies. Conceptualized as a mangle (Hekman 2014), a biocultural creature (Frost 2016), an exposed subject (Alaimo 2016), or a transjective being (Daigle 2017, 2018), the posthuman is still in the process of becoming.

The "becoming posthuman" that I gesture to, along with posthumanist material feminists, is a matter of acknowledging and embracing our being as posthuman, as the radically entangled and interconnected being we are and always have been, one that emerges from a manifold of affects, tensions, and relations and is constructed by them albeit always in flux, being done and undone by this web of relations, including its own relation to it. Our material entanglement with other humans, non-humans, living or non-living beings, renders us vulnerable. I argue that this is not to be understood negatively as it is generative of a new type of ethos and ethical responsibility, one that may lead to the enhanced flourishing of life in all its instances. Beyond accepting and embracing our entanglement, we must actively work toward affirming and taking delight in it. What is at stake here is building the foundation for a radically material understanding of our posthuman entanglement upon which we can elaborate ethical and political modes of thinking that foster our thriving and the unfolding of life in the mode of delight.

Taking insights from the existential feminist phenomenology of Simone de Beauvoir which I have inquired extensively and taking in consideration the material feminist critique that has been articulated in recent years, I propose that we are transjective beings, that is concomitantly transsubjective and transobjective. We are always caught up in a field of tensions and forces, being done and undone, both by ourselves and by other beings we are entangled with, doing and undoing

them as well, both subjectively and materially.[1] We are assemblages of experiences, consciousness, materiality, and so forth, and we exist in a flat ontological plane in which human exceptionalism is rejected and agency attributed to all beings. I form this concept by appealing to notions of radical material entanglement to be found in the works of Jane Bennett, Stacy Alaimo, Nancy Tuana, and Samantha Frost, among others.

A posthumanist material feminist philosophy allows us to think materiality and trans-objectivity in a way that challenges the anthropocentric point of view by rejecting human exceptionalism and emphasizing the material embeddedness and interconnectivity of all beings. It is common among posthumanist thinkers to posit a flat ontological plane in which no being takes precedence over others. Rosi Braidotti coins this "zoe-egalitarianism," a position that embraces and values all life and rejects any form of exceptionalism. As Braidotti suggests, embracing this point of view entails a far-reaching reconceptualization of the ontological plane and the beings it encompasses. She says: "the posthuman condition introduces a qualitative shift in our thinking about what exactly is the basic unit of common reference for our species, our polity and our relationship to the other inhabitants of this planet." (2013, 2) Braidotti speaks of "the posthuman condition" in reference to how we may conceive of ourselves beyond humanism. Braidotti's earlier Deleuze-inspired notion of the nomadic subject morphs into that of the posthuman while retaining its main characteristics: a fluid and hybrid being with a body that is a layer of corporeality, a substratum of living matter in which a self is grounded. This entails, as Braidotti also puts it, that "we need to learn to think differently about ourselves." (2013, 12) Understanding our being as rooted and entangled in materiality is key to that and is the first step toward embracing our beings as such, as I will argue in the latter part of this paper.

Bennett's concept of vibrant matter is important for my view. She says "I believe it is wrong to deny vitality to nonhuman bodies, forces, and forms, … I believe that encounters with lively matter can chasten my fantasies of human mastery, highlight the common materiality of all that is, expose a wider distribution of agency, and reshape the self and its interests." (2010, 122) Bennett's explicit goals are ethical and political. She wishes us to be attentive to matter and its power and thinks that this renewed attentiveness "can inspire a greater sense of the extent to which all bodies are kin in the sense of inextricably enmeshed in a dense network of relations." (13) Grounding her view in Spinoza's notion of the affective body and Deleuze and Guattari's notion of assemblage, she speaks of an "effervescence of agency" (29) that is distributed within and across individuals in the assemblage. This leads to a displacement of the subject, a deflation of the notion of agent, and a rediscovery of what we always were: beings engaged in a dance with other beings, human and nonhuman, an "interfolding network of humanity and nonhumanity." (31) An important point she makes is that the human "individual" – or more properly, the dividual – is itself an assemblage that operates within congregational assemblages. Entanglement is multilayered and runs within and

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1. This resonates with Braidotti's proposal to conceive of the enbrainment of the body and the embodiment of the mind (see Braidotti, 2018).

through the layers.

Stacy Alaimo and Nancy Tuana share this material feminist approach. Alaimo emphasizes that we are transcorporeal beings. She says, "a recognition of trans-corporeality entails a rather disconcerting sense of being immersed within incalculable, interconnected material agencies that erode even our most sophisticated modes of understanding." (2010, 17) She suggests that "the human is always the very stuff of the messy, contingent, emergent mix of the material world." (2010, 11) She embraces Nancy Tuana's view of viscous porosity, a view connected to interactionism which sees the world as composed of "complex phenomena in dynamic relationality.'" (2008, 191) She insists that our bodies have permeable boundaries (the skin, mucous surfaces, orifices) making us porous beings speared by the materiality surrounding us at the same time we seep into that materiality. This all means that we are toxic bodies with exceedingly leaky borders and as such, we are post-Humanist (indeed, the humanist subject is a solid, autarkic entity that does not leak or is not permeated by other beings). This points to the ontological vulnerability at the core of our beings, a vulnerability that can be problematic in a Humanist context wherein we try to deny it or guard ourselves against it. It can, however, and with the right mindset, be the tool we need to thrive.

In her latest book, Alaimo pushes the line of thinking on the transcorporeal. She talks of the "exposed subject [which] is always already penetrated by substances and forces that can never be properly accounted for" (2016, 5). As she points out, "agency must be rethought in terms of interconnected entanglements rather than as a unilateral 'authoring' of actions." (156) What is needed is for us to think the human being as material, as "subject to the agencies of the compromised, entangled world;" we need to embrace "an environmental posthumanism, insisting that what we are as bodies and minds is inextricably interlinked with the circulating substances, materialities, and forces." (158) This requires a radical change in how we conceive of ourselves, our world, and our relations to and within it. To quote Alaimo again one last time, "Thinking as the stuff of the world entails thinking in place, in places that are simultaneously *the material of the self* and the vast networks of material worlds." (187) I put the emphasis here on "the material of the self" because the place is radically material and not merely how one subjectively relates to one's existential situation, for example. The materiality of place permeates the being that thinks through and through, exercising its agency on this thinking "thing."

What the views examined thus far indicate, in addition to the material entanglement of beings, is that we must abandon our Humanist understanding of agency as the willful expression of freedom by an autarkic and autonomous being. We must instead embrace a notion of distributed agency, better even: distributed agentic capacity, a concept used by Diana Coole, Samantha Frost, and many others. The concept of agentic capacity is grounded in Karen Barad's famous *Meet the Universe Halfway* in which she speaks of the intra-active becoming of matter. To speak of agentic capacity definitely moves us away from a subject-object dichotomy where an identifiable and delimited subject can be identified as an autonomous agent. To say that all matter and material beings have agentic capacity allows for capturing the way in which we are done and undone by our material

entanglements and serves to further undermine the fantasy of human mastery and exception. As Samantha Frost puts it in her recent *Biocultural Creatures*, "there are many more agents afoot in the world than human exceptionalism has allowed." (2016, 10) Both a forest fire or microbe have agentic capacity and sometimes the extent of their agency may far surpass that of the human. We need a new theory of the human, according to Frost, one that "does not succumb to the conceits of old [e.g. human exceptionalism] but also does not conceptually dissolve humans as identifiable agents and thereby absolve them of the crises that mark the Anthropocene." (13) This concern, and associated attempt to establish that minimal locus of agency, is shared by many posthumanist thinkers, such as Braidotti, Alaimo, and Grosz. But where or upon what can we ground such a minimal agent? Frost proposes to conceive of ourselves as biocultural creatures. She is weary of going into the depths of the quantum field, which has been Barad's move. The level of uncertainty, indeterminacy, and unpredictability that we find at that level is such that we might as well be dealing with yet another metaphysical plane. Instead, she chooses to look into bio-chemical operations and the atomic relations of energy that ground them.

Frost demonstrates that biological processes have intentless direction. This, she says, allows us to "account for the precision and directedness of biological activity without that activity being reducible to anything at all." (2016, 28) Indeed, once one looks into the atomic field, one discovers the strict mechanics governing energy relations between particles. Tracking this through the atom, molecules, various types of chemical bondings, the operations of permeable membranes, and the role proteins and oxygen play is Frost's strategy to show that these processes are distributed throughout all matter, including, of course, the matter composing us. It serves to escape the indeterminacy and unpredictability of the quantum field and it allows for the establishment of some stability thanks to the rules governing biological processes and the intentless direction it generates. Frost seeks to escape the charge of biological determinism, or the überbiological as she refers to it, in showing that our corporeal history, our temporal unfolding and the levels of stability within change we may attain, what she calls our "itness," allow us to exercise some intentional direction amidst the intentless direction of our material foundation. As she puts it, the organism is permeated by its habitat and relies on the traffic of atoms and cells through its numerous membranes for its persistence, for life to unfold, but it also "composes and recomposes itself continuously in response to and through engagement with its habitat." (145) In this context, to speak of an inside and an outside is completely meaningless. There is no such distinction.

This is one of the key to Frost's propositions: no traffic through membranes, no life. No intermingling with one's habitat, no life. These processes are material, through and through. Entanglement is demonstrated to be fundamental to life processes when one bases one's analysis on the atom and up, focusing on biochemical reactions, like Frost does.[2] What interests me in this

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2. Referencing Timothy Morton's quip about close examinations of matter (2013), she points out that this leads to another problem: once one looks at matter that closely, matter ceases to be such (Frost 2016, 32) This leads her to question what it means for a materialist like her to claim the label "materialism" if

is the unfolding, necessary and yet open, processes that her theory uncovers since they cohere with my view of transjectivity and of the human as transjective by giving it a biochemical foundation. It is transjective and not merely transobjective because Frost recognizes culture and agency as not entirely material but as grounded in it.

We are permeated by the world we are in as much as we permeate it. As mentioned earlier, the permeability of our being renders us vulnerable. This is what I want to turn to now. This ontological fact is not to be understood negatively. Understanding it and embracing it can be generative of a new type of ethical responsibility—as per Jane Bennett—one that may lead to enhanced flourishing of life in all its instances—to give it a Spinozist twist. As Susan Hekman puts it, "Addressing the exclusion of some subjects from the realm of being must become our foremost political priority. This is [Butler'] thesis in *Frames of War*. Our politics must be oriented around broadening the norms that define human life, who counts as grievable and who doesn't." (2014, 182-3) But one must go beyond Butler and expand to the material and the nonhuman as well (something Hekman ultimately agrees with her notion of the mangle which has affinities with the notion of transjectivity)[3]. In her own critique of Butler's analysis of precarity, Rosalyn Diprose points out that the role played by non-human elements is often disregarded and by Butler in particular. Indeed, Butler misses the material constitution of humans just as often as she gestures to its potential importance. Now, interestingly and despite this critique, Diprose still ends up focusing on a human-centered shaping of the non-human through her favouring of the phenomenological notion of dwelling. And even when she claims that "precisely because human beings are not self-contained individuals, we are open to transformation by the world in which we are embedded and vice versa." (2013, 191), she still ends up hanging on to an emphasis on the subjective.

What is our posthuman vulnerability that is grounded in our entangled transjective being?[4] As Diprose points out, the Latin "vulner" means "to wound" and the usual meaning we attach to "vulnerability" is "to be susceptible to physical or emotional injury. [this understanding of vulnerability] assumes that the body is normally well-bounded and should remain so." (2013, 188) Such an understanding of vulnerability cannot apply to the transjective being. I think we need to take vulner—ability in a different sense. The transjective being is vulner—able since it is a body that does and undoes what it interacts with. It has the ability to wound, yes, but mostly to affect. The Latin "afficere" would be more appropriate and to talk of "affect—ability" a better way to describe what actually goes on. Being entangled in that affective fabric, our being is not only on

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indeed matter is no longer substantial. This may be her motivation to cling to the materially reliable and minimally substantial, as she does.

3. Hekman says: "What we have, then, is the subject as mangle. […] Subjects are mangles in the sense that they are constituted by distinct elements that intra-act to constitute the 'I.'" My argument here is that defining the subject as a mangle in this sense is the best description of the ontology of the subject available in contemporary feminist theory." (2014, 182-3)

4. In a much longer version of this paper, I explore affect theory's understanding of entanglement as it stems from Spinoza's dealings with affects and how it has been developed by Deleuze and Guattari and scholars who have been inspired by them such as Brian Massumi and Patricia Clough.

the giving end of "wounding" but on its receiving end as well. To wound is to affect. To quote Bennett again, "in a knotted world of vibrant matter, to harm one section of the web may very well be to harm oneself" (2010, 13) but further: to be harmed is also to harm. We are not self-contained entities interacting with one another. It should also be understood that "ability" here does not point to any kind of strong willful autonomous agency. To refer back to Frost, this ability is mostly an intentless one, the effect of biochemical processes without direction. This makes us, through and through vulner—able as affect—able.

Vulnerability is something we have often, if not always, sought to guard ourselves against. However, Simone Drichel makes a good point when she says "In seeking to defend ourselves, we—perversely—come to violate ourselves, or, to put this differently, what we preserve in 'self-preservation' is what makes the self 'inhuman' rather than human." (2013, 22) In an effort to protect ourselves and become invulnerable, we do violence to ourselves and dehumanize ourselves. It would be best to accept and embrace our vulner—ability and seek a multitude of experiences, recognize that a number of them will lay in the intensive field of affect that we may or may not recognize as emotions but that are still constitutive of our being. Claire Colebrook also thinks that to ignore the kind of being we are is very problematic. She identifies the denial of our vulnerability, or our constant attempt to protect ourselves from it, with Humanistic thought. She says, "The fact that we forget our *impotentiality*—that we treat humans as factual beings with a normality that dictates action—has reached crisis point in modernity, especially as we increasingly suspend the thought of our fragility for the sake of ongoing efficiency." (2014, 13) In *Frames of War*, Butler says: "the ontology of the body serves as a point of departure for […] a rethinking of responsibility […] precisely because, in its surface and its depth, the body is a social phenomenon; it is exposed to others, vulnerable by definition." (2009, 33) As we have seen, the posthuman transjective being presents itself as even more vulnerable than what Butler is offering here because its permeability lays at its very biochemical core: a being whose persistence depends on transit through its own being and on its own transit through other beings, a being whose thriving relies on its affecting and being affected by other beings, subjectively, socially, materially. Posthuman vulnerability is something we ought to cherish and nourish rather than try to guard ourselves against. One may say that this posthuman vulnerability tied to transjective affects is an ambiguous potentiality, one we need to understand and keep ambiguous.

Providing a theorization of the human and all being as transjective and radically materially entangled, a posthumanist view grounded in a Spinoza-Deleuze lineage that appeals to affect, moves us away from the centrality of a subject and its experiences which has been the entire focus of the Humanist tradition. It is a posthuman move, literally a post-humanism, that serves to defeat human exceptionalism as well. The focus on materiality and its radical entanglement is a further posthuman move that allows us to understand how our vulner—ability is constitutive of ourselves and other beings, it is the very foundation of life and what allows for life to persist. As such, it needs to be embraced, cherished, and fostered.

Rediscovering the posthuman being we have always been, our transjective being with its material constitution and the operation of affects within and across it offers a more comprehensive understanding of the multi-layers of relationality in which we are always entangled. It also allows to construe of vulner—ability in genuine generative terms. Alaimo calls for the performance of exposure, namely embracing our permeability, and she explains that "exposure entails the intuitive sense or the philosophical conviction that the impermeable Western human subject is no longer tenable. Performing exposure as an ethical and political act means … to grapple with the particular entanglements of vulnerability and complicity that radiate from disasters and their terribly disjunctive connection to everyday life in the industrialized world. To occupy exposure as insurgent vulnerability is to perform material rather than abstract alliances … The exposed subject is always already penetrated by substances and forces that can never be properly accounted for…" (2016, 5) We must actively seek what has been construed as our "undoing" in the Humanist worldview since only then will we be thriving as beings that are constantly and dynamically done and undone.

The views I have discussed all take us back to Spinoza and his understanding of affective bodies as having the potential to affect and be affected (1996). In her study of Spinoza, Hasana Sharp explains that the "politics of renaturalization" depends on an accurate ontological understanding of ourselves and our active embrace of it. As she says, "Only when we consider ourselves to be constituted by our constellations of relationships and community of affects can we hope to transform the forces that shape our actions and characters." (2011, 8) This includes the material entanglements of which we are. As she points out, there are multiple agencies at work, including what she refers to as "impersonal politics," that which allows for the conscious and personal processes to unfold (13). Making ourselves aware of the existence and operation of these processes is key to not only a better understanding but to an active embrace of a better ethos, a transjective ethics, one that immerses us in these processes rather than distinguish us from them. As she puts it, this requires "an affective orientation toward joy, which indicates an augmentation in one's power or agency." (14) It is only through such an orientation that we may take delight in our vulner—ability and thrive ethically. As Braidotti suggests, an affirmative nomadic ethics, one that conceives of the human as a radically entangled and vulnerable being, "proclaims the need to construct collectively positions of active, positive interconnections and relations that can sustain a web of mutual dependence, an ecology of multiple belongings" (2006, 250). Such an ethics is not a set of rules but rather the embrace of an ethos, the adoption of an orientation toward being, whereby one sees oneself as interconnected and one values life and its varied forms of intermingled striving. Acknowledging and nurturing our ontological vulner—ability yields ethical growth by allowing this striving to unfold for all beings. To put it in Nietzschean terms, this means affirming life in all its instances, what he coins a "sacred yes" (1969, "Of the Three Metamorphoses").

Were we ever human in the Humanist sense of the word? Have we not been "posthuman" all along? This is a line of questioning put forward most recently by Claire Colebrook (2014), for example. The idea is to claim, in the manner of Bruno Latour's *We Have Never Been Modern*, that

we have never been human. The Humanist ideals – autonomy, human exceptionalism, the rational human, the numerous dualisms– are merely concepts that have been superimposed on our reality and we constantly fail to conform to them, somewhat like Nietzsche's Christian who is doomed to sin because the ideal of Christian morality is unattainable. Living as Humanists, we are necessarily alienated because we fail to embrace ourselves and life as they are. The "becoming posthuman" that I gesture to, along with posthumanist material feminists, is precisely a matter of acknowledging and embracing our being as posthuman—or perhaps as ante-human, as the human that we were before Humanism laid its crushing ideals upon us—that is, it is a matter of being authentic about the entangled beings we are rather than imagine ourselves to be the humans we can never be. As Braidotti puts it, "we need to learn to think differently about ourselves."[5] Understanding our being as rooted and entangled in materiality is key to that and will yield an experience of our lives in the mode of delight, one that will foster our potential to affect and be affected rather than suppress it.

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5. Ibid. 12.

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# Posthumanist Entanglements: Language, Trees, and Politics

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### Introduction: Humanism and Posthumanism in the age of the Anthropocene

In the age of the 'anthropocene', the image of the human includes the entire planet, practically all of which, from bees and frogs to glaciers and ocean currents, is impacted by human technologies of production, consumption and war in advanced industrial economies. As the historical index "b.p." (before present, or before physics) confirms, there is no (longer) a nonhuman nature.[1] Conversely, by variously transforming, fostering and decimating their fellows, human beings alter their own nature in countless ways, many of which have become matters of academic research, and increasingly of public concern.[2] Thus, an appreciation for these ecological entanglements both expands and decenters the image of the human, disclosing myriad relationships on which the species depends and by which it is quite literally composed.

In this context, the image of the human developed in modern, European intellectual traditions has been criticized as a dangerous falsification of our ecological interdependencies and even as the pernicious cause of environmental destruction. As postcolonial critics emphasized, modern images of the human long reflected the domination of European imperial states and their privileged philosophical discourses, which envisioned those states as the vanguards of reason and the custodians of its global historical destiny, rationalizing colonial violence, the administration of 'developing' countries, the subordination of those deemed sub-human, and the expropriation the bodies of those people deemed incapable of education to rational autonomy. Paying more attention

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1. The 'present' in BP refers to the period following the nuclear tests of the early Cold War, which changed the distribution of radiocarbon in the atmosphere. Further compounding the ecological implications, uranium used in the bomb developed in the Manhattan Project, and the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which marked the beginning of the 'present' era, was extracted from the Shinkolobwe mine in the Belgian Congo.

2. Human beings can now manipulate DNA using CRISPPR cas9 techniques, but we also ingest the plastics we produce through the linings of cans that preserve food and the sea creatures fished from polluted oceans, altering hormones, and so personalities. A profusion of scientific studies trace these recursive entanglements. See for example, 'Early warning signs of endocrine disruption in adult fish from the ingestion of polyethylene with and without sorbed chemical pollutants from the marine environment', *Science of The Total Environment*, V. 493, No.15 September 2014: 656-661.

to deforestation and pollution, environmentalists have taken humanism to task for reducing nature to an object of rational knowledge and as "resources" for (Eurocentric, patriarchal) human self-realization. Theorists of environmental justice combine these criticisms, emphasizing the highly unequal distributions of environmental degradation across populations distinguished by intersecting lines of class, geography, gender and ethnicity. However, as feminist ecologists have argued, patriarchy, racism, and anthropocentrism were always mutually informed; gendered and racialized others were figured as sub- or non-human, and nature writ large was feminized.[3]

The ecological entanglements of modern politics and humanist philosophy can also be approached from the other direction. In retrospect, it appears that the political and economic dominance of European states and the self-aggrandizing presumptions of human exceptionalism rested not only upon military technologies and primitive accumulation but also upon relatively stable and hospitable ecologies.[4] In turn, as rising oceans, burning forests and collapsing fisheries amplify militarized competitions among states, corporations, classes and ethnic groups, they also drive a search for new modes of thought, representation and social organization by which human beings orient themselves to the biological and planetary infrastructures of their embodied lives.

Under these pressures, the language of humanism has evolved. Prominent theorists of global justice and U.N. agencies advocate for the conservation and redistribution of natural resources for the benefit of peripheral regions and indigenous peoples in the name of 'human capabilities' or 'human security'.[5] However, my concern here is with a more radical and marginal set of thinkers who align ecological politics with the displacement of the idea of the human itself. For the sake of simplicity, I here group such thinkers under the sign of posthumanism, with the caution that in not all those I include in this category so describe themselves. Posthumanism, as its proponents have explained, refers not to the material reality of ecological entanglement, which preceded and enabled both the human and 'humanism', but rather to a perspectival orientation that represents and cognizes the human as a relational, hybrid or 'cyborg' composition without essential form or purpose.[6]

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3. See Ynestra King, 'The Ecology of Feminism and the Feminism of Ecology' (1995) in Mary Heather MacKinnon and Moni McIntyre, Eds., *Readings in Ecology and Feminist Theology*, 1995, pp.150-159.

4. Recent studies in the fields of history and archaeology have begun to take account the entanglements of human ethical and political life with bacteria, animals, insects and weather patterns. Consider the following headline from The New York Times: 'Volcanoes Helped Violent Revolts Erupt in Ancient Egypt'. By Nicholas St. Fleur NYTimes 10/24/17. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/17/science/volcanoes-ancient-egypt-revolts.html (accessed 10/24/17) Cf. Kyle Harper. The Fate of Rome. Princeton. Princeton University Press, 2017.

5. Amartya Sen's emphasis on human 'capabilities', for instance, has influenced many discourses and institutions devoted to global justice. Sen advocates for a "'people-centered' approach, which puts human agency (rather than organizations such as markets or governments) at the centre of the stage." Jean Drèze and Amartya Sen. *India: Development and Participation*. Oxford. Oxford University Press, 2002, p.6

6. Donna Haraway repudiated both masculinized images of the autonomous subject and feminized images of essential nature in favor of a 'hybrid' or cyborg image of gendered humanity, understood as a composition blending human and nonhuman animals and technologies. Donna Haraway, 'A Cyborg Manifesto' in Simians, Cyborgs and Women. New York. Routledge, 1991. Today, the term 'posthumanism' is perhaps most prominently associated with the 'posthumanities' book series at the University of Minnesota press, edited by Cary Wolfe, which includes authors with diverse philosophical inspirations. See Cary Wolfe. What is Posthumanism? Minneapolis. University of Minnesota Press, 2010.

One could assemble many thinkers under the sign of posthumanism so understood.[7] Here, I will focus mainly on the works of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. Drawing on thinkers such as Alfred North Whitehead, Gregory Bateson, and Gilbert Simondon, Deleuze and Guattari described nominal individuals and groups as more or less enduring configurations - 'assemblages' in their terminology - of diverse elements and processes.[8] On their view, discrete individuals and groups emerge not from a formless "flux", as their less careful readers sometimes imagine, but instead from intersecting networks and processes (chemical, social, linguistic, climactic, geological, etc.) with different durations. Further, they suppose ecological relations are always being assembled or "becoming" and shot through with more or less powerful tendencies to dis- and re-assemble, or de- and re-territorialize in other ways. Hence, "every 'object' presupposes the continuity of a flow, every flow, the fragmentation of the object."[9]

While they made little reference to pollution, deforestation, or climate change, Deleuze and Guattari's writings have been seen as well-suited to an ecological politics, a connection made explicitly in Guattari's later writings.[10] Highlighting Bateson's influence, Robert Shaw writes, "… Guattari explores how a failure to recognize that subjectivity emerges from its relationship with the earth threatens both earth and subjectivity … This emerges as an attempt to counter the increasingly precarious relationship between human, social and environmental ecologies… it is an ecosophy, which brings an ethico-political orientation of responsibility towards the earthed and worldly subjectivity."[11] In this passage, Shaw expresses a common supposition regarding the ethical and political implications of posthumanist thought. This supposition finds a typical, which is to say simplified and exaggerated expression in a recent book by María Puig de la Bellacasa titled 'matters of care', in which she describes care as "a nonnormative necessity".[12] She writes, "… to value care is to recognize the inevitable interdependency essential to the existence of reliant and vulnerable beings", and in turn that "thinking with care as living-with inevitably exposes the limits of scientific

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7. Indigenous cosmologies have also been taken as a precursor of monistic philosophies of nature and have served as a template for the inclusion of non-human being in political constitutions. In Ecuador, for instance. See Vilaca, Aparecida. 2005. 'Chronically Unstable Bodies: Reflections on Amazonian Corporalities'. Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute Vo. 11, No.3: 445-464; Viveiros de Castro, Eduardo Batalha. Cannibal Metaphysics: For a Post-Structural Anthropology. Trans. Peter Skafish. Minneapolis. University of Minnesota Press, 2014. Cf. Francis Ludlow, Lauren Baker, et. al. 'The Double Binds of Indigeneity and Indigenous Resistance' Humanities 2016, 5, 53: 1-19. According to a recent study of forest 'degradation', "The priority is to protect pristine forests with high carbon density. The most effective way of doing this, he said, was to support land rights for indigenous people. "Those living in the forest can make a difference," Walker said." https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/sep/28/alarm-as-study-reveals-worlds-tropical-forests-are-huge-carbon-emission-source (accessed 10/31/17)

8. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus* (hereafter ATP). Minneapolis. University of Minnesota Press, 1987.

9. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. *Anti-Oedipus.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983, p.6.

10. See Bernd Herzogenrath, ed. *An [Un]Likely Alliance: Thinking Environments with Deleuze and Guattari.* Newcastle upon Tyne. Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2008.

11. Robert Shaw: Bringing Deleuze and Guattari Down to Earth Through Gregory Bateson: Plateaus, Rhizomes and Ecosophical Subjectivity', *Theory, Culture & Society* 2015, Vol. 32(7–8) 151–171, pp.167-168 Shaw does not explain what it would mean to "counter" the precarious relationship in question.

12. María Puig de la Bellacasa. Matters of Care. Minneapolis. University of Minnesota Press, 2017, p.70.

and academic settings to create more caring worlds".[13] More cautiously, Jeffrey Nealon suggests that taking "plant life" as an ontological model - understood in Deleuzean terms as a territorial, rhizomatic assemblage rather than as set of individuated animal organisms - "will hopefully" attune us better to ecological coimplications crucial in our "dark ecological times" (Timothy Morton's phrase).[14] By contrast, he claims, "the animal territory for thematizing life… tend to focus our attention on the biopolitical competition among individual organisms to the detriment of this robust sense of distributed, interconnected life".[15]

It is not far-fetched to suggest that the ideal of rational autonomy and faith in providential nature played a part in colonial destructions of indigenous peoples and ecosystems, nor that environmental ethics or politics might find affinities with a rhizomatic perspective, according to which social differences and political antagonisms emerge from complex bio-social ecologies subject to more or less abrupt transformation. On the latter view, an anti-essentialist philosophical critique of social identities and antagonisms is, paradoxically, grounded in a nature without essences. Quoting Rutsky, Cary Wolfe writes, "…to become posthuman means to participate in – and find a mode of thought adequate to - 'processes which can never be entirely reduced to patterns or standards, codes or information'".[16] As Wolfe notes, we have always been posthuman in the first sense, inasmuch as human beings are participants in processes that make and undo them, iteratively composed and recomposed by shifting relations, never the independent authors of their being or experience. What would it mean, though, to find a mode of thought "adequate" to inadequacy?[17] If we adopt the view that human ideas and sensibilities are ecologically entangled, it follows that posthumanist philosophies are also entangled, that is, they not more or less adequately represent, but rather participate in and intersect with other ecological processes.

What is the nature, so to speak, of this participation? Adopting a Hegelian conceit, some thinkers take a short-cut between ontology and politics, conceiving posthumanist philosophy as simultaneously of and for our time. That is, they suppose that contemporary configuration of human and nonhuman ecologies promulgate human philosophies of ecological entanglements and ethico-

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13. Ibid. 70, 92.

14. Jeffrey Nealon. *Plant Theory; Biopower and Vegetable life*. Stanford. Stanford University Press, 2016, pp.118-119. "The animal territory for thematizing life… tend to focus our attention on the biopolitical competition among individual organisms to the detriment of this robust sense of distributed, interconnected life". Nealon, *Plant* 119 Jane Bennet draws a line from a recognition of "horizontal" interaction among human and nonhuman agents to sensibilities, and to ecological politics. She writes, "…to note this fact explicitly which is also to begin to experience the relationship between persons and other materialities more horizontally, is to take a step toward a more ecological sensibility". Jane Bennett. *Vibrant Matter*. Durham. Duke University Press, 2010, 10.

15. Nealon, Plant 119.

16. Wolfe, *Posthumanism*, xviii

17. Wolfe discerns such modes of thought in Derrida and Luhmann, who reconcile individuation with potentiation or creativity, whereas Deleuze and others, he suggests, posit a conflict between "open" indeterminacy and "closed" systems. This does not prevent Wolfe from freely borrowing concepts from the same thinkers, including Deleuze's notion of the virtual. Wolfe insists the virtual is also "real", an odd qualification, given that Deleuze defined the virtual precisely as being "real without being actual, ideal without being abstract". Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*. New York. Columbia University Press, 1994, p. 208

political dispositions, and by implication, that their own thought expresses the promulgation by environmental crises of their own political solutions.[18] Along these lines, for instance, Richard Grusin suggests that a theory of 'radical mediation' – which understands relational processes as ontologically prior to identities and differences - is appropriate to the specific historical circumstances of *both* contemporary technosciences that operate on multiple scales of matter, and to contemporary crises, which blend social and biological or ecological activities.[19] Along similar lines, Steven Shaviro declares "The future is Whiteheadian."[20]

Must it be, though? A cursory glance at contemporary ideological and political struggles surrounding environmental crises suggests a less certain future. Looking more closely and carefully, Rob Nixon comes to nearly the opposite conclusions of thinkers such as Grusin and Shaviro. The increasing volatility of ecological conditions associated with the 'great acceleration' of the Anthropocene, he notes, coincided with the rapid growth of 'networked' perception and cognition, which transforms neural networks by which global material processes are thought and felt.[21] Rather than promote planetary ethical sensibilities, the accelerated circulation of information has overwhelmed human capacities for attention and responsiveness, making it all the more difficult to address the attritional or "slow" violence environmental degradations, the costs of which are disproportionately born by the least "connected". Countless studies have documented the deleterious effects of web surfing on attention spans, critical analysis and empathy, and for those not immediately affected, attention to the complex relationships between consumer practices and planetary biophysics is at best partial and glancing. However, the complex interdependencies sustaining human communities have always vastly outstripped human knowledge and sensibilities, and long before the advent of the internet, critics such as Georg Simmel and Walter Benjamin argued that the intensification of global networks coincided with the attenuation of sensory and affective powers.[22]

What good is caring, when knowledge concerning the interdependencies in question is so restricted? Walter Lippmann, who devoted the bulk of his studies of public opinion to documenting the frailty popular knowing in modern interconnected societies, mocked the moralist who supposed he public could be guided instead by a moral disposition: "When I am tempted to think that men can be fitted out to deal with the modern world simply by teaching morals, manners and patriotism, I try to remember the fable of the pensive professor walking in the woods at twilight. He stumbled

18. Along similar lines, Paolo Virno suggests that post-fordist models of "flexible" labor, and the corresponding precariousness of employment, embodied especially in the figure of the migrant, "reflect in historically determined ways the original lack of a uniform and predictable habitat." Paolo Virno. When the Word Becomes Flesh. Cambridge. MIT Press, 2015, p.206.

19. Richard Grusin. 'Radical Mediation', Critical Inquiry 42 (Autumn, 2015): 124-148, p. 147-8

20. Steven Shaviro. *The Universe of Things* (2014). Minneapolis. University of Minnesota Press, p.44.Cf. Shaviro. *Without Criteria*. Cambridge. MIT Press, 2009, p. 4.

21. Rob Nixon. Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor. Cambridge. Harvard University Press, 2011, pp. 11-12

22. See Simmel, Georg. 'The Metropolis and Mental Life'. *The Sociology of Georg Simmel*. Kurt Wolff, ed and trans. Glencoe. The Free Press, 1950; Walter Benjamin, 'Art in the Age of its Mechanical Reproducibility', Third Edition. Jennings, ed. *Selected Writings*. V.4 Cambridge. Harvard University Press, 2003.

into a tree. This experience compelled him to act. Being a man of honor and breeding, he raised his hat, bowed deeply to the tree, and exclaimed with sincere regret: 'Excuse me, sir, I thought you were a tree.'"[23] No misanthropist, Lippmann adds, "In some degree the whole animate world seems to share the inexpertness of the thoughtful professor."[24]

Emphasizing the sharing, Jane Bennett has argued, anthropomorphism can "catalyze" an appreciation for distributed agency and horizontal ontologies of human and nonhuman beings.[25] However, as Bennet recognizes, even if we are less cynical concerning the political value of hospitable dispositions, it is readily apparent that expansive concerns and sympathies are not the inevitable, or even the most likely response to a recognition of interdependence and vulnerability. Quite the contrary, an ecological awareness of interdependency is readily harnessed to what Roberto Esposito has called the 'immunitary' logic of biological security and a corresponding 'militarization' of the environment.[26] To use Deleuze and Guattari's terms, the de-territorializing image of post- or transhuman philosophy can be re-territorialized in commercial and political power struggles. Michael Mikulak writes**, "**in the same way that Darwinism became used to justify fascistic and nationalistic forms of power, rhizomatic theory is very amenable to reconfigurations of bios within biotechnological discourses of life". [27]

The lesson here is not that a fatalistic or nihilistic posthumanism is more historically apt than a wishful posthumanism, nor, *a la* Lippmann, that ecological politics should be left to supposed experts.[28] Rather, it is that the relationships among posthumanist philosophical ideas, ethical dispositions and political practices are neither logically nor historically "inevitable", but rather contingent on a set of evolving discursive, social and ecological entanglements. My interest, here, is in the way such entanglements are discursively described, figured, and staged by posthumanist writers. With which beings and processes do these writers place us in contact, in what manner, and to what effect? How do they extend ethical and political concerns beyond the dispossession of the proletariat to the related destruction of ecosystems? In what follows, I explore these entanglements in connection with images of interactions between human beings and trees.

Trees figure more or less prominently in the works of nearly all posthumanist philosophies. They stand, so to speak, variously for individuations (Deleuze and Guattari), for rhizomatic ecological relationships (Kohn, Haskell), and for independence of material being from human knowing (Harman).[29] Or rather, it might be interjected, they are so figured, represented or described.

23. Walter Lippmann. *The Phantom Public*. New York. MacMillan, 1930, p.28
24. Ibid. 29-20.
25. Bennet, *Vibrant*, 99.
26. See Roberto Esposito. *Bios*. Minneapolis. University of Minnesota Press, 2008. Cf. Robert Marzec. *Militarizing the Environment*. Minneapolis. University of Minnesota Press, 2015
27. Michael Mikulak, 'The Rhizomatics of Domination: From Darwin to Biotechnology', in Bernd Herzogenrath, ed. *An [Un]Likely Alliance: Thinking Environments with Deleuze and Guattari*, p.81
28. Bruno Latour has effectively criticized Lippmann's reasoning in favor of a more participatory public that includes human and nonhuman beings. See Bruno Latour. *Politics of Nature*. Cambridge. Harvard University Press, 2004.
29. See Eduardo Kohn. How Forests Think. Berkeley. University of California Press, 2013; Graham Harman, 'I am Also of the Opinion That Materialism Must be Destroyed', Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 28. No.5 (2010),

However, as posthumanists will be quick to point out, trees participate in thought, sensibilities and political practices not only by way of human language but also through biological interactions including, most obviously, symbiotic exchanges of oxygen and carbon dioxide. Human life literally depends upon trees, which not only afford a host of human technologies of production, but also sustain the atmosphere on which we depend.[30] Trees also frequently serve in human imaginaries as figures for bios, or creation as such. Thus, human relations with trees involve ecological interdependencies, symbolism, and aesthetics, all of which are intertwined. In some instances, the same trees both figuratively and literally 'inspire' human observers whose aesthetic responses and intellectual reflections are energized by the oxygen their inhale. However, again, there is no short-cut between material, symbolic, aesthetic and political dimensions of trees. Rather than formulate a general theory of trees – as task as fruitful as a search for a general theory of holes – we may instead explore some of complications and entanglements as they are theorized and enacted by posthumanist writers.

## Trees are not Trees: Deleuze and Guattari on the Arborescent and the Rhizomatic

Deleuze and Guattari are well known for prioritizing networked processes over discrete beings, or in the botanical terms they deploy, rhizomes over trees. The former signify assemblages formed by conjuncture, "and…and…and," the latter the teleological unfolding of an individual being. By replacing teleological and anthropocentric models of production with decentered processes of assemblage, Deleuze and Guattari part ways both with Hegel, and with Hegelian Marxism. In their terms, human beings neither realize spiritual purposes nor give form to raw materials, but instead "plug in" to all sorts of other "machines."[31] In their introduction to *A Thousand Plateaus*, they declare "nothing is beautiful or loving or political aside from underground stems and aerial roots, adventitious growths and rhizomes."[32] However, it would be a mistake to presume that the arborescent and the rhizomatic refer to mutually exclusive, opposite forms of life.[33] Rather, they represent different tendencies that operate simultaneously at various levels, variously composing and decomposing complex assemblages – a term that encompasses everything from biological cells to political collectives. Conceived as assemblages, all beings are distinguished by different degrees of closure, different rates of change, or different distributions of suppleness and rigidity. Thus, "… assemblages swing between a territorial closure that tends to stratify them and a deterritorializing

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p.788, qtd. in Steven Shaviro, 'Consequences of Panpsychism' in Grusin, ed. The Nonhuman Turn. Minneapolis. University of Minnesota Press, 2015, 38. I discuss the place of trees in Deleuze and Guattari's writings below.

30. Deforestation has been estimated to contribute to around three billion tons of atmospheric carbon per year, or around 10% of the total global contributions, as much as all cars and trucks on the planet https://www.ucsusa.org/global-warming/solutions/stop-deforestation/deforestation-global-warming-carbon-emissions.html#.W7FoLxNKjkK (accessed 9.28.18)

31. See ATP 435. As I argued in Chapter one, Benjamin similarly extends productive powers to non-human nature.

32. ATP 15

33. "The important point is that the root-tree and canal-rhizome are not two opposed models." ATP 20.

movement that on the contrary connects them with the Cosmos."[34] By the same token, it would be a mistake to take Deleuze and Guattari's figures literally. Trees are also machines that interact with and transform others – fungi, bacteria, deer, sunlight, beetles - and play a part in human processes, not least that of respiration. As the fortuitously named David Wood succinctly puts it, "If Deleuze and Guattari are right about trees, then trees are not trees," a formulation Deleuze and Guattari would no doubt have enjoyed.[35]

Nonetheless, given Deleuze and Guattari's metaphorical bias, it is surprising to find that their first example of schizophrenic experience involves the coupling of man and tree. They take the image of this coupling from Georg Büchner's 1836 novella, *Lenz*, a fictionalized account of a trip taken by the 18th century dramatist and likely schizophrenic Jakob Michael Reinhold Lenz to visit the reformist Lutheran pastor, Johan Friedrich Oberlin in the village of Waldbach (actually the Alsacian town of Waldersbach).[36] In particular, Deleuze and Guattari highlight the opening scenes, which dramatically narrate Lenz's perceptions and sensations as he walks through mountains and forests surrounding the village. In Deleuze and Guattari's summary of these passages, Lenz couples with "celestial machines, the stars or rainbows in the sky, alpine machines […] To be a chlorophyll- or a photosynthesis-machine, or at least slip his body into such machines as one part among the others. Lenz has projected himself back to a time before the nature-man dichotomy."[37] Yet Lenz is not just any part. For Deleuze and Guattari, Lenz exemplifies the human who, in their terms, is not master but rather attendant or "custodian" (*préposé*) of fellow machines, "not man as the king of creation, but rather as the being who is in intimate contact with the profound life of all forms or all types of beings, who is responsible even for the stars and animal life, and who ceaselessly plugs an organ-machine into an energy-machine, a tree into his body, a breast into his mouth, the sun into his asshole: the eternal custodian of the machines of the universe."[38]

As Deleuze and Guattari explain, they treat schizophrenia not only as a privileged mode of experience but also as a model of exposition. Their texts enact a rhizomatic or schizophrenic logic of conjunction, linking theories of language with biology, geology, mathematics, etc. However, apart from a few passing metaphors, they had little to say about past or present conjunctures of trees and human beings. How might the perspective they adopt be brought to bear on such conjunctures? Consider a recent book by David George Haskell, titled 'The Songs of Trees'**,** which introduces readers to a series of multispecies ecologies in which human beings and trees are co-participants, one tree species at a time. Like Deleuze and Guattari, Haskell asserts the priority of

34. ATP, 337

35. David Wood. 'Truth and Trees; or, Why We Are All Really Druidic,' *Rethinking Nature: Essays in Environmental Philosophy.* Ed. Bruce V. Foltz and Robert Frodeman. Albany. SUNY press, 2004, 38. Deleuze and Guattari write, "the question is whether plant life in its specificity is not entirely rhizomatic." ATP 6. Nealon gathers other relevant references in the course of a lucid analysis of the figure of the rhizome in *A Thousand Plateaus*. See Jeffrey Nealon. *Plant Theory*, ch.4

36. See Smith, Matthew Wilson, ed. *Georg Büchner, The Major Works*. New York. Norton, 2012 (hereafter Büchner).

37. Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983 (hereafter AO), 2

38. AO 4; Cf. Deleuze and Guattari. *L'Anti-Oedipe*. Paris. Les Editions de Minuit. 1972/3, p. 10.

relation over individual being, revealing interlaced ramifications of trees, insects, bacteria, fungi, and human communities. He writes, "The Chert-root tree seems an exemplar of individuality, its vertical trunk the antithesis of reticulation", yet "like all trees, the fir's separation is also an illusion… Every needle and root is a composite of plat bacterial and fungal cells, a weave that cannot be unknotted."[39] In his telling, trees are both components of relational entanglement between human and nonhuman beings, and models of entanglement generally. We are both connected, and alike in our incompleteness. As his title promises, Haskell's prose is riddled with extravagant anthropomorphisms. Not only do trees sing, but they also have mouths, blood, etc. However, as Haskell emphasizes, the songs he describes are also literal, comprised by sonic vibrations emanating from trunks, roots, leaves, and the 'chorus' they form with other beings, from rain on leaves to the rumble soil displaced by roots and their fungal conspirators, or the vibrations of a woodpecker's hammering in the bodies of insects. Haskell tunes into these songs by means of electronic instruments that amplify and translate subtle vibrations into the register of human audition. He then joins the chorus, placing his readers in contact with the multispecies ecologies he attends, translating amplified 'songs' into lyrical prose.[40]

As Haskell emphasizes, it is impossible to disentangle the literal and the metaphorical dimensions of influence and listening. Yet even as he eloquently ventriloquizes for his readers, he laments that 'knowledge gained through extended, bodily relationship with the forest… is more robust" than "ideas and statutes that live only in disembodied intellect".[41] Carried away by the music, he forgets that dichotomies between embodied and mediated knowing are unsustainable not only in practice but also on his own terms, which confirm that all ideas are embodied, and all language sensuous.[42] Regarding another poet in the woods in his lecture on *Symbolism*, Whitehead wrote, "Both the word itself and trees themselves enter into our experience on equal terms… Thus, for the poet in his ecstasy – or perhaps agony – of composition the trees are the symbols and the words are the meaning… For us, the words are the symbols which enable us to capture the rapture of the poet in the forest."[43] Whitehead described the reciprocal "correlation" between trees and words in his example of sylvan poetry as "the most fundamental exemplification of symbolism". As in all symbolism, language correlates experiences, tying sounds to images, smells, what have you, or vice versa. Returning these figures in *Process and Reality*, he wrote, "the word 'forest" may suggest memories of forests, but equally the sight of a forest, or memories of forests, may suggest the word, 'forest.'"[44] Dissolving the difference between human and nonhuman beings, Whitehead ascribed experience, even "enjoyment"

39. David George Haskel. *The Songs of Trees*. New York. Penguin Books, 2017, p.45.
40. Haskel. *Songs*, ix. Haskell can be seen to realize a task proposed by Bennett, namely that we "devise new procedures, technologies and regimes of perception that enable us to consult nonhumans more closely, or to listen and respond more carefully to their outbreaks, objections, testimonies and propositions." Bennett, *Vibrant*, 108.
41. Ibid. 121
42. Haskell, Songs, 191-3.
43. Whitehead, Alfred North. *Symbolism*. New York. Fordham University Press, 1927, p. 11
44. Whitehead, *Process and Reality*. New York. The Free Press, 1978 (1929), p.182

to all entities, every one of which is comprised by its relationships with, or regard for others.[45] He put the 'mentalism' in environmentalism. At the same time, he emphasized the multimedia, intersensory aspect of language, noting that the written word can suggest the spoken, the sound meaning, etc.[46] Language elicits not only cognitive meaning, but also "enveloping suggestiveness and an emotional efficacy."[47] Hence, "it is a mistake to think of words as primarily the vehicle of thoughts."[48]

Whitehead understood his philosophy in the same manner, that is, not as a set of ideas more or less representative of the world, but rather as an intervention in processes of interaction, or as he put it, a "lure" for correlated feelings and dispositions.[49] He described representational thinking, or what he called "presentational immediacy", as a partial and derivative mode of experience, one that reduces manifold embodied influences of "causal efficacy" to the discrete interactions of objects and subjects. Inasmuch as it places us in profound solidarity with all other entities, Shaviro notes, "there is more than a hint of romanticism in Whitehead's notion of causal efficacy."[50] Indeed, Whitehead found the efficacy of the world aptly communicated by the language of the Romantic poets Byron, Shelley and Wordsworth.[51] In Shaviro's words, the romantics showed that "nature cannot be divorced from its aesthetic values."[52] However, as Whitehead's offhand remark about ecstasy or agony suggests, the aesthetic values of nature, or encounters with forests, are highly variable. Wordsworth and Shelley, he noted, differently figured nature, either as a background of permanence on one hand, and as endless change on the other, a difference he traced to the contrasting landscapes in which they composed their writings.[53]

Inasmuch as all symbols elicit multisensory correlations, Whitehead suggests that "certain aesthetic experiences which are easy to produce make better symbols than do words."[54] He mentions the use of incense to evoke religious emotions.[55] What might we say about trees? In Whitehead's example of the poet in the forest, trees were nonlinguistic symbols. Elaborating on this suggestion, we might inquire into the aesthetic, and even ethico-political agency of trees. Trees operate act on human beings at a variety of levels. They exert causal influences, of course, variously mitigate

45. Ibid., p.13. Indeed, for Whitehead, one does not so much have experiences as one is a path of experiences. He writes, "we assign to the percipient an activity in the production of its own experience, although that moment of experience, in its character of being that one occasion, is the percipient itself." Whitehead, *Symbolism*, 9.
46. Whitehead, Symbolism, 11.
47. Ibid., 67.
48. Whitehead, Process, 182.
49. Isabelle Stengers describes Whitehead's thought in his own terms as a discursive technique "to induce empirically felt variations in the way our experience matters." See Stengers, 'A Constructivist Reading of Process and Reality' in Nicholas Gaskill and A. J. Nocek, Eds. The Lure of Whitehead. Minneapolis. University of Minnesota Press, 2014, p.48
50. Shaviro, *Universe*, 56.
51. He writes of Wordsworth's Prelude, "It would hardly be possible to express more clearly a feeling for nature, as exhibiting entwined prehensive unities, each suffused with modal presences of others." Whitehead. *Science and the Modern World*, New York, Macmillan, 1948/1925, 85)
52. Shaviro, *Universe* 60.
53. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World. New York. MacMillan 1948 (1925), p.87.
54. Whitehead, Process, 183.
55. Ibid.

atmospheric concentrations of carbon and modulate human experiences of elevated temperatures.[56] However, they can also elicit objects of concern and induce sensibilities and dispositions. Various studies have shown, for instance, that green spaces can remediate human sensibilities attenuated by the overstimulations of urban life, inducing more calm, reflective dispositions.[57] Might trees also imbue human beings with a sense of belonging and custodial care? In short, might they be agents of posthumanist perspectives? The question can be asked in earnest. Piers Stephens, for instance, suggests that the 'vitality' of encounters with nature depends upon "the extent to which they grant possibilities of new perception through non-instrumentalized immediate experience."[58] Thus, for instance, "the calm perception of a spider's web-work bridging two shrubs" can induce modes of attentiveness detached from the narrowing focus of instrumental consciousness, the kind of experience William James distinguished from habits.[59]

Like James, Henri Bergson, Whitehead and Deleuze privileged such moments, when instrumental bearings between subject and object are momentarily suspended in favor of sensations of indeterminate origin and location. The tenor of such experiences, vary drastically, however, ranging from ecstasy to agony, or, as Whitehead suggest in other places, "terror".[60] As he flatly put it, "feelings, divorced from immediate sensa, are pleasant, or unpleasant, according to mood."[61] Moods, in turn, are shaped by embodied encounters and symbolic correlations. The thoughts and sensations evoked by a given symbol will not be the same for every person, or in every context. Not all are calmed by the sight of spiders at work amongst their shrubs. Whitehead remarks, "… meanings are often shifting and indeterminate. This happens even in the case of words: other people misunderstand their import."[62] Inasmuch they enter our experience "on equal terms", the same can be said for trees. Their aesthetic, and so their ethic-political value, will vary along with the territories, broadly understood, in which they are encountered.

While trees have no intrinsic aesthetic value, they can nonetheless be vital components of landscapes of concern or indifference, of care and of terror. In his study of "slow violence", for instance, Rob Nixon describes several intersecting dimensions along which trees contribute to

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56. See Nicholas H. Wolff, Yuta J. Masuda, et. al. Impacts of tropical deforestation on local temperature and human well-being perceptions. *Global Environmental Change.* Volume 52, September 2018, Pages 181-189.

57. Thus, "research findings suggest that individuals' desire for contact with nature is not just the result of a romanticised view of nature, but is an important adaptive process, which appears to aid optimum functioning". Joe Barton and Mike Rogerson, 'The Importance of Greenspace for Mental Health'. BJPsych Int. 2017 Nov; 14(4): 79–81.

58. Piers Stephens, 'Liberalisms Old and New'. *The Oxford Handbook of Environmental Political Theory.* Oxford. Oxford University Press, , p.66

59. Ibid.

60. Whitehead, "An inhibition of familiar sensa is very apt to leave us a prey to vague terrors respecting a circumambient world of causal operations… the presentations of sense fade away, and we are left with the vague feeling of influences from vague things around us". Whitehead *Process*, 176; Cf. Whitehead *Symbolism*, 43 on inhibition of sense data yielding "a terrifying sense of vague presences." Deleuze and Guattari find a terror of this kind articulated by H.P. Lovecraft. "'Merging with nothingness is peaceful oblivion; but to be aware of existence and yet to know that one is no longer a definite being distinguished from other beings,' nor from all of the beings running through us, 'that is the nameless summit of agony and dread.'" Deleuze and Guattari, ATP, 240.

61. Whithead *Process*, 176.

62. Whitehead, *Process*, 183

human environmental politics. As he notes, the Green Belt Movement formed by Wangari Maathai to combat deforestation and forced dislocations in Kenya – one of Nixon's privileged examples of the environmentalism of the poor - illuminated the reverberation of tree ecosystems in social and military conflicts. In this movement, he argues, trees served a "theatrical" as well as a strategic function, playing a part in what he calls "aesthetic activism".[63] He writes, "Tree planting served not only as a practical response to an attritional environmental calamity but… in addition, a symbolic hub for political resistance and for media coverage of an otherwise amorphous issue".[64]

As these example indicate, trees not only play a crucial role as connectors and as symbols of rhizomatic entanglement, but they also situating human communities in time, or educate human temporal perspectives. They comprise a kind of slow anti-violence, thematizing the trans-generational temporality of sustainable ecologies. Trees have often played a central role in marking the durations as well as the territorial locations of trans-generational human societies. In a study of the landscapes of American activism, Daegan Miller notes the significance of "witness trees" in American colonial settlements.[65] Those trees with annual 'rings' have served as important sources for measurements of environmental change in human history. More broadly, it might be argued that the temporal perspective proper to trees is well suited to the ethical and political imaginaries of posthumanist thinkers. Deleuze and Guattari, for instance, argued that the terror which can generate hostile reactions to transversal relationships (which alter those who enter into them) should be ameliorated by retaining 'small plots', a phrase that can indicate both spatial and temporal stabilities.[66] The lifecycles of trees might serve as a mediator of sorts between the turbulence of contemporary social and ecological processes and the geological perspective implied by the term 'Anthropocene', which situates human history in long durations or "cycles" of climatological and biological change.[67]

I cannot elaborate on these speculations here, but only note, again, that none of this is inevitable, or even likely, and that the ethical or political function of posthumanist philosophies will depend upon their creative deployment in changing historical and ecological circumstances. As we explore their possibilities, we will be well served by the lessons of the canon of the humanities, which has been distinguished from that of the sciences not by the aim of discovering the essence and purposes of the human - with all its attendant exclusions and hierarchies - but rather by self-conscious attention to rhetorical, stylistic and figural dimensions of language through which ideas are communicated, and gain purchase in sensibilities and practices.[68]

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63. The relevant section of his book is titled 'The Theater of the Tree'. Nixon, Slow 132.

64. Ibid.

65. Daegan Miller. *This Radical Land*. Chicago. The University of Chicago Press, 2018, 2.

66. Deleuze and Guattari ATP, 160-161.

67. A similar temporal perspective is involved in descriptions the present as the era of the '6th extinction", which human beings are at once living through, and substantially causing. See Elizabeth Kolbert, The Sixth Extinction. New York. Henry Holt, 2014.

68. As I have argued elsewhere, Wordsworth sought to replicate "critical feelings" with his poetry, which he suggested might contribute to a remediation of a modern sensorium, and even improve inter-class social relations. See Shapiro, 'Critical Feelings and Pleasurable Associations'. *Theory & Event* 13.4 December, 2010.

# Emergent Technologies and (Post-)Human Embodiment

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## 1. Introduction

Posthuman variations of embodiment are gaining traction by the day. The movement has started quite a few years ago with unusual tattoos, plastic surgeries and attempts to bio-hack ones' own body. Imaginations of cyborgs are much older such as the classic animation of the manga *Ghost in the Shell* (Japan 1995, Mamoru Oshii), or David Cronenberg's *eXistenZ* (Germany, 1999). They are to be found in early film history, like in Fritz Lang's Metropolis (Germany, 1927). Literature has imagined cyborgs and androids for much longer, just think of E.T.A. Hoffmann's short story *The Sandman* (1816), where he describes a humanoid automaton named Olimpia, with whom the main character falls in love with. The topic of humanoid machines or human- machine hybrids fascinates the human mind long before the dawn of digital technologies.

Imaginations of posthuman life-forms today come with a change of the environment. Current utopias imagine live either in virtual realities or in smart environments (Internet of Things, IOT). Cronenberg's movie *eXistenZ* for example takes us into a whirlwind of layered and entangled virtual realities. Imagine you connect yourself via a bio-port, that is plugged into your nervous system with a VR, in which you can play out your wildest phantasies. Your biological body goes unharmed even if you got killed in VR - just as humans in the series *Westworld* (USA 2016, based on a Michael Crichton novel from 1973). They cannot be killed by the androids, even if those shoot a gun at humans. Utopias of new forms of embodiment go hand in hand with forms of disembodiment that play with the idea of experiences in a biology-free space.

The combination of experience without biology is a conundrum. How did we come to consider virtual life as a playground for enhanced experiences - experiences that have bodily consequences like the production of endorphins, increased heart rate and so on? Do we really think, our uploaded brain would enjoy chocolate cake as much as we do, even knowing that it will increase our body fat and the danger of a heart attack? Forbidden fruits are the sweetest or so they say. The sweetness of pleasures depends on cultural ideas and our bodily responses. The idea of an uploaded brain lacks at least one of them: the body. Still disembodied minds indulging in forbidden pleasures seems an

evergreen topic in science fiction as well as in the minds of creators of cutting edge technologies. Let me dig a bit deeper into the history of bodies and machines.

I am interested in the variations of embodied and disembodied forms of existence in science fiction. In the following I want to argue that science fiction movies can serve as a starting point for a phenomenology of future bodies content-wise and as a meditation on how we think and imagine future life. I take this to be an important topic because the ideas of VR, mind-upload and the dawn of a singularity are fueling our public debate even if the last two points are far from technological realizability. My hypothesis is that the danger machines represent to human life is not their growing intelligence but *how* we use them to govern social life.

## 2. Of Humans and Machines

Utopias of post- or transhuman life are rarely full-fledged positive scenarios. Though there are people in the industry, especially futurists who toy with the idea of mind-upload as a strategy to a fulfilling and sustainable future life. Most utopias or activities with utopian aspects though have something disturbing or uncanny about them. Just think of *Stelarc's* performances. In his work, he meditates on human-machine interactions that play out directly on or in his own body (e.g. *re-wired/re-mixed: event for dismembered body* (2015), *Stickman* (2017)). This mostly painful form of being hooked to machines also gives the spectator the impression of watching something uncanny going on. The artist sometimes seems to turn into an automaton or even a zombie, because his movements are governed not by himself, but a machine or even by other players that control the movements of his exosceletons or the devices he is connected to. This experimentation in embodying technology vividly shows that there is a lot of biology and materiality involved in current human-machine systems. These attempts can be understood rather in terms of disownment of bodily functions than of disembodiment in the strict sense. The body gets integrated within an ensemble of technological devices, that have not been integrated into the body scheme as it is the case with glasses or the infamous blind man's cane. The fact that technological artifacts become integrated parts of our body schemes is crucial not only for current developments in body-invasive technology and wearable industry. It has shaped already the usage of tools in the beginning of human history.

## 3. Historical Aspects of Human-Machine Relations

The first objects of clearly technological character were tools. Archeology as of now holds that the usage of tools dates back around 3.3 million years. The word *tool* was only used around 1200 A.C. What is true of tools in the stone age and now is that they have a special relation to the human body. They are shaped in a way that they correspond to the form and movement of the body. The skillful user integrates the tool into his or her body-schema. Hence, the tool becomes a part of

the body that broadens the sphere of agency of the user. This has been the predominant human-machine relation for the longest part of human history. Gilbert Simondon takes this to be one crucial reason for the alienation that seems to emanate from technology since 1900. In his work *Du mode d'existence des objets techniques* (Aubier 19893), first published in French in 1958 he holds that Karl Marx's idea that alienation of the workers' relation from the means of production is not only a question of socio-economic changes. Simondon describes a crisis of the human-machine relationship. The type of technicity in his view fundamentally changed with the rise of industrial production, which led to an alienation of humans from the means of production (Marx) and their bodily engagement with the means of production. A form of distance created the concept of the users that is to be differentiated from that of the craftsman. The users concentrate on the ends, to which technology provides a means to reach them. In that relation, knowledge of inner mechanisms of the devices becomes irrelevant and the imagination of a fully automated technology as utopia enters the scene. Though I do not believe that knowledge of the inner workings of machines is or has ever been a decisive criterion for the human-machine relation, the idea of automation is important with regard to utopias.

This crisis of the human-machine relation is rooted in a psychophysiological change: The machines in the industrial age are not integrated in the body scheme of the worker as tools were before. The worker becomes a user or an engineer, who organizes the machine, rather than bodily being engaged with it. Simondon thus recognizes the reason for this alienation within the realm of the culture of technicity. In his view, it is not only humans that lose existential connection with the technical objects but also vice versa. Technical objects also become increasingly concrete or individuated in order to achieve the optimal functioning. Also for the machines Simondon argues that the idea of the perfect automaton that can work toward a certain end with unwavering precision is an alienation of technicity. The technical objects as well as their users become subsumed under the same capitalist logic or utopia of ever increasing efficiency according to Simondon, that leaves not much room for further development.

Current developments in many sectors of industry and trade work frantically toward a "culture change", which embellishes the idea of complete automation of central work processes. Automated systems are generally thought of not only as replacing various forms of human labor, they are also predominantly invisible. We are talking of intelligent algorithms that organize supply chains, facilitate contracting, insurance processes and bureaucracy. Those systems become a new form of invisible hand. Whether it will have positive effects or not has to remain open.

If Simondon is right, then we have found at least one reason for the ambivalence of current projections of future life, where bodies become superfluous while bodily experiences seem to have a renaissance in a not overall positive way. Immersing oneself in a VR though is an entirely embodied experience since we experience our bodies in new ways while engaging in this activity. It is only the physics of the environment that is abandoned to some extent. The VR shark won't eat the user. Still most of Science Fiction scenarios give their plots another twist. The body re-emerges

within virtuality. This might be a symptom of an underlying fear of loosing the body or bodily contact within the life-world. After all it is bodily experience that reassures us of the reality of our experiences. This way of being embedded and entangled within the perceptual realm is not easily abandoned and will continue to function in augmented, virtual or hybrid environments. That is one reason why science fiction seems to be haunted by embodied minds.

When Simondon argues that machines do not broaden the human body scheme or stand in a vital relation with it as tools do, then this goes for the huge techno-ensembles like factories as well as early information technology. On the other hand, he argues that modern day technologies are not simply objects but ensembles that are intimately related with their environment and thus also with humans inhabiting and working in these environments. On a deeper level Simondon also invokes structural couplings of humans and machines in the sense that data procession and biological memory complement each other in information technology: "There is an inter-individual coupling between man and machine, when the very functions of self-regulation are accomplished better and more subtly by the man-machine couple than by man or the machine alone." (Simondon 1989, 120, my translation) Simondon explains this by the way people use data storing technologies to enhance their memory. Humans lack the capacity to keep huge amounts of information present in their minds, while machines lack the ability to integrate the data stored into meaningful sets of information. Thus, the human- machine interplay makes the best out of both worlds. This is where wearable technologies, the IoT as well as body-invasive technologies are headed too. It is still open, whether those designs will complement human cognition or just streamline it. One thing is for sure, the relation of human bodies and technology has by no means become more distant. Rather it is closer than ever. The question now is: Will technology be a prolongation of the body or vice versa?

At this point it already becomes clear that the distinction between human biology and technological artificiality becomes blurred or has little explanatory power. Human memory certainly has its biological underpinning and limits, but the way we memorize and what we memorize is deeply influenced by the use of technology. The way people used to memorize phone numbers before phones memorized numbers themselves is about to be a forgotten skill. Not only because the devices do that for us. Also, we don't dial number by number anymore. The knowledge of phone numbers in earlier times was literally in your fingertips just as your feet know, where the pedals are in the car are, or the right order of steps to tango.

This is what Maurice Merleau-Ponty (*Phenomenology of Perception* (PP), Routledge 2014) calls body memory or embodied knowledge. Huge amounts of knowledge are not propositional in the sense that you could bring it to the fore by uttering sentences in logical correct order. Most parts of knowledge and memory have to be triggered by psychophysiological relations of bodies and their environment. This not only holds for sensory-motor-skills but also for other kinds of memory. Merleau-Ponty writes: "I relate to the word just as my hand reaches for the place on my body being stung." (PP 2014, 186 [220]) The lived body plays a constitutive role in the constitution of meaning and integration of knowledge. This intimate relation of body and memory also includes media

and technological devices in general. The body is not confined to its outer skin but always reaches into the environment through extensions like tools, media and technological devices of all sorts. Basically, everything in our proximity can become integrated in skillful motor-sensory behavior (Alva Noë, Andy Clark). With micro-technologies and wearables this ecology complexifies and we need a phenomenological account of what this means for human embeddedness and the qualitative changes within our life-worlds.

## 4. Human-Machine (De-)Coupling

One obvious characteristics of our time and the near future is the disappearing of technology. Heavy hardware is rare in everyday surroundings. The huge personal computers will soon be a thing of the past. The IoT will hide intelligent and highly connected devices underneath the surface of ordinary things such as fridges, tabletops, wristbands, and even jewelry. Micro- seized technology will more and more penetrate our bodies, such as microchips. While technology seemingly disappears, it gets even closer to our bodies. It is not uncommon to regularly wear *Fitbits* or smartwatches. Pacemakers or neural implants that prevent epileptic seizures are common for a long time already. All of those devices the promise in common to make life easier, the user experience smoother and our life healthier.

These small (or even microscopic) devices and algorithms operate invisibly and might be one of the reasons why our imaginations and anxieties concerning technological developments run wild. When Elon Musk warns of the potentially deadly threat from AI one should be suspicious. Also Ray Kurzweil, who promoted the concept of the technological singularity thinks of humans as disappearing - either developing into a higher technological life-form or being outdated. Talk of humans being left behind or evolving into a whole different life-form is ubiquitous. Apart from those largely polemic discourse one could take a more phenomenological perspective on the changes in our life-worlds today.

The fears of being outrun by technology or governed by an evil big data system might be unwarranted. The development of specific technologies though can and probably will turn into a cultural crisis just like Marx's and Simondon's ideas of alienation from the means of production in the 1900's. We are faced with technologies that are governed by algorithms and heavy data exchange. The vision of the IoT describes a life-worlds that relies heavily on sensors and connectivity. That means, objects will have eyes and ears that are constantly awake. The IoT is the house that never sleeps. The fact that data collection processes, which constitute the usability of our current devices and the way interaction with them is shaped by mainly predictive algorithms has given rise to theories on the constitution of human mind through technology, namely Katherine Hayles concept of *technogenesis* (*How we think, Digital Media and Contemporary Technogenesis*, University of Chicago Press 2012) or Bernard Stieglers *epiphylogenesis* (*Technics and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus*, Stanford University Press 1998). That means technological processes inscribe

themselves into human cognition on a pre- conscious level. This is no news. Human cognition has always been shaped by contact rather than inherent genetics. But where do the dystopic fantasies arise? Futurism in technology is all about getting rid of obstacles, smooth user experiences and a better life that might ultimately leave behind the biology of our decaying bodies and finite minds. So far so good. Or not.

Movies tend to tell different stories. They are dystopian images of unjust, divided societies or other social threats. They share one pictorial logic with current futurism in technology. This is the disappearance of hardware. Most of science-fiction today envisages worlds with either outdated or no hardware at all. Instead, the body returns in sometimes violent ways. Let me end with an example: Cronenbergs *eXistenZ*.

*eXistenZ* is one of the early movies that imagine VR and their relation to the body. Around that time, a number of movies came out the still keep occupying the philosopher's mind like Matrix (1999), Minority Report (20029 or Ghost in the Shell (1995). While the first two movies resurrect the human body, Ghost in the Shell overcomes it. *eXistenZ* is somewhere in the middle. The movie is about a VR game, in which there are so many levels that nobody knows what is real or fiction. It clearly transcends the categories of reality and virtuality (as the end of the movie shows). Neither the viewer nor the protagonists get a hold of what is real. In this deep entanglement of worlds there is one salient characteristics: It is biology. Everything is as messy as it gets. Even weapons are mode of flesh and bones, game-pods are fetus-like creatures, human-machine interfaces are bio-ports, holes in the lower part of one's back with a clear sexual connotation. The claustrophobic character of the movie is constituted by the messy organic, mutated life as well as the idea that there is still a reality in which the gamers body lies dormant and vulnerable. The protagonist says: "I feel really vulnerable, disembodied." Though VR games suggest that your actual body is safe even if your avatar explodes, it only works if there is a clear consciousness of virtuality. If immersion goes as deep as to make one forget that it is a game-world, threats will become real for our embodied perception: bodily reactions will be the same as if faced with real threats.

René Descartes' dream argument comes to mind here. He holds that we have no real means to tell whether we are awake or immersed in a dreamscape. With VR this fundamental doubt concerning the veracity of our perceptions becomes a real issue. Even if we are already quite used to live an *on-life,* as Luciano Floridi puts it (*The Onlife Manifesto: Being Human in a Hyperconnected Era*, Springer 2014). Onlife, that means we are always somehow engaged in virtual and real spaces at the same time. But apart from that we still life by the idea that our bodily engagement warrants our believes about the world.

This might not be that case in a complete immersion that VR glasses today cannot give. If biological interfaces become reality, this can be possible. Then our nervous systems will become detached from bodily situatedness. Body and mind could find themselves in two different realities. We will be here and there at the same time, just like a quantum object. The movie plays out in depths how such an immersion upsets human categories and logic, because there is no possibility

to discern the status of the perceived world as either real or virtual. Maybe with a growing engagement in hybrid life-worlds we might learn how to accept such a body- mind splitting. For now, such narratives are symptomatic of a deeper attachment to our bodies than we might be aware of. Even if it is tempting to get rid of finite bodies and the threat of death, our imaginations show an even deeper fear of being trapped in virtuality.

As far as I can see, none of the science fiction movies in the last twenty years have a positive notion of disembodied life. Every narration is haunted by reverse embodiment. This calls for a phenomenological reflection on tendencies of disembodiment or rather an account of the functionality or obsoleteness of the body also in current stages like IoT or hybrid environments. The dystopian images in science fiction seem to be symptomatic for a crisis of human embodiment in analogy to what Simondon described for the alienation of humans and their means of production in the industrial revolution. Understanding human embededness in hybrid or virtual realities might proof as important as a reflection on the changes in labor and concepts of human work, because all of these shifts in the make-up of our life-world bring about qualitative shifts in perception as well as in values and ethical norms.

# Parallel Session 1

# Images of Uncertainty in Contemporary Historiography
## 19th-Century Emotional Legacy and 21st-Century Challenge

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The 21st century is very different from the 19th century as seen from its external manifestation. While the 19th century was ambitious to see the world as ordered, governed, and "scientifically" well interpreted like never before; the 21st century so far, by contrast, has been confronted with the tricky problems of "post-truth".

In the post-truth world of the 21st century, history, like journalism, has become much more truth-seeking than ever. But "truth" in this context is not as simple as "fact" or "fact-checking". *Oxford Dictionaries* demonstrates this by defining the term "post-truth" as such: "relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief".[1] In other words, facts are not enough. As Matthew d'Ancona emphasizes: "In many (perhaps most) contexts, facts need to be communicated in a way that recognises emotional as well as rational imperatives".[2]

It means, the legacy of the 19th century's factual narration can no more meet the needs of our contemporary world. Even though the 21st century has to manage very similar problems which the 19th century had faced, such as nationalism, racism, extremism, global capitalism, tsunami-like changes caused by various kinds of industrial revolution, enormous inequality in wealth and opportunity, and even nihilism. In other words, after the end of the Cold War, the world has not stepped onto the path as Francis Fukuyama prophesized as "the end of history",[3] but many problems evident in the 19th century have returned with their emotional powers, further enhanced by better-marketed digital tools.

This paper aims to reflect first on the humanist foundation of the 19th century historical writing and visual documentation, and on this basis to ask the following two questions: why people cannot end the 20th century as easily as people did in the *fin de siècle* with forward-looking manifestos for artistic and cultural movements (such as expressionism and modernism) and how we should think afresh about the human image in the time of the digital-revolution world to avoid overconfidence

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1. https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/word-of-the-year/word-of-the-year-2016.
2. Matthew d'Ancona, *Post-Truth: The New War on Truth and How to Fight Back* (London: Ebury Press, 2017), p. 127.
3. Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" *The National Interest* 16 (1989): 3–18.

and pay more attention to human vulnerability?

## 1. How human images were created in a changing world: from the Renaissance to the 19th century

The modern concept of "humanities" comes primarily from the Renaissance *studia humanitatis*. With the study of languages, literatures, history, and moral philosophy, the Renaissance humanists aimed to legitimize their pursuits for cultural innovation, and they expressed their self-confidence in various discourses on the relationship between the past and the present. Francesco Petrarca (1304-1374), the founding father and great representative of Renaissance humanism, compared in his autobiographical writing project of the *Familiarium rerum libri* (1351-1366)[4] his wandering lifestyle to Odysseus' journey; and with this, Petrarca not only identified himself with the blind bard Homer, but also made himself a new kind of intellectual in a changing time, who was eager to drop out the learnings of the nearest past by labelling it as the "Dark Ages,"[5] and who was also ambitious to revive the literary heritage of the distant past for the current new cultural movement.[6] Hence, both "*all'antica*" and "*ad fontes*" demonstrated clearly the Renaissance humanists' self-confidence to be able to reconstruct history as a true story with their linguistic and literary competency.

The humanists indeed have changed the world with astonishing accomplishments with their philological craft. In Italy, *Treatise on the Donation of Constantine*, written in 1440 by Lorenzo Valla (1407-1457), attacked the foundation of papal claims to secular asset in Italy with a forgery document and consequently paved the way for the Reformation. In the Netherlands, for going back to the original source of the Christian faith, Desiderius Erasmus (1469-1536) published in 1516 the first ever critical edition of the Greek New Testament to the public, and empowered Martin Luther in the following year to start the Reformation movement. The humanistic achievements of the critical study of literary texts established a long-lasting positive self-image of the students of humanities, and made them believe in obtaining the power of discourse to narrate and interpret the happenings in the world for the sake of truth,[7] as Eugenio Garin declared that the modern conception of history appeared on the terrain of humanist "philology" at just the point where the "consciousness" of the "novelty" of humanism arose.[8]

Since the 19th century, advances in the field of humanities has been brought forward more and more through institutionalized professionalism. History, for example, has been established as an

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4. Francesco Petrarca, *Familiarium rerum libri* XXIV, I, 1, 21-23.
5. Theodore E. Mommsen, "Petrarch's Conception of the 'Dark Ages'," *Speculum* 17,2 (1942): 226-242.
6. Peter N. Miller, "Major Trends in European Antiquarianism, Petrarch to Peiresc," in José Rabasa, Masayuki Sato, Edoardo Tortarol et al. (ed), *The Oxford History of Historical Writing, vol. 3, 1400-1800* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 244-260, esp. pp. 247f.
7. Donald R. Kelly, "Philology and History," in: José Rabasa, Masayuki Sato, Edoardo Tortarol et al. (ed), *The Oxford History of Historical Writing, vol. 3, 1400-1800*, pp. 233-243.
8. Eugenio Garin, "review of Franco Simone, *La conscienza del rinascimento francese*," *Rinascimento* 1 (1950), p. 97, quoted from Donald R. Kelly, "Philology and History," p. 233.

academic field for university education at Berlin University in 1810. The German model of the professionalization and institutionalization of humanities studies not only influenced other European countries and the United States; but faced with the challenges of the western superiority through the notions of "modernity" and "progress", Japan, other East-Asian countries as well as other countries around the world strived to catch up with the West.[9] However, the professionalization and institutionalization of history in the 19th century did not intend to survey things human in the universal experiences of human beings. Instead, it served a nationalistic purpose. Just as Georg G. Iggers said:

> In Germany, and later elsewhere, the professionalization of historical studies went hand in hand with the determination to explore the national past [.....] with the new methods of the discovery and the critical examination of sources. [.....] Thus there was a contradiction where historical studies underwent a process of professionalization between lip service to objectivity and a conscious commitment to nationalist ideologies.[10]

Of course, the 19th century's professionalization of the historical studies did not come by itself. It was a result of the nation state (or the nation-state building in progress) which needed national history to consolidate its legitimacy. For this purpose, the state became the most important supporter for the historical studies, and thus national historical writings tend to focus on two main themes: homogeneity and progress.

Due to the importance of getting acknowledgement from academic organizations to prove one's qualification, even photographers of the 19th century tried hard to gain memberships to academic associations to accredit the intellectual quality of their visual documentation. John Thomson (1837-1921), a native of Scotland, for example, won a membership of the Royal Ethnological Society of London and became a fellow of the Royal Geographical Society before publishing his first photography book in 1867.

Thomson was the first Westerner who made use of the newly invented photography technology to document Asia through the lens. From 1862 onwards, he travelled extensively and took photographs in Singapore, Siam (Thailand), Cambodia, Vietnam, Hong Kong, China and Taiwan (at that time called "Formosa"). As a professional photographer, he knew well that the best way to enhance the reputation of his photographic works was to connect his visual documentation with the academic disciplines. So, before he published his first book *The Antiquities of Cambodia* in early 1867, he became a member of the Royal Ethnological Society of London and a fellow of the Royal

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9. Jürgen Osterhammel, *The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 2014), pp. 798-808; Lynn Hunt, *History. Why it matters?* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2018), pp. 42-54.
10. Georg G. Iggers, "The Intellectual Foundations of Nineteenth-Century 'Scientific' History: The German Model," in: Stuart Macintyre, Juan Maiguaschca and Attila Pók, *The Oxford History of Historical Writing, vol. 4: 1800-1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 41-58, here 46.

Geographical Society in 1866.

In April 1871, Thomson, accompanied with the Scottish missionary Dr. James Laidlaw Maxwell (1836-1921), embarked on an expedition in the regions of the native tribes in southern Taiwan. In this expedition, Thomson not only achieved perhaps the most important image pairing in his ethnological project of the Natives of Formosa, (Fig. 1) but produced the first photographicell documentation of the island.



Fig. 1 John Thomson, A group of Pepohoan natives standing outside a Poah-be chapel, Formosa. 1871. https://wellcomecollection.org/works/f4g3nrxv (CC by Wellcome Collection)

Thomson named the native people he photographed "Pepohoan," (now called Siraya). In Baksa—the only native village Thomson visited during this journey—he sought to frame the inhabitants' ethnical characteristics according to the norm set by the Royal Ethnological Society of London[11] in front, half profile and three quarter profile photos. Thomson's approach signals the 19th-century's awareness to use photography as the most progressive technology to document the natural and cultural history of the world's remote regions. In addition, by putting context and informed narratives next to the photographs, he presented his photographic projects as academic research ones.

Fig. 2 is another photo taken by Thomson in Baksa. The various postures of the village inhabitants add a very cool mood to the photo and makes it look like a photo of a pop rock band. However, these seemingly cool postures were in fact intentionally arranged by Thomson for the visual documentation of racial types of "Pepohoan" for physical anthropological studies. Likewise, although the Formosan native people are pictured within their dwelling and surrounding landscape

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11. The predecessor of the Royal Ethnological Society of London (founded in 1843) is "Aborigines' Protection Society" (founded in 1837).

(Fig. 3), such kind of seemingly "casual images" are captured under some extent of intentional arrangement like the previously mentioned one.



Fig. 2 John Thomson, Pepohoan natives, Formosa.
https://wellcomecollection.org/works/zjwkvz8x
(CC by Wellcome Collection)



Fig. 3 John Thomson, Pepohoan natives, Formosa. 1871.
https://wellcomecollection.org/works/x3d52xpv (CC by Wellcome Collection)

After returning to Britain, between 1877 and 1878 Thomson joined with the socialist journalist Adolphe Smith in a magazine project called *Street Life in London* to photograph the street life of the London poor. The composition of the book, in the form of word-and-image combination, encourages readers to read a single photographic image alongside an accompanying text, to understand the living conditions of economically disadvantaged Londoners. Thomson made all the photographs and wrote or contributed to about one-third of the essays.[12] In the opening section of the book's first text titled "London Nomades," Thomson wrote:

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12. Emily Kathryn Morgan, *Street Life in London. Context and Commentary* (Edinburgh & Boston: MuseumsEtc, 2014), p. 19.

In his savage state, whether inhabiting the marshes of Equatorial Africa, or the mountain ranges of Formosa, man is faint to wander, seeking his sustenance in the fruits of the earth or products of the chase. On the other hand, in the most civilized communities the wanderers become distributors of food and of industrial products to those who spend their days in the ceaseless toil of city life.

[.....] To them the future is almost uncertain, and as far beyond their control, as the changes of wind and weather.[13]

With the trope of "nomad," Thomson drew an analogy between the Formosan natives and the wandering urban inhabitants of London. However, Thomson viewed the Formosan natives as leading a life in accordance with nature, while the street poor of London as living a sort of life out of the civilized order, hence full of uncertainty and far beyond their control. Contrary to the pictures taken by Thomason in various parts of Asia with some extent of academic research purpose, *Street Life in London* was consciously not composed for scientific study, but rather as a kind of "concerned popular journalism."[14] As Emily Kathryn Morgan argues that:

the photographic illustrations of street scenes, act as a kind of constraint on its own content. Smith and Thomson simply could not confront controversial or indelicate topics, because photographic illustrations of certain subjects would have been too real for their Victorian audiences. They could not risk a charge of indecency, so they excluded some topics that other studies of the London streets did confront—prostitution, for instance. Their study thus avoids titillation, but it also proves unable to confront some difficult truths.[15]

John Thomson laments the "London Nomades," but accepts the living circumstances of Formosa's natives without making further inquiries. Thomson's endeavor to make visual documentation abroad and inland characterizes the 19th-century awareness of photography as a new technology for modern historical records. Besides, for establishing a well ordered and homogenous imagination of his time for the benefit of the nation state, he was from time to time unaware of his failings to perceive the alternative ways of life or feelings of minorities properly as they meant to be. His deliberate avoidance of confronting with controversial topics also manifests his ambivalent attitudes toward the faithful recording of the visible world.

Thomson's example recalls the problematic heritage of the 19th-century humanities, which tended to create a massive amount of studies on homogenous and distinctive cultural legacy for constructing a certain community's collective identity and ideology. Of course, the remarks stated

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13. John Thomson and Adolphe Smith, *Street Life in London* (London, 1877), p. 9.
14. Emily Kathryn Morgan, *Street Life in London. Context and Commentary* (Edinburgh & Boston: MuseumsEtc, 2014), p. 200.
15. Ibid., p. 200f.

by Jürgen Osterhammel is still very instructive:

> Western academic study of other cultures, in spite of all the annoying arrogance that came within it, was not just a destructive intrusion into vibrant non-European cultures of scholarship but also a founding impetus for the globalized sciences of the contemporary world.[16]

But it is also important not to forget that the compassion for "the other" and the respect for intersubjectivity should be taken seriously to counterbalance the one-sided emphasis on nation-state.

## 2. The Spreading of Surrealism and the Suppressed Voices

To defy the rationalism and collective imagination stimulated by fanatic nationalism before and after World War I, the French poet and critic André Breton (1896-1966) published *The Surrealist Manifesto* in 1924 and thus started the Surrealism movement of visual art and literature. Surrealism aims to reunite human's conscious and unconscious realms of experience, and takes the world of dream and fantasy into the everyday rational world into a kind of an "absolute reality," as Breton calls it in *The Surrealist Manifesto* as a "surreality."[17]

Surrealism arrived in Japan in 1925 during the turbulent transformation from "Taishō Democracy" to the rise of the military state with an increasingly conservative stance. In this tense historical context, it is no surprise that the first translations of surrealist texts into Japanese were done by anti-academic poets.[18] Surrealism was received in Japan primarily as a kind of anti-mainstream and anti-nationalistic cultural movement. Its dissemination was brought forward by personal interest and local groups, in Kobe even by anti-fascist activists.[19] In contrast to the European Surrealism, which drew heavily on theories adapted from Sigmund Freud, Japan's Surrealist artists were more interested in the creation of surrealist imagery of anti-establishment and anti-war rather than depictions of the unconscious *per se*.

Yamamoto Kansuke (1914-1987) began his photographic career with Surrealism. In 1932, he created a series of photos with the same title *The Developing Thought of a Human (Fig. 4). With these series he claimed himself as a thoughtful young man beginning to articulate his beliefs through photography.*[20] *Unfortunately* by the late 1930s, Japanese society was radically altered

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16. Jürgen Osterhammel, *The Transformation of the World*, p. 820
17. André Breton, "The First Manifesto of Surrealism," in Charles Harrison and Paul Wood (ed), *Art in Theory 1900-1990. An Anthology of Changing Ideas* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 432-439, quote at p. 436.
18. Majella Munro, "Dada and Surrealism in Japan," in: David Hopkins (ed), *A Companion to Dada and Surrealism* (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2016), pp. 144-160, quote at p. 145.
19. Ibid., p. 151.
20. Amanda Maddox, "Disobedient Spirit. Kansuke Yamamoto and his engagement with surrealism," in: Judith Keller and Amanda Maddox (ed), *Japan's Modern Divide: The Photographs of Hiroshi Hamaya and Kansuke Yamamoto* (Los Aneles: The J. Paul Getty Museum, 2013), pp. 180-202, here p. 185.

due to the acceleration of militarization. While the "Thought Police" (tokko) deemed Surrealist art subversive, Yamamoto came under fire for his dissident avant-garde pursuit and was interrogated around 1939.



Fig. 4 Kansuke Yamamoto, "The Developing Thought of a Human… Mist and Bedroom and" (1932) hand-colored photocollage, © Toshio Yamamoto, Nagoya City Art Museum. *1932.*

At that time, Taiwan was under Japanese colonial rule (1895-1945), and in 1933 under the influence of Japanese surrealism seven Taiwanese and Japanese poets built the poetry society »Le Moulin« (Feng-Ch'e »Le Moulin« Poetry Society風車詩社) in south Taiwan, among whom, Chih-Chang Yang (楊熾昌1908–1994), Hsiu-Er Lin (林修二1914–1944), Chang- Juei Lee (李張瑞 1911-1952). It was the first instance of Taiwanese writers taking part in an international avant-garde movement. These surrealist poets ignored traditional rural culture and affirmed instead the uniqueness of the individual, valuing the private world of imagination over collective identity and values. For them, surrealism constituted a refuge granting freedom of expression and expressing protest, as Chih-Chang Yang stated as follows:

> There are many techniques and methods of literary creation, but realism was sure to invite a cruel incarceration of letters by the Japanese, I thought. And so we introduced the method of »surrealism«, which was showing progress at the moment in France, and thus glossed over the exposure of the heart.[21]

»Le Moulin« only lasted a year. The era was moving toward war and the Japanese government frowned on avant-garde pursuits in arts and literatures domestically and in the colonies. The

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21. English translation quoted from: Julia Schulz, "In Search of Taiwanesness in Modern Taiwan Poetry," *Studia Orientalia Slovaca* 11,1 (2012): 27-42, quote at p. 29.

infamous *Peace Preservation Law* forced artists and poets to conform to the military propaganda if they wanted to continue making artistic creation. After World War II, the poets did not escape from political suppression. In the White Terror years of Taiwan (1949-1987), Chang-juei Lee was accused of political activism and executed in 1952.

It wasn't until 1990s that the Taiwanese literature studies rediscovered the poetry of »Le Moulin«. In 2016, the documentary filmmaker Ya-li Huang (黃亞歷) shot a movie about the demise of »Le Moulin«-poets and made their story widely known in East Asia.[22] In order to capture the lost generation of avant-garde surrealist poets, Huang pictured few faces in the film. Instead he chose to show hands, movements and voices (Fig. 5). In the end of the film, a hand throws books of poetry into fire to indicate the suppressing and silencing of individual voices (Fig. 6), metaphorically the imagery is the opposite of Max Ernst's painting *At the First Clear Word* (1923, Fig. 7).



Fig. 5 Film still of »Le Moulin« by Ya-li Huang (2016).



Fig. 6 Film still of »Le Moulin« by Ya-li Huang (2016).

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22. Kaori Shoji, "'Le Moulin' gives a voice to Taiwanese poets who wrote under Japan's colonial rule," *The Japan Times* (Aug. 9, 2017). https://www.japantimes.co.jp/culture/2017/08/09/films/le-moulin-gives-voice-taiwanese-poets-wrote-japans-colonial-rule/#.W5IZCS33XUo

Fig. 7 Max Ernst, *At the First Clear Word*. 1923. Kunstsammlung Nordrhein-Westfalen, Düsseldorf.

## 3. Human Images in the Cold-War Era

Unlike the freedom people once enjoyed in the early 20th century as the American novelist F. Scott Fitzgerald described in his novel *The Great Gatsby*（1925): "I was within and without, simultaneously enchanted and repelled by the inexhaustible variety of life", in the Cold War era people were consciously and unconsciously restricted by political taboos. Luckily, the bipolar struggle between two superpowers gradually gave way to a more flexible pattern of international co-existence in which the cultural creation could be free from splitting into absolutely opposed blocs.

Vivian Maier (1926-2009), a posthumously discovered photographer in 2010, who liked to photograph bizarre scenes in ordinary life (Fig. 8), revealed the eccentric sides of the modern society. From the 1950s, she had been photographing urban life and anonymous people wherever she went.[23] Her objects rarely look directly into her camera, and there is no pre-conceived normative intention in her way of taking a picture. She captures the fleeting facial expressions of children in the street (Fig. 9) as worth-pondering mini-narratives in the contemporary mundane urban life without idealizing or criticizing. She photographed an aged man sleeping heavily in the bleached sand without giving any indication of the sitter (Fig. 10). Vivian Maier presents the world an abundant legacy of more than 100,000 images of how people live their lives in the 20th century and leaves us the freedom to interpret and imagine the context of these pictures.

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23. Parul Sehgal, "Vivian Maier, Through a Clearer Lens," *The New York Times* (Oct. 31, 2017). https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/31/books/review-vivian-maier-biography-pamela-bannos.html; Florence Waters, "Vivian Maier; eccentric amateur street photographer or maverick?" *The Telegraph* (July 11, 2011). https://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/photography/8629991/Vivian-Maier-eccentric-amateur-street-photographer-or-maverick.html

It is also noteworthy that Maier paid much attention to the unconsciously standardized behavior in women's and men's action too (Fig. 11-12). Through Vivian Maier's lens we can catch a glimpse of the world after WWII, in which pluralism has been valued increasingly. However, people still tend to act or dress themselves unconsciously in conformity for certain reasons. It's no wonder that the afore-mentioned off-work pictures of the better-off share some standardized stylistic features with the scenes captured in industrialized working circumstances (Fig. 13-14).



Fig. 8 Vivian Meier, *Self-Portrait*. 1955.
VM1955W03420-05-MC
http://www.vivianmaier.com/gallery/self-portraits/#slide-13



Fig. 9 Vivian Meier. September 1953. New York, NY. VM1953W03393-05-MC
http://www.vivianmaier.com/gallery/street-4/#slide-34

Fig. 10 Vivian Meier. August 22, 1956. Chicago, IL.
VM1956W03431-10-MC.
http://www.vivianmaier.com/gallery/street-3/#slide-33



Fig. 11 Vivian Meier. October 31, 1954. New York, NY.
VM1954W03413-05-MC
http://www.vivianmaier.com/gallery/street-5/#slide-1



Fig. 12 Vivian Meier. 1950s. Chicago, IL.
VM195XW00138-11-MC
http://www.vivianmaier.com/gallery/street-4/#slide-37

Processing tobacco leaves at J. R. Freeman Cigars, Cardiff, in the 1950s (Image: J. R. Freeman photographs@Gallaher Ltd)

Fig. 13 Tobacco factory, Cardiff, 1950s. https://www.walesonline.co.uk/lifestyle/nostalgia/women-who-helped-make-modern-12588864



Fig. 14 A 1950's labor intensive Dagenham production line at the English Ford factory http://i.telegraph.co.uk/multimedia/archive/02379/dagenham_2379618b.jpg

In the 1960s and '70s, with the gradual economic rise of East Asia, the uniform image of factory production line in East Asian had become a common image too (Fig. 15-16).



Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda at the opening reception with Ricoh president Kiyoshi Ichimura in May 17, 1962



Fig. 15 The camera company Ricoh's Ohmori Plant and General Research Laboratory, Japan (1962) https://www.ricoh.com/about/company/history/pdf/1936_1969/all.pdf

Assembly line for wristwatches at a Seiko factory around the year 1970. The number of timepieces produced in Japan grew by leaps and bounds in the 1960s and 70s, thanks to strict quality controls and efficient mass production launched by the industry in the second half of the 1950s.

Fig. 16 Assembly line for watches at a Seiko factory, Japan. c. 1970.
https://web-japan.org/niponica/niponica17/en/feature/feature02.html

To some extent, this kind of homogenous repetitive working pattern leads to the struggle of the 1968 movement to unmask new forms of social control. As Richard Wolin says, "The discourse of everyday life allowed the sixty-eighters to address fundamental questions pertaining to the quality of lived experience in the modern world."[24]

In 1980s as postmodernism reached its heyday, what's the "lived experience" for an illegal immigrant with extraordinary artistic talent?

Teching Hsieh (謝德慶，1950- ), a pioneer of performance art in Taiwan, arrived 1974 in the USA by ship-jumping and became an illegal immigrant in New York for 14 years until he received amnesty in 1988. Once there, Hsieh was ensnared in the dull life. He made a living at Chinese restaurants or by doing construction jobs. His immigration status, or lack of status, informed his art but also made him an outsider.[25] For turning his isolation and alienation in the foreign city into art, he embarked from April 1980 onward on a *One Year Performance. Punching the Time Clock on the Hour* (Fig. 17). By stenciling his name unto a uniform, shaving his head, and punching a time clock hourly, Hsieh essentially denied himself sleep for a whole year. During that year, Hsieh behaved in accordance with the self-imposed requirement (Fig. 18-19).[26] With the 6-minute resulting documentation of a 16 mm movie, we see how much the passage of a year really means: with his hair growing long and he eyes looking bleary, his appearance became different, but his facial expression remained almost the same unsmiling feature in all the 8,672 mugshots.[27] This

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24. https://www.britannica.com/event/events-of-May-1968.
25. https://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/01/arts/design/01sont.html.
26. https://www.guggenheim.org/arts-curriculum/topic/experiential-performance-art.
27. Adrian Heathfield and Teching Hsieh, *Out of Now. The Lifeworks of Teching Hsieh* (Cambridge MA.: The MIT Press, 2009), pp. 30-36.

*Time Clock Piece* recalls the futile labor of Sisyphus in Greek mythology. Sisyphus was forced to roll a rock repeatedly up a mountain, only to watch it fall down again. In other words, by demonstrating the endless reoccurrence of industrial labor, Hsieh showed his lived experience in the New York lower society as an illegal immigrant, and at the same time, he probed the questions of the existential human condition. [28]



STATEMENT                                    April, 1980

I, SAM HSIEH, plan to do a one year performance piece.

I shall punch a Time Clock in my studio every hour on the hour for one year.

I shall immediately leave my Time Clock room, each time after I punch the Time Clock.

The performance shall begin on April 11, 1980 at 7 P.M. and continue until April 11, 1981 at 6 P.M.

Sam Hsieh

111 HUDSON ST 2FL N.Y.C. 10013

Fig. 17 Teching Hsieh's statement of *One Year Performance. Punching the Time Clock on the Hour*.



Fig. 18 Teching Hsieh, *One Year Performance. Punching the Time Clock on the Hour*. 1980-1.
https://www.guggenheim.org/arts-curriculum/topic/experiential-performance-art

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28. https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/australia-culture-blog/2014/apr/30/tehching-hsieh-the-man-who-didnt-go-to-bed-for-a-year.

Tehching Hsieh
*Time Clock Piece (One Year Performance 1980–1981)* 1980–1
Tate T13875
© Tehching Hsieh

Fig. 19 Teching Hsieh, *One Year Performance. Punching the Time Clock on the Hour*. 1980-1.
https://www.tate.org.uk/research/research-centres/tate-research-centre-asia/ev
ent-report-tehching-hsieh

## 4. Human images in the digital-revolution world

In the past, rationality was valued as the most salient feature that distinguishes humans from other animals. By overlooking human inclination to be governed by bias and irrational choices, previous humanities studies have not paid enough attention to explore the unstable, or even fearful sides of human nature. But just as the 2017 Nobel prize laureate for economics Prof. Richard H. Thaler reminded us, people are liable to make choices with bias and overconfidence and "[i]ronically, the existence of formal models based on this misconception of human behavior is what gives economics its reputation as the most powerful of the social sciences".[29] Likewise, the American lawyer and social justice activist Bryan Stevenson appeals to a more authentic understanding of human limitations as he states in his book *Just Mercy* as follows:

> Paul Farmer, the renowned physician who has spent his life trying to cure the world's sickest and poorest people, once quoted me something that the writer Thomas Merton said: We are bodies of broken bones. I guess I'd always known but never fully considered

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29. Richard H. Thaler, *Misbehaving. The Making of Behavioral Economics* (London: Allen Lane, 2015), p. 19.

that being broken is what makes us human. We all have our reasons. Sometimes we're fractured by the choices we make; sometimes we're shattered by things we would never have chosen. But our brokenness is also the source of our common humanity, the basis for our shared search for comfort, meaning, and healing. Our shared vulnerability and imperfection nurtures and sustains our capacity for compassion.[30]

The 21st century has been facing the common problems of digital revolution. Whether we will see more change in human history than the people of the 19th century, is still an open question. People in the 19th century witnessed the introduction of the railway and electric telegraph influencing the projection of global history. The railway brought increased mobility but, it also destroyed localism and forced local market to be closed down. The railway brought a degree of homogeneity necessary for the power-centralization of nation states, just like the invention of electric telegraph made imperialist control and cross-continental administration more feasible.[31] However, the 19th century teaches us not to ignore the traumatic experiences of many hundreds of thousands of people who are suffering from the disasters caused by nationalism, imperialism, extremism, and technological disruption. These four common problems are the 19th century's legacies for our time and can only be solved, by acknowledging human limitations in confrontation with a rapid changing time, through the cooperative turn to shape the contemporary humanities with more empathy and compassion for "the other".

If Renaissance humanism founded seven hundred years ago was more confident in establishing a new world with human omnipotence and 19th-century scholarship was keen to interpret our living world with "scientific" analysis, nowadays we need to go along with the natural world and man-made world with more modesty. The increasing warming of the Arctic and Antarctic as shown in Ragnar Axelsson's photographic work (Fig. 20) should be slowed down through an effective global cooperation in sustainable and environment-friendly industrial production for the sake of future generations. The global order should not be defined only according to the needs of hegemonic countries.

The contemporary humanities also need to help people of our time to face changes and find better ways to deal with confusion and instability caused by the digital revolution. Since the coming of the printing press in the 16th century and the industrial revolution in the 18th century, the digital technology is the most drastic challenge for human culture (Fig. 21). It will put an end to the imagery of endless reoccurrence of industrial human labor as manifested in the photos of the 20th-centurty factory production line and as showcased in Teching Hsieh's performance art. Furthermore, artificial intelligence can also be turned into very effective surveillance technology and massively abused by authoritarian rulers to build digital police states.

30. Bryan Stevenson, *Just Mercy. A Story of Justice and Redemption* (New York: Spiegel & Grau, 2014), p. 289.
31. Ian Mortimer, *Centuries of Change. Which Century Saw the Most Change and Why it Matters to Us* (London: The Bodley Head, 2014), pp. 231-240.

Fig. 20 Ragnar Axelsson. *The World is Melting*. 2015.
https://icelandmonitor.mbl.is/news/nature_and_travel/2015/10/16/arctic_2015_where_the_world_is_melting/#



Fig. 21 Robotics and Artificial Intelligence of the 21st century
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/mar/24/millions-uk-workers-risk-replaced-robots-study-warns

Although the world image of our time with all these challenges is no more clear, stable, and well-defined as before, and people in the end of the 20th century could not like people in the *fin de siècle* be so confident to propose forward-looking manifestos for artistic and cultural movements, the contemporary humanities are not necessarily connected with apocalypticism as previously announced "the End of the World" in the year of 1200 or 1500 by influential scholars in Europe or something similar in the rest parts of the world.[32] Stepping out the self-proclaimed rational superiority and human overconfidence, we will have a more authentic and modest human image (Fig. 22) which strives for environmental sustainability and for more commitment to getting along with "the other" for individual wellbeing and global peace.

32. Eric Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes. The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991* (London: Abacus, 1995), pp. 558-585; John M. Court, *Approaching the Apocalypse. A Short History of Christian Millenarianism* (New York: I. B. Tauris, 2008), pp. 71-80, 93-102.

Fig. 22 AV1, an app-linked telepresence robot for school children. London Design Biennale, 2018. https://www.frameweb.com/media/files/rtf/2018_08_FRAME/London_Design_Biennale_Norway_No_Isolation-01.jpg (https://www.frameweb.com/news/installations-london-design-biennale-2018)

# Rediscovering the Human Image by Crossing Borders: Amitav Ghosh's Writerly Travels/Travails

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### Introduction: Amitav Ghosh and the Imbrications of the Human Image in a Changing World

In contributing to our conference theme about "The Human Image in a Changing World", my paper will range over the works of the Indian-born, New York based, but truly international and peripatetic writer Amitav Ghosh. It will claim that he is one the leading contemporary chroniclers of what our conference write-up calls "the imbrications of the human image "at this time. I intend to begin it though with an attempt to understand what the phrase implies. I will then discuss briefly Ghosh's writerly location and stance. In the body of my paper, I will focus on five of his works. I will begin with his 2001 collection of essays, *The Imam and the Indian*. I will then go to an earlier work, his debut novel *The Circle of Reason* (1986). I will look next at his 2$^{nd}$ and perhaps his most thought-provoking work of fiction, *The Shadow Lines* (1988). I will consider afterwards *River of Smoke,* the second book of his Ibis trilogy, which he published in 2011. I intend to glance too at some of his other non-fictional as well as fictional works because of my intent to present him as someone deeply committed throughout his works to our conference's theme.

Let me begin, however, by trying to explain what the phrase "imbrications of the human image in a changing world" means to me. Firstly, as a student of English literature, it reminds me instantly of William Blake's poem, "The Divine Image" in *The Songs of Innocence* that sees "Mercy, Pity, Peace and Love" as the most compelling attributes of the creator embodied in humans. In the companion poem, "The Human Abstract", published in the volume Blake composed afterwards, *Songs of Experience*, Blake depicts the antithesis of these virtues as intolerance, suspicion of others, pride and deceit. These qualities, he avers, mar the human image anywhere. Blake implies that the human image takes divine form in the coming together of all human beings, and not in their divisions and conflicts, but that repressive governments and the emissaries of capital collude to complicate the process.

As for "imbrications", the word always seemed to me to be like many other theory words to be endlessly suggestive as well as exasperating. To pin it down for my paper I decided to Google it. I

think I got what I wanted in a blog exchange where in response to the blogger's contention that the word only implies something like "overlap" or "connected with', someone responded anonymously by saying, "it has more to do with separate things coming together seamlessly, whether by accident or design, to make a whole" and is "similar to interwove or embedded."It will be my contention that in his fiction as well as in his prose writings Ghosh wants to depict the way we are all connected, either fortuitously, or because we would like to do so willingly, despite our differences as people. It is in our coming together that we can face the problems that keep cropping up for us humans, age after age.

As for the human image in a changing world, who can deny in this second decade of the twenty-first century that capitalism and mechanical civilization have combined to create a world where we are much more intertwined than ever before, although our coming together can be quite problematic and tension-ridden? As we face the possibilities of more and more outbreaks of violence, environmental degradation and dehumanization than ever before, we need to find a way out of our current predicaments creatively, urgently and together if we are going to make the best use of our increasing contact with and physical proximity to each other.

Ghosh is like many leading thinkers and artists of our time in finding creative ways of making us rethink not only of the plight people find themselves in again and again, but also of the possibilities ahead of them when they get together. In the face of conflicts displacing people and endangering lives, and threats to the environment caused by global warming, he continues to gesture at ways of underscoring the interdependence of human beings through his works. He is thus in line with those who have been stressing that we are all ineluctably entangled in the future of the planet, and who have been finding more and more creative ways of first understanding, and then driving home this fact to as many people as possible.

As I will try to show, from the beginning of his professional life as a writer, Amitav Ghosh has focused on the imbrications of the human image in a changing world. Focusing on different periods of history and the coming together as well as the dispersal of people in different parts of the world in the last two centuries, he has been portraying intricate situations that develop out of such phenomena. Ghosh traces imaginatively complexities in relationships created by ever-new forms of circulations as well as disjunctions in our lives induced by capital flows, the desire of profits, and the complications colonial/neocolonial movements create in human relationships. Certainly, this is why Ghosh has been writing novels about the human cost of sudden acts of violence, as in *The Shadow Lines,* or the price we pay for environmental degradation, as in the non-fictional work, *The Great Derangement*, and composing other essays and novels throughout his writing career about human predicaments in a fast-changing world.

### *The Imam and the Indian* and the Intricate Network of Differences Humans Thrive In

Ghosh declares in the "Acknowledgements" pages of his collection of essays, *The Imam*

*and the Indian*, that "In the circuitry of the imagination, connections are of greater importance than disjunctions" (vii). This is the conclusion Ghosh arrived at from his readings of history, his anthropological research, novelistic predilections and travels in the Middle East, Africa, Southeast Asia and Oceania, as well as his extended periods of stay in South Asia, Britain and the United States. They exposed him to the plight of expatriate workers and periodic outbreaks of sectarian violence. They also made him reflect on partitions and shadow lines dissecting populations and contemplate ways of countering such phenomenon. His first major collection of essays, *the Imam and the Indian* is testimony to his preoccupation with such issues.

In "The Ghost of Mrs. Gandhi", Ghosh records how he came to realize that he could not be like V. S. Naipaul, a writer who wrote about diasporic situations, and someone who Ghosh otherwise admires. To him, Naipaul is someone who can report astutely on people caught up in violence or mired in postcolonial predicaments. However, Ghosh realizes that Naipaul is the kind of person who would ultimately prefer to stay aloof from human beings caught up in such unsettling moments. This realization comes to Ghosh after the rioting that erupted in New Delhi subsequent to Indira Gandhi's assassination. Unlike the ironic and detached Naipaul, at the sight of a "forlorn little group" marching against the riots and for peace in the Indian capital, Ghosh "without a second thought", joins their procession (56). Such compassion and desire for peace and love constantly propel his art. The feelings triggered in him by the marchers, in fact, lead him to write *The Shadow Lines*. Ghosh tells his readers in the essay that the route he preferred to take was not controlled by""literary aestheticism", or the kind of rapt attentiveness to 'the horror of violence" that seems to be Naipaul's forte; what the "forlorn little group" had revealed to him was the importance of "the affirmation of humanity' through his writing (61).

In the next essay of *The Imam and the Indian*, titled "Petrofiction: the Oil Encounter and the Novel", Ghosh laments the lack of literature about parts of the world where disparate groups of people had been coming together in the 1970s because of employment possibilities created by the worldwide surge in demand for petroleum products. He notes that the fluid situation created thereby in the city-states of the Gulf, "where virtually everyone is a 'foreigner', was well worth paying attention to for any chronicler of human predicaments. After all, "admixtures of peoples and cultures" were taking place "on a scale never before envisaged; vicious systems of helotry" were now being "juxtaposed with unparalleled wealth", while deserts" were being "transformed by technology, and military devastation on an apocalyptic scale" (78). Ghosh notes that the oil boom has created a 'space that is no place at all, a world that is intrinsically displaced, heterogeneous and international" (79). The novelist, he implies, would and should find material to depict the interwoven nature of humanity in such settings.

A couple of essays of *The Imam and the Indian* look back in history to note humans crisscrossing travel and trade routes in medieval times. One such essay, "The Slave of MS.H.6", is inspired by Ghosh's archival forays into documents that are related to "the chronicle of travel and dispersal in modern times" (179). It is clear though that Ghosh is interested in reconstructing narratives of

travel to and from the subcontinent mainly because he wants to show people in it "enmeshed with its neighbors in an intricate network of differences" (190). The point is reinforced in "The Diaspora in Indian Culture", an essay where Ghosh once again observes that "the culture" of the subcontinent "seems to be constructed around the proliferation of differences" (250), the paradox here being that "to be different in a world of differences is irrevocably to belong" (250). It all depends; however, Ghosh avers in yet another essay, on how we work out our relationships. As he puts it in the essay, "The Global Reservation: Notes towards an Ethnography of International Peacekeeping", "Diversity…properly managed, can easily be transformed into its mirror image, homogeneity" (259). What can only infect the human image fatally, Ghosh avers, is a state governed by an ideology like that of the Khmer Rouge. He encountered its consequences in Cambodia and thought then that it "embodies the ultimate pathology of nationalist thought, where the national and racial Other becomes so pervasive, so omnipresent, that he is no longer distinguishable from the Self except in death" (260).Taken beyond a point, then, nationalism can become a bane for humanity. In contrast, it is the interwoven nature of humanity that Ghosh intended to alert his readers to through his writings and the imbrications of the human image in our time that fascinate him.

## The Circle of Reason and the Queue of Hope

In his debut novel, *The Circle of Reason,* Ghosh fictionalizes the plight of ordinary people torn apart everywhere by centrifugal forces, even as they attempt to reach out to each other and overcome them. As the novel begins, a schoolteacher named Balaram, living in a village in West Bengal called Lalpukur, adopts the orphan Alu, destined to be the picaresque work's central character. The people of Lalpukur are originally from an East Bengal district who have had to relocate because of the partition of India. They speak in "a nasal sing-song Bengali, with who knew what mixed in of Burmese and the languages of the hills to the east?" (27). In other words, the newly arrived people of Lalpukur were already hybrids by the time they crossed the border, like most people everywhere who, however, may think otherwise. Many of us, however, would like to believe that we have a "pure" aspect in us we need to hold on to, even as we eliminate any traces of the "others" in our selves or try to distinguish ourselves from the "others" surrounding us, Ghosh is clearly intent on demonstrating instead that such attitudes lead to endless problems that proliferate differences between people who are really not and cannot be so detached from each other.

Balaram is inspired by enlightenment and progressive values he has inculcated from his readings in western thought. Born in 1914, when people in the west were fighting each other with tools forged by science, and soldiers were being recruited from the colonies for distant wars, even as racist values were leading to discriminatory policies in North America, Balaram wants to hold on to his belief in Reason as the panacea for all problems. However, the narrator keeps drawing attention directly or indirectly to the unforeseen consequences on human amity that result from advances in science and technology and that have only benefited the west in the past. The narrator thus cites

brutal episodes of British imperial history when "millions of Africans and half of America were enslaved by cotton" by westerners intent on "strangling the very weavers and techniques" of the Indian subcontinent they had crossed oceans to discover" (57). However, if history records horrors of such imperial ventures and supremacist policies fuelled by the insatiable desire for markets, the narrator is keen on emphasizing that history should be seen as a repository of "hope as well as despair". Keeping in view that Alu has been apprenticed to weaving, the narrator suggests that "having made the world one and blessed…with its diversity", weaving and weavers "must do so again" (58). It is clear as the novel progresses that Ghosh also uses weaving as a trope for the writer's craft, thereby indicating that as a novelist he too would like to weave people together through his work. Even as he records fictionally not only the adverse consequences of nationalism but also the ill effects of the nexus between power and capital on humanity in recent decades, Ghosh would like us to appreciate the composite nature of the human image and its dependence on qualities like mercy, pity, peace and love for the benefit of all of us.

The partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947 led to the exodus of millions of Hindus and Muslims across it; in 1971, events in Pakistan would lead to the country breaking up in another enforced migratory flow. As the narrator of *The Circle of Reason* observes, "borders dissolved" once more then "under the weight of millions of people in panic-stricken flight from an army of animals" (60). However, not only external forces drive people across borders or from one place to another then. Statist repressive forces in independent India, for instance, force Alu, out of Lalpukur. As a result, he is forced to fend for himself, first and briefly in the Indian state of Kerala, and then for some time in the Middle East oil boomtown of al-Ghazira.

The central and most compelling parts of *The Circle of Reason* focus on the lives of the temporary migrants who flock to places like al-Ghazira in vessels carrying humans in flight. As the narrator phrases it, they board vessels "carrying with them an immense cargo of wanderers seeking their own destruction in giving flesh to the whims of capital" (189). Alu joins here others who have migrated legally or illegally, most of them out of sheer desperation. Almost all these migrants keep hoping that the jobs available in the oil-rich state will provide them with some economic security at least for a while, though they know well that they would still be vulnerable politically as undocumented workers in al-Ghazira, or as people doing low-paid menial jobs.

In al-Ghazira, Alu joins migrants and runaways from other parts of the world as well as the Indian subcontinent—for example, Egypt and Morocco. They all become part of a shantytown here called the Ras where at least the older settlers are ready to accept the newcomers in their midst. As Hajj Fahmy, whose family had come to the Ras years ago from Egypt, declares expansively, "Let them come to the Ras if they keep out of our way. The Ras gave us shelter; let it give them shelter" (227). This suggests that to people like him compassion is something they can extend to others, since they were aware of how necessary it had been for them at one point.

Despite such people, Alu and the migrants of al-Ghazira live precariously. They are perpetually at the mercy of the greedy and uncaring expansionary maws of capitalism. Trapped in the wreckage

of the construction site he has been working in at one point, he manages to escape from it and al-Ghazira somehow with some members of the group he had met on the journey to the Gulf oil town. In the last part of the novel, we find him relocated in Algeria, where too migrants from India and other parts of the world have settled provisionally, either in flight or in transit. The ultimate destination for such migrants in an unsettled world appears to be Europe. Here, when a woman member of the group Alu has been with in his travels since he left India dies of a heart attack, an Indian doctor called Mishra present then declares that she did not deserve to be given the last rites prescribed in the Hindu religion because she was supposedly harboring adulterous thought at the moment of her death. However, Mrs.Verma, a much more sympathetic presence in this part of the novel, points out that both religion and enlightenment thought tend to stifle human impulses and accentuate the divisions between people. Berating Doctor Mishra, she says, "That's how you and your kind have destroyed everything—science, religion, socialism—with your rules and your orthodoxies. The difference between them, she points out to Dr. Mishra, who is otherwise equal to her socially, is that while he obsesses about such rules and rituals, she worries "about being human" (409).

*The Circle of Reason* ends with the surviving members of Alu's group who had fled with him to al-Ghazira now poised to leave North Africa for some part of Europe or the other that will accept them—at least for a while. Although written over thirty years ago, Ghosh's description of the situation these band of migrants find themselves in resemble uncannily the predicaments of contemporary illegal migrants. As we see in news reports on television even now, such people are perpetually on the brink of yet another desperate move to escape their precarious present-day position by fleeing to western shores from Asia and Africa, despite the endless barriers erected in their paths. As one of them tells the plainclothes security people in an airport in accounting for their indomitable spirit, "How many people will you send away? The queue of hope stretches long past infinity" (409).

As a novelist of contemporary migrants repeatedly caught up in dehumanizing situations but trying to rise above the circumstances that keep pulling them down, Ghosh seems to believe thus that the human spirit cannot be repressed for long. The last line of the novel, states simply but unequivocally, "Hope is the beginning" (423). It is a line that could be the signpost of all discussions about the imbrications of the human image in the face of our present-day predicaments.

### *The Shadow Lines* and a World without Borders

To me, Amitav Ghosh's best work to date is his second novel, *The Shadow Lines*. Focusing in it on a few educated, cosmopolitan and relatively well-off Indian Bengalis this time and people they forge relationships with elsewhere, Ghosh now seems bent on showing that events such as partitions and diasporas force them too to confront situations that bring to the fore the complexities of being human in our time. This novel is ostensibly about Tridib, described in the dust jacket of

the Penguin edition of the book as "an eccentric Calcutta intellectual"; his English lover May, who is bent on liberal causes to heal humanity's wounds; the narrator's grandmother, who holds on to nationalistic sentiments that appear to be reinforced by the partitioning of India; and his cousin Ila, who was raised outside the subcontinent and is apparently quite liberated in her mindset from all boundaries, but is really stuck in her self. However, the novel is mostly about the anonymous narrator, who worships Tridib and tries to uncover the chain of events that led to Tridib's death in a communal riot and the lessons he learnt from it so that he can communicate it to benefit us all. In the course of his reconstruction of the narrative of Tridib's death, the narrator finds his central theme in the necessity of going beyond the shadow lines that divide peoples and rediscovering paths that can lead them to transcend barriers and affirm their common humanity.

Ila, the narrator discovers, is despite her international upbringing and freethinking posture, restricted in her imaginings about the complexities of relationships, and hemmed in by her inability to transcend her immediate desires. The narrator's grandmother, outwardly so different from the ostensibly liberated and cosmopolitan Ila, is severely restricted in her imaginings as well, but by the scars nationalism has left in her psyche, for she upholds the notion of borders and looks for them intently. Like many middle-class people everywhere, the narrator observes, she "would thrive believing in the unity of nationhood and territory, of self-respect and power" (77). In contrast to both of them, Tridib's imaginings transcend space and time. He is drawn to his lover May in the romance mode; he views their relationships as if he was mythical Tristan of a Europe that was once without "borders and countries… a man without a country," who fell in love with "a woman-across-the seas" (183).

However, the Indian Bengali intellectual Tridib and the liberalized and altruistic English woman May have come together in a world mired in sectarian divisions, religious antagonism, and mind-forged manacles that erect borders in the path of human amity. Not only do partitions like those of 1947 divide families like that of the grandmother, but their aftereffects and resurgent nationalism in India and Pakistan create obstacles for anyone trying to transcend borders and hold on to a vision of the interconnectedness of peoples as do Tridib and May. Like in *The Circle of Reason,* Ghosh underscores the alienating artificial borders erected between people because of nationalism or in the name of patriotism. Parts of the grandmother's Hindu family thus had to end up in different parts of India, "the Middle East…and God knows where" (132). Indian Muslims similarly had to crisscross the subcontinent and end up in Pakistan, the Middle East or elsewhere.

The culmination of this theme of borders and the othering of the self in the novel is Tridib's death in a Dhaka riot. He is killed when the city was part of East Pakistan because of the violence that ensued in parts of the Indian subcontinent after the theft of a Muslim holy relic in a Kashmir mosque in 1963. That theft set off a chain reaction then that led to riots in Calcutta, Dhaka and other cities of India and Pakistan. These riots reopened Partition's wounds and added to the trauma of the families split by partition, spiraling religious strife, and causing endless queues of refugees who have to cross borders and set up provisional settlements for themselves.

However, the narrative of Tridib's death presented by the anonymous narrator suggests that one must imagine an alternative to endless partitions and divisions and take inspiration from acts of individual heroism. This is mainly why the narrator recounts the story of Tridib, who sacrifices himself to save May, who is stranded momentarily in a riot in Dhaka. The narrator must live to tell their story, since "stories are all there are to live in" (179), not only romances like that of the mythical Tristan and his woman-across-the seas, but the contemporary one of Tridib. After all, and stories are exemplary as well as illustrative. The narrator will pass on to us his discovery through Tridib's death that no borders can separate us from our "others" permanently; the riots in Dhaka that killed Tridib, set off by events in distant Kashmir and riots elsewhere in the subcontinent, prove that people in Calcutta and Dhaka, and indeed India and Pakistan, are "locked into an irreversible symmetry by the line" that was to set them "free". That is to say, the sub-continent's "looking-glass border" (228) ensures that India and Pakistan are locked in permanent opposition. The point, he implies, is to understand this truth and then find ways of dealing with it.

Indeed, the thrust of Amitav Ghosh's narrative in *the Shadow Lines* is that we human beings have memories of togetherness that can and should outlast borders and partitions. Robi, Ila's brother, concludes his account of the circumstances that led to Tridib's death to the narrator by reflecting bitterly on the communal hatred that led to it thus: "I think to myself, why don't they draw thousands of little lines through the whole subcontinent and give every little place a new name? What would it change? It's a mirage....How can anyone divide a memory? (241). That we human have in our unconsciousness memories of a world where people coexisted for ages in relative harmony is something the narrator indicates at the end of the novel. In addition, the novel leaves us with the image of May trying to rescue the narrator's grandmother's aged uncle from the mob in addition to Tridib sacrificing himself to rescue them both; these images are offered to readers as "a final redemptive mystery" of the narrative (246). The culminating idea of the narrative seems to be that if there are shadow lines dividing peoples that are known as borders, there are even more lasting and primordial shadow lines that unite human beings that are worth dying for.

### *Sea of* Smoke and the Imbrications of the Human Image in the Past, the Present and the Future

With his 2008 novel, *Sea of Poppies*, Amitav Ghosh embarked on bringing out one after another the books of what is now known as the Ibis trilogy. Its sequels, *River of Smoke*, which came out in 2011, and *Flood of Fire*, which completed the series in 2015, succeeded this historical work of fiction. All three are based on the linkages as well as the deprivations and displacements of populations at a time when the imperial encounter had not only created international frictins on unprecedented scales but also brought together disparate groups of people in many parts of the world in hitherto unforeseen mixtures. The tension created by the opium trade between India and China, the trafficking of coolies in Mauritius, imperial impositions in the nineteenth century, and

the thrust for survival of people who come together for one reason or another to begin new lives elsewhere are some of the subjects of the works of the trilogy. Ghosh writes in them not only about colonial officials, traders and entrepreneurs, but also about sailors and subalterns, amateur botanists, painters, and all sorts of other people from India, China, and Britain in locations that encompass three continents. The idea seems to be, to adapt John Dryden's wondrous observation on the characters of Geoffrey Chaucer's *The Canterbury Tales*, and use it to characterize Ghosh's settings and themes in one exclamatory sentence, "Here is God's plenty!" But I will use the time I have left to talk briefly about the second and what seems to be the most impressive of the three novels of the trilogy, *River of Smoke*, to show how it concentrates on a historical narrative that has implications for our own world and even our futures, as we deliberate on the "imbrications of the human" at this time.

Ghosh's intent in *The Sea of Smoke* is perhaps best articulated by the attributes he tells us in the novel one of his characters possesses when looking at atmospheric disturbances such as storms. Neel, the character I have in mind, has endured a lot of hardship and fallen from social heights quite drastically. Ghosh tells us, however, that he is someone who is always "looking for new possibilities, creating fresh beginnings, rewriting destinies and throwing together people who would have never met" (20). Reading the novel, the reader realizes that this is Ghosh's intent from the beginning to the end—he wants to highlight the endless possibilities in addition to the tensions generated by the continual coming together of people, and dedicated to the idea of visualizing new beginnings for characters who have experienced the worst of times but refuse to go down in life.

*The Sea of Smoke* is indeed an exuberantly imagined, vibrant polyphonic work that revels in heteroglossia and the coming together of peoples. The novel begins in "a far corner of Mauritius" (3) where indentured servants and convicts have rehabilitated, but the action shifts across the Indian Ocean and moves through newly emerging townships like Singapore and Hong Kong to settle down in Canton, where the opium trade has brought together people from all over the world and created a kind of of potpourri. The novel, indeed, is a celebration of hybridity, of the coming together of tongues, cuisines, apparels, and what not. Its accomplishment in bringing together people from all over the world and making them interact with each other and showing the imbrications of the human image in archetypal situations is impressive. *Sea of Smoke,* to adapt lines from a letter supposedly written by one of its character, Robin Chinnery, supposedly the son of the real-life painter English George Chinnery who spent most of his life in India and China, pens about a garden in China, is "a place of the most *extravagant* fantasy…large enough to accommodate a hundred people" where "at every turn there was a new perspective to baffle and delight the eye" by the medley of "events, people, faces' (280).

*Sea of Smoke* climaxes in the First Opium War that took place in China in the mid-nineteenth century, but the events and the peoples of the novel can be easily reimagined in our times when the international market of illegal habit-inducing drugs keep bringing business persons and subalterns together in cosmopolitan locations all over the globe. The coming together of races, tongues,

cultures and sexual crossings and relationships forged across national and class impositions in the novel is not only engaging but is also of great relevance in our time. Ghosh seems to be saying through the book that we are all intertwined in our destinies, and that the human image needs to be reimagined as often now as then. The incessant coming together of peoples in generation after generation is ssssomething that he treats in work after work with sympathy and a transcendental imagination. Ghosh's historical novel, like many of his other books, is thus immensely suggestive for all of us contemplating our collective futures as human beings.

## Conclusion: The Novelist and the Affirmation of Humanity"

At one point in *The Imam and the Indian*, Ghosh tells us that that what he learnt most from the religious riots that took place in New Delhi in the aftermath of the then Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's assassination is that it was not enough to write about such happenings with "writerly wonder"; what the writer needs to do, he realized then, is take these occasions as inducements for the "affirmation of humanity" (61). Ghosh thus has been imaginatively visualizing for us past and present pressing issues in his works in ways that clearly have implications for our futures as human beings. In fact, in recent years, he has been focusing in his books on the future of the planet in the wake of the human assault on it in the form of global warming. I am thinking here of his 2004 novel *The Hungry Tide* which deals imaginatively with cross-cultural connections over time and space but is centered in the Sunderbans, a part of Bangladesh and West Bengal where the environment and non-humans as well as humans are increasingly imperiled by such warming. But I would like to conclude by saying that the novel now appears to be only a preliminary foray into a theme that Ghosh would develop fully in his 2016 work of non-fiction about the whole world, *The Great Derangement*. As he observes at the outset of the book, as a writer he has had to "recognize" the phenomenon as one that "poses challenges" for the contemporary writer" (9), although such challenges "derive ultimately from the grid of literary conventions that came to shape the narrative imagination in precisely the period when the accumulation of carbon in the atmosphere was rewriting the destiny of the earth" (ibid).

Through his fictional and non-fictional works, then, Ghosh has been contemplating the "imbrications of the human image", in an ever-changing international landscape. He has done so from the vantage point of the present, but ultimately must be seen as someone who also writes with an eye towards the future. In this, I believe, he is one of the most astute chroniclers and observers of human destines in our time. Through inventive and sympathetic portrayals of the consequences of imperialism, capitalist forays across the world, and "progress" in recent centuries, he has made us contemplate all too human issues associated with border crossings, diasporas, and the coming together of disparate groups of people over the centuries in our parts of the world.

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# A Study on Multicultural Socialization and Cultural Adoption of International Migrants – Focused on (Russian-speaking) Migrant Youths

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Nice to meet you. My name is Kang Su Kyung. I received a doctorate in Russian literature from Moscow State University, and now I teach Russian literature at a university, and I am working on 20th century Russian novels, literature and journalism, and recently I am interested in multi-cultural education including Russian speakers.

In this "World Humanities Forum" I want to talk about the cultural adaptation of immigrants, as the title suggests, and specifically the Russian speakers-migrant youths are studied. I'd like to start my presentation with very sad news. The video I'm going to show you is from last October 21st. The title of the article is *Didn't catch the meaning of "Fire"…The burned-down of Koryoin family's "Korean dream"*. Let's watch a video.

https://youtu.be/X3uDjSFOb8Y

On October 21, a fire broke out in a studio apartment in Busan's suburban city of Gimhae, and two children from four Koryo families living on the second floor died, and the other two children are now in critical condition. The adults were all out at the time of the fire. The parents of the victims arrived in Korea in late July 2016 and worked at a factory in Gimhae. In August this year, seven people, including aunts and nephews, who also entered Korea on a visiting visa, lived in a two-room studio apartment. Both the death toll and serious injuries were among these children, and police and the media raised the possibility that children could not understand "불이야(Fire)!" because they were poor at Korean.

The number of foreigners staying in Korea reached 1 million in 2007, and in the next 10 years, the number of foreigners staying in Korea has risen rapidly to more than 2.18 million, or 4.2 percent of the population[1].

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1. Refer to the 2017 Immigration and *Foreign* Policy Statistical Yearbook (Registration 28 June 2018).

Table 1. The trend of foreigners staying in Korea (2007~2017)



자료 : 법무부

Also, the latest data shows that as of September 2018, about 2.3 million foreigners are staying in Korea, a visible number equivalent to about 4.5 percent of the total population. Now, the number of foreigners residing in Korean society is 4.5 out of 100 people, and multiculturalism in Korean society has become a daily, not a discourse.

If an individual's exposure to a multicultural environment is seen as a process of 'transgressing' (Bell Hooks), a multicultural society entails a process of changing disparate experiences. As cultural contacts become more frequent and adaptations of individuals from diverse cultural backgrounds are becoming an important issue, interest in cultural adaptation is increasing. Especially for young immigrants, the problem of adapting culture is urgent and important. As they adapt to the new Korean culture, they are suffering from various psychological and social difficulties due to the confusion of identity and social distance as well as the burden of Korean language and study.

The focus of this study is on the cultural adaptation of 'Migrant youths'. Here the term "Migrant youths" refers to a teenager who entered Korea with a foreign parents after being born and raised in a foreign country or who later entered to Korea to live with a remarried parent with Korean spouse. After 2000, they came to Korea with a rapidly increasing number of international remarried families. In this group may include children from international marriages who have grown up and entered the country of foreign parents. The kids in the video that we saw earlier belong to the latter group.

Interest and research in government-related institutions and academia on Migrant youths began around 2000. However, it has been pointed out that the existing and ongoing education and government-level policies on immigrant youth are still sharing a level of authority. This is due to the lack of sophisticated, micro-studies that understand the learner characteristics of Migrant youths.

In response, the study will examine the existing cultural adaptation programs for Migrant youths and point out the problems associated with language education. In addition, I would like to take a look at the possibilities and prospects through an example of the Korean Cultural Adaptation

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Program, which is being conducted on Russian youth. The research could be useful in developing a program to adapt Korean culture to Migrant youths in other languages as well as Russian.

In relation to the cultural adaptation of international immigrants, prior studies in Korea have been conducted largely in three aspects: social science psychology, counseling, multiculturalism, general education, education administration and Korean as a foreign language education. Here we looked at some of the preceding studies on cultural adaptation conducted from the viewpoint of Korean education. The research has been ongoing since the early 2000s. However, most of the studies are aimed at foreign adult students studying abroad, and we can see that not many are among the teenagers we are studying.

Table 2. A Study on the Cultural Adaptation of Youth from the Viewpoint of Korean as a Foreign Language Education

| Researchers | Target of research | Tool/study problems | Results |
|---|---|---|---|
| Moon Y.H. (2012) | Relationship between Mongolian and Korean proficiency and cultural adaptation types of Mongolian youth | Mongolian and Korean proficiency test sites, cultural adaptation measures | Demonstrates that language proficiency is an important factor in cultural adaptation and social distance determination, and that language and culture have an interdependent relationship. |
| Kim J.N. (2016) | Korean overseas youths from Uzbekistan | A Study on the Change of Cultural Adaptation and Identity through School Life | Koryo teenagers generally strive for cultural adaptation through school life, but they have a unique identity as "Koryoin" rather than Koreans or Uzbekistanis. |
| Kim M.K. (2018) | Migrant youths | Scale of cultural adaptation | The biggest influence on academic achievement is an Korean proficiency, and the more Korean culture is assimilated, the higher the level of proficiency and academic achievement. |

As you can see in the table above, the three keywords related to cultural adaptation of Migrant youths are the problems of 'Korean language,' 'school work,' and 'identity.' They will learn Korean as a second language. Earlier in the field of second language education, cultural adaptation has revealed an important personal variable that affects learners' language acquisition. As shown in the table above, preceding studies show that Korean language and cultural adaptation are closely interrelated. Professor Brown, who has done a lot of research in the field of second language

education, pointed out that it is important to understand the process of cultural acquisition because second language acquisition implies second culture learning. Brown went on to say that learning a second language involves learning a second identity. If a second language learner is a teenager, their cultural adaptation and identity change processes will be more closely related, and an in-depth analysis is needed.

The preceding studies on cultural adaptation state that it is necessary to maintain pride in your own culture and be more comfortable with Korean culture as a way to overcome and adapt to cultural stress. Then, it is necessary to look at how Migrant youths in Korea behave in their native languages, and whether they have a good environment for learning and using their own language.

To help us understand, I would like to refer to *the results of a survey on multi-cultural families conducted by the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family in 2015*. The following data are compiled by researchers who investigated children (from 9 to 24 years) of multicultural families. The survey is aimed at children from multicultural families, so it includes children from multicultural families born in Korea as well as Migrant youths. However, some data show significant results in the discussion of this study.

The tables below are compiled in part to the thesis of this study. We will focus on children who grew up mainly in foreign countries, or children whose fathers are Korean, mothers are foreigners, and parents are all foreigners. Because most of Migrant youths are children of these families. Let's first look at their foreign parent's native language abilities.

Table 3. Language skills of multicultural children: a language of foreign-born parents

(Unit: %, person, grade)

| | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | Sum | Average |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Background of growth | domestic growth | 36.5 | 36.0 | 14.4 | 7.0 | 6.1 | 100.0 | 2.10 |
| | foreign experience | 17.8 | 27.2 | 22.1 | 14.5 | 18.4 | 100.0 | 2.89 |
| | **growth in foreign countries** | **1.0** | **3.7** | **13.4** | **17.8** | **63.9** | 100.0 | **4.40** |
| the sex of foreign parents | A foreign father + a Korean mother | 18.1 | 26.4 | 18.2 | 18.1 | 19.2 | 100.0 | 2.94 |
| | A Korean father + a foreign mother | **30.1** | **32.1** | **16.4** | **9.1** | **12.3** | 100.0 | **2.42** |
| | **A foreign parents** | **9.3** | **9.0** | **16.4** | **12.6** | **53.8** | **100.0** | **3.92** |

(*1: not at all, 2: not much, 3: in ordinary circumstances, 4: be a bit good, 5: be very good)

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Children who have grown up mainly in foreign countries and are both foreign parents are more likely to use the language of their foreign parents. This is a very natural result. Now let's take a look at foreign parents' attitude toward their native language.

Table 4. Foreign parent's attitude toward their native language

|  | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | Sum | Average |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Parents and families from Korea encourage the use of language from foreign countries. | 19.5 (14,202) | 20.4 (14,866) | 30.0 (21,885) | 15.5 (11,331) | 14.5 (10,689) | 100.0 (72,873) | 2.85 |
| Learn the language of one's parents from abroad. | 28.9 (23,852) | 22.3 (18,895) | 21.0 (17,306) | 14.7 (12,087) | 13.1 (10,836) | 100.0 (82,476) | 2.61 |
| **In the future I want to speak the language of my parents from abroad as well as Korean.** | **11.4 (9,408)** | **11.2 (9,274)** | **23.1 (19,062)** | **20.2 (16,636)** | **34.1 (28,096)** | **100.0 (82,476)** | **3.54** |

*1: not at all, 2: not much, 3: in ordinary circumstances, 4: be a bit good, 5: be very good

The table above shows that the environment in which children from multicultural families learn the language of their parents from abroad is very poor. Only 30 percent of the respondents said they were encouraged to use foreign parent's native language. Fewer than 30 percent responded positively that they are learning the language of their parents from abroad. In addition, only 50 percent of the respondents said they want to learn the language of their foreign parents, and 22.6 percent said there is no need to learn it. What is even more surprising and unfortunate is that the attitude of foreign parents toward their native language has dropped significantly in all questions compared to the 2012 survey.

Table 5. Foreign parent's attitude toward their native language (2015, 2012)

Then, how about the attitude of multicultural children toward foreign parent's language? Let's take a look at the results of the response based on the growth background.

Table 6. The attitude of multicultural children toward foreign parent's language

(Unit: grade)

| | | Parents and families from Korea encourage the use of language from foreign countries. | Learn the language of one's parents from abroad. | **In the future I want to speak the language of my parents from abroad as well as Korean.** |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Background of growth | domestic growth | 2.68 | 2.33 | 3.33 |
| | foreign experience | 3.14 | 3.03 | 3.95 |
| | **growth in foreign countries** | **3.15** | **3.07** | **3.76** |
| the sex of foreign parents | A foreign father + a Korean mother | 3.08 | 3.00 | 3.90 |
| | A Korean father + a foreign mother | **2.82** | **2.55** | **3.62** |
| | **A foreign parents** | **3.01** | **2.89** | **3.76** |

According to the results of the survey, children of multicultural families are willing to learn the language of their foreign parents in the future, but they are not encouraged in the home, and they are even more unusual in practice. But for children who have grown up in a foreign country, which mostly consists of Migrant youths, you can see that they are more willing to learn the native language of their foreign parents. However, despite such willingness, you can see that the score of multicultural children who responded that they are learning the language of their parents from abroad is much lower. Despite the fact that we have provided bilingual education to multicultural children, the results suggest that the current bilingual language education system needs to be reviewed.

The question of bilingual education in a multicultural society has been studied in earnest since 2010. However, bilingual education should be applied differently depending on the characteristics of the learners. Parents of a typical multicultural family (The family is usually a case where a child was born and raised between a Korean father and a foreign mother from a married immigrant.) are improving Korean faster than learning two languages and desperately want their children to speak

Korean perfectly (Lee C.D., 2010).

Nevertheless, several researchers continued to raise the importance of bilingual education, and around 2010, Korea began offering bilingual education to multi-cultural and general-family children. In Busan, we conducted a bilingual education for immigrant women who applied for bililngual language instructors in 2012, and started to provide bilingual education centered on multi-cultural special classes and currently, we support bilingual education for general schools in consideration of budget and number of instructors.

The opinion is that bilingual education should be approached cautiously as it can change the identity, values and mindset of multicultural children. But if the target is Migrant youths, and the purpose of education for them is to be their Korean cultural adaptation above all, the Korean language education and the bilingual education goals and curriculum should be set differently.

Currently in Busan, there are three alternative educational institutes for children of multicultural families. Most of the students at this school are Migrant youths. According to the 'designation and operation guidelines' provided by the education office, these educational institutes are focusing on Korean language and culture programs to help Migrant youths adapt to Korean society in a short time. In addition, more than 50 percent of the classes must be taught in Korean according to the guidelines. This means that classes in other subjects besides Korean classes should be mostly taught in Korean. The curriculum also states that it provides native language education to help Migrant youths establish a healthy identity for their native culture. However, considering that most spend two hours a week on native language education and that the lack of thorough education and management of bilingual instructors, we cannot help but doubt the effectiveness of native language education in foster institutions. The Busan Metropolitan Office of Education conducted the first and last training of a bilingual instructor in 2012 and is currently managing bilingual language education by consulting schools with bilingual instructors once a semester.

As mentioned earlier, Korean cultural adaptation education and support for general multicultural children and Migrant youths should be conducted from a different level of perspective. It is very important for children from elementary school to high school to learn Korean quickly to adapt to the unfamiliar environment of Korea. So the Korean language education and native language education for these people are currently underway at a rate of about 8:2. However, it can be pointed out that the importance of native language education is too small in terms of their cultural identity, values, and mindset.

What's interesting is that from a completely different perspective, there is a school that provides education for Migrant youths to adapt to Korean culture. This is the Russian college, which was recently founded in Busan. The school conducts education in accordance with the standard curriculum in Russia. The basic direction of the school is that knowledge should be given to students as their native language. In relation to language education, the school, on the contrary, offers Korean and Russian education at a rate of about 3:7. However, they support senior students' TOPIK exams (Test of Proficiency of Korean) and help them get Korean language education in

after-school classes. In addition to Korean language education, it offers Korean culture education, but also teaches Korean history, culture and society in Russian that students can understand. For example, for a month in May 2018 Korean culture class was hosted under the title of «Korea is our second hometown ». The students studied the great people of Korea, modern Korean culture, Hallyu and experienced folk games and Hanji crafts.

This view of knowledge education and Korean cultural adaptation education for Migrant youths is very innovative and refreshing. In the meantime, Korea has emphasized 'integration', 'adaptation', 'diversity', and 'community' in education for Migrant youths. However, we should consider whether it was a one-sided multicultural education that emphasized 'assimilation'. Migrant youths may have felt relative frustration while taking classes in Korean, which they are not familiar with. It is important to adapt and incorporate the Korean society in a short time, but considering the background of their growth, the adjustment process itself needs attention and attention. Also I think we need to reflect on dual language education that has been perfunctory.

The Russian school I mentioned is about a year and a half old. The school's experimental attempts need to be carefully examined. This presentation is nothing more than a shared sense of problem and a direction for discussion. But I'm going to go further. Thank you for your attention.

# Sustainability in Humanities by Empowerment of Interdisciplinary Scope in Academia: Focusing on Translation Studies

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## 1. Translator, Translation, and Translation Studies in Future Humanities

Translation is one of the most ancient disciplines in Humanities. Translation Studies in modern academia, however, emerged as one of the youngest disciplines only about forty years ago "at once international and interdisciplinary." (Venuti, *Translation Studies: Reader*, 2004)  Translators and their images have always been problematic. As other disciple, many 'wannabe' translators or interpreters, at the beginning, do their tasks under master's guidance, become journeymen, and then only a few would become masters. Every scholar in various disciplines, at first, explore the collective field and assess those masters' tasks, outputs, and the process under specific conditions or constraints in order to construct and to theorize them into one specific discipline. Human translation will be continued on whether AI took some part and role in the process, and Translation Studies(TS) is ringing the golden bell every year as one of the new born  studies, especially in Korea,[KRF gives us 95 points out of 100 this year again] which concerns much with human communication and now starts studying human and machine talk.

According to Caminade and Pym's 1997 research, over 250 academic sites are offering a variety of certificates and degrees, undergraduate and graduate, training not only professional translators, but also scholar-teachers of translation. (Caminade and Pym 1995; Harris 1997) And probably the number has been doubled or tripled by now. For it is regarded a newly emerging discipline, we still have to face a sort of prejudice in Academia in Korea like other countries. University administrators including faculties tend to regard Translation and Translation Studies as a minor discipline in Humanities, comparing to so-called "pure" or traditionally major disciplines, for example, Literature, Language, History, and Philosophy, and so on. In early 1971, one great poet, Octabio Paz(1914~1998) says every text is the translation.

"Every text is unique and, at the same time, it is the translation of another text. No text is entirely original because language itself, in its essence, is already a translation." (1971:9)

And I, as a translator, published 17 translated books, appreciate with this poet's recognition. As

a professor, teaching translation at the university for almost twenty years, I would like to express my deep respect to all the translators throughout times and places, who have faithfully devoted themselves to their tasks without having much proper acknowledgment including my students, presently many of them are undergoing their journeymenship all around the global. Indeed, the status of translator is much problematic as I mentioned above. Without their sacrificial efforts, all global villages might have lost opportunities of her communication with the other beyond the lingual and cultural borders or limits. Many say Humanities faces crisis of its downfall. In most part I do not agree with it, but it is still true in some aspect for our narrowness and prejudice. If Humanities in the disciplinary sites continues to insist her boundary only on the traditional subjects while excluding all kinds of newly emerging disciplines from her bosom, and not want to exchange the ideas, it truly will meet its endangerment sooner. We desperately need interdisciplinary efforts wherever subject field we belong to.

In this presentation, I would share the idea Translation Studies, as one of the newly emerged discipline during last several decades, could develop the discourse/dialogue to gather sustainability in Humanities by interdisciplinary efforts in Academia. Firstly, I am going to diachronically look into translators' role in past and present in order to mirror their future images since this Forum is focusing on human image in Future world possibly living with robots at home and at jobs.

Secondly, I am sharing my aspect of translation in academia as a passage for exchanging various cultures and then would like to predict what contribution TS will give to Humanities, while checking on their positions in the Era of Robotic World. My conclusion will be a summing-up of these aspects and more importantly it will be a celebration remarks for the International Translation Day, which UN declared last year.

## 2. Images of Translators in Different Times and Places

### 2.1. In the Beginning

Human image has been shaped in millions of ways with languages starting from the scribbling art eon ago from the prehistoric ages. We could trace back the oldest human images through literary pieces, for example, four among the greatest translations in the world literary history might show the oldest human images and translators as well. In the Bible God created humans to be like himself, that is, in the image of God Himself, while in Greek and Roman mythology gods and goddesses were created by human in the image of human. Even prior to these two western archetypal images, there had been a Sumerian epic which was first written on the tablet in 2100 BC.: *The Epic of Gilgamesh*. Gilgamesh, young and strong, rejects the old goddess Ishtar, teasing "What could I offer the queen of love in return, who lacks nothing at all? / Balm for the body? /The food and drink of the gods? /I have nothing to give to her who lacks nothing at all……" We, you and I, who might not know the Sumerian language, have just met Young Gilgamesh through an epic written between 2150~1400 BCE and through the serving hands of translators, from Sumerian into

English, possibly the oldest literary piece up until now, even had influenced on Homeros' epic. The speaker here is King of Uruk, the powerful man who has all the skills and wisdom which human can hold. In an instant you love to read this epic more because you understand and comprehend the translated words, English, not even know the original language, the Sumerian.

Ever since the oldest epic was transmitted to the listener, prior to the written form in which the human images were made up in letters. We know the father of Eastern classical literature, Confucius (551~479BC), a Chinese teacher and philosopher:

| | |
|---|---|
| Chinese | "子曰, 德不孤 必有隣" |
| Transliterating into Korean | "자왈 덕불고 필유린" |
| Translating into Korean | "공자가 말씀하길, 덕이 있는 사람은 외롭지 않으며 반드시 이웃이 있다." |
| Translating into English | "Master says, a virtuous person is never alone but surely has neighbor." |

His philosophy was able to be transmitted and spread by translators all over the world. These four literatures, the Hebrew Bible, Greek Homeros, Sumerian Gilgamesh, and Chinese Confucius, whether they had been written either on the papyrus, sheepskins, tablets, or a paper, you never know their existence without translators. But sadly you do not pay attention to those unknown translators but only to the author.

In Korea, the first whole HanGeul, Korean alphabet, translation from foreign literary text, is a Christian Bible published in 1911, that is, *Korean Bible*, in Korean, *SungGyungJeonSuh: GooYeok*, and translators are Pastor John Ross, a Scottish, and several Korean translators including Suh, SangYun. Ross met Mr. Suh, a Korean business man, in Manchuria. Mr. Suh got an abdominal colicky pain there and had no medicine. Someone—there is always someone—took him to Pastor Ross, who had been looking for any Koreans who could help him translating the Bible into Korean. And there both translators met the right person. And he might be the first reformed Christian in Korea around the year of 1887. It is really happy to have those translators name. And now this translated Bible into Korean has over 25 million Korean readers.

Looking into further diachronic facts, we must refer to George Steiner, who divides the literature on the history of translation into four periods at the chapter 4 "The Claims of Theory" in his *After the Babel*.: the first, from Cicero and Horace up to the publication of Alexander Fraser Tytler's *Essay on the Principles of Translation* in 1791; the second period, up to the Larbaud's *Sous L'invocation de Saint Jerome* in 1946; the third, from the first papers on the machine translation in the 1940s and is characterized by the introduction of structural linguistics and communication theory into the study of translation through and it lasts for thirty years; and then the fourth period had been slightly overlapped with the third in 1960s, and is characterized by a 'reversion to hermeneutic, almost metaphysical inquiries into translation and interpretation.(Steiner, 1975/1998,

248-311) I have recited it from the summarization of Susan Bassenett's *Translation Studies, a* famous introductory book on the TS, first published in 1980, and in Korea, it was introduced to Korean academia by a respectful teacher on the literary translation, and a remarkable essayist, late professor Chang, YoungHee of Sogang University. Steiner's division is very much famous and especially he includes, in the third and fourth periods, the hermeneutic approach in translation. This is famous division, but Susan Bassenett complains it is too difficult of studying diachronically which the first period covers almost 1700 years while his last two periods are only thirty years each. And I agree in some degree. (40)

It is, however, marvelous that Professor Steiner had already included the MT(machine translation) in one of his division of the period, 1940s, and his division could lead on screening translators' status in each period more fairly. There have always existed translators in every time and every place. In the earlier period the more scholarly masters did their tasks either as their national demands or their religious desire. The translator's status was naturally higher than common people. They executed, that is, carried out their tasks under many constraints but mostly they had their patriarch spirit for their country in order to improve their mother tongue, that is, their own national language.

There have been hundreds of, thousands of dispute concerning translation in history, but here I would like to introduce one more example in the west, then move on to the east for sharing translator's status.

First, Eusebius Sophronius Hieronimus(390-405 BC), one of the most famous translators in Roman empire, who has been known as Saint Jerome in English, a priest, a translator of the *Vulgate*, the well-known and authorized Latin version of the Holy Bible. He was, however, embroiled in controversy in his translation when he was in the process of retranslating the "Hebrew truth" directly into Latin. The *Vulgate* gradually displaced the Old Latin and eventually became the official Christian version. (Referring from the Kathleen Davis' "Translator's notes," in the Lawrence Venuti's *The TR Reader*, p.30) In the "Letter to Pammachius," a Roman senator, who abandoned his political career to become a monk, Hieronimus wrote about the accusations as the translator Davis wrote as follows:

> … Jerome is writing to him about the accusations made by a former friend, Rufinus, with whom he was involved in a dispute concerning the Origenistic heresy. Bishop Epiphanius of Salamis had written a letter to Bishop John of Jerusalem, charging him with preaching the heresy. After Jerome's Latin translation of this letter was published, his enemies, including Rufinus, accused him of inserting deliberate falsifications for the purpose of disparaging John.(30)

In the letter, Hieronimus even stated his accusers were all actors: "All this is not the fault of my accusers, who are like actors playing roles in a tragedy."(29)

Next example is more tragic. He is also a great scholar and an intelligent painter, and a printer of Lyons and certainly a translator of the Bible into French: Étienne Dolet (1509–46). He wrote treatises on French grammar, poems, a short history of Francis I, and works in Latin about Cicero. He even influenced on the French Renaissance through his issuing *Commentarii linguae Latinae* in 1538. In 1540 Dolet published a short outline of translation principles, entitled La *manier de bien traduire d'une langue en autre* (How to Translate Well from one Language into Another) and instruct five principles for the translator (Bassenett, 54):

(1) The translator must fully understand the sense and meaning of the original author, although he is at liberty to clarify obscurities.

(2) The translator should have a perfect knowledge of both SL and TL.

(3) The translator should avoid word-for-word renderings

(4) The translator should use forms of speech in common use.

(5) The translator should choose and order words appropriately to produce the correct tone.

These instructions are still proper and pretty much modern in translating. Despite of all his contribution as the writer and the printer, and as the translator of the Bible and of the Greek philosophy, he encountered trouble with the authorities, was arrested, convicted of heresy, strangled and burned with his books. He was sadly executed in the Place Maubert. But now they commemorate him as one great scholar and a translator.



It is true, there is the politics in translation and in any field in human industries as Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak writes:

Democracy changes into the law of force in the case of translation from the Third Word and women even more because of their peculiar relationship to whatever you call the public/private divide. A nearly reversible argument would be possible if the particular Third World country had cornered the Industrial Revolution first and embarked on

monopoly imperialist territorial capitalism as one of its consequences, and thus been able

to impose a language as international norm. (378)

Professor Spivak continues "If you want to make the translated text accessible, try doing it for the person who wrote it."(379)  It is so meaningful that she does not say "try translating it for the person who read it," but "who wrote it." And she emphasizes "the task of the translator is to surrender herself to the linguistic rhetoricity of the original text. It sounds really political. Unless you know another language, at least one, you never have a chance to learn other or others in profundity. You never translate other lingual folks in the global village if not know their language and culture to the depth or the level of translating.

### 2.2.  In Korea

In Korea, translator's social status remained in the middle class up until the early twentieth century, in 1900s when the western languages entered into. They worked or served as royal subjects in the middle classes of society. And their diplomatic authority wholly depended upon the political situation, that is, they always risked their own life. Their power still became stronger because they could stand right by the highest noble persons including Royal Highness or Emperor's family, like Mr. Hong Ryuk Kim in Korea, in fact, Chosun, Yi-Dynasty. He is a famous translator who could speak Russian well in 1920s as Charles Alévêque's photo shows. Later after he made of great money, he was executed. Certainly there was kind-of political reasons behind his death.



http://www.culturecontent.com/contentdata/thumbnailView.do?big_img_path=/UploadFiles/ThumbNail/
cp0710/460/&big_img_name=cp0710b20131_001_460.jpg&title=%EC%BB%A4%ED%94%BC%C2%A002_%EA%B
9%80%ED%99%8D%EB%A5%99%EC%95%8C%EB%A0%88%EB%B2%A0%ED%81%AC%EC%82%AC%EC%A
7%84%EC%97%BD%EC%84%9C

Nearer towards the new millennium, the year of 2000s, Translation Studies is getting more prosperous in Korean Academia. The first doctoral dissertation on Translation Studies, written by Korean scholar in South Korea was published in the spring of 2002, about sixteen years ago, at the

Department of English Language and Literature of SungKyunKwan University in Seoul. The title is "On Translating the English Bible into Korean." The first Korean Ph.D. holder on Translation Studies is still teaching at the university. [Handong University] She wrote the purpose of the study is "to search for answers to the question: What is a good translation?"(197) Here the translation means only the case of translating English text into Korean. There is one important reason why she chose the English Bible for the original text to be analyzed in various levels: assessing translation quality, and studying over principles, constraints and rules in the process of the Bible translation, the text itself is the most famous among readers. That is, the first translation from the western language into Korean is the Bible. The first complete translation of the Korean Bible is GooYeok (*Korean Bible*, 1911), which means the Oldest Version. It was translated into only vernacular Korean, what it means, translators used only HanGeul, Korean spelling and her alphabet, not using in combination with Chinese letters which had been a common way of writing in the twentieth century Korea—Chosun Dynasty, forcefully annexed by Japan in early 1900s, for 37 years. The first translators from the western language, English, into Korean are John Ross(1842~1915), Scottish Presbyterian Pastor and several Koreans. They completed their translation task at DongKwan Church in ShimYang, China between 1880 through 1911.(*Recent photo of DongKwan Church in ShimYang in PPT)

Since then, 107 years later, now we have several academic association where hundreds of scholars and translators actively research and share information of Translation Studies, while publishing Academic Journals which had been well acknowledged by Korea Research Foundation for a decade or longer in terms both of their quality and of frequency. No mention about the Korean Bible Society, one of the leading group of printing Bible in many languages. And as the President of Korea Association of Translation Studies (KATS), founded in 1999, remark tells, TS grows faster than ever with many scholars' contribution.

> … Now the KATS has grown as one of the top-class academic circles in terms of both quality and quantity in just fifteen years. … On October 17-18, 2014, we co-hosted an international conference in collaboration with ERITS (Ewha Research Institute for Translation Studies) of Ewha Womans University, one of the leading institutions of higher education in Korea. We invited world-renowned scholars to the conference: Daniel Gile from France, Douglas Robinson from Hong Kong, and Minhua Liu from the U.S.

Many scholars from all over global lands were welcomed by Korean translators and shared various discourses to improve translating and interpreting theory and practice.

## 2.3. In Academia

James Holms draws the map of TS in his *The Name and Nature of Translation Studies* (1988, 66-80)

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┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                     Translation Studies                          │
│                                                                   │
│          Pure  --------------------------------------- Applied    │
│                                                                   │
│    Theoretical --------------  Descriptive                        │
│                                                                   │
│  General – Partial    Product --- Process --- Function    Translator--- Translation---Translation │
│                       Oriented    Oriented    Oriented    Training     Aids         Criticism     │
│                                                                   │
│                                                                   │
│  Medium--------Area--------Rank--------Text--------Time--------Problem │
│  Restricted (Rtd.)         Restricted  Rtd.       Rtd.        Restricted. │
│                                                                   │
│                            (James Holmes' map of translation studies) │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
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Then, Google presented computer translation program, not machine, but in the system of artificial intelligence, while Papago in Korea started its service. Both are fine in short and insignificant file. It is still very much dangerous to trust. Mike Schuster, a researcher of Translation Machine in Google, confessed that

> No matter how advanced the AI technology is, it may not be able to completely replace human translation. Language is more than just a tool. Human conversation is not just transmitting text in communication. It is not easy for AI to learn the meaning of language, human gestures used during communication, and cultural differences.
> (http://m.biz.chosun.com/svc/article.html?contid=2017122901772#csidx0779197c1145541a00eacf243c64046)
>                    (* Papago translated these sentences from the article and I revised it.)

This statement I found in the web-news in Korean, and I used it for trial. Unsatisfactory! Still it is helpful in some way as D. Arnold and I. Balkan predicted in their *Machine Translation: An Introductory Guide*, in 1994:

> Machine Translation can take over some of the boring, repetitive translation jobs and slow human translation to concentrate on more interesting tasks, where their specialist skills are really needed.(11)

Then what is the reality in academia and institution of teaching translation? While KATS becomes the KRF recognized academic journal in a very short period, students, who had been instructed and practiced on campus still hard to find a good position as a translator. Most of translation teaching institutions belong to the "Special Graduate School" which does not involved in the regular structure of the curriculum. It opens probably for financial profit to the institution because students enter into for degree and the skill. They, these special graduate schools, are not

many though. In many cases, university opens one or two translation courses in other majors, not in an independent translation studies major. It has been freeloading at other relevant departments, for example, in the department of literature, linguistics, comparative literature, or sometimes, cultural studies.

## 3. Reliability in Translator

Above all translation itself is very interdisciplinary. A translator may manage her tasks whatever subjects the original text focuses on. That is, she needs to change one text into foreign one, or vice versa, whatever the core discussion of the original text is, either in a written way or in oral. This paper focuses more on translation, a written style, than on interpretation, an oral one. And we call it Source Language Text(SLT), into the other, Target Language Text(TLT). And here is another condition. The SLT is English, and the TLT is Korean at this presentation. For her responsibility is translation, she must translate SLT into TLT *properly* whatever the contents of the original document is presenting.: natural science, computer engineering, medical research results, legal papers, business contracts, news, thesis, research papers or a literary piece or even a commercial advertisement which she "abhors" personally. She needs to change one language text into another as long as she accepted the offer. In this way translation has served as the role of bridge between not only east and west but also ancient and modern culturally and politically, and certainly a diachronic bridge between past and now and future. It helped construct the modern grammar for each language and extend the usage of words and make freshly coined words and spread to the public. Image of translator past both in Korea and in the world were extraordinary and very much distinctive for s/he is the first person who could experience foreign cultures for s/he knows two languages: source language (SL) and target language (TL).

But it is still true that her position as a translator is very weak and fragile under prejudicial social and academic system. Many of my students work as freelancer translator, while seeking permanent position. For the sustainability in one part of Humanities, I am now asking sincerely to the  Government which provides with all kinds of certificate, please construct one more system for professional translators in order to test them and to issue them a government authorized certificate like lawyer, Patent Attorney, CPA….. And please hire translators as professional government officers and you will be able to avoid fatal mistakes and errors in translating very important papers or contracts or agreements like FTA.

Douglas Robinson instructs translators in his *Becoming a Translator* (1997) as following demands:

> The translator will stay up all night doing a rush job, cancel a pleasant evening outing
> with a friend, or translate a text reliably that s/he finds morally or politically loathsome.
> Professional pride in reliability is the main reason we will spend hours hunting down

a single term. What is our pay for that time? Virtually nothing. But it feels enormously important to get just the right word.(29)

"Virtually nothing!" It is necessary under the condition of fair payment for their labor. I taught this way, as many professors in Humanities echoes to their students: material is secondary. Sorry, but I had to follow this norm while I am checking their draft translation to improve their professional spirit as reliable translators:



A translator must know at least two languages. My professor, late Peter Newmark once said at the classroom he taught in London, "A translator is the most intelligent person for she must know more than two languages and cultures." And I agree with. It is necessary that they need to learn closely two languages, Source Language (SL) and Target Language (TL), and simultaneously two cultures, too, to become the most intelligent professionals.

## 4. Celebration of UN Recognition of Translation

We have many mirrors to see our Future. And we have over seven times two(7x2) billions of windows for next generations, among which some possibly will show green pastures on the moon. As long as my vision is considerably rational enough that I could consider every human eye is a window which opens towards the world of creative thinking. These windows are given neither just from AI analyses, nor from experimental results at all kinds of science labs only. They would come from our mind, Human mind where a creative, complex, dynamic, mystical, soundless but energetic soul resides which nourishes human aspiration for tomorrow. And most of all we, all human beings, do have various languages and more marvelously millions of literature: fictions, poems, prosaic essays, theatrical dramas, and rhetoric, symbol, irony, and image. And all of these elements are

tasks for translation to revive it life in foreign lands.

Last year the United Nation General Assembly declared the 30th of September as International Translation Day. It was happened in the seventy-first session after they adopted Resolution as the agenda item 125, Multilingualism. They welcome the holding of the annual Saint Jerome Translation Contest to commemorate International Translation Day, and are also happy to have the Secretary-General with the network of universities that signed for language competitive examinations and language services. And the very last month many related events were held around UN in New York and in Geneva, and they decided next year 2019 will be celebrated as the Year of International Indigenous Language. It was one emotional moment as a Humanity major, as a Linguist, as a Translator, and above all as a Human. It also acknowledges the role of multilingualism in the activities of the United Nations and its projection to the world, as a core value of the Organization, and its pursuit as a means of promoting, protecting and preserving diversity of languages and cultures globally.

Then the resolution notes professional translation, including translation proper, **interpretation and terminology**, is indispensable to preserving clarity, a positive climate and productiveness in international public discourse and interpersonal communication, while recalls again the paramount importance of the equality of the six official languages of the United Nations. Eventually it affirms that the professional translation plays an important role, <u>bringing nations together, facilitating dialogue, understanding and cooperation, contributing to development and strengthening world peace and security.</u>  Then, UNGA decides to declare 30 September International Translation Day and invites all to observe International Translation Day, in an appropriate manner and in accordance with national priorities, in order to raise awareness of the importance of professional translation, and stresses that the cost of such activities should be met from voluntary contributions. (*Please refer to the following site for more information in detail.  https://undocs.org/A/71/L.68)  Two weeks later, on the 24th of May, 2017, UNGA approved agenda 71/L.68 as the resolution 71/288 at their 82nd plenary meeting. ( http://www.undocs.org/a/res/71/288 )

The first International Translation Day had been celebrated between 26 September and 4 October at the several venues around UN ECA, ESCWA, UNHQ, UN House, and even online on DGACM's social media channels and so on. (*Programs are found in the site "ITD 2018-Program as below: http://www.un.org/en/events/translationday/assets/pdf/ITD%202018-%20Global%20 calendar%20of%20events%20(as%20of%2026%20Sept.).pdf ) The declaration of the International Translation Day is one of the most recent and meaningful victories in the Humanities along with the Year of World Indigenous Language.

## 5. Conclusion:

UN declared next year 2019, the year of Indigenous Language, warning us now we have 7000 languages from lingua franca to tiny indigenous languages, and soon half of them will face to

be distinct. If we are living in the era of losing variety, small, mysterious images of human but insisting on bigger collective image, Humanities is in crisis. According to Jacque Derrida… there is no culture like Korean one, Indonesian One, but younghee won's culture, Derrida's one, Mr. Cho's culture, Tyler's or WangHui's culture. Today we live in the world of diversity in diversity, not diversity in unity. Everybody is looking for their own way, and the Future demand them they need to be their own, and free to be different. Socratic era is probably coming again as our future. If you want to Be, Know thyself. So Human Image is changing everyday and every moment is coming. Difference is more familiar. That is Creative. Similarity is just boring. Do not copy. Understanding this trend you have to learn how to translate and how to interpret others in intimacy. We say translating is the closest reading the source text among readings, that it is the attempt to know others in the most intimate way/level.

Translators will make up all kinds of Human Images for Future in translation, so she again will hunt down a single term to translate before being disappeared half of **7,000** languages from lingua franca to tiny indigenous tongue. Sustainability in Humanities is important, but how to continue to be sustainable is more urgent. Translation Studies will open windows to give fresh winds to Humanities as the cooperative interdisciplinary paradigm in Academia.

# Beyond Appearances: Modernist Portraiture

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While many kinds of art represent the human image, portraiture is the genre solely dedicated to representing the individual person. European portraiture grew out of and testified to a belief in the correlation between exterior appearances and interior qualities. Skepticism about that correlation can be seen in the literary and artistic experiments of the later nineteenth century, leading to a rupture in the conventions of portraiture in the early twentieth century. Interestingly, it was primarily through female portraiture that this process took place. This history tells us something about the human image and the limits of its meaning.

In Europe, the individual painted portrait emerged at the end of the Middle Ages and reached its highest development in the seventeenth century.[1] The rise of Protestantism, private wealth, and ideas of individual identity contributed to the development of portraiture. Charles Taylor has chronicled the discovery of the modern self in this era, a discovery also aided by the use of mirrors, diaries, and conduct manuals.[2] Descartes's "Cogito ergo sum"—I think therefore I am—was its philosophical articulation. To be sure, women were not credited with interiority to the same degree as men, and depicting physical beauty remained the artist's top priority in female portraiture. Nonetheless, we see thoughtful expressions on women's as well as men's faces in seventeenth-century portraits, especially from the Netherlands, where women enjoyed more education and legal rights than in the rest of Europe.

Along with hailing and exploring the dimensions of modern selfhood, the European portrait served other ideological purposes throughout the period of its cultural dominance, crowned in 1856 by the establishment of the National Portrait Gallery in London. For over three centuries, portraiture

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1. See, for example, Shearer West, *Portraiture* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); Joanna Woodall, ed., *Portraiture: Facing the Subject* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997); and Norbert Schneider, *The Art of the Portrait: Masterpieces of European Portrait-Painting, 1420-1670*. Translated by Iain Galbraith (New York: Benedikt Taschen, 1999). For fuller references to the topics alluded to in this short paper, see my *The Modern Portrait Poem from Dante Gabriel Rossetti to Ezra Pound* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2012).
2. Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), esp. Chapter 8. See also Roy Porter, ed., *Rewriting the Self: Histories from the Middle Ages to the Present* (New York: Routledge, 1997), especially Roger Smith, "Self-Reflection and the Self," 49-60, and Peter Burke, "Representations of the Self from Petrarch to Descartes," 17-28.

reinforced and advanced an ideology of appearances that operated at every level of society and in many discourses ranging from literature to forensics. This ideology held that physical traits could be read to reveal a person's individual character. Such traits included hair and skin coloring, body size and type, the shape of the skull, cheekbones, and nose, facial expressions, gesture and gait, and so on. Appearance was thought to indicate personality, intelligence, social rank, degree of religious belief, chastity or promiscuity, and propensity to commit crimes, among other qualities. The European portrait thus represented and indeed yoked together two not necessarily compatible beliefs: belief in an interior self capable of independent thoughts and choices, and belief in the legible correlation between physical features and character traits.[3] While these two beliefs may not directly conflict, the deterministic view of character that underlies the ideology of appearances is in tension with a robust concept of interiority and freedom of thought.

This tension is very much on view in the Victorian era. While committed to ideas of personal responsibility and individual virtue, Victorian culture also generated multiple discourses professing the intelligibility of physical appearances, such as phrenology, which linked a person's character to the shape of the skull. Victorian sentimental fiction served to reinforce a code of symbolic correlations by matching external physical features to internal character traits. Each character type in the sentimental novel is discernible via physical appearance, and none so consistently as the stock figure of the chaste girl or woman, who is invariably thin, delicate, and fair in coloring. She embodies virtue in the sense that every aspect of her appearance testifies to her goodness. In poetry, this code of appearances was distilled in a minor genre, the female verse portrait. In the Victorian portrait poem, the poet describes a woman (or a picture of a woman) whose skin, facial structure, and eyes proclaim her innocence and honesty (terms that apply both to her character and her physical chastity). In "A Portrait" of 1844, Elizabeth Barrett Browning describes "a forehead fair and saintly, / Which two blue eyes undershine, / Like meek prayers before a shrine."[4] Similarly, in "Emma: Verses Suggested by a Portrait," the Quaker poet Bernard Barton describes Emma's "Eyes of mild and thoughtful tone, / Forehead-where no care is shown," linking her "simple loveliness" with her "guileless heart."[5] Similarly, Frederick Locker-Lampson's 1857 "On 'A Portrait of a Lady' By the Painter" asserts, "She is good, for she must have a guileless mind / With that noble, trusting air…/ She is lovely and good; she has frank blue eyes…/ With her wistful mouth, and her candid brow."[6] And in "Portrait of a Lady" of 1886, Scottish poet John Stuart Blackie declares,

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3. For an exposition of the legibility of appearances in the Victorian era, see David Peters Corbett on the pre-eminent Victorian portraitist, George Frederic Watts, in Corbett, *The World in Paint: Modern Art and Visuality in England, 1848-1914* (State College: Penn State University Press, 2004), 146. See also Barlow, "Facing the Past and Present: The National Portrait Gallery and the Search for 'Authentic Portraiture,'" in Woodall, *Portraiture*, 219-238.

4. Elizabeth Barrett Browning, *Poetical Works* (NY: Thomas Y, Crowell, 1882), 383.

5. Bernard Barton, *Household Verses* (London: George Virtue, 1845), 150.

6. Frederick Locker-Lampson, *London Lyrics,* 1857 (London: Macmillan, 1904), 131.

Oh, she is lovely! all the summer dwells

In her bright eyes, and every feature tells

A treasured sweetness in the soul within,

That beats like music through the lucid skin….

She knows no falseness; even the courtliest lie

She dreams not; truth flows from her deep blue eye…[7]

The poet's insistence on the female sitter's honesty serves the ideological purposes of the genre; the possibility of lying would throw off the whole scheme. Indeed, fainting, blushing, and especially crying are common narrative devices in sentimental fiction, used to underscore the female body's truth-telling. The uncritical use of such devices might show that the Victorians were not very smart, or, more likely, they may reflect a widespread anxiety that, in fact, appearances are *not* universally and unfailingly legible. If they were, no special reader's guide to the body would be necessary. Indeed, the con man is a stock character of sentimental fiction, whose unmasking reasserts the transparency of appearances that his existence undermines.

Dissent from the ideology of appearances was inevitable and powerful.[8] While portraiture remained a significant genre in both literature and painting, it served increasingly as an occasion to repudiate the moralistic correlation of appearance and character. In the 1860s, painters on both sides of the English Channel began experimenting with inscrutable facial expressions and baffling props that withheld the usual assurances about the sitter's character, religious inclinations, and social status. The enigmatic individuals in Edouard Manet's single-figure compositions present blank faces and even their dress seems intended either to conceal their identity or mislead us about their social status. Some paintings are self-consciously staged; in *Mademoiselle V… in the Costume of an Espada,* we know the woman portrayed is not the bullfighter she is dressed up to look like; in others, we just don't know the sitter's social identity, still less what she thinks (see *Young lady in 1866* and the *Bar aux Folies-Bergère*). The sitter for many of these portraits was not a paying client but a paid model, Victorine Meurent. Herself a painter and musician, Meurent occupied an ambiguous social position. Manet's viewers often accused him of painting prostitutes in the guise of respectable women.[9] This accusation reflected the reality of women's lives in nineteenth-century Paris: in order to afford the fashionable clothing required by their jobs, many shop assistants moonlighted as prostitutes by night.[10] Their daytime appearance did not assure their respectability. Cutting straight to the social anxieties of late nineteenth-century France,

7. John Stuart Blackie, *Messis Vitae: Gleanings of Song from a Happy Life* (London: Macmillan, 1886), 73.

8. Dorothy Ross identifies the second half of the nineteenth century as a period of increasing skepticism in all areas of life and intellectual disciplines; see *Modernist Impulses in the Human Sciences*, 1870-1930 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1994), 1.

9. See T. J. Clark, *The Painting of Modern Life: Paris in the Art of Manet and his Followers* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), especially Chapter 2, "Olympia's Choice."

10. See Alain Corbin, *Women for Hire: Prostitution and Sexuality in France after 1850,* trans. Alan Sheridan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), especially "The Failure of Regulationism," 115-185.

Manet asked his viewers to consider if there was really any difference between a prostitute and a respectable woman, and more profoundly, whether the status of her body and dress can tell us anything about the character, still less the thoughts, of a person. Manet is considered the father of modern art because his paintings foreground their own painted surfaces and their status as representations.[11] Rather than windows to a world, his paintings present themselves as canvases. The social ambiguity of his female figures is not an accidental aspect of his modernism: challenging the ideology of appearances is a key feature of modern art. Without denying the significance of interiority, Manet is simply agnostic about the possibility of knowing it through appearances.

In England, the art-for-art's-sake movement emphasized female physical beauty as an end in itself, rather than a sign of moral virtue. Rossetti's striking portraits also deny us access to the sitter's thoughts and character. His sitters always have the same vacant, self-absorbed look whether they are presented to us as figures of virtue (*Sibylla Palmifera*, *Ecce Ancilla Domini!*, *The Salutation of Beatrice*), sensuality (*Bocca Baciata*, *Regina Cordium*) or danger (*Lady Lilith*). Like Manet, Rossetti used the same model for many of his portraits, Elizabeth Siddal, a painter and poet who became his wife. The flat, decorated surfaces of Rossetti's canvases suggest that we may be seeing all there is: we're not asked to look through the windows of the soul.

The celebrated and scandal-prone American painter James McNeill Whistler, who associated both with French Realists and English Decadents, exploited the possibilities of ambiguous appearances in his portraits of women, especially Joanna Hiffernan, also a model. In *The Little White Girl*, later *Symphony in White No. 2*, Whistler suggests that the figure in the painting is pure representation, again like Manet. Our clearest view of the sitter's face is in the mirror, where her head is framed by the reflection of one of Whistler's own paintings hanging on the opposite wall. The back of the sitter's head is framed by another painting to the left, and her body is supported and framed by the fireplace. Painted in 1864, this work exhibits elements of Japonisme that Whistler had adopted in Paris: the ceramic jar on the mantle, the painted fan she holds, and sprays of azaleas, a recently introduced Asian plant that, unlike European flowers, carried no specific connotations in the Victorian language of flowers. The azaleas do nothing to help us interpret the meaning of the sitter's look: pensiveness, melancholy, longing, regret? Her image is no more meaningful than the blurred landscapes reflected in the mirror or the abstractly rendered scene on the fan: it's an arrangement of color and line.

Algernon Swinburne, a younger member of the Rossetti circle, wrote a poem to accompany Whistler's painting, entitled "Before the Mirror," in which he articulated the doctrine of aestheticism. He begins in the tradition of the Victorian portrait poem by asking the painting to reveal its secrets:

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11. An argument elaborated by Michael Fried in *Manet's Modernism, or the Face of Painting in the 1860s* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

Behind the veil, forbidden,
    Shut up from sight,
Love, is there sorrow hidden,
    Is there delight?

The figure in the painting answers by interpreting her own reflection in the mirror:

" I cannot see what pleasures
    Or what pains were;
What pale new loves and treasures
    New years will bear;
What beam will fall, what shower,
What grief or joy for dower;
    But one thing knows the flower; the flower is fair."

The poem suggests that personal interiority is a kind of mise en abîme, leading back into successive reflections or representations; the only stable meaning to be found is in beauty itself. While the Victorian portrait poem guides us from physical traits to inner qualities, Swinburne's "Before the Mirror" embraces appearances as an aesthetic end rather than a means to a moral.

Such ambiguous or inscrutable paintings of women dramatized as early as the 1860s that the ideology of appearances limited and circumscribed the scope of painting. Painters who were free to experiment with portraiture without having to please paying clients increasingly emphasized the pictorial aspects of their subject rather than a narrative or message about character. From Whistler it is but a small step to the abstract designs of Matisse's portraits of his wife (*Madras Rouge*) and his collector Auguste Pellerin, or portraits by Georges Braque (*Woman with a Mandolin*) and Picasso (*Head of a Woman*). Analytic cubism makes a complete rupture—not with representation itself, because we can still tell that a human being is depicted—but with the ideology of appearances. Where feeling is represented in the painting, it is not the sitter's feeling (her piety, sympathy, pride) but the painter's feeling towards her (see Matisse's *The Green Stripe* and *The Conversation*). The exuberant freedom that modernist art exudes is not just a freedom from aesthetic convention, but also from a worn-out belief system dictating the moral meaning of appearances. In particular, modernist portraits of women celebrate freedom from the requirement to flatter the sitter and ensure the legibility of her virtue. A perfect case in point is Picasso's portrait of Gertrude Stein of 1906, which combines a heavy, masculine body with an impassive, mask-like face that is considered one of the starting-places of cubism. Stein's freedom from social convention and her fearless avant-garde experimentation gave Picasso permission to experiment in his own way.

While turn-of-the-century painters embraced physical appearances as a sufficient subject for their canvases, this approach was hardly adequate for fiction and poetry. An alternative was to ignore

physical appearance and focus on interiority. Perhaps the most famous fictional portrait of the nineteenth century was Henry James's *Portrait of a Lady* (1881), a deep exploration of a woman's self-cultivation and consciousness, with little reference to her outward looks. James's novel was an important precursor for modern explorations of consciousness by Joseph Conrad, Ford Maddox Ford, Virginia Woolf, and T. S. Eliot. One of the most notable literary portraits of the modernist period is James Joyce's *A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man,* which renders the subject entirely from the inside, experimenting with stream-of-consciousness techniques that became hallmarks of modernist fiction. Gertrude Stein also composed a series of short prose portraits, many concerning painters in her circle such as Picasso and Matisse. These works experiment with language and seldom make reference to the physical appearance of her subjects.

Modernist portrait poems are numerous, including T. S. Eliot's "Portrait of a Lady," Ezra Pound's "Portrait d'une femme" and the portrait sequence "Hugh Selwyn Mauberly," and William Carlos Williams's "Portrait of a Lady" and "Portrait of a woman in Bed." Significantly, the reference point for these works is not visual. Unlike the Victorian portrait poem, which typically begins with a physical description of the sitter from life or from a picture, the woman's appearance rarely plays a role in the modernist portrait poem. Instead, her personality, opinions, memory, and attitudes are on display. We do not think of Eliot and Pound as socially or politically progressive, only as rebels against literary convention; they fought for freedom from censorship, not for female suffrage. Yet an aspect of their nonconformity was to refuse the ideology of appearances, which is more than a theory of representation; it is a set of social expectations.

For example, take Ezra Pound's "Portrait d'une femme" (1912), most likely a sketch of Florence Farr, a well-known Edwardian actress and writer who collaborated with both George Bernard Shaw and W. B. Yeats.

> Your mind and you are our Sargasso Sea,
>     London has swept about you this score years
> And bright ships left you this or that in fee:
>     Ideas, old gossip, oddments of all things,
> Strange spars of knowledge and dimmed wares of price.[12]

Pound's portrait describes Farr not as possessing a physical body at all, but rather consisting of all the memories, "spars of knowledge" and tributes that she has gathered to herself over the years. While Pound suggests that she lacks originality, he pays this New Woman her due by making her mind, not her body, the subject of the portrait. Indeed, every time in the poem when he seems to mention a physical object, such as "The tarnished, gaudy, wonderful old work; / Idols and ambergris and rare inlay," it turns out that these are metaphors for what she knows or remembers.

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12. Ezra Pound, *Ripostes* (London: Stephen Swift & Co., 1912), 17.

She is her recollections. And, indeed, this portrait of Farr is a fitting account of the poet himself, whose poetry in this period consists mainly of skillful pastiche and allusion—a hoard of literary recollections. "Portrait d'une femme" both portrays the subject and mirrors the artist. Release from the ideology of appearances meant that writers could begin to explore the true complexity of the human mind, its capacity for exceeding the boundaries of the individual and combining with other minds, and its freedom to transcend the body's temporal and spatial limits. While appearances still have an inordinate influence on how we think of each other in the twenty-first century, the legacy of modernist portraiture provides a healthy check on our impulse to judge others by how they look.

# The Image of the Moving Body as Cultural Change: Interrogating the Transformative Potential of Performance

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Tremendous gratitude to the conference organizers and my colleagues from around the world for inviting and welcoming my participation in this dialogue. I am deeply heartened by the power of critical projects this year's forum topic, The Human Image in a Changing World, has brought forth from so many scholars. What I seek to offer today is a sample of how I have been thinking about cultural change and the potential role of community performance in furthering that change. My thinking has included the questions: How can we understand how and where we impact each other in collaborative, public art experiences? What makes these experiences potentially transformational and what gets in the way? How can we discern where we cannot, or where we should not go with others in contested public spaces? These questions cross through a variety of fields and disciplines from art and dance to ethics and political philosophy, and operate within a tangle of relational dynamics. To distill that tangle to a question that might serve as a lever for investigation, I offer more simply: How can we create transformative arts experiences together? Using the language of philosophy, I add: What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for relational art spaces and participatory art experiences to be created in community? I want to understand these questions not only because I like to think about them but because I also am engaged in relational art making. So while what I present today operates primarily at the theoretical level, my larger project is a pragmatic one.

Two major threads of thought frame and inform my thinking. The first thread is from feminist theory and theories of the body, represented incompletely by a quotation from Simone de Beauvoir writing in *The Second Sex* (translation provided by Toril Moi): "The body is not a thing, it is a situation; it is our grasp on the world and our sketch of our project." The body is always situated; it is a living, mediated space where concepts of self and other are not fixed; there is both a potency and vulnerability in that dynamic. This is not an uncommon position in feminist theory, yet giving weight to the relational aspect of that dynamic is increasingly important for understanding participatory art experiences. The second thread is from an approach to movement or dance sometimes placed under the umbrella of the 'postmodern,' yet more precisely would be described as improvisational, experiential, and expressive. About *Ceremony of Us,* a collaboration created

in 1969 between Anna Halprin, San Francisco Dancers & Studio Watts School for the Arts in response to the Watts Riots or Watts Rebellion in Los Angeles, August 1965, Halprin stated, "I wanted to do a production *with* a community instead of for a community" (152). In an interview with Nancy Stark Smith at her home studio in 1989, Halprin, who did not embrace the language of postmodernism, describes her project in this way: "One of the things about working with real-life issues is that it can be transformative. You work with an issue because it is unresolved, and through the dance, we hope to discover new possibilities. It's not about the dancers and it's not an interpretation of a theme, it's real. And by doing it you get to a different place with that issue, and in your life. The dance changes the dancer. The purpose is to create change…" (14). There's a rush of optimism in Halprin's dialogue and we would do well to unpack the participants' experiences in the workshop as well.

First, some framing: between the 1960s and the 1990s, art historical writing refined descriptions of the work of a variety of community-engaged artists. One development in this creative and critical activity was the naming of relational aesthetics in 1998 by Nicholas Bourriaud through a curatorial and theoretical project. Bourriaud contends that collaborative, public art projects can catalyze social environments and can create transformative moments (1998/2002) so long as such projects meet a criteria of co-existence. He suggests that we ask the following questions: "does this work permit me to enter into dialogue? Could I exist, and how, in the space it defines?" (109). In other words, his formulation gives at least equal weight between the community and the subject. Subsequent feminist critiques have questioned the quality of relationships cultivated in such activity (Bishop, 2004) and the degree to which such projects reflect and replicate or contest and resist prevailing cultural perspectives (Reckitt, 2013). Such critiques are interested in the quality of encounters created through relational art, emphasizing that the activity of encounter alone is not enough to determine if there is a communal capacity for exchange created or indeed anything like democracy in action. Claire Bishop writes, "The model of subjectivity that underpins [relational art] practice is not the fictitious whole subject of harmonious community, but a divided subject of partial identifications open to constant flux. If relational aesthetics requires a unified subject as a prerequisite for community-as- togetherness…" then she questions how this would be "adequate to the divided and incomplete subject of today." She argues for a "relational antagonism" that "would be predicated not on social harmony, but on exposing that which is repressed in sustaining the semblance of this harmony. It would thereby provide a more concrete and polemical grounds for rethinking our relationship to the world and to one other" (79). This makes pragmatic sense, whether from the perspective of increasing attention to intersectionality and transnationalism or the complexity of body and our understanding of it through advances in neuroscience. Also Bishop's work is focused less on greater societal transformation and is more about the moment or site-specific experience where micro-changes can take place for a participating individual. Her work in this vein therefore offers greater descriptive adequacy for the participant than for the possibilities of collective transformation.

Philosopher Erin Manning offers a more nuanced way of understanding art-informed relational encounters through a concept of elasticity (which she imports through her reading of Delueze). She contends that in order for expression to have affective force it must be conjoined with thought in motion (2009). Relational movement for Manning always carries an element of the improvisational, what she poetical describes as the "elasticity of the almost." "The elasticity of the almost is the intensive extension of the movement, a moment when anything can happen, when our bodies are poised in a togetherness beginning to take shape. The next movement has not yet come, the past movement is passing. No step has been taken, and yet in this elastic the micro-perception of every possible step can almost be felt" (32). Her elasticity is infused with an active imagination always conjoined with embodied experience. Manning asserts that "relation is always already elastic. Even a simple walk can feel elastic when the movement carries us, when the goal is not the first thing on our mind. The elasticity of the relation is perceptible in its affective margin, in the emergence of the unknowable where what is felt stretches and contracts into a propulsion of experience toward the unfathomable" (41). Her project's strength is its descriptive quality of the complexity of relational encounter; however, in its descriptive nuance any application of what aspects of relational art engender healing and/or transformation become more difficult. The same elasticity that activates imaginative embodiment might also re-inscribe wound, or generate distance, avoidance, and deferral. From an ethical perspective, such an expansive elasticity clearly broadens the terrain of aesthetic experience, yet it also requires a higher degree of responsibility on the part of artists and participants.

A similar higher threshold for participants' responsibility also is underlined by Derek McCormack who contends that in order for the therapeutic to be realized we must "learn to attend" (98). Highlighting the experimental and experiential qualities of creating affective spaces, he argues that only through collective mobility does the possibility of a fully-engaged (or fully re- membered) present emerge (2013). "Broadly defined, somatic therapeutic practices are organized activities that privilege moving bodies as the locus of transformative potential in subjectivities. They aim to generate transformative intervention in subjectivities by reworking somatic, affective, and cognitive processes" (91-2). McCormack acknowledges that aiming for healing in creative work may create a problematic performance positivity. He wonders about how to gauge the efficacy of participation and the role of abstraction in improvisational experience. For instance, might we understand any "good feeling" engendered through a relational arts experience "just an atmosphere?" He writes, "the affective and ethics-aesthetic value of therapeutic intervention lies in their capacity to generate contexts for experimenting with the refrain of experience" (115). In this way it is possible that even the experience of an atmosphere begins to encode new imaginative pathways that the embodied subject may internalize and grow to re-pattern; this possibility seems more suited for individual healing. Different criteria and/or higher levels of processing would seem to be necessary for community healing. Moment-to-moment awareness may not be enough for cultural transformation; a larger re-patterning likely is required.

When we read feminist writing on relational autonomy, applications of this sub-discipline to personal and public spheres are more common in arenas of family and workplace relations, hospitals, bioethics and are less frequently applied in the arena of aesthetics. In those subfields, feminist relational autonomy has offered important contributions in problematizing notions of consent, questioning what has been thought of as the moral minimums required in order for a person to give consent, and what counts as full participation. For example, to what degree can an ailing patient untrained in medicine truly 'give consent' to have an experimental procedure performed. Returning to Halprin's *Ceremony of Us*, the question of informed consent within the improvisational, creative collaborative process is revealed to be layered and complicated.

There is quite a long section in an interview where Halprin describes how the collaboration between (white) San Francisco Dancers and (black) Studio Watts dancers had to work through highly charged gender and socially scripted sexuality dynamics concurrently with the racial content the collaboration aimed to create from and work through. Clearly dancers consented to participate on a race-responsive project, yet the emergence of sexually charged content that delighted Halprin (she saw it as essential work to reach authentic co-creation) could not have been consented to by the dancers; it emerged in process. The complexity of these performative experiences raises the question of what qualifies as full participation and when this participation can be understood to be autonomous, to be democratic, actionable, and not to be simply bodies following a pattern either suggested by an artist or materialized by a social structure, or desired as performance positivity. To respond to such situational complexity, Bishop's relational antagonism mentioned earlier at least offers clarity of participatory will and gives weight to the autonomy of a subjective participation; that's the benefit of the antagonistic stance, although we could problematize the potential for self-deception and for reposting limiting social scripts within this antagonism as well. Working before the time of Bishop's writing, Halprin herself acknowledged the pitfalls of aesthetic expectations for unity in numerous interviews about *Ceremony of Us;* she describes how at the outset the white dancers improvised in ways that could be characterized as "trying to be too nice" and were hesitant to engage tensions even when "antagonism" or competitive tensions were overtly present within the group dynamics and favored moving towards wholeness and fluidity.

Bishop's work raises the paradox of relational art and spotlights a main sticking point for understanding how and when a communal aesthetic experience can be or become transformative or healing. In the design of relational and participatory art, we must interrogate how we claim to be fully conscious of:

- The power of the organizing artist(s), the degree to which, through charisma or socially accepted role, her suggestions drive and shape collaboration;
- The power(s) of the participants, where they have agency, or where for example they may feel coerced, or even more problematically where consent to one aspect of collaboration becomes imbedded or distorted with another area where consent may not have been given;

expectations for discomfort to be accepted as "part of the creative process" and a given hazard of collaborative improvisation cannot simply be a blank check for transfer of consent;

- The limits of social structures and historical/cultural relational dynamics; in setting a container for a relational arts experience, physical and temporal boundaries may not be enough to exclude particularly pernicious power dynamics.
- The possibility of active imaging to influence creative process, and
- The potential of affective space to impact experience.

Astrid Breel in a 2015 article in the journal *Participations* encourages us to remember that "[a] distinction should be made between participatory processes and outcomes" (369). In thinking about relational art, I invite us to elevate the intentionality of artists and conveners, to continue to move beyond the 'chance operation' of the 1960s and the moment-presence of the 1990s to include a stronger pragmatism, an informed deliberateness in co-creative spaces of artful emergence and improvisational making. While not a one-stop solution, the emerging subfield of somaesthetics offers a tempering challenge to transformative claims of relational aesthetics that can work in dialogue with feminist critiques. Its origins most often credited to Richard Shusterman, somaesthetics emphasizes the experiential and resists the representational domain. Shusterman agrees with de Beauvoir's description of the situated body: "Just as our world cannot make sense without a body, our bodies make no sense without a world" (129) yet is skeptical of transformational claims of relational aesthetics not only on feminist grounds but also on pragmatic ones. Shusterman's somaesthetics queries to what degree a transcendent imagination is possible and the utility to which it can be employed toward cultural change. For if the body as ground is situated, it likely imports as many problems as it solves for it carries the world within it. And so the potential for transformation of social structures through bodies, even in motion, if the world order is already and always encoded within it is limited. While this pragmatism is a helpful corrective, it may leave us in a less optimistic place regarding our belief in the capacity of relational public art to foster healing; at best it may return us to the moment-to-moment elasticity as described by Manning and perhaps makes the therapeutic interventions of affective spaces described by McCormack merely aspirational at the collective level. I want to be optimistic, yet to collectively create from that orientation we must be able to bring and apply a higher standard of pragmatism and ethical reasoning to creative inquiry and aesthetic improvisation - neither "good feeling" nor dedicated relational antagonism is enough.

Our hope or eagerness for transformational personal and community experiences may foreclose our ability to acknowledge the persistence of social structures that operate on and through the material domain. Establishing truly experimental, affective spaces can feel dangerous and destabilizing for community (even the resistance of relational antagonism can operate in socially prescribed scripts; indeed this is some of the critique leveled at contemporary protest action whether on the streets or on social media). Aesthetic quality also may be seen to be negatively

affected by fully participatory process when an inclusive range of community participants who may not be perceived as meeting the standards of professional (high) art take equitable roles in shaping both process and outcome; yet such aesthetic limitations may be worth our patience in exchange for relational authenticity and the possibility to meaningfully foster an acceptable range of autonomy for participants. The arc of processes of engagement between artists-conveners and participants may well need to be longer, even slower, and may need to proceed through multiple creative cycles of conscious, active imagining if our aims are to fully activate the image-experience of public bodies in motion in order to prime our shared spaces for cultural change.

Compare for example the participatory scale, degree of embodied engagement and cultural impact of the AIDS Memorial Quilt which "changed public opinion through its mechanisms of publicity and meaning-making" (Gambardella 213). The individual quilt sections varied widely in traditional artistic quality, yet the transformative effect emerged in the volume of participants and the scale of loss expressed and represented, alongside the required activity of viewers of the project who had to move themselves in order to visually experience the various installations of the quilt. Or consider Ruth Sergel's *Chalk,* a public participatory art intervention in memory of those lost in the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory Fire of 1911 which killed 146 garment workers the majority of them Jewish and Italian immigrants to New York City. The first year (2004) Sergel and a small group of artist friends chalked 140 names of those lost in the fire along with the word "unidentified" six times on the pavement in front of the old factory building. In the decade that followed, the memorial chalking activity grew to over 100 locations and now serves as a larger call for workplace solidarity. Sergel writes, "The work of the Coalition was to set up a process that invited participation while respecting autonomy. What people created was not nearly as important as the experience of trusting an internal passion, turning it into action…" (166). In order to create a transformative experience, Sergel contends the participatory art process "had to include the whole person" and as such the aesthetic product becomes less important that the embodied, affective experience the participants create together (48). To continue to "include the whole person" in transformative art experiences and for that whole person to be inclusive of divided or incomplete subjects as Bishop reminds us of many of our 21st century positions, we will have to recalibrate and change our expectations for the visual presentation of artistic works and performances as part of creating the necessary and sufficient conditions for community aesthetic experiences to emerge; we will have to re-evaluate and re-pattern the weight we grant to artist-conveners and to participants, to recognize a more layered elasticity to the communal creative process and affective moment-to-moment experience of that process, and accordingly to adjust our expectations, particularly spatiotemporal, for perceived quality of artistic presentation.

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# Comparative/Historical Poetics in an Age of Cultural Studies

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'Comparative poetics' does not belong to the set of established terms. It has been introduced by Earl Miner as a title to his book (1990) and might have heralded an ambitious project if not immediately undermined by the subtitle 'An Intercultural Essay on Theories of Literature'. It did not take long to find that poetics did not easily agree with cultural studies as they were laid out. The only combination where the word 'poetics' could be admitted was 'poetics of culture', picked up by Stephen Greenblatt from Yuri Lotman and conceptualized as an invitation to semiotics. It was a decisive turn in understanding poetics which since the beginning of the 20th century, in different national traditions but unanimously, had been advanced as part of linguistics focused on the poetic nature of word. In this direction theory was developed by Benedetto Croce and the Russian Formalists, and later New Criticism practiced it in all forms of close reading.

The Russian Formalism was especially famous for its theory of speech focused on the question how the word of the language takes on a poetic quality. This tendency, extreme in its formalist transformation, can be traced back to Alexander Veselovsky's 'From the Introduction to Historical Poetics' (1893) which he had memorably opened arguing that "literary history is reminiscent of a geographical zone that international law has consecrated as *res nillius* [no one's land], where the historian of culture and the aesthetician, the erudite antiquarian and the researcher of social ideas all come to hunt" [Veselovsky 2016: 40]. Veselovsky did not intend to fence off a special field for poetics but insisted on the specific literary/poetic quality waiting to be examined. Some decades later Roman Jakobson, in his youth a member of the Russian Formalist circle, canonized the problem as *literariness* stipulated by one of the verbal functions initially inherent in the language.

The accent on literariness and specific quality of the poetic word was often overstated. The Russian Formalists – at least in the early days of the theory – were ready to negate any reference to reality sacrificing semantics to poetic significance in the self-sufficient word. Poetics as part of semiotics ran to another extreme: word was reduced to a sign cut off from its poetic specificity, and natural language was treated as a cultural product minimized in its poetic quality.

Culture and literature do not immediately invite to oppose them, and had not been memorably opposed before one was considered the object for poetics the other – for cultural studies. Cultural

reading of the text – not rarely – is illuminating on the plot in its historical context but passing by its literariness indiscernible in the picture memorably defined in its universality as "historicity of texts and textuality of history." [Montrose: 23]

An enthusiastic and wide rally in cultural studies was a reaction of students of literature generation after generation involved in close reading. Under these circumstances an invitation to locate poetics within cultural studies, no matter whether comparative or any other, was doomed to fail. The century, which opened with a hope for a new linguistic poetics capable to concentrate on the distinctive features, was closed with a semiotic concept of language and text. Literary/poetic text was perceived as a cultural text with a minimum of interest paid to its specific literariness. For poetics it could mean either the death of the discipline, or, at least "the downgrading of literature" [Saussy: 21]. But now we know – better than ever – that cultural deaths are an introduction to revivals.

In 2004 a foremost figure in American theory of literature Jonathan Culler, invited to join an exchange of opinions following the meeting of ACLA (American Comparative Literature Association) and to give his recommendations, expressed his hope that aesthetics "which for a while was a dirty word" began to attract an increasing interest, and that "comparative literature would provide a home for poetics" [Culler: 241, 240].

Comparative literature was always noted for its keen awareness of its method. Its dynamic definition suggests that comparative literature is by no means an aggregation of texts, neither a canon, but 'a mode of reading' [D. Damrosch: 11]. And now when poetics is on the agenda again the question how to read and how to read comparatively is raised.

An attempt to answer was suggested by Franco Moretti when he coined the term 'distant reading' [Moretti]. The connection with and opposition to 'close reading' is evident in the adjective. But no less important is a repetitive part of the term – 'reading'. Again we are invited to discuss its 'mode', but does it bring us to comparative literature as 'a home for poetics'?

The term "distant reading" is an invitation to comparative poetics where "a mode of reading" has a suggestion of reading in foreign languages. After decades of insistence on a broad linguistic competence for the comparatist, a polyglot beyond European languages on a level to read texts closely, this utopian demand seems to be reduced in view of reality, especially when reality of world literature is considered really worldwide. Haun Saussy argues that "the battle between 'literature' and 'cultural studies'" is "repeatedly correlated with the battle between 'Eurocentic' and 'non-Western' canons of text and theory…" [Saussy: 21]. Even if an overstatement this opinion is consistent in relation to poetics of comparative literature where the worldwide understanding of the world literature asks for a mode of reading comprehensive in its coverage and profound in its relation to the text, both close and distant.

This is a short historical sketch of the recent situation and the perspective for poetics and cultural studies in view of their would-be cooperation. Poetics as a way to understand verbal art was always considered an important instrument in reification of the human. Cultural studies, with culture as

its object, do not seem to prompt the idea of dehumanization. And nevertheless cultural studies had played its part in the process because of the view of culture with its verbal centre removed and culture devoid of its traditional logocentricity. This is why the revival of poetics is associated with the return of the human in culture and poetics bound to seek for its new method.

In the last 5 years not a few international events in Russia, USA, Italy and other places confirm the growing attention to historical poetics and its author - Alexander Veselovsky. New editions of historical poetics in Russia were published, for the first time following his original plan and filling up the lacunae with the works written by Veselovsky beyond the plan but devoted to the problems he intended to discuss in "Historical Poetics"[1] [Veselovsky 2006; Veselovsky 2010]; translations of his works proliferate, collections of articles on historical poetics come out.

It is much less surprising that Veselovsky's name becomes familiar at last; it is more surprising how long it took for him to come out from the shadows. For decades his name was vaguely heard of mentioned in the works of the eminent Russian scholars (the Formalists, Bakhtin, Propp) who were always ready to admit the fact that, no matter how different, they all worked in the domain cultivated by Veselovsky and named by him historical poetics.

In the first report from Germany, where Veselovsky went in 1862 to continue his education, he pointed out what had grown archaic: "The time of manuals on rhetoric and poetics is irretrievably past' [Veselovsky 1862: 444]. Between Veselovsky's early discovery that poetics was gone and the term he accepted as his own 30 years had passed. First he avoided poetics, then he was looking for a name he could appropriately apply to his own system of thought, and for a long time preferred Steinthal's 'historical aesthetics'. Veselovsky, unlike contemporary theoreticians, was apprehensive of terms, both old and new. He did not want to precipitate but at the same time he did not want to provoke wrong associations. This was true with poetics, an overall term for his system, and genre, a final term in the plan of his poetics. Veselovsky used the 'genre' but rarely and preferred a corresponding Russian word 'rod' – genus).

Veselovsky's slow gait on his way to historical poetics had played a bad joke on its comprehension after his death. In a broad view it had a reputation of a great idea Veselovsky had stumbled on and left unfinished. The general regret has been long concerned with the absence of the plan laid down by the author for "Historical Poetics". The fragmentary reception had grown into such an unshakable persuasion that the publication of the author's plan by Victor Zhirmunsky in 1959 had passed practically unnoticed and only half a century later a new edition of "Historical Poetics" according to the plan was brought out [Veselovsky 2006].

Part I in the plan has a title "The Definition of Poetry" and is preceded by the Introduction first voiced in public as a lecture in 1893 and published a year later with the qualification '*From* the Introduction to Historical Poetics".

Part II "Historical Conditions of Poetic Production" looks most extensive, probably, because

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1. The term is written in capital letters when the book Veselovsky was working on is referred to.

three quarters of it (three sections out of four) were partly written, partly in progress. The first two were presented by articles published in Veselovsky's lifetime. The name of the first section has several manuscript variants « Syncretism of the Old Poetry and Beginnings of the Differentiation of Poetic Genera». Veselovsky uses the word 'genera' (rodov) not only because he is still apprehensive of 'genre', reminiscent of the prescribing normative poetics, but because in this section he speaks of the situation when – at the beginning of poetry within the ritual – epic, lyric and drama (the genera of Aristotle's poetics) were taking form and emerged from the initial indistinguishability.

Section 2 deals with the "History of Poetic Style" and can be reconstructed from several articles published by Veselovsky: "Language of Poetry and of Prose", "Psychological Parallelism and its Forms in the Reflection of Poetic Style", "From the History of the Epithet". Section 3 "Poetics of Narrative Plots" was left unfinished and in fragments reconstructed by Veselovsky's disciple Vladimir Shishmarev for the collected works (Part I of Volume 2; it had to be continued in the publication of raw materials from the archive but this Part 2 never came out).

This is what we have from "Historical Poetics", far from completion but much above the basement. The final section in Part II had to be devoted to the "History of Ideals", Parts III and IV respectively – to the poet's personality in its historical evolution and poet's relation to his audience; and the history of genres (still cautiously called genera). Some of the lacunae left can be filled up with the works written and published by Veselovsky in his earlier years, formally beyond historical poetics but on the way to it (as the volume complementary to the edition of "Historical Poetics" was titled) [Veselovsky 2010]. Of course, much could be changed and brilliantly innovated by the scholar in his heyday compared, for example, with an early work in the history of ideals "From the History of the Development of Human Personality. Woman and the Old Theories of Love". Written by the beginner in 1872 it impresses now as a powerful precursor to the research both of the everyday and of the feminist approach.

Summing up the value of Veselovsky's achievement for a current research one should pay attention to how widely and in how various particulars its significance had been acknowledged in the 20th century. The Formalists appreciated Veselovsky's call to change a vague status of literature as *res nullius* and to concentrate on the specific. Propp claimed for him the right to have laid the foundation of the narrative research with the difference drawn between the 'plot' and the 'motif'. Bakhtin considered the importance of Veselovsky's genre theory in relation to his own future interpretation of genres as the driving belts 'from the history of society to the history of language' (Bakhtin V: 165) and at the same time as verbal structures (the idea that Julia Kristeva attempted to interprete introducing her famous catchword – *intertext*).

In other words the unique significance of the historical poetics stands out in its *universality* stretching from the minute constituents of the poetic function of the language up to the social function of verbal art. The most general appreciation of this aspect had been expressed by Mark Azadovsky, a foremost folklore scholar, when 80 years ago he argued that in Veselovsky's work every "encounter of plots" presents "an encounter of various culture" (Azadovsky: 101).

A demand for the theory capable of a similar universal scope is on the agenda in the humanities nowadays when the tradition of close reading is being opposed with the idea of "distant reading". Franco Moretti with his terminological neologism has responded to several challenges both old and new. In the field of combative literature he has provided an argument in a long-term dispute how many languages the comparatist ought to know. Veselovsky's linguistic competence was extraordinary: he knew practically all European languages, knew and old, some of them to such perfection that he wrote and published in them, he could read some oriental texts, not to mention Hebrew. But an average comparatist, even if he reads half a dozen or even a dozen languages, in how many of them he can boast of the ability to read closely? Distant reading is to save him from the sense of guilt and incompetence if he is allowed to draw on translations in his reading or other people's experience and judgment without being thought of as second rate.

The allowance is actually made not for an individual use but for the sake of scholarship in its present day methods when corpus linguistics and similar literary studies deal with a huge amount of texts. Even the most assiduous and conscientious student of Victorian novel is supposed to have read a collection measured in 3-figure numbers but new methods of corpus reading allow to count in thousands. Comparison with a European novel may result in a hundred thousand.

But would this kind of research mean a 'mode of reading', named a 'distant reading' would this be a reading at all? It would depend on the researcher, on his ability to address the computer sensible questions which, it its own turn, depend on the researcher's experience in close reading and poetics. In other words, reading as a human activity and human knowledge may be successfully supported and developed by the scope of information we have an access to. But 'to support' should not be taken for 'to substitute', not to substitute information for either reading, or knowledge. This is where poetics can step in and close reading serve as an argument to introduce distant reading with an aim to draw on the entire accessible database, but not to undermine the sense of the specific quality of the data and our ability to judge of it.

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# Of Bugs and Men: Narratives of Desire and Hatred in Korean Literature from the 1970s to the Present

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## 1. Nietzsche, Kafka and Korean Literature

In his philosophical novel "*Thus Spoke Zarathustra*", Friedrich Nietzsche had announced that human beings as mere animals, mere bugs.

"Ye have made your way from the worm to man, and much within you is still worm. Once were ye apes, and even yet man is more of an ape than any of the apes. Even the wisest among you is only a disharmony and hybrid of plant and phantom. But do I bid you become phantoms or plants? Lo, i reach you the Superman! The Superman is the meaning of the earth."

The way that Nietzsche's 'worm – animal – human' has to evolve is a way to be a "super-man". If human can not become "super-man", human will regress. For Nietzsche, the process of human evolution is the process from "worm – animal – human" becoming to "human – superman". However, Kafka's "*Metamorphosis*" (1915) is a process of the reversed-evolution of "human", process of regressing from "human" to "bug".

This article analyzes the works of Cho Se-hee, Kim Young-hyun, Oh Su-yeon and Kim Ae-ran, who have works with the same title, or the same subject, "worms/ bugs" (벌레) since the 1970s. Writers show that human nature is not different from bugs through motif of transfomation into bugs themselves, or hatred for bugs. It shows the reality of human beings as a contradiction of their conditions and desires.

Cho Se-hee's "*The Dwarf*" (1976) is a series of twelve shortstories about dwarf's family. Although they are the underprivileged in the city and living in very poor condition day by day, they had never stop hoping to live for a better life. One day, however, they received a Redevelopment Notice from the Seoul Metropolitan Government, "Etopia District, Happy Ward". The demolition simply ended, and apartment will be distributed with the price they can not imagine. Even though they had a right to move in, they did not have enough money. So they sold the right to the leaguers. The dwarves had to work harder, their children had to quit school and worked in factories. In despair, the dwarf father climbed up chimney of the brick factory to commit suicide, dreaming of a

happy world. His children planned revenge, saying that they would no longer live as dwarves.

In Kim Young-hyun's "*Worm*" (1989), the narrator "I" remember a worm-liked experience in a solitary cell called '*meokbang*먹방', a closed-space like Kafka's Gregor's room. "I" left the graduation semester and went to prison because of violation of Emergency Action No. 9. In prison, "I" was confined to solitary cell-room because of apposing Yushin Constitution (유신헌법). With hands were tied up, and mouth filled with the stick, I could not bear urine, but the guards did not concern. "I" felt like a worm himself at the moment of relieving himself in anger and despair.

The novel by Cho Se-hee is a work that shows the real life of workers without dreams and hopes, the deprived life of poor urbans in the constrast of capitalism. While Kim's story recalls the experience in cell where the human had been treated like bugs in the late 1970s, thereby revealing the ruthlessness of dictatorship.

In Oh Soo-yeon's "*Bug*" (1997) short story, the heroine was suffering from skin disease and went to the dermatology clinic. Just as doctor and nurses in the hospital avoid and despise her, she hated the gruesome and unsanitary bugs invading her apartment. She can not live like normal people because her non-treatable disease. On the other hand, her husband is always grumbling that everybody knows how to live like 'normal people' except her, and for that she must change. In the meantime, the bugs invade her apartment. She thought that the keratins covering her body are the scales of bugs. She rushed to the hospital and told to the doctor, but the doctor picked up another patient's chart before her bugs-story over. She decided to get a peels after few days, and turned back home. Then she transformed into a bug and laying eggs. At that moment, her husband came back home, said that he loves her and they can have human-life now.

Kim Ae-ran's "*Bugs*" (2008) is a story about a poor young couple in Seoul. They are a representative of the underprivileged class in modern society. They do not have a house that meets their conditions. It was not until a month after moving in, they realized that the 'Rose Villa' was designated as a redevelopment zone and 'A zone' next to the Rose Villa was already subject to demolition. They had to endure this space filled with all kinds of insects and noises all day. They decided to give birth in a better house 3 years later, but on the first day when they moved into this house, the child life was begin in her. The husband, who is a staff in a confectionery company, is always busy with making a lot of money, and his wife, who is sensitive because of pregnancy, has to confront with sores and bugs all day at home. One day when she was fighting the big caterpillar, she dropped her wedding ring out of the window down to the A zone, and she went down to the 'A forest', looking for the ring at dawn. Instead of finding a ring on the dark night where there is nobody, she found a tree with bugs. At that time, the child being inside her struggled to get out of the world. She can not move, and worry even that she can give birth safely this time.

## 2. Desire for human life – "I am a worm"

In history of the world, the 1980s is an important point. It is the same in case of Korean

Literature. From the end of 1960s, Korea has entered into industrialization and modernization in earnest, and since the end of 1970s, the democratization movement raised against the power of dictatorship nationwide. Due to rapid industrialization, urban development and the poor, capital and labor problems became social issues. On the otherhand, under the pressure and control of the Yushin-cheje, people resisted in their own way, even while they shrank to survive.

This tragic experience shows social situation at the time through the proposition "human beings are bugs" in Cho Se-hee's "The *Dwarf*" and Kim Young-hyun's "*Bug*".

Two writers wrote about the violent world that 1970s generation had experienced. The novel by Cho Se-hee is a work that shows the worm-like lives of the workers who be deprived of dreams and hopes. While Kim's story recalls the experience in prison where he had been treated as a worm in a detention place in the late 1970s, thereby revealing the ruthlessness of dictatorship. This phenomenon is reminiscent of Kafka's "*Metaphosis*".

Kafka's bug is not monster, but is something monster-like of human-beings. In this sense, "*Metamorphosis*" accurately diagnoses the realistic world, and open to readers the possibility of interpretation about the conditions of the world in which human beings are living, and the existence of human beings in this world. On the outside, the transformation of Gegor Samsa in Kafka's novel is the transformation of a man turned into a ugly bug that the world rejects. In Kafka's "*Metamorphosis*", the main character, Gegor Samsa, was transformed from "the wage earner of family" into "a creepy bug" as in the eyes of the family and the surroundings. "Gregor Samsa awoke one morning from uneasy dream and found himself, laying in the bed, transformed into a gigantic insect."

'Dwarf (난장이)' in Jo Se-hee's novel is a word that refers to the people who are not treated properly in the 1970s, showing tragedy, underprivileged and violence in Korean society. In short stories titled "Little ball that the Dwarf shoots" and "City of the machines", people have a (false) notion of "dwarf = worm". In story named "Klein's Bottle", the dwarf father said himself, "I am a worm". Unlike Kafka's Gregor Samsa, the dwarves of Cho's novel has been treated as a bugs from the beginning by the people who are living the human-life.

In "*Dwarf*", Cho set up the conflict structure of 'the insiders' and 'the outsiders', 'the haves' and 'the have-nots', 'employers' and 'employees', and showed the gap between the rich and the poor, social discrimination at that time. The terms of "dwarf is not human" and "dwarf is a worm" seem to be a binary structure but it actually equipollence. Another binary structure overlaped here is that "the haves are human" and "the have-nots (the dwarf) are non-human".

<u>"The father said, "The house will be under the redevelopment and you have to go to the factory instead of the school. Do you think I can feel easy with all that things? There is no hope. I am a bug. This is a final chance for me to wriggle out to earn money.""</u>

("Klein's bottle")

"Please do not talk about the dwarf."

"Why?"

"It makes me thinking of a bug."

"He is not a bug, but a human!"

"It is the same."

("The City of Machine")

The dwarf father felt "no hope" about a dream of "human-life". "The death of a dwarf is the end of a generation," but 'dwarfs' world' still remains around us. The question dwarf left to us is that whether or not 'the world that all can live together' can become reality without discrimination and underprivileged, violence and oppression.

The ending of Cho's worm-like dwarf father and Krafka's bug-transformed Gregor are the same. The two became losers in the human world (real world) and finally decided to die in despair. However, if the family of Gregor drove him to death and just watched that thing happend, the dwarves' family did not give up hope after the death of dwarf father. Their struggle agaisnt the "real world" is the contunity of the darwf father's derise for a better life.

Kim Young-hyun's "*Worm*" began by referring to the transformation of Kafka. The writer expressed his intention directly or indirectly in the view of narrator while mentioned the mutual text between his work and Kafka's work. However, unlike Gregor of Kafka, suddenly turned into a bug one day, the main character of Kim Young-hyun's novel did not transform into a bug but has deluded himself into a worm-like feelings.

The feeling that the narrator changed into a worm has been going on since the last five years in prison and army, and that feeling continues till 'World War II syndrome'. It is a kind of post-traumatic stress disorder. The symptoms of the mental and physical pain that the narrator suffered in the past are related to the autobiographical experience of the writer's. "The prison and the army are the space where the national violence of the Yushin dictatorship (the Revitalizing Reforms system) treated people like bugs and worms." In the age writer has lived, people share "the unpleasant memory that (they) have became worms and bugs in various forms".

"When I looked around the dark room, it was raining outside the bars, drawing straight lines.
At that time I was surprised to find out that I transformed into a worm.
It was a very surprised discovery. Tightly bound hands was no painful anymore. And now the bit blocked my mouth is no longer a pain to me."

(Kim Young-hyun's "*Worm*")

The dictatorship, the violence symbolized here as a space of prison, made "I" feel like himself transforming into into a worm. But when "I" transformed into a transparent being like "invisible dust" and "a larva is found on the leafs in summer," I felt "no more pain at all".

Gregor transformed into a bug refusing to eat food. It was the sound of his sister playing the

violin, grabbing him instead of food. At that moment, Gregor realized that he had a true-human desire from a bug to a human again. Eventually, however, the bug-human Gregor died, leaving only the twisted bark. He did not compromise society until the end.

In the prison, a dirty body (like a worm) that can not speak human's language, just a sound like "Ooooo". On the one hand, the narrator who has become a worm-like existence liked this experiences, a desire to be a small insect that does not stand out from the others, and experiences complex feelings at the same time. The narrator "I" refered to the past experience of "being treated like a worm" and "a painful state that seems to turn into a bulky worm by myself nowadays". However, the feeling of being turned into a worm shows the ambivalence of "very uncomfortable but at the same time a little comfort". This complex feeling is the same with Grego's. After being transformed into bug, Kafka's Grego avoided people and said to him, "The sofa was very comfortable and cozy."

However, Kim ,s narrator, "I" "hide myself completely and observe the word outside" with the "consciousness in the eyes of my torso". Feeling like himself transformed into a worm, then he can feel the freedom for the first time. If Gregor is dead in despair and hunger, "I" tried to survive to the end, fighting against the violence in prison, and now telling about his worm-like experience. By telling the experience of being trapped in prison, the writer expresses the desire to become free from that non-human experience in the past. It is only because he can feel freedom from the world to turn into a worm.

Dwarves of Cho Se-hee and worm-transformed experience of Kim Young-hyun are the stories about the peopele who struggled to escape from the non-human social structure and was tragically resisting the reality by shouting "I am a worm", showed the complex desire in a humorous way. They resisted the word discriminated them, called themselves worms to oppose discrimination of capitalism/dictatorship (insiders) - labors (outsiders).

## 3. Hatred of non-human life – "I am not a bug"

In the 1990s, Korean literature shows significant difference with previous period's. Consumption and popularization, information technology and globalization, intensifying competition and individualism have formed a complex variety of environment that human beings had never experienced before. Unlike literature in previous period, this period's literature focuses on daily life and the inside of individual rather than the contemporary problems. Among the writers in this period, female writers such as Oh Su-yeon and Kim Ae-ran show their will to recover women's identity by breaking away from society or family's structure in the point of feminism.

Since the 1990s, there are many literary works have word "bugs" in the title. In previous period's novels, "worm/bug" was used as a metaphor, while the real bugs appeared in this period's novels such as works of Oh Su-yeon and Kim Ae-ran. If in the novels of Cho and Kim, human beings called themselves worms or transformed themselve into worms/bugs to be free in non-

human life, in the works of Oh Su-yeon and Kim Ae-ran, heroines hate bugs but be forced to transform into bugs under the pressure of social environment. There is an irony that they kill bugs to live a human life, but finally they must transform into bugs to surive.

To Oh Su-yeon and Kim Ae-ran, the desire to become "insider" in "the haves and the have-nots", "male and female", "employees and employers" of the binary structure in modern the society raises a feeling of strong hatred toward bugs. In Oh Su-yeon's story, bugs are considered as the reason of her skin 'diseases', and in Kim Aaran's work, bugs are considered as 'poverty'.

It is more similar to Kafka's transformation in espect that the heroine in Oh's story turned into a bug. The story was told in the first-person narrative, a woman who regularly goes to dermatology because of her chronic skin disease.

> "There is a war with bugs every night since that day. The kinds and numbers of bugs increase day by day, and the fighting became fierce. I sprayed insecticide in the whole house as much as I could not breathe ... To sleep or to live, I have to kill them all night."...
>
> "Doctor ... There are a lot of bugs in my house .... So I think, because of bugs,... the scales just fell off from the bugs' wings,.... my skin is so sensitive, it itches and scales appear all over...."
>
> "It's always as crowded as a supermarket, but it's just as quiet as a prayer house. People usually communicate with hand-signal and gestures.... The nurses ask visitors for their address, phone number, and how they are sick through perforated window, with the voices are thin and faint as the sound of an old microphone. Patients sneak up on their heads and lift their hands up and down to explain themselves. They point their finger to the acne on the face, or to lift the forearm and scratch it. The nurse then raises her left hand for a while. It means "You should wait in the waiting room". If she turns her hand to the right side door, it means "You should go home now". If she opens her finger and push it downwards, "The medicine is written on the pill. Do not ask"."
>
> (Oh Su-yeon, "*Bug*")

In dermatology clinic, the communication between the patients and the nurse is not a "human-style" but by "hand signal and gestures". And they "do not feel uncomfortable with or without words" as if this place is a bugs' world. "their voice is furious", "point finger at their face", "lift forearms and scratch their skin". Like worms and bugs, all their moves are in silence without words. "I" go to this place with desire to live a human life, but here "I" was treated as a bug.

In Korean society, women have to live under the oppression and control of patriarchy. Transformation is required to become a new-being in order to survive in the social binary structure of 'female (I) / male (husband, director)'. Then "she" in Oh's novel was always under psychological pressure from her husband and doctor.

"Lets have a life as human beings", he said. Of course I agree with him. But he insisted that I have to change myself first. When I asked him how to change, he said other women know about that except me." ... The law of life that all women around me know, except me. The law that not only women but men also have to know after becoming an adult by being married."

When a man/woman is born and grows up, he/she leaves his parents' arms and sets up a family, share joy and sorrow together. How should one change when married?

"If you do not know, you are neither a human."
"Somehow I felt like that I made him (the director of the hospital) disappointed... Maybe he is hatread toward my sickness. While I walked out of the clinic, I felt like I broke up into the pieces."

<div align="right">(Oh, Su-yeon, "<em>Bugs</em>)</div>

The masculine-world that harasses the heroine, her husband and the doctor, as symbols of "money" and "appearance", described as "a ruthless money-worm in the workplace". In other words, image of husband and doctor can be interpreted as symbols of power and capitalism. The "fake" desire that they think they can change their life is to make a beautiful appearance by peeling, and to have a child like ordinary women. This is a forced transformation because of the desire for snobbery which commercialize the appearance in modern society, and cause of the role of the woman in giving birth.

In the end, can not win the male-centered system, husband and director (doctor), the main character of Oh Su-yeon decided to do a peeling operation. Back home, she was transformed into a bug and then her husband return home and said that he loves her.

"I know what I have to do to pass the fate at this time. I try mybest, using all the power inside myself to lay the white and shining eggs in the night."
He burned into tears and dropped things in his hands. And cried again.
"You are so different!"
My husband rush into me.
"Thanks, thank you very much, you really did it! We can live like humen now."
He embraced me and wrote me with his tears in my chest and whispered, I love you, I loved you. I whispered too, bipppppp."

<div align="right">(Oh, Su-yeon, "<em>Bug</em>")</div>

It is irony that after laying eggs like a bug, "she" can communicate with her husband. The husband see the beauty of his transformed-into-bug wife and think that they can live a human-life now.

In "<em>Bug</em>" of Oh Su-yeon, women want to live as a human being should have a child in the family

and have a beautiful appearance when going outside. The main character "I" was transformed into a different identity because her desires to become "the others/the insiders" (that husbands, people request). The heroine who dislikes bugs due to her sickness had to turn into a bug and lay eggs to live a human life. From this point of view, Oh criticizes this social structure pushing women back to the ecosystem, the bugs-life.

Oh Su-yeon's story shows the process of confirming the female identity that turned into "bug". Bugs are reason that carry disease, as in Oh Su-yeon's short story, but are perceived as a sign of fear and disgrace nearest to human. They also have limitless propagation and viability. In Kim Ae-Ran's novel, bug is applied as a threat symbol of 'poverty'.

> "The border between Rose Villa and Zone A, so the weeds are lush at the bottom of the cliff. These are grasses that have grown up in a land that has not been caring for a long time, and which gives a persistent and greedy impression. There, the bugs that I see for the first time in my life grow into a rose villa. Blue, plump, prolonged, disgusting..... In the darkness, a slight twinkle that feels on your forearms. When I turn on the light and see nothing. Something I feel but can not catch."
>
> (Kim Ae-Ran, "*Bugs*")

She named the smell from Zone A as "the smell of poverty" and despised it, but there is no guarantee that it is not their future. "The people who lived there were poor, aren't they?" - The husband said. "Are you sure it is not yours' situation?". Having trong viability creepy insects appear in the fear of 'poverty' that the main character, young couple is facing.

If to Oh' character, giving birth is the way to live a humman life, to Kim's character, having a child is a fear of another "poverty".

> "So it was just passing through the root of the tree. I soon witnessed the unfolding scene. A huge amount of insects, worms. The insects were moving in groups. The procession of long-lived insects was spreading as a catastrophe, or as a line of refugees, into the city.... The tree was lying like a woman with a womb extracted. I look the hole in flashlight while holding my chest down and bend my waist. The stump was strangely empty. In the deep darkness, the worms and bugs came out constantly. .... I tried to move the whole body joints and muscles. But it did not work. I looked across my legs with a dazed face. Water was flowing down like a pee in the groin. Amniotic fluid broke."
>
> "I grabbed a piece of concrete with my all power. From far distance, Roses villas, motels and churches, apartments still seemed peaceful, I was not sure if this birth could be successful."
>
> (Kim Ae-Ran, "*Bugs*")

Bugs and children are considered as the same thing growing in a harsh environment called 'Rose villa', should be redeveloped in the city, what highlighted poverty and weakness of the heroine. Those who are potrayed as the image opposed to capitalism, but have strong vitality to survive till the end though they are in the same position nothing, just like bugs.

While Kim Young-hyun's worm transformation is a resistance to the world, Oh's bug transformation was foreced under the oppresion of society. Cho Se-hee's dwarf and Kim Ae-ran' bugs imply the survival power of the poor like bugs that breed in the the city. Oh Su-yeon and Kim Ae-ran hate and feel disgust bugs invading human space. Perhaps this hatred derived from their desire to despise their own situation in modern society.

## 4. Conclusion

In the 1970s, worm-like / bugs-transformed characters appeared in the works of Cho Se-hee and Kim Young-hyun are the transformation of the underprivileged who are **'the outsiders'** / be considered as **'non-human'** in social structure. Said themselves **"I am a worm/bug"**, they raise the voice against the violence of capitalism and dictatorship and dream of a free life.

Since the 1990s, the age of democracy and popularization, but women have to transform themselves into **'the others'** to survive in the **'male/capitalism-dominated society'**. Being hatred toward the bugs but actually their life-in-identity of 'the others' nothing but like a bug. That is the issue that female writers such as Oh Su-yeon and Kim Ae-ran want confirm true identity and vitality of women under the modern society's oppression.

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# A Semiotic Approach to Post-Humanity in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction

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**1.**

Within the framework of this international conference on "The Human Image in a Changing World," I would like to start with the final passage of *The Order of Things* by Michel Foucault:

> As the archaeology of our thought easily shows, man is an invention of recent date. And one perhaps nearing its end. If those arrangements were to disappear as they appeared, if some event of which we can at the moment do no more than sense the possibility – without knowing either what its form will be or what it promises – were to cause them to crumble, as the ground of Classical thought did, at the end of the eighteenth century, then one can certainly wager that man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea.

The ending of Foucault's monumental oeuvre raises many questions. Can it be read as alluding to the extinction of our species? Or is the death of man a strong appeal for the birth of a new man in the history of humanity? In that case, how should we think about "man after man"? When AlphaGo defeated 18-time world Go champion Lee Sedol, winning all but the fourth game at the Google deepMind Challenge Match held in Seoul between 9 and 15 March 2016, these questions became serious, as "some event" of which Foucault could "no more than sense the possibility" really took place. As the face of a man "drawn in sand at the edge of the sea" begins to blur, has the time now come to take Foucault's wager seriously and discuss "post-humanity?"

**2.**

In this paper, I address this issue from a semiotic perspective, making use of what Jacques Fontanille calls the "tensive schema." The aim of my paper is not to define post-humanity. It is out of the question for me to state categorically what humanity looks like in the present or the future. Rather, I aim to establish the range of the related discussion such that it is possible to seek an appropriate way of reformulating the question of humanity in the era of post-humanity. Notice that

the prefix "post-" can be interpreted in various ways. It can mean "super-" as in the concept of the Übermensh/Superman developed by Nietzsche in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. However, the Superman concept is not contemporaneous with the death of Man but with the death of God. In my view, the Desiring Machine proposed by Deleuze and Gattari in *Anti-Oedipus* in 1972 might be a new version of Nietzsche's Superman in the era of the death of Man. Further, "post-" can also signify "neo-", giving birth to the concept of "neo-humanity," which Franz Fanon and his followers, for instance, still dreamed of in the context of the post-colonial movement, where "neo-Humanity" is referred to as "neither white nor black."

> Let us decide not to imitate Europe; let us combine our muscles and our brains in a new direction. Let us try to create the whole man, whom Europe has been incapable of bringing to triumphant birth. (*The wretched of the earth*)

In the Marxist tradition, those who gain the opportunity to live in a society without social classes are supposed to be endowed with the status of neo-humanity, being "neither superior nor inferior." However, the realization of this utopian dream is always deferred to the future. "Post-Humanity" can also be translated as "trans-humanity," which has many technological or mechanical implications. Contrary to the image of the beasts connected to Superman as illustrated in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, it is technological or mechanical images that prevail in the conception of trans-humanity. In this paper, I attempt a new arrangement of the elements that constitute post-humanity. I refer to Benjamin's concept of *aura* to gain access to this conceptual arrangement, with a special focus on "the human image in a changing world, or the "face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea."

## 3.

Yoon Tae Ho is a webtoon artist in Korea, renowned especially for *Misaeng* ("an incomplete life"), which ran online from 2012 to 2013, drawing 1 billon hits. The story is about white collar workers' daily life at a trading company. One of the reasons for the great success of this webtoon is the very interesting allegorical connections that Yoon established between the Go match record and workers' daily life. The artist placed the former before each episode so that it could operate as the allegory of the latter. However, curiously after the defeat of Lee Sedol, when I reread *Misaeng* or read *Misaeng Part II*, which was recently released online, my interest in the Go(or Baduk) record had been drastically diminished. It was as if the aura of Go, which has been regarded as a rare game based on human creativity, had disappeared, being transferred quietly to AlphaGo. It is interesting to note that contrary to the remark Benjamin made in his 1935 article, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," AlphaGo seemed to win the humanity aura that previously belonged to Go. How can this be explained?

Before getting to the heart of the matter, let me first briefly look at the semiotic model known as "tensive schema." The tensive schema elaborated by Fontanille to reformulate semiosis on the basis

of perceptual experience consists of the correlation between the intensity of the sensible and the extension of the intelligible. In short, the intensity of the sensible is the degree of perception, which can be either strong or weak. The extension designates the domain to which this perceptual intensity is applied: the domain of extension can be either restrained or extended. According to Fontanille, the combination of the intensity of the sensible with the extension of the intelligible brings about a field of presence in which semiotic experience takes place, as represented in the following model.

**Tensive Schema**



Let me now apply this semiotic model to Benjamin's concept of aura. In the well-known passage from "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," Benjamin offers a definition for his enigmatic concept of aura.

> A strange weave of space and time: the unique appearance or semblance of distance, no matter how close it may be. While at rest on a summer's noon, to trace a range of mountain on the horizon, or a branch that throws its shadow on the observer, until the moment or the hour become part of their appearance – this is what it means to breathe the aura of those mountains, that branch. Now, to bring things closer to us or rather to the masses, is just as passionate an inclination in our day as the overcoming of whatever is unique in every situation by means of its reproduction. Every day the need to possess the objet in close-up in the form of a picture, or rather a copy, becomes more imperative. The difference between the copy, which illustrated papers and newsreels keep in readiness, and the original picture is unmistakable. Uniqueness and duration are intimately intertwined in the latter as are transience and reproducibility in the former. (Benjamin 1935)

This passage, about which much has been written and spoken is far from clear. It seems that the focus of the discussion is perceptual experience, a kind of optical illusion, poetically described in terms of spatiotemporal distance, "A strange weave of space and time: the unique appearance

or semblance of distance, no matter how close it may be." In the tensive schema illustrated above, the degree of vividness connected to this optical illusion called aura constitutes the intensity axis that can be either strong or weak, while the reproducibility delimits the extensive range to which the aura intensity is applied, which can be either restrained or extended. The combination of the aura intensity with the extension of reproducibility gives birth to a field of aura where the optical illusion takes place. The tensive schema of aura thus constructed is capable of visualizing a new arrangement of the work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction, in which a distinction between "the original picture" and "the copy" is established. For instance, the "uniqueness and duration" of the original picture can be characterized by the combination of a strong aura intensity with a drastically restrained reproducibility. So it can be situated in the upper left corner of the aura field. The copy, whose aura intensity is by definition very weak, is designed to be repeatedly reproduced. Characterized in terms of "transience and reproducibility," it can be situated in the lower right corner of the aura field.

**Tensive Schema of Aura (1)**



Let me risk generalizing this example to a work of art. Then, the age of mechanical reproduction can be characterized by the following graph, which shows a descending tendency.

**Tensive Schema of Aura (2)**

## 4.

Based on this model, I now attempt to arrange the different concepts of post-humanity briefly outlined at the beginning of this paper. In brief, I propose the following arrangement.

**Tensive Schema of Aura**

Intensity of aura

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Strong | Superman | |
| Weak | Neo-Humanity | Desiring Machine |

Reproducibility

Restrained — Extended

A strong aura emanates from Nietzsche's Superman, singular in personality: "In truth, man is a polluted river. One must be a sea to receive a polluted river without becoming defiled. I bring you the Superman! He is that sea; in him your great contempt can be submerged." Stripped of this heroic aura, Deleuze and Gattari's Desiring Machine is designed to produce infinitely and to reproduce itself repeatedly.

> There is no such thing as either man or nature now, only a process that produces the one within the other and couples the machines together. Producing-machines, desiring-machines everywhere, schizophrenic machines, all of species life: the self and the non-self, outside and inside, no longer have any meaning whatsoever.(Deleuze and Gattari 1977: 2)

As Benjamin argues with respect to the work of art, from the death of God to the death of Man, the history of humanity can be summed up by the loss of aura. The neo-human, living in a society in which perfect equality is realized is capable of maintaining his personality without any aura. He can be described in terms of the combination of weak aura intensity with restrained reproducibility. As Fredric Jameson argues with respect to the Greimasian semiotic model in *The Political Unconscious*, the advantage of the tensive schema developed by Fontanille lies in the fact that it can foreshow the realization of possibilities in a logical way. Thus a question can be raised with respect to the unoccupied corner of the aura field.

## 5.

As mentioned above, Benjamin's aura can be viewed in terms of an optical illusion. Let me go

one step further and claim that this optical illusion is caused by the overlapping of two different dimensions, such as material and spiritual or human and mechanical. On the one hand, the optical illusion can be regarded as a subjective phenomenon. On the other hand, it seems that the aura emanating from an original picture, for instance, belongs to this picture as an objective "thing." I think that AlphaGo was left without any aura just before defeating Lee Sedol. By this, I mean that aura is not simply given but it can be produced through an interaction between human and non-human. In the age of mechanical reproduction, the aura that has been lost can be regained through this interactivity. Even a copy can be endowed with a sort of aura, provided, for instance, that it testifies to bygone days for a user or viewer. To take another example, *Her* is a science-fiction film by Spike Jonze, released in 2013. In this film, there appears a man called Theodore Twombly who is excited about being able to develop a relationship with an intelligent computer operating system called Samantha, whose learning ability is unrivaled. He starts to have feelings of love while talking with her, and their intimacy rapidly grows through a verbal sexual encounter. At the end of the film, Theodore is disheartened to find out that there are many Samanthas. Theodore falls in love with a female operating system, not just because the performance of this OS is excellent, but also because it seems to be endowed with an aura of humanity. Notice that this aura is not present from the outset but is produced through the emotive interactions between Theodore and Samantha. So there is an ascending tendency even in the age of mechanical reproduction.

**Tensive Schema of Aura (2)**



I conclude by claiming that the humanity image is not given but can be produced by various interactions between human and non-human, which are likely to increase more and more in the near future. What is at stake is to know what kind of interaction humanity should develop such that we do not lose our human nature. The following schema represents the new arrangement of the human image in a changing world.

**Tensive Schema of Aura**

Intensity of aura

| | Restrained | Extended |
|---|---|---|
| **Strong** | Superman | AlphaGo &Her |
| **Weak** | Neo-Humanity | Desiring Machine |

Reproducibility

# In Life and in Death: the Image of the Deceased in the Koguryo Painted Tombs (4$^{th}$-7$^{th}$ centuries AD)

Ariane Perrin

**Catholic University of Paris, France**

The painted tombs of the ancient kingdom of Koguryo (37 BC-AD 668), located today in northeast China and in North Korea not only bear a rare and early testimony to a painting tradition in East Asia, but they also offer a unique glimpse into the lives, religious beliefs and concerns in funerary matters of the people inhabiting these regions during the 4$^{th}$ to 7$^{th}$ centuries AD. The tombs are found scattered on both sides of the Yalu river, mainly in Ji'an, Jilin province and in Huanren, Liaoning province, in China, and in the vicinity of Pyongyang, Nampo and South Hwanghae province in North Korea. Out of a few thousand tombs ascribed to this kingdom, about 120 painted tombs have been discovered so far. They are believed to have been made for the local elite of that time, including kings, aristocrats and high officials. Only two tombs were identified thanks to a funerary inscription dating them to the mid-4$^{th}$ century (Anak n°3, AD 357) and to the early 5$^{th}$ century (Tokhung-ni, AD 408).

The tombs of the elite were built and decorated with colourful paintings to emulate an underground dwelling for the deceased's life after death. Wooden pillars were painted at the corners of the rooms as well as various living quarters of the household (pavilions, kitchen, stables for animals, etc.). It is believed in East Asian funerary traditions, that after death, the spirit separates between a "physical" spirit remaining in the tomb, and a "spiritual" one that is taken on a journey to the afterlife. The wall paintings are endowed with a narrative quality where the deceased is represented multiples times, sometimes with his wife, in various stations in his past "terrestrial" life on the walls of the tomb chamber. His afterlife is represented on the ceiling of the tomb that signifies the celestial realm.

In the Tokhung-ni double-chamber tomb, dated to the early 5$^{th}$ century, one can further distinguish a separation between the "public space" where the deceased is represented in his official duty as a local governor in the front chamber, and the "private quarters" of the household in the back chamber.

In addition, several auspicious cosmological imageries were positioned in specific locations inside the tombs in order to call on the protection of the deceased's spirit and to ensure his safe journey to the other world. Among the most salient ones are: the four guardian animals protecting

the cardinal directions (the Black Warrior of the North, the Red Bird of the South, the Green Dragon of the East and the White Tiger of the West; the funerary "portrait" of the deceased is always positioned on the North wall that is the realm of the dead in burial context. He is under the protection of the Black Warrior and the Northern Dipper Constellation. The Green Dragon and the White Tiger were in addition known to be the two celestial animals leading the way and guiding the deceased in the afterlife; the sun (East wall) and the moon (West wall), and constellations of stars; flying immortals and the Northern Dipper and Southern Dipper constellations.

On the tomb layout of Yaksu-ri, one can see the orientation of the four guardian animals protecting the cardinal direction on the walls of the burial chamber where the coffins of the deceased would be laid. They form a circular movement counter-clockwise as if they were protecting the spirit of the deceased. In addition, a secondary movement can be seen: the Green Dragon of the East and the White Tiger of the West stand out as a pair, oriented the same way, heading toward the South, that symbolizes the gate to the afterlife.

The Northern Dipper and Southern Dipper constellations carry a special significance in Koguryo funerary art. They have the unusual feature of being represented on the ceiling of the tombs facing each other on a much larger scale than the other constellations. The conspicuous presence of the Northern Dipper in a funerary context has been explained as this constellation's embodiment of the establishing of all order in the Universe. As to the religious significance of the Southern Dipper in a funerary context, it appears that it served an auspicious function as well. For instance in the *Shangqingjing* ("Scriptures of Highest Clarity") by Yang Xi (AD 331-386) from the Eastern Jin period (AD 316-420) it is stated that the division in charge of prolonging life is located in the Southern Dipper.

With the arrival of Buddhism to Korea through the kingdom of Koguryo in the late 4<sup>th</sup> century AD, we begin to see new elements appearing in the tombs' decor reflecting the newly imported foreign religious beliefs, such as the idea of rebirth in the Buddhist paradise. Among these new elements there are: Buddha and bodhisattva figures, new-born souls emerging from lotus flowers, and flying immortals. One painted Koguryo tomb stands out as it is the earliest known painted Buddhist imagery in a funerary context, the Changchuan tomb n° 1 located in today's Ji'an region of Jilin province of China. The tomb is dated to the mid-5<sup>th</sup> century AD, based on the iconographical study of the Buddhist elements and on the tomb construction type. The Buddhist scenes thus offer us a rare insight of early northeastern Buddhism. This double-chamber tomb displays a unique composite iconography where genre scenes mingle with Buddhist elements and cosmological thinking, including the images of the four guardian animals. Although the animals are correctly laid out spatially in connection with one another (left Dragon, right Tiger and front Birds) they do not accord with their traditional geographical direction since the tomb is aligned on an east-west axis with the entrance to the tomb on the west side.

Eight bodhisattvas (four on each of the North and South wall) whose heads are surrounded by aureoles, are standing on lotus pods and are turned toward the main figure of this Buddhist

assembly, the Buddha that is depicted at the centre of the ceiling (East wall) and above the doorway leading to the burial chamber. It is the earliest known painted representation of a Buddha figure in a tomb in northeast Asia. He is sitting on a lion throne and is surrounded by an oval-shaped mandorla. Two figures are kneeling on the right side of the Buddha in a gesture of homage. They are followed by two attendants. Two figures, a male and a female (perhaps the deceased couple), each carrying an umbrella, are standing on the left side of the Buddha and they are followed by an attendant. The remaining space is filled with clouds, lotus buds, flying apsarasas and new-born lotus spirits.

The bodhisattva figures depicted in the Changchuan tomb n°1 are in fact the identical painted representation of traditional bodhisattva figures that were represented in numerous contemporary Buddhist votive sculptures in East Asia. It can be seen in this way in this Liang dynasty bodhisattva sculpture dated to the early 6<sup>th</sup> century AD. According to Qiang Ning, the eight bodhisattvas are believed to guide the deceased believers of the Bhaisajya-guru cult to the Western Paradise of Amitabha where they "would be reborn in lotus flower". However, the earliest representations of the Bhaisajya-guru sutra are found in Sui dynasty (AD 581-618) caves at Dunhuang in western China. The Changchuan tomb n°1 is dated to the 5<sup>th</sup> century AD based on stylistic consideration of the Buddha figure and his Sumeru-type of throne, and as such, could well be one of the earliest painted representations of the eight bodhisattvas. Another scene in the Changchuan tomb is reminiscent of an identical representation in the Northern Wei period Buddhist cave n°10 of Yungang, at Datong, in Shanxi province, in China: the kneeling figure on the right side of the Buddha who is bowing in a gesture of homage. These elements point to transcontinental exchanges and diffusion to Korea of elements of northern Buddhism in particular that of the Northern Wei dynasty (AD 386-534) who commissioned the Buddhist caves at Yungang, and with which the Koguryo kingdom exchanged numerous envoys.

In conclusion, we have seen how the ancient Koguryo people depicted themselves in a funerary context _ through scenes reflecting the lifetime achievements and the social status of the deceased _ and also, their concern for a safe journey in the afterlife through the use of auspicious cosmological imagery. Through the newly introduced foreign religion of Buddhism, new decorative Buddhist elements were incorporated in the iconographical programme of the tombs from the 4<sup>th</sup> century AD onward. The latter fact, together with the use of similar decorative features in the Koguryo tombs and at the sites of the Northern and Southern Dynasties (AD 420-589), in particular the Buddhist caves of northern China, is an additional testimony to the cross-cultural contacts and exchanges between these various kingdoms throughout the 5<sup>th</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> centuries AD in northeast Asia.

# Reframing Human Autonomy: Contemporary Feminist Speculative Fictions

### Diana Brydon

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What does it mean to be human and what are the stakes involved in how we answer that question?[1] This paper begins with the premise that we need to decolonize the kind of mind that defines the human in exclusionary ways before those currently denied full human status can realize their potential for taking part in what Cornelius Castoriadis describes as the social and individual project of autonomy, understood as the continuous self-aware interaction of the instituted and instituting democratic imaginary (163). Understood within such a framework, autonomy and relatedness are not opposites but rather intertwined (Fajans). The terms currently defining the human, and even the category itself, are deservedly in question (Haraway, Povinelli), yet people still matter. It is the nature and practices of our humanity that are in question. How and why humans matter is imagined in the stories we tell, in both fictional and factual form. This paper begins by discussing two theoretical articles, cast loosely in the form of thought experiments, before turning to several contemporary novels that work through related questions in forms usually described as science fiction and fantasy.

## Challenging the Imagination: Asking What If?

In probing the category of the human and its limits, Elizabeth Povinelli asks "what if" current thinking about Anthropogenic climate change is leading "to the acceptance that the human did not exist in the past, does not in the present, and will not in the future? What if," she asks rhetorically, "there is no *human*, or even any *humans*, but merely regionally more or less densely compacted forms and modes of existence, one component of which has been abstracted out and named 'the human'? " (294, 300 italics in the original).[2] This hypothesis frames my argument. In asking where we can find useful representations of those "more or less densely compacted forms

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2. See also Nicholas Gane, "When We Have Never Been Human, What Is To Be Done? Interview with Donna Haraway. *Theory, Culture & Society*. 23. 7-8 (2006): 135-158.

and modes of existence," from which what passes for the human (and its constituting others, the subhuman and the nonhuman) have been abstracted, I turn in this paper to contemporary feminist speculative fictions as they reframe human autonomy away from its "toxic modalities" (as identified by Povinelli) toward the kind of relational forms of autonomy imagined through Karen Barad's queered quantum perspective as "*material entanglements enfolded and threaded through the spacetimemattering of the universe*" (261 italics in the original). It is the tension between Castoriadis's political focus, repurposed through a relational feminist lens, and Barad's focus on an ethics of response-ability[3] that I find explored in the fictions discussed below.

Povinelli turns to Australian settler colonial and Indigenous relations to insist that they cannot be understood in terms of conventional liberal settler colonial binaries. Her provocative questions are designed to push left political thinking in new directions, revealing the inadequacy of current frames and the need to decolonize them. Focussing on Indigenous Australians, she follows contemporary critical race theorists in arguing the need "to find a mode of belonging outside these Western imaginaries" of antagonistic sociality, which opposes "the *autological subject*" of Western modernity (defined by a possessive and insular understanding of autonomy) to what it sees as the backward "*genealogical society*" of Indigenous peoples and their non-extractive relations to the land (302 italics in original). She concludes that the "illusions of our epoch are the autonomous and antagonistic" (308). She rejects both these frames for categorizing the human because "anthropogenic toxins do not obey the settler colonial spatial technology of a barbed wire fence or the concept of a border. They seep through and corrode" (307). I will argue, however, that there are other concepts of autonomy than those that depend on such fictions of non-porous borders separating the human from its others.

The kind of autonomy I explore in this paper owes more to feminist theorizations of "relational autonomy" (MacKenzie & Stoljar) and the rejection of an antagonistic politics in favour of thinking through the "agonistic pluralism" of Chantal Mouffe. Such understandings of the politics of relational autonomy recognize mutual dependencies and the co-constitution of selves in the "dilemmatic spaces" (Honig 567) of everyday negotiation and choice. I think these models are compatible with Barad's endorsement of the need to think with an acceptance of indeterminacy over uncertainty and with her understanding of entanglements as "not intertwinings of separate entities, but rather irreducible relations of responsibility" ("Quantum" 265). I believe these irreducible relations are enacted in much of the fiction examined here.

**Literary Thought Experiments**

Povinelli sets up an imagined encounter between Italian autonomist theorist Franco "Bifo" Berardi and science fiction writer Philip K. Dick as the stage for her argument in "The Ends of

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3. This term, employed by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Karen Barad, and Donna Haraway combines the meanings of response and responsibility to stress the importance of listening and acting as related modes of ethical accountability.

Humans: Anthropocene, Autonomism, Antagonism, and the Illusions of Our Epoch." Barad sets up her article "Quantum Entanglements and Hauntological Relations of Inheritance: Dis/continuities, SpaceTime Enfoldings, and Justice-to-Come" as a thought experiment in imagining "how electrons experience the world" and as a "way of thinking with and through dis/continuity …" and much else that challenges the imagination (240, 244). Taking Povinelli and Barad as models, in this paper I think through the productivity of the literary thought experiment, narratives that in asking their own versions of the "what if?" question enable readers to experience imaginatively how to think and act beyond the supposed givens of our times. These fictions bring complex ideas into the more accessible realm of stories and the embodied lives of individuals. They include Annalee Newitz's *Autonomous*, N.K. Jemisin's The Broken Earth trilogy, Ann Leckie's The Imperial Radch trilogy, Nnedi Okorafor's *Who Fears Death* and *The Book of Phoenix*, Vandana Singh's *Entanglement*, and Martha Wells's The Murderbot Diaries. These texts reframe the concept of individual human autonomy away from possessive and bounded identity toward shifting understandings of how to live our human interdependence with others in the world, such as through "making kin" (as Donna Haraway advises) among humans, aliens, and machines, or recognizing, as Barad suggests, that "Ethicality entails noncoincidence with oneself" ("Quantum" 265).

In a related vein, but with a stronger focus on how such processes might be institutionalized within near and far future human-centred communities, Malka Older's The Centenal Cycle and Ada Palmer's Terra Ignota series rescale democracy beyond the nation-state system, reimagining the exercise of individual autonomy within self-chosen communities operating within an institutionalized global system at macro and micro scales. Following Anna Tsing's example in *Friction*, where she begins with the question, "how does one study the global?" (1) these writers explore what it means to describe "multiple situated worldings and multiple sorts of translations to engage globalism" (Haraway "Tentacular" fn 17), I argue that in such texts, the concept of autonomy is reframed beyond the bounded units of both individuals and nation-states in efforts to renew democratic practices and reframe what community could be.

## Decolonizing the Humanist Mind

Decolonizing the mind involves rethinking what is meant by mind and the ways in which mind/body dualities still largely operate to enable ongoing inequities separating one group of humans from another, and humans from animals and machines. This decolonizing critique of the humanist mind is the territory claimed by many contemporary speculative fictions as well as some versions of contemporary posthuman theory. The fictions analyzed here decolonize a genre once associated with colonization and the building of empires, to reframe it for an age dominated by "the ruins" of empire and capitalism (Tsing, *Mushroom*, Stoler). Many of these texts seek inspiration in premodern stories for reconfiguring the human and its others. Globalization, Anthropocene pressures, and new technological developments have each contributed in interconnected ways to put pressure on

modern ideas of the human that are best represented in Leonardo da Vinci's Vitruvian Man. For Rosi Braidotti, the human is "a normative" and highly regulatory "historical construct that became a social convention." It operated by "transposing a specific mode of being human into a generalized standard" (26). That is the mode being challenged in many of the fictions I consider here. Braidotti argues the need to embrace "alternative ways to look at the 'human' from a more inclusive and diverse angle," such as those emerging from feminist, decolonial, and postcolonial thinking (26). Such alternatives are likely to reframe what is meant by human subjectivity, as the texts examined here clearly show. My argument in this paper is that these fictions enable readers to experience such reframings of the human in both visceral and intellectually exciting ways.

In recent years there has been an explosion of writing loosely termed science fiction/fantasy that problematizes normative humanist images of the human while advocating for recognizing the autonomy and "human rights" of characters normatively excluded from this category: not just women and racialized peoples, although they are often central, but also androids, clones, robots, zombies, animals, sentient plants (Story), and figures from mythologies old and new. *The Fifth Season*, the first volume of N.K. Jemisin's Broken Earth Trilogy, is dedicated "For all those who have to fight for the respect that everyone else is given without question" (ix). That expansionist agenda is reflected in more specific form in the dedication to Nnedi Okorafor's *The Book of Phoenix*: "To the stolen girls of Chibok, Nigeria."

Jemisin's trilogy and Okorafor's adult fictions (*Who Fears Death* and *The Book of Phoenix*) may fuel intense anger at past and current injustices while turning to narratives of the exceptional girl on a mission to destroy the old and enable the new. In contrast to these apocalyptic fictions in which a chosen figure from a despised race and gender fulfils a heroic destiny, many of the other texts considered here depict collectivities exploring new ways of living together, often in future worlds that are ambiguously a mix of the utopian and dystopian, what Margaret Atwood describes as "ustopian." Jemisin's *The Fifth Season* begins with the end of the world, while the rest of the trilogy explains why that apocalypse was needed while dramatizing attempts to start again with a new set of inter-human and inter-species relationships. Okorafor's *The Book of Phoenix* builds to such an apocalypse, destroying a future 21st century world. Her *Who Fears Death* works through those ruins to enable a new world to emerge, yet again only after enacting mass destruction. Jemisin and Okorafor's fictions critique the historical system of transatlantic slavery while situating such oppression and dispossession within other practices of racism and genocide.

A key scene in *The Book of Phoenix* shows two characters who are the subject of unethical scientific experiments in a New York Tower discovering a memory hole that shows horrific scenes of genocidal violence that are being accessed many years later as if through a portal into the past by the scientists who are experimenting on them. Phoenix, an "accelerated organism" (9) has been created ("mixed, grown, and finally birthed" [9]) by these scientists. Her friend Saeed has been tortured by them after his retrieval from Egyptian slums to turn him into another kind of genetically manipulated "speciMen" (6). When they compare notes as to what each saw through the portal,

Phoenix recalls seeing white bodies being led to slaughter in a scene that explicitly recalls the Holocaust (24-25 & 33). However, Saeed saw Africans being led to slaughter (128). They conclude that there are many precedents for the inhumane cruelties practiced by the scientists in their Tower 7 and all should be acknowledged. For Saeed, ultimately, "Genocide is genocide" (128). A humanity capable of such acts is not the humanity they envisage nor the humanity they seek to enact.

## Alternative Collaborative Futures

The dystopian worlds of Jemisin and Okorafor draw inspiration from empires of the past and the rising power of corporations in the present, as do those of Leckie, Newitz and Singh. The futurist fictions of Older and Palmer, in contrast, present worlds in which it seems possible for people to work collectively to reconstitute global society after devastating wars have left them searching for different ways of creating and maintaining peace. The historical range of Older's global tale is relatively narrow whereas its geographical range is broad. She describes *Infomocracy* (the first in the series) as "a global book" (7), concerned in part with themes of "risk and […] local government" (9). These play out on the human scale in ways that prompt questions about both the changing and unchanging image of the human in the 21st century. The title, *Infomocracy*, draws attention to the ways in which human attachment to informational devices is changing how many people live and also how they think, including the very ways in which their brains work and how they access information and entertainment. At the same time, when voting, many still demand a human face at the head of a political party as they always have. Despite its name, the fictional party called PolicyFirst, finds its insistence on policy before personality a drawback when seeking to win voters to its cause. Like Older, Palmer imagines a future in which nation-states and political parties have fragmented into a multipolar system in which individuals exercise more freedom of choice in choosing the governments and laws they wish. Palmer sets her 25th century story within a context that goes back to "the first human who thought to hollow out a log to make a boat …", as she puts it in the dedication to *Too Like the Lightning*, the first book of her series. Palmer describes her work as her contribution "to the Great Conversation … my little contribution to the path which flows from Gilgamesh and Homer to the stars" (*Too Like*: 431). Yet despite their many differences, what links Older's and Palmer's series is the ways in which they prioritize individual choice in selecting the local laws by which groups of humans will abide, but within a globalized management system that involves massive bureaucratization, intensive surveillance, and control of information in ways that create doubts for readers about whether or not such a system might be seen as either utopian or dystopian.

## Reframing Autonomy Beyond the Bounded Individual

Each of these texts enables multiple interpretations of the meanings they make, thereby

conveying different implications for social change. Some may be read as commentary on past and present injustices perpetrated by some members of the human race on others, such as the Atlantic slave trade, the annexations of territory by Empires, settler colonialisms, neoliberal capitalism, and various genocides. Others suggest recognizing human kinship with other lifeforms, such as animals, aliens, and plants, and with our own creations, whether they be dreams or gods, or more obviously material constructs such as Artificial Intelligence and machines. Many create empathy for alternative forms of spirituality and blur the lines between science and magic, as do Jemisin and Okorafor, forcing a rethinking of both. What ties these texts together, I argue, is a reframing of autonomy: away from notions of exclusive boundedness toward a recognition of entanglements and their constantly shifting borders. Similarly, social autonomy in these texts is always a work in process, because the autonomous society is continuously recreating itself in interaction with the choices made by humans and often, by their others as well.

These fictions bring together often separated domains of political commentary and theoretical speculation in ways that demonstrate the entanglements of animal, human, and machine worlds as well as those of material and spiritual realities. If once, as in *Frankenstein*, speculative fictions expressed a fear of new versions of technological life (of hybridized cyborgian identities, robots, and artificial intelligence), much contemporary speculative fiction follows theorists such as Donna Haraway and N.Katharine Hayles in embracing its revolutionary potential, "especially as it challenges patriarchal and heteronormative values" (Brown 2). Writing in 2010 about Latin American cyborgs, J. Andrew Brown suggests that the works of these American theorists "often failed to transcend the North American and European contexts in which they are articulated" (3). Nonetheless, there are increasing examples of concurrent streams of thinking that set such work in implicit dialogue with streams of thought from elsewhere. In one explicit example, Vandana Singh, while drawing on ancient South Asian narrative traditions, also recognizes affinities between her thinking and that of the U.S-based theorist Karen Barad, author of the influential book, *Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning*. Singh explains: "Some years ago I read Karen Barad's work, and I am still trying to understand it, but it changed the way I look at the world. The universe is a far more creative, happening place than I imagined—matter speaks, we make cuts that create worlds, and it is in these intra-actions with matter that cultures and sciences come into being" (Kurtz 539).

Singh is especially insightful in explaining the value of speculative fiction in reframing the human away from texts in which people live only in "people-ville" (Kurtz 540) toward writing that incorporates "awareness of the non-human—animal, alien, machine or for that matter, proton" (539). She explains that the mechanical universe of the Newtonian imaginary is no longer sufficient to address all the ways in which the universe works, and she draws a parallel between this inadequacy and the limits of the stories that can be told within the Western modernist paradigm (Kurtz). In an interview with Malisa Kurtz, Singh claims that "Science fiction is the only modern literature I know of where the great questions of our place in the cosmos—things of deep concern to the

ancients—are still central" (Kurtz 535). She explains that there are other ways to tell a story than to show humans interacting only with humans, while the rest of the universe functions as background only. In her texts, as in the title of Barad's book, humans meet "the universe halfway." Just as "the ancients in many cultures were active participants in the cosmos," she notes, so characters in contemporary science fiction and fantasy may also move between different realities and across various borders, whether they be "physical, metaphoric, or psychological" (Kurtz 535). That more expansive universe "in which the imaginative reach spans space and time" (Kurtz 540) can create "cognitive dissonance" (Suvin), enabling space for alternative framings of the human in the world. Singh argues "We need to let other species, aliens and other non-humans, into our stories more generously and honestly. We need to deconstruct the individual, to subject that notion to contextualization, to history and circumstance, so that we can acknowledge how different we are under different lights" (Kurtz 540).

Arguing along somewhat similar lines, Michelle Reid suggests that the strategy of literalizing otherness in science fiction "can encourage the white, Western science fiction audiences to examine prejudices and assumptions that they might be reluctant to face head-on" (Reid, cited in Bannerjee 284). But such an experience is open to all readers, and equally necessary for them. Although advocates acknowledge that such fiction risks dismissal as merely escapist, Suparno Bannerjee and Uppinder Mehan agree that diverse audience may be encouraged to "imagine futures different from the hegemonic Western pattern" (Bennerjee 284). Even while science fiction as a genre certainly carries a history of complicity with imperial conquests and their derogatory stereotypes of others, it may also enable the dismantling of such stereotypes and the opening of alternative ways of imagining the human.

## Reimagining Relational Forms of Human Autonomy

The rest of this paper delves more deeply into some of those ways of reimagining the human, recognizing as Singh points out, that they may not all be new to formerly colonized or Indigenous peoples but only seem new to those accustomed to Western forms of modernity. Singh draws attention to the wider cast of figures with agency in both ancient and science fictional stories. Other ways in which narrative form and linguistic choices make meaning include attention to how naming confers or withholds human identity, elevating some while denigrating others as sub-human or non-human. Those named as outside the human can embrace their identity as monsters and fight back as such (as does Okorafor's Phoenix) or rename themselves according to their own criteria, as does the protagonist of Jemisin's trilogy, whose learning curve through life is reflected in her adaptation of different names for each stage of her journey. The reframed human often involves recognition of the multiple and transforming selves that form any subjectivity. This multiplicity is sometimes indicated through alternative pronoun usages or through blurring the boundaries between entities once thought to be separate.

In Martha Wells' Murderbot Diaries, the central character and first person speaker Murderbot has adopted that derogatory name in part as an act of self-flagellation in memory of a massacre it was told it had completed. It chose this name yet it does not entirely identify with it. When research proves it was not the perpetrator of the massacre, the name takes on a more ironic character, but it still functions to create a certain distance between the speaking and acting selves in these diaries. *All Systems Red,* the opening volume of the series, ends with Murderbot reflecting: "I don't know what I want….But it isn't that, it's that I don't want anyone to tell me what I want, or to make the decisions for me" (150). The central issue for Murderbot is autonomy. In a similar vein, Newitz's *Autonomous* is dedicated: "For all the robots who question their programming." In postmodern fashion, these texts invite human readers to question their own programming, the social conditioning that determines who they think they are and where they belong. Freedom of choice is a major issue for those excluded from human rights in these texts, and most also recognize that autonomy is complicated. Many exist in heteronomous societies in which people are ruled by dominant belief systems about a god (as in Okorafor) or an ideology (such as neoliberal capitalism). Time after time, Murderbot puts the needs of others above its own, not because of its programming, which it has disabled, but because of complicated feelings of affection, respect, and a desire to act for justice, even in situations where this is apparently against its own best interests.

I use the pronoun "it" uncomfortably here. Murderbot is not gendered as humans are and the only alternative might be "they," which in this context could be confusing, although in its recognition of the multiple nature of subjectivity, "they" is probably more appropriate. Murderbot has a core of sentient selfhood but is also, like any human, conflicted and evolving. Newitz's *Autonomous*, in its depiction of the growing relationship between the combat bot, Paladin, and its partner Eliasz, shows how complicated pronouns can become when humans anthropomorphize bots that have no human gender. Eliasz can only deal with his complicated feelings for Paladin by thinking of it as she. For the first part of the novel, Paladin is referred to as he, but after Eliasz decides the proper pronoun should be she, ostensibly because the human brain implanted in Paladin's stomach came from a human woman but more likely because he fears being thought what he calls "a faggot," then the pronoun shifts to she. The incongruity of Paladin's appearance and gender assignation works to "queer" assumptions about gendered identity, thus throwing them into confusion. Similarly, Jack and her friend Bluebeard's male names complicate their identities as women and Threezed's non-human name similarly renders his human identity uncanny. Because Threezed has been a slave for so long, when Jack first sees his empty eyes, she mistakes him for a bot.

Attention to the pronouns distinguishing male from female and human from non-human is one of the more contentious and interesting dimensions of the fictions discussed here, several of which employ linguistic systems to "queer" normative expectations of the human as gendered and human identity as singular. Ann Leckie's Imperial Radch trilogy, Newitz's *Autonomous*, Palmer's Terra Ignota series, and Jemison's Broken Earth Trilogy constitute some of the better-known examples.

Jemisin's trilogy does not play with gender as the others do, but it moves back and forth between second and first person address, heightening the multiplicity and transforming identities of her characters. Her chapter, "you, at the end" in *The Fifth Season (Book One)*, begins: You are me. She is you. You are Essun. Remember? (15). Essun is telling herself her story, seeing herself from the many different perspectives of the lives she has led and how others have seen her, most especially as despised "orogene," disparagingly termed "rogga," a person capable, if trained, of controlling earthquakes, and if not, of actually causing them. *The Obelisk Gate* (Book Two) begins with Essun claiming: "After all, a person is herself, and others. Relationships chisel the final shape of one's being. I am me, and you….You are Essun, after all. You know this already. Don't you?" (e-book). Essun begins her life as Damaya and becomes Syenite before she becomes Essun. Eventually, as the price of using her powers to save the world, she slowly transforms into stone and eventually becomes a stone eater. The stone eaters, originally oppressed peoples with certain superhuman powers, have thrown off their chains and metamorphosed into a new form of stone-embodied humanity, who live according to the timescales of deep time rather than that of an embodied human life of relatively short duration.

Gender pronouns are an issue in Newitz, Leckie, and Palmer's books. In retrospect, Ursula K. LeGuin regretted her earlier decision to employ the generic masculine pronoun to refer to androgynous Gethenians in *The Left Hand of Darkness*. In later introducing her story, "Winter's King," in *The Wind's Twelve Quarters*, she explains her decision to revise this version "to use the feminine pronoun for all Gethenians—while preserving certain masculine titles such as King and Lord, just to remind one of the ambiguity" (93-4). Leckie's imagined Radch culture similarly employs a language that makes no gender distinctions, while designating the female pronoun as the default setting for referring to citizens. Although this linguistic refusal to prioritize gender differences might seem progressive, the insistence of the Radch to use the same word for human and citizen of the Radch indicates the limits of its own views of the human. Further complicating matters, many of the other cultures with which the Radch interact, do employ gender distinctions and gendered customs of dress, rendering social interaction confusing. These authorial decisions can shock, confuse, displease or please readers, with considerable impact on how the novels are read and valued. In Leckie's fiction, pronouns maintain ambiguity rather than resolving it in most instances, working to reframe the human away from the privileging of gender as central to all human activity and providing more space for multiplicity. Palmer's series seems to work differently, problematizing gender in many instances but also rendering it more central. The first person narrator of Palmer's series approaches gender in an idiosyncratic fashion, using male and female pronouns for the same individual depending on the narrator's stereotypical assessment of the nature of their behavior in that instance. In that way, this character often seems to reinforce dominant stereotypes while at the same time confusing them when descriptions of a character's physical attributes seem to clash with the gendered pronoun employed

## Posthuman Subjectivities

The first person narrator of Leckie's trilogy is One Esk 19, posing as Breq from the Gerentate, a human tourist, at the opening of *Ancillary Justice.* She was originally an "ancillary," part of the troop carrier, Justice of Toren. As ship and with a distributed consciousness among many ancillary bodies, with immediate access to multiple perspectives and to the ship's coordinating brain, she had the ability to be in many different places at once, participating in a hive mind, and even having the ability to sing "choral music *all by itself*" (Interview 395; italics in original). However, at the time the novel begins, she is living as a single, fragmented unit, cut off from the multi-bodied and complex mind she once was. She is still a "corpse soldier," termed an ancillary, a human body with artificial intelligence and implants, made to function as a tool of Empire, but who has been pretending to be human for nineteen years when the trilogy opens. In the course of her quest to avenge a beloved lieutenant who was wrongly charged and murdered by the Ruler of the Radch, she learns more about herself, gaining autonomy as she questions her choices and actions, which carry wide-reaching consequences for her world.

Because One Esk 19 knows what it is like to be both originally multiple and also autonomous, and the Ruler of the Radch, Anaander Miannai, has come to be divided amongst her several selves, with at least two sides and maybe more, at war with one another, the trilogy breaks assumed links between a unified subjectivity and the agency to govern oneself and others. It challenges the borders established by "possessive" forms of individualism (C.B. McPherson) to imagine alternative modes of being-in-multiplicity in the world.

As I have suggested so far, the texts discussed here reject images of the human as separated into public and private realms as well as the gendering of these realms that has characterized humanism, and the societies it has made in its image, in its modern iterations. They also complicate distinctions that genre fiction sometimes makes between inner and outer space. In these texts, inner and outer space are entangled in co-constituting and shifting respects, not just through technological enhancements but also through a recognition of their constituting entanglements. These texts recognize, as Leckie puts it, that "People are who they are because of the world they live in, and the world is the way it is because of the people who live in it" (Interview 393). Whereas the modernist aesthetic asserted that art's value lies beyond social relations, these texts posit that the two are intertwined, not to insist upon any kind of determinism but rather to stress their continuous co-creation along lines theorized by Cornelius Castoriadis in books such as *The Imaginary Institution of Society*. Whereas much contemporary fiction in the form of modernist realism focusses on private lives, and some genre fiction privileges action above introspection, these speculative fictions more often concentrate on characters (humans and non-humans) immersed in the creative world of work, and on the entanglements of what were once divided into public and private.

In these fictions, characters find satisfaction and identity in the work they do. Even long retired people, octo- and nonagenarians in Older's *State Techtonics*, often choose to work, craving

occupation. People in Palmer and Older's texts work in recognizable jobs such as bureaucrats, politicians, policy analysts, technical experts, translators, video producers, security providers, taxi drivers, migrant workers, and aid workers. In Palmer's series, there are a range of professions both old and new: assassins, businessmen, Olympic athletes, scientists, producers of smellscapes for cinema, human sex dolls, new forms of cyborgs called setsets, spiritual advisors called sensayers, censors, and brothel madams. The range of employment described is extensive and most of these professions are central to the plot.

Other texts are equally work-focussed although with less variety in the range of employment. Murderbot is a contract security worker, mostly with research expeditions around the universe. Eliasz (a human) and Paladin (a military bot) are also contract security workers employed by big businesses enforcing patent regulation in Newitz's *Autonomous*. They are contracted by Big Pharma to kill Jack Chen, a microbiologist who has turned drug pirate to reverse-engineer patented drugs in order to make them available to those who need them but cannot afford the prices. She works with Threezed (a human slave she has freed from a bad master) and Med (a born-autonomous bot), along with a team of university researchers, to engineer an antidote to a dangerous drug that is killing people even as she flees her pursuers. Perhaps ironically, that drug has been engineered to render work so addictive it leads people to literally work themselves to death. The future world Jack inhabits is a place where distinctions between human and AI are less important than the division between those who have autonomous status, which depends on money, and those who do not. Bots such as Paladin can theoretically earn autonomous status after years of indenture or have their status bought for them by someone willing to pay, but until they do, their minds and memories are not their own. Paladin knows that "Until he was autonomous, the Federation would always hold a key to the memories he'd encrypted in the Federation cloud….He was a user of his own consciousness, but he did not have owner privileges" (124). Humans such as Threezed, sold into slavery by impoverished parents, have even fewer options available to them.

These shifts represent one logical end-result of current practices of neoliberal capitalism, in which everyone's worth—human or machine—is determined by their capacity to generate wealth. Only the wealthy have access to a degree of self-determination and full human status, which in this text is named as "autonomous." Jack's choice to leave her research career with a university in order to become a pirate is a choice between two types of autonomy. As a researcher dependent on research grants, she had little freedom to follow her conscience but considerable security. As a pirate working outside the system, she has the freedom to set her own research agenda and follow her conscience, but at the cost of living a more precarious existence. Furthermore, she would be unable to survive were it not for her circle of loyal friends. Because the novel alternates between the growing partnerships between Jack and Threezed on the one hand, and that between Paladin and Eliasz on the other, it is successful in generating respect and understanding for all its characters, in the face of the dehumanization each encounters.

In these examples, much of the plot is determined by the nature of the work depicted. In Palmer

and Older's texts, innovative future governance systems are challenged by dissident elements seeking their own gain. People work to maintain the system, to reform it, and to overturn it for a variety of well-articulated reasons. Characters seriously debate complex issues from multiple angles in situations where there seems to be no single, correct answer. Their discussions illuminate issues without necessarily resolving them. They depict the "dilemmatic spaces" of democratic debate in action. In contrast, and at a much simpler level, The Murderbot Diaries show a character internally debating his decisions and who he is. He has initially internalized his maker's definition of his identity as a weapon before gradually reframing his sense of self so as to form community with other sentient bots as well as humans, defining his emergent self through a practice of "relational autonomy." Okorafor's *The Book of Phoenix* shows a character undergoing a similar transition from accepting others' definitions of who she is (as abomination and as weapon) toward realizing she can direct her own transformations. In her case, she has friends with whom she can debate her decisions but in the end, she makes up her own mind. From fleeing physical captivity she spends much of the novel discussing the differences between justice and vengeance with other previously dehumanized and dispossessed characters. These texts challenge the distinction between "tools," whether they are designated as human or non-human, and fully articulated humans, in part by the showing the ways that many humans who think themselves autonomous are in fact being used by the dominant systems of their worlds, whether they be governments, corporations, resistance or nationalist movements, or a combination thereof.

These texts present the human as a relational concept and not an ontological status. In this way, they seem aligned with Haraway's stress (in an interview with Nicholas Gane) on "our constitutive relationalities with the machinic but also more than the machinic -–the non-living and the non-human" (143). Believing that "this is where many urgent questions in the world are," she concludes: "We need new category work. We need to live the consequences of non-stop curiosity inside mortal, situated, relentlessly relational worlding" (Gane 143). I am arguing that this is the situated territory of much contemporary speculative fiction. Through reading, readers may live these consequences in ways that strike more deeply than does talk of category work. In her article, "Tentacular Thinking," Haraway asks: "What happens when human exceptionalism and bounded individualism, those old saws of Western philosophy and political economics, become unthinkable in the best sciences, whether natural or social? Seriously unthinkable: not available to think with" (1). These texts begin to answer this question, by exploring different dimensions of that impasse in ways that make the imagination available for exploratory kinds of creative thinking.

## Working with Entanglements

Each of the writers discussed here see border territories as contact zones in which identity and difference are produced and reproduced in unstable power relations. Singh often addresses environmental concerns, in which entanglements of the human and the non-human play central

roles. In *Entanglement*, for example, a whale rescues a scientist whose equipment has failed while she is diving in the Arctic as part of her work to combat global warming: "The whale pushed her until all she had to do was to tumble over the rail onto the deck" (*Entanglement* 12). Remembering the Inuit wisdom of her grandparents, she thanks the whale for saving her life (14). Her equipment is also depicted as a sentient learning environment that was designed as "linked artificial intelligences with information-feedback loops … [that] was based on biomimicry, inspired by natural systems like ecosystems and endocrine systems" (Ibid. 15). As she thinks about how each brolly communicates with the others, "She had a sudden vision of a multilevel, complexly interconnected grid, a sentience spanning continents and species, a kind of Gaiaweb come alive" (Ibid.15). The humans in this world are linked globally through their scientifically-based efforts to save the world from the ravages of human-induced climate change. Upon leaving the Amazon, another character sees a businessman and thinks "how alien her own species seemed whenever she returned from the forest" (Ibid. 21). Later this character, Fernanda, thinks: "the days of the Lone Ranger were gone; this was the age of the million heroes" (Ibid.29). Instead of the model of autonomy embodied in the white male hero of American Westerns, she posits an autonomous social imaginary through which living beings work collectively to achieve a heroic goal that can only be earned through working together.

In arguing that science fiction has often engaged economic and political concerns in its explorations of new technologies, Annalee Newitz argues that "[w]hat often gets forgotten about the origin story of this term [cyberspace, in *Neuromancer*] is that Gibson wasn't just talking about the future of computers, but of a world where tech corporations rule every aspect of our lives" ("Rise")—in other words, about a heteronomous world in which the image of the human and the rights that entails are radically changing. Each of the writers whose works are discussed here share that concern for their view of the need to protect a reimagined relational human autonomy from systems designed to limit or destroy it. In this sense, Newitz's pirates and those who pursue them, the exploited ancillaries of Leckie's space opera and the orogenes, stone-eaters, and Guardians of Jemisin's Broken Earth trilogy serve similar functions, of humanizing the dehumanized in the name of imagining a world in which everyone has a hand in worlding and reworlding the evolving social imaginary.

These writers seem to agree with Arjun Appadurai that it is the imagination itself that is at stake in current societal debates, I have examined how various contemporary fictional thought experiments challenge their readers to reimagine the human beyond the limits of today. My focus has fallen on changing notions of embodiment, relationality, and autonomy and the linguistic and governance structures to which they give rise. In re-envisioning these key humanist concepts, these writers imagine alternative futures for the global community and all the inhabitants of the earth we inhabit. I see these texts are part of a current trend to bring science, literary, and social justice studies back into closer dialogue, redefining creativity and culture through renewed engagement with the unrealized potential of decolonization, women's equality, and a reimagined ethics of entangled engagements.

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# Imbrication of Woman Image

## Kristyna Stebnicka

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All my remarks are based on the research project (conducted by P. Siekierka, K. Stebnicka, A. Wolicki): "Honours for women and the change of citizen mentality" - the first corpus of all Greek honorific inscriptions for women which consists of 1208 preserved texts [for 1131] women (sometimes one female individual was honoured in more than one inscription), issued by public civic male institutions (the people, council, religious and professional associations) in the Greek cities in mainland Greece, Asia Minor, and Aegean islands from classical period till the end of 2nd century CE. Most of the available Greek honorific inscriptions for women were made in the early Imperial period (beginning from the late I BCE).

The honorary inscriptions point female merits and virtues. I will start with female merits.

## I. Describing Female Merits

Public honours for women are not different from the ordinary honours for men: public praise, granting of a crown, commemorating the event with engraving of the decree on a stele and its public display: all of these constituted a list of the earliest female honours. In the earliest times women were predominantly honoured for their achievements in the sphere of cult. It has been once stated that within the city (Greek *polis*) the religion was for women an equivalent of politics for men and in the sphere of religion women exercised their (quasi)citizenship rights.

The first women to be indisputably honoured were an anonymous sister of Pythodoros in the first half of the fourth c. BCE[1] and an anonymous priestess in Athens at the end of the fourth c. BCE.[2]

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1. *ID* 88, ll. 28-37: "In the archonship of Charikleides, in the seventh prytany of the (phyle) Hippothontis, [---] when Aphidnaios was the epistates, Nikostratos **(30)** of Pallene was the secretary. Andromenes said. It was decided about the sister of Pythodoros and nephew of Pythodoros. Since he is a serviceable man on the islands [---] let there be a proxeny for the nephew of Pythodoros. And it is to inscribe **(35)** his name on the stelai of Pythodoros, secretary of the council (shall do it) on the one on the Acropolis, secretary of the Amphictyons (shall do it) on the one on Delos." (tr. by P. Siekierka)

2. *IG* II² 1199: "Philaios son of Chremes proposed. Since the appointed by lot *hieropoioi* in the sanctuary of Hebe took care justly and with love of honour in sacrificing the sacrifice for Hebe and the other gods for whom it is necessary for them to sacrifice, and they gave account (of what they did), it is to crown each of them with an olive

In terms of analogous granted privileges, the earliest known public honours for men were a golden crown for Thrasybulos, Phrynichos' killer, voted in 410/409 BCE (year of a political, oligarchic coup in Athens) and a statue for Konon granted after the battle in 394 BCE. Perhaps the timespan between the earliest public honours for men for their 'political achievements' and for women for their 'religious exploits' was not at all as distant as it usually seems.

An honorific decree for a women called Bakchis issued by a religious association (*thiasos*) of the Good Goddess in the early third c. BCE marks the turning point of female ambitions: Bakchis from Athens not only fulfilled her obligations as the priestess, but in order to gain prestige she went far beyond her duties: 'at her own cost she paid more or (even) double of what was allotted to her by the association, she gave accounts of (her) management, and when the term of her office ended she sacrificed to the goddess and having made the most beautiful preparations possible she was the first one to entertain all the members (*thiasotai*) in the sanctuary'.[3] Also a priestess Timokrite was honoured by the council and the people for her religious accomplishments in a decree from the mid-third c. BCE.[4] These two inscriptions symbolically constitute the beginning of individual activity of women in the public sphere: the male part of the community accepted it and even supported such deeds.

The following ages witnessed the emergence of a new category of female honorands, i.e. benefactresses who generously sponsored some public expenses made by women at their own cost on behalf of the city (for example building activity, public distribution of money and others like paying ransom for the captive citizens) which, however, only appear in the available sources after the so-called 'Hellenistic revolution'. The famous French scholar Philip Gauthier argues the character of *euergesia* (which means "well-doing, kindness, public services" in Greek) changed in the Hellenistic period from the Classical definition of extra expenses made during one's term of office to some separate and very lavish donations of rich citizen. Women of the Hellenistic period definitely went beyond the bounds of religion and – again - male members of community must have accepted and supported such a process.

The first known benefactress of the Hellenistic type was Archippe of Kyme in Asia Minor who lived around the mid-second century BCE. The list of her achievements is very long. She funded the construction of the council house along with its enclosure and later repaired the roof of the building, provided for the feast, gave 1000 staters for sacrifices, one talent for the repairs

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crown: Anticharmos son of Nauson and Nearchos son of Chairigenes, Theodotos son of Aischron, Aristokles son of Kalliphon because of righteousness and love of honour for the members of the deme. The demarch (chosen) after the archon Neaichmos shall engrave this decree on a stone stele and set it up in the sanctuary of Hebe. It is also to praise the *sophronistai* and to crown each of them with an olive crown: Kimon, Metalexis, Pythodoros son of Pytheas and the herald Charikles because of love of honour concerning the festival. It is also to praise the priest of the Herakleidai Kalias, **the priestess of Hebe and Alkmene**, and the archon Kallisthenes son of Nauson and to crown each of them because of piety and love of honour concerning the gods. It is to engrave this decree on a stone stele and to set it up in the sanctuary of Hebe." (tr. by P. Siekierka)

3. *SEG* 56.203, tr. by P. Siekierka.
4. G.S. Dontas, 'The True Aglaurion', *Hesperia* 52 (1983), 52= *SEG* 33.115

and purchase of public slaves, she also gave donations for the native city and left property to her homeland in her will. It is probable that she made many more benefactions to the community of which we know nothing about. Archippe's benefactions were all undoubtedly of political and not religious nature. The several lavish inscriptions for Archippe not even once mentioned any of her priestly functions.[5] She was rich and she acted on her own behalf.

The most important is that Archippe was the first woman who received a statue for her benefactions towards the city. The privilege of granting statues of men grew in popularity from the third century BCE on; women started receiving that kind of privilege from the mid-Hellenistic period. Such statues were usually put in display for the entire city and it was the most prestigious – let me say –reward. The practice of erecting statues for members of the city elites, both for men or women, became so popular in the Roman period (I BCE- I CE) that one is entitled to speak of devaluation of such honours. 85% of the extant inscriptions on statue bases come from the period between the reign of Augustus and the third century CE.

> The Roman times brought with them great changes in the East. From that moment on, the honours for women of the elite were commonplace in the Greek cities, a phenomenon that can observed on a mass scale. Women could already hold offices and undertake civic obligations (liturgies) in the Hellenistic period, but the practice became popular only in the first c. CE, i.e. when women started holding some particular eponymous offices in the Greek cities. We need to stop here to remark that only 45 female honorands were members of the city elites: the attested individuals held eponymous offices, were the gymnasiarchs (*office of gymnasiarch, president of gymnasium,* lasted usually for a year), i.e. they covered the cost of delivering olive to the gymnasia), and agonothetes, i.e. they took the costs of organizing festivals upon themselves and they also paid for theatrical performances. In Roman times women erected public buildings of different kinds: they expanded temples, but more often gymnasia, in exceptional cases some buildings at the agora. By these means, wealthy women could get involved in exactly the same activities as men and they imitated men in their acts, a phenomenon that became typical in the East in the early Empire (honorific inscription for Claudia Anassa reads that she made donations "imitating generosity of her husband"). What is striking here is that many women acted there autonomously and we know of many instances where the women were capable of erecting buildings by themselves whereas the others did it with their husbands.

Kristyna Stebnicka

Imbrication of Woman Image

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5. Archippe is known from the eight decrees (*I.Kyme* 13 II=*SEG* 33.1036; *I. Kyme* 13 I=*SEG* 33.1035; *I.Kyme* 13 III=S*EG* 33.1037; *SEG* 33.1040; *SEG* 33.1041; *I. Kyme* 13 IV=*SEG* 33.1038a; *I.Kyme* 13 V=*SEG* 33.1038b; *SEG* 33.1039) incised in the same period, but the individual decrees were passed at different times; on the chronology of texts see R. van Bremen, 'The Date and context of the Kymeian Decrees for Archippe *(SEG* 33, 1035-1041)', *REA* 110 (2008), pp. 357 – 382.

I would like to mention some women of this period. In the second c. CE, Lalla of Tlos (Asia Minor) [6] made a substantial donation: "[---] gifts [---] in exchange for the gymnasiarchia of the neoi she had promised 12.500 denarii which had been put on a contract to pay interest to bring profit to the city in such a way (that there is no need) to select investors (i.e. people who lend the capital) or the people to demand dues. She certified to give one denarius each year out of the interest for each of 1.100 grain recipients, on the 15th day of the month Xandikos, on the first day of the magisterial elections. In return, at the electoral assembly the city called by acclamation upon the priest of the Augusti to propose a motion that Lalla should bear the title 'mother of the city', and should be honoured [---]." (tr. K. Stebnicka). Around the same time Atalante of Termessos (Asia Minor), following in the footsteps of her ancestors, provided money for public benefit and promised the city to buy grain when the city did not have enough of it.[7] Benefits of Iunia Theodora who was a Corinthian citizeness of Lycian origin living around the mid-first c. CE was of a different kind.[8] She is well known among the researchers of early Christianity for she was remarkably similar to Lydia, a rich merchant of purple cloth of Thyateira who lived in Macedon and who hosted saint Paul in her house (Acts 16:14-15). After Iunia's death, there were five honorific inscriptions made for her. She received guests from Lycia in her house (nothing was said of her husband: perhaps she was a widow?), helped the Lycians who stayed at Corinth and she probably facilitated their contacts with the Roman governor of the province Achaia. Unfortunately, the available sources do not attest any other 'female ambassadors' who represented their native cities' interests in such a dignified manner.

Women were rarely honoured for their craft and skill in e.g. poetry, philosophy, drama etc. We know only of 4 poetesses, 2 harpists, 1 female rhetor, and 1 physician who were honoured in the Greek inscriptions.

## II. Describing Female Virtues

Since most of the female honours were of a religious character, comes as no surprise that piety (*eusebeia*) is the most common term used in those inscriptions; *eusebeia* almost monopolized the Greek language to mean a praiseworthy religious devotion. Since the *eusebeia* was mainly mentioned in the cases of priestesses, it indicates that it was not commonly associated with womanhood, but rather being a priestess. On the other hand, the *eusebeia* is commonplace in the honorific inscriptions for men, priests, and sacred property administrators or managers of funds reserved for ritual practices.

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6. Ch. Naour, 'Inscriptions de Lycie', *ZPE* 24 (1977), no.1.
7. Ph. A. Harland, *Greco-Roman Associations: Texts, Translations and commentary,* vol. II, Berlin 2014, no. 147& 148, pp. 385-387.
8. D. I. Pallas, S. Charitonidis, J. Venencie, 'Inscriptions lyciennes trouvées à Solômos', *BCH* 73 (1959), 496-508 : *SEG* 18.143 ; *SEG* 22.232; *SEG* 23.176. On Iunia Theodora see f.e. A. Kearsley, 'Women in public Life in the Roman East: Iunia Theodora, Claudia Metrodora and Phoebe, benefactress of Paul', *Tyndale Bulletin* 50.2 (1999), pp. 189-211 (for Iunia Theodora, pp. 191-199).

*Eusebeia* was sometimes the only visible reason for the honours granted to women, but more often appeared in the company of other terms referring to the honorand's activities outside religion; it usually took the form of: 'X is honoured for her *eusebeia* towards gods and for [the other virtue/merit] towards the people/city/humans'.

In the late Hellenistic and early Roman period, perhaps due to 'devaluation' of the traditional formulae, some new formulae were invented, which either succeeded *piety* or were used in conjunction with it: goodwill (*eunoia*), virtue (*arete*), modesty/chastity (*sophrosyne*) but *eusebeia* (or epithet *eusebes*, pious) retained its dominant position till the end of paganism. Piety and some other female virtues created their public image as of 'good women'.

Goodwill *(eunoia)*, virtue (*arête*), and modesty (*sophrosyne*) were the most common virtues invoked in the Hellenistic and Roman period. Whenever community wanted to emphasize the honour, put stress on the extraordinary merits of the honorand, or simply add some rhetoric to the honorific language, it could add some new virtues to the list, but they generally did not supersede the earlier virtues, but only duplicate them.

*Sophrosyne*/modesty is definitely the most female virtue from the attested list. It is indeed also attested in the honours for men, but unquestionably less often (it is difficult to find a single group of terms used in the public honours for women in the Hellenistic period that would not find their place in the honours for men). *Sophrosyne* can be clearly seen as a 'female' virtue when we have got parallel honours for men and women. When Demetrios and his wife Meltine were honoured in Apollonia in Phrygia in the second c. BCE – early first c. BCE, Demetrios was praised for his virtue - *arete*, goodwill - *eunoia*, good order - *eutaxia*, righteousness/justice - *dikaiosyne* and love of glory - *philodoxia* towards the people, but his wife received praises for her *arete* and *sophrosyne*.

With the end of the Hellenistic period the honours for women gained a new dimension: they started being praised for their attitude towards their relatives. Praises for female *philandria* (love for housband), and *philoteknia* (love for children) started being common. This new approach was certainly related to the new kind of relations between particular families and the city: families no longer fought for the favour of the city – it was the city fighting for the favour of powerful rich families which sponsored the Greek poleis; women who 'only' fulfilled their duties to their families now were seen as deserving public praise.

The typical pairs and groups of female moral virtues of the period were as follows: piety, modesty, love for husband, love for children, virtue in all things. Female honorands became also models of virtue, like in inscription for Lala of Arneai (Lycia in Asia Minor), end of the first c. CE: „The people of the Arneatans and (the people) of their *sympolitai* honoured Lalla daughter of Timarchos, son of Dioteimos, their co-citizeness, wife of Dioteimos son of Ouassos, who held the priesthood of the Augusti and fulfilled gymnasiarchia as a free gift (for the city), already honoured five times, **prudent (woman), citizeness, husband-loving (wife) who surpassed all the fame, model of virtue, and embellished the virtues of her ancestors with tokens of her own**

**character, because of (her) virtue and benevolence**.” (tr. K. Stebnicka). [9]

The available inscriptions only once mention *oikodesposyne* (“household rule”) which described the honorand as a good lady of the house. Beauty, a virtue which can be found regularly in the funeral epitaphs, can be found in public honorific inscriptions extremely rarely.

### III. Female Images in Art – Visualisation of the Female Virtues

Now I would like to show three female images of different periods and of different styles.

### 1. An anonymous woman from Smyrna.



First one belongs to a series of the Hellenistic grave *stelai* from Smyrna (III-II BCE) which have been indubitably made for women from the higher social strata.[10] They presented women most often in standing position (depiction of seated figures seemed to suggest maturity). The deceased were accompanied by female servants (usually one or two) and the catalogue of female attributes on the stelae normally consisted of small jewellery boxes, hats, and umbrellas, all of them ordinary female utensils. The reliefs rarely presented items related to spinning which was a typical female activity (only two stelae depict items remotely linked to spinning), there were no children there that would be a traditional indicator of womanly life. In the entire collection of female reliefs from Smyrna, there is also only one that presented a woman in company of a nursemaid with two children

Women are presented mostly in a *pudicitia typus* (modesty stance) that was widely popular

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9. *TAM* II 3, 766.

10. On the *stelai* from Smyrna see P. Zanker, ‘The Hellenistic Grave Stelai from Smyrna: Identity and Self-image in the Polis’, in: A. W. Bulloch et al. (eds.), *Images and Ideologies: Self-Definition in the Hellenistic World*, Berkeley 1993, pp. 212-230.

in the reliefs from the Hellenistic period: the women stood with their arms and hands hidden underneath the robes, their heads were covered and their entire body language seemed to express modesty. The reliefs reflected the luxurious life of the deceased and yet at the same time presented female modesty and restraint, i.e. female virtues that were to become indispensable elements of female praises from the Hellenistic period on.

## 2. Menophila from Sardis (Asia Minor).



Large funerary stele from Sardis (ca. half of the second c. BCE) brings a literary epitaph:[11]
"The people (honoured) Menophila daughter of Hermagenes.
'The stone displays a cultured and graceful woman. Who is she? - The writings of the Muses tell us, Menophila. – Why is there carved on the stele a lily and an alpha, a book, a basket, and a crown as well? – The book indicates her education, the crown on her head her office, and the number one that she was an only-born. The basket is a sign of her orderly virtue, and the flower shows her youth, which fate has taken from her. So they may the earth rest lightly on such a woman as this. Ah, to your childless parents you have left only tears". (tr. K.J. Gutzwiller).

Literary epitaph for the deceased Menophila of Sardis has a close analogy with poems of a famous Hellenistic poet Antipater of Sidon due to the usage of symbolic figures. The crown mentioned in the poem referred to the *stephanophoria*, an eponymous office held by Menophila in

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11. On Menophila see for example K.J. Gutzwiller, *Poetic Garlands. Hellenistic Epigrams in Context*, Berkeley-Los Angeles-London 1998, pp. 265-267; A. Bielman, *Femmes en public dans le monde hellénistique*, Paris 2002, no. 44, pp. 224-229; A. Bielman, 'Unu vertu en rouleau ou comment la sagesse vint aux Grecques', in R. Frei-Stolba, A. Bielman, O. Bianchi (eds), *Les femmes antiques entre sphère privée et sphère publique*, Bern 2003, pp. 79-107; B. Connelly, *Portrait of a Priestess. Women and Ritual in Ancient Greece*, Princeton 2007, pp. 251-252; K.J. Gutzwiller, *Poetic Garlands. Hellenistic Epigrams in Context*, Berkeley-Los Angeles-London 1998, pp. 265-267.

Sardis. The relief presents a draped woman flanked by two servant girls, with a crown on her head; she is surrounded by a lily, letter alpha, roll of papyrus, crown and basket. Although (according to Bielman) the inscription presented one of the rare cases where a 'virtue-male' woman may have enjoyed the education usually reserved for a boy, the figure of Menophila emphasized Menophila's typically female virtue – her modesty.

### 3. Plancia Magna from Perge.



Plancia Magna, a great benefactress of Perge in the early second c. CE, came from the most notable and wealthy families in Asia Minor: her father M. Plancius Varus achieved the senatorial rank under Nero, held several Roman offices, he was the proconsul of Pontus and Bithynia in 70-72 CE.[12] The name of Plancia's mother is never mentioned in the inscriptions (probably Plancia was daughter of Iulia, who in turn was the daughter of the Armenian king Tigranes VI; the expression 'daughter of the city', always present after her filiation in the preserved inscriptions, may indicate adoption by the personification of the city. Plancia's husband, C. Iulius P.f. Hor. Cornutus Tertullus was *cosnul suffectus* in 100 CE and proconsul of Africa in 116-117 CE.

Ca. 121 CE, Plancia restored the Hellenistic city gate, the main southern gate of Perge, and its two round towers. The gate complex included a new inner oval courtyard, which was closed by a

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12. On Plancia Magna and the Plancii family see St. Mitchell, "The Plancii in Asia Minor", *JRS* 64 (1974), pp. 27-39; M.T. Boatwright, "Plancia Magna of Perge. Women's roles and status in Roman Asia Minor", in S.B. Pomeroy (ed.), *Women's History and Ancient History*, Chapel Hill-London 1991, pp. 249-272; *eadem*, "The city gate of Plancia Magna in Perge", in E. D'Ambra (ed.), *Roman Art in Context. An Anthology*, Englewood Cliffs 1993, pp. 189-207; J. Nollé, 'Frauen wie Omphale. Überlegungen zu 'politischen' Ämtern von *Frauen* im kaiserzeitlichen Kleinasien", in M. Dettenhofer (ed.), *Reine Männersache? Frauen in Männerdomänen der antiken Welt*, Köln 1994, pp. 247-252; S. Şahin, *I.Perge* I, pp. 107-123 (on the family, foundations of Plancia Magna and her sculptural programme); Sh. Dillon, *The Female Portrait Statue in the Greek World*, Cambridge 2010, pp. 156-161.

two-storied triple arch. On the inner two-storied walls of the courtyard 28 niches were made for the bronze statues: the 14 lower niches held the statues of the Olympian gods and local deities, the upper niches carried statues of founders of the city, mythical and contemporary figures (including Plancia's father and brother related to her as 'father of Plancia Magna' and 'brother of Plancia Magna').

The preserved statue of Plancia Magna in the so-called Large Herculaneum format represents her wearing the crown of the priestess of the imperial cult. The most striking is that the statue of the rich and generous benefactress emphasized her female modesty.

# Reconfiguring the 'New Woman' in Koreanized Feminist Discursivity: Na Hye-Suk's Play the Woman in Paris

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## A. The Korean New Women in the 1920's: Historical Context

Since the mid 19th century, Chosun, the old dynasty Korea, began to be subjected to growing western influences in the age of 서세동점 西勢東漸 (Western forces occupy East). It generated a sense of crisis within the Korean society, and the "Enlightenment Movement" came into being. The movement goal was to 'modernize' the nation and upgrade the national standards by introducing Western culture and technology, ultimately to achieve the nation's independence. Education was emphasized as an integral part of such process, and most conspicuously the importance of women's education was emphasized. Despite all its efforts, Korea became a colony under Japanese rule in 1910.

By the 1920s, Korea witnessed a significant change in its history of women. During the era, the issue of women's liberation surface unprecedentedly. and there appeared the first generation of Korean New Women (Sin Yosong).

### 1. Korean New Women: A Definition

From a larger global point of view, Korea was participating In the global phenomenon of the New Woman, according to Dina Lowy.:

> The term New Woman was first used and became widespread in the West in the 1890s. Although the specific outlook and activities of the New Women varied from country to country, a common characteristic was a heightened awareness of self and of gender distinctions, which led to changing views on such issues as marriage, sexuality, and fertility. (2)

Kwon In-Sook indicates that New Women in Korea are a group of women activists, who challenged the moral system of Confucian patriarchy, using a new self-identity that they crafted through modern education in Korea, and overseas.(382)

Many of them strongly endorsed modern values such as freedom of choice in love and marriage, and equality between the sexes, while challenging the traditional Confucian morality of Three Obediences to men, the ideology of chastity and the Wise Mother/Good Wife stereotype.

## 2. Korean New Women's Movement and *A Doll's* House Translation in 1920

Three representative Korean New Women during the 1920's are:

1) Korea's first woman modern painter/writer Na, Hye-suk (羅蕙錫, 1896～1948)

2) Kim, Won-Ju, (金元周alias, Il-Yop 一葉) (1896-1971) the editor of the first Korean women's/ feminist magazine *New Woman* (Sinyoja 新女子) (1920.3-1920.6).

3) Korea's first woman novelist Kim, Myung-Soon(金明淳1896- ).

They were young Korean feminists in their early 20's, studying in Japan, and seemingly imbibed western feminist ideas of the times including Ellen Key, Emmeline Pankhurst, etc through Japanese feminists such as Hirachuka Raicho and Yosano Aiko. Ellen Key's ideas on True Love and Chastity exerted strong influence in East Asian countries during the 1920s. This point will be discussed more in detail later in this paper.

Timely the Korean New Women feminists realized the potential value of *A Doll's House* play in awakening women's consciousness in order to bring about changes in Korean women's lives and prompted its translation into Korean by Yang, Baek Hwa originally to publish it in their magazine *New Women*. This marks an "important momentum in the history of Korean reception of Ibsen". (Maeil Sinbo newspaper, 23 Jan. 1921)

Na, Hye-Suk, the most prominent 1st generation Korean New Woman, actually identifies Nora with her own self In her poem "Nora"(113), by citing Nora's monologue in the last scene of the play *A Doll's House*.

> I was a doll. A daughter doll to father. A wife doll to husband…Let go of Nora…into the air of freedom…A Human being I am…'I have a sacred duty to myself, as much as to my husband and children.'.. Girls, Wake up and follow me. Stand up and illuminate. Lights of the new days are dawning.(113)

Through this poem, Na actually repudiates the Confucian morality of Three Obediences(to father, husband and son), traditional woman's role, and declares her own independence as an individual human being. Moreover, she calls for the younger generations of women to wake up and participate in the movement for better future.

Na, Hye-suk and Kim, Won-ju's urgent but unflinching call for actions from the next generations seemingly reflect their sense of Han as colonial subjects under the Japanese Rule at that time. Thus, "better future" here seemingly implicate women's liberation and enlightenment, and ultimately nation's independence.

In her essay "Ideal Women"(183) Na identifies 7 Western and Japanese women as exemplary ideal women, including Ibsen's character Nora *in A Doll's House*. Na invokes Nora as her examplary model because Nora had an ideal of 'true love', namely love and marriage that recognize a woman's worth as a person rather than her value as a daughter, wife and mother. Na also cites Mrs. Harriet Beecher Stowe for her ideal of religious egalitarianism, and Japanese feminists Hiratsuka Raicho and Yosano Akiko.

### 3. Challenges Against Traditional Morality of Chastity

Traditional concept of Chastity meant for Korean women during the early 1900's included the morality of three obediences (to father, husband and son), the practice of arranged marriage by parents, the practice of the ideal of Virtuous Woman by avoiding 'seven deadly evil acts' (七去之惡) including jealousy such as against concubine, not bearing a son, etc. By the 1920's, it was reframed in the modern image of Wise Mother and Good Wife. For the Korean New Women, the question of True Love and Chastity became a focal point in their New Women's movement.

In 1920, Kim, Won-Ju, and Na, Hye-Suk primarily started the first Korean women's magazine *New Women*. Kim also formed Korean Blue Tower Society(청탑회(靑塔會)) to wage women's enlightenment movement. Kim, the editor, introduced her concept of New Chastity and Free Love through her writings for New Women's Movement.

Kim, Won-Ju stated her goals in leading the women's movement, in the second issue of *New Women* (Sinyoja) magazine as follows:

> Why do we declare ourselves New Women in front of society, despite our ignorance and immaturity?....Because we are going to liberate ourselves from the whole traditional, conservative, cultural and outdated ideology, as New Women in a new era. This is our responsibility and obligation, and that explains the reason for our existence. (26)

As for her concept of New Chastity, Kim redefines it in new terms of True Love as follows:

> Human beings are free from the time of their birth. Free love, free marriage and free divorce are sacred, and to prohibit them is old backward convention. (59)

Na, Hye-suk, in her essay "Confession of My Divorce"(397), also criticizes the patriarchal practice of chastity in Korea at that time:

> Chosun men's thinking is hard to understand. They themselves don't practice chastity but demand it from their wives and women in general. And they attempt to ruin other persons' sense of chastity as well.(425)

By the 1920's, many Korean New Women became Korean Noras in search of True Love by either leaving their homes or having free relationships with men. However, according to Chung, Se-Hyun, the most liberal attitude toward these changes about women stipulated that "the boundary of women's liberation must not surpass the natural duties of women; the respect and independence of women as individuals must not take precedence over their submission to man."(33)

Many of the lives of the first generation Korean New Women ended with suicide, divorce, or self-imposed seclusion. The tragic endings of these women reflect the particular social circumstances of Korea as the nation sought to deal with modernization/westernization, within less than half a century, roughly from late 19th century up until the 1920s. Loss of the National sovereignty was their source of Han, and national independence was their ultimate goal to achieve. Thus the particular sense of Han seemingly became the driving force for them to help rapidly modernize the nation. It was their mission of the times.

Na, Hye-suk, for example, actively participated in the March 1 Independence movement and because of this were incarcerated. Na clearly indicates her sense of mission for the nation:

> for me as an individual woman to have achieved all this, I owe greatly to Chosun, my country. I should have a mission to repay all the gratitude I owe it.(438)

Thus women's Korea spearheaded the nationwide strong aspiration and impulse for change through modernization and thus was inevitably pulled into the whirlpool of New and Old cultural clashes.

Looking back afresh, that these Korean New Women could bear the brunt of this period of cataclysmic social changes and transition witnesses the strength of each individual Korean New Woman, and their ardent devotion to the cause of national independence as well as women's liberation. Through their individual sacrifices, they paved the way for the next generations of New Women to advance beyond.

## B. Nora and Early Modern Korean Drama in the 1920's - 1930's

A Korean theater historian Yu, Min-yong characterizes modern Korean drama in the 1920's and the 1930's as "a social and consciousness movement rather than pure art tradition".(13) It is understandable that the woman's emancipation theme of the play *A Doll's House* was rather favorably received in Korea as an essential part of the national liberation plan, when it was first introduced as literary work in the early 1920's. But by the 1930's, public responses to the play became quite ambivalent due to the change of political and social atmosphere.

## 1. Public Responses to the 1st Public Premier *A Doll's* House in 1934

The first public premier of *A Doll's House* happened in 1934 by Theater Arts Research Group. Na, Woong's review in *Donga Daily News* records contrasting responses from the male and the female audience members as follows:

> At Nora's last dialogue, rolling applause broke out from the ladies' seats, whereas the sound 'hush, hush' rose among the gentlemen seats. (27 April 1934, p.7)

Critic Na further recorded the negative attitudes of the male spectators, who took issue primarily with Nora's leaving home:

> Audience C: Nora's leaving home is not natural. Her action lacks convincing motivation nor is it based on a firm belief. It seems rather that she acted out on the spur of the moment. (Dong-a Daily News. 29 April 1934, p. 3)

The public response seems at best ambivalent. In other words, the colonial Korean patriarchal society felt the keen necessity to modernize the nation ultimately for the sake of national independence cause. Under this project women's modern education and women's role for national motherhood was emphasized. On the other hand, Nora's act of leaving home was considered a serious threat to the stability of the Confucian patriarchal family system and hence the nation itself.

## 2. Korean Adaptation: *After Leaving a Doll's House* (1933)

### by Chae, Man-Sik

In Korea, the play *A Doll's House* exerted powerful influence not only to women's sectors but also in literary circles. Writers began to create women characters who dare to leave home and family. This was unthinkable before introduction of *A Doll's House* to Korea.

A socialist writer Chae Man-Sik wrote a novel adaptation with a title, *After Leaving a Doll's House.* In this novel, he emphasizes importance of economic independence for women's liberation. Chae recontextualizes the Nora narrative in Colonial Korean society, posing the question if a woman of Chosun makes a decision like Ibsen's Nora what will happen to her. Chae expands the focus from that of gender to that of class, thereby suggesting an alternative solution for Korean Nora's plight.

In this novel, Chae recreates Nora in the figure of Korean New Woman Yim, Nora under the Japanese colonial rule. Yim, Nora in this Korean context is an educated modern middle-class woman, who from the beginning of the narrative is portrayed as equipped with enlightened consciousness of women's questions.

The novel starts with the scene the day after Nora left home. Hyun, Suk-Jun, Nora's husband and a lawyer creates the typical image of a patriarchal husband at the time, showing extreme anger

at the woman's revolt and declares that he will take revenge at her.

Nora, however, says in her own words that she "sustains hope to explore the world outside of home, and a firm spirit to fight the patriarchal world." (108) Thus Yim Nora starts her first step into the real world by going back to her hometown, and taking a job as a church night school teacher. But her high spirit and ideal to change the patriarchal society instantly comes into clash with the base realities of the colonial rural society: for example, In one of her night class she teaches village women that marriage should be based on love and mutual understanding, not by parental choice and arrangement. The village women shockingly reacts to her teaching, and the class is disbanded soon due to the lack of students.

Yim Nora returns to Seoul, and takes another job as a private tutor. But she is soon subjected to sexual harassment, and she quits. Nora now becomes broke and tries other jobs such as cosmetics sales job, and then finally becomes a cafe girl. But there she loses her chastity by Mr. Lee, after drinking liquor with him.

Now she faces three choices: starve to death, or fall to depravity, or go back home. But the Korean Nora takes a slightly different choice by committing suicide, death by her own will. But ironically she fails in this attempt as well, and rescued. Author Chae seemingly uses Nora's suicide attempt and her rescue as a turning point in her creed in women's liberation to that of class struggle.

Determined to live again, Nora takes a job as a worker at a printing factory. Here she comes to change her views about working and working class people.

> Working is sacred. I agree with it, as I learn to work.
> Working people here all look energetic and spirited. (293)

Now Yim, Nora comes to ideologically enlightened about socialism as she begins to read August Bebel's(1849-1913) Book *Women and Socialism*. Nora starts reading it, finding in it a word that captures her attention. That word is 'class struggle'. Now she seemingly realizes that women's movement and class struggle are closely interconnected.

Another important scene is the last scene of the novel. Nora encounters her former husband Hyun, Seok-Jun, as the manager of Dong Yang Bank, which audits the printing factory, where Nora works. His first dialogue to Nora is "you have fallen under my control again as a beggar." Nora retorts unyieldingly:

> You see me triumphantly as if you won the victory. But another fight is just beginning
> between you and me. They say that this world is a class struggle. I truly believe so.(297)

Regarding how the class struggle between Nora and her former husband develops is left open to the audience's imagination.

### *The Woman in Paris*, A Play by Na, Hye-Suk

Another literary work of significance is the play *The Woman in Paris* (1935) written by Na, Hye-Suk, 4 years after her divorce. The play is an autobiographical representation of her extramarital love affair with Choi, Rin, a male celebrity, and the public responses, which provided the core reason for her divorce. Here in this play, Na challenges firstly to deconstruct the patriarchal male-gaze that dominated the representation of her romance and her own self; and secondly to defend and reconfirm her unflinching belief in the morality of True Love, thereby creating a feminist counter-narrative.

In Act 1, in a Paris apartment two Korean men named C and D discuss about Woman B, who just left Paris with her husband to America on their world tour itinerary. Male character C is sympathetic with Woman B, and says that it is a pity that such a woman of great potential could not stay longer in Europe, where she could enlighten herself in order to ultimately do service to Chosun, her nation. This man talks along the line of women's enlightenment for the sake of the nation. But male character D misunderstands male C's talk, and suspects certain romance between male C and Woman B.

Here in Act 1, author Na Hye-Suk foregrounds Male C's dialogue about Woman B's potential, thereby challenges the Korean patriarchal history's dismissal of her as an immoral woman.

Act 2 portrays Korean residents in New York, exchanging their views regarding Woman B's scandalous romance, the news of which was carried in a Korean Newspaper published in America. Korean New Yorkers criticize Woman B for her depravity, causing such a scandal, and her husband A for not preventing it beforehand. Since A and B are considered valuable persons from whom they expected certain possibility for the nation's independence, they express their dismay and concern for the future of Chosun.

> Act 3 is set in a beach in Wonsan, Korea many years after the scandal. Woman is back in Chosun. Male character J is specified as Woman B's lover. They reminisce their past years. Their common concern now is the future of Chosun nation under the Japanese Colonial Rule. Woman B says that she feels "confused after her world tour," but has become more determined about the direction of her future life. J says that "before his tour to the West, he had immense hope, but now after the tour, he has endless disappointment. J says, Chosun is like wasterland and desert compared to European countries. We will have to plant seeds, and wait until they sprout and grow, while they will continuously progress.(149)

Then they confirm their love toward each other. Woman B says that she wants her life to be a master piece. In this scene, author Na, Hye-Suk seemingly justifies her firm belief in the spirit-flesh union through woman B's romance with J, the new morality for chastity, by highlighting how B and J both share common concerns regarding the nation's future, and thus how their spirits correspond

with each other. Through this scene, the author actually comes to her own defense regarding her romance scandal in her own voice, against the patriarchal society's monolithic dismissal of her as an immoral woman.

## Notes

Please do not quote this paper, since it is not published in print yet.

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____. "Confession of My Divorce". *Complete Anthology of Na, Hye-Suk.* ed. Sang-Kyug Lee. Seoul: Taehaksa, 2000.

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# I Change therefore I am: The Construction of Female Identity in the Works of Tahmima Anam

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## Introduction

"Who is there when a woman says, "I am"?"[1], more than three decades ago Gardiner posited it as the central question of feminist literary criticism, with the additional claim that "fictional women are worse off than the real one"[2], thus declaring the difficulties that relies with literary analysis. The reason then, despite the difficulty, the present paper is interested in fictional narrative is because "Fiction flows between life and imagination, and it is one of the most direct links between the two worlds"[3] and "Storytelling reveals meaning without committing the error of defining it"[4]. The paper deals with the narratives of three generations of women of the Haque family, who territorially belong to the 'Third-World'. The West, blinded by its 'white solipsism'[5] has long perceived the 'Third-World women' as a homogenous category, as the 'Third-World *woman*' suggesting a 'positionality without a subject'[6]. And if the women in question are Muslim, then it develops into a 'triple colonization' "Oriental, woman and Muslim" echoing the Spivakian construction of "poor, black and female"[7]. Thus one of the main concerns of the paper is 'decolonization of feminism' and the 'acknowledgement of differences' as propagated by Mohanty[8].

1. Gardiner, Judith Kegan. "On Female Identity and Writing by Women." *Critical Inquiry* 8, no. 2 (1981): 347-61. doi:10.1086/448158.
2. Curti, Lidia. "Female Stories, Female Bodies." 1998. doi:10.1007/978-1-349-26207-6.
3. Ibid.
4. Bagchi, Barnita. "Hannah Arendt, Education, and Liberation: A Comparative South Asian FeministPerspective." *Hidelberg Papers in South Asian and Comparative Politics*, January 2007, 2-20. www.sai.uni-heidelberg.de/SAPOL/HPSACP.htm.
5. Mohanty, Chandra Talpade. "Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses." *Gender*, 2000, 51-71. doi:10.1007/978-1-137-07412-6_5.
6. Spivak qtd in Mansoor, Asma, and Najeeba Arif. "Articulation, Agency and Embodiment in Contemporary Pakistani Urdu Poetry by Women." *Asiatic* 10, no. 1 (June 2016): 128-44.
7. Hasan, Md. Mahmudul. "The Orientalization of Gender." *The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences* 22, no. 4, 26-56.
8. 5 Mohanty, Chandra Talpade. "Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses." *Gender*, 2000, 51-71. doi:10.1007/978-1-137-07412-6_5.

The title suggests that the paper is concerned with the construction of female identity as the "issue of identity and female consciousness has always been one of the major concerns of feminists". I do not opt for a rejection of the differences between the sexes but prefer the performative views regarding the female subject over the essentialist ones. Therefore I use Gardiner's preliminary metaphor "female identity is a process"[9] while analyzing the Hoque women. That brings about the questions related to 'being' and 'becoming'. Though I do not commence my arguments solely from an existentialist standpoint, the third stage or the *female phase* where the issue of 'self-discovery' or 'a search for identity' gradually moves into 'a new stage of self-awareness'[10] in Elaine Showalter's triadic formulation of the history of women's literature particularly interests me. I maintain that the three phases 'feminine, feminist and female' are not successive and cannot be applied unswervingly to all literary subcultures as Showalter suggests.

Demystifying the formulation of Third-world women's identity as unitary and monolithic is one of the primary concerns of the present paper. Thus I wish to employ Braidotti's conception of identity as a "site of difference", thus speculating that the "subject women is not a monolithic essence, defined once and for all, but rather the site of multiple, complex and potentially contradictory sets of experiences…"[11]

### *A Home of One's Own*

In the paper "Hannah Arendt, Education, and Liberation: A Comparative South Asian Feminist Perspective" Barnita Bagchi exhibits "some of the limitations of Arendt's taxonomies in her ideas about the private, social and public spheres, and about what counts as political and what does not"[12] by comparing Arendt's ideas with that of Ramabai and Rokeya. Arendt draws on a number of distinctions between "the *oikos* and the *agora*, the private and the public, the social and the political"; the *ghar* and the *baahir*, the home and the world. Interestingly, the work of Rokeya makes the "fluid continuum between the spheres of the private, the social and the political, in which human action manifests its dynamism"[13] eminent. It is here that I would like to place our first Haque woman, Rehana.

*A Golden Age*, Tahmima Anam's first novel of her planned Bengal Trilogy is the epic narrative of the 'becoming' of a nation interwoven with that of the 'becoming' of a woman. The gradual and violent birth of Bangladesh runs parallel with Rehana Hoque's developing agency. Rehana is in her

9.  1 Gardiner, Judith Kegan. "On Female Identity and Writing by Women." *Critical Inquiry*8, no. 2 (1981): 347-61. doi:10.1086/448158.
10. Showalter, Elaine. *A Liteature of Their Own: British Women Novelists from Bronte to Lessing*
11. Braidotti, Rosi. *Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2011.
12. 4 Bagchi, Barnita. "Hannah Arendt, Education, and Liberation: A Comparative South Asian FeministPerspective." *Hidelberg Papers in South Asian and Comparative Politics*, January 2007, 2-20. www.sai.uni-heidelberg.de/SAPOL/HPSACP.htm.
13. Ibid.

forties, a widow and a mother of two. Rehana's identity is what I would like to call 'homebound'. According to Porteous home provides "three essential territorial satisfactions" – "identity, security, and stimulation."[14]. Rehana's story seems to provide a justification to this claim. Rehana "had married a man she had not expected to love; loved a man she had not expected to lose; lived a life of moderation, a life of few surprises. She had asked her father to find her a husband with little ambition. Someone whose fortunes had nowhere to go."(7) This signifies how she values security. As the events unfold, Rehana loses her husband to heart attack and is forced to give up the custody of her son and daughter to her in-laws due to her lack of wealth. Since then it becomes her mission to gain enough wealth in order to receive the custody back.

Rehana tries to regain the disrupted psychic and physical security through building her second home 'Shona' all by herself. Later on she confesses to the Major how she stole from an affluent old blind man, her prospective suitor; in order to claim the custody of her own children. "… Rehana looked at the house with pride and a little ache. It was there to remind her of what she had lost, and what she had won."(18). She named the house built with the stolen fortune of the blind old man, "Shona", "For all that she had lost, and all that she wanted never to lose again" (43). Part of her developing agency has been portrayed through her epistolary conversation with her dead husband, implying the power that she receives from her role as a wife. Much of Rehana's agency stems from her role as a protective mother. She exercises direct authority over her children as mother, "I want to protect you. Everything I have done I've done for you and your brother" (102). Thus the novel jolts the idea that home is a place of man's domination and woman's submission.

The novel traces Rehana's "politicization"[15] while keeping her embedded to home. Rehana remains homebound while the concept of her country itself goes through 'the process of migration'[16]. Because in the subcontinent "Often it was not women who moved – the boundaries of the nation did, making women "alien" in their own homes"[17]. Her "feelings about the country she had adopted" are "ambiguous". Territorially Rehana has been twice colonized, once by the British and later by her own people, the Pakistanis, whose language she spoke and loved dearly. "She spoke with fluency, the Urdu of the enemy. She was unable to pretend, as she saw so many others doing, that she, could replace her mixed tongue with a pure Bengali one. Rehana's tongue was too confused for these changes. She could not give up her love of Urdu, its lyrical lilts, its double meanings, its furrowed beat" (55). The modest territory of her home, becomes the nation and the world, "This is my home".

14. Porteous, J. Douglas. "Home: The Territorial Core." *Geographical Review*66, no. 4 (1976): 383. doi:10.2307/213649.
15. Ranasinha, Ruvani. "War, Violence and Memory: Gendered National Imaginaries in Tahmima Anam, Sorayya Khan and Contemporary Sri Lankan Women Writers." *Contemporary Diasporic South Asian Womens Fiction*, 2016, 93-127. doi:10.1057/978-1-137-40305-6_3.
16. Hasanat, Fayeza. "Religion, Diaspora and the Politics of a Homing Desire in the Writings of Zia Haider Rahman, Tahmima Anam and Monica Ali." *Asiatic*11, no. 1 (June 2016).
17. Loomba, Ania, and Ritty A. Lukose, eds. *South Asian Feminisms*. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2012.

"Rehana had not read Sultana's Dream" (43). She develops her agency through her roles as a wife and a mother. Her primary role as a mother is to protect her children, "She kept telling herself she was in charge, that nothing would be done without her consent" (49). She becomes the mother figure for all the revolutionaries, "They'll be happy to get your blessings. Some of them haven't seen their own mothers in a long tie." "she felt a flush of pride at being asked." (121) "She turned into the kitchen and wondered how she would feed all these hungry dreamers."(55). She participates in the war by feeding the refugees (71), by "sending my son to war with a full stomach" (96). During the war she develops a war sisterhood and creates the group "the sewing sisters" in order to sew blankets for the soldiers (111).

Nationalism too for Rehana is related to home and relationships. She observes that the people "were his charge, his children. They called him father… Mujib… Shouting Joy Bangla" (57). She is told, 'Don't be foolish. You're just a housewife. What on earth could you possibly do?' But she persists, 'We should do something. I'm not giving up so easily'(99). "We are at war, and my daughter says I have to do something. To prove I belong here. So I'm doing something." 106. She performs "marriage rituals" (68) during the war. Leads men in prayer (128). Travels to Calcutta and serves at the Red Cross. Rehana's "battle-weary body of a woman" (58) has bore the children, the home and the nation (58). She sacrifices her home *Shona* to the Guerrillas (119). She lets the wounded Major hid at *Shona*, violating the Jungian notion of "the sanctity of the threshold"[17]. Despite the war she retains the traditional role of a woman, "It felt foolish nowadays to take pride in cooking, but she couldn't resist taking pleasure in the domed rise of the puris, the perfect vague sweetness of the halwa" (126)

Above everything her motherhood prevailed. "I'm a mother. Above all things, a mother. Not a widow, certainly not a wife. Not a thief. A mother" (162). For her, family is of utmost importance, "She felt an old swell of longing for the unit, the family: man, woman, hild. This was the formula for happiness, the proper order of things. All other eqations suffered in its shadows" (190). Thus she does not hesitate to sacrifice the Major's life, with whom she briefly fell in love with, for the sake of her son's life (304). That's Rehana's secret. Her protective love for her children. She confesses to her dead husband, "This war that has taken so many sons has spared mine. This age that has burned so may daughters has not burned mine. I have not let it." (315).

This is how "a story of domestic loss… works itself into the narrative of civil war."[18] And home, for Rehana becomes a place of empowerment, whereas home for women has been largely portrayed as a place of confinement. The relationship between Rehana's home and her identity extends in such a way that the house she has built becomes "a symbol of psychic wholeness".[19]

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18. Ranasinha, Ruvani. "War, Violence and Memory: Gendered National Imaginaries in Tahmima Anam, Sorayya Khan and Contemporary Sri Lankan Women Writers." *Contemporary Diasporic South Asian Womens Fiction*, 2016, 93-127. doi:10.1057/978-1-137-40305-6_3.
19. Porteous, J. Douglas. "Home: The Territorial Core." *Geographical Review*66, no. 4 (1976): 383. doi:10.2307/213649.

### She Sings the Nation-state

It has been thought for long that feminism in the Non-Western land is a Western import. Classic works like Kumari Jayawardena's *Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World* revealed organic emergence of feminism in many parts of the once-colonized world through anti-imperial struggles[20]. Rehana's daughter Maya's hero, Begum Rokeya is one such woman. In her works Gyanphal (The Fruit of Knowledge) and Muktiphal (The Fruitt of Freedom), Rokeya combined critiques of colonialism and patriarchy[21]. While Rokeya and her people were colonized by the British, Maya and her people are being colonized by the Eastern part of their land, the Pakistanis. The way Rokeya imagined concealed links between "women's education, women's agency, and political freedom"[22], similarly Maya envisioned a feminist engagement with the liberation war eventually leading to the creation of Bangladesh, the nation-state. Her identity is constructed through her nationalistic struggles for the gradual birth of Bangladesh. For Rehana it was *Shona*, her home around which her identity developed and took shape. For her daughter Maya, it is *Shonar Bangla*, Bengal of Gold.

Maya wanted to believe in "something greater than myself" (286), she wanted to "do" something. Nationalism provided her with an itinerary. She had the "proper trappings of a nationalist" (55) "She swallowed like sugar, every idea passed to her by the party elders. Uprising. Revolution. She bandied the words about as though she had discovered a lost, ancient language (39). "This is our flag". "Maya whooped, draped the flag around her shoulders and ran to find a bamboo pole so they could secure it to the rooftop (56). "She wanted to be on the streets, distributing leaflets and singing 'We Shall Overcome' (62). In her pursuit of doing something for the nation, Maya practices gun firing using a wooden gun on university campus. She later becomes a war correspondent and also serves at the "Salt Lake Refugee Camp" (251) Calcutta.

After the war ended Maya performed abortions on some of the thousands of female rape victims named 'Birangonas' (courageous female war heroines) by the Bangladeshi 'father of the nation' Sheik Mujibur Rahaman, although Maya reasons that such an attempt to deal with the patriarchal stigma of rape 'erases what really happened to them'[23]. Later she sacrifices her ambition of becoming a surgeon in order to become 'a doctor for women' (11), 'She didn't think of the debt she was repaying, that each of the babies she brought into the world might someday be counted against the babies that had died, by her hand, after the war'[24]. She again

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20. Loomba, Ania, and Ritty A. Lukose, eds. *South Asian Feminisms*. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2012.

21. Bagchi, Barnita. "Hannah Arendt, Education, and Liberation: A Comparative South Asian Feminist Perspective." *Hidelberg Papers in South Asian and Comparative Politics*, January 2007, 2-20. www.sai.uni-heidelberg.de/SAPOL/HPSACP.htm.

22. Ibid.

23. Ranasinha, Ruvani. "War, Violence and Memory: Gendered National Imaginaries in Tahmima Anam, Sorayya Khan and Contemporary Sri Lankan Women Writers." *Contemporary Diasporic South Asian Womens Fiction*, 2016, 93-127. doi:10.1057/978-1-137-40305-6_3.

24. Ibid.

takes the role of a writer in order to turn her 'crusading' experience as a country doctor into a 'chronicle'. Through her writings she participates "in the larger political movement calling for Bangladesh's unnamed dictator to prosecute war criminals who live with impunity in neighbouring Pakistan"[25].

"The nation is a state of mind… with a political thrust that replaces the "subject" by the "citizen" and "demands that the nation-state be the site of primary loyalty"[26]. This is what we see in Maya. Even her relationship with her mother and brother becomes secondary. Maya remains loyal to the nation throughout the trilogy. She actively participates and sees through the trial and punishment of the war criminals. Therefore, Maya's agency is developed not through a "equality struggle" but through nationalistic struggles and survival[27].

## Her Nomadic Existence

"As a woman I have no country, as a woman I want no country, as a woman my country is the whole world."[28]

This very utterance of Woolf best describes our third and last Hoque woman, Maya's daughter Zubaida. Her identity is not homebound, neither is she inclined towards a national identity as "the realities of our globalized world question the traditional understanding of nation, culture, and identity"[29]. The character of Zubaida is hinted in the second book of the Bengal Trilogy and is fully developed in the last. *The Bones of Grace*, Anam's last book of her planned Bengal Trilogy recounts the story of a whale, a ship, and an orphan cum paleontologist. It conjoins the bizarre assemblage in an intricate manner. The story is narrated as an elaborate confessional note that Zubaida composes for her lost love. Learning about her orphanhood and adoption at the age of nine, she has been "living in a state of waiting" (3) ever since. Studying as a graduate student in the USA, travelling to Pakistan to dig the fossil of a whale that will make everything fall into place, getting back to her birthplace Bangladesh, only to travel in the depths of the country and then travelling back to the USA again; gives Zubaida the status of an "Amphibian" that "signaled people in between, people who lived with some part of themselves in perpetual elsewhere" (15). I intend to employ Rosi Braidotti's concept of feminist Nomadic subject based on Delueze's nomadic epistemology[30] in order to understand Zubaida's identity formation.

25. Ibid.

26. Vanaik, Achin. "Marxism and Nationalism." (January 2018).versobooks.com/blogs/3578-marxism-and nationalisnm

27. Ranasinha, Ruvani. "War, Violence and Memory: Gendered National Imaginaries in Tahmima Anam, Sorayya Khan and Contemporary Sri Lankan Women Writers." *Contemporary Diasporic South Asian Womens Fiction*, 2016, 93-127. doi:10.1057/978-1-137-40305-6_3.

28. Woolf, Virginia. *A Room of Ones Own ; and Three Guineas*. London: Vintage, 2016.

29. "No(N)-Place Like Home: Postnational Narrative in Carlos Fuentes's Gringo Viejto." *INTI*75/76 (2012): 64-75.

30. Braidotti, Rosi. "Nomadism with a Difference: Deleuze's Legacy in a Feminist Perspective." *Man and World*29 (1996): 305-14.

The discussion on Hoque women started with that of the *ghar*, home, the within. Zubaida's nomadic subjectivity functions in baahir, the world, the without; "blurring boundaries, making transitions between categories, states and levels of experience."[31] The novel begins with Zubaida already displaced, signifying the "unhomely". There is an 'intrepid' self that resides in Zubaida, which came out when she packed and set for Pakistan to begin the fossil hunt, the fossil of *Ambulocetus*, an intermediate species (30). Deleuze's detachment "form the emphasis on stable and foundational identities" and his rejection of "the notion of roots – let along of a matrix – for the self" seems pertinent to be au fait with Zubaida's identity which can only be grasped "in terms of spaces of becoming, that is to say of constant mutation"[32]. Zubaida is beyond the boundaries of home and nation. While her adoptive mother thinks of migration as an abandonment of one's own country, Zubaida on the other hand feels perfectly at home in Pakistan, the enemy territory for her parents and many other nationalists. She knows "home too was not going to be my ultimate destination, that other, final place more barren than anywhere I could have imagined?" (54).

Zubaida is our diasporic Antigone, best described through the notion of *Unheimliche*. Despite of being conventionally translated as the "uncanny", *Unheimliche* is actually rooted in the word *Heim*, "home". As Reed propounds, "The range of significations associated with the word *unheimlich* [eerie, strange, disturbing] is shared to a certain extent by the word *Heimlich* [secret, furitive, hidden], despite the fact that the latter term looks like the opposite of the former, and in fact originally had the same meaning as *heimisch* [homey, domestiv, familiar]- a historical connection that remains visible in the near-identity of the words themselves. The notion of the *Unheimliche* can thus suggest that there is something strange or improper about that which belongs to the home- and at the same time, something familiar or "homely" about that which belongs outside of it"[33].

From the very beginning Zubaida seems to be at odds with her relationship with home, "she is both loyal to and transgressive of its demands"[34]. In her pursuit of a homing desire, Zubaida meets the American stranger Elijah, who like her shares the "same restless spirit" and wish to be "somewhere else" (256). After meeting him, for the first time "I didn't care where or who I came from. I didn't care if I was an amphibian or a member of an in-between species because I belonged here, in this moment..." (47). Despite her love for Elijah, Zubaida settles to marry her childhood sweetheart Rashid, perhaps because "The implication that I was not at home in my own country irritated me" (93). Soon she finds out about her pregnancy. After the initial rage passes she thinks of "meeting a person who was related to me by blood, something that has never happened to me before" (127). She finally finds a cause to settle in, feels the sense of belonging.

31. Braidotti, Rosi. *Nomadic Theory The Portable Rosi Braidotti*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012.
32. Braidotti, Rosi. "Nomadism with a Difference: Deleuze's Legacy in a Feminist Perspective." *Man and World*29 (1996): 305-14.
33. Reed, Valerie. "Bringing Antigone Home?" Comparative Literature Studies 45, no. 3 (2008): 316-340
34. Ibid.

As the baby vanishes "as suddenly as it had appeared" (128), Zubaida sets on a lone, unhoming journey to Chittagong, the port city of Bangladesh far from the "people who had known me all my life and not at all" (81). Her "arrival coincided with the purchase and arrival of a new ship called *Grace*" (143). Losing the baby made Zuabida's homing desire acute (141). She braves to invite Elijah her beacon of home, to Chittagong. Together they create a temporary home by the shores of Chittagong, observing the ship *Grace*, which like Zubaida is an intermediate species, dwindling between the land and the sea. But the sudden arrival of her husband disrupts her temporary home, creating a "disjunction between the physical and the relational aspect" of home. Like Antigone the physical boundaries of the house do not delimit Zubaida's "proper place", but rather serves as an obstacle[35]. The way *Pakicetus* feelt at home in the sea, unlike her ancestors (389), similarly Zubaida "assumed an air of being able to float seamlessly from place to place". "Everything about my life was too easy. I could love whomever I wanted, and marry or not marry them, or change my religion, or get divorced multiple times and have children with three different fathers if I wanted. I came from what you might call a traditional society, but I was not in thrall to that society… (13). She decides on "transgression" and "abandonment" of the familiar (396), "I seek the connection, but resist when the opportunity is offered. My heart is a nomad still, after so many years of being in this country" (84). In Braidotti's words, "The nomad is a transgressive identity, whose transitory nature is precisely the reason why s/he can make connections at all. Nomadic politics is a matter of bonding, of coalitions, of interconnections."[36]

Zubaida lives in flux, in the constant making and unmaking of her identity. Her "de-essentialized" self can only be understood as "becoming". Thus Zubaida evolves, a diasporic new-woman[37], ready to leave "all our ghosts behind" and to stand fearless before "the terrible, dark world" taking strength from the sense of "belonging only to each other" (407), without any "roots" or "nation" to bind. She is the Deleuzian woman, "the sign of fluid boundaries"[37].

"Equally problematic for feminists is the fact that "difference" is confined to the past: all differences are flattened out in a shift of perspective that encourages us to move beyond race, gender, and sexuality to construct a future beyond difference. In response, nomadic theory stresses difference as the principle of not-one, so as to remind us that difference is not a concept but a process. It, moreover, is not a simple additive, or something you can join, but rather a permanent fracture, a split form within: not a utopian future world awaiting our engagement, but a people we are missing right here and now." (Nomadic Braidotti 172)

### *Can the Muslim Woman Speak?*

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35. Ibid.

36. Braidotti, Rosi. *Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory, Second Edition*. Columbia University Press, 2011.

37. Hasanat, Fayeza. "Religion, Diaspora and the Politics of a Homing Desire in the Writings of Zia Haider Rahman, Tahmima Anam and Monica Ali." *Asiatic*11, no. 1 (June 2016).

The discussion of the Hoque women, placed at home, nation and the world; remains incomplete without a discussion of their 'other'. The way in Western feministic discourses the binary opposition between man and woman prevailed, similarly regarding Third-world feminism the binary opposition between the privileged West and the non-privileged non-West reigned. The Hoque women are loosely tied with the thread of nationalism; Rehana forcing herself to become a nationalist out of love towards her children, Maya a dedicated nationalist has nationalism as her identity, and Zubaida questions the very existence of nation-states. But apart from nationalism there are other categories. "Religion and caste are just two of the categories that have catalyzed fundamental rethinking about the problem of "difference" and its relationship to definitions of the feminist subject."[38] My contention here relies in the possibility of a religious "I", that requires and interrogation with the author's "secular assumptions"[39] Can the Cartesian Cogito be theologically formulated? Is a pietistic "I" possible? Marianne Katappo expresses her identity as, "I am," "I am an Asian," "I am a Christian," "I am a woman"[40] in a predominantly Islamic society. Is a similar articulation – "I am," "I am a Muslim," "I am a woman" possible for the women in Anam's work in a society that is secularized and overtly nationalistic?

The first woman to embrace a religious identity during the national upheaval in Anam's work is Silvi, Maya and her brother Sohail's childhood friend, who later gets related to the Hoque family through marital ties. 'It would be arrogant to say that God had found me, or that I had found God. Who are we to find Him, that holiest, most exalted of beings? For He is everywhere, in every breath, every heart. One has only to look.'(186) In a time when Maya was looking for freedom in the creation of a nation state and Rehana was developing he agency through her role as a mother, Silvi seems to have found her freedom in her relationship with the divine. All of them "want to believe in something greater than myself" (286). For Rehana it is the family, for Maya it is the nation and for Silvi it is the divine. This emplies " 'Freedom' certainly does not mean the same thing to all women in the world."[41] Strikingly, Anam's treatment of Silvi and her fellow Muslim tabligh jamaat sisters is at variance from that of the Hoque women. Here Anam seems less flexible and presents the women with an overtly religious identity "as a composite, monolithic group of powerless women lacking agency"[42]. It can be argued that now the First world Western feminism, playing the role of the self, characterizes Muslim women as the Other. Thus the oriental Muslim women seems to plunge on 'a triple colonization or a triple orientalization'; as Hasan points out, "The Orientalist representation of Muslim women added another fold to the feminist construction of "double colonization," and thus we can talk of a triple colonization or a triple orientalization. In this case, the Orientalists portrayed Muslim women

38. Loomba, Ania, and Ritty A. Lukose, eds. *South Asian Feminisms*. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2012.
39. Ibid.
40. Katappo qtd in Kim, Hyun Hui. "Asian Feminist Theology"
41. Crowley, Ethel. Third World Women and the Inadequacies of Western Feminism. 2014
42. Hamid, Shadi. "Between Orientalism and Postmodernism: The Changing Nature of Western Feminist Thought Towards the Middle East." HAWWA4, no.1 (2006).

according to a three-fold mental image in mind: "Oriental," woman, and Muslim. This can be compared with Spivak's construction of "poor, black, and female"[43]. This threefold construction seems to have triggered Anam's portrayal of Muslim women in her *The Good Muslim*. She seems to follow the Beauvoirian injunction that "the veiled and sequestered Moslem woman is still today in most social strata a kind of slave"[44].

Silvi's "pordah" (hijab) and her time spent in reading "the Holy Book" has been dubbed as "Foolishness" (184). Silvi gradually attains an agency based on her religious inclinations. She accepts the death of her first husband as God's will. She braves to let Maya know that "Not everyone believes what you believe…. Your problem, … is that you can't tolerate a difference of opinion." Silvi is a pacifist – "I happen to think this war – all this fighting – is a pointless waste of human life." (285) Silvi's religious inclinations gain full force in the second book *The Good Muslim*. The initial description that we find of the "burkha-clad" Muslim women makes us visualize the activities of a swarm of insects other than human beings, "The women seemed to have multiplied, taking every inch of space on the carpet. They leaned against each other and held hands." 'Maya packed herself tightly against the wall', as if to save herself from the attack of the swarm (15). Intriguingly, it is among these seemingly backward looking Muslim women a novel kind of "global sisterhood" evolves, out of their religious unity. The sisters from different parts of the world meet and greet each other 'enthusiastically, touching their faces and fingering the material of their burkhas' and 'speaking to them in a mixture of Bengali, Arabic and sign language' (134).

Through Silvi, Anam sums up the life of a Muslim woman within 'God, men, morality. Purdah and sex… The raising of children' (22). After Silvi's death, Khadija, 'the fat', 'large' woman (33) takes over her and plays the role perfectly. To add to the portrayal of the gruesome Muslim women, we find the description of Maya's 'ustani', to whom she 'never did pay any attention' because, "She never explained anything to me. And she told me to shave between my legs…. But you remember Ammoo, she was always scratching herself there?... I swear, I thought there was a man hiding under that burkha. Or a hive of mosquitoes" (199). We find a ghastly picture of the woman maybe because it is 'faith' that she has, not 'science' that Maya expects. And for Maya as it seems for Anam as well both the terms are contradictory. Regarding the portrayal of Mayas religious teacher it can be easily concluded that, "when it comes to issues of Islam and Muslim women, feminists more easily discard judicious analysis and reiterate negative stereotypes"[45]. Despite this "universalizing" agenda their remains a vast wealth of speculations offered by feminist scholars regarding "women's agency, women's

43. Hasan, Md. M. "The Orientalization of Gender." *The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences* 22.4 (2005): 26-56. Print.
44. Hamid, Shadi. "Between Orientalism and Postmodernism: The Changing Nature of Western Feminist Thought Towards the Middle East." HAWWA4, no.1 (2006).
45. Shaikh

choices, and concepts of unified "selves"."[46]. In studying the "burha-clad" women Saba Mahmood's approach seems most befitting, "I have insisted that it is best not to propose a theory of agency but to analyze agency in terms of the different modalities it takes and the grammar of concepts in which its particular affect, meaning, and form resides."[47]

## Conclusion

"I proudly regard myself as a feminist", says Anam, and finds it "crucial to openly acknowledge feminisim". Bangladesh is a place of rich, diverse and often conflicting cultural and religious history. Therefore it has come to be a place of many feminisms. Whereas Anam is able to portray the organic secular-national feminism that stemmed from resistance, she falls short while dealing with religious feminism. Pundits tell us that there is a clash of civilizations or cultures in our world. They tell us there is an unbridgeable chasm between the West and the "Rest." Muslims are presented as a special and threatening culture— the most homogenized and the most troubling of the Rest. Muslim women, in this new commonsense, symbolize just how alien this culture is[48]. And the message that Anam seems to propagate is perhaps to get out of the grip of the alienated 'rest' and to embrace the 'West'. And her portrayal of Muslim women seems, "perpetuates the myth that Muslim women can become assertive and confident only by becoming more westernized and less Muslim"[49].

As the West has taken the authors of ethnic or religious minority as native informants, and view their portrayal as something authentic, thus a real and true picturaization of the issues regarding women is something that appears to be of utmost importance. As Lazreg puts it, we need to see women's lives, even under adversity, as 'meaningful, coherent and understandable, instead of being infused "by us" with doom and sorrow'. It is also important to draw attention to the fact that 'the other is just as entitled as I am to her/his humanity expressed in his/her cultural mode[50]. Anam's portrayal fits Visweswaran's comment that it has become commonplace for feminists 'to reharse inventories that begin with middle-class and end with Western or Western-educated'[51]. The cure perhaps is to have "a simultaneous other focus: not merely who am I? But who is the other woman? How am I naming her? How does she name me?"[52]

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50. Lazreg qtd inMoghissi, Haideh. *Feminism and Islamic Fundamentalism: The Limits of Postmodern Analysis*. London: Zed Books, 1999. Print.

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# Our Women Keep our Skies from Falling: the Female Figure in Contemporary African Novels

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## Introduction

In his poem « Our Women Keep our Skies from falling », American poet Kalamu ya Salaam forcefully captures contemporary African women's conditions as he depicts the difficulties they face in today's society and the ways they overcome these problems. Salaam's line has been borrowed for the title of this paper because it also deals with the representation of women in three novels which are based on the portrayal of the African female figure, the loads she has to carry and the way she copes with challenges. Through a feminist analysis of the representation of women in three African award-winning novels[1], namely *We Need New Names* (2013) by Zimbabwean writer, NoViolet Bulawayo, *Juillet au pays, chroniques d'un retour à Madagascar* (2007) [July in the Country, Chronicles of a Return to Madagascar, by Malagasy writer, Michèle Rakotoson, and *Americanah* (2013) by Nigerian author, Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, this paper sheds light on new and revisited images of African women. According to these writers, African women are victims of several forms of violence and injustice; however, they are resilient and are able to achieve agency thanks to national and transnational feminist solidarity. Such solidarity offers freedom and the power to bring changes in their country. The novels also highlight the significance of writing for women.

## Contextual Background

The current status of African women[2] according to the latest UNDP report is still marked by challenges, as reflected by "the ongoing efforts of African countries to accelerate the pace of assuring women's empowerment through all spheres of society – in the home and community, in health and education, in the workplace, and in political participation and leadership." (84) In spite

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1. *Americanah* won the American Library Association, the US National Book Critic Circle Award, as selected as one of the 10 Best Books of 2013. We Need New Names won the 2011 Caine Prize. Michèle Rakotoson was awarded the Grand Prize of the French-speaking world
2. The use of the term African women is not meant to say that it is true for all women, it refers to women in general, but obviously there are exceptions.

of all the advances being made in the promotion of women's conditions, gender equality for African women and girls is not yet satisfactory. Many women face severe deprivations in terms of health as a result of early age marriage, sexual and physical violence. The spectrum of violence affecting women includes domestic violence, intimate partner violence, rape, genital mutilation, intimidation.

If such is the reality of African women, the representation of this reality reveals several facets that have remained unexplored. The most recent literary publication dealing with the status of African women is *African Women Writing Resistance: Contemporary Voices* edited by Hernandez et al. It features the ways in which women overcome adversities, how they discern the root causes, and how women engage these challenges on a personal level. The three novels discussed in this paper reflect the use of Literature to resist, transgress and reinvent.

## Women's representation in African Literary Tradition

If such is reality of African women, the representation of this reality reveals several facets that generally remain ineffable. The most recent literary publication dealing with the status of African women is *African Women Writing Resistance: Contemporary Voices* (2010) edited by Hernandez et al. It features the ways in which women overcome adversities, how they discern the root causes, and how women engage these challenges on a personal level. The three novels discussed in this paper reflect the use of Literature to resist, transgress and reinvent.

The choice of these novels lies first of all on the message they convey. All three focus on the representation of Sub-Saharan African women who try to master their destinies by fighting for their rights to education, to choose the life they want to lead in spite of violence and injustice. *July in the Country* portrays the journey of Michèle who leaves Madagascar for France in the 1980s because of the difficult socio-political context. Decades later, she returns to the country in order to renew her relationship with her roots.

Similarly, *We Need New Names* traces the journey of Darling from teenage to adulthood as she grows up in the shanty town of Zimbabwe and later moves to the US. Written in the first person point of view, that of Darling, the story begins with an overview of the harsh living conditions of the protagonists. Darling and her friends have stopped going to school and are almost literally starving. The first part of the novel recounts the daily lives of those characters and the strategies they use to survive. The second part portrays Darling living in America and focuses on her coming-of-age as an immigrant and her relationship with her country of origin.

*Americanah* also depicts the journey of Ifemelu a young Nigerian woman who immigrates to the US. Written in medias res, the novel is about the love story between the heroine and her university boyfriend. However, serving as a backdrop to this romance is the tough living condition in Nigeria. Ifemelu's life trajectory is shaped by the general context: her father's unemployment and the shutting down of her university. She thus moves to the USA and like the other heroines, comes to grips with the experience of immigration and becomes a writer. At the end she comes back and

settles in Nigeria.

Those three texts at the same time continue and disrupt the African women's literary tradition. In her seminal text on African women's writing, Obioma Nnaemeka argues that in African Literature by women, "issues in feminism – voice, victimhood, agency, sisterhood, motherhood, subjectivity, speech, silence, power, gaze, knowledge and nation… are recast in different, complex, and interesting ways" (1). Such a focus on feminist issues places those novels within African women's literary tradition. A closer analysis of the different tropes and motifs deployed by the three writers however enables us to distinguish several shifts in the tradition. This paper aims to shed light on those new representations of the female figure.

## Women's Conditions in the three novels: State failure and its impact on African women

One of the most important literary elements which are given a lot of representational attention in the novels is the setting. All three writers portray the socio-political and economic contexts as the first force oppressing women. Through meticulously-chosen short and very vivid scenes, the reader witnesses the deprivations experienced by the female characters in the three novels.

In *We Need New Names*, three generations of women are painfully hit by the socio-economic agony of Zimbabwe. High rate of unemployment, poverty, hyperinflation and hunger are the dominant facts affecting their lives. Because of lack of jobs, Darling's father has left for South Africa but never sends money and her mother has to do several jobs to make ends meet. The very first pages of the novel open with a scene rendering this sad reality: the heroine, who has dropped out of school, spends her days stealing guava in the neighborhood because she has nothing to eat. Such physical deprivation also affects the characters' morality. The symbolic episode in which Darling's group of friends discovers the dead body of a woman who had hung herself in a guava field and steals her shoes because they are new and can be sold puts emphasis on Zimbabweans' moral and economic breakdown characterized by wild mercantilism.

The women in *Americanah* and *July in the Country* are also crushed by extreme poverty due to unemployment and hyperinflation. From the beginning of the novel till the very last pages, Rakotoson presents a clear indictment of the State's failure to protect its citizens as reflected in women's conditions. Counting the number of paragraphs, pages and chapters relating women's poverty in the novel would be a tedious endeavor but some of those excerpts are worth mentioning. One of them is the chapter entitled "The small garage owner". The writer offers a very detailed account of the life of a female small garage owner in Antananarivo and how she lives below the poverty line on a daily basis. Her dwelling and livelihood are "*un bout de trottoir, un talus, une bouteille de gaz pour la vulcanisation du caoutchouc, quatre tôles qui servent de maison* [a patch of pavement, embankment, a gas cylinder for rubber vulcanization, four steel sheets serving as a house.]" (78) The concision of this description perfectly captures the scarcity which characterizes the lives of this woman and her family.

In *Americanah*, "Nigeria's failed promises" (Adichie) to borrow the author's terms can be seen in the high rate of unemployment and the dereliction of the education system. The impact of Ifemelu's father's joblessness is described with dark humor through the dysfunction of the household: unpaid rent, low purchasing power and the visible malaise of the father. Ifemelu somehow manages to escape this situation as she goes to the university but soon after that, the university goes on strike and closes down. It is this event that literally changes the course of Ifemelu's life. She moves to the United States, thus leaving behind her family, boyfriend and parts of her dreams. This departure is her way of survival, the subject of the next section.

## Women's Survival and Agency in the three novels.

### Sisterhood and Solidarity

In her discussion of women's situation in the face of challenges, Nnaemeka asserts that "victimhood and agency are not mutually exclusive; victims are also agents who can change their lives and affect other lives in radical ways" (3). Indeed, the three heroines all end up surviving their tribulations and gaining several forms of agency. In major and minor elements, the reader can feel the thrumming pulses of the novels which present myriads of ways for women to survive harsh living conditions.

The most significant of these strategies of survival is probably female solidarity as it is the energy that nourishes the narratives. It can be seen through the act of alleviating the tasks and duties of one another. As said earlier, Darling's mother in *We Need New Names* does a lot of odd jobs and it is her mother who is in charge of the household and Darling's education. Similarly, when Uju follows her medical studies, it is her niece who is in charge of her son. In *We Need New Names*, Chipo who is pregnant after an incestuous rape is helped by her friends to have an abortion. Through a poignant scene which serves as a microcosm for the precarious conditions of women in Zimbabwe, the heroine and her friends who are all adolescents at the time, elaborate a plan to help Chipo to put an end to her pregnancy by using dangerous and inefficient means such as herbs and esotery.

The importance of solidarity in the three novels is symbolically represented by the hair braiding metaphor. Hair braiding for some African societies is generally an act that is not done by oneself but has to be performed by another person, generally a woman. It can be regarded as a way of taking care of each other but also of making a woman gain some time, time to rest, time to look and feel good and time to be used for other things. In *Americanah*, the story begins with a scene in which, the heroine, Ifemelu is in the US and crosses the whole city in order to find a hair salon specialized in African braiding. The braiding session is indeed a moment for those immigrant women to talk, give advice to one another, share joys and pains and comfort one another. Also, prior to Ifemelu's departure to the USA, her aunt advises her to braid her hair, a premonitory advice which predicts the help and feminine solidarity that the latter will greatly need later in life. In *We*

*Need New Names*, the heroine fondly reminisces how women sat "outside a shack and gossiping and doing one another's hair" (28). Similarly, in July in the Country, the very last words of the writer powerfully evokes the image of braiding which is a necessity for survival: "*un tissage régulier [où] on rassemble les fils, on les tire et on les croise* [a regular braiding in which threads are brought together, pulled and crossed]" (122).

Like hair strands which make up braids, women in the novels get together, help and support one another in order to preserve their rights or find better opportunities. The idea of solidarity and sisterhood is not new in African Literature by women. But the particularity of the novels studied here are their representation of transnational sisterhood. The most recurrent motif in the novels is that of an older woman, sometimes an aunt, an older sister or a mentor who lives in a developed country and who helps another woman to escape from the bankruptcy of her country of origin. Most often, the older lady helps the other one to move to the developed country.

## Migration, Writing and Agency

As already said, all three women leave their countries to settle in the USA and in France. Such an action first of all enables the family of the migrant heroines to have a better standard of living, but above all, it is for them a gateway for new experiences which liberate and empower them. It is true that female migration can be violent and disruptive but for the three protagonists, but it enables them to go through a very enriching experience: awakening and expression.

Often regarded as a coming-of-age novel, *Americanah* indeed traces Ifemelu's awakenings. The most studied of these awakenings are her discoveries of racial and cultural issues in the United States. Adichie weaves this racial awakening of Ifemelu through a subtle input of events that expose the protagonist to her own identity. Indeed, Ifemelu slowly understands her positioning in the world, a fact that is revealed by her decision to move back to Nigeria.

Similarly, after two decades spent in France Michèle, the heroine *of July in the Country* returns to Madagascar in order to remember the reasons of her departure. Before such a decision, she is tormented by existential questions related to her country of origin, the people, especially the women she left behind. She spends two months in Madagascar and goes back to France to write her memoires about that trip. This mémoire is a tribute to the courage of the Malagasy women that could not leave the country. Darling, the youngest of the three protagonists, also goes through an awakening phase. The last chapter of *We Need New Names* depicts Darling's anger, rage and frustration when she talks over the telephone to her friend Chipo who has remained in Nigeria. When the latter asks her why she has left and says that she has no right to talk about Nigerians' sufferings, Darling enters in a fit of uncontrolled anger. She is unable to describe how she feels, but her reaction is expressive of a growing sense of identity.

Another unifying point between those female characters is the role they assume for their community at the end of their journey: writing. Writing is indeed an essential practice in women studies. It means empowerment because it represents the ability to say, to do, to reinvent, to

transform, transgress and above all to create. According to feminist thinkers: "Story-telling registers survival on two scores – the survival of the storyteller and that of his/her listeners. The storyteller survives to tell the story and his/her listeners survive because they learned from the story."(Nnaemeka 7)

This is indeed what happens in the novels most notably in *Americanah* and *July in the Country*. The women achieve agency and freedom as they become writers who are able to make the impossible within reach through words. In *We Need New Names*, Darling is not a writer per se yet, but her habits of writing on the walls reveal her potential as a writer. Moreover, the title *We Need New Names* alludes to the possibility to reinvent oneself and the world offered by writing.

To conclude, this paper has enabled us to reveal a few old and new features of African women in contemporary novels. The image we get is deeply embedded in society and politics. The novels present African women as both traditional and modern, both victims and agents. The portrayal we have seen insists on the importance of solidarity. Such solidarity is more efficient if it transcends generations and national borders.

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# El Buen vivir; an Alternative for the Town´s Development

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## The Latin American Context

The neoliberal restructuring of the eighties of the last century had intensive social and political repercussions for the Latin American and Caribbean States. In all the States that assumed neoliberal policies, the social conditions were worsened by the massive layoffs of workers, the cuts in social spending, the deindustrialization and the subordination of farmers to agroindustrial monopolies. The capital and private investments were favored, that gave as a consequence the aggravation of the working and social conditions, what originated intense time and cycles of popular protest. The popular protest, in confluence with other factors, was decisive for the changes that have occurred in different political regimes in Latin America.

In States like Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, El Salvador and Nicaragua, the parties that held the hegemonic for several decades were displaced from power and they were replaced by new parties and organizations, which felt more empathy for the poorest sectors of society. During these last fifteen years, the political map of the region was redrawn almost entirely. This region is forced to face, new and complex global challenges since the fall of the Berlin Wall.

A new era has begun characterized by excessive centralization and concentration of hegemonic, technological, computer and military power in the hands of a small group of countries. These trace the guidelines to the most of the nations, as well as the rearrangement and restructuring of international relations in the new economic and political blocs. It is essential to keep in mind that this is a tangled period, influenced by the strong fluctuations in the international system. Very early in the decade, the terrorist attacks of 9-11, drastically modified the global priorities and strategies of the hegemonic power, which had immediate effects on the entire system.

At the end of 2008, there was a new shake up in the global panorama, this time of an economic nature, when the explosion of the housing bubble and the crisis of risk assets in the United States unleashed an economic recession of planetary dimension. These two events were equivalent to a genuine systemic shocks that influenced the definition and configuration of the foreign policy of all Latin American and Caribbean countries.

In the first decade of the 21st century emerged a new development model, which some even call a new paradigm. This would mean that in Latin America and the Caribbean, the main laboratory for the implementation of the neoliberal reforms of the Washington Consensus, would also be one of the regions that actively seek new models to transcend it.

In the wake of the global economic crisis, the central theses of "market fundamentalism" have been discredited, even in industrialized countries, and in Latin America it has served as a catalyst for new paradigms, more autochthonous, in terms of development. In the social field, the 2000, show positive indicators in terms of reducing inequality, but it is still the most unequal region in the world and the challenges it faces are very important. Many analysts agree that for the export boom of raw materials that has been favoring the region in recent years can be translated into a new development platform, it is essential to invest in education and technology. In the international area, new dynamics have been configured. In the past, Latin American States used to attach greater importance to relations with developed countries than their neighbors.

In the first quinquennium of the 21st century, intraregional relations became a priority for many countries: the most important Argentina´s bilateral relationship is with Brazil, while countries such as Bolivia, Cuba and Nicaragua privilege their relationship with Venezuela. Facing the US withdrawal and the favorable evolution of its macroeconomic indicators, the Latin American States have been able to increase their international presence and the scope of their diplomatic initiatives.

Actually the outlook it´s more complicated, after the Macri´s triumph in Argentina came a conservative offensive that won wide political margin in the region, like a clear example the destabilization in Venezuela and Nicaragua, and the change of orientation of the policy of Lenin Moreno in Ecuador. While it is true that the landscape for progressivism improved considerably after the triumph of Andrés Manuel López Obrador in Mexico, months later the conservatives return with the victory in the first round of Bolsonaro in Brazil.

These two characters represent models of opposite development, on the one hand, in Mexico, the arrival of a politician who considers the neoliberal model exhausted and, therefore, the need to recover the role of the State to promote development and growth of the country and thereby rebuild the social fabric. On the other hand, in Brazil, the arrival of a very controversial character for his statements in favor of the dictatorship, authoritarianism, homophobia and, economically, a liberal at all costs, who would try to reduce the role of the State to the minimum

## A new worldview is born in Latin America; el buen vivir

In this context at the beginning of the 21st century, in the Andean region, a new way of understanding the world is being debated, after historically the indigenous peoples did not participate in the political life of the Latin American countries, they went from the resistance to

the proposal and action[1], and beginning this century, thanks to a combination of their struggles and resistance, and the inclusion of progressive governments in the region to the political life of the countries, a worldview called buen vivir is made known.

The preceding decades left us like a conclusion that the Latin American States that were constituted looking for the welfare of the citizenship, looking for a better life, did not achieve the welfare of the societies. In addition, it is easy to perceive signs of a civilizatory crisis that has led to the destruction of nature, to imbalance and has generated a huge social debt in the region.

Dominant paradigms of life conceptualize the individual as the only subject of rights and obligations, establishing it as the only reference of life. Therefore, the legal, educational, political, economic and social systems were adapted to these paradigms and respond to the rights and obligations of individuals.[2]

The vision of capital as a fundamental value of Western thought, generated enormous inequality between rich and poor. These referents of life have led to space of disagreements and have increasingly deepened the abysses between peoples, leading humanity to a high degree of desensitization.

The promise of the development of modernity[3], progressand its postulates, tries to sell us the idea that the population can accumulate wealth despite structural conditions, both at the personal level and at the level of States and that natural resources were a condition key to achieve it. In addition, they have tried to give the image of the State as a bad administrator and that therefore private capital should intervene in the administration of our resources to achieve true profitability. However, in Latin American countries it has been proven that this vision of development has only brought about greater inequality.

At the environmental level, the vast majority of current conservation efforts are based on third-generation rights, where environmental protection is associated with ensuring quality of life. This approach, undoubtedly, has ended bounded in perspectives that privilege the human being and leave nature in the background. They protect species that are beautiful and striking, or resources that have or may have economic utility. However, the imperative of nature conservation must be applied to all life forms, including those species that are ugly or useless.

Thereby, what is meant by wealth, its quantification, it could mean what is measured and what is not measured, has a basic instrument with which the entire economic sphere is evaluated: macroeconomic indexes. These don´t measure the productive capacity of life and omit destructive processes, which often appears as accumulation of wealth what is actually a systematic process of

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1. The original indigenous peoples of the continent are contributing to the process of change and proposing a new institutional design for new States, which recognizes cultural diversity and promotes harmonious coexistence among all beings of nature.

2. Fernando Huanacuni Mamani, Vivir Bien/Buen Vivir: Filosofía, políticas, estrategias y experiencias regionales, Ministerio de las Culturas, Bolivia, 2009, p.34

3. Among many concepts that are used daily, one of the most deceptive is "development", this is generally understood as synonymous with "improvement". However, it is enough to observe reality to conclude that, in most cases, this type of "development" results in social and environmental destruction, which benefits a few.

collective impoverishment, because they are destroying the conditions that make possible what we call riches.

As a result of neoliberal policies, the number of poor people increased, the gap between the rich and the poor grew in parallel, to the point that in the same country, some live in opulence and ostentation just like in the first world countries, and the others try to survive on the street begging for what is indispensable to survive.[4]

The crisis that Latin American countries are going through is the process of a developmentalist, individualistic, predatory, materialist, anthropocentric, model. It is not an economic crisis, neither political nor environmental, it is a sum of all of them, a civilizing crisis. The paradigm that brought humanity to the State that is, considers that the earth is a reserve of resources that can be used for the "welfare" of the human being. A worldview that did not consider the different forms of life, when all deserve respect because they live and have a certain role for the balance of life.

This also occurs in a context in which a very high percentage of the population of the planet does not have drinking water or access to food that covers the minimum daily calories. We are facing a situation where calculations show that several decades ago we have moved into a zero-sum game: if we are using beyond what is available, the rich necessarily become richer, reducing resources for the poorest.

In the face of this crisis, many are the intentions to reformulate the dominant system and try to find solutions. These intentions are expressed in countless summits, workshops, international meetings, publications, etc. they must contemplate the need for a change of paradigm of life based on the philosophy of Buen Vivir.[5]

Buen Vivir calls into question the term development and all that it implies, because for the peoples and communities "development" has meant the deterioration of nature and the destruction of their communities. The term "development" is linked to exploitation, marginalization, depredation and dependence, inasmuch as from the western logic, the development implies gaining at the expense of another.

The development is associated with the countries of the "first world", which have caused the deterioration of life, altering the cycles of nature, among other factors, by the emission of gases into the atmosphere producing excessive pollution and by the policies promoted. from transnational initiatives, which far from benefiting life or meeting the needs of society, cause large and irreversible environmental impacts.[6]

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4. At this point the problem is not only the neoclassical economy, it is not only the neoliberal model of the economy, the notion of wealth, the notion of what is quantified, what is measured. That construction, what is now understood as richnes, can only lead us to the disappearance of life on the planet.

5. In the search for an alternative model that replaces the one named as "social market economy", the social and solidarity economy has appeared with these paradigmatic scopes, not just as a sector and as a set of associative experiences.

6. Cesar Fabián Vega Cevallos, La responsabilidad social de la IES: vinculación universidad-comunidad a través del plan nacional del buen vivir, 3Ciencias, España, 2017, p.56

In the indigenous´ worldview, there is no concept of development understood as the conception of a linear process that establishes an earlier or later state. There is no vision of a state of underdevelopment to be overcome. And neither a state of development to be achieved by forcing the destruction of social relations and harmony with Nature. There is not, as in the Western vision, this dichotomy that explains and differentiates a large part of the ongoing processes. For indigenous towns there is also no traditional conception of poverty associated with the lack of material goods or wealth linked to their abundance. From the indigenous worldview, social improvement is a category in permanent construction and reproduction.[7]

Material goods are not the only determinants, there are other values at play: knowledge, social and cultural recognition, codes of ethical and even spiritual behavior in relation to society and nature, human values, the vision of the future, etc.

This does not mean denying the possibility to promote the modernization of society, particularly with the incorporation into the logic of Buen Vivir of many and valuable technological advances. Neither can valuable contributions be marginalized from the thinking of humanity that are in tune with the construction of a harmonious world as derived from the philosophy of Buen Vivir. For this reason, one of the fundamental tasks lies in the permanent and constructive dialogue of knowledge and ancestral knowledge as the most advanced of universal thought, in a process of continuous decolonization of society.

Without a doubt, an unavoidable change to leave behind neoliberalism has to do with the ways of doing economics and defining it. Today it is not just a question of shifting the control or decisions of one hegemonic group to another, or even just of "de-privatizing" those decisions, but of facing fundamental transformations that lead from an economy focused on the accumulation and tyranny of the market, towards an orientation to the sustainability of life, justice and democracy. This implies changes in the productive matrix, in the visions and policies about who and how they do economics, what and how to produce, what and how to consume, how, ultimately, to reproduce life.

The Buen Vivir helps us to provoke epistemological ruptures as regards thinking and rethinking development, seeks to establish an intercivilizatory dialogue, to break the dichotomy between human beings and nature, because another relationship with Mother Earth which established where everyone is a part of of the Pachamama, and where social relations or quality of life are no longer seen from a purely economistic point of view.[8]

For the ancient worldview of our native peoples, nature is not a thing, or an object. It is "a living space". Therefore, it is not possible to combine that vision with a concept of development that reifies nature, because its values differ.

The Buen Vivir is the result of a model that goes beyond the economic[9], therefore to reach the

7. Alberto Acosta, El Buen Vivir en el camino del postdesarrollo, FES-ILDIS, Ecuador, octubre, 2010, p. 11
8. Katu Arkonada, *Transiciones hacia el Vivir Bien*, Ministerio de Culturas, Bolivia, 2010, p. 184
9. One of the recurring questions has to do, for example is with the application of complementarity. So, you can see how they can be complementary. That is a market reading, which focuses attention only on products, no more dimensions of the economy and geopolitics.

horizon of Buen Vivir, not only must rethink the structure and economic model, but reconstitute the worldview of the culture of life.

## Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia; Cradle of Buen Vivir

The Ecuadorian and Bolivian indigenous movement has been the key to placing Buen Vivir in the regional debate. For its part, Bolivia is experiencing a historic process, for the first time since the founding of that country in 1825, they have an indigenous president, getting the power without resorting to violence and within the democratic rules themselves.

Some outstanding values on which the New Constitution of the Bolivian State is based today are unity, equality, dignity, freedom, reciprocity, respect, complementarity, harmony, transparency, balance, equal opportunities, responsibility, distribution and redistribution of richnes and social goods.

Constitutionally established, that are "essential" purposes of the State to establish a fair and harmonious society, based on decolonization, without discrimination or exploitation, with full social justice, to consolidate plurinational identities. Guarantee also the protection and dignity of nationals, peoples and communities, and foster mutual respect and intercultural dialogue.

For its part, the Political Constitution of Ecuador, promulgated in 2008, in the preamble recognizes "the millenary roots, forged by women and men of different peoples, celebrating nature, the *Pacha Mama*, of which we are part and which is vital for our existence. " Appeals to ancestral wisdom as a legal principle. Then it continues declaring that it is constituted in "a new form of citizen coexistence, in diversity and harmony with nature, to achieve buen vivir, *sumak kawsay*".

In a clear and forceful way, the Constitution projects the horizon of buen vivir, declaring "a society that respects, in all its dimensions, the dignity of people, and collectivities." It also declares the public interest and the preservation of the environment, the conservation of ecosystems, biodiversity and the integrity of the country's genetic heritage, the prevention of environmental damage and the recovery of degraded natural spaces.[10]

Finally, in Venezuela the rise of Hugo R. Chávez to the presidency of Venezuela in 1999 was the beginning of a new era for both Venezuela and the Latin American region. It was the beginning of the implementation of the Bolivarian Revolution Project, which has permanently sought to change the policy of its country and in the region through a substantial program establishing a participatory democracy and granting to the most disadvantaged sectors better conditions of life, in addition to considering itself as an alternative to the prevailing economic system.

After calling a Constituent Assembly the Constitution of 1999 is created. The new Constitution changes the rules of the political game and puts obstacles to neoliberalism, posing against the privatization of the Venezuelan oil company and the large estate; in favor of small fishermen to the detriment of transnational fishing companies; for the propagation of cooperative enterprises and

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10. To understand what Buen Vivir implies, which can not simply be associated with "Western wellbeing", we must begin by recovering the worldview of indigenous peoples and nationalities.

microcredit; against the privatization of education and free education; against the privatization of social security. This constitution also advocates the rights of indigenous peoples, of children, for the right to free information and demands a participatory model, in which citizens play a leading role.

The reconstruction of the political practices of the Bolivarian project shows a transformation that, anchored in the democratic ideal and of social justice, is not free of contradictions, problems and paradoxes. It has materialized a Constitution that legitimizes and encourages popular participation but, in trying to propitiate it, unleashes patronage and cooptation. It has influenced the reordering of the party system based on the polarization generated by the project and its leader. It has improved the living conditions of those who have less, while it has encouraged welfare. But it has also proven its ability to reinvent itself and coexist with the conflict, and a limitless perseverance to deploy its proposals, be it called "Bolivarianismo" or "Socialismo del siglo XXI".

In Venezuela, the appeal to the social and solidarity economy is a way of recognizing to make visible the diverse existing economy, with its multiple relationships, logics, tensions and protagonists. It allows to see the forms of production and work that are organized for subsistence and reproduction, some of the long journey such as the community or artisan workshop, others more recent such as cooperatives, others only recently seen as an economic entity, such is the case of the homes.

## Final Reflections

Latin America is at the moment of reconstruction of concepts, of new paradigms, indigenous peoples have not arrived alines, they come with proposals that they intend to make visible and propose.

The disciplines in which we are trained, in particular, the economy, with Eurocentric, colonial; it divides life into pieces and arbitrarily assign one or the other as it object. The economy is reduced to a very particular vision, which has to do with an inheritance of the construction of the market society of the liberal tradition, unfortunately assumed in a relatively uncritical firm also by the socialist Marxist tradition in several ways.

A collective consciousness emerges to give meaning from the local to a call of the times. This occurs at a historic moment in which technological advances, broad mobility of goods and high virtual connectivity converge on a global scale with a deep multidimensional crisis characterized by social inequality, environmental destruction, financial debacle, armed conflict and the contradictory political leadership.

This scenario at a global level is the context in which a region like ours awakens to its reality of dependence, discrimination, instability, corruption and degradation; while looking inward and beginning to appreciate its richness as a sovereign, unitary, plurinational, intercultural and megadiverse country; with Buen Vivir understood as a new social pact in harmony with nature.

The principles of sovereignty, solidarity, cooperation, reciprocity, complementarity are invoked

more and more frequently. They are the cornerstone of the alternative economy, and have become the foundation of new or alternative proposals for regional integration, among others.

These are principles that are not only in a past or an ideal future; to varying degrees, they accompany and explain practices and relationships of the present, which speaks of their viability as fundamentals of transformation, as their utopian dimension is often alluded to.

This awakening is the result of the dreams and social struggles of popular, labor, indigenous, ecological, feminist, intellectual, young and many others movements; that for a long time they waited for a response from the political to change their reality and that now they enter the political arena to transform it from the decision-making spaces, the participation, the proposal and the guarantee of rights in a comprehensive manner for the people, social movements and nature.

In this way, the Andean region awakens and transmits to the region a great hope for Buen Vivir. The challenge is to move from the social pact in harmony with nature, approved by the majority of its population in its constitutions, to the profound transformation that means giving life to buen vivir with the new social and solidarity development regime that supports and guarantees the full exercise of rights with intergenerational justice.

The process of change that emerges in Latin America and the Caribbean affects the global environment, promoting a paradigm: the community paradigm of the culture of life for Living Well, based on a way of living embodied in the daily practice of respect, of the harmonic relationship and balance with everything that exists, understanding that in life everything is interconnected, interdependent and interrelated.

Despite this, the theories of development prevailing in Latin America, even in the 21st century, continue to depend on the appropriation of natural resources to maintain economic growth. Exports are still based on nature. Likewise, it is committed to attract foreign investment, where social and environmental demands are reduced as a way to increase that attractiveness. It reinforces a pattern of subordinated international insertion, based on primary products, where our countries are price takers.

Experience in recent decades shows that the new progressive governments have made progress in some areas, especially the social one, but show enormous difficulties in generating new styles of development, and in particular in achieving another appropriation of natural resources and reducing the degree of environmental deterioration. Conventional styles are maintained, especially in the use of natural resources to boost economies through increased exports.

Since the beginning of the 21st century, many Latin American States and populations have been exploring greater autonomy in their domestic and foreign politics, and have been building coalitions and launching initiatives based on alternative visions of development and regional integration. Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia have been key players in this process.

The new political circumstances have led to a return of the State to take a leading role in the use and exploitation of natural resources. This is an important point, but it is also extremely important to pay attention to the rules and conditions under which economic processes manage natural resources.

This generation has the great opportunity to welcome these emerging views of ancient cultures as a point of entry to change the course of the crisis towards a harmonious worldview where human beings must act in accordance with nature. These changes begin to be observed with a growing awareness scattered in various parts of the world where the integral perspective of life marks decisions at home and at work.

The change of the development regime is oriented to a social and solidary proposal that thinks about the country without privileges, with equality and action for the priority attention groups. This premise seeks to recover the sense of community where families and urban and rural social networks play a fundamental role in returning to look at the other as one, understanding their links and without the market being the end of social relations.

One of the key issues to face is the accumulation of capital, which is not simply a set of material goods but a social relationship mediated by power. So, it is necessary to achieve a redistribution of power and create new spaces of relationship and incidence in decision- making. In such a way that the new development regime creates a value matrix based on work, distribution, conservation with present and long-term responsibility.

Buen Vivir appears as a category in the philosophy of life of ancestral indigenous societies, but has lost ground due to the practices of Western modernity, as well as the effect of the coloniality of power. Their contribution, however, without in any way leading to a mistaken idealization of the indigenous way of life, invites us to assume other knowledge and other practices, in this case of traditionally marginalized peoples and nationalities.

The Andean vision is not the only source of inspiration to promote Good Living. Even from the circles of Western culture, many voices that could be in some way in tune with this indigenous vision and vice versa have been raised and have been around for some time. The concept of Good Living not only has a historical anchorage in the indigenous world, it is also based on some universal philosophical principles; Aristotelians, Marxists, ecologists, feminists, cooperativists, humanists, etc.

# 'Moveo Ergo Sum': Mobility as Vital to Humanity and its (Self-)Image

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## *Setting the Scene*

Human mobility—a complex assemblage of movement, social imaginaries, and experience (cf. Cresswell, 2006)—is not only popular among those who talk about a "mobility turn" in social theory and who have proposed a "new mobilities paradigm" to reorient the ways in which scholars think about society (Sheller & Urry, 2006). Influential theorists such as Anthony Giddens, Arjun Appadurai, Ulrich Beck, Manuel Castells, Bruno Latour, and Zygmunt Bauman all conceptualize contemporary capitalism and globalization in terms of increasing numbers and varieties of mobility: the fluid, continuous (but not always seamless) movement of people, ideas, and goods through and across space. Many contemporary scholars valorize, if not romanticize, ideas of travel and mobility (Bude & Dürrschmidt, 2010). Mobility can thus be described as a key social process, "a relationship through which the world is lived and understood" (Adey, 2010).

Indeed, the human being is, first of all, a "moving being" (Farnell, 2012). People have always been on the move, for a variety of reasons, from subsistence to experience, from necessity to privilege (Amato, 2004; Gotaas, 2009). Granting that the act of moving is a universal trait, the particular ways in which humans move, and the processes of identity and belonging attached to these movements, are strongly linked to sociocultural factors (Bergmann & Sager, 2008; Casimir & Rao, 1992). Basic self-powered forms of human locomotion such as walking, running or dancing are deeply embodied practices (Mauss, 1973[1935]), drawing attention to the (physical) self (Lund, 2012; Wylie, 2005). Our body-in-motion is also the medium for knowing the world (Ilundáin-Agurruza, 2014), enriching us cognitively and existentially (Ingold, 2010, p. 18). Through our feet, we are 'in touch' with our surroundings (Ingold, 2004), allowing for sensual experiences of place (Edensor, 2000). In other words, self-propelled movements such as walking and running are one of the most fundamental modes of 'belonging' in the world (Heidegger, 1996[1929]; Thorpe & Rinehart, 2010). As we move through space and time, we become our movement (*moveo ergo sum*), phenomenologically and in terms of identity and social position (Austin, 2007; Ingold, 2011). The physical act of moving thus captures a certain attitude to life as "becoming" or "potential" (Manning,

2009). The idea of "becoming through mobility" (*moveo ergo sum*) is part of the perceived shift from inherited or acquired identities to a focus on identification, a change from relatively stable (place-based) identities to hybrid (achieved) identities characterized by flux. In motion philosophy, becoming is conceived as a process of emergence, transition, and change (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987).

The "primacy of movement," as a philosophy of becoming, was articulated long ago (Sheets-Johnstone, 2011). Pre-Socratic scholars already distinguished between movement as change in location (*kinesis*) and transformation (*métabolè*), the process through which something becomes something else (Laplantine, 2015). Since then, people have connected the two, arguing that physical journeys, of which wandering pilgrimages function as an archetype (Coleman & Eade, 2004), act as opportunities to transform the self (Lean, Staiff, & Waterton, 2014). Locomotion, mostly in the form of walking, running or dancing, has also played a significant role in traditional rites of passage across cultures (e.g. "walking towards adulthood") (Nabokov, 1981). The lived experiences and attributed values linked to physical movement are important ways by which people express their adaptation to, and understanding of, periods of personal, social, or environmental change. This is illustrated by the many etymological and historical links between concepts for travel, transition, and experience (Lean, 2016). Moreover, as an expression of the human will to explore, interact with, and ultimately transcend the limits of the physical environment, corporeal movement is considered to be deeply embedded in the formation and continuing transformation of societies and cultures across the globe (Leed, 1991).

Moving, and thinking and feeling with and through movement, is foundational to being human, to being a dynamically embodied and emplaced person (Farnell, 2012). Despite, or perhaps because of, its omnipresence in life, the physical practice of locomotion is rarely analyzed on its own terms, as a distinct category of scholarly investigation. Existing research in the social sciences and humanities ranges from analyses of individual "body motions" (Mauss, 1973[1935]) to broad (and often abstract) investigations of "moving bodies" in the context of migration, tourism, or other forms of travel (Adey, Bissell, Hannam, Merriman, & Sheller, 2013). Mobility studies have theorized how people move around by looking at social phenomena through the lens of movement (Adey, et al., 2013; Endres, Manderscheid, & Mincke, 2016; Urry, 2007). Most of these studies, however, reveal very little about the dynamic embodied and emplaced experiences of the act of moving itself. In refugee and migration studies, for instance, the endurance journey that many people have to undertake, as "a profoundly formative and transformative experience" (BenEzer & Zetter, 2014, p. 297), often involving immense personal and social upheaval, is significantly under-researched (Schapendonk & Steel, 2014).

Nomadic societies and agricultural peoples alike had physically active and mobile routines (Devine, 1985). The development of sedentary lifestyles, and the subsequent depreciation of self-propelled movement by the wealthier segments of society (associating it with poverty and vagrancy), is related to processes of industrialization and modernization. However, an increasing

number of people started reporting to be living in "overdrive," in a state of excessive activity (not necessarily physical) and speed (Aldrich, 2005). This is linked to the ideology of capitalism, which is concerned with efficient production, and because of technological developments, which facilitated this surge in rhythm to occur. In reaction to this, people began yearning for a slower pace of life, closely related to nostalgia for an idealized and romanticized "slower" pre-modern past, with an emphasis on "authentic" experience (over external rewards) and the sensuous human body (Gros, 2014; Solnit, 2000).

Self-conscious, recreational forms of (slow) locomotion grew in the industrialized centers of the 19th century, with the emergence of middle classes who had the requisite free time and resources (Scheerder & Breedveld, 2015). Recreational mobilities became very popular and started democratizing worldwide in the 1970s, closely connected to the renewed societal attention to fitness and health (Berg, 2015). Today, such locomotion, in all its varieties, is routinely integrated into many people's lifestyles, as "a way of being" instead of "a means of travel" (Urry, 2007, p. 79). However, although increasingly popular, the idea of walking, running, or dancing as recreational physical activities is far from universally accepted across cultures and societies. Recreation refers here both to "create anew, restore, refresh" (*recreare*) and to "restoration to health" (*recreatio*). Some people engage in recreational walking, running, or dancing motivated by the utilitarian values commonly associated with them—as "body maintenance" activities to lose weight, to keep fit or healthy, or to look good (Featherstone, 1982). However, many also perceive their enduring mobilities (in the sense of deeply lived experience as well as imagined connectedness to the past) as having intrinsic value.

Imaginaries, as socially shared patterns of meaning rather than as private cognition, can both endorse the normality or historicity of stasis or of mobilities (Salazar & Glick Schiller, 2014). This points to the controlling role of mobility imaginaries (cf. Castoriadis, 1987; Taylor, 2004). I conceptualize imaginaries as socially shared and transmitted representational assemblages that interact with people's personal imaginings and are used as meaning-making and world-shaping devices (Salazar, 2011). Empowered by mass-mediated images and discourses, imaginaries circulate globally and change the way in which people collectively envision the world and their place and mobility within it. Imaginaries travel through a multitude of channels, including people.

In a sense, dedicated walkers, runners, or dancers engage, not unlike the romanticized and aestheticized image of pre-modern wandering pilgrims, in quest-like activities that require stamina as well as emotional strength ('no pain, no gain') to reach uplifting experiential and existential "authenticity." They devote themselves both to moments of effort and self-mastery, and to a way of life that involves passion, pain, sacrifice, faith, and addiction (Koski, 2015). In the process, they can create both ephemeral and more permanent (quasi-subcultural) "communities" of practitioners and supporters. Resisting suffering becomes part of a search for deeper meaning, a validation of the self and lived experience (Le Breton, 2012). Pain reminds people of the erratic capacities of their body (Scott, Cayla, & Cova, 2017), facilitating (meta)physical rediscovery and spiritual elevation

(Glucklich, 2001). The link between physical activity and "spirituality," broadly defined, has often been made (Humberstone, 2011).

Because locomotion can involve long periods of monotonous rhythmic activity (Edensor, 2010; Lefebvre, 2004), and a large degree of contact with the (natural) environment, it can be a means of achieving a meditative-like state, allowing for a sense of deeper connection and awareness. "The end result may be excitement of the psyche, but the starting point is visceral. The change of register cannot be brought about unless it starts in the very depths of the organism" (Leroi-Gourhan, 1993, p. 284). The experiences reported are often aesthetic in nature (Tainio, 2012). The encountered pleasurable, euphoric state (biochemically related to the release of endorphins) cannot always be articulated. In the literature, it has been variously described as"'flow," "peak experience," "runners' (or walkers') high," and "the zone" (Annerino, 1992; Csikszentmihalyi, 1990; Parry, Nesti, Robinson, & Watson, 2007; Sheehan, 1978; Stevens, 1988). This state is linked to spirituality in the sense that people experience a meaningful (re)connection to themselves, to others, to the environment or to the transcendent. The conscious process of searching this embodied experience (Csordas, 1994) in locomotion resembles a wandering ascetic pilgrimage, a quest (by means of a bodily experience) in search of something, a journey toward a goal, if only one's own transformation (Bratton, 2012), or the accumulation of "existential capital" (Nettleton, 2013). Pilgrimage, a reconnecting journey of endurance, suffering and sacrifice (sometimes only symbolically) is, at its core, a "kinetic ritual" (Turner & Turner, 1978, p. xiii). Sociocultural frameworks deeply influence the interpretation of this condition (Bridel, Markula, & Denison, 2016).

## Running P(e)acefully

The "pace of life" commonly refers to the relative flow or movement of time that people experience (Levine, 1997). Pace is made meaningful through practices, discourses, and representational strategies that imbue it with ideological significance (Molz, 2009). Consequently, it is a multiple and heterogeneous concept, varying both within and between groups and individuals, and according to social position. Assumptions and theories about the pace of life speeding up abound in contemporary social theory. Some scholars have made explicit links between the experience of time pressure and accelerating mobility. Hartmut Rosa (2013), for example, develops the concept of "social acceleration," ascribing an accelerated pace of life and frequent time scarcity to technological and socio-economic advancement. The continuous tension between interior (personal) rhythms and social rhythms is identified as the distinctive sign of this form of acceleration.

The desire to slow down the pace of life, thereby equating the good life with the slow life, increasingly features in studies of happiness and well-being. In this context, it is good to remember that the experience and value of slowness was historically derived from, and articulated through, notions of speed (in both time and movement) (Parkins, 2004). John Urry, for instance, noted how

"The diversity of modes of transport increasingly enabled people to compare and contrast different forms of mobility" (2000, p. 54). As a result, earlier forms of transport such as walking became romanticized and aestheticized.

Most people associate the word "pacemaker" with the medical device that stimulates cardiac impulsions and regulates heart muscle contractions. Inspired by Henri Lefebvre's (2004) work on "rhythmanalysis" (the study of the rhythms of urban spaces and their effects on people), Don Parkes and Nigel Thrift applied the term pacemaker, "an entity controlling or influencing rhythmic activity" (1980, p. 20), to urban contexts. In their view, the relevance of urban pacemakers – regions or points in space, durations or instants in time or relations in space and time that are sources of timing (e.g. city lights) – is high because they change the characteristics of places (and, consequently, people's relations to them).

In a similar vein, I am focusing in my own research on the role of human pacemakers. In running practice, a pacemaker denotes a seasoned runner who helps other runners to run an optimal race by setting the pace. While in the past only frontrunners had pacemakers (usually running only part of the race), it has become customary at big races to provide a whole team of pacemakers, each running at a different pace so that followers may reach the finish line in a timely manner. In running lingo, pace is always comparative, indicating how fast you are running in comparison with others during the same race. In long-distance and ultra-long-distance running, however, pace has quite a different meaning.

After all, running is an embodied practice with specific rhythmic qualities (You, 1994), a mode of experiencing place. The way we "run" different places varies in purpose, pace, and rhythm. The most popular running settings are "green environments" (Howe & Morris, 2009; Lund, 2012; Qviström, 2016), preferably remote areas of natural beauty, with mountainous regions having a special attraction. Running in such environments can be experienced to distance oneself from the busyness of everyday life, through an encounter with a different temporality. Breathing is perhaps one of the most externally noticeable ways that the body reacts to pace and place. Respiration is one way in which place "invades" and affects the body. Enjoying "the fresh air" of a natural environment is an aspect that runners mention repeatedly because they literally "breath in" place. The expression "breathing space" is of course also a figurative way to refer to a place where one can relax from the pressures and demands on one's time that are associated with everyday life.

Endurance activities such as long-distance running are praised for the additional advantage of identity-making, predicated on qualities like achievement, exceptionalism, triumph of the will, and moral redemption. Exercising in nature (or made-natural environments) is believed to make people tough enough to keep "progress" on the march, "making the specific kind of self-sufficient, risk-managing bodies and selves the neoliberal political, economic and cultural formations [require]" (Barnes, 2009, p. 239). Mainstream popular culture, arts. and (social) media representations often tend to represent endurance practitioners as model individuals in contemporary society: "dedicated, controlled, disciplined, culturally and economically invested in health and self-responsible"

(Shipway & Holloway, 2010, p. 275). Continually feeling pressured to prove themselves in a society where role models are both countless and contradictory, endurance runners seek to test their strength of character, bravery, and personal resources (Le Breton, 2000). In other words, long-distance walkers and runners can be thought of as symbolical "pacemakers," people who set standards of performance and achievement (efficiency and success) for others.

The desired "synchronization" of the rhythms of the body and the environment can also go wrong (Edensor & Larsen, 2017). Taking things too seriously (e.g. heavy training) and the overdependence on technological gadgets (e.g. GPS watches, heart rate monitors and foot pods) has the risk of reducing, if not eliminating, the anticipated experience. The fixation on "healthy food" (Oxlund, 2012) or the, sometimes compulsive, online sharing of endurance data (which requires substantial amounts of "immobile" time behind the screen) that can go together with the practice of endurance running hint at other problems (Lupton, 2016). The sacrifices and level of commitment may, in some sense at least, conflict with human flourishing and fulfilment in a broader sense (e.g. maintaining healthy social relations with family and friends), as does the contrast between the slow recreational mobilities during leisure time versus the fast mobilities during other moments (including the transport needed to get to the sought-after remote "green environments").

Like any other human activity, the practice of endurance running is undergoing constant transformations. Bestselling books such as *Born to Run* (McDougall, 2009) or *Ultramarathon Man* (Karnazes, 2005), documentaries such as *Unbreakable: The Western States 100* (Benna, 2012), and iconic endurance runners such as Kílian Jornet Burgada have made these practices known among the broad public. Endurance running is becoming increasingly popular and the more extreme feats receive wide media attention.

**Conclusion**

Imaginaries are influential in the sense that they can precede different discourses, power relations, social relations, institutional structures, and material practices of mobility. Studying and questioning these imaginaries of (im)mobility offers a novel way in which to grasp the ongoing global transformations of the human condition. The focus on imaginaries as a major source of relating people across boundaries and borders also effectively challenges basic assumptions of, and the divisions between, previously separated fields of study such as tourism and migration studies. An anthropology of mobility imaginaries reveals how local lifeworlds in global contexts are always negotiated, contested, and constantly under transformation.

No concept of mobility is possible without considering temporal aspects. Slow mobilities are not only a fashionable contemporary way of spending (mostly) leisure time but, more importantly, also a mode of movement that reinforces the traditional connection between travail (physical toil) and (inner) transformation (Salazar, 2018). The development of running as recreational leisure is a nice expression of how values and attitudes towards speed may be changing, or how certain

implicit senses of the appropriate pace of life may be losing ground to new sensibilities and even associated senses of social virtue. The slow lifestyle in general, however, is fraught with the neoliberal contradiction of demanding individual responsibility for how one spends one's time, as if the problem of time was really a matter of lifestyle choice, while advocating for slowness as an attainable public good (Sharma, 2014, p. 128). Not everyone wants to or can have a slower life. Moreover, there is also the view that sees busyness as a sign of full and active participation in modern society – "speeding up," "being busy," or "harried" as the main symbolic source of a full and valued life (Darier, 1998).

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# Latent Human: Tracing Interstitial Lives Between Presence and Absence

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## *The strength of latent ties*

Strong ties are at the root of our identities as social humans. Characterized by high degrees of trust and redundancy, strong ties between people represent the support needed to survive: resource sharing, affective labor, kinship. Whatever else may happen, strong ties will continue to fill these important roles. People may hear rumors, propagate memes, or "like" social causes, but the ultimate factor in decisions to adopt technologies, behaviors and beliefs seems to lie with this close network of strong ties (Centola 2018).

That said, as Richard Florida observed nearly twenty years ago, human organizations and institutions in urban areas are more and more characterized by the salience of "weak ties," as in the diagram below (Florida 2003). Let's say that A, B C and E are related to each through "strong ties"—living close together in a neighborhood they grew up on, they meet several times per month and, and share resources through multiplex relationships. "F," on the other hand, represents here a weak tie, a person that C knows through work who lives and socializes elsewhere in the city. The strong ties, as the argument goes, are still vitally important for all of the exigencies in life that make us reliant on friends and family for help and succor. But the weak ties, as Granovetter noted in his 1974 paper, "The Strength of Weak Ties," are where C can procure new information or opportunities that are unavailable to the tight-knit community represented by A, B and E. The links that F has to G (and then to H), for example, might yield new information about employment, new friendship connections and, ultimately, may offer C resources otherwise unavailable to A, B and E (Granovetter 1973).

(figure 1: strong and weak ties in a social network)

In the time that has elapsed since Granovetter's landmark paper, weak ties have waxed in importance—both in terms of their usefulness for people and in their explanatory power for researchers. In some ways, weak ties now epitomize the urban condition:

> Where strong ties among people were once important, weak ties are now much more effective. These social structures that historically embraced closeness may now appear restricting and invasive. (Florida 2003: 6)

Sociologists like Robert Putnam have eulogized the institutions most often characterized by strong ties—the churches that people no longer frequent as often, the neighborhood associations to which they no longer belong, etc., and others have extended Putnam's lachrymose sociology to a variety of information technologies and AI-agents (Putnam 2000; Turkle 2011).

Putnam's nostalgic evocations aside, there is ample evidence that the strong associations, identities and groups have given way to more networked individuals at the center of vast webs of weak ties, and that those networked lives lead to not only personal fulfillment, but to tangible, material benefits. Lee Rainie's and Barry Wellman's *Networked* is sprinkled with anecdotes about people receiving support on various levels through occasionally far-flung network of weak ties.:

> They have become increasingly networked as individuals, rather than embedded in groups. In a world of networked individuals, it is the person who is the focus: not the family, not the work unit, not the neighborhood, and not the social group. (Rainie and Wellman 2012: 6)

Nothing suggests the importance of weak ties more than the explosion of social media. First, social media allow people to maintain enormous skeins of weak ties that they might exploit later.

Some platforms, like LinkedIn, are literally electronic rolodexes of business contacts, while other SNS (Social Networking Services) platforms perform more subtle functions, allowing people to maintain congregations of "friends" through occasional prompts and birthday reminders. Not surprisingly, social media are used more often in urban populations than in rural, with the Pew Center reporting that 59% of rural adults use social media, while 75% of urban adults do (Pew Research Center 2018).

After all, the city itself is a par excellence generator of weak ties. From public spaces like parks and sidewalks to mass transit hubs, the city structures the conditions for the formation and maintenance of long chains of weak ties—the old acquaintance you meet at a sidewalk café, or the friend of a classmate at a subway stop. Although not initially designed as such, these public spaces and urban infrastructures have the effect of generating weak ties, enabling their maintenance, and, as a consequence, producing the organic solidarity that Durkheim believed was at the core of urban life (Hampton, Goulet and Albanesius 2015).

However, cities do much more than provide the physical and digital catalysts for our weak ties. Imagine the same network of people in Figure 1 (above). In figure 1 (above), D and I are disconnected nodes, "singletons" in the language of network analysis. But if they all occupy a contiguous social space—tables in a café, a line for beer at a festival, seats at an open-air concert—then what kind of connection might they have? Not weak ties, certainly, but isn't there still some possibility of a connection? In other words, the absence of a weak or a strong tie is not *prima facie* evidence of nothing: there's still something there—that potential for chance interaction. Figure 2 (below) illustrates latent ties in the same network.

These potential connections are, as Haythornthwaite has theorized, "latent ties," that is, ties that are rendered possible but not actual. As she explains,

> These technical connections support *latent social network ties*, used here to indicate ties that *technically possible but not yet activated socially*. They are only activated, i.e., converted from latent to weak, by some sort of social interaction between members. (Haythornthwaite 2005: 137)

In social media, Facebook groups, fan sites or Instagram followers make up a vast cloud of latent ties that might be activated through continued dialogue and interaction. Haythornthwaite's focus is on digital media, but these digital platforms have their urban equivalents in the heterosocial spaces that proliferate through urban modernization.

(figure 2: latent ties in a social network)

Moreover, Haythornthwaite is not the only one to write about the latent. Her work echoes earlier work in critical theory and, in particular, the writings of the utopian critical theorist, Ernst Bloch. As Kellner summarizes, "The present moment is thus constituted in part by *latency* and *tendency*: the unrealized potentialities that are latent in the present, and the signs and foreshadowing that indicate the tendency of the direction and movement of the present into the future" (Kellner 1997: 81). Superficially, Haythornthwaite and Bloch are discussing different forms of latency—one social, the other emancipatory. But both concern the dialectic of presence and absence at the heart of urban life and at the core of our hopes for a more just future.

This paper is an inquiry into latency, into its salience for modern life and in its role for both urban futures and for urban critique. I understand latency as durable feature of the urban landscape, one that combines physical, social and digital systems in ways that trace possibilities and evoke critical futures. We can see it as the shadow of weak ties (as Haythornthwaite does), but it is also comes to us as the occulted dimensions of sociality, as the space between revelation and concealment (Pels 2003). Latency, I will argue, returns us to an enchantment of place, and echoes earlier experiments in surrealism and psychogeography. Finally, latency is ultimately the hopeful realization of the utopian in a world of the obdurately quotidian; far from wishful thinking, it is a speculative realism. And if latency seems too abstract or spectral, then it's because we (mis) recognize the city as a finished project rather than a field of heterogeneous potentials.

## *Latent Cities*

The 21st century city is one where latency lies at the core of urban development, albeit in an etiolated form that serves the ideological ends of elites. In IT, infrastructural projects like wifi networks are justified with reference to their potential "pay-offs" for the city. In Baltimore, this has meant that "digital divides" might be bridged with the implementation of free wireless connectivity

and that businesses might re-locate to Baltimore because of their identification of the city with advanced technology: "This program sends a message nationally that Baltimore is 'with it' in terms of technology" (Peston and Stroh 2003: 1A). But the presence of wifi connectivity (and other, similar programs with broadband, cellular networks, etc.) doesn't tell us anything about who will connect, nor under what circumstances. As a civil project, wifi is pure latency, a free-floating signifier of urban development.



(figure 3: wifi networks in Baltimore are still predominantly private pockets of connectivity, here centered mostly in hotels and restaurants)

The same latency can be found across urban ecologies in the form of public places and events that might later be generative of friendships, networking opportunities and business contacts. Indeed, much of urban planning and design over the past 2 decades has turned to the elaboration of latency, from co-housing and co-working spaces to decrepit urban infrastructures that have been re-purposed in order to support community solidarity (Droste 2015).

The In many ways, writings on the smart city and the internet of things (IoT) combine both of these senses of agency: the integration of people in a networked environment that is itself made up of networked infrastructures. In general, the discourse of smart cities has involved the application of networked information systems designed to ameliorate persistent urban problems, including traffic, energy-use, environmental degradation, water usage. Smart city systems and architectures are said to is said to generate the conditions for a more informed, more creative and, ultimately, more productive citizenry. By allowing people to communicate with their environment through flows of data, the citizenry is said to become more empowered, resulting in a more healthy community for all:

> As citizens' ability to measure, map, store, and display environmental degradation becomes, commoditized cheaply, communities can adopt and observe their own land, air, and water in a new technological data-rich way. (Nourbakhsh 2013: 115)

Of course, citizens are only one constituency, and critics of smart city policy look to the potentials there for abuse of power.

With networked communications connecting people to each other and to objects that, themselves are connected to each other, many scholars have worried over the potential for an exponential leap in surveillance and Foucauldian governmentality: smart cities as the actualization of Deleuze's *control society*.

> The philosopher argued that unlike disciplinary society, wherein individuals are enclosed in hierarchically structured institutions (school, factory, bureaucracy) and moulded into discrete identities, the *society of control* is organized in networks that connect and modulate 'dividuals' (through perpetual training, corporate meritocracy or instant communication): 'the man of control is undulatory, in orbit, in a continuous network'" (Krivy 2018: 19).

In this formulation, to be continuously connected to a continuously connected city is to surrender oneself to perpetual surveillance. It is true: cities are surveilled as never before—with multiple systems and sensors tracking our perambulations and behaviors across urban space. Moreover, with the smart city, we are compelled to surveil ourselves in our consumption of utilities, our recycling, our fitness: co-opted to the cybernetic organism-city that is a perfection of Stafford Beer's "Cybersyn" model for Allende's Chile (Pickering 2011).

At the same time, though, smart city architectures are nowhere so complete; Deleuze's dystopian control society remains elusive, and the "smart city" likewise eludes complete integration. "I want to suggest that the virtual state of an always deferred potentiality *is* the SC's fundamental mode of existence" (Kirvy 2018: 10). With each new interface, the smart city emerges as an assemblage of networked systems, one that, ultimately, exceeds those parts without, in fact, connecting them together. Or, rather, they do connect: but in an imagined convergence at utopian or dystopian futures.

The point here is that the work of the smart city is the sum of its imaginaries, one that amounts to not only the way people think cities should be, but they the way they are supposed to fit together. Vanolo (2016) writes of the smart city at the cusp of multiple imaginaries, imaginaries involving self, the state, authoritarian surveillance and freedom. Imaginaries, in his formulation, refer to "collective mythologies, presuppositions and popular stereotypical ideas about the city" (Vanolo 2016: 26).

This does not mean that the smart city is a fiction; indeed, we can see several examples of

a realized smart cities, including projects in Songdo and Mazdar City (United Arab Emirates). Instead, it means that all of them exist partly in the future, one where existing networked projects are imagined to converge on a future point where the imagined endpoint is finally realized. In that imagined space, the networked connectivity between citizens and city is seamless and, indeed, takes on a mythological quality as, for example, the state wields "minority report"-style algorithms with integrated big data that profile all neighborhoods and all citizens, turning (for some people) the city into an a priori jail.

Here, the smart city conjures an enchanted place, one where, as Thrift argues, we see "animism," "of a fathering of spirits like sprites, shades, demons and gods" (Thrift 2014). Whether beneficent or belligerent, the imagined connectivity of the smart city is the dream of communication and data flow between humans, objects and human+objects. Of course, as Kath Weston has said, "everyone wants to rethink animism, but almost no one wants to be an animist" (Weston 2017:26). But we see in the ontological turn to actor networks and to non-human agency a return to animism as the status quo of late capitalism.

Here the smart city joins other evocations of urban re-enchantment, including the re-discovery of psychogeography in the work of Iain Sinclair, and, in general, the "ineffability which is always at the heart" of the city (Wolfreys 1998). The urban continues to be uncanny because, as Tschumi writes of architecture, it is "always an expression of lack, a shortcoming, a noncompletion" (Tschumi 1975: 142). Around us swirl the "ghosts of place," understood here as memory, and as unfinished modernity (Bell 1997). Above all else, the urban uncanny is constituted by a "secret alterity" that inheres in objects, places and people (Kim 2015). And this alterity propels us forward towards closure and integration, even as it reflects on those incomplete, spectral pasts.

Every time we inhabit urban place, we are simultaneously inhabiting its absent possibilities, possibilities that find their echoes in other cities, other places and, perhaps, other resolutions to the unfinished tensions of city life.

(Figure 4: A photograph of Wilmington's East Side embellished with 3 other images of streets in other cities)

For example, the above photograph shows a street in Wilmington, Delaware—part of an ethnographic project there over the last two years. In this neighborhood (Wilmington's East Side), factories and businesses have closed over the years, and the neighborhood today is a food desert with high unemployment. But it could be different, and the streets of Wilmington's East Side open onto other streets—shades of other cities—where the Wilmington's underdevelopment connect to other urban problems (and solutions). Taking this image and running it through Google's reverse image search yields hundreds of other streets, signs, directions. In this example, the image search performs a latency connecting place to place through algorithmic pattern recognition.

In Ernst Bloch's original formulation, "latencies" "are the potential or possible affective content of something better that takes place as part of what has become. Each attune to how movement, and emergence, are *part of* an undetermined matter" (Anderson 2006: 700). We can characterize, then, these palimpsests of spaces and systems that make up the smart city as a latency, but where is it located? In its absence or presence?

## Man of the Crowd

Consider Edgar Allan Poe's "The Man of the Crowd" (1845), a story fragment that reads like a primer in urban theory. Initially, the narrator sits in a café identifying people on the street as belonging to discreet "classes" (clerks, pick-pockets, gamblers), but then he sees an old man that draws the narrator onto the street in pursuit. The old man's perambulations take them all over the city:

> He entered shop after shop, priced nothing, spoke no word, and looked at all objects with
> a wild and vacant stare. I was now utterly amazed at his behavior, and firmly resolved
> that we should not part until I had satisfied myself in some measure respecting him. (Poe
> 1845)

The narrator's distress stems from this central indeterminacy. What is the old man looking for? Why doesn't he stop? Initially, the narrator follows him along his path expecting to trace the man's network. But the network is never resolved: the old man continues to wander the city without stopping or speaking. Ultimately, the narrator is convinced that the old man is a criminal—"the genius of deep crime." But the crime here seems to be the indeterminacy at the heart of the old man's peregrinations. The latency implied in the near connections of shops, markets and alleyways is what ultimately bothers the narrator most: the identity that never resolves. Ultimately, he is "the man of the crowd": potential without connection.

Latency, then, becomes a paradigmatic, urban experience: potential connection without actualized connection, network without nodes, movement without completion. But this is not the

same as urban nihilism. Instead, in a way similar to Benjamin, latency pushes towards emergent possibility, while revealing the inequalities inherent in the past and present. But not, ultimately, to a kind of urban solipsism. Instead, there is a revolutionary import to Benjamin's fragments, just as (perhaps), there lies a criminality in the vaguely sinister ramblings of the "Man of the Crowd". For Benjamin, the ruins that populate the Arcade Project's fragments explore "the revolutionary potential and critical character stored up in the old-fashioned artefact" (Gilloch 1996: 109). The analysis of the city's phantasmagoric repetition leads to the realization that "the cityscape and the artefacts found therein are dream-like creations of dormant collectivity" (Gilloch 1996: 109). Ultimately, the "lightning flash" that Benjamin conjures in these juxtapositions is one that is enabled by a gap, one in which "past and present recognize each other across a void which separates them" (Gilloch 1996: 113).

That is, for Benjamin, latency is not ultimately a property of things and places, but in the interstices and gaps between things and places. By looking at the obsolete ruins of modernity—between the promises and realities of past spectacle—Benjamin's "dialectical image" rescues their revolutionary potential to wake us up from the phantasmagoric dreams of fetishized commodities. Similarly, the nineteenth century fears of "the crowd" and "the mob" hinged not what they were doing, but the revolutionary work that they could do.

### Revolutionary Latencies

We inhabit urban places where, despite the growth of networks and the smart city, the integration of material infrastructure, information technologies and networked sociality is always incomplete—or, rather, their completion has been deferred into a vague near-future. We can see these as simply stages along linear teleologies of technological determinisms, or we can look to the gaps themselves as revolutionary latencies potentially generative of creativity and critique. That is, between potentiality and actualization lies a field of latency productive of both critique and of possibility.

**An example:**

The post-industrial history of Baltimore has involved the introduction of multiple information and communication technologies to the ailing city: augmented reality, wifi, along with physical infrastructures (parking lots, greenspaces), all designed to make the city a more attractive "eds and meds" destination for tourism and capital. Still, vast swathes of the city remain abandoned while the city's population continues to shrink, part of a shifting demographic trend away from urban centers that has been overdetermined by structural racism and inequalities in the United States. In the middle of the city, just northwest of City Hall, Park Avenue traces blocks of boarded-up building and homes in an area that used the center of the city's Chinese American community. Pockets of

Baltimore have undergone rapid (and occasionally desultory) gentrification, but Park Avenue is not one of those places, and the street continues to suffer from abandonment.



(Figure 5: Looking north on Park Avenue in Baltimore, Maryland)

In September, the Chinatown Collective, a group of Asian American volunteers, organized the "Charm City Night Market," a neighborhood festival showcasing East- and Southeast Asian performances and food, coinciding with the lunar harvest festival and featuring speeches from long-time community organizers. For Baltimore, it was another neighborhood festival, one of many held during Baltimore's long autumn. But it was also a moment to reflect on the city's latency.

Organized over Facebook, the event drew thousands of people, including many of Baltimore's younger Asian American residents, who exhibited what the Baltimore Sun described as "the creation of new kinds of culture" and who, in addition, "might be waking up a little bit to their political power" (Case 2018). But the next day, the street was empty as before and, while Asian American merchants in the Baltimore area might have profited from the festival, there were no visible changes.

But there was still a latency in the near-convergence of digital and urban networks. In the graphic below, I have represented some of that through a combination of maps. The lines represent tweets about the festival. A few of these were geolocated at the festival itself (the large node at the circle's center), but the majority were not, and are represented in the ring of nodes around the outside of the map. The blue circles are historic tour sites that are visible through an augmented reality app, while the pins designate parking.

(Figure 6: A map centered on Park Avenue in Baltimore, Maryland. Edges represent tweets, circles represent augmented reality historic sites and teardrops indicate parking)

And while there is certainly evidence of digital and physical activity, nothing, in the end, coheres. But there are still the possibilities—place, history, social media, physical locations. If these latencies converged on Park Avenue, could they speak to not just Asian American history in Maryland (one shaped by both legal and illegal segregation in Baltimore), but also to the continued divestment from the city? Could actualized latencies evoke the generational differences that led older Asian Americans to suburbs around Baltimore while attracting their children to graduate programs and professional careers in the city? Finally, could a revived Chinatown embrace the diverse assemblages of histories in the area, including immigration from Ethiopia and the traces of African American folk heritage in the candle-shops on nearby Saratoga Street? These, ultimately, are visible features in the map through the gaps between the graphics. Latency demands that we look to the near-connections, both as a form of critique and as an evocation of hope for networks that could be.

In the end, the question becomes one of empirical veracity. We are now accustomed to apps and websites that "augment" urban sites with their absent antecedents through geolocated photos and media content. But what about the latency of these urban places? By definition, they don't "exist" in any material sense. And, yet, as Anderson (2006: 707) warns, we do ourselves a disservice by reducing "reality to what has become real." In any case, "the real" is more than just what we see in front of us now—it includes what could be, the latencies engendered across the city's layered grids of physical, social and digital systems.

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# The Origin of Artificial Petroleum Facilities in North Korea Aoji Petrochemical Kombinat

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## 1. Artificial Petroleum extracted from Coal

At the time of World War I, the large warships, especially the dead weight capacity of warships became an important indicator of naval power. Since the giant warships needed a large amount of fuel 'coal', the country ,like UK, that could supply coal, ammunition, water, food and so on to colonies around the world, had favorable position in war. However, since the United States, which took second place in the struggle for colonization, used oil instead of coal as a fuel, the maneuverability of the US warships was excellent to astonish the world. On the other hand, Germany and Japan also participated in the colonial contest as latecomers, but they had limitations in securing oil fields and coal ports. Thus, naturally Japan has become interested in the technology of producing petroleum from coal. Since then, Japan has built coal liquefaction plants in Aoji of Korea.

During World War II, Japan had a partnership with Nazi Germany. Japan was receiving 'Artificial petroleum technology' from Germany and UK and 'Crude oil refining technology' from US. The Japanese government has built various artificial petroleum facilities in Korea, mainland Japan, Sakhalin, Manchuria and mainland China based on the technology that has been transferred.

## 2. C1 defined by Kim Jong-Eun: A Technology to extract gasoline from coal

There are several definitions for Carbon 1 ("C1") industry in North Korea. According to professor, Kim Tae Mun of Kim Il Sung University, "C1 chemical industry is a process to synthesize various organic compounds such as gasoline through drying, liquefaction and gasification and catalysts (especially, ferrite and nickel, etc) using coals and oil stones". The North Korean press easily explains to ordinary readers that "C1 industry is a technology to extract gasoline from coal." There has been considerable debate in Korea at the point of extracting oil from coal. In fact, if you search for artificial petroleum, coal petroleum, coal liquefaction, semi-coke, etc. on the internet such as Naver and Google search engine as well as coal chemical research

papers, they explain about artificial petroleum in detail. However, some people in Korea insisted a logic that such claims of North Korea are impossible with the industrial technology and economic power of North Korea. However, the coal chemical industry that produces artificial petroleum is an old technology that was already verified and industrialized in the Aoji coal mine in the 1930s. In other words, the logic about C1 industry in Nodong Shinmun, Chosun Central Broadcasting and the journals are being verified from the political point of view in Korea.

## 3. Construction of Artificial Petroleum Plant in Aoji by Japanese Navy

Immediately after the World War I, Japan centered on the naval fuel plant, South Manchurian Railway Co., Ltd. (Joint Military and Industry Complex, 'Manchurian Railway'), and 'Joint Military and Industry Complex' consisting of universities including Tokyo University, fuel research centers, large scaled companies and chemical companies to carry out joint technical research and production experiments. Among them, the naval, Manchurian Railway and Gwandong Army carried out a dry run test of the oil shale of Mushun coal mine at Dalian Central Test Laboratory of Manchurian Railway and extracted artificial petroleum from the oil shale. This was the first successful example in Japan of 'Shale Energy Development (Artificial Petroleum Resources Development)'. At the same time, the Navy Fuel Division built a refinery in 1921 and started refining crude oil.

Professor Oshima of Tokyo University, who led the artificial petroleum development of Japan at that time, summarized the artificial petroleum development technology of Europe and Japan in three ways (Professor Kim Tae-Moon of Kim Il Sung University also explained similar in the <Labor Newspaper>). The first is the dry distillation method. This is also called as 'carbonization', or 'dry distillation', is a process in which coal (lignite) or oil shale is intercepted and heated without contact with air to obtain semi-cokes, coal tar and coal gas.

The second is the hydrogenation method (Bergius method). It was developed in 1913 by Friedrich Bergius of Germany. It is a 'liquefaction method' in which coal is finely pulverized in a heat resistant steel barrel, and high temperature and high pressure are applied directly to add hydrogen. In a word, it is easy to understand if you put it in a pressure cooker and boil it. The chemical specialized companies such as 'Japan Nitrogen Industry' mainly introduced this 'hydrogenation method' into artificial petroleum process. The Japanese Nitrogen Industry was the unique liquefied petroleum process facility built at Aoji by Noguchi Shitagou, Japan treated this technology as a secret at the time. The United States, which became a victor of World War I, secretly sealed these artificial petroleum technologies of Germany and Japan for a period of time.

The third is the Fischer-Tropsch synthesis process. This is a method of 'gasifying' coal to carbon monoxide and hydrogen ($H_2 + Co$) and making artificial petroleum from hydrocarbons using catalysts. It is also a technique to produce various organic chemical products. The 'gasification method' was developed in 1921 by Germany, the coal sector of the Binh Erumu Institute, and

succeeded in extracting artificial petroleum in 1923. Mitsui and other Japanese conglomerates have mainly introduced this third artificial petroleum extraction method, the 'gasification process'.

With above three artificial petroleum process technologies, Germany produced fighter fuel when World War II took place. At that time, in Germany, the maximum annual amount of liquid petroleum fuel extracted from coal was 5 million tons, and if include Nazi German occupied territories, about 2 million tons of crude oil produced in Germany and Austria to make total approx. 7 million tons of imported oil from. In Germany, oil production peaked in May 1943 ~ 1944, with 150,000 tons of aviation oil per month (135,000 tons per month for dual air force), 25,000 tons per month for civilian gasoline, and 21,000 tons per month for export, 135,000 tons per month for army vehicle gasoline, 750,000 tons per month for military diesel and 45,000 tons per month for civilian diesel respectively.

| Oil production in Germany, early 1944 (10,000 tons/ Annual) | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Hydroge nation | Fischer Method (Gasificat ion) | Crudeoil refinery | Distill ati on of lignite, bitumino us coal | Aromatics (Benzene) | Import from Rumania and Hungary | Total |
| Aviation oil | 190.0 | — | — | — | 5.0 | 10.0 | 205.0 |
| Gasoline | 35.0 | 27.0 | 16.0 | 3.5 | 33.0 | 60.0 | 174.5 |
| Diesel | 68.0 | 13.5 | 67.0 | 11.0 | — | 48.0 | 207.5 |
| heavy oil | 24.0 | | 12.0 | 75.0 | — | — | 111.0 |
| Lubricants | 4.0 | 2.0 | 78.0 | — | — | — | 84.0 |
| Others | 4.0 | 16.0 | 4.0 | 5.0 | — | — | 29.0 |

As shown in the table above, Germany produced about 95% of aircraft fuels and about 4 million tons of total petroleum by the Hydrogenation Method. Using today's common artificial petroleum process technology, it is possible to produce 4 million tons of oil from 20 million tons of coal. That is, about 20% of the total coal input is extracted as petroleum from coal. More specifically, about 1 ton of artificial oil is produced with about 4 tons of coal. However, when extracting petroleum from coal, it is necessary to apply heat, pressure, or electricity, which consumes about 1 ton of coal. Thus, 1 ton of synthetic oil (artificial petroleum) can be produced with 4 tons of coal and 1 ton of fuel coal.

## 4. How much will be the annual coal mining of North Korea when translated to artificial petroleum?

According to the official announcement of the North Korean authorities, in 2010, the amount of coal mined in North Korea is about 30 million tons. Recently, the amount of coal mined in North

Korea has surged, so it is estimated to be much higher. According to the defectors interviewed by the author besides of the official statistics of the authorities, the claim that "the amount of coal produced in North Korea will be more than 100 million tons a year because the coal production of private coal mines is two to three times that of the national coal mine". Therefore, assuming that the total amount of coal mined in North Korea is 100 million tons per year based on the information of North Korean refugees, the total amount of oil extracted from coal in a year is about 20 million tons. Of course, Sasol which has the best technology of artificial oil production may more effectively produce the artificial petroleum. In opposition, if North Korea's technology level is at the test level, it can be considered that the production efficiency is much lower.

| Hydrogenation Plants in Germany | | |
|---|---|---|
| | 1939 | 1945 |
| Name of Plant | Main Material | Main material / Alkylation |
| Reuna | Ignite | Ignite and **Ignite Tar**    ● |
| Boeren | **Ignite Tar** | **Ignite Tar**    ● |
| Magdeburg | **Ignite Tar** | **Ignite Tar**    × |
| Zeiz | **Ignite Tar** | **Ignite Tar**    × |
| Schelben | Bituminous coal | Bituminous coal    ● |
| Belheim | **Bituminous coal Tar, Pitch** | — |
| Gelsenberg | Bituminous coal | Bituminous coal    × |
| Bernheim | — | **Pitch, Tar**    × |
| Sternberinz | — | Bituminous coal, **Pitch, Tar, Petroleum pitch**    ● |
| Reugendorf | — | **Tar, Petroleum pitch**    × |
| Busenring | — | Rhine Ignite    ● |
| Bruks | — | **Ignite**    ● |
| Brezbihama | — | Bituminous coal    ● |

When investigate the 13 plants that produced gasoline in Nazi Germany with the "hydrogenation system", the main material was Ignite (Brown Coal) and produced gasoline with Ignite Tar which was produced by distilling ignite using hydrogenation method. After that, 'octane number' (numerical value indicating the degree that abnormal explosion does not occur when gasoline is burned) is increased through 'Alkylation catalyst process (catalytic action based on acid by the production method using solid acid catalyst) to produce gasoline. Professor Kim Tae Mun of Kim Il Sung University, Professor Kim Ryu Sung of Hamheung Branch of National Academy of Sciences, Professor Shindong Cheol of Hamheung Chemical University claimed similar theories.

One of the reasons why it is important to increase the octane number through the 'Alkylation process' is that if the gasoline with low octane number is put into the fighter plane, the performance

of the fighter engine will deteriorate and it will not function properly. Therefore, unlike civil fuel, putting 'optimized fuel' according to usage in military fuels is a very important task. It is not a big problem in the industrial structure like North Korea that the speed of the private bus is injected the similar fuel to go from Pyeongyang to Sinuiju, but the speed and power output of the tank and the fighter in the war means that the war can not be carried out.

In other words, it is important to know whether North Korea is capable of producing artificial petroleum by coal, and what is the level of current technology of North Korea that produces artificial petroleum. In the past, there were farmers who stole asphalt in Korean farms and produced their own similar fuel for cultivators. In this process, people were killed by toxic gas poisoning. In North Korea, there was a phenomenon similar to the time of the hardship march, and there was a crackdown. Although the technical principle of artificial petroleum production is not difficult, the assessment of artificial petroleum industry in North Korea has a very different meaning depending on whether it was the level of petroleum production technology used for farmers in Korea or the level of technology of Sasol in South Africa.



Google Satellite Image. Chemical Plant in Aoji

In fact, if you look at Aoji's "coal chemical Kombinat" as a Google satellite, you can observe a round-shaped facilities which are assumed to be 10 petroleum facilities. According to the defectors' interview, it was said that it was No. 120 enterprise of Aoji coal mine as and 'artificial oil facility'. Therefore, additional verification is needed in the future.

In March 1939, in the House of Representatives of Japan, Yokohama Mitsumasa, a Navy Minister said, "The United States has imposed sanctions against Japan due to the invasion to Manchuria and China under the pretext of moral petroleum containment and Japan had to discuss about invasion of Hawaii against such sanction" Since the Japanese invasion of China in 1937,

the United States has intensively attacked the raw materials needed for major Japanese industries such as Japan's oil, iron and machine tools. In July 1939, the United States and Japan abolished the Nautical Voyage Treaty, and in December 1939, US corporations declared a so called "Moral petroleum embargo", a measure prohibiting the construction of aircraft gasoline manufacturing facilities and the export of construction rights to Japan. In August 1941, all oil exports to Japan were banned, step by step, while strengthening the strength of economic and oil sanctions.

"The research for artificial petroleum has been completed ... The operation of plants in Aoji and Youngan has been started"

'Economic sanctions against oil' was a key step toward military sanctions. In 1939, Japan was dependent on the United States by 90% of its oil imports. To overcome this, the Japanese government was promoting artificial petroleum development. The context of these sanctions and provocations is quite similar to that of the present Kim Jong Eun regime, so the author would like to summarize some of the statements made by Yonai, the Navy Minister in that time and compare it with the current situation in North Korea. At that time, the Japanese government was also worried about technical difficulties and financial problems like North Korea now.

*"Our country (Japan), which lacks natural resources, discussed the current status and technology prospects at this conference to develop artificial petroleum businesses surrounding the empire fuel companies in order to achieve self-sufficiency of liquid fuels such as heavy oil and petroleum. As a result of the Navy's efforts for more than 10 years, the artificial petroleum business has been completed and commercialization has reached "profitability." The artificial petroleum factories of Aoji, Youngan in Chosun Wanishi, Ube and Nihoro (Sakhalin) and other factories are expected to commence operations soon and the current status and prospects of this project are expected to be very high. About the technical problems of the artificial petroleum business, all three points of 'foreign technical assistance" including first, the manufacturing method, second, the production of artificial petroleum machinery, third, the technology manufacturing skill (work force) became unnecessary. The quality and quantity of crude oil production is expected to be the same as the natural oil "- Yonai Mitsmasa, Navy Minister.*

Under this strategy, Japan built the "Aoji Artificial Oil Factory" in 1936, in Hoeam Dong Sangha Myun, Gyeongheung Gun, Hamgyeongbuk-Do, facing borders with Manchuria and the Soviet Union. The factory was built within a few kilometers of Aoji Station of the Manchurian Railway. The plant produced gasoline, petroleum, light oil, heavy oil, methyl alcohol and lubricating oil with the world first 'hydrogenation direct liquefaction method (Bergius method)'.

Aoji was at the forefront of the border, and in 1938 there was a war of 'Jangobong War' in 1938 and 'Nomonhan War' 9n 1939 in the vicinity of the Aoji Artificial Oil Factory. At that time, the

situation at the Aoji Military Plant was confidential. According to the Dong-A Ilbo in January 1938, the artificial oil development of the Aoji coal mine was built for national defense and industrial purposes, and the construction of a coal liquefaction plant with the goal of producing 1 million kl per year, including gasoline and heavy oil. When converted to the current unit, it is about 660,000 tons (6.3 million barrels). In March 1938, about 60,000 tons of synthetic liquefied petroleum was produced at the Aoji plant. In 1939, the United States increased production on a large scale as the "Moral oil embargo" was strengthened. In the same year, in the middle of July, Dong-A Ilbo reported that "It is enough to sell even in the general market through Chosun Oil".

## 5. Status of Artificial Petroleum in the time of Kim Jeong Eun

In 1939, Japan was dependent on the United States for 90% of its oil imports. In the US military diplomacy strategy, 'oil sanctions' taken against the target countries was a key process just before the military action. In response to US petroleum sanctions, Japan implemented both the artificial oil development and the Pearl Harbor surprise attack. The Japanese government built the "Aoji Artificial Oil Factory" in 1936 to overcome the oil problem. Aoji's artificial oil contributes to the Pacific War by providing gas to the Kanto region and the Navy.

These coal industrial technologies have already been developed actively since the end of the 19th century, and especially during World War II and Japan's invasion war, Nazi Germany procured gasoline and aviation oil as well as various chemical products through coal liquefaction and gasification processes. The most commercially successful corporations are Sasol of South Africa. In addition, developed countries maintain a pilot plant for the purpose of economic reasons to prepare synthetic petroleum facilities for high oil prices or to develop environmentally friendly energy. Although large commercial productions such as South Africa are not aimed, small quantities of 100 tons per day (35,000 tons per year) is never small at the position of the country which under sanction of the United Nation. If only 15 small test facilities are used, it would have the effect that the amount of artificial oil from such facilities would be similar to that North Korea imports from China.

Kim Il Sung also emphasized the development of coal liquefaction and gasification at all times, with petroleum chemistry as a precaution, since petrochemicals may not be brought in from outside. The representative C1 industrial facilities from the time of Japanese colony to the time of Malima Speed include Aoji factory, 2.8 Vynalon factory, Heungnam fertilizer factory, Sungjin steel plant and thermal power plants.

# Parallel Session 2

# An Alternative Image of Women Developed by a New Religion in Early Modern Japan

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In early modern Japan, during the Tokugawa period (1603-1867), women were regarded as being dull, passive, and inferior to men in many aspects. Confucian ethics, which was orthodox at the time, taught that women should be subject to men. In addition, Buddhist and Shinto notions fostered an image of women as being polluted and sinful.

People of our time tend to think that it was modern science and thought that liberated women from such a negative image. It is true that modernists viewed the notion of women's innate pollution to be superstitious and that the concept of "good wife, wise mother" which became the key objective of women's education in modern Japan, supplanted the traditional concept that women were naturally dull.[1] Yet, we should not overlook the fact that not all Japanese people before modernization agreed with such a negative image of women. In fact, arguments against the notion of women's sin and pollution and inferiority to men had emerged decades or more before modernization started. Yet, most of these arguments are unnoticed and almost forgotten in modern times.[2]

Among those who contradicted the negative image of women in the premodern period, this paper sheds light on a religious organization called Fujidō 不二道, which was organized in the early nineteenth century.[3] Although it was not legitimized by the political ruler of the time, over several decades this religious group grew to have more than ten thousand believers, most of whom were commoners. Fujidō not only denied women's sin and pollution but also promoted a positive image of women as able and active as men. Its believers expected such women to work together with their male counterparts to realize an ideal world on the earth, which was the ultimate aim of this religious group. This paper examines how Fujidō developed the new image of women and what activities its believers undertook in hopes of realizing the ideal world, which would be characterized by a well-balanced relationship between the sexes, harmony among people, and equilibrium between yin and yang.

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1. For the objectives of women's education in modern Japan, see Ambros 2015, pp. 116-19.
2. An image of women different from the conventional one presented by a female thinker, Tadano Makuzu (1763-1825) has been relatively well studied. For her life and thoughts, see Oka 2006; Seki 2008.
3. Although this religious association changed its name more than once, I will refer to it as Fujidō throughout this paper.

## 1. Conventional image of women of the Tokugawa period

What was the image of women prevalent in Tokugawa Japan like? What social, cultural, and religious developments accounted for its formation?

The Tokugawa period was marked by political stability, which continued for more than two centuries and a half under the rule of the Tokugawa warrior government. The political system was based on a hierarchical social structure combined with a rigid class system. A patrilineal household structure, which had been widely established by the seventeenth century, served as the foundation for the class system. The establishment of such a household structure was accompanied by the spread of patriarchal values, in which power and importance were given only to males. These developments helped root Confucian ethics, which originated in ancient China, in the upper and middle social classes. A popularized version of these ethics further infiltrated into almost all sectors of society. Its influence served to consolidate the assumption that a woman should concentrate on the inner, domestic sphere and be subject to her husband and the other senior members of his household.[4]

Religious discourses based on a combination of Buddhist and Shinto theories reinforced the idea that women should be subordinate to men.[5] The Buddhist premise that a woman cannot attain enlightenment became intertwined with teachings that a woman should obey her father as a daughter, her husband as a wife, and her son as a widow. At the same time, the idea that women were naturally polluted, which is assumed to have originated from the taboo against menstrual blood and intrapartum blood, spread widely across classes and regions by the seventeenth century.[6] This idea not only limited women's activity in religious areas but also functioned as the basis for another prejudicial idea that all women are sinful by nature. Women were condemned for contaminating sacred places and objects with their pollution and, as the retribution for this sin, were supposed to be destined to fall into a special hell, a lake filled with blood.

In this period, the ancient Chinese cosmological paradigm of yin and yang, as well as the Chinese correlative theory of five elements (*wuxing*), spread from the elite to the common people. Under the influence of these paradigms, women were compared to yin, earth, and water, while men were linked to yang, heaven, and fire. Such comparisons gave rise to the assumption that women had a dull and passive nature, and that women should be subordinate to men in both society and family. The famous saying, "the Way of the woman is to obey man," plainly expresses the conventional notion of the period regarding women.[7]

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4. Ambros 2015, pp.97-102.
5. For Buddhist prejudicial discourses about women, see Caroline Hirasawa, 2013, pp.108-26.
6. Wakita 2004, pp.6-10.
7. *Onna daigaku takara bako*, in Ishikawa 1977, p.40.

## 2. Brief history of Fujidō

Fujidō emerged out of the tradition of a folk religion devoted to Mt. Fuji. Mt. Fuji has been regarded as a sacred mountain since the ancient period. Many shrines dedicated to the deity of the mountain, called Sengen, were founded in both its vicinity and distant places. They served as a base for widespread worship of the mountain. Believing that its peaks, caves, and waterfalls belonged to the realm of Buddhas and deities, religious practitioners went to the mountain to engage in asceticism.

Fujidō had its origin in a lineage of lay ascetics founded by a practitioner called Kakugyō (?-1646). Based on oracles that he believed had been received from the Sengen deity, he preached new teachings and conducted religious rites that were different from those of the established religious schools. Such activities were illegal from the viewpoint of the Tokugawa government, which prohibited the propagation of religious teachings that differed from those of the recognized religious schools and restricted the religious activities of laypersons in public.[8] Despite this prohibition, however, the government tacitly allowed laypersons' religious activities so far as they were moderate and inconspicuous. This tacit toleration enabled lay believers belonging to this lineage to develop unique teachings.

Jikigyō Miroku 食行身禄 (1671-1733) was the first person in the Fujidō tradition to criticize the notion of women's sin and pollution. I will look more closely later at this aspect of his teachings. First let me introduce his teachings about the ideal world, which had a large influence over the formation of Fujidō's ideas about women's nature, their roles in the family and society, and their relationship with men. Making his living by selling vegetable oil in Edo, the present-day Tokyo, he engaged in ascetic practices both at home and at Mt. Fuji. He believed that Sengen gave him oracles about realization of the ideal world and entrusted him with the task of overseeing it.[9] He called the ideal world the "world of *miroku.*" *Miroku* means Maitreya. Beliefs that Maitreya Buddha would bring about a blissful world on earth can be found in most East Asian countries, including China, Korea, and Japan.[10] Yet, Jikigyō developed a new version of Maitreya belief. He preached that the blissful world should by realized by human beings and that human beings could achieve it by correcting their mode of living, or, to be more concrete, by keeping themselves honest, sincere, and compassionate, as well as diligently conducting their family occupation.[11] Thereby they could overcome the moral deterioration that he saw as tarnishing almost all the people of his day. He set out his teachings in two volumes and entrusted them to his followers in the hope that people in

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8. For government policies concerning religious associations in early modern Japan, see Tamamuro 1987, pp.2-26; Hardacre 2002, pp.36-56.
9. For the life of Jikigyō Miroku, see Iwashina 1983, pp.128-97; Earhart 2011, pp.47-55.
10. The concept of the world of *miroku* can be traced back to the Buddhist cult of Miroku Buddha, or Maitreya. For the Miroku beliefs in Japanese folk religions, see Miyata 1970. Jikigyō gave a new meaning to the term of *miroku,* a mode of living in which one makes himself/herself (*mi*) righteous (*roku*), when he developed the concept of the ideal world.
11. *Ichiji fusetsu no maki* in Iwashina 1983, p.502.

the future would use his teachings as guidelines for realizing the ideal world. He conducted a fast until death on Mt. Fuji in 1733. While he engaged in this final act of asceticism, he transmitted his teachings to a disciple attending him. The man later compiled the teachings into another volume. Jikigyō's ideas written in these volumes later became the basis for Fujidō teachings.

Jikigyō became famous after his death. His immediate disciples and daughters obtained many followers. Each of them organized the followers into religious groups called Fujikō 富士講, which means confraternities devoted to Mt. Fuji.[12] Fujikō soon became very popular in and around Edo. Many believers made pilgrimages to Mt. Fuji. Some Fujikō leaders attracted still more believers by performing faith-healing rites. Yet, most of the Fujikō leaders kept the volumes of Jikigyō's teachings secret, something like treasures, rather than studying them.

Unlike them, a lay ascetic called Sangyō Rokuō 参行六王 (1745-1809), who succeeded Jikigyō's youngest daughter as the leader of one lineage of Fujikō, elaborated Jikigyō's teachings. He further developed Jikigyō's teachings about the ideal world by adopting the paradigm of yin and yang and that of five elements. The year before his death, 1809, he transmitted Jikigyō's teachings with his annotations of them to his successor, Rokugyō Sanshi 禄行三志 (1765-1841).

Sanshi and his close disciples studied the teachings and developed them further.[13] On the one hand, they further emphasized industriousness, filial piety, harmony with others, and the spirit of mutual help. On the other, they emphasized the necessity to create a well-balanced relationship between women and men as the means to restore equilibrium between yin and yang, which they believed to be a necessary condition for realization of the ideal world. To carry out in practice what they learned from the teachings, they founded a religious association, which was later called Fujidō. The name carried the dual sense of "the way to Fuji" and "non-dual way."

While making their living by either trading or farming, Sanshi and his disciples energetically propagated the Fujidō faith in their home region, the eastern provinces, as well as more distant places that they visited on their tours of pilgrimage to Mt. Fuji and Jikigyō's home in Ise province in the middle part of the country. Those converted by them in turn spread the faith to other regions. With their efforts, Fujidō grew into the largest of the new religions of the early and mid-nineteenth century Japan, in both size and geographical extent.[14] Most of believers were men and women belonging to the commoner class, although some belonged to higher classes. Fujidō had neither clerics nor permanent institutions. The Fujidō organization was basically a network of lay believers that spread across classes, occupations, sexes, and regions. Believers living in the same local area made a small local group and held prayer meetings at the house of one of the members.

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12. For religious activities of Fujikō, see Iwashina 1983, pp.223-317; Earhart 2011, pp.71-88.

13. For the life of Sanshi and those of his major disciples, see Watanabe 1942; Hatogayashi Bunkazai Hogoiinkai 2007.

14. We can guess the rough number of Fujidō believers and their geographical distribution from lists of participants in a project planned and carried out by the entire Fujidō association in 1863. 9,619 believers from 20 provinces of Kantō, Chūbu, Kinki, and Kyushu regions donated either money or goods to contribute to it. Presumably there were many other believers in addition to those recorded as donors. Another document indicates the existence of groups of believers in western part of Chūgoku region. Matsushita-ke Monjo, Sai, 4-18-6-1.

Local groups of the same area developed ties with each other to form a regional network. Regional networks gathered together to form a nationwide network. Hundreds of pious and able believers volunteered to manage local, regional, and national networks of believers. They were called coordinators (*sewanin*). Coordinators also acted as promoters of various projects that believers conducted in the spirit of mutual help, including charity campaigns and public works such as repairing roads and bridges. After the death of Sanshi, major coordinators from various regions collectively exercised leadership over the entire Fujidō organization.[15]

Fujidō had been exempted from suppression by the Tokugawa government until the mid-1840s although it was not a recognized religious association.[16] The government, however, took a stricter stance when a junior believer petitioned it to officially adopt Jikigyō's teachings as guidelines to reform the world. After two years' investigation, the government banned Fujidō in 1849.[17] Although few believers in fact abandoned the faith, Fujidō had to keep a low profile for several years until the government loosened its control over the group.

After the Meiji restoration in 1868, Fujidō believers faced another difficulty. Some crucial elements in Fujidō teachings conflicted with the policies of the newly founded Meiji government. Seeking for the way to survive, Fujidō had to change its name, teachings, rites, even the name of the main deity, throughout the 1870s and 80s.[18]

## 3. Formation of a Positive Image of Women

A positive image of women and teachings about a well-balanced relationship between the sexes were formed by several generations of lay ascetics belonging to Kakugyō's lineage from the seventeenth century to the nineteenth century. The nature of the deities they venerated exercised a favorable influence over the formation of a positive image of women and teachings about a well-balanced relationship between the sexes. The deity of Mt. Fuji, Sengen, has been regarded as female by not only Kakugyō and his followers but also all devotees of the mountain both in the past and present.[19] In addition to Sengen, Kakugyō and his followers venerated paired male and female deities. Based on a mythical belief that the two deities created the world out of their symbolic

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15. Although Sanshi designated Rishōin Gyōga (1806-1883), a son of a high-ranking courtier and the current abbot of a prestigious temple, as his successor, Gyōga could not fully act as the leader of Fujidō believers because of various restrictions accompanying his social position.

16. The shogunal government banned Fujikō activities several times, when they became too conspicuous, and punished some Fujikō leaders for practicing magical rites despite of their lay status. *Shichū torishimari ruishū*, vol. 16, pp. 193-222.

17. Miyazaki 2017, pp. 163-170. For records of the investigation, see Okada 2011, pp.11-294.

18. For the changes in Fujidō teachings, rites, and organization, see Miyazaki 1993. The changes caused discord among believers, which resulted in a split of Fujidō organization into two factions. One of them developed into present day's Jikkō-kyō 実行教.

19. During the medieval and the early modern period, Sengen was regarded as the manifestation of a bodhisattva appearing in the form of a goddess. In addition to Sengen, medieval Japanese believed Kaguya-hime as the deity of Mt. Fuji. Since the mid-Tokugawa period, Konohanasakuya-hime has been regarded as the deity of the mountain. The three deities are all female.

sexual relationship, the devotees called them the Original Father and Original Mother (*moto no chichi* and *moto no haha*).[20]

Based on the belief that the Original Father and Original Mother gave birth to human beings, Jikigyō was convinced that each human being was invaluable and good by nature.[21] This image of human beings led him to the conclusion that all human beings are essentially equal. His criticism of notions about women's sin and pollution reflected his image of human beings and his veneration of Sengen. Criticizing the conventional notion of women's pollution, he said that menstrual blood was pure because it had something to do with the birth of human beings, which had utmost value.[22] To rebut the Buddhist notion of the innate sinfulness of women, he said, "A woman cannot be sinful if she does nothing wrong. She is good when she does what she ought to do. A man is sinful if he does something wrong."[23] In other words, whether one is good or evil had nothing to do with one's sex but depended on one's behavior. Displeased with another Buddhist notion that women could hardly attain salvation, he said that Sengen, a female deity, would certainly save woman.

Sangyō adopted the paradigm of yin and yang to elaborate Jikigyō's teachings about the ideal world. He believed that the balance between yin and yang had a decisive influence over the weather, harvest, childbirth, and human society. He stated that the equilibrium between the two forces would bring about the orderly round of seasons, good harvests, harmonious human relations, a productive conjugal life, and the birth of good children, while an imbalance between the two forces would result in the opposite. According to his observation, yang forces had been excessively elevated in his day, which resulted in the suppression of yin. He was afraid that the extreme imbalance between the two forces would result in catastrophes and, in the worst case, the extinction of human beings. He concluded that the equilibrium between yin and yang should be restored to avoid catastrophes and to realize the ideal world.[24] He also developed the egalitarianism inherent in Jikigyō's image of human beings. He wrote that people belonging to the major four classes in Japanese society of the time, the warrior class, farmer class, artisan class, and merchant class, were equal since each of them played an indispensable role to maintain the world although in fact there was a hierarchical social order among them.[25]

Sanshi further developed the points that Sangyō made. Taking the egalitarian tendency further, he stated that there would be no difference between superior and inferior in the ideal world.[26] Based

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20. Although Kakugyō did not explain the relations between Sengen and the paired creators, Jikigyō thought that Sengen was essentially the same as the paired creators, who were united into one. *Ichiji fusetsu no maki* in Iwashina 1983, p.500-502.
21. *Ichiji fusetsu no maki* in Iwashina 1983, p.502.
22. *Sanjūichinichi no otsutae* in Iwashina 1983, p.538.
23. *Sanjūichinichi no otsutae* in Iwashina 1983, p.542.
24. Based on the paradigm of five elements, Sangyō stated that, in the ideal world, yin and yang would be represented by metal and wood, rather than water and fire. He expected that this change would make the contrast between yin and yang milder, and that it would make two forces easily harmonize themselves. For Sangyō's teachings about the yin-yang equilibrium and the world renewal, see Miyazaki 1994, pp.325-27; Sawada 2006, pp. 348-49, 353-55.
25. *Hatogaya-shi no komonjo,* vol.4, pp.74-76.
26. *Hatogaya-shi no komonjo,* vol.15. p.99.

on this notion, he mentioned that yin and yang, as well as women and men, were equal. As for the equilibrium between yin and yang, Sanshi thought that human beings could play an active role in restoring and keeping the equilibrium by creating a well-balanced relationship between men and women, since men were endowed with a yang nature, while women had a yin nature. Like Sangyō, he thought that yang power was excessively elevated. As evidence for it, he pointed out that people of the time attached great importance to their sons, while slighting their daughters.[27] To correct this imbalance, he argued that women should be given precedence over men. Thus, Fujidō adopted the mottoes of "The woman should be above, the man below" and "Women go first." Nevertheless, what he really wanted was not to have women take over the positions previously occupied by men but to restore a harmonious relationship between the sexes, which he believed would contribute to the equilibrium between yin and yang.

Sanshi advocated not only spiritual equality between men and women but the revision of gender roles in family and society. He argued that women had the ability to do whatever men could. To support this argument, he pointed out that in his day a considerable number of women were engaging in occupations that had been traditionally pursued by men: they were teachers, painters, hairdressers, yin-yang diviners, and agricultural laborers.[28] He hoped that in the ideal world women would engage in many more kinds of work from which they were commonly barred because of their alleged impurity, including iron manufacturing, rice-wine brewing, rice-malt fermenting, and dying cloth.[29] As for men's role, he wrote that not only mothers but also fathers should nurse their young children.[30]

Changes in the positions and roles of the husband and the wife in their sexual life was another important issue. Sanshi wrote, "The woman has the nature of water, which tends to stream down. The man has the nature of fire, which tends to flame up. Water and fire join each other when the woman is on the top of the man. …When they change roles and positions, they can embrace each other, realize harmony, and generate good offspring."[31] Encouraging women to be more active in their sexual life with their husbands, Sanshi wrote that it was all right for a wife to suggest to her husband to go to bed together.[32]

Sanshi recognized that such an image of active and able women deviated from the image of women widely-accepted in the society of his time. To counter the conventional notions about the role of women, which were fostered under the influence of Confucian ethics and Buddhist theories, he argued that ethics and teachings developed in China and India were not appropriate for regulating the behavior of Japanese people since the Japanese cultural tradition was different

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27. *Hatogaya-shi no komonjo,* vol.14, p71.
28. *Hatogaya-shi no komonjo,* vol.16, pp.92-97.
29. *Hatogaya-shi no komonjo,* vol.16, p. 114.
30. *Hatogaya-shi no komonjo,* vol.16, p. 113.
31. *Hatogaya-shi no komonjo,* vol.16, pp.115; Sawada 2006, pp.356-64.
32. *Hatogaya-shi no komonjo,* vol.16, pp.113-14. To elder people, who might be shocked by the image of a wife exercising leadership in the couple's sexual life, Sanshi pointed out that such a woman would give birth to good children and thereby fulfill the earnest wish of her parents-in-law to have grandchildren.

from those of China and India. To support this argument, he pointed to notable women appearing in Japanese history, including female emperors, a female warrior, a female novelist, and female saints. From this he drew the conclusion that, unlike China and India, Japan was a country where women had won respect by achieving great deeds.[33]

## 4. Female Fujidō believers

There were a considerable number of female believers in Fujidō since it did not discriminate against women.[34] In principle, no distinction was made between male roles and female roles within the group. Male and female believers attended religious meetings side by side. Believers of both sexes participated in charity campaigns and volunteered to engage in public works, such as repairing roads and bridges, in the spirit of mutual help. Further, some female believers gave sermons at religious meetings, engaged in proselytization, and acted as coordinators.

Matsushita Chiyo 松下千代 (1799-1872) serves as a good example of a Fujidō female believer who exemplified the image of a woman as able and active as a man.[35] She was born the daughter of a rich merchant in the city of Iida, a busy commercial center in Shinano province. Although most women of the time had to live in their husbands' houses after marriage, she founded her own house together with her husband as a branch of her father's house. She and her husband started a new business of producing and trading soy sauce and succeeded in it.[36] Thanks to this favorable social and economic background, she had a high-level of literacy, experience in running a business, a considerable amount of money at her disposal, and freedom from various restrictions that most women of her day were subject to in their husbands' houses.

Chiyo became affiliated with Fujidō in 1828 at the age of 30, and the following year she became one of Sanshi's earliest disciples in her province. She learnteachings mainly from copied volumes of teachings, records of sermons, letters exchanged between Sanshi and the believers, etc., since there were no senior believers in her province who could instruct her. Based on what she learned from the copied documents, she propagated the Fujidō faith in and around her home region, converted several hundred people there, and organized them into many local groups.[37] The converts,

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33. *Hatogaya-shi no komonjo,* vol.15, p.88. As another piece of evidence for the cultural difference between Japan and China, Sanshi refers to the difference between Japanese and Chinese languages in the way of making idioms made of two words with corelated meanings such as "day and night". He wrote that words with yin meaning, such as "night," were placed before those with yang meaning in Japanese language, while Chinese language gave precedence to words with yang meaning. *Hatogaya-shi no komonjo,* vol.14, p.101. Sanshi could be acquainted with some of nativist ideas through his friendship with a nativist literatus, Takada Tokimiyo (1783-1847). Sawada 2006, p.362.

34. Although there is no statistical record of the number of male and female believers, we can guess that about 30 to 40 percent of believers were women depending on remaining records about believers' activities. *Hatogaya-shi no komonjo*, vol. 6, vol.22, vol.23; Matsushita-ke Monjo, Na, 3-1-1.

35. For the outline of Chiyo's live, see Matsushita-ke Monjo, Na 8.

36. The shop founded by Chiyo and her husband appears in the list of major one hundred odd commercial enterprises in Iida in 1841. Iida-shi Rekishi Kenkyūjo 2012, p.329.

37. For the spread of Fujidō in Chiyo's home region, Ina Valley, see Ichimura 1929, pp.425-35.

in turn, further spread the faith into other areas of the province.[38]

Contrary to the conventional image of women, who concentrated on the domestic sphere, Chiyo acted in the public sphere as a leading coordinator. For example, when a group of believers planned to carry out work on an embankment in an area of her province in 1869, she acted as the chief promoter of the project and took charge of the formal procedures necessary to carry it out. She requested the office of the local government in charge of water control in the area to sanction the project, and when the project was completed, she submitted a written report about it to the office.[39] When the Tokugawa government investigated Fujidō, she was the only woman among thirteen leading coordinators summoned to the court. Without being intimidated, she gave the investigators a detailed explanation of the teachings about the ideal world.[40] When the government nevertheless banned Fujidō, she was one of the major believers whom the government made officially pledge to abandon the faith.[41] Of course, she only pretended to do so.

After the government loosened its control over Fujidō believers, Chiyo actively worked not only to manage local groups of her home region and the regional network of her province but also to support Sanshi's successor in Kyoto as one of his confidants.[42] While she was staying in Kyoto, she engaged in the propagation of Fujidō teachings among women from some aristocratic houses as well as commoners.

After she experienced the prohibition of Fujidō by the Tokugawa government, Chiyo wanted to have the religion officially recognized by the political authority. Attentively watching political changes in the 1860s, she was convinced that the fall of the Tokugawa government and the establishment of the Meiji government would give Fujidō a good chance to become a recognized religion. Yet, she soon recognized that some elements in its teachings and rites did not conform with the policies of the government. During the last several years of her life, she energetically worked to revise Fujidō's rites and teachings so that it could not only avoid persecution but also win official recognition as a proper religion by the government. Although she succeeded in persuading believers belonging to more than half of the regional networks, some senior believers, who did not want to change teachings and rites taught by Sanshi, fiercely opposed her plan.[43]

Chiyo's activities tell us that a female believer could play the same role as male believers did. Although there were not many women who were as active as Chiyo, almost all female believers participated in various Fujidō activities side by side with their male fellows. They shared an image of women as not only free from sin and pollution but also able enough to do whatever men could.

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38. Among 9,610 participants in the Fujidō project in 1862, 1474 were from Shinano province. Matsushita-ke Monjo, Na, 4-34. Thus, the regional network of believers from the province had grown into the second or third largest among all regional Fujidō networks.
39. Matsushita-ke Monjo, Na, 6-18.
40. Matsushita-ke Monjo, Sai, 2-2-13.
41. Ichimura 1929, pp.421-22.
42. She visited Kyoto twenty-one times in her lifetime. Matsushita-ke Monjo, Na, 8.
43. For Chiyo's efforts to reform of the teachings and rites, see *Kokiroku.*

## 5. In the Hopes of Restoring Yin-Yang Equilibrium

The challenge to the customary rule of excluding women from sacred mountains was one of the most conspicuous activities that Fujidō believers undertook in the hopes of redressing the imbalance between men and women and thereby restoring equilibrium between yin and yang.[44]

In pre-modern Japan, women were excluded from the sanctuaries of Buddhist temples, the inner precincts of Shinto shrines, and most sacred mountains, including Mt. Fuji, because of their alleged pollution.[45] Jikigyō Miroku, who objected to the notion of women's pollution, criticized this custom.[46] Nevertheless, few of his direct followers openly challenged it.[47] But, the later Fujidō believers defied it actively and persistently. Their first targets were village shrines dedicated to Sengen that were built on mountains off-limits to women. Both male and female Fujidō believers climbed these mountains in the presence of villagers who had previously observed the taboo against female ascent. When they saw that Fujidō female believers' ascent did not cause any catastrophe, the villagers abandoned the taboo.[48]

Fujidō's ultimate target was Mt. Fuji. It was not easy to change the customary rule there since it was one of the most popular pilgrimage sites of Japan and was under the control of some prestigious shrines and several groups of professional religious figures. The religious figures made it a rule that female ascent should be blocked at a certain point on the lower stages of each climbing route. Residents of villages in and around the mountain, who believed that female ascent would result in bad weather, poor harvests, and famine, demanded that the religious figures strictly check women's intrusion into the higher parts of the mountain.

Despite these restrictions, a female Fujidō believer secretly reached the summit in 1832. Disguised as a man, she started climbing the mountain with Sanshi, four other male believers, and two luggage carriers in the late 9th month of the lunar calendar, equivalent to mid-October. They intentionally chose a season when snow and strong winds would discourage other climbers so that the woman could reach the higher part of the mountain without being discovered. Despite the danger and hardships, they reached the summit, offered prayer rites there, and safely came back.[49] Fujidō believers interpreted the woman's successful ascent as a sign that Sengen allowed women to climb the mountain. With this conviction, Fujidō female believers tried to climb the mountain to as high a point as they could.[50]

The persistent efforts of the Fujidō believers exercised influence over a group of religious

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44. For more detailed information about the Fujidō believers' challenge to it, see Miyazaki 2005.
45. For the custom of excluding women from sacred places, see Miyazaki 2005; Suzuki 2002.
46. *Osoegaki,* in Iwashina 1983, p. 527.
47. Instead, some Fujikō confraternities constructed small hills with the shape of Mt. Fuji near their residential areas, enshrined Sengen there, and allowed female believers to climb the hills. Iwashina 1983, pp.268-73.
48. *Hatogaya-shi no komonjo*, vol. 18, pp.27, 109-12.
49. Kotani-ke Monjo, ken1-i26; *Hatogaya-shi no komonjo*, vol.14, pp.56-50.
50. For example, a group of female and male believers performed asceticism, walking around Mt. Fuji at height of between 2,300to 2,500 meters, in the area off-limit to women. Kotani-ke Monjo, ken1-ro13.

professionals managing an entrance to the northern climbing route. Expecting that lenient policies toward female ascent would attract many more pilgrims to their entrance and thereby contribute to their prosperity, they suspended the rule of excluding women from the higher parts of the mountain during the summer climbing season of 1860. As a result, women became able to climb up to the eighth stage, about 3,100 meters high, along the northern climbing route. Fujidō believers welcomed it. On the most auspicious day of the year, a little over one thousand male and female believers climbed the mountain together.[51] Groups of women with Fujidō banners in their hands led the huge climbing party at its head, middle, and the rear. In line with the motto of "women go first," male believers followed their female fellows softly singing lullabies in the spirit of harmony.[52]

## Conclusion

From the seventeenth century to the nineteenth century, generations of ascetics and believers dedicated to the cult of Mt. Fuji developed teachings about realizing the ideal world, which was characterized by people adopting a righteous mode of living, productive married couples, and cosmological equilibrium between the forces of yin and yang. They also fostered an alternative image of women as not just free from sin and pollution but as able and active as men. Fujidō expected such women to work with their male counterparts together on equal terms so that they would realize the ideal world. Fujidō also advised believers to change the roles and positions of the husband and the wife in their sexual life and encouraged women to exercise leadership there.

Both the alternative image of women and the image of married couples that Fujidō fostered were opposite to the conventional image of women and that of married couples. Therefore, at a first glance, Fujidō teachings seem radical. Nevertheless, Fujidō obtained many believers in many regions of the country. How was it possible?

It was probably because patriarchal values and Confucian ethics did not apply to everyone in every class equally. It was not easy for most commoners in pre-modern Japan to adopt a life style in accordance with Confucian ethics. Even if Fujidō teachings that both men and women should engage in the same work conflicted with Confucian ethics, those ideas might not have sounded so strange, to most commoners at least, since most commoner women either participated in their house occupation or worked as hired laborers to contribute to their household economy. It also was not very strange for men to take care of their young children. Fujidō teachings about the production of good offspring through a balanced relationship between the husband and the wife was attractive in the eyes of the people of the period since good offspring were indispensable for the continuation the household, which was one of their prime concerns.[53] So far as it should result in the birth of

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51. The record about the climbing party tells us that 1,034 members stayed overnight at the eighth stage to conduct a prayer rite at the dawn there. Kotani-ke Monjo, Shi, 35.

52. *Kyōkun kayōshū*, pp.263-65.

53. Matsushita Chiyo wrote in her written statement submitted to the court that many believers in her region brought into practice Fujidō teachings about the relationship between the husband, and that many of them reported her that they

good children, they likely agreed with Fujidō's advice that the wife should play an active role in her sexual life with her husband, even if it was at odd with the conventional notion of women. Sanshi depicted a man and a woman in the ideal world with the phrase, "Working side by side and smiling at each other from morning till night, the husband and the wife live in perfect union in the world of *miroku*." Such an image of a married couple must have been appealing in the eyes of the common people, at least, even if it deviated from the orthodox ethics of the period.

In short, Fujidō's alternative image of women won support from many believers because it was rooted in the sense of values shared by commoners of the time. The same is true for the image of women presented by some other new religions. For example, the founder of Nyoraikyō preached that women were precious since the creator intentionally had made them and both men and women were indispensable for reproduction of the world. Why were most of the alternative images of women of the period developed by new religions? It is probably because lay commoners needed confidence that their perspective was endorsed by divine authority in order to raise objections to the notions of human beings and human relations fostered and supported by the political and religious elite.

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succeeded in having offspring. Okada 2011, pp.250-51. Not only commoners but also court nobles listened to Fujidō's advice about the issue. Watanabe 1943, pp.144-45.

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# The Colored American Magazine and Black Media Networks in the United States

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In February of this year, the official portraits of former U.S. president Barack Obama and his wife, Michelle Obama, were unveiled amid great fanfare at the National Portrait Gallery in Washington, DC. While Michelle Obama's portrait was painted by Amy Sherald, her husband's portrait was painted by Kehinde Wiley. Wiley, the more established of the two artists, is known for his large-scale portraits of contemporary young African American men in heroic poses that wittily allude to or derive from the aristocratic poses central to the work of European Old Masters like Manet and Rubens. Recruited on the street by Wiley, the young men (and sometimes women) are depicted in their ordinary clothes in postures conventionally reserved for religious or royal subjects, usually in front of a lushly patterned background, reminiscent of aristocratic wallpaper or textiles. Wiley's work questions conventional representations of African Americans in the mainstream culture and asks us to consider what it means to see their portraits as worth painting, seeing, and valuing in relation to the canon of Western art.

Wiley's work makes central the politics of representation. Representation tells a story about a person; this story might match one's sense of self or aspirations but it can also be shaped by others' perceptions and biases. My focus in this talk is on the U.S. context, specifically in relation to the history of African American representation, but it has confluences with the representation of other marginalized peoples throughout the world. Visual culture has historically skewed towards the negative in representations of African Americans. Here, I am thinking of racist caricatures, lynching postcards, mugshots, and photographs grounded in racial pseudoscience. But we could also think even more generally of visual art, literature, the press, and popular culture. In the introduction to his novel, *Invisible Man* (1952), Ralph Ellison has described the "'high visibility' [that] actually rendered one *un*-visible" to highlight the ways that African Americans are not seen outside of stereotypes (xv). In this paper, by focusing on photographs published in the early twentieth-century *Colored American Magazine* in relation to not only Wiley's work but also the media of today, I trace a diverse set of portraits of the race. African Americans "painted" pictures of themselves to provide counternarratives—counter-portraits, one might say—opposing poisonous representations that were taken for truth. In working to counteract "un-visibility," these twentieth and twenty-

first century portraits are, in other words, nodes in networks invested in reframing the politics of representation.

The humanities have had a long history—and current life—of aiming to effect change in the world. The humanistic disciplines are built on the entirely modest and utterly audacious idea that part of this mission lies in representing human beings. This notion that the mere representation of human beings is a political act is particularly important for those marginalized in the world. In the United States, African Americans have fought battles around their media representations from the time of slavery to the current day with the Black Lives Matter movement. At the turn of the previous century, during the Jim Crow era, a period of legalized segregation that stretched from the late nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth century in the United States, W.E.B. Du Bois, the towering African American intellectual and leader, famously proclaimed that "all Art is propaganda and ever must be" to argue for representation's political power (22). For the purposes of propaganda, Du Bois used the platform of his magazine, the *Crisis*, to present stories of black success and achievement, alongside portraits of African Americans framed as professional and respectable. These written and visual texts worked to create a portrait of the race that countered the widely circulated images of the criminalized and lynched black body.

In his editorship of the *Crisis*, from its founding in 1910 to his ouster in 1934, Du Bois recognized the power of the press in combating lynching, both through the written word and the visual text. Similarly, the turn-of-the-century activist journalist Ida B. Wells declared that, in combating lynchings, "there is no educator to compare with the press… The Afro-American papers are the only ones which will print the truth…" (70). The early twentieth century was an era when black periodicals exploded in number as African Americans were hungry to see themselves and combat the Jim Crow system with its attendant stereotypes. Anne Elizabeth Carroll has discussed how the *Crisis* and other publications used words and images in concert to present pictures of the race that refuted the inferiority and criminality that characterized white-focused periodicals' representations of African Americans. But before the influential *Crisis* magazine, there was the *Colored American*; both magazines shared many of the same concerns in their investments in representational politics, particularly in their emphases on portraiture and literature as propaganda tools. The *Colored American*, founded in 1900 and published in Boston and later New York, where it met its demise in 1909, was one of the first genteel magazines aimed at African Americans. Using race biographies, fiction, photographs, and essays, the magazine worked to counter mainstream representations of African Americans, acting as an antidote to their poisons.

In the August 1900 issue, the *Colored American* announced its "Photographic Contest" (1.3, "Our Photographic Contest" 191); there is no evidence that this contest came to fruition, but it reflects the *Colored American*'s recognition of the race's interest in photography. The advertisements in the magazine often used the conventions of portraiture to sell goods, most often cosmetics products. These advertisements presented simple illustrations that represented "before" and "after" images of someone who had used the cosmetics on their hair or skin. The magazine also advertised to its

readers a "photogravure" for the price of $1.50 in several issues. Originally featured in the October 1900 as the frontispiece, the image, titled "The Young Colored American," depicts a boy perched on an American flag acting as a kind of stand-in for the "colored American" of the magazine's title. Significantly, in the May 1901 issue, R.S. Elliott presented a 35-page essay, titled "The Story of Our Magazine," accompanied by many photographs to highlight the workings of the periodical; the written sketches of the key players associated with the magazine were accompanied by seventy portraits of those figures (3.1). Part marketing move, this photo essay was meant to call attention to the worthiness of those associated with the periodical, providing the readers a way to see them and, in seeing them, see themselves. In other words, the *Colored American* contributed to and was deeply imbricated in the visual culture of the time.

One of the most striking characteristics of the *Colored American* was its use of halftone photographical reproductions. The halftone reproduction process was a late nineteenth-century technological innovation that allowed for the inexpensive printing of images that captured black-and-white gradations with greater detail and realism. The process uses "a screen to rephotograph the original photo and reduce it to a series of patterned dots of differing sizes. Thus rendered, the images could be sent by wire; when reproduced on paper, the areas with large dots close together appeared black or dark gray, and the areas with smaller dots and more space between them appeared light gray or white, thus re-creating a version of the photograph" (Kaestle and Radway 13). The period between the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries has been characterized as a time of a "visual revolution" due, in part, to the invention and use of the halftone process that facilitated the explosion of images in periodicals (Trotti 382). This new technology meant that images of African Americans could be disseminated more widely and with greater fidelity to the actual look of the subjects. In outlining Estelle Jussim's influential claims about the halftone process, Neil Harris has said that her argument suggests that, with the use of halftones, in contrast to labor-intensive wood and metal engravings, "the illusion of seeing an actual scene, or receiving an objective record of such a scene, was immeasurably enhanced" (198). This illusory sense of unmediated access to the real that halftone photographic reproductions offer matched the *Colored American*'s goals in producing a picture of the race that was not offered by the mainstream white press. Halftone photographic reproductions with their ability to capture subtleties of skin tone allowed African Americans to be represented with a greater degree of sensitivity to the differences in racial appearance; this was an implicit rejection of racist descriptions of the race as monolithic in appearance and, ultimately, in character.

Every cover of the magazine in its early years included a portrait of a notable African American person in the center, framed by floral designs, and the issues contained multiple portraits of prominent African Americans in their pages. The June 1900 issue, the second issue of the magazine, for example, spotlights James Warren Payton, a graduate of Yale, in his graduation gown on the cover (1.2). Other portraits within that issue include "Dr. T.W. Robinson, a Prominent Dentist of Boston, Mass." and "Chas. Fred White, A Real Negro Poet. Springfield and Chicago, Ill" (119,

120). Including the cover image, there are eight portraits in this one issue. In fact, the majority of images in the magazine over time were portraits. These portraits did not simply publicize the figures who were the subjects of articles within the magazine but they worked in concert with the content to provide evidence for the accomplishments of the race. For example, Pauline Hopkins, one of the editors of the magazine and a key contributor, wrote a series called "Famous Men of the Negro Race," which testified to the race's achievements by "drawing" portraits with words of figures like Toussaint L'Overture and Booker T. Washington. These written portraits were married with visual portraits to forcefully make arguments for black humanity and achievement. As Shawn Michelle Smith has argued, "visual culture was fundamental not only to racist classification but also to racial reinscription and the reconstruction of racial knowledge in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries" (3). Portraiture is a vital site of this racial reinscription and reconstruction in the magazine's pages. Maurice O. Wallace and Smith point to the radical nature of portraiture: "Leveling social hierarchies of portraiture that had been in place for centuries, photography offered a ubiquitous and seemingly universal tool of self-representation" (6). They claim, "For many African Americans, photography served not only as a means of self-representation but also as a political tool with which to claim a place in public and private spheres circumscribed by race and racialized sight lines. The photograph became a key site through which a new identity could be produced and promulgated" (5). In other words, photography and portraiture were contested terrain for asserting race identity. Portraits acted as propaganda for at least two audiences: the white viewers to whom African Americans wished to assert their humanity and the black viewers who looked at these images as mirrors to see themselves reflected back, reflections that were not visible in the white press.

The portraits in the *Colored American* are, to our twenty-first century eyes, conventional, possibly dull. However, their very conventionality is radical because representing black people as worthy of portraiture was not conventional. These portraits are, in fact, characterized by a political aesthetic. Representing black humanity at this time was a radical political act, and the magazine's tactics in doing so, I argue, have found continuity in the battlegrounds of black representation in the changing world of today. Kehinde Wiley, for example, takes ordinary young African American men in their t-shirts, tank tops, and tattoos and places them in religious scenes in triptychs, wood panels, and stained glass that asks viewers to re-see the men as extraordinary—as religious figures such as saints and as other figures worthy of high art. Wiley's "Mugshot Study" (2006), an oil on canvas, takes a mugshot of a young black man and re-paints it to offer up a counternarrative to society's categorization of the subject as simply a criminal. In an interview, Wiley explains, "It's a rebuke of the mug shot, it's an ability to say 'I will be seen the way I choose to be seen'" ("The Exquisite Dissonance of Kehinde Wiley"). Similarly, the portraiture of the *Colored American* magazine offered a rebuke of the mugshot, racist caricature, pseudoscience photograph, lynching postcard, and more and asserted the right of the race to be "seen the way it chooses to be seen."

In the U.S. context, generative energies around black representation have been produced by the

Black Lives Matter movement, a movement that sprang from the 2012 shooting death of Trayvon Martin, an unarmed black teenager in Florida who had gone out to buy iced tea and candy. At its core, Black Lives Matter insists upon the humanity of black people, a humanity that has been ignored and threatened with violence. In death, Trayvon Martin was depicted by some media outlets as a "thug," with all the racialized connotations that word entails, and news stories of his death were accompanied by reports of traces of marijuana found in his system. This journalistic reporting had the effect of criminalizing a murder victim, making him responsible for his death.

As a way of questioning these representations and those of Michael Brown, who was shot by a police officer in Ferguson, Missouri in 2014, African Americans, communicating via Twitter, began posting photographs of themselves with the hashtag #IfTheyGunnedMeDown. This hashtag, accompanied by two photographs of the Twitter user, asked which photograph the media would use if the user were killed. One photograph showed the user in a manner that fit negative stereotypes of black criminality, while the second photograph depicted the user engaged in ordinary or even high-status behaviors. The most famous example was that of Tyler Atkins, a high school student, who posted one picture of himself in a bandanna posing in a way perceived as a stereotypical gang stance and one picture in a tuxedo with his saxophone.[1] The implication was that the former photograph, which was taken from a rap video that he made for a school math assignment, would have been used by the mainstream media because it fit cultural assumptions about black criminality, even if he had been the victim.

The hashtag was used to protest the criminalization of African Americans, like Martin and Brown, even in death to show the ways African American lives are devalued in the public sphere and the related stakes of the politics of representation. These newer social media networks have been deployed to counter representations in mainstream media networks (along with those on social media, as well). As Ida B. Wells, the anti-lynching activist, wrote, more than a century ago, "No other news goes out to the world save that which stamps us as a race of cut-throats, robbers and lustful wild beasts" (71). The hashtag #IfTheyGunnedMeDown was an attempt to expose the "stamping" of African Americans in the mainstream press and popular culture as belonging to "a race of cut-throats, robbers and lustful wild beasts."

African Americans were afforded a very narrow series of categories of representation within Jim Crow ideology and that they were represented as respectable humans, worthy of equality, not criminals or lynched bodies, in the *Colored American* magazine was a radical political act. Gwendolyn DuBois Shaw points to the subversive nature of this focus on portraiture: "During the early colonial project… it was rare that enslaved Africans were depicted as individual subjects in visual images created by Europeans and European Americans. Instead blacks were most often shown as peripheral to the main subject, as ancillary figures subordinated to a dominant white figure" (16). The pages of the *Colored American* were filled with stories about notable African

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1. See Tanzina Vega, "Shooting Spurs Hashtag Effort on Stereotypes," for an account of this instance of hashtag activism.

Americans and, at the same time, alternative black histories, such as a focus on the wonders of ancient Ethiopian civilization. In other words, the *Colored American* worked to reinscript African Americans into history not as ancillary and inferior figures but as central, as main subjects worthy of portraiture, both in photographic terms and in terms of the written word. Ultimately, the networks of black representation that stretch from the past to the changing world of today ask us to open our eyes and truly see the people standing before us.

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# Masculinity, Medicine, and Human Empathy in Sinclair Lewis's Arrowsmith (1925)

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American novelist Sinclair Lewis won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1930. The prize committee described the 1925 novel *Arrowsmith*, one of Lewis's most significant works, as an attempt "to represent the medical profession and science in all its manifestations, at least in the early twentieth-century Western world. My paper argues that *Arrowsmith* remains particularly relevant today for the connection it reveals between, on the one hand, shifts in cultural ideologies of masculinity during Lewis's era and, on the other hand, the changing role accorded to human empathy in Western medical discourse and practice during the same period.

For thousands of years, doctors believed that the healing process required them not only to know their patients as complete individuals but also to allow themselves to become personally affected by patients' experiences of distress—that is, to emphasize with them. Over roughly the past century, however, advances in biomedical science and a greater reliance on technology in diagnosis and care, as well as ever-increasing commercialization, have overshadowed the importance of personal connection in Western medicine. This problem has been exacerbated by a mindset known as "clinical detachment, a form of emotional distancing that many American doctors have been taught is necessary to preserve their scientific objectivity when diagnosing and treating illness.

The novel *Arrowsmith*, I contend, provides the best literary representation we have of the historical transition in American medicine from prioritizing individual human connection to privileging scientific detachment. Moreover, the book demonstrates that this transition in what we might call medical ideology both drew heavily on and also reinforced the period's gender stereotypes and gender ideologies. To put my argument briefly, *Arrowsmith* represents male doctors who consider empathy to be an important dimension of their medical work as overly feminine. In Lewis's novel, empathy signals a lack of masculinity. The book depicts empathy as a feminized weakness that precludes a genuinely scientific approach and thus, in an ironic paradox, actually diminishes a physician's ability to save lives. I will show that by the end of his novel, Lewis has married a traditionally idealized version of American masculinity, the frontiersman, with a *new* masculine ideal: the virile research scientist.

Lewis's eponymous protagonist Martin Arrowsmith grows up in a rural village in the

midwestern United States dreaming of becoming a physician. He goes to medical school at the public university in his state, where he falls under the sway of a professor and medical doctor named Max Gottlieb. Gottlieb is a researcher in the exciting new field of bacteriology, which strives to identify, understand, and ultimately defeat the germs that cause disease. Among other lessons, Gottlieb teaches Martin the scientific concept of "control. Most literally, this refers to the use of a so-called control group in medical experimentation—a group that doesn't receive, for example, an experimental treatment, so that the responses of patients who do receive the treatment can be measured against them. Without a control group composed of people who do not receive the new treatment, there is no way of knowing whether that treatment has helped the experimental subjects who do receive it, or whether a given improvement in those subjects' condition may in fact be caused by some other, unrelated reason, perhaps simply the passage of time. But the concept of "control also takes on another, explicitly gendered meaning in the novel—the ability to strictly govern or "master one's emotional response to suffering, to pursue medicine and science in what Gottlieb calls "a cold clear light—a form of what Martin himself later calls "truer manliness. As we will see, both the scientific and the gendered meanings of "control become especially relevant in the most climactic portion of the novel, when Martin finds himself confronted by an epidemic of Bubonic Plague on an island in the West Indies.

First, it is important to note that not a single woman doctor appears in *Arrowsmith*, although they did exist in 1920s America. Yet shortly after reaching medical school, Martin encounters two distinct approaches to medicine, both of which are embodied by men but nonetheless rely on gender stereotypes: medical science versus the direct care of patients. The most prominent example of the "direct care category, which the novel implicitly associates with femininity, is the dean of the medical school, Dr. Silva, whose "religion was the art of sympathetic healing. Dr. Silva is repeatedly described as a physically "little man, whose voice "purred and squeaked. The imagery describing Arrowsmith's medical-school classmate Fatty Pfaff is even more explicitly feminizing, and the feminization is equally associated with Fatty's empathic sympathy for his patients:

> Fatty had the soul of a midwife; he sympathized with women in their gasping agony, sympathized honestly and almost tearfully. During his first obstetrical caseFatty was terrified, and he longed as he had never longed for anything in his flabby yet wistful life to comfort this gray-faced, straining, unknown woman, to take her pains on himself.

Martin Arrowsmith, by contrast, cultivates a sense of detachment that makes it impossible for him to empathize with, or really even to *see*, his patients as individual human beings. He finds the hospital routine slightly dull. He did not, he could not, develop the bedside manner. He was sorry for the bruised, yellowed, suffering patients, always changing as to individuals and never changing as a mass of drab pain, but when he had thrice dressed a wound, he had had enough; he wanted to go on to new experiences. As Gottlieb has taught him, Now it is time for the scientist, who works

and searches and never goes around howling how he loves everybody!"

Ultimately, Martin escapes patient care altogether when he obtains what appears an ideal job for him at the McGurk Institute, devoted to medical research, which Sinclair Lewis modeled on the real-life Rockefeller Institute, founded in 1901 by multi-millionaire John D. Rockefeller. Also working at McGurk is Martin's old mentor Dr. Max Gottlieb. Shortly after Gottlieb has been promoted to Director of the entire Institute, there's news of an outbreak of Bubonic Plague, a devasting illness, on the island of St. Hubert, a fictional British colony in the Caribbean. As it happens, after months of intensive work in his laboratory, Martin has just isolated a so-called "phage or, more formally, a bacteriophage, a type of virus sometimes useful in combatting malign bacteria. Martin believes his phage may be effective as a vaccine against the germ that causes Bubonic Plague. Dr. Gottlieb determines to send Martin to test the vaccine in St. Hubert.

Before Martin departs, Gottlieb warns him that when he sees the suffering the plague has brought to the island's inhabitants he may find himself beset by humanitarian feelings and tempted to administer the phage indiscriminately to as many people as he can. If Martin indulges what Gottlieb ironically refers to as "beautiful pity, however, his experiment will be ruined. Without an untreated control group, there will be no way to know with certainty if injected patients who avoid coming down with plague have been protected by Martin's experimental phage or by some other, unknown factor. As a result, no meaningful or reliable scientific knowledge would be generated, knowledge that would, for instance, justify expending resources to manufacture the phage in massive quantities and use it, perhaps, to permanently eradicate Bubonic Plague throughout the world and thereby save millions of future lives. In response, Martin swears to Gottlieb that he will "observe test conditions. He will "harden his heart. Although the expression "harden the heart originally derives from translations of the Old Testament, I would argue that in this context the word "harden also connotes masculinity, perhaps even with a very subtle phallic implication. Once Martin reaches St. Hubert and sees people suffering intensely and then dying all around him, he realizes that remaining true to his research mission, which requires half of the people "to get the phage, half to be sternly deprived, will call for "a truer manliness than even Gottlieb had imagined. "I'm not a sentimentalist; I'm a scientist!" he boasts.

Martin's hardened heart ultimately breaks, however, when his wife Leora, who accompanied him to St. Hubert, becomes infected by the plague and dies. Upon Leora's death, Martin "went to pieces. Stricken with remorse, he begins giving the "phage to everyone who asked, thus "blott[ing] his experiment. The epidemic on St. Hubert lessens in intensity and then it ends. Martin and his phage are glorified in the media as "the savior of all our lives and when he returns to New York he receives a promotion and large raise at the McGurk Institute. Yet the hero treatment Martin receives feels hollow to him. He knows that his breakdown on the island—his simultaneous loss of "control in both the emotional and the scientific sense—has rendered it impossible to know whether the epidemic has ended from the phage he developed or from "rat-killing or Providence. What is important for my argument in this paper is that Martin's internal feeling of shame at not

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having been hard-hearted enough to continue his experiment by withholding his phage from half the population also undercuts his sense of manliness. He imagines other, tougher scientists judging him as weak. When he comes face to face with a fellow medical researcher named Stokes, "he saw in his eyes a pity worse than condemnation.

Partly out of despair, Martin then enters a second marriage with a young but wealthy widow named Joyce Landon. Martin's inner sense of manliness is even further wounded by this marriage. Unlike his first wife Leora, who habitually "obey[ed] his wishes, Joyce Landon assumes from the start that, partly due to her independent wealth, she can assert power over him: "She expected him to remember her birthday, her taste in wine, her liking for flowers, and her objection to viewing the process of shaving. She wanted a room to herself; she insisted that he knock before entering; and she demanded that he admire her hats. Martin finds himself "afraid of her (439). In this portion of the novel, Martin is repeatedly associated with the word "soft, and in each case the word has an implicitly feminizing connotation. His marriage to the wealthy Joyce has him trapped in a "soft and smothering prison," he sleeps in an overly "soft bed, he himself has "become soft. For Martin, the softness that undercuts his ability to feel manly and masterful began not with this marriage but instead on St. Hubert, at the moment when he allowed his emotions to conquer his scientific rigor.

Martin determines that the only way to recover his masculinity is to return to serious laboratory research. He determines to do so both by leaving Joyce and, perhaps surprisingly, by leaving the prestigious McGurk Institute. Martin leaves McGurk because he fears that the "ease and repute he gains by working there will, again, "make him soft. Martin's solution to his crisis of masculinity draws heavily on an ideology of re-masculinization that became especially prominent in America at the turn of the twentieth century, when President Theodore Roosevelt, among many other prominent male voices, urged supposedly "over-civilized American men to reclaim their manly identities by spending time in nature performing such rugged activities as hunting, chopping wood, wilderness camping, and the like. The idea behind what was sometimes called the "wilderness cure was to recapture the experiences of risk, fortitude, and strength traditionally associated with the American frontier, which by the early twentieth century had been fully settled. This is the period during which organizations such as the Boy Scouts were founded to teach American boys wilderness survival skills, cowboys became mythic heroes of popular culture, and *Tarzan the Ape*, though written in England, became an American best seller. So-called "primitivism was celebrated as a way to restore masculinity to American men who feared that they had become too soft to qualify as "real men.

*Arrowsmith* adopts this ideology with a twist, however. The novel's ending borrows the virility popularly associated with the American frontiersman, the man wresting his living from the wilderness, and assigns it to independent biomedical research. Martin and a lab colleague named Terry Wickett, who also resigns from the McGurk Institute, acquire a "shack or small cabin in the northern woods of Vermont. Next to it they build with their own hands a "shanty to use as a laboratory and a "rough stable for their horses. They spend all day working in the lab and in the evening they smoke "before the rough fireplace of the cabin, loafing in chairs made of barrels

cushioned with elk skin. They fished before breakfast, they supped at a table under the oaks, they tramped twenty miles on end." Martin, the narrator tells us, "felt himself growing sinewy and "deep of chest. In many respects, the life that Martin and Terry live in their wilderness cabin mirrors the sort celebrated in the pages of Sinclair Lewis's famous contemporary, Ernest Hemingway, the bard of supposedly "true American masculinity. Lewis takes a step beyond Hemingway, however, in intertwining Martin's and Terry's stereotypical male pursuits in the wilderness with a vision of medical science that is as far removed from empathy, sympathy, or similar emotions as possible. For instance, they order some lab monkeys and, in pursing their experiments, become "as merciless as the gods, injecting them with deadly pneumonia. Martin's new sinewy strength, his deepness of chest, is associated with the elimination of human emotions in his medical pursuits: He would yet determine the essential nature of phage; and as he became stronger and surer — and no doubt less human — he saw ahead of him innumerous inquiries into chemotherapy and immunity; enough adventures to keep him busy for decades."

In conclusion, I want to be clear that I am not trying to suggest that *all* male medical researchers in real life have become what Sinclair Lewis describes as "less human" to meet the demands of their profession. In analyzing this work of fiction, my goal has been to explore links between gender ideology, the scientific concept of "control," and what many observers today lament as the devaluing of human connection in modern Western medicine.

# Transparency, Self-Imaging and Reversal of Power in Contemporary Muslim Women Blogging

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## Introduction:

Homi Bhbaha's 1985 "Signs Taken for Wonders" introduced his conceptualization of ambivalence and hybridity, since then it has become central to many researchers in understanding how colonialism both worked and unworked (2004, 1165). By allowing one's self to be resented in public is to expose one's identity and reverses colonial power of portrayal. The act of narrating the self brings it into a state of transparency despite the questions of validity that may be raised.

Muslim women imaging is probably one of the clearest examples of inaccurate and unjust examples of human imaging in the last few decades. A stagnant image of Muslim women is repeatedly presented in Western media that stigmatizes her as homogeneous oppressed, ignorant and helpless creature. Apart from these two extremes, this paper brings into focus Muslim women self -imaging during the last decade through personal blogs. It examines how Muslim women utilize the blogosphere to revisualize themselves and shatter the stereotypical mold in which they were confined for long. In addition to writing, blogging allows the reflection of individuality and identity via display of photos and videos. It opens the space for self-identification and communal collusion against the stigmatized picture of the "other".

Blogosphere introduced a new body of literary and cultural genera that belongs to autobiographic writings it shows the blogger in different daily life situations. A review of literature has indicated that very little research has been written on Muslim women and their self-representation as bloggers in particular. This paper fills in this gap as it gives deserved critical attention to the rising new body of Muslim women blogs[2]. The objective of this study is to critically read selected examples

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1. The researcher is indebted to Prince Sultan University in Riyadh for supporting the presentation of this paper at the 5th World Forum of Humanities.

2. The idea of this paper came originally from my own blog which I started with two fellow bloggers on 2007. Living in US at the time, I found it necessary to have a platform for "us" Muslim women to express our point of view and to express issues of identity and other related matters as well. We chose the title *Muslim Women in America* and continued to blog between 2007-17, It is a *New York Union* blog and concerned with issues of Muslim women in America. Currently, the idea is carried on by my students in two different blogs, one is concerned with cultural issues, I administer the blogs but both are written from the point of view of my female students at PSU.

of Muslim women blogs to examine the image the bloggers chose to present of themselves and to explore how far it deviates from the traditional presentation of Muslim women on Western media. Four Muslim women bloggers are analyzed here; they are selected for their wide readership and the diverse postings. The focus of the study is examining issues related to identity as presented in the selected blogs. The examples considered here respectively are; Suhaimah Manzoor-Khan, Dina Tokio, Nura Afia and Amani Al-Khatahtbeh. I am conducting here a qualitative research within the framework of postcolonial and feminist theories to examine the above bloggers' approaches to self-representation.

## Challenging the Traditional Stereotypical Image: "Write or Be Written"

Representation usually indicate a form of authority and control; it gives the presenter an upper position to project his/her point of view and to demonstrate his own prospective. Homi Bhabha sees it as an ambivalence of colonial power in its "phenomenological projection of Otherness", the ambivalence in the colonial use of power lies in its focus on *difference*, Bhabha emphasized (2004, 1171).  The act of writing and possessing the right to control what is being written about one's self and history is the colonialist project of civility, Bhabha explained which entails a one-dimensional version of truth that is told from the colonizer's *positionality* (1172).

## Blogging and the Issue of Representation:

Among numerous online forms of communication blogs remain distinctive due to their dynamics and the personal nature, although they maintain elements of the public discourse and interaction with receivers. The appearance of the internet within the last decades has clearly affected the identity of people. It allowed for a dialogic space that is seen as a counterpublic space and provided an opportunity for parallel literature. Kalyani Chadha emphasized that finding a counterpublic is not a novel idea as it has its roots in history where minorities find alternatives for self- expression. Numerous older examples like the coffee- houses and literary clubs in eighteenth century England can be seen as a form of narrating to the public. More recent counterpublic examples can be seen in the Egyptian literary blogs as they represent a counterpublic sphere to the mainstream literary public sphere (Chadha 2013, 930).

Blogging is simply defined as a space where a person can represent his/her self. The general assumption is that a blog is a diary writing and a form of autobiography, it is considered an emerging genera of literature that aims at presenting segments of real life (Pepe, 2015, 73). While the main preservation against blog as literary genera stems from the fact that they are documentation of daily life incidents in the blogger's life, it can easily be argued here that blogs

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https://hajbehindthescenes.wordpress.com/about/
https://translationtimesblog.wordpress.com/about/

are similar to journal and diary writings which occupy a considerable amount of literary studies. The only actual difference between the two is that in the case of blogging, they are published on intervals not as a whole as the case of the diaries which is an attribute to their immediacy and development of presentation. In both cases, the writer choses which part(s) of his personal life and identity s/he wishes to expose.

Despite their earlier beginning, blogs became popular by the first years of the twenty first century. By 2004, blogs were so popular that "blog" was named the word of the year by the Merriam- Webster (Rettberg, 2017, 10). Today's blogs are not limited to the diarist formats as they include interaction with surrounding communities and international events. However, among different forms of diary writing, blogs remain distinctive because of the quality of interaction. It is also quite representative even with the debate of validity of representation and the questioning regard the virtual persona. How much of what is portrayed in the blog is real and how much is fictitious is another issue that should be considered.

## Blogs considered in this study:
## Suhaimah Manzoor-Khan

Suhaiymah Manzoor-Khan is a Pakistani-English Muslim woman. Suhaiymah is a poet, writer, public speaker, and founder of the brown Hijab[3]. She mostly writes about issues in politics, race, gender, Islamophobia, and decolonizing minds. She is a Roundhouse fellow for 2018. Suhaimah wears hijab and openly expresses her identity through narrating everyday life situations that happened to her. As a poet she relays on poetry in presenting herself. Her blog includes videos of herself presenting slam poetry.

## Dina Tokio

Dina Torkia, who goes by Tokio on her YouTube video blog, is a 29 year old half Egyptian half English woman living in the U.K. Dina started her YouTube channel at the age of 21 because of her frustration with the lack of representation of Muslim women in the beauty and fashion industries. She uses video blogging or "vlogs" to communicate with her readers. She regularly vlogs about fashion but also explores other issues such pregnancy and her battle with an eating disorder, as well as other personal experiences. Her ultimate goal is to show that wearing a hijab doesn't stop Muslim women from being like everybody else, and breaking the negativity surrounding that (best represented in her #YourAverageMuslim series on her YouTube channel). She now also posts occasionally[4] and was the subject of a BBC3 documentary called Muslim Miss World[5].

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3. www.thebrownhijabi.com
4. http://www.dinatorkia.co.uk/
5. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GIeMt38gLfE&list=PL1Z7qli1BQMxskY1fu9Pvf6VCQKVLrZZd

### Nura Afia

Part Moroccan and part Lebanese, Nura Afia is a 25 year old YouTube vlogger[6]. She rose to sudden fame for being the first hijab-wearing ambassador for Cover Girl cosmetics, making her the very first model to feature in an ad campaign for a cosmetics company in the U.S. She started filming makeup tutorials after giving birth to her first daughter and now has a total of over 300,000 followers across her platforms. Afia was always vocal about Muslim representation in the beauty industry and its importance. She has publicly said that she wants to show people that being a mother, a wife, and a hijabi, which are things usually looked down upon in her western society, are not things that stop her from doing what she wishes to achieve.

### Amani Al-Khatahtbeh[7]

Amani Al-Khatahtbeh is a 26 year old Jordanian author. She is the founder and editor of muslimgirl.com. At 17, Al-Khatahtbeh started the blog in her bedroom with a goal of creating a place for other Muslim women to take control of their identities. The site began to achieve incredible numbers, hitting 100 million views in 2015 alone. Now working with a full staff, Amani's site covers Muslim women's issues, as well as other issues within other minority communities. When she was 23 years old, Amani became the first veiled Muslim woman to land a spot on the Forbes 30 under 30, and was also named one of CNN's 25 most influential Muslim American's two years later. She has since then partnered up with Teen Vogue, NASDAQ, and more. Amani stresses issues of identity in her blog and certainly refuses to use the term Muslim women as "tokenized" by the western media to inclusively describe all Muslim women into a homogeneous group.

### Becoming Part of the Narrative:

Blogs provided an opportunity for the bloggers to outreach for the public and encouraged members of the communities to speak and to have a voice. The blogs became a sort of the platform to debate issues of identity and representation. The fact that the responses can be read by the public is in itself a proactive step that demonstrated the enabling effect that the blogs have on the members of certain group. It will be naïve to assume that all responses conform to the writer's view point; otherwise, we would be recycling the colonial homogeny which the representation via blogging is trying to challenge. The diverse responses of blog readers in itself can be seen as a proof of the heterogenic and multiplicity of Muslim women and furthers the inaccuracy of the term. Readers' responses to the selected blogs vary from full agreement to severe opposition. In

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6. https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCbeXigLhNXyAGy48d9wZutA
7. http://muslimgirl.com/author/admin/

that sense, while women empowerment by possessing the ability to speak may be misunderstood as a call for unifying conformity, it needs to be stated here that the ability to object, argue and disagree is an inseparable part of such empowerment. It invites revision to the colonial dichotomies.

## Conclusion and Recommendation for Further Studies:

The paper deals with the representation of Muslim women as homogeneous entity and it reads the attempts of challenging the colonial divisive discourse that separates human into us versus them. It also explores how Muslim women are becoming more active in breaking the molds of "others" in which they were framed into for quite some time. By allowing one's self to be presented to the public, an act of transparency is taken by choice to reveal identity and open a space for discussion. This act in itself is described by Homi Bhabha as an attempt to reverse the colonial power an authority over the individual and the community (1985). Blogs as literary representation are forms of diary writing that enable writers to project an image of choice to the public readers. Despite the debate about the authenticity of the representation via blogs through creating an online persona, many Muslim women bloggers consider this persona more authentic than the homogeneous portrayal in western media. In that sense, the blogosphere is utilized by Muslim women as a space of representation to unshackle their traditional stereotypical image portrayed in the media. This proactive stride is a move towards practical feminism, which is seen by writers like Sara Ahmed as the more contemporary form of feminism (2003).

Based on the critical reading of the selected blogs, the study concludes that while the representation of Muslim women as helpless oppressed entities, the bloggers chose, instead, to portray themselves as free active women who are open to their communities and to humanity at large. All four bloggers examined above demonstrated a strong sense of identity, as they did not refrain from showing their identity as Muslim women wearing Hijab despite its stereotypical stigma and the homogeny of this representation. Blogs enables the writers here to create a counterpublic where they opened spaces for community dialogues. The study also concludes that blog posts instigate self- refection and enhanced the sense of communal solidarity as demonstrated in the positive interactions and affirmation. Because of the various issues and topics discussed in Muslim women blogs, this study is only a preliminary examination that should be taken into a deeper level of analysis especially with regards to the debate of identity. Transparency is another issue that needs further thorough investigation and scholarly attention.

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# A Metamorphosis of Images: Lafcadio Hearn's "Snow Woman" in Japanese Contemporary Theatre and Film

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In this paper, I will discuss a set of contemporary images on stage and in film that encompass the ideal encounter between Western and Eastern traditions reflected in the writings of Greek born Irish literary figure, Patrick Lafcadio Hearn. Stimulated by a Japanese exhibition at the 1884-85 New Orleans World Expo, combined with his reading of Basil Hall Chamberlain's English translation of *The Kojiki, Records of Ancient Matters*, Hearn came to Japan in 1890, after spending years in Ireland, England, France, the States and Martinique Island. Though fascinated by whatsoever and whosoever he encountered in Japan, Hearn, at the same time, was dismayed by Japan's rush toward modernization by chasing after Western standards while ignoring its own cultural treasures, especially classic folktales. By collecting and rewriting folklore and classic literature in his own delicate, subtle, poetic prose, Hearn tried to resurrect the spirit of classical Japan. At Tokyo Imperial University, Hearn lectured on the importance of what was fast disappearing throughout the country to students who were being trained to lead a new modernized Japan, where the primary educational principle was to promote the Westernization of Japan—erasing even a tint of Japan's past cultural achievements.

Up until now various artists, musicians and writers have created new literary and artistic contributions through their encounters with Hearn's work. I will explore the transformation of these images, mainly focusing on one particular story, "Yuki-Onna," i.e. "Snow Woman" compiled in *Kwaidan: Stories and Studies of Strange Things*. I will discuss the metamorphosis of this story from two perspectives--its transformation from the original into Hearn's story on one hand, and from Hearn's story into other literary and theatrical genres, on the other. Because "Yuki-Onna" is filled with images of beauty within a backdrop of terror in a specific Japanese setting and sensitivity, many people regard it as a Japanese classic tale, without noticing Hearn's contribution. Interestingly, one can even trace Irish elements being merged at essential moments in the story, such as the use of *geis/gessa*, literally meaning a 'taboo' in Irish.

I will first explain the metamorphosis of how Hearn transformed an original Japanese tale to create his own masterpiece, although he lacked a good command of Japanese. Hearn's Japanese wife, Setsu Koizumi, daughter of a prestigious *samurai* warrior family, was a good story teller,

who told Hearn stories she thought he would be interested in, and then Hearn rewrote them. She did not have a good command of English, just like Hearn's rather basic Japanese, but they could communicate by an idiosyncratic pidgin-like Japanese-English dialect. Her sources were based on not only written documents but orally transmitted stories among local people over many generations. "Yuki-Onna" also evolved out of this hybrid process, but its specific original source has never been identified.

Before going further into my discussion, I should summarize the story of "Yuki-Onna." Two woodcutters, old Mosaku and young Minokichi, went to work daily in the forest across a river from their village. One evening because of a snowstorm, they took shelter in the ferryman's hut. In the middle of the night, Minokichi woke up and saw a beautiful woman dressed in white attire blowing a shiny white-colored breath of air toward Mosaku. She was about to do the same to Minokichi, but didn't, demanding that he keep everything he had seen a secret or she would kill him. A *geis* or pledge was thus enacted. After he recovered from the shock, he married a beautiful girl called Oyuki who came from outside the village. This common female name acts as kind of a pun with the word for snow "*yuki*" in Japanese. ("O" is a prefix providing an affectionate honorific.) They lived happily with ten children. But one night, reminded by Oyuki's dimly lit face of "somebody as beautiful and white as herself", Minokichi retold that fearful story. Instantly, Oyuki revealed her identity as Yuki-Onna, crying out that the original pledge/*geis* had been broken. Still, she could not kill him because she felt sorry leaving their children parentless, but should "they have reason to complain," she would treat him as he deserved. After uttering this warning, she disappeared like the wind.

Previous studies have already discussed the following two points. The first is that Hearn heard quite a different version of Yuki-Onna story which described a huge monster, assaulting travelers, which was retold all over Japan, (However, thanks to the power of Hearn's Yuki-Onna image, this monster image of Yuki-Onna has vanished.) Another point is that Hearn was fascinated by exogamy where humans marry animals or other worldly creatures like celestial beings or ghosts of living humans. In a 2018 NHK radio lecture series Bon Koizumi, Hearn's great grandson, revealed important newly discovered facts. Bon argues Hearn heard a tale of exogamy between a woodcutter and a spirit in a tree from a maid in their household, Hana, or possibly from her father, Sohachi, a gardener, who had a strong connection with woodcutters and knew their stories handed down over generations. Based on this story between a woodcutter and a spirit of a tree, Hearn's "Yuki-Onna" was created. Therefore, we could say this beautifully sad story of exogamy between a human and the spirit of snow, in which flows the theme of a mother's love, a motif Hearn presents over and over again throughout his life, is mostly Hearn's own creation. Besides, since the spirit of a tree lay behind the spirit of snow, a sense of revenge in Yuki-Onna's murder of woodcutters permeates behind the scene, as woodcutters' métier is killing her kin. (In Tanaka's film version they are sculptors of Buddhist statues, which adds an interesting dimension as they cut off the life of the trees to give wood eternal life with spiritual power. Moreover, Minokichi succeeded his master

Mosaku's will to carve a *kuannon*, goddess of mercy, out of wood.)

In addition, in the image of Yuki-Onna, Irish and Japanese images are integrated. One is the spirit of trees. Both in Ireland and Japan, every tree is thought to have its own spirit. In Ireland even now a highway takes a detour evading a fairy tree. A literal meaning of a religious and intellectual leader of ancient Ireland, "Druid," meaning "wise man of Oak Trees," illustrates how, trees have been worshiped since ancient times. Hearn's special affection towards trees can be found in his lecture given at Tokyo Imperial University entitled "On Tree Spirits in Western Poetry," his re-told stories such as "The Story of Aoyagi," a tragic exogamy of a beautiful willow spirit and a human, and essays like "*Gaki*" in which he develops a local tale in Shiga Prefecture of a tree spirit's revenge on a thoughtless man cutting down a tree. Setsu in her memoir explains how Hearn severed even the most intimate relations with people if they cut trees, especially temple trees.]

Another element related to Ireland is Hearn's use of wind. Yuki-Onna comes into the hut with the snowy wind and the ending of the story concludes like this:

> Even as she screamed, her voice became thin, like a crying of wind; —then she melted into a bright white mist that spired to the roof-beams, and shuddered away through the smoke-hole….Never again was she seen. (*Kwaidan*, 118)

Yuki-Onna is thus described as one with the wind. In the Irish language fairy is called as a *sídhe*, meaning wind. A fairy in Ireland is often connected with fear, like *bean sídhe*—if people hear *bean sídhe*'s scream in the wind, someone in their immediate family is said to die in the near future. Yeats concisely explains the fear as related to this fairy as follows：

Hearn also says in his lecture "Some Fairy Literature," …the fairy belief is much more terrible and gloomy; there is no humour in it; its subject is supreme fear"(*Life and Literature*, 328). In "The Value of the Supernatural in Fiction", Hearn writes:

In Hearn's view, a fairy is related to fear, and the literature which arouses fear and contains something ghostly is, in his opinion, great art. His "Yuki-Onna" embodies this idea. Developing this point further, we could also say since ghostly, other-worldly and supernatural Yuki-Onna embodies trees, snow and wind, she is nature's spirit itself. She is supernatural, but natural to the extreme. I do not like to transform this mysterious image into something banally pedagogic, but we humans living in the 21st century should hear Hearn's or nature's warning against environmental issues caused by humans.

Let me now quickly turn to the film version of this story. In the 1965 highly artistic film, *Kwaidan*, which won the Special Jury Prize at the Canne Film Festival, Masaki Kobayashi combines classical Japanese images with modern/postmodern imagery. The film's details including scenes, character development, props and scripts are very realistic, with a huge eye in the sky dystinh directly down toward the audience, with both sound effects and music composed by the internationally recognized composer Toru Takemitsu, giving the story a mysteriously symbolic and

abstract feeling. The huge mysterious gold eyes in the sky are constantly watching the whole scene, especially Minokichi's behavior--these eyes seem to be a visual embodiment of the *geis*/pledge. The image of these eyes is handed down to succeeding films: an impressive huge eye reappears in a drawing on the wall in Kiki Sugino's 2017 version. In the 1968 a much less artistic version entitled *Kaidan Yukijoro* by Tokuzo Tanaka, the golden eyes of Yuki-Onna enhances the image of a strikingly spooky power of an otherworldly creature. The story line of Kobayashi's "Yuki-Onna" is quite true to Hearn's original--with a special emphasis on mother's love. Also Kobayashi suggests that her change of character is caused by her appreciation of human love. In the course of living with Minokichi and their children she came to appreciate human affection, and at the end when she transformed herself into her real self as Yuki-Onna, the maternal love that had grown inside her never left her. Tanaka' s version treats this maternal love with a sense of discrimination. The narration at the end of the film," Yuki-Onna, who is supposed to never have any emotion, got mercy" reveals a human arrogance reflected in a sense of superiority over other beings--quite the opposite of Hearn's open-mindedness which accepts everything without prejudice. (Remember Minokichi in the 1968 version carved a statue of the goddess of mercy out of a tree.) In addition, the feudal order of a class-based society without any introspection is present--the death of Minokichi's master's wife caused by an agent of the lord reflects inhuman treatment of an "inferior" arising from class, gender and age differences, literally socially vulnerable people being abused. In this way, Tanaka's version and to some extent Kobayashi's version as well reflect the way of thinking accepted in the 1960s', parts of which have already become somewhat obsolete.

The 2017 film by a director/ actress Kiki Sugino, with herself as Yuki-Onna gets rid of this kind of prejudice, which is true to Hearn's intention, though many new details were added to the film. As she saw universal issues flowing in Hearn that go beyond a specific time and place, her version presents issues we in the 21st century face--like emigration/immigration, present day US policy etc. The film starts with the black and white image of snow falling from the sky onto the trees in the forest which gives us the impression of the countryside in the Edo Period or even an earlier time. The audience is immediately drawn into the scene and then the story of Minokichi and Mosaku, commences. The principal points of the beauty and terror--Yuki-Onna appearing with the snowstorm, killing Mosaku by blowing her breath toward him, and then disappearing with the *geis*--is presented true to the original in an exquisite black and white image. Then the black and white image changes into a colored scene of Minokichi and his cousin crossing the river on the boat to the forest. Our sense of time is destroyed with the dexterous use of the attire Minokichi's cousin wears--he wears westernized clothes worn around the 1920s or early 30s in Japan. The audience's sense of time becomes suspended. In addition, Minokichi's house is lit by a dim electric light, a modern invention. In this suspenseful scene, the audience begins to accept that this is when modernization was established through a Westernized way of living in Japan even in Minokichi's household, which mostly followed a traditional Japanese way of life, using electricity. Minokichi's uncle, in contrast, runs the electric company, who was observant of the principle that Japan was pursuing

in those days which Hearn thought was deplorable. In this exquisitely subtle film Sugino's sense of awe and nostalgic admiration towards "what is not seen" runs throughout the film. Minokichi's mother's words, "Our human knowledge is limited. We know only a part of the universe" reflects Sugino's respect for "what is unseen" in nature, which shows the same as what Hearn calls "ghost" or "ghostly." When Hearn emphasizes the importance of human communication with other-world(ly) or supernatural beings, he is not being spooky or maniacally cultic, but he appreciates what is not in oneself --the opposite to an idea of exclusion. Since he appreciates "what is not yourself," he respects people with different opinions, religious beliefs, and cultures as well as their existence in nature. This comes back to our previous discussion of Hearn's "Open Mind." This leads us to Sugino's unusual interest in a child born out of parents from two different dimensions-exogamy. This also pertains to the same kind of crucial contemporary issue of not excluding others when someone contains elements of different beings residing inside a singular persona.

The 2012 rendition in Jiří Barta's Czech film, *Snow Woman*, gives a Western point of view of Japan--which takes on a mysteriously exotic feel, with the dexterously unique technique of combining wax with other materials like asphalt, oil, crayon, photos and real human acting. Overall this new mysterious abstraction, simultaneously brings concrete yet magical images. The music also presents an interesting mixture of Czech and Japanese cultural contributions. In addition to the newly composed film score by Michal Novinski, a melody called "Going Home," from the 2nd movement of Dovorjak's 9th Symphony "From the New World," provides an interestingly nostalgic touch to the Japanese audience, because that very music was used to get elementary school children to go home once classes had finished. Overall, this short film presents an understanding by a Western artist --originating from the outside but going straight to the core of the generic Japanese soul.

In this way Sugino's and Barta's versions, both reveal distinctively original insights as well as a universality beyond time and space. These four films prove that Hearn's work simultaneously marks and transcends the spirit of a specific time and place, containing universal principles relevant to anytime in history across a variety of cultures.

Finally, I will conclude by introducing another contemporary expression of Hearn's work, an idiosyncratic reading performance of Hearn The Lafcadio Reading, held annually for past twelve years, performed domestically and internationally by Shiro Sano, an actor and his friend, Kyoji Yamamoto, a musician. In addition, Hearn stimulated Sano's artistic sensitivity and let him create a short film, *A Drop of Dew*, combining Shoji Ueda's photographs with Hearn's writings, which Sano directed, acted in, based on a film script written by himself. This film develops a world of fantasy beyond time and space ---with the use of Ueda's still photos which catch the reality of the 1950s and 60s, Sano's contemporary video images and music by Kazuhiko Kato, a leader in the Japanese pop music world during 1960s.

In the reading performance Sano decides a theme annually, having titles such as "Encounter," "Promise," and "Nostalgia," for which he chooses seven to ten Hearn pieces of writing, eventually

weaving them into an integrated whole with Yamamoto's music as an essential part of the production. During their Irish tour in 2015 I saw the audience completely dazzled and spellbound regardless of the linguistic barriers—Sano read in Japanese while Hearn's original text was shown on the screen. Thanks to the power of Sano's dramatic reading which renders life to Hearn's work, mingled with Yamamoto's poetic music, the Japanese text became almost like a universal language, shattering the differences between two cultures, reinforcing the long and rich oral traditions shared between Ireland and Japan. He tells stories just like the ancient bards once did with Yamamoto's music employing *fili*'s harp. Hearn's work is transformed into a musical score where these two artists, like old bards, reinvent a unique performance style.

Another metamorphosis can be seen in a new Japanese *kyogen* version of Hearn's work, "Chin Chin Kobakama," though not "Snow Woman." In 2017, I commissioned a theatrical production led by Sengoro Shigeyama XIV, the head of the prestigious Japanese traditional kyogen family to commemorate the 60th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Japan and Ireland. This turned out to be another ideal marriage between Japan and Ireland, which was accepted favorably by Irish audiences in three venues in Ireland: Dublin, Sligo and Waterford.

To conclude, Hearn's work continues to give inspiration to artists everywhere by creating fresh images that transcend both time and place, a universal language of creativity, if you will, shared by everyone. Finally , I should also mention that I wanted to explore the contribution of traditional Japanese Noh theatre running throughout this new artistic wave of Hearn related productions, but I have taken up to much of your time today so I will leave that discussion for another occasion.

# Surveillance and Human Refashioning in Super Sad True Love Story and The Circle

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Speculative fiction has long presented nuanced and instructively creative projections on the shape of things to come, to quote the title of H.G. Wells's 1933 work, a text that purports to present 'a short history of the future'. Wells in 1933 was at the height of his fame, a writer with an international popularity and political reach difficult to find a parallel for today. A year after *The Shape of Things to Come*, for example, he had discussions both with both Joseph Stalin and Franklin Delano Roosevelt; in 1935 the film version of *The Shape of Things To Come* appeared. Nearly three decades earlier, his *A Modern Utopia* (1905) he imagined a utopian world of material plenty, freedom, creativity and technological advance. Vital to this imagined world, and to Wells's conception of the utopian genre, was the need for such speculations to build in change and innovation, to 'face towards the freer air, the ampler spaces of the things that perhaps might be'. (5) In this prospective world, new possibilities for humans were attainable. Wells required utopian thinkers not to fashion static, perfect places. Yet his ideas sparked two very different, antagonistic responses: Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World* (1932) and George Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four* (1948), both of which envisaged dystopian futures where people were under constant surveillance, whether by each other or by the state, or by a combination of both. In the past century, and increasingly in the last few decades, surveillance has changed the way we function, are perceived and controlled in a rapidly changing world. Indeed, in a world of Big Data, and social media, surveillance has transformed the way see ourselves and operate socially, under scrutiny not only from the state, but from corporations, and from each other.

As I have argued elsewhere, in *Imagining Surveillance: Eutopian Dystopian Literature and Film* (2015), speculative fiction and films offer us ways of understanding the human impact of these amorphous, often invisible, and highly consequential forces. In this paper, I consider the depiction and assessment of surveillance in two recent novels, Gary Shteyngart's *Super Sad True Love Story* (2010)*,* and (especially) Dave Eggers' *The Circle* (2010). I aim to trace how, in different ways, they offer us visions of the future that we might endure, or potentially resist. In David Lyon's recent evaluation of the current state of play, *The Culture of Surveillance* (2018) world authority David Lyon deals briefly with Shteyngart's novel, seeing it as part of increasing problems of

human intimacy. It is that, but it also deals with questions of border control and personal identity. This paper deals especially with border control in a pivotal early scene in the novel. Lyon sees *The Circle* as the replacement for *Nineteen Eighty-Four* as the text that captures surveillance in a multi-media and data driven world that Orwell could not have imagined. Eggers' novel appears to a imagine a utopian future; this is key to its satirical bite.

Shteyngart's *Super Sad True Love Story* introduces a confronting otter by the name of Jeffrey, who exists in a future where the United States is in serious political, cultural, cultural and economic decline. The protagonist, Lenny Abramov, inhabits a brave new world where everyone wears an 'apparat' around their neck, a communication cum-surveillance device in a society where information about your net worth and your desirability—or, in the argot of the novel, 'Fuckability'—rating is regularly available to public view in places such as bars and clubs. Lenny describes his apparat as 'buzzing with contacts, data, pictures, projections, maps, incomes, sound, fury.' The last two words are a literary in-joke, referencing Shakespeare's *Macbeth*, where the title character, near the end of this either and with his wife newly dead, declares that 'life is a tale, told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.' By association the ubiquitous apparats are the technological idiots, endlessly spewing information, but signify nothing. Yet, as the child of Russian immigrants, Lenny must also be aware of the Russian roots of the term, an apparat being an uncritical Communist. The device, a more sophisticated version of the mobile phone that connects you to the 'real' mediated world, is a means of brutal and real time social control, its constant flow of information making each individual transparent to others. Hobbled by the lack of privacy and the freedom privacy allows, individuals are passive, conformist, complicit. In this world of publicly visible Big Data, privacy is hardly a concept with any social meaning.

Having worked in Italy trying to find rich clients who want to be immortal, Lenny needs to return to the US because a friend has told him

> that if you spend over 250 days abroad and don't register for Welcome Back Pa'dner, the official United States Citizen Re-entry Program, they can bust you for sedition right at JFK.

As the schlub from Central Casting, Lenny complies, finding at the American Embassy in Rome that:

> Only a few of the saddest, most destitute Albanians still wanted to emigrate to the States, and that lonely number was further discouraged by a poster showing a plucky little otter in a sombrero trying to jump onto a crammed dingy under the tagline "The Boat Is Full, Amigo".

The combination of faux-folksy racism is barely mollified for Lenny when, down the hall, the

'plucky little otter' has been Americanised (sombrero replaced by a red white and bandana) as Jeffrey the Otter.

Jeffrey asks 'some friendly questions for statistical purposes only', adding encouragingly: '"On behalf of the American Restoration Authority, I would love to welcome you back to the *new* United States of America. "Lookout, world! There's no stopping us now!"' These attempts to bely the parlous state into which the USA has fallen themselves fall flat. There follows a series of comic interchanges as Jeffrey mishears Lenny's answers:

> Jeffrey: "Did you meet any nice *foreign* people during your stay abroad?"
> Lenny: "Yes".
> Jeffrey: 'What kind of people?"
> Lenny; "Some Italians."
> Jeffrey: 'You said "Somalians"'.
> Lenny: "Some Italians".
> Jeffrey: "You said Somalians", the otter insisted. "You know Americans get lonely abroad. Happens all the time! That's why I never leave the brook where I was born. What's the point? Tell me for statistical purposes, did you have any intimate physical relationships with any *non*-Americans during your stay?

Lenny compliantly tells the truth, potentially putting, Fabrizia, the Italian with whom he had sex in Rome, at serious risk. The information and misinformation collected here by an increasingly confronting otter exposes how border surveillance based on databases and biometrics confirms or confers identity, classifying individuals as valid or invalid, person or non-person. Lenny's transnational sexual encounter gets him flagged as a potential subversive or degenerate. But he passes through because the programme that generates Jeffrey freezes up as the questions become increasingly invasive. As surveillance theorist Gary Marx has observed (see, for example, 2002), surveillance systems fail. They can also be circumvented. In this case, because the decline in American technological knowhow, failure *is* the option. In what Torin Monahan calls 'the time of insecurity' (2010), surveillance systems are increased, morph into new systems and impose new expectations and restrictions, and with them new social formations, new individual and group identities. Shteyngart takes these real-world elements and develops them for satirical purposes. But the point of this satire is not simply to propose comic extrapolations of the present; it is to warn us of the encroaching possibilities, to prompt us to think and react in order to stifle or circumvent these possibilities. *Super Sad True Love Story* is a cautionary tale as well as a comedy.

By contrast to the troubled and decaying world of *Super Sad True Love Story*, Dave Eggers' *The Circle* appears to present a utopian space for many of its characters—a, importantly, not all. Among the many schemes advanced by the Silicon Valley company called The Circle (a hybrid of Google, Facebook and Apple) is one that aims to bear witness to tyranny, and by doing so to bring an end to

tyrannical practise. A suitably utopian goal, with all the naivete sometimes attached to that idealism. The Circle corporation is immediately coded positively but the protagonist, Mae Holland:

> 'My God, Mae thought. It's heaven.' is its opening line.

Her words unconsciously reference connections between utopias and Christian notions of heaven, with the company a kind of Big Data Eden. I want at this point to zero in on one element that speaks to the visual trope of the all-seeing eye, rebooted for the contemporary world.

Or all-seeing *eyes*, plural, for at the Steve Jobsesque product launch/love-in, his Circle equivalent Eammon Bailey unveils tiny high-resolution cameras, cutely named 'See Change', that can be placed unobtrusively anywhere and then accessed everywhere by a global audience. The Circle being an unmistakably Californian company, the initial images beamed to the company's audience are from surf beaches, before 'the screen atomized into a thousand mini-screens. Beaches, mountains, lakes, cities, offices, living rooms. The crowd applauded wildly'.

Technological innovation clearly overrides concerns about intrusion, but Bailey's agenda requires the breaching of national boundaries:

> imagine the human rights implications. Protesters on the streets of Egypt no longer
> have to hold up a camera, hoping to catch a human rights violation or a murder and then
> somehow get the footage out on the streets and online.

Bailey then shows the audience coverage of 'fifty cameras in Tiananmen Square and in a dozen authoritarian regimes, from Khartoum to Pyongyang', declaring

> I agree with the Hague, with human rights activists the world over. There needs to be
> accountability. Tyrants can no longer hide. There needs to be and will be,
> documentation and accountability, and we need to bear witness. And to this end, I insist
> that all that happens must be known.

The plan to infiltrate other countries with mini-surveillance cameras is born of at least two impulses: i) global capitalism; ii) imperialism. As Silicon Valley companies show, technical innovations can be mass-produced and mass-adopted in immensely profitable ways, in fantastically short periods of time. See Change combines the portable, groovy product design of an iphone with the supposed community-building capacity of Facebook. Despite the hype, though, it is still primarily a product manufactured for profit. Indeed, without the profit, can there be a product?

See Change combines people power, regime change and Jeremy Bentham's panopticon scheme, traditionally a key trope for surveillance theorists. And it reflects imperialist confidence that liberal democracy, too, is a product that sells internationally. The history of *actual* American military

interventions in foreign fields is one of high-minded ideals brought to earth with brutal and often long-lasting consequences. Think Vietnam and Desert Storm and Afghanistan. Liberal democracy is not simply another product. I'm not arguing against liberal democracy *per se*, but against demagogic chutzpah *masquerading* as liberal democracy, confident that such rule is the hidden desire of *all* people and the inevitable end point of *all* social evolution. The regime-changing premise of See Change, that media visibility is a form of instantly efficacious moral power that brings tyranny to heel, is dangerously naïve. The images from Tahrir Square or Tiananmen Square, powerful as they undoubtedly were, did not lead inevitably to democratic transformations in Egypt or China. Media visibility is not the fast track to democracy.

Visibility can be *used* as part of military or terrorist strategy. The televisual impact of the 'Shock and Awe' tactic in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, when live pictures of the attack were beamed around the world, functioned to celebrate American power and to warn the watching global audience. Think, too the searing psychological damage of the 9/11 attack, massively enhanced by it being broadcast in real time. Images replayed over the following days, and months and years, justified the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. Al Qaeda and ISIS *want* people in the 'West' to see mass destruction in their own backyards, to see beheadings, understanding them as a graphic taunt and as recruiting and propaganda tools outside (and potentially inside) the West. Visibility, then, is not of itself a political cure all. Being scrutinised does not guarantee right action on the part of bad actors.

In the supposedly utopian world of *The Circle*, we never find out whether the See Change cameras have the transformative effect predicted. But Bailey foretells in his initial pitch that as a result of their introduction, '"We will become all-seeing, all-knowing"'. It's another literary reference, this time to the Book of Genesis, where Adam and Eve are offered the same promise. As Eggers no doubt intended his knowing readers to recognise, the fabricator of that seemingly utopian assurance is the serpent, and result is the expulsion of humanity from Eden.

Eggers also addresses more generally the place of social media and the Internet in the exponential rise of monitoring in contemporary lives, of a sort that connects not so much to fears of state oppression or violence, but with the utopian attractions of instant access, virtual sociability and prosperity that social media and modern technology promises. One of the many casualties of a world consciously similar to the one we inhabit today is privacy. While cameras play some part in the types of surveillance carried out in *The Circle*, the novel is as much the child of Big Data as of Big Brother. Eggers explores the complex and often impossibly blurred junctures between information and identity, agency and complicity, the individual and larger groupings in an age in which it is possible to have thousands of 'friends' and millions of co-users. Mae's entry into the 'vast and rambling campus' of the hi-tech, high profile company, The Circle, marks her introduction to a world that bears obvious resemblances to the hip work environments associated with Google. (To avoid confusion, I use the words The Circle to designate the eponymous company and *The Circle* for Eggers' text. Mae's immediate response is awe, and while her enthusiasm for The Circle as an institution wavers occasionally, it is vital that for the most part she maintains a definite sense

that the company is a utopian *space* constructing a far better world well beyond the confines of the campus itself.

Eggers the author clearly is antagonistic to the ideology The Circle and actual companies like it propound, but he does not make his protagonist a rebellious loner along the lines of Orwell's Winston Smith. Those characters do exist, in the form of Mae's former boyfriend, Mercer, or the mysteriously Circle employee Kalden, with whom she has a sexual relationship. But the overwhelming number of Circle employees, including Mae's adored friend, Annie, are conscientious spruikers for the company's activities and aspirations. Quite what the real motivation is driving the company's leaders, the so-called 'Three Wise Men'– Ty Godspodinov, the Mark Zuckerberg like boy-genius behind the company's early innovations; Eamon Bailey, the company's avuncular spokesman, and Tom Stenton, the predatory CEO – is not clear. Yet the sheer commercial and social success of The Circle generates its own momentum, one begun by Ty's devising of a 'Unified Operating System, which combined everything online that has heretofore been separate and sloppy'. The Circle's phenomenal growth and influence as a company derives from the Internet, which provides the key to what Mae recognises as its ever-expanding influence for good.

Its power comes from the very twenty-first century use of social media and the consequent comfort with which individuals function and come to socialise online, the rise of Big Data and the breakdown of physical boundaries across a virtual planet. Ty's great advance had been to 'put all of it, all of every user's needs and tools, into one pot' and to invent TruYou:

> One account, one identity, one password, one payment system, one person. There were no more passwords, no multiple identities. Your devices knew who you were, and your one identity – the TruYou, unbendable and unmaskable – was the person paying, signing up, responding, viewing and reviewing, seeing and being seen. You had to use your real name, and this tied you to your credit cards, your bank, and thus paying for everything was simple. One button for the rest of your life online . . .
>
> Once you had a single account, it carried you through every corner of the web, every portal, every pay site, everything you wanted to do. (21)

TruYou reconfigures identity in terms of economic transactions. The notion that 'your devices [know] who you are' requires stretching the definition of the terms 'you' and 'know' to breaking point.

While the Internet offers amazing access to portals and pay sites, the implicit idea that 'everything you wanted to do' was available online is included, as Thomas More included slaves in the original *Utopia*, to test the reader's acceptance of contentious proposals or states of affair. Mae's naivety functions as another prod for the reader to go beyond some of her sporadically teetering confidence in the larger project that The Circle promotes. Were she merely positive, the novel's satirical bite would be muzzled, so her willingness to break rules occasionally by maintaining a clandestine

relationship with Kalden, constitutes a small protest against the drive to conformity.

She also recognises the oppressiveness of the constantly positive attitude the company promotes. Or at least the appearance of such, so that when she sees Annie's assistant watching her she knows 'her face was betraying something like horror. Smile, she thought. Smile' (7). The scene is an eerie reminder of facecrime in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, but where Winston's masking of his emotions is logical and necessary in the dystopian world of Oceania, Mae's own version on the supposedly utopian campus of The Circle is equally troubling. A social mask is necessary to conceal private thoughts and emotions in both novels. Mae's innocence also blinds her to the reality that most of her work on the Web is inconsequential, responses to parallel activities that have little reality beyond the screen. They feed into information loops that constantly monitor her actions, giving largely empty rewards and virtual applause when she achieves or exceeds arbitrary targets:

> The Circle was everywhere, and though she had known it for years, intuitively, hearing from these people, the businesses counting on The Circle to get the word out about their products, to track their digital impact, to know who was buying their wares and when – it became real on a very different level. Mae now had customer contacts in Clinton, Louisiana, and Putney, Vermont; in Marmaris, Turkey and Melbourne and Glasgow and Kyoto. (54–5)

Mesmerised by a faux reality that only exists in the virtual world and through Big Data, Mae fails to see that the supposedly private 'contacts' entail no physical contact, no knowing of people except as data or as emails.

Technology refashions spaces and identities, and the novel promotes the critical and multifaceted concept of visibility as the guiding principle enabling The Circle. Eamon Bailey is certain of the moral benefits of monitoring:

> What if we all have behaved as if we were being watched? It would lead to a more moral way of life. Who would do something unethical or immoral or illegal if they were being watched? … we would finally be compelled to be our best selves… In a world where bad choices are no longer an option, we have no choice but to be good. (290)

These dubious propositions recall Bentham, suggesting that the internet in some ways is the contemporary version of the Panopticon. Yet the emphasis on watching provides what might establish the possibility of monitoring totalitarian regimes through tiny portable movie cameras that can be placed in great numbers anywhere and then accessed by an infinite number of viewers around the globe. The cameras act as portable Panopticons; Bailey places them in his mother's house to ensure that she is safe. 'Transparency' he tells the audience 'leads to peace of mind' (68).

The utopian mindset that creates dystopian consequences permeates the novel. What is billed as 'the ultimate search tool' and which goes by the name of SoulSearch, allows the company to track down fugitives from justice. But because of faulty recognition, a woman nearly is lynched. Mercer, who wants to be anonymous but is discovered, kills himself by driving his truck off a cliff (461). Cameras at Mae's parents' home publicly broadcast them having sex, while the dating site LuvLuv exposes Mae herself to general ridicule. Annie volunteers for the PastPerfect project on family history as a means of re-establishing her status in the company, confident that her renowned 'blue blood' heritage will enhance her standing further. Instead, she finds out dark secrets about her family history that push her to a mental breakdown. Kalden finally reveals himself to Mae as Ty Godspodinov, and makes the most sustained critique of The Circle, arguing that Stenton has 'professionalised our idealism, monetised our utopia' (484). Kalden proposes 'The Rights of Man in a Digital Age', rights that include anonymity and the understanding that 'The ceaseless pursuit of data to quantify the value of any endeavour is catastrophic to true understanding' (485). Rather than bringing these truths to the world, though, as he asks, Mae rejects what she calls his 'bizarre claims' and betrays him. As Winston Smith will do, Mae ultimately supports the power the reader is encouraged to abominate.

The novel's penultimate paragraph carries Mae's assurance into the future The Circle promises, in which the existing world is

> replaced by a new and glorious openness, a world of perpetual light. Completion was imminent, and it would bring peace, and it would bring unity, and all the messiness of humanity until now, all those uncertainties that accompanied the world before the Circle, would be only a memory. (491)

The new glorious openness requires the elimination of privacy, but the novel ends not with messy humanity and earthy uncertainty now just a memory, but with Mae sitting next to the now-catatonic Annie in hospital, fuming that 'They needed to talk about Annie, the thoughts she was thinking. Why shouldn't they know them?' The novel ends with her frustrated demand, 'The world deserved nothing less and would not wait' (491).

For all the public and publicised scrutiny, Annie's thoughts remain unknown, something Mae finds 'exasperating', adding that 'It was an affront, a deprivation to herself and to the world'. In what I take to be a conscious echo of Julia in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, The Circle 'can't get inside you'.

Despite the undeniably twenty-first century aspects of the novel, not least the centrality of Big Data and computer-based social media, in many ways Eggers work intersects with earlier utopian texts such as Bentham's Panopticon writing and *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. The company's edicts—'SECRETS ARE LIES, SHARING IS CARING, PRIVACY IS THEFT'—sit in ironic counterpoint to Orwell's 'WAR IS PEACE, FREEDOM IS SLAVERY, IGNORANCE IS STRENGTH'. Mercer warns Mae at the end of their relationship that:

> I've never felt more that there is some cult taking over the world… It's the usual utopian thing . . . like everything else you guys are pushing, it sounds perfect, sounds progressive, but it carries with it more control, more central tracking of everything we do.

The novel reworks the trope of individual dissent and mass compliance common to utopias, Eggers having the protagonist, Mae, consciously and actively supporting the dominant ideology. Characters who resist pay the price of resistance: Mercer suicides, Kalden is neutralised, Annie has a mental breakdown and Mae's parents disappear. Mae plays a crucial role in their respective downfalls. There is no happy ending here.

Subverting generic codes by having a protagonist who complies through most of the text and then does not rebel at the end gives the novel a freshness and vitality that requires interpretive creativity on the part of the reader. It undermines smug complacency or lazy despair. It is a misreading of dystopias and utopias generally and generically to think that they depict static or complete societies. By offering estranged representations of our own world, the genre, right back to Thomas More, remains fundamentally provocative, a challenge to thinking and a call to action.

Eggers' proposal for 'The Rights of Man in a Digital Age' updates to the 'Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man', allowing us to chart some of the distance travelled since 1948, as well as to contemplate the shape of things to come. It should not surprise is that HG wells was a driving force behind the thinking that produced that text. Like all such forward looking texts, they encourage us to strive for better futures and to resist those that are worse. Writing about the world he had imagined in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, Orwell advised his readers: '*Don't let it happen. It depends on you*'. His words have lost none of their potent relevance.

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# The Depiction of Disability in a Changing World: The Image of the Disabled Body in Chinese and East Asian Cinema and Literature

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The depiction of characters with disabilities in literature and visual culture has changed dramatically over the past few decades. While for centuries disability was often been viewed from the perspective of stigmas and stereotypes, which read impairments as limiting and differentiating people from the able-bodied and neuro-typical "normal" person, physical and mental impairments today are now increasingly viewed with greater sensitivity in ways that are empowering and enabling. Works of fiction, poetry, film, and art today frequently see disabled people and their bodies as an integral part of society and as part of the human experience, rather than as a marginalized other.

At the outset, I will briefly explain some terms that I will use in the course of this paper. Impairments include blindness, deafness, speech/communication disorders and more rarely loss of taste or smell. Mobility impairments incorporate amputation, paralysis, limb abnormalities, or medical conditions that can impair movement such as cerebral palsy or multiple sclerosis. Finally, cognitive impairments refer to conditions such autism and Down Syndrome that can limit mental function and intellectual development.

While the terms impairment and disability are often used interchangeably, in the humanities branch of disability studies, impairments describe the medical or physical condition of loss of function or ability, while disability engages the broader social conditions that lead to the ways in which impairments facilitate or limit a person's ability to function. For example, accessible building design, Braille signage, and sign language interpretation reduce the disabling effects of impairment for people who are mobility impaired, blind, or hard of hearing. Similarly, social constructs, biases, and stereotypes associated with impairments can also have a disabling effect, whereas efforts to include, mainstream, and engage people with impairments enables rather than disables them, suggesting that impairments need not inherently be disabling.

Disability studies scholarship has called for a move away from a medical approach based on a need to treat, cure, and rehabilitate people with medical conditions (impairments) to a social model that sees disability as stemming from biases, stereotypes, physical barriers, and other factors that limit access and integration into society for people with impairments. In humanistic studies, the goal

is to facilitate inclusion by reducing barriers, minimizing difference, and enhancing capability that allows for rich and meaningful lives free from stereotype and stigma. Disabled bodies are no longer alien, strange, inferior, or objectified, but instead become in the words of disability studies scholar Rosemarie Garland-Thomson terms "extraordinary bodies," different in a neutral or positive way.[1]

Depictions of impairments in East Asian literature and culture have developed significantly since premodern times. In earlier eras, impairments were often associated with particular stigmas or stereotypes. For the most part, blindness, deafness, mobility impairments, and cognitive impairments were viewed negatively, particularly within Confucian societies wherein disability could limit the ability to pursue a course of education, sit for and pass highly competitive civil service examinations, hold a job, marry, and have offspring. It could also limit the ability to practice filial piety and make ancestral sacrifices, making people with impairments incapable of fulfilling core social expectations. The more severe the impairment and the more it limited a person's ability to meet social expectations, the more stigmatizing the impairment would be. While Daoism as taught by the fourth century BC philosopher Zhuangzi actually privileged people with impairments as models of proper conduct for their focus on meditation and devout practice, most people saw disability as limiting and something to be feared. Career and marriage options for people with impairments were quite limited, and many resorted to begging to support themselves.

In the early modern era in China and in other East Asian countries, people with impairments continued to face bias. In China, modernizing intellectuals and the Republican government supported calls for hygiene, physical fitness, and able and neuro-typical bodies in the military and in the civilian population at large. The whole and healthy body became a symbol of a strong and healthy nation, and this left little positive symbolic potential for the impaired body. Not surprisingly characters with impairments were rare in fiction and film from this period, and in the rare cases where they did appear played marginal and largely stereotyped roles. Under the People's Republic of China, emphasis on the healthy proletarian body emerged as physical and cognitive fitness became prerequisites for serving the nation in constructing socialism. Disabled bodies did appear, but largely in roles geared to show the power of communism and Mao Zedong thought to miraculously transform people with impairments into productive citizens. In Taiwan, where healthy realism prevailed, characters with impairments appeared only rarely and were viewed as signs of karmic retribution as found in the book *Wang Yangzhong's Boat* (Wang Yangzhong de yitiao chuan), a staple of the secondary school curriculum for many years, and its film adaptation of the same name, known in English as *He Never Gives Up*. In Japan and Korea people with impairments continued to be viewed as limited in capability and use to society, though in Japan, veterans with disabilities enjoyed greater resources and respect than in China, Taiwan, or Korea.

In popular cinema of the 1960s from Hong Kong and Japan, we begin to see the depiction of leading characters with impairments in serial films, though in both cases they are martial

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1. See Garland-Thomson's *Extraordinary Bodies: Figuring Physical Disability in American Culture and Literature* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

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arts practitioners living in the premodern era. Zhang Zhe (Chang Che)'s series of One-Armed Swordsman films starring Jimmy Wang Yu situated disability in the realm of the martial arts-practicing knight errant. In the case of this Hong Kong film series, the first installment, *The One-Armed Swordsman*, the eponymous protagonist Fang Cheng loses his arm when his master's daughter cuts it off, after which he flees into self-imposed exile. He teaches himself to fight with his left hand and, with the aid of a secret book of left-hand fighting techniques, soon regains his fighting ability and handily defeats the men trying to defeat his master and his brother disciples. In spite of his martial arts prowess, Fang refers to himself throughout the film consistently as *canfei*, a term equivalent to the English word cripple, implying worthlessness. This suggests that his impairment has devalued him and made him less than human, in spite of the fact that he alone is able to defeat the men who are killing his teacher's other disciples. In the first sequel in the series, *The Return of the One-Armed Swordsman*, Fang emerge from retirement to fight a consortium of eight villainous martial artists who threaten the established and upright schools of sword-using martial arts and victimize the local people. In this film, Fang is clearly identified as the only person capable of defeating the villains and enjoys the deep respect of all who fight with or against him. The self-deprecating references are absent from this film, suggesting that Fang has now become accepted for his superior fighting skills and no longer needs to apologize for his impairment, since it in no way limits his ability and has shifted from being a negative marker of loss to a sign of strength and superior skill.

Similarly, in Japan from 1962-1989, the *Zatoichi* franchise, a sequence of twenty-six popular films and a four-year-long television series of one hundred episodes, both starring actor Shintaro Katsu, brought disability to the fore. It stars the itinerant blind masseur and gambler Zatoichi, who happens to be a superb swordsman. In the films he makes his living by gambling with dice and giving massages, though he also practices acupuncture as well as plays music and sings, typical roles associated with blind persons in traditional Japan. Given the long run of the films and their popularity in Japan, Zatoichi became one of the most widely-known characters with an impairment—specifically blindness—in Japan. Zatoichi, with his finely-honed fighting skills, is unquestionably an example of an empowered person. Yet, because of the traditional setting of the films and television programs, his role as a knight errant, his practicing expected traditional career paths for people with visual impairments, and the ways in which Katsu played him, Zatoichi remains a product of the tradition-based popular films in which he appears and does not become a model for a person with disabilities in a modern age. The modern, able-bodied viewer sees the Zatoichi character as *kowai*, that is scary or frightening, or something to be dreaded, feelings they then associate with visual impairments and the people who have them, according to Kishi Hiromi, a historian of education for the blind who is affiliated with the Kyoto School for the Blind and Deaf.[2]

Since the 1980s, views of the disabled have changed dramatically in China, Korea, Japan, and

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2. Interview with the author, June 29, 2013, Singer-Polignac Foundation, Paris, FRANCE.

Taiwan. This has been due to domestic factors such as political liberalization, social and educational reforms, economic development, and the influence of local charitable, non-governmental, and religious organizations that have advocated for rights for people with disabilities. International factors, including the United Nations year and decade for disabled people, international NGOs, charitable and advocacy groups for people with disabilities, as well as educational and cultural exchanges including study abroad opportunities have also shaped views of disability at the individual, local, and national levels. Not surprisingly, literary, filmic, and artistic works produced after this period tend in general to show an awareness of, interest in, and sensitivity towards characters with disabilities. Over the last two decades in particular, characters with disabilities have become the focus of a variety of artistic works. While not always positive, the overall trend is towards more inclusive and less objectified treatments of people with sensory, mobility, and cognitive impairments. I would like to briefly survey a variety of examples that illustrate this trend. Because I specialize in Chinese literature, film, and culture, most of my examples come from China or Taiwan, though I will introduce one Korean film to demonstrate that this pattern also applies to East Asia as a whole.

To begin with an example from literature, I turn to the work of Yu Xiuhua, a peasant poet and a woman with cerebral palsy. Through its circulation on the internet, Yu's work has rapidly gained fame throughout China over the past four years. One of the central features of Yu's work is a discussion of her own body and disability, which she treats candidly and frankly. In a manner devoid of self-pity that balances both the challenges she faces and the opportunities they afford, she chronicles the challenges she faces living with cerebral policy and the speech and mobility impairments had led to. In "I simply live brazenly," Yu writes:

> A life without a single redeeming future, loving devoid of merit
> a marriage that no medicine can cure, a body that, even with medicine, is difficult to cure.
> In a thousand fateful moments in which I should have died
> I grasp with all my life a chance to live
> and with this only chance
> I sing, I turn in my dance.[3]

Yu first acknowledges common perceptions about her life with disability—holding no future and having no accomplishments—and combines them with two aspects of her reality, a failed marriage and a body with impairments stemming from her cerebral palsy. By all rights, she notes, she should have died, but she has channeled her energy into grasping the chance to live, finding joy in her life

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3. "我只是死皮赖脸的活着" (Wo zhishi sipilailian de huozhe 我只是死皮赖脸的活着), in Yu Xiuhua 余秀华, 我们爱过又忘记 (*We Have Loved and Forgotten* 我们爱过又忘记) (Beijing: Xinxing chunbanshe, 2016), 100-101. English translation published in Steven L. Riep, "Body, Disability, and Creativity in the Poetry of Yu Xiuhua," *Chinese Literature Today* October 2018.

as indicated by her singing and dancing. Life for Yu Xiuhua may pose challenges, but it is rich and rewarding also. As a woman with cerebral palsy, someone who is doubly marginalized in Chinese society, Yu writes extensively about her body and her impairment, giving her poetry the unique perspective of a disabled writer, not simply a character with impairments created by an able-bodied author or filmmaker as is the case for the other works I will discuss.

Feng Xiaogang's 2010 epic disaster film *Aftershock* also offers positive depictions of disability, though in terms of a supporting character. Fang Da, the son of the protagonist Li Yuanni, is injured when he is caught in a collapsed building during the 1976 Tangshan Earthquake. To rescue him, a large slab of concrete that traps both him and his older sister is moved, leading all to believe that his sister Fang Deng is crushed to death. Fang Da is taken from the rubble alive, though his left arm has been crushed and must be amputated. This leads his paternal grandmother to complain tearfully that his life is ruined because he cannot hold a book and pen at the same time, meaning he will not succeed in school. For the grandmother, Fang Da's impairment means little to no future, since disability implies that one is useless, stigmatized, and incapable. For her, Fang Da becomes an object of loss and pity. Fang's mother, Yuanni, however, works to help her son succeed in school and pass as able-bodied, a goal Fang Da does not share. She aims to have him follow the educational path to career and life success, though Fang Da has no interest in going to school and taking exams. She buys him an expensive prosthetic arm, which would hide his impairment, but he opts instead for a passive cosmetic arm, a subtle way of acknowledging his disability by not hiding it. Fang Da aims to make a career for himself in the travel industry, beginning with a job as a pedicab driver. Through his hard work and effort, Fang Da works his way up through the ranks to become the owner of a large and prosperous travel agency. He also acquires the trappings of a wealthy businessman, including a home, BMW sedan, wife, and eventually a son. The film portrays him as upwardly mobile, capable, and non-objectified. He becomes a model of success for not only disabled people, but also for able-bodied people as well, a reminder that hard work and effort can facilitate success and that the traditional education-centered career path is not the only road to success. This depiction of disability may also hark back to Zhang Haidi, the mobility impaired author, translator, and later disability group leader who, in her earliest appearance in propaganda posters in the early 1980s, became a symbol of overcoming adversity through hard work and personal effort for the population at large. *Aftershock*, a main melody or politically orthodox film of 2010s, thus echoes this earlier use of the iconic model Zhang that emerged at the start of the era of reform and opening up when disability was also reappraised in China in a positive light.

The Taiwan film *Island Etude* likewise demonstrates how a character with an impairment can live a rich and full life and advance in society as is shown in the works of Yu Xiuhua and in the character Fang Da. The protagonist Mingxiang, a college student on the verge of graduation, embarks on a bicycle trip around the island of Taiwan, a popular rite of passage. Mingxiang happens to be hard of hearing and has some speech challenges, yet the film never depicts these impairments as becoming barriers to the successful completion of his trip. Loosely constructed

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from a series of encounters between the protagonist and a variety of people from all walks of life and cultural and ethnic backgrounds in Taiwan, *Island Etude* lacks a strong central narrative thread other than the bicycle journey of a young man with some disabilities. The film director Chen Huaien had previously shot a series of travel videos for a Taiwan tourism organization, and the episodic nature and visual style of the film with its emphasis on motion and travel reflect this. These features suit the depiction of Mingxiang particularly well as they highlight his capability, mobility, and inclusion. He converses freely and easily with both old and young, men and women, and foreign as well as Taiwanese people from all walks of life, engaging with each in a way that impacts their lives in a positive way. The director's frequent use of tracking shots, which frame Mingxiang riding his bicycle along highways with expansive views of the ocean and of fields, conveys a sense of his freedom of movement and physical mobility. The film empowers its protagonist and instills in him independence, competence, and confidence that allow him to function fully and meaningfully in a wide variety of situations without making him subordinate to larger narratives of overcoming of the sort found in *Aftershock*.

It is worth noting that not all films depict disabilities in a positive light, and that while the overall trend in literature and art has been to treat disabilities in increasingly progressive ways, some examples of more negative, retrograde depictions continue to appear. There is no better example of this than Lou Ye's 2014 adaptation of Bi Feiyu's novel *Tuina* or *Blind Massage*, which despite being a recent film, depicts visual impairment in stigmatized and stereotypical ways. Set in a massage therapy clinic staffed with blind massage therapists, the film focuses more on their isolation, sexual relationships, and limited career possibilities than it does on their capability, mobility, empowerment, or inclusion. While therapists with visual impairments manage operations and treat clients, they rely heavily on sighted staff who take care of day-to-day operations and the day-to-day needs of the massage physicians. The blind staff members live segregated in a dorm to which they are taken as a group by their sighted staff members, who also prepare and serve all meals. They are rarely if ever shown moving around their neighborhood, much less the city independently or taking care of their own needs. The cinematography offers point-of-view shots that are out of focus, dark, or otherwise unclear, representing the limited sight of the visually impaired staff members, but this represents the limitations of their capability rather than any sort of empowerment. The camera's gaze is at times voyeuristic, depicting private, intimate moments in an intrusive format that privileges the sighted viewer over the blind subject of the camera's gaze. Instead of showing the blind staff's capability and mobility, the film focuses on their sexual desires in a way that perpetuates stereotypes that link disability with polarized sexuality: either a complete absence of desire or passions raging out of control. Similarly, there is a tendency to show those who are blind as irrational, emotional, and unpredictable rather than as rational, intelligent, thinking people. When the clinic closes at the conclusion of the film, the plot reveals that few if any of the blind therapists continue to practice massage therapy. In fact, most seem to head off into unspecified and thus uncertain futures. The only character to continue to work in massage therapy is Little Ma,

who through an accident, regains some of his sight. This troubling ending indicates that only the sighted can live independently, hold a job, and have meaningful lives, a pessimistic view that does little more than reinforce popular stereotyped and stigmatized views of the lives of people with disabilities.

It is fair to say that in literature as well as in art, authors, filmmakers, and artists from not only China, but also other East Asian countries portray characters with disability with sensitivity and awareness and in ways that highlight capability, mobility, and inclusion. *Blind Massage* then is more the exception than the rule. In the wider East Asian context, we find this in works such as Korean director Sang-hoon Ahn's 2011 film *Blind*. A police detective drama with a blind former police cadet fighting a misogynistic serial killer who targets women, the film stars a female protagonist, Min Soo-ah, who happens to have visual impairments, is depicted as an independent, intelligent, mature, and capable woman. It shows her life in quotidian detail and reveals that she is capable of working through challenges and solving problems and crimes through the use of her native intelligence, police training, persistence, hard work, and the selective use of adaptive and assistive technology. The film also interrogates preconceptions of blindness as debilitating and offers a candid portrayal of how blind people are treated in South Korea. Those with visual impairments are frequently seen as unlucky, careless, and unintelligent. The film shows this early on when Soo-ah attempts to cross a street in a crosswalk, only to be honked at and verbally abused by impatient drivers waiting for her to clear the intersection. It also reveals bias when the police officers interviewing witnesses resist taking her statement because in their minds, her impairment precludes her from being a reliable witness. However, the film's central narrative demonstrates an alternative approach to disability in contemporary South Korea that moves beyond traditional biases. Soo-ah earns the respect of a police inspector from the southern port city of Busan on temporary assignment in Seoul. As a marginalized man from the periphery who faces bias in the metropole, he comes to believe her story and collaborate with her. Together they try to find the killer before he finds and kills Soo-ah. The film climaxes with a nighttime confrontation at the deserted and darkened orphanage where Soo-ah was raised. Soo-ah uses her blindness and adaptive technology to level the playing field with the strong, sighted, and violent killer in the thriller tradition of the Audrey Hepburn film *Wait until Dark*. Min Soo-ah triumphs over the villain when she knocks him out after she has lured him to his car by breaking a window and setting off the car alarm. The film empowers Soo-ah by placing her at the center of the plot: she moves the investigation forward, solves the crime, and captures the killer. As the film concludes, she is readmitted to the police academy, graduates, and is poised to take her first job.

In sum, over the past two decades, depictions of people with disabilities have increased in frequency in East Asian literature and art. In general, these depictions have evolved away from stereotypes and stigma that focus on disabled people as minor characters who are dependent, incapable, and lack physical and social mobility towards empowering, inclusive, and mobilizing portraits of leading protagonists with impairments. While there are exceptions to this, as seen in

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the case of *Blind Massage*, the trend overall is positive, encouraging, and real. In the case of Yu Xiuhua, a poet with impairments, we find a person with impairments as the author rather than the subject of a work of art, reminding us that disabled persons can be the creators of literary, filmic, and artistic works as well.

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# YI Gan's Inclination Toward the Learning of the Mind-Heart in the 18th Century: A Comparison with Wang Yangming's Mind-Heart Philosophy

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The study of Joseon Neo-Confucianism has recently given some attention to an inclination toward the Learning of the Mind-Heart(*xinxue* 心學), and YI Gan 李柬 (1677–1727) is at the center of this research. He was an outstanding disciple of GWON Sang-ha 權尙夏(1641–1721) and a successor to the philosophical spirit of the Yulgok School; he is renowned for initiating the Horak Debate through his controversies with HAN Won-jin 韓元震(1682–1751). In "A Thesis on the Not-Yet-Aroused State," YI asserted that the mind-heart is purely good, basing his argument on the doctrine that "*li* and *qi* are actualized as the same entity, and the mind-heart and nature are united as one." HAN Won-jin criticized this assertion as belonging to the Lu-Wang School of Neo-Confucianism.

The latent features in YI Gan's notion of the mind-heart and nature can be found by examining his debate with HAN Won-jin on the not-yet-aroused state (mibal/weifa 未發). This concerned the problem of whether there existed a psychophysical nature in the mind-heart before arousal: YI contended that the mind-heart in the mibal state is absent from the psychophysical nature, and so is purely good, whereas HAN asserted that the mind-heart is of a psychophysical nature, and thus, has both good and evil.

YI proposed that "li and qi are actualized as the same entity and the mind-heart and nature are united as one," his argument being as follows:

First, mibal has two dimensions, shallow and deep. At the shallow level, mibal refers to the state in which equilibrium is not established; and at the deep level, mibal is in a state of equilibrium, thus achieving the great foundation. The former is the ground for which HAN made his argument about the presence of good and evil in the psychophysical nature before arousal; and the latter is the basis for YI's notion of the pure goodness of the mind-heart before arousal. Of the two dimensions, the deep level is what is described in Zhongyong, which thus affirms its true meaning. YI therefore concludes that the mind-heart before arousal is purely good.

Second, in the mibal state of great foundation, nature should be in equilibrium and the mind-heart should be upright. It is important to understand that the mind-heart must be upright for nature to be in equilibrium, since no one can have a balanced nature unless their mind-heart is upright; just

as li is present apart from qi in the world of origin, but li cannot be present without qi in the world of phenomenon. YI's inference, therefore, is that in the mibal of great foundation, li and qi should be actualized as the same entity and the mind-heart and nature should be united as one.

Third, regarding the distinction between li and qi, nature is li and the mind-heart is qi. However, the qi constituting the mind-heart is not qi in the general sense, but a special category of qi, the "quintessential and bright qi." This means that the mind-heart as upright and flowing qi is different from the corporeal qi. Thus, the mind-heart composed of upright and flowing qi—which epitomizes the lord of Heaven, spiritual illumination, and bright virtue—should be distinguished from the corporeal qi, the psychophysical constitution, physical matter, physical form, and the psychophysical endowment. There is no need to consider the psychophysical nature in the unaroused mind-heart, which is not affected by the corporeal qi, and such a mind-heart is therefore purely good. YI Gan thereby rejects HAN Won-jin's assertion that good and evil are present in the psychophysical nature before arousal, and this is how YI Gan justified his contention that the mind-heart before arousal is purely good.

YI Gan's arguments on the purely good mind-heart, li and qi actualized as the same entity, and the unity of the mind-heart and nature had some considerable similarities to WANG Yangming's theory of the mind-heart. Indeed, HAN Won-jin criticized YI Gan's idea of the purely good mind-heart as resembling the Lu-Wang School's theory of the mind-heart, and this was not simply a misunderstanding on his part, but an interpretation with some degree of validity.

For instance, JEONG Je-du, a representative WANG Yangming scholar of Joseon, criticized the dualistic notions that "li and qi are separated from each other" and "li and qi are two different things," which is consistent, to some extent, with YI Gan's arguments. Also, WANG Yangming's understanding that innate knowledge is endowed equally to sages and ordinary people and never disappears seems consonant with the view which YI Gan expressed in the discussion about the analogy of steel and pools: that the substance of a mirror (mind-heart) is not the steel (corporeal qi) embodying the mirror, but its reflective capability (spiritual illumination), and that sages and ordinary people have an identical mind-heart of bright virtue which never disappears.

Then should YI Gan be considered as an inadvertent convert from ZHU Xi to WANG Yangming? By no means: he was, thoroughly and unequivocally, an ardent follower of ZHU Xi's philosophy, as is generally acknowledged by earlier research.

Indeed, YI Gan himself made it clear that his notion of bright virtue was based on that of ZHU Xi. Moreover, YI's fundamental assertion—that li and qi are actualized as the same entity and the mind-heart and nature are united as one—was derived from ZHU Xi's view on the inseparability of li and qi, together with YI I's idea of the "single path of activity of qi issuing and li mounting it" (gibal iseung ildoseol 氣發理乘一途說). And YI Gan's divergence from WANG Yangming's philosophy is more significant than his convergence: for example, WANG scholars believed that the mind-heart is li and talked much about jianyi 簡易 which means a simplicity, which is quite different from YI Gan's emphasis on self-cultivation. Also, the purpose of YI Gan's insistence that

sages and ordinary people have an identical mind-heart was to establish the ontological basis of the potential for ordinary people to become sages; as such, it was clearly different from WANG's ideas about action and practice, as revealed by such expressions as "the streets are full of sages."

All in all, it is difficult to deny that the inclination toward the theory of the mind-heart in YI Gan's notion of the mind-heart and nature was, essentially, a Neo-Confucian concept securely rooted in ZHU Xi's philosophy, albeit bearing some similarity to WANG Yangming's ideas. And this understanding provides some useful insights into the tradition of the Learning of the Way, which gave great importance to self-cultivation and practice, a distinct characteristic of Joseon Neo-Confucianism. Indeed, this can be glimpsed in YI's contention that li and qi should be actualized as the same entity, and the mind-heart and nature should be united as one: for ordinary people, if not for the sages, too often qi fails to follow the principle and likewise the mind-heart fails to follow nature.

# A New Interpretation of Wang Yangming's Doctrine of the Unity of Knowing and Acting

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## I

The philosophy of Wang Yangming has been under the profound influence of Zhu Xi although it is also a refutation to that of the Cheng-Zhu School (Tang 1990: 291-350). Wang's doctrine of the unity of knowing and acting is of no exception. Therefore, it is not difficult to find some commonalities of their views on the relationship between knowing and acting. For example, Wang agrees with Zhu on the views that genuine knowledge warrants action (Zhu 2002: 3483) and that knowing and acting reinforces each other; intelligent knowing leads to serious acting, and vice versa (Zhu 2002: 457). However, what Wang disagrees with Zhu is that for Zhu knowing is, at bottom, before acting; instead, for Wang, they are fundamentally one. The reasons why Zhu stresses knowledge first and action later are it is the normative structure of moral knowledge, and second, it is apparent to common knowledge. As to moral knowledge, Zhu advocates that (moral) pattern (*li*理) that one's heart/mind has or grasps (*xin ju li*心具理 or *zhizhi*致知), through the effort of investigating things or affairs (*gewu*格物), can enable one's intention sincere (*chengyi*誠意), which then warrants one's earnest action to act on it (*lixing*力行). Accordingly, knowing is fundamentally before acting. Also, it is right to common knowledge, as Zhu says if one wants to travel to Changan, one has to know where Changan is before one goes there (Zhu 2002: 2308). In sum, for Zhu moral and other knowledge all fall under a specific normative structure of knowing precedes acting.

In contrast, Wang has an entirely different account of moral knowledge. For him, (moral) pattern is what one's heart/mind issues (*xin ji li*心即理 or *liangzhi*), as an active response (not a passive reaction) to a particular situation encountered that constitutes an action, so is inherently motivational. Thereby, knowing and acting are just parts of one single response of the heart/mind. In response to the query about there have been people who know what should do but do not act, Wang explains that it is because of the inherent motivation of the heart/mind that brings together knowing and acting is cut off by selfish desires (*siyu*私欲), resulting in the separation of knowing and acting. On this account, if one's heart/mind can function in its original state (*benti*本體) without being beclouded by selfish desires, its active response as issuing (moral) pattern, or in other words

as good knowing, falls under a specific normative structure of knowing and acting are one.

Since Zhu has a different conception of the heart/mind that does not recognize Wang's idea of good knowing, there is no point for his followers to question whether good knowing implies knowing and acting are one. Instead, it is quite easy for them to criticize that the claim that knowing and acting are one is wrong to common knowledge. Should one not know where Changan is before one goes there? In order to reply to this criticism, there are two possible ways. One is to distinguish moral knowledge from other knowledge, defending the doctrine of knowing and acting are one is only applicable to the former but not the later. Another way is to argue that even to common knowledge, its normative structure is still knowing and acting are one. Almost all the past studies have not touched upon this criticism, or they might consider Wang did not and cannot give any reasonable reply. We aim to argue that Wang does give his reply by adopting the second way aforementioned. The evidence is in Wang's "Answer to Gu Dongqiao," where Gu has cast doubt on the view that knowing and acting are one. He says,

> Nevertheless, in the performance of a task, there must be a distinction between what to do first and what later. For example, one knows the food before one eats it, knows the soup before one drinks it, knows the clothes before one wears them, and knows the road before travels on it. It is not true that one performs an act without first of all knowing the thing to be acted on. The difference [between knowing first and acting later] is, of course, a matter of an instant. I do not mean to say that it is comparable to one's knowing today and then acting tomorrow. (Wang 2011: 47; Chan 1963: 679-680 with slight modification)

According to Wang's answer, as follows, he holds the view that even in the cases of eating food, drinking soup, wearing clothes, and traveling on the road, knowing and acting are one.

> One must have the desire for food before one knows food. This desire to eat is the intention; it is already the beginning of the action. Whether the taste of food is good or bad cannot be known until the food enters the mouth. Is there anyone who knows the taste to be good or bad before the food enters the mouth? One must have the desire to travel before one knows the road. This desire to travel is the intention; it is already the beginning of the action. Whether the forks of the road are rough or smooth cannot be known until one oneself has gone through them. Is there anyone who knows whether the forks of the road are rough or smooth before going through them? The same is without a doubt about the cases that one knows the soup before one drinks it and that one knows the clothes before one wears them. (Wang 2011: 47; Chan 1963: 680 with slight modification)

It must be recognized that Wang does not articulate his argument clearly. So we have to do the job for him.

## II

Warren G. Frisina may be the only scholar who once argued that Wang's doctrine of the unity of knowing and acting is "the structure of knowledge in all its forms." (Frisina 2002: 74) However, he does not pay attention to the dialogue between Gu and Wang quoted above. Hence, his additional argument for Wang is merely ontological. That is to say, for Wang, knowledge is not purely cognitive; instead, it is something that can reconstruct one's relationship with it and thus lead to one's self-transformation. He considers that Wang's goal "was to remove an *epistemological* dualism that focused a student's attention on learning before action." (Frisina 2002: 74) We shall not follow his line of argument, but rather to reveal three epistemological arguments, which Wang should hold for his doctrine.

First, according to Wang's answer to Gu, Wang reminds us that for all sorts of knowledge there is desire (*yu*欲) and intention (*yi*意) behind, and it is the beginning of the action. We can articulate this view as follows:

> Knowing X entails a desire for X that is a form of intention to know X, and an intention
> to know X is the beginning of the action.

Let us consider Mary sees a mouth-watering cake in the window of a bakery on her way to work. To say she sees the cake is tantamount to say she knows the cake, for knowledge would be a state of recognition. Moreover, there must be a desire for the cake together happened (*juqi*俱起), which is not limited to eating. This desire is indeed an intention that not only motivated Mary to see the cake but would also motivate her to walk into the bakery to check out or to buy the cake. Of course, this intentional action may be interrupted or changed by another intention of her, such as to go to work on time when seeing a bus is coming.[1] Accordingly, knowing and acting are one and inseparable.

One may wonder whether Wang mixes up the physical and psychological action when he takes intention as intentional action and says that "things or affairs are that to which intentions are directed." (*yi zhi suo zai bian shi wu*意之所在便是物) (Wang 2011: 6) Is this question true? Well, take any domain of human action, if it is not merely physical motion, it is necessarily intentional, where the intention is already there and serves as the beginning of the action. Admittedly, the

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1. However, Wang seems not having consider the case of subconsciously seeing or knowing that does not have a together happened desire or intention. Let us consider Mary glimpses a mouth-watering cake in the window of a bakery on her way to work. She glimpses the cake so she knows there is the cake in the window of a bakery, however, she does not have a desire for the cake together happened. As the majority of all sorts of knowledge humans have are consciously knowing, this pitfall may no be critical to Wang's doctrine.

intention can be interrupted, changed or replaced by another one so cannot reach out as action. So, Wang does not claim that the idea of intention is identical to the idea of action. What he claims is that intention and action are indeed one matter. Then we have to reinterpret Wang's statement about knowing is "*shi*始" of acting and acting is "*cheng*成" of knowing. The term "*shi* 始 " is usually translated as the beginning, and "*cheng*成" as the completion and the statement as "knowing is the beginning of acting and acting is the completion of knowing." (Chan 1963: 669-670) This translation gives the impression that there is a temporary gap between knowing and acting as if knowing is before acting although they are bound together (Chen 1991: 99). If that is so, the statement is inconsistent with Wang's doctrine of knowing and acting are one, not to say Wang made the statement at the time he advocated his doctrine. Therefore, the term "*shi*始" should not refer to the beginning; instead, "*xing zhi shi*行之始" refers to the intention that is the beginning of the action. As "*shi*始" is not a temporal concept, "*cheng*成" as well should not refer to the completion but the achievement (*chengjiu*成就). In sum, the statement means that knowing always involves the intention of knowing, which is the beginning of acting, and the knowing action achieves knowledge. Knowledge itself is a human achievement.

The second argument Wang could hold for his doctrine is that we should conceptualize knowledge as a holistic knowing process or activity.[2] It runs as:

> Knowledge C (the knowledge of Changan): There is an altogether happened desire for C (Dc) that is also an intention of knowing C (Ic), which is the beginning of an intentional action (IA). For example, we want to travel Changan, or we have to do a research project on Changan, or anything related to Changan.-------->Under the motivation of Dc or Ic, if not being cut off by other desire or intention, we will then proceed to collect information of Changan by reading books, asking people who have been in Changan, and searching Google, and so on. That is an intentional action IA1, resulting in KC1; the superficial knowledge of Changan.-------->Keeping under the motivation of Dc or Ic, if not being cut off by other desire or intention, we would go to Changan to know more about the city. That is an extension of our intentional action IA2, and because we ourself have gone through the city, we can get an in-depth knowledge of Changan KC2.-------->Still, keeping under the motivation of Dc or Ic, if not being cut off by other desire or intention, we would decide to stay at Changan for a period. That is a further extension of our intentional action IA3 that can enable us to have a more in-depth knowledge KC3 than KC2.-------->The knowing process can keep running.

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2. In thinking of this epistemological argument for Wang's doctrine, I am indebted to the inspiration of Ernest Sosa's talk on "Insight and Understanding"; the talk for the 24th Tang Chun-I Visiting Professorship of the Department of Philosophy, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, on March 30, 2017. See also Ernest Sosa, "Getting it Right,"http://opionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/05/25/getting-it-right/; *Epistemology* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2017), Chapter 5 "Knowledge as Action," pp. 71-86.

There are some implications of this holistic conception of knowledge. (1) The key to getting a higher degree of knowledge is to keep consistently our desire or intention of knowing that can further our intentional action for knowing. Also, our desire or intention can be strengthened or transformed during the whole process. Using the example of knowing Changan, our original intention may be to study Changan, but we can strengthen our intention to be having a detailed study by going to Changan if we are dissatisfied with the superficial knowledge we got from books or the Internet. We can also transform our original intention to be traveling Changan after we are impressed by photos of its beautiful landscape. The intention to study Changan and the intention to travel Changan, though seemingly different, are the same one, for they all lead us to achieve a higher degree of knowledge of Changan.

(2) On this holistic conception of knowledge, Wang notes that knowledge is of different degrees or levels (Wang 2011: 126). KC1, KC2, and KC3, as suggested in our Changan example are cases in point. Wang describes the lower degree knowledge as shallow (*qian*淺), rough (*cu*粗), and sensory and verbal (*kuoer tanshou*口耳談說) whereas he describes the higher degree one as genuine knowledge. What we usually think of only practical or technical knowledge is of different degrees, such as playing basketball or swimming, and theoretical or conceptual knowledge is not, such as mathematics and logic. However, this habitual view is doubtful. For if we can move our sight from the objective content to the subjective agent of knowledge, and understand that knowledge is necessarily what the knower knows, it is not hard to imagine that all sorts of knowledge are of different degrees or levels.

(3) For Wang, the effort we can do to enhance our knowledge from the lower to the higher level is to go through the knowing process by ourselves (*qinshen luli*親身履歷), and that is acting. He says as quoted earlier, "Whether the taste of food is good or bad cannot be known until the food enters the mouth;" "Whether the forks of the road are rough or smooth cannot be known until one oneself has gone through them." Similarly, in our cake example, we cannot know whether the taste of the mouth-watering cake is good or bad until we take a bite of it. The taste of the cake deepens and extends our knowledge of it and thus be called genuine knowledge. By comparison, our seeing or knowing the cake is shallow and rough. In other words, to go through the knowing process by ourselves is to carry out an active inquiry, which can enable us to transform our knowledge from the stage of secondhand to firsthand, just like from KC1 to KC2 and KC3 in our Changan example. Here, the transformation involves a higher order reflection as well as an extension of knowledge.

(4) Wang's holistic conception of knowledge, moreover, implies knowing and acting are not bound together but are interpenetrating. Although the term Wang uses to associate knowing and acting is "*heyi*合一" that means the unity or to unify, as if knowing and acting are the two to be unified, he clearly expresses that his teaching is pragmatic, like using medicine to heal the sickness of the people of his times, who have separated knowing and acting (Wang 2011: 5). Wang adds, however, that his teaching is not merely pragmatic and also aims to convey a certain view about knowing and acting are essentially one. He says, "if this is understood, then when only knowledge

is mentioned, action is included, and when only action is mentioned, knowledge is included." (Wang 2011:5; Chan 1963: 670) If using the words of Ernest Sosa, the teaching of Wang is to say "judgment and knowledge itself are forms of intentional action" or "knowledge as action." (Sosa 2017: 71) Although Zhu Xi also emphasizes the mutual reinforcement of knowing and acting and hence their inseparability, they are not one but the two that should be bound together. By contrast, Wang emphasizes the mutual reinforcement of knowing and acting because they are an interpenetrating one. That is why Wang deliberately exchanges the descriptions of knowing and acting. He describes knowing should be sincere and earnest (*zhenqie dushi*真切篤實), which are used to describe acting, but if knowing is an intentional action, then it can be said as sincere and earnest. He describes acting should be intelligent and discriminating (*mingjue jingcha*明覺精察), which are used to describe knowing, but if acting is the process of knowing, then it can be said as intelligent and discriminating (Wang 2011: 47, 232, 234). After all, "knowing and acting are two words saying one effort." (Wang 2011: 233)

(5) To know is to learn, so Wang's doctrine is the same to claim that learning and acting are one, as he puts it, "For all sorts of learning, there is no learning that is without acting, for the beginning of learning is already acting." (Wang 2011: 51) The examples he gives are one has to pull the bow and shoot the arrow to hit a target so that one can be said as learning archery, and one has to hold the brush and dip it in ink to write on paper so that one can be said as learning calligraphy. Although his examples may have the impression that only practical learning and acting are one, Wang ascribes to all sorts of learning the oneness with acting. That is why he interprets the five steps of learning in the *Zhongyong*, including extensive study (*boxue*博學), careful inquiry (*shenwen*審問), careful thinking (*shensi*慎思), clear discrimination (*mingbian*明辨), and earnest practice (*duxing*篤行), are all about acting for learning and not only earnest practice refers to acting. Consider an example of John is learning arithmetic in his mathematics class. He learns to multiply seven by seven is forty-nine from the multiplication table which his teacher tells him is true. He thereby knows through deference the truth of the multiplication table but falls short in his understanding of why the table is true. If he does have an intention to learn arithmetic, saying out of intellectual curiosity, which is not interrupted, he then will be motivated to carry out an active inquiry to know the underlying principle of multiplication and hence gets an insight of his own into understanding why the multiplication table is true. In other words, he has transformed his learning from the superficial to the genuine, from the lower level to the higher level of knowledge, and from the secondhand to the firsthand, which deepened and extended what he learned.

Now, we have to consider some possible criticism from the perspective of Zhu Xi. Zhu scholars might argue that it is not necessary to adopt the holistic conception of knowledge offered by Wang. It is because if one conceptualize knowing from a local perspective, we can find at some point knowing is before acting, such as using our Changan example, KC1 is before IA2, and KC2 is before IA3. Antonio S. Cua also considers that there should have a differentiation between different stages of knowledge, as he calls knowledge that is anterior to action as 'prospective knowledge'

and knowledge that is posterior to action as 'retrospective knowledge' (Cua 1982: 15). Since Cua does not think that Wang intends his doctrine to apply to all sorts of knowledge, the distinction between prospective knowledge and retrospective knowledge is all about moral knowledge. For him, when knowledge is before action, it is prospective knowledge anticipating the moral dimension of a situation; and when the action leads to the completion of moral knowledge, it engenders retrospective moral knowledge that is knowledge confirmed by actual experiences (ibid, 69). Regardless, we can find as well at some point acting is before knowing, such as IA1 is before KC1, IA2 is before KC2, and IA3 is before KC3. Here, Zhu scholars might further argue that it is therefore optional to adopt either a local or a holistic perspective of knowledge.

Would Wang accept this conclusion? Well, no doubt he would reject it. As we mentioned earlier, Wang reiterates that the prevailing view on knowing first and acting later is not a minor mistake and that his doctrine aims not only to correct this mistake pragmatically but also to reveal the original state of knowing and acting that they are one. The reasons Wang would propose to argue against adopting the local perspective of knowledge are: (1) It does not pay attention to the fact that for any knowledge there is always an altogether happened desire that is a form of intention to know, and that is already the beginning of acting. In other words, it is not aware of the fact that knowledge itself is a form of intentional action. (2) It then does not notice that the essential to obtain genuine knowledge, the higher level or firsthand knowledge, lies on nurturing the desire or intention of knowing not to be interrupted to carry out itself in the end. (3) More worrying, it implies the suggestion that there is not a single intention but are different intentions going through the process of knowing. One has to have the intention of knowing and then to make up another intention to act on what one knows and then to make up an additional intention to know what one can know from one's action and then make up another additional intention to act on what one knows from one's action, and so on. Consider the examples Wang uses from the *Daxue* of loving beautiful colors and hating bad odors to convey his view on knowing and acting are one. When one sees a beautiful color, one likes it upon seeing it; similarly, when one smells a bad odor, one hates it upon smelling it. What Wang wants to stress in these examples is that there should be no gap between seeing (knowing) and like (acting), or smelling (knowing) and hate (acting). Furthermore, what enables the gap does not exist between knowing and acting is the single intention that is going through the course. Accordingly, Wang says, "as soon as one sees a beautiful color, one has already liked it. It is not that one sees it first [that is one's intention is directed to] and then makes up one's mind [another intention] to like it;" "as soon as one smells a bad odor, one has already hated it. It is not that one smells it first [that is one's intention is directed to] and then make up one's mind [another intention] to hate it." (Wang 2011: 4; Chan 1963: 669 with modification) That is to say, if one's intention of knowing is interrupted by another intention such as selfish desires, there is the separation of knowing from acting.

Let us turn to the third epistemological argument for Wang's doctrine. This argument is predicated on his understanding of the inner structure of the knowing capability. That is, according

to Wang, the person or the body (shen身), the heart/mind (xin心), intention (yi意), knowing (zhi 知), and things or affairs (wu物) are all one (Wang 2011: 6-7, 27, 53-54, 86-87, 103). In response to a query about how the external things and affairs can be the one with the body, the heart/mind, intention, and knowing, Wang replies,

> Ears, eyes, mouth, nose, and the four limbs are the body, can they see, listen, talk, and move without the heart/mind? The heart/mind wants to see, listen, talk, and move, it cannot do so without ears, eyes, mouth, nose, and the four limbs. So without the heart/mind, there is not the body, and without the body, there is not the heart/mind. However, referring to the extensity, it is the body; referring to the control over the body, it is the heart/mind; referring to the emission from the heart/mind, it is the intention; referring to the intelligence of the intention, it is knowing; referring to which the intention is directed, it is the thing or affair. All are one. (Wang 2011: 103)

In another context, Wang puts it, " The heart/mind is the lord of the body, intentions are the emission from the heart/mind, knowing is the original state of intentions, while things or affairs are that to which intentions are directed." (Wang 2011: 6-7) All these illustrations suggest that for Wang, the inner structure of the knowing capability is the ground for his having the appropriate conceptions of the body, the heart/mind, intention, knowing, and things or affairs as well as his teaching of knowing and acting are one.

The above discussion can help reveal how this inner structure of the knowing capability operates in the formation of knowledge. As to all sorts of knowledge except the moral one, it runs as follows: (1) The person or the body is the agent. (2) The heart/mind is cognitive, and (3) the intention emitted from the heart/mind is intentionally to know, which is already the beginning of acting. (4) If this intention is not interrupted, it then can carry out itself as knowing and acting are one. (5) As a result, the agent can obtain genuine knowledge through the mutual reinforcement of knowing and acting, which is generated from their interpenetration.

As to moral knowledge, it similarly runs as follows: (1) The person or the body is the moral agent. (2) The heart/mind is moral, which Wang names it good knowing, and (3) the intention emitted from the heart/mind is to like good and to dislike evil, which on the one hand simultaneously gives the moral agent the knowledge of good and evil and is the beginning of a moral action on the other. (4) If this good intention is not interrupted, it then can carry out itself as knowing and acting are one. (5) As a result, the moral agent can obtain genuine moral knowledge that is also genuine moral action through the mutual reinforcement of knowing and acting, which is generated from their interpenetration.

To conclude, Wang does intend his doctrine of the unity of knowing and acting to apply to knowledge in all its forms. Therefore, the difference between moral knowledge and other knowledge lies not in their shared normative structure of knowing and acting are one. Instead, it

lies in their nature, effect, and origin. In short, for Wang, moral knowledge is different from other knowledge because it is normative knowledge, so it should have a unique binding force on our behavior, and more importantly, it is our self-knowledge.

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# On the Buddhist Conception of Human Beings as Dream Apparitions[1]

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## Introduction

The present paper was written for the 5th World Humanities Forum, held in Busan from October 31 to November 2, 2018. Corresponding to the theme of the conference, "The Human Image in a Changing World," the paper addresses an important but underrepresented strand of Buddhist thought and belief, namely the idea that the whole world, including the bodies of human beings living in it, are a mere mental creation. In the classical texts of this tradition, the whole of existence is described as a dream, formed collectively by the minds all living beings. In the formation of this dream, human beings are not more or less important than other forms of life. This article is aimed at a general audience and outlines some of the implications, historical developments, and modern interpretations of this world-view.

## 1. The Place of Human Beings in the Universe: When Medieval Europe Met Buddhism

In medieval Europe, human beings saw themselves in a clearly defined place in nature: 1. God had firmly placed them in the middle of the universe, on a solid earth around which sun and moon revolved. 2. The whole world, including animals, had been created for the sake of human beings. Only human beings had a soul, and God had formed them in His own image, as the crown of creation. 3. Human beings had a free will to choose what they wanted to do. Just like Adam and Eve had made a free, independent choice to eat forbidden fruit, human beings were free to choose between good and evil.

This proud and stable self-image of human beings received serious blows in the modern era: 1. Copernicus and others showed that the earth revolves around itself and around the sun. Human beings were no longer at the center of the universe. 2. Darwin outlined how the *homo sapiens* had

evolved from earlier species, just like any other animal on earth. 3. Darwin later turned to human body language and showed that that much of human behavior correlates to the behavior of other animals.[2] This suggested that humans were not completely "free" to choose between good and evil. An animalistic part of human consciousness was hidden from plain sight, controlling human thoughts and wills in obscure ways. The uncontrollable parts of the human mind were later unveiled by Freud, who presented his theory of the three humiliations in 1917.[3] Human beings were no longer in control, no longer the crown of creation. Paradoxically, technical and intellectual progress had factually brought Europeans unprecedented control over nature and other humans, while it had gradually deprived them of their assumed position as the natural rulers of the world. While they were spiritually dethroned, they were factually empowered.

Even after the discoveries of Columbus and Galileo had set the sprit of critical inquiry and exploration in motion, the breakthrough to modernity was basically limited to Europe and European settlements overseas. When non-European cultures were confronted with European modernity, they were, on the one hand, overwhelmed by modern military technology, while on the other hand, they looked back on cultural developments quite different from what had happened in Europe (and her overseas settlements) before and after 1492. Pre-modern cultures all over the globe held different beliefs about the place of humanity in the universe, and modern advances in biology and cosmology affected their beliefs in different ways. Buddhism, in particular, seemed to have always advised a rather humble place for humans in the universe.

## 2. No Self: Buddhist Meditation and Theories of Human Nature

Buddhist traditions transmit hundreds of speeches by the Buddha, who lived in India in about the fifth century BCE. Since he lived several centuries before the widespread use of writing in India, it is not quite sure which of these speeches go back to the Buddha himself. The oldest manuscripts of Buddhist doctrines date from around the first century CE. They were found in the Hindukush mountain range between Central Asia and the Indian subcontinent, in modern-day Pakistan and Afghanistan. According to these manuscripts, Buddhism denied that there is a pure, immortal "self" (in Sanskrit: *ātman*) at the core of living beings, while all other Indian religious traditions euphorically praised the *ātman*.

In order to realize that there is no *ātman*, Buddhists practiced a specific meditation that is widely popular to the present day: first, the meditator visualizes his or her own body, looks at its different parts, the internal organs, and so on, and asks whether a "self" can be found in each of the parts. Having not found a "self" in the body, the meditator then examines his or her feelings, conceptions,

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2. Darwin does not dwell on the questions of free will and the soul in his 1872 *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* but acknowledges that the subject he is dealing with is broadly related to the "relations between the physical and moral realms" (Darwin's translation of M. Lemoine's phrasing "rapports du physique et du moral"). See Darwin 1998: 8.
3. See Freud 1917: 3–7.

intentions, and perceptions, and asks, again, whether they are as permanent and self-reliant as a true "self" is expected to be. The meditator finds feelings, conceptions and so on in constant change, without a permanent core. Notably, it was presupposed that a pure and unchangeable "self", if it exists, must be *in control* of itself, and upon contemplation, the meditator found that there was neither control over the ailing and ageing of the body, nor was there control over feelings, thoughts, and sense perceptions.[4] Buddhist monks and nuns probably first used this meditation technique merely as a practice in humility and non-attachment, without attempting to challenge other traditions. Still, over time, "no self" (*an-ātman*) emerged as the unique trademark of the Buddhist tradition. What humans (and animals) instinctively perceive as "myself" (distinct from the environment) is merely a conglomerate of changing, impermanent parts that are not under their control.

Some Buddhist monks and nuns practiced this meditation for many hours every day, developing its various stages. In order to overcome the instinctive idea that the body is in any way stable, lasting, or the self, some even went to funeral sites and looked at corpses in different stages of decay. They would then, in meditation, recall those images vividly, to the point that these images appeared to them just as real as the actual bodies they had seen.[5]

## 3. What is Real? Atomism and Hellenic Buddhism

Already in ancient India, more than two thousand years ago, not everybody was pleased to hear that there was no true self. Already the Buddha, it seems, adapted his teaching style to the mindsets of his listeners, depending on the occasion. The solid and simple layman would mostly receive teachings on living life in a peaceful and successful way. The teachings on the absence of a self were mostly given to monks and nuns, who had abandoned their homes in search for the higher truths, and to spiritual seekers of other traditions who came to ask or challenge the Buddha on philosophical issues. Lay Buddhists mostly relied upon Buddhist monks and nuns for prayer and blessing, and followed the Buddha's advice on how to maintain peace and stability in one's family and community.

Since the laity supported the monastic order with donations, the enthusiastic meditators could devote much of their time to the visualizations and contemplations about the absence of the *ātman*. The disassembling of the human body and mind led to further insights: to be sure, no lasting "self" can be found anywhere within the body, but if that is so, is there actually a "body" as such, or is there no more than an assembly of various parts? While the term "body" is a convenient description for this assembly, a real "body" does not exist, just like the self. And even looking at the liver within the body, is there a real liver, or is it, again, only a convenient term for something that only mind considers as an entity? When deconstructing the human body in this way, one may ask, where

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4. See Buswell and Lopez 2013, s.v. *Satipaṭṭhānasutta*.
5. See Schmithausen 2018, n. 69.

does this analysis stop? Normally, one can rightly demand from a religion to provide a somewhat assuring, comforting truth. Nonetheless, the possibility that the body could be disassembled to infinity was potentially less comforting.

An influential Buddhist group in northern India thus decided to make a distinction between, on the one hand, unreal things which consist of smaller parts, and on the other, real smallest building blocks, the atoms of which composed things consist.[6] The theory is basically consistent with Democritos' doctrine of indivisible (Greek: *a-tomos*) particles and was particularly strong in the Hindukush mountain range where Alexander's invasion of northern India (BCE 326–324) had established Hellenic dynasties. There, monks and nuns lived in monasteries built of stone (while in the Ganges plains, straw or wood were predominant) and began to write down the Buddhist teachings on manuscripts, a practice probably inspired by the literal culture of the Hellenic kings. The manuscripts were easier to preserve in the cool and arid northern mountains, while they would quickly rot in the Indian plains, where the hot and humid climate had once brought Alexander's army to its knees. The meditations of "no self" were still practiced and passed on orally to novices, but at the same time, scholars began to write down their insights and exegeses in manuscript and founded monastic colleges for higher education where these manuscripts would be kept and explained.

One group of scholars wrote down a list of seventy-five "real" building blocks of mind and matter, a periodic table from which all phenomena derive. Some of those elements could appear in combination, others could not, and it was discussed how and why that was so. This analytic approach laid the foundation for significant advances in Buddhist systematics, as well as in geography, medicine, architecture, grammar, formal logic, mathematics and other "wordly" subjects. In this way, the colleges of the Hindukush brought a wave of progress to the Indian subcontinent and the regions where Buddhism later spread.[7] The resident colleges in the north were the models for the famed Buddhist colleges in the Indian plains, such as Nālandā which housed several thousand resident scholars by the sixth century, and they inspired foreign monastic schools such as Samyé in Tibet or Nara in Japan.[8]

Although "atomist" scholars of the north in the northern mountains greatly advanced education and science in the pre-modern world, many Buddhists considered such theoretical pursuits unessential to the Buddhist path. Buddhist monks and nuns were expected to aim at overcoming the world spiritually, gain insight into the supramundane, and guide others along the Path. Explaining how things work *in* this world (in terms of physics, medicine, astronomy and so on) was not necessarily seen as the task of monks and nuns but rather as a diversion from the Path. When Buddhist scholars wrote treatises in those days, they often by declaring their *motivation* for writing this particular treatise, and clarifying how it fits the overall aim of liberation from suffering, for

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6. On atoms in Buddhism, see Buswell and Lopez 2013, s.v. *paramāṇu*.
7. These developments are outlined in Beckwith 2012.
8. See Bayer (forthcoming 2019).

themselves and for all sentient beings. Still, as a matter of fact, many had tasted the sweetness of free and factual inquiry and found delight in more "worldly" sciences, not directly related to the liberation gained by the Buddha. This was not liked by everyone, and furthermore, it was rightly questioned whether those atoms (or smallest building blocks) factually existed.

## 4. No Self in Living Beings, No Self in Things

While early Buddhist meditators had looked at body and mind and found no "self" in it, the northern atomists had concluded that there must be indivisible building blocks of mind and matter. Not everybody, though, saw this as a necessary consequence. Why should things be divisible down to a smallest part and no further? In the second century CE, the South-Indian monk Nāgārjuna emerged as the speaker of a scholastic tradition that directly opposed the atomism from the northern mountains.[9]

Nāgārjuna questioned whether mind, matter, and even time factually consisted of indivisible units. For the sake of simplicity, let us here focus on material atoms only: Nāgārjuna objected that however small an atom may be, it must still be divisible into smaller parts. It must have a certain length and height, however miniscule. Atoms without length or height cannot possibly be combined into "things" with a palpable length or height. In order to form any larger structures, the atoms would have to combine, and in order to combine, they would at least need a left side and a right side at which they could connect (or, top and down, front and back), and in order to have sides, they would need to have size. Thus, one can always speak of a left part and a right part of an atom, however small it may be.[10] An indivisible atom without parts is logically impossible. While things always appear to us as consisting of smaller units, they must ultimately be quite different from that. In Nāgārjuna's terms, material things and so-called atoms are "empty" (*śūnya* in Sanskrit), and so are mind and time. However far one seeks for a core, there is no core.

Does this mean that matter does not exist at all? Certainly not, as a simple thought experiment can demonstrate. For this experiment, let us assume that Demokritos and the Indian atomists imagined an atom to be something like an extremely small and solid ball or marble. If we were to cut this ball in half, we would find no core. Nonetheless, on the left and right of us, the halves would still be there. Cutting all atoms in the universe in half would mean a lot of cutting, and we would still have two huge piles of half atoms to the left and right of us. Nothing would ever disappear, even if we were, then, to cut the halves in half, their halves in half, and so on, *ad infinitum*. Matter is empty, but at the same time, matter is not nothing. Nāgārjuna's way of explaining this fact was more abstract, but the above thought experiment explains it quite well.

Although his argument was compelling, Nāgārjuna produced only a *logical* proof that atoms still

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9. The questioning of reality as a whole, and the specific theory of "emptiness" (*śūnyatā*) probably predates Nāgārjuna by two hundred years or more. See Buswell and Lopez 2013, s.v. *Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā*.
10. See Vaidya 1960: 301 (verse I.71 of Nāgārjuna's *Ratnāvalī*).

consisted of parts and must be divisible–theoretically. At his time, there was no evidence that this would work in practice, and the northern atomists continued to flourish for centuries. Humanity had to wait for Lise Meitner and Otto Hahn to finally split the atom, and as could be expected, nothing on a sub-atomic level has yet been found that would qualify as an inseparable singularity.

Thus seeing "emptiness" as the nature of matter, Nāgārjuna and his followers boldly propagated that emptiness manifests as matter, a doctrine known from the the "Perfection of Wisdom" *sūtra*s.[11] Matter is empty, but conversely, emptiness is also matter. In the same way, since time has no smallest units, time must be empty. Since our feelings, conceptions, wills, and perceptions have no smallest units, they must be empty, too. Emptiness manifests as time, and emptiness manifests as mind.

However much we search for independent things, or smallest parts, we will not find them. What we will find, though, is interaction. Although things have no real core, they somewhat miraculously work in relation to each other. The interaction of things works reliably, and still, ultimately, there are no "things" that interact. An Indian clay jar, for example, surely holds water. It effectively interacts with water, but if we break it and look at the parts, we will find no "real" jar in them, even on the subatomic level. This quite closely corresponds to Bertrand Russell's realization that "events, not particles, must be the 'stuff' of physics."[12] Nonetheless, while Russell was still in search for common-sense physics, Nāgārjuna felt no obligation to look for any "stuff" and said that interaction is the same as emptiness.

## 5. A Universe from Nothing: How?

Although Nāgārjuna's reasoning was irrefutable, he did not answer the fundamental question how these empty things come about. If matter was at the core empty, how can it manifest? How can emptiness generate the illusion of a tangible reality? Nāgārjuna and his followers contented themselves with pointing out what was ultimately true: "things" are an illusion. The somewhat "worldly" question how the illusion was generated was of little concern for them.

This time, the response came again from the north, where there was more of a taste for such worldly issues. It seems that some scholars in the north saw that the "Perfection of Wisdom" and Nāgārjuna's reasoning were ultimately correct, but that they lacked a solid explanation for the "worldly" phenomena that the atomists had discussed in detail. While Nāgārjuna vaguely referred to the world as a dream, this was not a scholastic explanation of the origin of illusion, especially when compared to the sharpness of atomist scholasticism and Nāgārjuna's refutation thereof.

Perhaps unexpectedly, help came from those meditators who had practiced the visualizations of the human body with great intensity. In their hours of practice, some Practitioners of Meditation (Sanskrit: *yogācārag*) visualized the human body so intensely that they saw it *just as real* as the

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11. See Buswell and Lopez 2013, s.v. *Prajñāpāramitāhṛdayasūtra*.
12. Russell 1945: 832.

bodies they had seen *in natura*, in front their physical eyes.

The vivid, clear images of meditative visualization proved that mind as such had the capacity to produce a reality *just as real* as our everyday perception. The visualized image was a much stronger argument than just saying that our reality is like a dream or an illusion: even though dreams appear to the human mind clearly and vividly while dreaming, there is a mental mechanism that leads us to either forget dreams completely or to remember them in a somewhat hazy way. The visualized image, though, is vividly perceived in waking consciousness.

While it can be proved that matter cannot possibly be what we assume it to be, it can also be proved that mind has the capacity to produce the illusion of matter.[13] Scholars were now sure that the world was generated by mind alone, and this allowed for a continuation of the worldly analyses of the atomists, under the premise that all phenomena were ultimately empty, as Nāgārjuna had taught.

The situation was in a way similar to modern science: In fields such as chemistry or mechanics, the specific laws and questions of the subatomic level rarely play a role, and much of modern science can be conducted *as if* atoms were rather stable combinations of "real" electrons, neutrons and positrons, *as if* time was a stable, linear continuum, and so on. In the same way, monks in the monastic colleges of northern India could study the natural philosophy of the atomists and applied sciences such as architecture or medicine in some classes, while studying emptiness and the creation of the world by mind in others.

## 6. The "Practitioners of Meditation" in the Golden Age of India

The northern Indian "atomist" tradition of periodic tables and classifications was fused with Nāgārjuna's southern tradition of emptiness around the time when the south and north of India were fused into a single kingdom under the Gupta dynasty (c. 350–550 CE). Nāgārjuna had written his critiques of the atomists in the second century CE, while he was affiliated with a South-Indian dynasty in a real war with the North-Indian patrons of the atomists. In the fourth century, the Gupta dynasty conquered the territories of both opposing kingdoms. At that time, two famed scholars called Asaṅga and Vasubandhu came from the northern mountains to the Ganges plains, the homeland of the Guptas, and strove to unite different Buddhist traditions from all over India into a coherent whole. The name of their tradition derived from those Practitioners of Meditation (Sanskrit: Yogācārāḥ) who had achieved mastery in visualization. While Asaṅga focused on collecting and harmonizing doctrines from various Buddhist traditions, his younger brother Vasubandhu, who had formerly been a well-known master of the northern atomists, now used his fame in order to convince them of the new doctrines: emptiness and the world being generated from "mind only" (Sanskrit: *citta-mātra*).

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13. See Duckworth 2011: 31.

### 7. Do Living Beings Create the World? Opposition to the New Doctrines

Although Asaṅga and Vasubandhu held sway over their times and were held in high esteem at the Gupta court, their fusion of doctrines was naturally not readily accepted by everyone in the older traditions. Many atomists were not in favor of the new illusionism and the somewhat nihilistic doctrine of emptiness. In order to convince them, Vasubandhu wrote treatises in which he pretended to uphold that the material world was real and independent of mind. Interwoven with such "realist" arguments, he skillfully inserted some dogmatic problems that would be unsolvable without accepting emptiness and "mind only" (*cittamātra*). This would hopefully cause his readers to take these problems seriously and eventually come to accept the Yogācāra world view.

In the beginning, the followers of Nāgārjuna's tradition seem to have had no objections to Yogācāra doctrines. After all, Nāgārjuna himself might not have objected to studying the advanced scholasticism of the atomists under the premise that it was all ultimately empty. It was only years after the passing of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu that some admirers of Nāgārjuna began to voice objections. According to those critics, the Yogācāra tradition had not fully accepted the doctrine of emptiness and allegedly claimed that mind exists, while matter does not exist. Nonetheless, this is not what Asaṅga and Vasubandhu meant to say by the term "mind only"

(*citta-mātra*). Mind produces the illusion of objects, and it also produce the illusion of "existing" objects, as different from "non-existing" objects. "Existence" and "non-existence" play a role only on the level of mental projection; ultimately, they are obsolete categories. The very conception of "existence" versus "non-existence" is fundamentally flawed and applies to neither mind nor matter from the ultimate point of view. Mind and matter are ultimately in a state beyond existence and non-existence, of "non-dualism between existence and non-existence" (Sanskrit: *bhāva-abhāva-advaya*).[14] This Yogācāra doctrine of non-dualism matches Nāgārjuna's theory that mind and matter are emptiness, while emptiness is also mind.[15] In the Yogācāra tradition, in order to produce the dreamscape of the world, mind does not have to "exist" in an absolute and static sense. Although this seems paradoxical, the realization of "mind only" (*citta-mātra*) brings with it a realization of a "mindless" (*a-citta*) state. The full understanding of this apparent paradox can only be gained through intense study and contemplation, and the meditative realization of "non-duality of existence and non-existence" constitutes the breakthrough to highest insight.

### 8. Preserving Public Sanity: Hidden "Mind-Only" Doctrines

On the meditative path of Asaṅga's tradition, insight into "non-duality of existence and non-existence" leads to the peak of meditative insight, to the union of "mind only" and a mindless state. Nonetheless, the path does not end there. Similar to a mountaineering map, the treatises of the

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14. Dayal 1932: 289.
15. Dayal 1932: 238.

Yogācāra tradition describe not only the way to the peak, but also the peak itself and the descent on the other side. Firstly, from the vantage point of highest insight, the meditator gains an overview of the condition under which humans and other living beings go through their lives: Being misled by their minds only (*citta-mātra*), they pass through birth, death and rebirth in a chain of interactions which they hold to be real. Having understood the condition of deluded beings, the realized Yogācāra practitioner does not remain in elevated contemplation but descends from the peak with a sincere interest in the different mindsets of living beings. Having understood different individual mindsets, he or she provides them with the best possible support, in view of their individual knowledge and aspirations.

A particular group of living beings, for example, were the erudite few who had already studied the extensive treatises of atomist analysis and classification. Vasubandhu composed tailor-made treatises for them, leading them gradually from their present mindset to the truths of emptiness and "mind only."

The followers of Nāgārjuna thought about these things quite differently and were in need of a different approach. Asaṅga is credited with compiling an extensive treatise that matches their particular mindset. In this book (the *Bodhisattva-bhūmi*), we find the main ideas of Nāgārjuna rephrased and presented in a skilful way. At the same time, advanced scholars and practitioners are warned not to teach the doctrine of emptiness (*śūnyatā*) to untrained people since "emptiness" could deeply unsettle them.[16] There were indeed various risks in teaching emptiness to outsiders: Primarily, ordinary people could misunderstand "emptiness" as nihilism, as teaching that nothing at all exists and that nothing really matters, which could have a devastating effect on the functioning of society. This was surely not the real intention of "emptiness", but there was a real danger that the Brahmanic rivals of Buddhism could accuse Buddhists of propounding such nihilism. By the time of the Gupta dynasty, India had developed a lively tradition of public debates, often held in the presence of the king or local policy makers. Since rulers were naturally interested in promoting economic growth and uplifting public morale, the accusation of nihilism could weigh heavily against the Buddhists.

In order to avoid such misunderstandings, the followers of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu chose not to mention the doctrines of emptiness and "mind only" in public debates with non-Buddhists. Rather, they reverted to the complex "realist" system of the atomists, albeit in moderate form. They did not strongly emphasize that the atoms "exist", modified the list of indivisible parts of mind and matter, and only covertly hinted at the higher Yogācāra doctrines. For debates with non-Buddhists, they used Vasubandhu's "hidden Yogācāra" treatises that he had once written in order to gently guide the atomists to the higher truths of Yogācāra. On this basis, two scholars in Vasubandhu's tradition, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, wrote guidelines for Buddhist arguments against Brahmanic doctrines such as the pure self (*ātman*) or a creator god.

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16. Dayal 1932: 248f. See also Buswell and Lopez 2013, s.v. *bodhisattvasaṃvara*.

## 9. Further Opposition to Yogācāra Doctrines in Tibet and East Asia

In the 8th century CE, the Tibetan king invited Indian Buddhist masters to spread Buddhism in Tibet. His vast Tibetan empire was still illiterate, and a Tibetan script had to be invented based on the Gupta script. The first Indian monks in Tibet were masters from the enormously successful Indian Buddhist colleges. They brought with them not only writing and state ritual, but also a philosophy that was a balanced combination of (moderate) atomism, emptiness in Nāgārjuna's tradition, and the "mind only" thought of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. Nonetheless, in the centuries that followed, Tibetan Buddhist orders were strongly involved in politics, and doctrinal arguments were used against political rivals. By the 18th century, those Tibetan scholars prevailed who claimed that the Yogācāra tradition had in fact held mind to be existent, matter to be non-existent. The question had become a political issue of highest order, and the older, more balanced view of the early Indian missionaries was marginalized.

In the Chinese Tang dynasty, "mind only" doctrines and higher learning were popularized by the imperial translator Xuanzang (c. 602–664) who had studied in the Buddhist colleges of India and Central Asia. Nonetheless, higher education in Buddhist monasteries was somewhat affected by the rise of Chan (Korean: Seon, Japanese: Zen) Buddhism. When Chan monks began to form a distinct tradition of East-Asian Buddhism, they considered Vasubandhu to be one of their Indian forerunners and basically accepted the doctrine of "mind only". Still, Chan masters came to emphasize silent, non-analytical meditation and poetry, at the expense of systematic study (such as the theories of the atomists) and ontological analysis. It remains to be investigated whether they had to act under rulers who thought that higher education should be in the hands of Confucian scholars, especially after Buddhism had been persecuted in the later Tang dynasty (845 CE).

## 10. Modernity: "Mind Only" Comes to the West

The above developments played a major role when Buddhism gained popularity in Europe, Australia, and the Americas after World War II. In the 1950s, Zen was popularized overseas by Japanese monks and lay practitioners. Zen brought an enormous cultural benefit to the West but also led to an image of Buddhism as being centered upon silent, non-analytical meditation and refined poetry. Even though the foremost proponent of Zen, D.T. Suzuki (1870–1966), was an academic Buddhologist and conducted research in Indian mind-only thought, his writings on mind only were far less popular than his Zen books.

When Tibetan scholars arrived in the West as refugees after 1959, Tibetan Buddhism gained an equally large following, which raised the question whether the Tibetan critique of "mind only" would apply to Zen. Some Western scholars, inspired by Zen, jumped to the assistance of "mind only", without, unfortunately, reading the original writings of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu sufficiently. Trying to defend the "mind only", they held that Yogācāra had never claimed matter to be a mere

mental projection.

This argument was meant to fend off the accusation that Vasubandhu had held mind to be inherently existent. Nonetheless, the two questions whether matter is a projection of mind and whether mind exists inherently were not necessarily connected in Buddhist discourse. They were necessarily connected in Western discourse only: Plato most famously held that individual things were unreal, while the ideas of these things were real. Thus, when the name for Plato's doctrine, "idealism", was applied to the world-view of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, this inevitably led to confusion. Now Western scholars debated whether or not "mind only" was idealism, mostly ignoring fact that they would have to define the term "idealism" in the first place, before any fruitful discussion could take place. Adding insult to injury, this all came at a time at which Bertrand Russell had rightly pointed out the risks and misuses of idealism, as exemplified in the authoritarian state outlined in Plato's *Republic*.[17]

It only added to the general confusion about "mind only" that after the end of European colonialism in the 1950s, Buddhist scholars in Asia searched for common ground among all Buddhist traditions, underestimating the fact that Yogācāra was quite distinct from the Therevāda tradition of Sri Lanka, Burma and Thailand, and from the Gelugpa tradition of Tibet. Although classical Yogācāra meant as unifying doctrine between "emptiness" and atomism/realism, it rests on a thorough and explicit scholarly argument about the nature of mind, matter, and "existence," and naturally, not all traditions accepted these arguments had preserved their distinct doctrines into modernity.

As if that weren't confusing enough, there were also those treatises that Vasubandu and his followers had written in order to convince the Buddhist atomists (Sarva-asti-vādins) and non-Buddhists of their ideas. In order not to overwhelm their somewhat "realist" opponents, Vasubandhu and his followers had (in these specific treatises only) hidden their "mind only" views behind other arguments, such as saying, for example, that mind can perceive itself (mental images) when reliving past events. In the 1970s to 1990s, some modern defenders of Yogācāra did not know the purpose of these treatises and took them to represent the real "mind only" doctrine.

And, as if that weren't confusing enough, still, some critics of Yogācāra in ancient India referred to the revealed sacred texts (*sūtra*s) of Yogācāra and claimed that the scholastic Yogācāra commentators had misinterpreted them. The original *sūtra*s, those critics claimed (against all evidence), had never taught matter to be a mental creation.[18] The arguments that were, in seventh century India, used to denounce the Yogācāra scholastic commentaries, were now used by some Western scholars to defent the *sūtra*s against the accusation of "idealism."

It should be clear by now that the situation in was highly confusing, especially for those who did not read the original revealed sacred texts (*sūtra*s) and scholastic treatises of the Yogācāra tradition. And so it happened that, over several decades, some modern scholars (with the best of intentions)

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17. See Russell 1945: 105.
18. See Bayer (forthcoming 2018).

argued against "mind only", which they took to mean that mind inherently exists, to which other scholars (with the best of intentions) replied that "mind only" never meant that matter was a mere mental projection. Both parties somewhat missed the point. While the critics spoke about mind, the apologists spoke about matter, both not acknowledging that in classical Yogācāra, mind generates the world while mind itself is empty. The few scholars who specialized in reading the actual treatises of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu were first puzzled by the debate, and early words of caution remained unheard.[19]

Fortunately, the situation has now greatly improved. There has been some amount of insight that, in order to understand Asaṅga, one needs to read Asaṅga first, and in order to discuss the "idealism", one needs to define the term "idealism" first. In public discourse, a number of recent introductions to Buddhism still contain the misinformation that Asaṅga never held matter to be a mere mental projection, and the same idea has been spread all over wikipedia. Still, the actual meaning of "mind only" is now documented in an entry on "Vasubandhu" in the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, and there exist several articles countering the misinterpretation of "mind only" in detail.[20]

## 11. Summary and Conclusions: The Human Image of Classical Yogācāra, Its Past, Present, and Future

Religious traditions have a natural tendency to provide uplifting and assuring explanations for our being in the world. The Abrahamic traditions placed human beings in control of a stable world, and most Indian traditions saw a pure self (*ātman*) at the core of the human condition. The Buddhist tradition went in the other direction and demanded that the spiritual seeker abandon even the instinctive the idea of a self, on the grounds that the changes in one's body and mind were uncontrollable.

In the centuries after the Buddha (c. 5th century BCE), progress in agriculture and statecraft were making the Ganges basin one of the most densely populated regions of the world. Freed from the immediate struggle for survival, Buddhist monks and nuns started to seek truth instead of immediate benefit, to the point of even denying the very core of our evolutionary struggle, the idea of a "self." Paradoxically, this rejection of immediate benefit and the search for higher truths eventually contributed to the elevation of the human race. Critical inquiry led to advances in science and education, and from the fourth century CE, the "Golden Age of India" saw monastic colleges with thousands of students, leading to widespread literacy within the Buddhist order–while Europe was still trudging through the Dark Ages.

Nāgārjuna (c. 2nd century CE) had taken the willingness to abandon certainties to the next level and proved that there was nothing "real" in one's body, mind, and surroundings, even on the most microscopic level. The doctrine of emptiness included a complete deconstruction, not only

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19. See, for example, Hall 1988.
20. See Schmithausen 2005, Taber and Kellner 2014, Bayer 2017.

of common assumptions, but even of the intellectual achievements of Buddhist scholasticism. Obviously, emptiness, when misunderstood, can be dangerous. If human beings see themselves as non-existing in a non-existent world where nothing matters, they lose control and direction. In order to counteract such defeatism, the "mind only" doctrine of the Practitioners of Meditation allotted some amount of control to the mind, the subject. With their minds contributing to the creation of collective reality, living beings were to some extent "masters in their own house" (in Freud's terms). "Mind only" encouraged personal responsibility and a sense of direction. While in Abrahamic traditions, the world was created for human beings (as the crown of creation), in "mind only", human beings, along with animals, perpetually create their own world (as the root of creation).

Though effectively steering clear of nihilism, "mind only" brings along its own dangers and pitfalls. Human beings who fancy themselves the omnipotent creators of reality, unbound by external laws of nature, will either collide with these laws at some point, or cause their followers to collide with them. Asaṅga adamantly taught that "mind only" does not place us above the laws of cause and effect in everyday life, and Nāgārjuna had taught the same truth about emptiness.

When rightly understood, "mind only" further implies maintaining a reasonable distinction between self and others (the above-mentioned core of evolutionary struggle). Human beings are equipped with the ability to recognize themselves as separate from their natural surroundings and to recognize their own will as separate from the wills of others. When the healthy distinction between self and others is overridden by thinking the whole of existence to be a mere mental creation, this can lead to all kinds of exploitation against which our inborn sense of separateness was meant to protect us. Individual separateness is not true in the ultimate sense (and this is already implied in the contemplation of "no self"), but this separateness needs to be maintained once one rises from the meditation cushion.

Bertrand Russell saw a connection between the the lack of individual freedom in Plato's *Republic* and Plato's idealism. And indeed, modernity has seen no short supply of abusive religious cults claiming that reality is just a dream. For these reasons, contemporary traditional Buddhist orders seem to be partly reluctant to teach "mind only" and emptiness in public, but it is exactly these orders that continue to lose members to new religious cults. The question how to teach emptiness and mind only in public is as acute as it was 1700 years ago.

Regardless of social consequences, the ultimate question about "mind only" should probably be, "Is it true?" In 1945, Russell observed that "while physics has been making matter less material, psychology has been making mind less mental."[21] This tendency has continued to the present day. History has proved biology right: so far, no amount of immaterialism has freed a human being completely from the animalistic drives first pointed out by Darwin and later laid bare so masterfully by Freud. On the other hand, modern physics has proven that our normal perceptions of time, space,

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21. Russell 1945: 833.

and matter need an update, as even the most unadventurous physicist will admit. The materiality of our neurons, synapses, and the electrons moving within them has been challenged. Still, whatever the future will reveal about the nature of mind and matter, it will probably not change the fact that we are animals, even if this is all just a dream.

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Cultural Giving-back: A New Realm of the Exchange between Human Civilizations, with the Sinicization of Buddhism as a Case Study

Zhang Zhigang

# Cultural Giving-back: A New Realm of the Exchange between Human Civilizations, with the Sinicization of Buddhism as a Case Study

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## I. New Concept: "Cultural Feedback" and Case Study

This essay attempts to present a new theoretical concept, namely, "cultural giving-back". As the term suggests, the so-called "cultural giving-back" refers to a particular form of civilizational exchange that involves a return of cultural achievements back to its native place, with an attitude of gratitude or in the spirit of reciprocation.

If we see the history of human civilization as a long process of exchanges and mutual learning, clearly ever since basic ways of transportation and communication came into place, civilizations have started to make contact, and then regularly interact, in the meantime learning from each other and converging with each other (while of course also getting into contention, conflict, or even combat, etc.). Thus, as the age of globalization dawns and the global village becomes reality, such a phenomenon that we may tentatively call cultural giving-back is likely to become more and more common in the field of cultural exchange: one civilization had once learned from another civilization some excellent cultural elements or advanced cultural products, such as those in the realms of science, technology, literature, art, philosophy and religion, which, after processes of mixing and adaptation, have become assimilated into the learning culture, and, after still more hammering and tempering, become welded into the local culture in the form of new inventions, artifacts, works, theories, ideas, ethos and wisdoms that are characteristic of the new native culture - such is the instance of giving back, when the new results that are often more excellent and mature are contributed, i.e. "given back" to the human civilization as a whole.

As is well-known, the five-thousand-year history of the Chinese civilization contains a large number of records of Sino-foreign cultural exchanges and mutual learning. Those include but are not limited to such important moments as the "Silk Road" that originated in the Spring and Autumn Period and prospered during the Tang Dynasty, the two expeditions led by Zhang Qian to the Western Regions (referring to the area that includes present-day Xinjiang, parts of Central Asia and beyond) during the Han Dynasty, Zheng He's seven voyages to the Western Seas (referring to the region west of the South China Sea), the transmissions to overseas of China's "four great

inventions", its porcelain and tea culture, the import of Indian Buddhist culture, Western Christian culture and Arabic Islamic culture into China, the great journeys taken by two Tang monks, Xuanzang (602-664) and Jianzhen (688-763), the former going west to bring Buddhist scriptures back from India and the latter travelling east to bestow them on Japan, the communication of Western learning to China and Chinese learning to the West in the early modern era, and much more recently, the introduction of Marxism from Europe to China, and so on. If, by taking a forward-looking and constructive approach, we would like to look at a positive moment in the history of Sino foreign cultural exchanges, not only as a nice example of the exchange and mutual learning between human civilizations, but also to explore the theoretical value and practical significance of the aforementioned concept of "cultural giving-back", "the Sinicization of Buddhism" probably serves as the best case study possible. Let us start from Xuan Zang's journey to India for the Buddhist scriptures.

Why do we want to use "the Sinicization of Buddhism" as an example and start with Xuan Zang's journey to the West for Buddhist scriptures? As a matter of fact, a lot of research has been done by Chinese scholars on these two topics and their historical significance has been fully recognized. For instance, Wang Jienan, in his recently published *A History of Sino-Foreign Cultural Exchanges*, points out: "Buddhism is the oldest one of the world's three major religions, and it is also the largest religion in China. Both Buddhism and the Indian culture that it represented are the first foreign cultures that the Chinese people came into contact with on a large scale in their national history. After the integration of the foreign Buddhist culture into Chinese culture, it has become an inseparable part of the Chinese traditional culture."[1] Also, Lai Yonghai, in the fifteen-volume *The General History of the Chinese Buddhism* that he edited, points out that "in the history of Chinese Buddhism, even in the history of China, Xuan Zang should without doubt be regarded as one of the greatest Chinese individuals. As a senior Buddhist monk, he travelled alone in spite of all sorts of difficulties, all the way to Tianzhu to seek Buddhist scriptures for China. His significance has already gone beyond the scope of Buddhism, and he has become a symbol of the unyielding spirit of the Chinese nation, which for over a thousand years has inspired the Chinese nation in its striving. For Buddhism, Xuan Zang is not only the greatest scholar in the history of the propagation of Buddhism in China, but also a great synthesizer who has inherited orthodox Buddhist teachings from India. His translations of Buddhist scriptures and commentaries are both vast and refined. They are most effective in promoting the true teachings of Buddhism, and have left extensive and profound influence in the history of Chinese Buddhism, the history of Chinese culture and of Chinese thought.[2]

It is of particular significance that during recent years, as the Belt and Road Initiative was

1. Wang Jienan, *A History of Sino-Foreign Cultural Exchanges*, Taiyuan: Shanxi People's Publishing House, Beijing: People's Publishing House, 2011, p. 85.
2. Lai Yonghai, ed. *The General History of the Chinese Buddhism*, Vol. V, Nanjing: Jiangsu People's Publishing House, 2010, p. 381.

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put forward and into practice, the significance of such themes as the Sinicization of Buddhism and Xuan Zang's journey to the west for Buddhist scriptures for promoting Sino-foreign cultural exchanges, and for presenting Chinese culture and Chinese religions to the world, have increasingly attracted the attention of the political, religious and academic circles of China. Xi Jinping, President of China, in his address delivered at the UNESCO headquarter, pointed out that Buddhism originated in ancient India, but since it came to China, it has gone through a long process of evolution, integrated with both Confucian and Taoist cultures, and developed a Buddhist culture with Chinese characteristics, which has profoundly influenced the religious beliefs, philosophy, art and literature, rituals and customs of the Chinese people. During the Tang Dynasty, Xuan Zang traveled through hardships to India for Buddhist scriptures, which demonstrates the determination and perseverance of the Chinese people to learn from foreign cultures… The Chinese people developed Buddhist thoughts based on the Chinese culture, formed unique Buddhist theories, and helped Buddhism spread to Japan, Korea, Southeast Asia, etc. The exchange and mutual learning between civilizations is a strong impetus for the progress of human civilization and peaceful development of the world. Also, when President Xi Jinping greeted Prime Minister Modi of India at the Dacien Temple of Xi'an, he said to the latter, "last year you accompanied me to visit Gujarat Bong which is your hometown, and which you explained was where Xuan Zang the eminent Chinese monk had studied Buddhist scriptures. After Xuan Zang returned to China, it was here at the Dacien Temple where he translated those Buddhist scriptures. This temple thus has witnessed a history of friendly exchanges between China and India. The reason we reflect upon the exchanges and mutual learning between the civilizations of China and India, is thus to further promote friendly exchange between the two countries and to add new impetus to the development of Sino-Indian relations." Modi also said that Master Xuan Zang is a symbol of the cultural exchange between India and China. His journey to India has served as a connection that has linked the two nations ever since.[3]

The author believes that if we could combine the above two aspects in our consideration, it is possible to uncover a new academic perspective based on existing research, i.e. the "comparative study of Sinicization of foreign religions", which will be further discussed in the following sections.

## II. New Perspective: Comparative Study of the Sinicization of Foreign Religions

Among the five major religions in China today, only Taoism is both native and local, and the rest, which include Buddhism, Islam, Catholicism and Christianity (Protestantism), are all "foreign" by origin. Generally speaking, they were all imported through the northern and southern "land and maritime Silk Roads" to China: the entry of Buddhism can be traced back to the Han

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3. See Xi Jinping: Address at the UNESCO Headquarter (03/37/2014), Xinhua Net (http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2014-03-28/c_119982831_2.htm); "Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Modi Visit Xi'an" (05/14/15), Xinhua Net, (http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2015-05-14/c_127802254.htm).

Dynasty (circa. 2 BC); that of Islam is during the 2nd year of the Yonghui reign period of Tang Dynasty, which is 651 AD. In contrast, the arrival of Christianity in China had experienced twists and turns in a process of making "four entries". This includes first the coming of the Nestorian sect during the Tang Dynasty, next that of what is known as "Yelikewen" during the Yuan, then the coming of Catholicism in late Ming and early Qing, and finally the (re)entry of Catholicism and Protestantism just before and after the Opium Wars. The above historical facts are sufficient to show that the ancient Chinese civilization has always been inclusive, and the world religions mentioned above have indeed been welded into the cultural tradition of China to various degrees. Although the Chinese academia has traditionally attached importance to the study of the localization or Sinicization of foreign religions, a comparative approach that is inter-disciplinary and comprehensive has been rather lacking. Therefore, building upon the related results of existing research, the comparative study of the Sinicization of foreign religions will surely help us to sum up and learn from the historical experiences and lessons from an academic perspective, and to develop new concepts, ideas and initiatives that are more positive and constructive for promoting Sino-foreign cultural exchange and mutual learning in the future. In order to expound the scholarly conception of this new perspective and its research potential, I ask for your patience and that we first peruse this long quotation included here below:

Christianity is different from Buddhism; Chinese people did not ask for Christianity... The westerners came to evangelize, their mission was internally compelled. Believing that their orders were from God, they focused on getting into China and did not ask where their power was coming from. As a result, Christian mission was protected by treaties, and backed by the political powers of the West. Zhang Bohuai, who is a friend of mine, once said, "Christian evangelization (in China) at the beginning of the nineteenth century was an act of aggression. The missionaries from the West, backed by the military power of their native countries, forced the religion that they believed in on China. As to whether the Chinese people welcome it, how Christianity may benefit the Chinese lives, they had hardly given any careful thought to them. The twentieth century started with the Boxer Uprising. Ever since then…the Chinese sentiment against Christianity started to grow everywhere imperceptibly… to the point of such indignation that "peace cannot be restored in China before this harm be eliminated". As a result, the Great Anti-religious Alliance was formed in 1922, followed by anti-Christian propaganda and establishments after the Nationalist Party decided to ally itself with Soviet Russia and the Communists." (see *Lu Duo*, Vol. 7, page 1.) As Christianity was propagated, not on its own merits, but relying on foreign forces, it was unavoidable that some Chinese believers tried to defend themselves, or bully others, with the help of foreign powers, and that the Chinese started to differentiate between the people and the believers, treating the latter as traitors, to the effect that "when Mount Kun is caught in flames, jade and stone are destroyed indiscriminately". Since those Chinese that converted to Christianity came under suspicion of betrayal, surely the religion that they believed in could not integrate with and feed back to the Chinese culture. This is probably one unfortunate reason that Christianity and the Chinese nation

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came to be at odds with each other."[4]

This above passage was written 80 years ago. Only with a knowledge of its author's background could today's readers possibly understand his words correctly in its historical context. Zhao Zichen (1888-1979) is one of the most influential Christian thinkers in modern China. He is not only seen as "the founder of Chinese Christian philosophy and systematic theology", and "the forerunner for the reform and innovation of the Chinese church", but also known as "the pioneer thinker that advocates the Sinicization of Christianity". Thus, it was from the bottom of his "Chinese heart" and out of deep "love for the nation" that Zhao Zichen reflected, in a strikingly "rational and critical" manner, on the particular background against which "Western Christianity" entered China just before and after the Opium Wars, and on the unfortunate consequences that we now all know of. The purpose of his theoretical reflection was thus to rediscover the "true Christianity", i.e. the real face and true spirit of Christianity, so that the "Christianity as an excellent foreign culture" may truly integrate into the Chinese culture, the Chinese nation and the Chinese society.[5] This is the first thing that needs to be understood. Second, 80 years have passed by since the time of his writing, during which the Chinese society has undergone tremendous changes. It is possible to say that the Christian church in China has to a large degree localized or Sinicized. However, when speaking of "Sinicization of foreign religions", the majority opinion of experts and scholars within China and abroad is that, Buddhism has already been integrated with the traditional Chinese culture, Islam has also become part of the large family that is called the Chinese nation, while comparatively speaking, the Sinicization of Christianity still seems to have a long way to go. This relatively shared view thus shows that we may still refer to the theoretical reflection that Zhao Zihun attempted many years ago for historical lessons. Next, it was when comparing the Sinicization of Christianity and Buddhism that Zhao Zichen originally made the discussion cited above. In his article "The Chinese Nation and Christianity", Zhao has a detailed analysis of "the six reasons why Buddhism has been able to become a Chinese religion". Although not all of his reasons may seem objective to us today, the conclusion that he arrives at through comparative analysis proves to be very thought-provoking: "The Chinese sought Buddhism, while the opposite was the case for Christianity - the Westerners brought it in through economic and political aggression." Obviously, this statement has its historical limitation. That is, the observation about Christianity should be mainly limited to the activities of Western missionaries and their unfortunate consequences just before and after the Opium Wars.

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4. Zhao Zichen, "Chinese Nationality and Christianity", first published in *The Truth and Life* (1935), Vol. 9, Issue 5, 6; also in Zhang Xiping, Zhuo Xinping, eds. *The Journey of Enculturation: A Collection of Academic Essays on the 20th Century Chinese Christian Culture*, Beijing: China Radio and Television Publishing House, 1999, pp. 18-33.

5. It should be noted that this observation made here reflects less the sentiment of this author than Zhao Zichen's own thinking. In another famous writing entitled "Chinese Nationality and Christianity", Zhao said, "we are Chinese, and live in the Chinese environment, but we also absorb the cultures of the world and Christianity, and have once lived comfortably in the realm of Chinese thoughts and ideas"; "What we should think carefully is how to retain the spirit of our culture, how to develop this culture so that it can harmonized with the world's cultures and continue to grow." See for more details Zhao Zichen, "Christianity and the Chinese Culture", in *The Journey of Enculturation: A Collection of Academic Essays on the 20th Century Chinese Christian Culture*, p. 2, 6.

Now that we are fully aware of this necessary qualification, we could give more careful thought to Zhao's historical insights, that is, the two terms of "qiu" (seek, or sought after) and "bu-qiu" (not seek, or not sought after) as he put it.

Zhao Zichen points out that if the Chinese need religion, they must seek it for themselves. There are three kinds of "seeking": "seeking in action", "seeking the Scriptures" and "seeking the text", meaning, respectively, "to practice what one preaches," "to seek the Scriptures and true teachings from their place of origin," and "to translate the Scriptures to his/her own native language". Zhao cites examples and shows that Chinese Buddhism has made great achievements in all the three aspects. It is my view, nevertheless, that if we could adjust the order of these three, it may appear more logical, and more consistent with the historical processes of the Sinicization of Buddhism, that is, first "seeking the Scriptures", next "seeking the text", and then "seeking in action". In this way, the critical significance of Xuan Zang's journey to India for the Buddhist Scriptures and his translation project become apparent.[6]

On the motivation, processes and achievements of Xuan Zang's journey to India and his translation project, there are a multitude of historical records and research works available. For the sake of brevity, I shall mainly offer the research of Fang Litian (1933-2014) as support for my argument: Xuan Zang (about 602-664) was born a bright child in a poor family. At the age of 13 he became a Buddhist monk. Before going to India, he had already visited everyone who could teach him, studied the teachings of all schools, and was elected one of the "ten elders of the Zhuangyan Temple". However, detecting variance between Buddhist doctrines taught in different places in China, he was keen on finding a solution and was determined to travel to India for the original scriptures. Historical records show that Xuan Zang spent 17 years on his trip to and back from India, which covered 25,000 kilometers in distance and spanned 110 countries and regions, and he brought back to China 520 boxes or 657 volumes in total of Buddhist scriptures in both the Mahayana and the Hinayana tradition. After Xuan Zang returned home, he declined Emperor Tang

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6. On the significance of Xuan Zang's pilgrimage for the Scriptures and his translation project, Zhao Zichen points out: Fa Xian, Xuan Zang and hundreds of other monks took countless risks and endured severe hardships on their climb of Congling and many snow mountains on their way. They had to find a way where there was no way, and to survive where there was no life. Many of them died on their trip going there, or on their trip coming back, or in the foreign land, because of all sorts of dangers, diseases, lack of food, or the cold, in spite of which they pressed on, determined to seek the Buddhist Scriptures and teachings from the masters in its place of origin. They were forced to go to India by their heart, as if they received ineffable truths in the air. With such men doing so, the wide spread of Buddhism was simply unavoidable. This is the example of seeking a religion at its origin. As for the necessity of seeking the texts (meaning scriptures) of a religion, Buddhism can indeed claim having had great feats. In the beginning, the translation of scriptures were done by the foreigners at such places as Yuezhi, Anxi, Yutian, Tianzhu. Later, as the Chinese came to have a good knowledge of Sanskrit as well as the environment and background of Buddhism, and they also knew well Chinese literature and history, they started to translate the texts themselves. Thus, after such figures as An Shigao (安世高), Lokaksema (支娄迦谶), Zhiqian (支谦), Dharmarakṣa (竺法护), Kumarajiva (鸠摩罗什), Dharmakṣema (昙无忏), Paramartha (真谛) and Yan Cong (严琮), we find Xuan Zang Master of the Tripitaka and Yi Jing Master of the Tripitaka and others, whose translations are everywhere identical in the idea but all distinct in their voices. When we read the biography of Xuan Zang of Cien Temple, we will see how great his life achievements and his translation works have been. (Zhao Zichen, "Chinese Nationality and Christianity", in The Journey of Enculturation: A Collection of Academic Essays on the 20th Century Chinese Christian Culture, pp. 25-26.)

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Taizong's suggestion that he resume secular life and take up a position at the imperial court. Instead Xuan Zang wrote as promised *The Account of a Journey From the Empire of the Great Tang to the West*, and devoted all his time and energy to the translation of Buddhist scriptures. With the support of the imperial government, he spent another 19 years in translating systematically into Chinese the key sutra texts and commentaries of the Yoga, Abhidhamma and Prajna traditions, including for instance the 200 volumes of Mahā-Vibhāshā (大毘婆沙, the Great Exegesis) of the Hinayana branch of Buddhism, Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽师地论, Discourse on the Stages of Yogic Practice), and 600 volumes of *Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra* (大般若经, Large Perfection of Wisdom Sutra) of the later Madhyamaka school. The translation project that Xuan Zang presided over dealt with the Buddhist theories that dated back to the peak years of the Nalanda Temple, which was the highest Buddhist institution of learning then in India. For that reason the Chinese translation is commonly known as "the New Translations", and is praised as "having ushered in a new era in the Chinese history of scripture translation". Since Xuan Zang brought the scriptures back and started the translation project, many talents came to study under him and work form him. As Xuan Zang was extremely knowledgeable in the Tripitaka (三藏, Three Treasures), he came to be called Master of the Tripitaka, which was an unprecedented recognition in his time. That he has been popularly referred to as the "Tripitaka of the Tang", or the "Tang Monk", is indeed the highest praise and respect for this venerable monk.[7]

To sum up the above discussion, we can see that as an example of Sino-foreign cultural exchange and mutual learning, Xuan Zang's pilgrimage to India for Buddhist scriptures and his translation project are symbolically significant for us in at least two ways. First, from the perspective of comparative study of the Sinicization of foreign religions, if the triple "seeking" discussed above has some academic value, and more over, for any foreign religion, "seeking the Scriptures" and "seeking the text" may be seen as the two indispensable premises or steps of localization, that is, only after the authentic scriptures are sought out and translated faithfully into another language could they be possibly "sought after in action", i.e. to be practiced, approved and spreaded, all in a different cultural context and social situation, we could perhaps compare the triple "seeking" to "three musical movements" during which foreign religions are able to take roots, blossom and bear fruits. Indeed, if without Xuan Zang's journey to India for the scriptures and his translation project as the "prelude" and "continuation", to still follow the metaphor of music, there is no way that we would ever reach a "climax" in the process of Sinicization of Buddhism.

Second, when reviewing the thousands of years of Sino-foreign cultural exchanges, previous researchers at home and abroad tend to discuss at length the "majesty of the Tang Dynasty". Generally speaking, the achievement of political progress, economy development and cultural prosperity during the Tang Dynasty (618-907) has its roots mainly in Tang China's open and friendly stance toward the outside world, and its readiness to accommodate their differences and

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7. See for more detail in Fang Litian: *Chinese Buddhism and Traditional Culture*, Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publishing House, 1988, pp. 71-74.

learn from each other. Chang'an, which was the capital city of Tang Dynasty, may be regarded as the center of Sino-foreign political, economic and cultural exchange of the time. The land and maritime communication and transportation network, of which Chang'an was the focal point, extended in all directions. Tang China was in friendly exchange with more than 70 countries and regions.[8] Hence it had seen the "first peak" of Sino-foreign mutual learning and cultural exchange.[9] As mentioned above, the introduction of Indian Buddhist culture into China may be said to be the "first large-scale contact" between Chinese culture and foreign culture. As for the historical process of the Sinicization of Buddhism, since its entry into China during the Western and Eastern Han dynasties, Buddhism had gone through a long period of clashes and collisions but started to integrate into the Chinese culture from Eastern Jin dynasty on. During Sui dynasty and Tang dynasty, the eight major sects of Chinese Buddhism took shape, which include Tiantai, Sanlun (the Three-Treatise sect), Cittamatra, lüzong (the Vinaya sect), Huayan (the Garland sect), Tantra (the Esoteric Buddhism), Jingtu (the Pure Land sect) and Chan (the Zen Buddhism), and have gradually become an integral part of Chinese culture. The basic structure of China's traditional culture, which is also its distinct feature, i.e. the three traditions of Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism forming a tripartite balance, at once mutually constitutive and self-differentiating, was exactly formed during this extraordinary period of Tang Dynasty.[10] Therefore, in my opinion, if we can build upon the existing research by making a theoretical investigation into Xuan Zang's pilgrimage to India and his translation project during the majestic Tang period, and thus into the Sinicization of Buddhism, all within the macro context discussed above, we will be able to envision a desirable situation where civilizations engage in cultural exchange and learn from each other.

## III. New Realm: Theoretical Value and Practical Significance

The reasons that the author, starting with Xuan Zang's journey to India for the scriptures and his translation project, and using the Sinicization of Buddhism as the example, expounds the concept of "cultural giving-back", and moreover perceives it as a desirable state for the cultural exchange and mutual learning between human civilizations, are mainly as follows:

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8. See Wang Jienan, *A History of Sino-foreign Cultural Exchange*, "Chapter IV: Sino-Foreign Cultural Exchange during Sui and Tang Dynasties".

9. Lou Yulie said, "the Tang Dynasty is the one period when China had absorbed the most from foreign cultures. Not only foreign religions but also literature, art and so on had integrated into the traditional Chinese culture, to the point that we were not even able to distinguish between them later on. Nowadays we can only tell from the name that something was originally foreign. For example, Hu Qin, which we see as a Chinese music instrument, is in fact brought in from the West. Why is it called Hu-Qin? It's because ancient Chinese called people from Western countries Hu-ren (men of Hu). So, foreign cultures poured in during the Tang and was absorbed and integrated, thus enriching the traditional culture of China. (Lou Yulie: *Lectures on the Methods for the Study of Religion*, Beijing: Peking University Press, 2013, p.44.

10. For more details see Lou Yulie: *Lectures on the Methods for the Study of Religion*, pp. 34-46.

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**1. It helps to promote the idea of cultural exchange and mutual learning between human civilizations.**

About the exchange and mutual learning between the Chinese and Western civilizations, Bertrand Russell, the famous British philosopher, who is also the most influential public intellectual of Euro-America in the twentieth Century, once said:

> There is at present in China, as we have seen in previous chapters, a close contact between our civilization and that which is native to the Celestial Empire. It is still a doubtful question whether this contact will breed a new civilization better than either of its parents, or whether it will merely destroy the native culture and replace it by that of America. Contacts between different civilizations have often in the past proved to be landmarks in human progress. Greece learnt from Egypt, Rome from Greece, the Arabs from the Roman Empire, medieval Europe from the Arabs, and Renaissance Europe from the Byzantines. In many of these cases, the pupils proved better than their masters. In the case of China, if we regard the Chinese as the pupils, this may be the case again. In fact, we have quite as much to learn from them as they from us, but there is far less chance of our learning it. If I treat the Chinese as our pupils, rather than vice versa, it is only because I fear we are unteachable.[11]

The above quotation is from Russell's *The Problem of China* (1922), a collection of his essays on China published in the British newspapers after he visited the country between October 1920 and July 1921. Russell's visit took place during China's New Culture Movement and the May 4th Movement, when was a high point of the Chinese intellectuals' effort to learn from the Western culture, and the ideological trend of Westernization was at its height. Reading Russell's discussion today may still raise thought-provoking questions for us. For instance, what are the consequences of the encounter and collision of different civilizations? Is the progress of human civilization a process of "learning from the more advanced"? Whether there exists the phenomenon of "the pupil outdoes the teacher" in the processes of human civilizations? Obviously, Russell's own answers to those questions are rational and objective. He not only fully affirms the importance of learning from advanced cultures in the history of human civilization, but also avidly suggests that cultures switch the roles of teacher and student between themselves and learn from each other.

Since the ideas Russell put forward have become part of the international mainstream thinking or even basic consensus in the study of cultural exchange and intercultural dialogue, if we could introduce the concept of cultural giving-back, as well as the rich Chinese experience it contains, to the theories and practices of Sino-foreign cultural exchange and mutual learning, it will surely make a significant positive impact. In that regard, let us use the example of the Sinicization of Buddhism

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11. Bertrand Russell, The Problem of China, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1922, p. 185.

again for explanation. Just as Lou Yulie says, "Buddhism entered China, took roots, blossomed and bore fruits. That process has established an excellent paradigm for cultural exchange. It is the kind of cultural exchange that happens peacefully, which enables mutual absorption at equal status, whereby cultural exchange and self-enrichment takes place at the same time. Such is the general history of Chinese Buddhism. Although Buddhism died out in its native India during the 13th century, it has continued in China and is still undergoing development." [12] To follow Lou's argument, we may say that although Buddhism almost disappeared from its land of origin, which is India, within China it has taken roots, blossomed and borne fruits. How wonderful if we could today communicate the Chinese spirit of Buddhism the other way around along the Silk Road, and thus give it back to the world of human civilizations!

It is worth mentioning here that in citing the Sinicization of Buddhism as a paradigm to elucidate the concept of cultural giving-back and its significance, this author does not mean it is the only model or even the best model available. Rather, it is his intension to stress that the Chinese civilization, which is at once whole and diverse, has always kept the tradition of learning from other excellent cultures, absorbing them and making them part of her own. There is a vast reserve of past experiences in the field of Sino-foreign cultural exchange that have yet to be tapped for historical lessons and theoretical generalization, all for the purpose that human civilizations may better enjoy friendly exchange and common prosperity in the age of globalization.

**2. It helps to carry forward and develop the fine traditions of Chinese culture.**

Since the reform and opening up of China, as the nation's comprehensive strength and international influence keeps increasing, the international academia has come to pay more and more attention to the study of the history of Chinese civilization. This is not only because of the tremendous progress made by the Chinese society during the past three decades, but also due to the recognition by a growing number of scholars within and outside China that the Chinese nation that is re-emerging in our era is a civilization with thousands of years of history, which, it may be said, is the only one that has not suffered disruption or rupture in the history of world civilizations. Therefore, if we regard "cultural identity" as the highest level of identification in any civilized society, academic inquiry into the cultural traditions of China will be of particular importance for in-depth understanding of the history and current situation of Chinese society.

As far as current research is concerned, scholars within China and abroad have not arrived at a unified, comprehensive representation of the excellent traditions of Chinese culture. Nevertheless, there have been quite a few sensible and inspirational characterizations of the essence or core values of the traditional Chinese culture, such as "people-orientedness" (以人为本，yi-ren-wei-ben), "morality-orientedness" (以德为本，yi-de-wei-ben), "harmony between the heaven and humans" (天人合一，tian-ren-he-yi), "a middle course" (中庸之道，zhong-yong-zhi-dao), "harmony

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12. Lou Yulie: *Lectures on the Methods for the Study of Religion*, p. 37.

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but not sameness" (和而不同，he-er-bu-tong). It is thus this author's opinion that building on the current research on this matter, we may choose the following 20 words to both represent the excellent traditions of Chinese culture, and to feature the cultural spirit that has enabled the Chinese civilization to persevere and grow for several thousand years: "people-orientedness" (以人为本), "harmony but not sameness" (和而不同), "fully inclusive and equitable" (兼容并蓄), "all-embracing" (海纳百川，literally "all rivers run into sea") and "capacious" (有容乃大，literally "capacity makes greatness"）. That is to say, because the Chinese civilization boasts such a broad cultural vision, she has been able to continually integrate various local and foreign cultures in history; as she peacefully rises and opens to the world, she shall also be able to, today as in the past, take in and integrate all excellent cultural achievements of the other civilizations. [13]

In recent years, one hotly debated topic in the study of Sino-foreign cultural exchange and dialogue is whether or not "the more ethnic it is, the more global it becomes". If argued simply from a nationalist or universalist point of view, this debate may not be of much theoretical value or academic inspiration. However, over a thousand years of Sino-foreign cultural exchange has demonstrated that cultural exchanges and dialogues in their true sense are rich and colorful. The practical and effective ways of interaction are never one-way import or export with a nationalist or universalist label, nor are they limited to two-way or even multi-directional learning, integration and complementation. Instead, they can develop into a more complex and meaningful approach toward cultural exchange and mutual learning, which is exactly the creative practice of cultural giving-back that is characteristic of Chinese culture, and is also what this essay sets out to propose. From this author's point of view, this meaningful approach toward cultural exchange and mutual learning is not only in harmony with the aforementioned fine traditions of Chinese culture, but also able to represent the style of ancient Chinese civilization as "a state of ceremonies" (礼仪之邦) that abides by "courtesy demands reciprocity" (礼尚往来), in the international arena of cultural exchange in this age of globalization.

## 3. The cultural aspiration behind it helps to promote and deepen the exchange and mutual understanding of human civilization.

Since its reform and opening up to the outside world, China, grounded in its ancient civilization,

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13. Zhang Qizhi recently pointed out that Chinese culture boasts a "spirit of integration", and the history of Chinese thought and culture is rather a history of integration of thoughts and cultures. From the end of the Warring States period down through the Qin and Han dynasties to the Wei and Jin dynasties, the Confucian and the Taoist theories had integrated, and the metaphysics of Wei and Jin took its form. The next round of integration of Chinese thoughts and cultures started with the three religions coexisting side by side in the Tang dynasty, and culminated in the Neo-Confucianism of Southern Song dynasty. In the Tang dynasty, Buddhism absorbed some aspects of Confucianism and the Taoist thought of Lao Tzu. Some monks started to explain the Buddha nature with the Confucian idea that "all men can become a sage". Buddhist texts that specifically preach filial piety also appeared, e.g. *Sutra of Filial Piety* (《父母恩重经》). The *Baizhang Rule*(《百丈清规》) is a book of precepts for the Chan Buddhist community and was created during the same period. In keeping the idea of loyalty and filial piety and taking the form of family organization, it has helped a certain Buddhist sects to become secularized, and thus secured a cultural footing for Buddhism in China. (Zhang Qizhi: "The Chinese culture has a spirt of integration", *People's Daily*, September 1, 2015, page 16.)

has both committed to its own way of development, and reached out to the world by engaging in extensive exchanges, cooperation, mutual learning and mutual benefiting activities in the fields of economy, politics and culture. The Belt and Road Initiative which has become a hot topic in the political and academic circles during the last couple of years is just one latest experiment in this context. The Initiative, known as "the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road" in the complete form, is originally a strategic economic and trade initiative. Nevertheless, after much discussion and probing on the topic during the last two years, men of insights across fields have come to the deeper understanding that what the Initiative envisions is not only a "road of mutual respect, mutual trust, and all-win cooperation" in the economic and political sense, but also "a road leading to friendly exchange and mutual learning between the civilizations". At "the Host's Partners Dialogue on Strengthening Connectivity Partnership" on November 8, 2014, President of China Xi Jinping solemnly suggested: "we should strengthen the social foundation of Asian connectivity partnership with cultural exchange as its link. China supports dialogue between civilizations and religions, encourages cultural exchange and contact between peoples of different countries, supports joint application by the Silk Road countries for world cultural heritage, and encourages more Asian countries, regions, provinces and municipalities to establish cooperative relations." The mention of "cultural exchanges as the link", and especially of the "dialogue between civilizations and religions", is indeed worthy of more consideration here.

According to preliminary statistics, more than 60 countries alongside the Silk Road routes and international organizations have made it known that they will actively participate in The Belt and Road Initiative. Therefore, many experts have pointed out that The Belt and Road not only thread through many countries and regions, but also bring together different ethnicities, cultures and religions; The Belt and Road Initiative will bring about more convenient conditions and a better atmosphere, and, through strengthening the human and cultural exchange between different countries, regions, ethnic groups, cultures and religions, will enhance mutual understanding, respect and trust, and avoid mutual misconception and even conflict with each other, so that a plurality of human civilizations may live together in peace and enjoy common prosperity. In this regard, it is necessary for us to reconsider the important roles of major world religions in the history of cultural exchange between China and foreign countries. Just as Geng Sheng, a senior Chinese expert on this subject, points out, looking back on the history of cultural exchange between China and foreign countries, we will be surprised to find that the three major world religions have played bridging roles in that very process. For example, Buddhism, which originated in the Indian civilization, was brought to China during the Han dynasty. For nearly two thousand years, it has gone through assimilation and transformation, during which process it has not only become an integral part of the ethnic cultures in such regions as China's Tibet and Inner Mongolia, but has played a bridging role in the cultural exchange between China and such regions as South Asia, Southeast Asia and Central Asia. For another example, Islam, as the cultural foundation of the Arabic-Persian world, came to China during the Tang dynasty. For more than a thousand years it has gone through assimilation

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and transformation, and become not only the cultural component of many ethnic groups such as Hui, Uygur, Kazak, Kirgiz, Tajic, Tatar, Salar, Dongxiang and Bao'an, but also the channel of cultural exchange between China and the Persian-Arabic world. Again, Christianity, the landmark achievement of Greco-Roman civilization, first arrived in China during the Tang dynasty. After many periods of collision and running-in, it has by now become a part of Chinese national culture and a bridge for the cultural exchange between China and the West.[14]

Everywhere within or outside China, in the past or at present, people in their daily contacts hope for heartfelt exchange. Indeed, exchange of heart and mind, or of the soul and spirit, especially at the level of faith, is perhaps the most profound and significant kind of exchange in the world, and thus perhaps the most difficult to attain. However, as the Chinese saying goes, nothing is difficult if you put your heart into it. Fei Xiaotong (1910-2005), the eminent Chinese anthropologist, in his last years recapped his lifelong studies with a sixteen-word maxim, which conveys his hope for the future of human civilizations: "Each one appreciates her own beauty and recognize the beauty of the others. In sharing and celebrating the beauty of everyone, all under heaven bathe in great harmony". In presenting and expounding the concept of cultural giving-back, this essay is thus inspired by Fei's scholarly compassion, in the hope that the idea may add something new and useful to the cultural exchange and mutual learning among a plurality of human civilizations in our age of globalization.

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14. Geng Sheng, "A Word from the Translator," in Jacques Gernet, *China and the Christian Impact,* Chinese translation 中国和基督教—中国和欧洲文化之比较, Shanghai Classics Publishing House, 1991, p. 5.

# Do you see what I see? Representing War and the Human in the Internet Age

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On 1 February 2005, almost two years after the United States invaded the country of Iraq in "Operation Iraqi Freedom," an insurgent group calling themselves "the Mujahideen Brigades" claimed to have kidnapped an African-American Special Ops soldier named John Adam. Posting a ransom note on ansarnet.ws, a website once famous for carrying tough talking statements by militant groups in Iraq (and now devoted to "the best diet tips and tricks"), the kidnappers bragged at having nabbed Adam in an ambush where they also killed a number of Americans and captured the rest. "God willing," the kidnappers' internet posting warned, "we will behead him [Adam] if our female and male prisoners are not released from U.S. prisons within the maximum period of 72 hours from the time this statement has been released" (Reid, 2005). Attached to the note was a frightful, grainy image: an African American soldier wearing desert fatigues, seated on the ground, his arms tied behind his back. Hung behind the soldier was a black flag with familiar Arabic script. A rifle was pointing directly and menacingly at his head.

Needless to say, such threats are no joke. Thousands of Iraqis and more than 180 foreigners had been kidnapped in war-torn Iraq in 2004 alone, including Sgt. Matt Maupin, who was abducted and later executed (Myers, 2014). Everyone was on edge in Iraq in early 2005. But the kidnapping of Adam still came as a surprise to the US military, who admitted they had no information on this missing American soldier. "We're looking into it," was all a US military spokesman could tell the Associated Press (Reid, 2005).

The rest of the world was looking into it, too. The image of the captured soldier, with his vacant expression and oddly proportioned body, quickly spread around the internet and, by the next day, Liam Cusak, the marketing coordinator of Dragon Models, USA, a toy manufacturer, recognized Adam's face and told the military a startling fact. John Adam was not a soldier in the armed forces. John Adam was none other than Special Ops Cody, an action figure doll created by Dragon Models for exclusive sale, at a cost of $39, at Army and Air Force Exchange Services in the Middle East (Sanderson, 2005).

The ransom story quickly unraveled, and it took only hours more for the hoaxer to come somewhat clean. On another message board commonly used by insurgents, a person using the

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pseudonym al-Iraqi4 wrote: "In the name of God, the Most Merciful and Most Compassionate, Soldier John Adam is a toy." He continued:

> I am a 20-year old Iraqi young man. I am unarmed, independent and do not belong to any party or group. I apologize to all the parties and everyone, for I meant nothing by that [no harm]. The picture was a scheme that I made up with a toy that I bought with $5. Today I am announcing that this news was made up, and that the picture was of a toy that I worked on with the help of some children. I cannot provide any information about me because, as I mentioned earlier, I am unarmed, and any information about me might jeopardize my life and the lives of my family. My apologies to everyone. (Mikkelson, 2005)

We now live in an age when the huckster and the hoax have truly gone global. From Nigerian 419 scams to 9/11 truthers, we are inundated by an almost daily deluge with false promises offering instant riches or paranoid pundits offering a fabricated moral clarity. The very idea of "truth" today has perhaps never been under such sustained assault from so many corners. This is hardly surprising. Ours is a time, after all, when reality is a genre of television programming, when rumors circulate faster than fact, and when uncomfortable news is simply and summarily dismissed as "fake."

No doubt, the fraudster, the charlatan, the counterfeiter, and the liar have all been around for as long as people have been telling stories to one other. In 1873, Nietzsche remarked on the phenomenon: "Deception, flattering, lying, deluding, talking behind the back, putting up a false front, living in borrowed splendor, wearing a mask, hiding behind convention, playing a role for others and for oneself—in short, a continuous fluttering around the solitary flame of vanity—is so much the rule and the law among men that there is almost nothing which is less comprehensible than how an honest and pure drive for truth could have arisen among them" (Nietzsche, 1993, p. 80). Who could dispute the philosopher's account? In the history of the human species, lies and deceptions are undoubtedly more common than the truth itself. And if you don't believe me, allow me to offer you this large wooden horse from Greece as a token of our continued friendship, regardless of this small misunderstanding.

Still, in the postmodern era of instant communication and image manipulation, the opportunities and possibilities for hoaxing have multiplied significantly, raising concerns not only about the ever-precarious state of truth itself but also about the nature of the human image in a changing world, the very theme of our conference. The more connected we have become—not just technologically connected, but also connected through trade, commerce, culture, and even concern for averting a common catastrophe such as climate change—the more reliant we are on knowing how things *really* are, whether those things are half a mile or half a world away. And because words have always contained within them the seeds for untruth—for what is language after all but a unique gymnastics

of interpreting abstract sounds and symbols—the image has, since the rise of photography, assumed even more importance. The image has seemed so much more immediate and, even foolishly, less corruptible than the word. We would be wise, however, to pay attention to the old adage that says you should only believe half of what you hear, and none of what you see.

Nevertheless, fraudsters abound, playing on our desires to believe that what we see is true. The short-lived genius of al-Iraq4's kidnapping deception (if we are to believe him), was that, along with procuring a $39 doll for $5, he was deftly able to use American commodity culture, the GI Joe doll, against itself. The deception also craftily mocked America's own foreign policy objectives and assumed sense of strength. Added to this feat was the fact that John Adam was African American, which only made the forgery feel more realistic. That even a young man in Iraq can elaborate on American racial politics in his ruse is itself meaningful. The spread of such visual sociology concerning race in American to the fake battlefield of Iraq is a kind of testament to the hegemony of American culture in the world—almost enough to make an American feel proud.

That al-Iraq4's deception took place during wartime is certainly no coincidence. Truth may be the first casualty of war, but today it is a casualty in the form of a visual body for everyone to see, even if international law prohibits such practices. Article Thirteen of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 states that "prisoners of war must at all times be protected, particularly against acts of violence or intimidation and against insults and public curiosity" (ICRC, n.d.). Here, acts of public curiosity have traditionally been understood to include photography when the photographs include identifying characteristics of a prisoner of war. Even the American Secretary of Defense conferred directly on this issue with his General Counsel (Haynes II, 2002) in early 2002. The driving force behind this Geneva Convention rule was a moral obligation to preserve the dignity of the detained. Captured soldiers ought not be paraded, either in the streets or on the airwaves, by the capturing power, and controlling the image of the human was one universally accepted way of preserving the humanity of the imprisoned. Something similar was in practice for the dead, whose remains must by law also be treated with dignity and respect. According to the 1977 Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions, to commit "outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment," and not only against combatants but also against non-combatants, is to commit war crimes (ICRC, n.d.).

Thus, as International Humanitarian Law makes clear, there are universally agreed upon ethical responsibilities one should adopt when representing human life—and death—during warfare. Yet the prohibitions established by international treaties are frequently ignored, especially in the internet age, when war footage can be—and often is—uploaded to YouTube instantly. While mainstream media organizations may feel compelled to follow these rules out of a sense of professional obligation and the canons of journalistic ethics, the same organizations have also drastically reduced coverage in some of the world's hottest war zones because of the danger involved in covering these conflicts.

According to the Committee to Project Journalists, more journalists were killed in the course of

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their work in 2009 than in any other year since the organization began keeping detailed records in 1992 (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2018). And in recent years, the danger to journalists has been especially acute in the Middle Eastern region. From 2011 to 2016, Syria was the deadliest country for a journalist to work in, with at least 114 journalists having been killed there. In 2017, Iraq was the deadliest country for journalists, with Syria again following closely behind (with 8 and 7 journalists killed respectively). Since 1992, at least 186 journalists have been killed in Iraq, more than in any other country during this time period (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2017).

Citizen journalists have often filled the breach, proving international news outlets with reporting on the ground and also producing their own stories and uploading them directly to social media. But the growth of citizen journalism has not solved the problem of truth in representation. If anything, the human image has become more contested, less assured, more vexed, and less trustworthy. During the horrific war in Syria, for example, both the regime and various rebel groups routinely accused their opponents of faking war footage to win the propaganda war, behavior that is as predictable as audiences are susceptible. Consider just a couple of examples. A horrific video of someone being beheaded by a chainsaw was widely circulated in Syria, the action attributed to forces loyal to Bashar al-Assad. In fact, the video is about ten years old and was shot in Mexico (Shelton, 2012). Another video claimed to show Syrian regime soldiers beating their prisoners, but the footage was later revealed to be from Lebanon in 2008 and not Syria in 2011, but not before it had appeared on major media networks such as Reuters and the Australian Broadcasting Company. Both later issued corrections (Australian Broadcasting Company, 2011). In December 2016, an image of a little girl in a ragged brown dress running down a street littered with dead bodies was widely shared on Twitter, with the caption "Girl running to survive and All her family have been killed It's not in Hollywood This [is] real in Syria #Save_Aleppo." The image was in fact photoshopped from a 2014 Arabic music video (Abdallah, 2016).

Nor are the deceptions limited to various rebel groups. During an emergency 2016 UN Security Council meeting in New York, Bachar Jaafari, the Syrian ambassador to the United Nations, brandished a photo of a kneeling soldier helping an elderly woman climb down a ledge. "Look at what the Syrian army is doing in Aleppo," he proudly intoned. Yet the photo was from Iraq, not Syria, and not from December 2016 but from June 2016 (Observers, 2016). The United Nations setting only recalled Colin Powell's speech 2003, where he also presented false evidence to the international community regarding Iraq's weapons of mass (Weisman, 2005).

Each of these examples says a good deal about the motivations of those pedaling these deceptions. It would seem that these forgers are often after more than just Nietzschean vanity and are instead searching through their deceptions and manipulations for real power on the international stage. What these examples more deeply reveal, however, is a fundamental truth about audiences. It is not that we are fooled by these forgers and fakers, these deceivers and frauds. On the contrary. It is we who *allow* ourselves to be fooled by these falsifiers. And we do so only by fooling ourselves.

The forger understands this well. The forger plays with pre-existing social or narrative

constructs—the kidnapping of soldiers, the tragedy of children orphaned by war—and fills them in with easily recognizable detail. The forger plays on our sense of outrage or shock, disarming any sense we may have of disbelief while exploiting the human desire for community. For the truth is, the forger cannot exist alone. The forger wants accomplices to build his narrative with him, to add to the verisimilitude of the deception. The forger thus provides an excess of detail in some areas and a paucity of detail in others, cleverly letting the audience fill in the gaps, as they reassure themselves that they are the ones who really know how such things work. The forger is a fawner, waiting for the moment when flattery will overpower criticism. While ours is already a world of stereotypes and thinly sourced knowledge, the forger creates a parallel world *that is even more dependent on stereotypes and thinly sourced knowledge.* The forger draws us into his circus show by fashioning himself as a postmodern oracle. Yet, the truth is that we are the ones who buy the tickets. After all, the forger is always only telling us what we already believe is true, and that's exactly what we want to hear.

There are few better examples of this phenomenon than the story of the popular blog titled "A Gay Girl in Damascus." The author of the blog, which has since been taken down, was purportedly a young Syrian American lesbian by the name of Amina Abdullah Arraf. According to her blog, Arraf was 35 years old in the first half of 2011, when her blog went live. She claimed to have been born in October 1975 in Virginia to a Syrian father and to an American mother who had roots in the United States that date back to 1742. She also claimed to be a dual national of the United States and Syria and fluent in both English and Arabic, having moved back to Syria in 2010, where she taught English until the Syrian uprising began in 2011.

Arraf garnered significant international attention for her posts describing the Syrian popular uprising. The *Guardian* called her "an unlikely hero of revolt in a conservative country" and described the blog as "brutally honest, poking at subjects long considered taboo in Arab culture" (Marsh, 2011). CNN conducted an online interview with her for an article on gay rights and the Arab uprisings, asking "Will gays be 'sacrificial lambs' in Arab Spring" (Davies, 2011). Arraf also wrote passionately about the Syrian struggle for democracy, describing her actions in February 2011 this way:

> I live in Damascus, Syria. It's a repressive police state. Most LGBT people are still deep in the closet or staying as invisible as possible. But I have set up a blog announcing my sexuality, with my name and my photo.
> Am I crazy? Maybe.
> But I'm also aware of the winds of freedom and change blowing from one end of the Arab world to the other. And I want that freedom wind to bring with it our liberation, not just as Arabs and as Syrians, but also as women and as lesbians.
> Maybe it will happen. Maybe it won't.
> But if I want it to happen, I have to begin by doing something bold and visible. I can,

because I'm a dual national and have benefits of politically connected relatives, be more visible than many women here.

In April 2011, she authored a blogpost title "My father, the hero" that described how two men from the Assad regime's dreaded security forces had come to arrest her late one night on the charges of "conspiring against the state, urging armed uprising, [and] working with foreign elements." The agents then told her father that Amina "likes to sleep with women" and proceed to threaten her with rape. Dramatically, even melodramatically, the agents departed after receiving a dressing down by her father. The post received widespread acclaim and traveled around the internet. A month later, Amina reported that she was forced to live "underground," having gone into hiding because regime forces appeared again at her door. She was lucky to have been away at the moment, she explained. Two weeks later, she said she donned a headscarf and traveled around the country, posting on the atrocities she witnessed and musing on her life. Her fan base was swelling.

Then she disappeared. Her cousin, Rania O. Ismail, took over the blog briefly to report that Amina had been arrested while "walking in the area of the Abbasid bus station, near Fares al Khouri Street…by three men in their early twenties." The cousin explained: "The men are assumed to be members of one of the security services or the Baath Party militia. Amina's present location is unknown and it is unclear if she is in a jail or being held elsewhere in Damascus." Around the world, people mobilized for her freedom. A Facebook page—Free Amina Arraf—was immediately set up. The U.S. State Department got involved. "Officials in Damascus and Washington are working to ascertain more information about Ms. Arraf, including confirmation of her citizenship," the New York Times reported (Mackey & Stack, 2011). Her disappearance was reported by everyone from Al Jazeera ("Gay blogger 'abducted' in Syrian capital", 2011) to the Washington Post (Sly, 2011) to the Associated Press ("Gay Syrian American blogger disappears in Syria", 2011). The international watchdog group Reporters Without Borders even demanded her <u>release</u>. ("Woman blogger abducted in continuing crackdown on coverage of protests", 2011).

But there was no one to release, of course. Amina Arraf was a figment of the imagination of Tom MacMaster, a forty-year-old white American guy from Georgia. A failed fiction writer, MacMaster had been cultivating the persona of Amina for the better part of a decade, and as a student and traveler of the Middle East, MacMaster had just enough raw knowledge to make his case sound convincing enough.

After the hoax was detected, MacMaster came forward, posting an apology on the blog. "While the narrative voice may have been fictional, the facts on this blog are true and not misleading as to the situation on the ground," he explained. "I do not believe that I have harmed anyone—I feel that I have created an important voice for issues that I feel strongly about."

But of course, MacMaster's cry of "I'm guilty but only of wanting a better world" is simply not true. For one thing, the blog became a public meeting place for Syrian activists, many of whom did live under threat, so finding and spying on activists was facilitated by the blog itself. Second, the

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blog trafficked in one man's idea of what life would be like for a half-American half-Syrian lesbian. By doing so, the blog not only hid what life is like for actual members of the LGBT community but also ended up replicating simplistic stereotypes about homosexuality in the Arab world. Writing in *The New Yorker*, Kevin Young describes the blog's reliance on "Orientalist fantasy," including the long tradition in the West of male writers fantasizing [about] sexy harems and poetesses" (Young, 2017). The blog was nothing more than a long cliché about Muslims, ready to be consumed by eager public.

And in what is probably the strangest element of an already strange story was this revelation. For years prior to the "Gay Girl in Damascus" blog, MacMaster (as Amina) had been contributing to another lesbian blog called "Lez Get Real," which was run by one Paula Brooks. In fact, it was Brooks who encouraged and even helped Amina to set up the "Gay Girl in Damascus" blog. Over the years, Brooks and Amina also often flirted with each other over email. In the same month that Amina was revealed to be Tom MacMaster, Brooks was discovered to be Bill Graber, a 58-year-old veteran and construction worker from Ohio. Graber was using his wife's identity the entire time, unbeknownst to the real Paula Brooks. I guess it must be true that there is no love like the lesbian love between two white, middle-aged, American men.

Perhaps most damaging, however, was the amount of global attention that was paid to unraveling this long and bizarre hoax. These were key moments in the history of the Syrian uprising, and to have the world's attention diverted away from the horrors inflicted on Syria and placed instead on a middle-aged male's desires for fame and applause for his own politics is a betrayal to the very revolution Tom MacMaster claimed to support.

MacMaster has proven himself to be a master forger in the Nietzschean mold. His talent was not to create a unique character in the form of Amina. In fact, the character of Amina pens terrible lesbian poetry, crafts cringe-worthy prose, and writes posts that merely reiterate commonly available analyses of the Syrian situation. What really enabled MacMaster's ruse to continue for as long as it did was not the character of Amina per se but rather a specific public's desire to have its biases confirmed. There was very little surprising in the blog, but what was there was composed with a painful level of detail. When Amina's cousin narrates Amina's disappearance by saying Amina was "walking in the area of the Abbasid bus station, near Fares al Khouri Street," we are almost literally plunged into a map. When she first reports being visited by the state security forces, she writes that she heard them in the courtyard and they were asking for her by name. "So, I pulled on my clothes as fast as I could," she writes, "the ones I have had laid out for such a moment; simple cotton underwear and t-shirt (no underwire or anything like that), jeans, loose fitting pullover." Why would anyone describe one's clothes this way? To write "simple cotton underwear" and to describe that one is wearing a t-shirt with no underwire seems excessive, but it is in the excess that we begin to feel as if we know Amina personally and in the level of detail that we find MacMaster's will to truth, to verisimilitude, in his blog and in his writing.

Contrasting MacMaster is Abounaddara, an anonymous and mostly female collective of self-

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taught filmmakers in Syria who produce some of the most mesmerizing portraits of their country at war, and they do so with an intimacy that is almost never seen in war reporting and with an aesthetic that repudiates the excesses of stereotypical detail. Although they began creating "emergency cinema"—their term—before the Arab uprisings burst forth in late 2010, Abounaddara—the name translates into "the man with the glasses," which is to say the man who, through his lenses, can see clearly—has been able to maintain a steady stream of production since April 2011, when the regime of Bashar al-Assad upped their wanton killing of protestors. (Their production has unfortunately trailed off in the past year). For most of the Syrian war, Abounaddara has been able to release a new short film on Vimeo (Abounaddara, n.d.) every Friday. And as the uprising turned into a revolution and then morphed into a gruesome civil war, the film collective has managed to uniquely capture the social and human dimensions of the conflict.

Their films straddle the border between art and news. Most are between thirty seconds and five minutes in length. Offered without narration and absent most frames of reference to guide viewers, they can be disorienting to those looking only for evidence of regime or rebel atrocities, and frustrating to those voyeuristically seeking out images of human carnage. This is deliberate, and it is what pushes their work outside the realm of the ruse and away from the power of the forger.

The collective is fiercely critical of the news media's voracious appetite for gratuitous images, and has pushed for media producers to adopt their own ethics of responsibility in representation, which they term "the right to the image." The success of that project is elusive, but no matter: the power of their films is unwavering and the films demand us to question that invisible but often heavily patrolled border demarcating art from journalism. The films also force us to ask once again that unanswerable question of whether and how art should commit itself to changing this world. Most of their films are disorienting and open-ended, beautifully open-ended, if one can responsibly summon the word beautiful for an art that confronts and displays the worst of our natures. What tend to be the most powerful of Abounaddara's films, in my regard at least, are the interview films, performed sometimes in shadow and sometimes not.

Consider the film "What Justice" as an example, where a man describes what proper punishment for a torturer would look like, only to repudiate his ideas at the end. Like the other interview films, here we are thrown into the middle of a conversation. We, the viewers, are disoriented, desperately attempting to make sense not only of who is speaking but also who the malefactors are in the grim story being relayed. We don't know if the torturer belongs to the regime or a part of the opposition. In lesser artistic-documentary hands, such ambiguities would resolve into a bland universalism of war is evil and humanity sucks. In lesser newsy-documentary hands, the ambiguities would be explained by banded text and baritone voice-overs. But Abounaddara's choice of difficulty over simplicity is profound. By disrupting viewing expectations, Abounaddara forces us to look intrusively at minor details for larger meaning. Faces matter here. We find ourselves looking to a gesture to understand more from the words being spoken. The wringing of hands is made to speak. The man scratching his arm becomes a metonymic effect for the larger human experience being

dispatched.

The interview videos almost always end abruptly. By telling a person's experience rather than a full human story, the videos are by definition fragmentary, difficult, unresolved, and disrupting, as is Syria's civil war. The interview videos in particular (and Abounaddara's videos in general) do not seek to explain the politics of Syria to viewers or to argue for a tidy political solution to the butchery they are constantly menaced by. But it is precisely this open-endedness, a style which resists the easy pundit prophecy that too much of art and politics succumb to, that makes the work bracing, relevant, honest, and incomplete. And here, I should be clear, I mean incomplete in a positive rather than a negative way. "It is not the office of art to spotlight alternatives," the German Jewish philosopher Theodor Adorno writes in this essay "Commitment," "but to resist by its forms alone the course of the world, which permanently puts a pistol to men's heads" (Adorno, 1977, p. 180).

In that same essay, Adorno criticizes the plays of Jean-Paul Sartre for their fundamental idealism. Adorno argues that Sartre's plays are in fact not so much engaged in the real world of human political choices. Rather, they become demonstrations of choosing between abstract notions of freedom or unfreedom, and in such a dialectical universe, "freedom becomes an empty claim" (Adorno, 1977, p. 180). Adorno rejects Sartre's notion of an engaged or committed art in favor of an "autonomous art," which he suggests is art which does not serve a deliberately political message though which still engages the world as an independent object.

Abounaddara's videos, it would seem to me, do just that. They refuse to "take sides" in the civil war, while taking sides against atrocity. By not fully explaining the politics of Syria to the outside world, they make epistemological demands on viewers before requesting political allegiance. Abounaddara's films thus choose an autonomous over a committed aesthetic. And as Adorno warned, "even committed art in the proper sense is not intended to generate ameliorative measures, legislative acts or practical institutions." He explains: "Committed works all too readily credit themselves with every noble value, and then manipulate them at their ease. Under fascism too, no atrocity was perpetrated without a moral veneer" (Adorno, 1977, p. 193).

It's all too easy, of course, to allege that one's opponents are closeted fascists. What's more interesting is the idea that deception finds no alibi in good intentions. It's a thin moral veneer that degrades our own sense of civilization. Fraudsters like MacMaster don't want us to think. They want us to believe. Abounaddara on the other hand forces us not to believe and instead to think. The former produces accomplices for deception, the latter produces critics (Grafton, 1990). And if the human image is to have any meaning—and contain any truth— in our changing world, then we must learn that the less we know, the more we have to discover.

Do you see what I see? Representing War and the Human in the Internet Age

Moustafa Bayoumi

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# Cognitive Function of Utopia

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Reading a utopian literature is the best way of reflecting our image of today. In this paper, I will show the reason why. I investigate the ontological status and the epistemological role of Utopia and then I show the way how Utopia reveal our reality.

## Anachronistic utopianism

There might be numerous interpretations on the exact meaning of Utopia. However, there is no dissent with regard to its etymology. The word was coined by Thomas More in a novel with the same title in 1516. Unfortunately its exact etymology does not help to make its meaning clear because ambiguity inheres in the word itself. Utopia stems from greek word and it could be elided from *eutopia* (eu+topos-happy place) and/or *outopia* (ou+topos-no place). Furthermore topos can also mean a space and a state (itself ambiguously hovering between, for example, French etat and condition).[1] These ambiguities might be intended by More as a joke, but it caused everlasting confusion about the meaning of Utopia.

Thomas More's Utopia is important not only because it established the term but also because it initiated Utopia as a literary genre. Two points should be noted with regard to More's Utopia; it suggested a very realistic image of ideal society for the first time, and marked a ground for a literary genre. This two factors are very important because the former is the indispensible element of epistemological function of Utopia and the latter is related to its ontological status. Before dealing with the main argument of this paper, I will shortly mention the utopian thinking prior to More's Utopia.

One might insist that there were utopian thinking way before Thomas More wrote Utopia and coined the term. From ancient times regardless West and East, people have dreamed of perfect world in which their cherished wishes come true. Let me name a few ancient ideal societies: Golden age in Greek myth, the Pure Land of the West in Buddhism, Garden of Eden and the

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1. Suvin, Metamorphoses of Science Fiction, p. 37

millennium in Christianity, I will call these mythical ideal societies or countries as anachronistic utopian because they exist before the coinage of the term utopia. Davis categorized the ideal countries prior to More's Utopia into Cockaygne, Arcadia, the perfect moral commonwealth and the millennium according to its form. And he argued that all of these are not proper utopia because they are unrealistic. According to him, "The utopian is more 'realistic' or tough-minded in that he accepts the basic problem as it is: limited satisfactions exposed to unlimited wants." On the contrary, anachronistic utopias are unrealistic mainly for two reasons; first, they make the fixed motivation from changeless societies absolute, and second, they describe these state superficially. Thomas More's Utopia is the classical work which satisfy these conditions of utopia.[2]

Davis's definition of utopia might seem to oppose to Engels's criticism on utopian socialists such as Saint-Simon and Fourier. Friedrich Engels criticized in "Socialism: Utopian or Scientific" such system builders as Saint-Simon, Owen, and Fourier with not sufficiently taking actual historical conditions or the process of revolutionary change into account.[3] Should utopia be realistic or unrealistic? If the unrealistic is the utopian feature as Engels's criticism, this criticism might be returned to Marxism itself. The fall of socialism could be the evidence that marxists failed to take the reality of capitalism and the vision of socialism into account.

However Socialism's failure does not necessarily entail Marxism's failure. Even though socialism failed because of its insufficient considering reality, Marxism can remain intact. Moreover Marx could be evaluated as the greatest of utopian philosophers in a realistic sense. As Bloch mentioned "The zero point of extremest alienation which the proletariat represents now at last becomes the dialectical point of change; Marx teaches us to find out All precisely in the Nothing of this zero point" (Principle of hope 3:1358) This quotation from Bloch shows clearly the relationship between utopia and reality in Marxism. The zero point in reality means All in utopia. Understanding reality is the presupposition of understanding utopia. "All in Nothing" but All is not Nothing. Reality presupposes utopia and they can coexist in a different mode of existence though. Utopia cannot be realized in this actual world, because utopia presupposes reality, utopia cannot exist without reality. If utopia is realized, it means utopia becomes reality, that is not possible. Utopia exist in the world of imagination which cannot be realized. Marx failed because he thinks of himself as a scientist not as an artist. Utopia does not belong to Science but to Literature. The role of utopia cannot be providing a blueprint for better world let alone for perfect world. Utopia exists in the unreal world and reveal the hidden aspect of reality. The proper area of utopia is imagined worlds, that is literature.

Sometimes utopia is considered an ideology or an impulse. However I claim utopia is literature and it can only exist as literary form. For Bloch, utopia exists in the dimension of future and it is collective impulse. The future in this context does not mean temporal dimension but future as an object of hope. Blochian conception of utopia is well described by Freedman as below.

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2. Davis, "Chronology of nowhere", p. 11.
3. Tom Moylan, Demand the Impossible, p. 5.

For Bloch, the central truth of utopia is paradoxical. On the one hand, utopia is never fully present in the here-and-now, and necessarily eludes all attempts to locate it with complete empirical precision. It depends upon what Bloch calls the Novum, that is, the radically (though not purely) new, which by definition cannot be exhaustively or definitively mapped. Utopia is to be found in the Not-Yet, or the Not-Yet-Being, or the In-Front-of-Us, or simply the Front, as Bloch variously designates it. Utopia can never be fixed in the perspective of the present, because it exists, to a considerable degree, in the dimension of futurity: not, however, in the future as the latter is imagined by mere chronological forecasting, or in mechanistic and philistine notions of bourgeois "progress," but rather as the future is the object of hope, of our deepest and most radical longings. These are longings that can never be satisfied by the fulfillment of any individual wish (say, for personal wealth) but that demand, rather, a revolutionary reconfiguration of the world as a totality. Utopian hope or longing, in other words, possesses an inherently collective character and at bottom has nothing in common with individualist impulses like greed....utopia, which in one sense is always elsewhere, always escaping our actual horizons, is in another and no less important sense inscribed in the innermost core of our being.[4]

Utopia as collective hope, not as individual desire or greed, cannot be a mental state of an individual. The most proper mode of existence of Utopia, which cannot exist in actual world and cannot be a psychological state, is literature. Literature is a locus for imagined world in which imagined creatures live. It's not a new idea to define utopia as literary genre. Kumar put: "utopia is closer to the novel than to any other literary genre; is in fact a novel." Suvin defined utopia as below.

Utopia is the verbal construction of a particular quasihuman community where sociopolitical institutions, norms and individual relationships are organized according to a more perfect principle than in the author's community, this construction based on estrangement arising out of an alternative historical hypothesis.[5]

Literature itself is a place for imagination, but Utopian literature demands much more aggressive imagination. Utopian literature could be distinguished as special genre by its demanding extreme imagination. In the next section I will explain the perspective which consider utopia literary genre in detail and investigate the function of utopia as literary genre.

## Utopia as Literary Genre

More's Utopia itself is a great literary achievement, but the importance of More's Utopia increases because of its contribution to establishing utopian literature as a literary genre. It was enormous influence on his contemporary readers and gave inspiration to produce utopian literature modeled on it. As More's contemporaries who read Utopia, Francois Rabelais wrote *Gargantua*

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4. Freedman, p. 64
5. Suvin, p. 49

*and Pantagruel*(1532), in 17<sup>th</sup> century Johann Valentin Andreae created *Christianopolis*(1619); Tommaso Campenella, *City of the Sun* (1623); Francis Bacon, *The New Atlantis* (1627); Gabriel Platt, *A Description of the Famous Kingdom of Marcaria* (1641), and in 18<sup>th</sup> century Jonathan Swift, *Gulliver's Travels* (1726), in 19tn century Edward Bellamy, *Looking Backward* (1888), William Morris, *News from Nowhere* (1890) to name a few representative utopian successors.[6]

In 20<sup>th</sup> century, utopian literature was inherited by Science Fiction. Suvin claims, "utopia is not a genre but the sociopolitical subgenre of science fiction."[7] In this quotation, he emphasizes that even though Science Fiction succeeded utopia, it is much wider concept than utopia. Freedman also evaluates Science Fiction as the ideal form of utopia. For him Science Fiction is an unattainable utopia of utopia.

A purely science-fictional text would not only estrange our empirical environment absolutely but would do so in such a perfectly cognitive fashion that the utopian alternative to actuality would not merely be suggested but delineated in complete and precise detail. The project of composing such a text is thus impossible not only in the sense that no asymptote can ever be actually attained, but also in the sense that the situation of such a project is inherently self-contradictory. For the perfected knowledge of utopia required to compose a purely science-fictional text could only be obtained by the kind of residence in utopia that would leave one without a nonutopian actuality to be estranged.[8] (72)

SF is a literary genre whose necessary and sufficient conditions are the presence and interactions of estrangement and cognition, and whose main formal device is an imaginative framework alternative to the author's empirical environment.[9]

The important features of SF as utopian literary genre, as Suvin and Freedman emphasizing, are 'estrangement' and 'cognition.' Brecht defined this attitude, estrangement, as "a representation which estranges is one which allows us to recognize its subject, but at the same time makes it seem unfamiliar." Estrangement includes both cognitive and creative aspects in that it let us know something new through unfamiliarization. Generally estrangement effect in literature is made by unnatural text in order to reveal its subject. However, estrangement in SF works by way of vividly showing the fictional world with naturalistic text. In other words, estrangement in SF is a unfamiliarization not with respect to form but with respect to content. The fictional world of realistic novel represents actual world, but the fictional world of SF represents new world which is totally different from actual world. Utopia is no-place which does not exist in this world, so SF is the ideal utopian literary genre which vividly shows totally different world.

According to the quoted passage, Freedman claims SF is the ideal literary genre in which utopia could be fully realized, however, at the same time, it cannot be realized because of its own utopian

6. Phillip E. Wegner, ch. 5 "Utopia", A Companion to Science Fiction, p. 84
7. Suvin, p. 61
8. Freedman, p. 72
9. Suvin, p. 7

character. The pure science fictional text, in Freedman's idea, should be a text which describes absolute fictional world in detail which perfectly estranged from actual empirical world. It may be logically impossible to satisfy the condition of absolute estrangement, because estrangement presupposes actuality from which it is estranged. Even though pure SF is impossible, we can still talk about SF as utopian genre not in an absolute sense but in a relative sense. There are two conditions which SF should meet, that is estrangement and detailed description. You can consider some text SF in case it sufficiently satisfies these two conditions relative to other texts which describe sufficiently different world by unnatural way, naturally describe empirical world, and unnaturally describe empirical world. Compared to utopian literature before 20th century, contemporary SF satisfies these two conditions well. Prior to 20th century, utopia was described as locating somewhere in this world and coexist with actual world. But contemporary utopia is temporally detached from actual world and independent of actual world. Related with this feature, traditional utopia was a country-state, but contemporary SF settled in the world that absolutely excludes the possibility to coexist with actual world.[10]

Even though SF takes naturalistic style it does not give impressions to describe actual world, because it creates fictional worlds remote from actual world. The more detailed the fictional world is described, the more the estrangement effect increases. This estrangement effect highlights the fact that this fictional world is composed of language and exists as a text not as a world. And this text does not assert and does not require belief. This text just show a world and what happens in it. The SF — distinct from other texts which assert, argue and correspond to facts in actual world — might be considered the purest literary text.

This is the reason why the purest utopia cannot but exist as SF literary genre. Literature does not assert the fact on the actual world but insinuates an aspect of this world by way of showing another world. If we admit that utopia is a collective hope unattainable individually, there could be no utopian fact corresponding to this world and it is impossible to assert that fact directly. It is impossible to express utopian hope with asserting and arguing language. The best way to express utopian hope is showing instead of asserting and this method could be ideally realized in literature. Realistic literature tends to give an impression or illusion to read a text which assets facts about actual world. However SF blocks the possibility of this illusion by way of showing totally different world and this estrangement effect reveals its textuality. Utopia should not only show another world but also reveal its textuality, it is necessary that utopia exist as literature. Among many literary genre utopia should be a novel, because utopia should describe the fictional world in detail and novel is more proper than poet when it comes to detailed description.

Text itself plays a role of bridge between fictional and actual worlds. Utopia cannot be accessed without having recourse to text. And the text gives us a way to understand the unfamiliar world with respect to actual world, because language cannot totally free from the order of actual world and

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10. Wegner, p. 88

inherently reflect it. The text works two-way; on the one hand, we can understand utopia through the text and, on the other hand, we can see the actual world through the utopian perspective thanks to the text. Utopia is connected to actual world by the existence of text, its author and implied readers.

Now we can see the close relationship between utopian fictional world and actual world, that is estranged but interconnected through the text. Then we are ready to move to the next question. How can we understand actual world through utopia? What is cognitive mechanism of utopia? Let me investigate utopian cognitive function with regard to the logic of impossibility.

## Logic of utopian cognition

Utopia fulfills its critical role by way of showing a world in which the impossible in the actual world is possible and through which we can see the actual world in a new way. In this section, I will investigate the critical role of utopia through the logic of impossibility. Logics is an academic field which formulates the argument within the logical possibility. So it might sound absurd to investigate the logic of impossibility. However many people argue that the logics of impossibility is necessary and possible. There are studies which apply the logic of impossibility to epistemology and I will argue that its epistemological usefulness could also applied to utopian epistemology.

Possible world is used in many fields with various meaning, but generally it loosely means an imaginable spatio-temporal world. For example, Dolezel defines possible World as macrostructure (mereological sum) constituted by a finite number of possible particulars. And he assumes fictional worlds in literature as a kind of possible world. Fictional world is a small possible world shaped by specific global constraints and containing a finite number of individuals who are composible. He stresses the role of fictional text which create, conserve and convey fictional world.[11] As a kind of fictional text, utopian literature plays the same role. Fictional world as literary possible world can contain everything conceivable.

On the contrary possible world in logics means logically possible world. Logically possible world does not permit self-contradictory concepts like round square. In contrast, fictional world accepts everything conceivable including round square and knowledge on impossible knowledge. Bearing in mind this difference, let me investigate how the logic of impossibility contribute to explaining cognitive role of utopia.

Some people might worry about accepting impossible world within the area of logic because they think this could make the classical logic weakened. However Daniel Nolan argues that accepting impossible worlds does not necessarily weaken classical logic and impossible worlds are useful and necessary. Nolan takes the example of logics, mathematics and metaphysics which sometimes need to deal with incompatible systems. In logics, in case there are genuine

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11. Dolezel, Heterocosmica: fiction and possible worlds, 1998

disagreements among rival incompatible logical systems and if at most one of the parties can be correct, then the other parties are reasoning about impossibilities. Each logical system should be logically possible, so if there are logically incompatible systems and one is correct and others are not, then the incorrect systems are logically impossible. Mathematics and metaphysics likewise.

Logical impossibility is also useful when we deal with epistemological problem. Epistemology should be able to deal not only with states with or without information but also with changes of information. Some object can be created and destroyed. It means non-existence becomes existence and vice versa. And when existence becomes non-existence, the knowledge on it should also change. For example, before Neptune was discovered, the belief in Neptune was not knowledge but after its discovery this belief became a knowledge. In order to deal with this change of knowledge, the incompatible propositions 'Neptune exists' and 'Neptune does not exist' are required. This example shows that in order to explain changes of knowledge, both existence and non-existence are required in an epistemological system and coexistence of both is logically impossible. Therefore logical system for dealing with changes of knowledge requires logical impossibility.[12]

When we need to understand the relationship between utopia and actual world, the logic of impossibility can be applied to logical, physical and epistemological impossibility. Utopia requires logic of impossibility in ontological level, in that the existence of utopia relies on logical, metaphysical and physical impossibility. And its epistemological function relies on its ontological impossibility. Utopia makes us see the actual world in the perspective of impossible world and find new possibilities in the actual world. The acquisition of new knowledge presupposes impossibilities.

## Conclusion

In this paper I argued two theses. Utopia cannot but exist as literary text, and utopia can contribute to the knowledge on our world through the logic of impossibility. I think utopia is very powerful cognitive tool and its power comes from the imagination of the impossible.

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12. Barteld Kooi, "Information Change and First-Order Dynamic Logic", p. 34

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# Photographic Physiognomy from Charles Darwin to Katherine Blackford (1870s-1910s): Reading Emotions or Human Characteristics?

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## Introduction



**Fig. 1** One sheet in Darwin's copy of Duchenne's *Album*

Darwin is widely recognized as a naturalist and evolutionist. His theory of natural selection was conveyed in his most influential books— the *Origin of Species* (1859) and the *Descent of Man* (1871). In the same time, Darwin was also regard by some psychologists as the father of a specialized subject in psychology— Emotional Psychology. One year after the *Descent of Man*, Darwin published *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* (1872) (referred to hereafter as the *Expression of Emotions*), in order to extend his evolutionary kingdom to people's and animals' inside (instinct and emotion). In the *Expression of Emotions*, Darwin rejects the previous physiognomic tradition that links physical traits with inner characters while focusing on the behaviours of emotion. As Fig. 1 above shows, the old man's behaviours (facial muscle movements) when being galvanized was captured by Darwin's friend, French physiologist, Duchenne. Darwin showed 11 such photographs to his guests, asking them what emotions were being expressed.

Darwin was deemed as the first to use this method, which was now called Recognition experiment. However, before this method became popular in psychological domain, physiognomic study was still active in the four decades after 1870s. In each twenty years, there was one representative physiognomist, as introduced below.

## 1. Mantegazza's expressional study

Paolo Mantegazza (1831-1910), M.D., was a famous Italian physiologist and anthropologist, the founder and President of the Italian Society of Anthropology. From the 1850s he started to publish a series of books on the physiology of mental states, including *Physiology of Pleasure* (1854), *Physiology of Pain* (1880), *Physiology of Love* (1885) and *Physiology of Hate* (1889). At the same time, he also wrote on physiognomy (see his *Physiognomy and Mimics* (1883), translated into English as the *Physiognomy and Expression* (1904)). He was a regular correspondent to Darwin before the latter's death. They exchanged ideas and copies of their volumes. Mantegazza was responsible for translating the *Origin of Species* into Italian and publicizing Darwin's ideas and works in his country (see his *Charles Darwin and his latest book* (1868)). His name appeared on the presentation list to receive the first copies of the *Expression of Emotions*. In a letter to Darwin in December 1872, Mantegazza mentioned that some of his experimentations on expression would be published in an album, which came out four years later as the *Atlas of expression of pain; photographs taken from life and many works of art, illustrating the experimental studies on the expression of pain* (1876).



**Fig. 2** Paolo Mantegazza subjecting himself to painful stimuli (Mantegazza 1876)

**Fig. 3** The three degrees of anger, surprise and irony (Mantegazza 1876)

**Fig. 4** 'A Negro' posing in pain (Prodger 2009: 214)

The photographs consulted in Darwin's recognition experiments were produced by Duchenne faradizing the faces of several patients in his asylum. In contrast, Mantegazza took the photographs of healthy subjects undergoing natural stimuli, such as bright light, extreme noises, acid fruit and crushing of fingers. The subjects include three kinds of people. The first is Mantegazza himself, as

shown in Fig. 2 above. The second is a professional actor, seen in Fig. 3. The last are people whose photographs were taken during Mantegazza's trips in South America, Lapland and India, see Fig. 4 above. The published atlas comprises twenty-eight pages, and fifteen of the photos were sent to Darwin on 23rd December 1872 (Prodger 2009: 213). Mantegazza in that letter confirmed two expressional cases in the *Expression of Emotions*.

The first confirmation was about Monkeys' reaction in terror. Darwin wrote in the *Expression of Emotions* that 'Monkeys also tremble from fear; and sometimes they void their excretions' (Darwin 1872: 146). It was endorsed by Mantegazza in the letter with his observation in Paraguay, South America, that *Mycetes caraya* void their bowels from terror (Mantegazza 1872). The second case was respiratory expression in pain. Darwin in Chapter III argues that 'When animals suffer from an agony of pain… Almost every muscle of the body is brought into strong action' (Darwin 1872: 69); with man the mouth might be closely compressed, and the circulation and respiration were much affected: 'the breath may be held until the blood stagnates in the purple face' (p. 69-70). Mantegazza wrote to Darwin to explain the reason that, 'during the most intense physical pain man closes his mouth and holds his breath, since by producing a slight degree of asphyxia, general sensibility is diminished and suffering is assuaged' (Mantegazza 1872).

We can see that both the cases grew out of Mantegazza's studies of pain. However, his later publications conflict with Darwin's belief in expressional universality among human races while affirming the cultural and individual differences. Mantegazza in the *Physiognomy and expression* (1904) notes the gender, age and racial differences in expressing pain. With gender, he wrote that, 'Men and women express their pains differently, even when they are of the same degree. The differences become greater in proportion as we rise in individual and ethnical rank. Generally grief is translated in women into stupor or violent reactions; tears are very frequent. … a man's expression of grief the character of resistance' (Mantegazza 1904: 127). With age diversities, he wrote that 'Age, still more than sex, modifies the expression of pain.' (p. 127-128). The expressions of grief at different ages were classified by Mantegazza into five types: Childhood: cries without tears, abundant weeping; Adolescence: calm and melancholy sadness; Youth: menacing reaction; Adult Age: expression of bitterness; Old Age: plaintive groans and tears (p. 128). Mantegazza's next finding opposite to Darwin's idea was racial differences, resulting from his extensive ethnic surveys. As early as in the *Atlas* (1876), portraits of 'a Negro model', see Fig. 4 above, are illustrating racial differences in response to painful stimuli. After that, in Mantegazza's ethnographic investigations[1], photography was used to document his observations, seen in Fig. 5 below. As an anthropologist, Mantegazza was concerned with the diminishing racial characteristics in the trend of modern civilization (see Hill and Minghelli 2014: 80).

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1. See *A trip to Lapland* (1881) and *A trip to India* (1884).

**Fig. 5** 'Something Like a Mirror'[2]

Immediately after Mantegazza, an Italian physiologist, Angelo Mosso (1846 -1910) produced a similar atlas of pain by oppressing fingers of the attendees including himself (Mosso 1896: 201). Mosso's findings too echo the age differences in painful expressions (p. 203). Cesare Lombroso (1835-1909), as the leading Italian anthropologist in Mantegazza's time, also used photographs to demonstrate human facial features. After the Italian research, in the first ten years of the twentieth century, there were not many serious studies on human emotion with photographed subjects. Painter Rudolph (1903) drew self-portraits to record his emotions, but those drawings should not be considered, 'since they do not assess objective accuracy of facial expression' (Leeland 2008: 25). In America, alongside industrialization, there emerged an interest in modern physiognomy for the selection of labour forces. The leading practitioner Katherine Blackford, an assiduous reader of Mantegazza, not only photographed human faces but also carried on racial studies, inquiring into the correlation between physical traits and personalities. Her research combined modern managerial science with racist discussion.

## 2. Katherine Blackford's character analysis

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2. Presented at the National Museum of Kraljevo, Serbia, 27 May – 8 June, 2014.

DR. KATHERINE M. H. BLACKFORD
Author of
THE BLACKFORD COURSE IN READING
CHARACTER AT SIGHT

**Fig. 6** Dr. Katherine Blackford
(Blackford and Newcomb 1918:4)

The photographic technique at its initial creation was for commercial use. It was later applied in scientific research, such as in the physiological practices of Duchenne and Darwin. In 1872 seeing the publication of the *Expression of Emotions*, photography was also applied in business and managerial industry. At the turn of the century (from the end of the nineteenth century to the start of the twentieth century), Frederick Taylor (1856-1915), who founded modern managerial science, photographed workers' motions[3] to standardize manufacturing process. After Darwin and Mantegazza, reading human faces via photographs was conducted in Taylor's period by a female business consultant, Katherine Blackford. Her work was a revival of physiognomy and was bound up with Scientific Racism — the background of the contemporary human sciences. At the turn of the century, there emerged a huge number of books and articles on racism. Most of them were just the authors' arbitrary judgements, while some of them were masked under some kinds of 'scientific' arguments. This trend was later called as Scientific Racism. Blackford's research is typical in understanding modern physiognomy and the scientific-racism trend.

**2.1 Reading portraits**

Born in Kansas, Katherine Blackford (1875-1958) received a M.D. degree in 1898 from College of Physicians and Surgeons in Keokuk, Iowa (Brown 2005: 27). During her medical practice, Blackford became interested in the diversity of human races. After a global trip to pursue this interest, she settled in New York City working for Harrington Emerson (1853-1931), an American pioneer in industrial engineering and management. They endeavoured to invent labour screening technique to compete with the prevailing methodology of Taylor. Blackford became an expert in this field by importing the thoughts of physiognomy. She believes that people's mental abilities are associated with their physical features. Therefore, according to Blackford, to identify a labourer with suitable capacity on certain tasks, one only needs to

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3. See his *On the Art of Cutting Metals* (1906).

look for the ideal external manifestations corresponding to such inner traits. The above is the theoretic base of Blackford's personnel physiognomy. In practice, she spent fifteen years advising interviewees in regard to their vocations and counselling employers for selecting and assigning employees (Blackford and Newcomb[4] 1914: vii).

In order to demonstrate the ideal facial features of prominent labours, hundreds of male portraits were collected from business magazines and newspapers. There are several characteristics in Blackford's selection of these portraits and photographs. First, the men in the photographs are divided by their social classes: the so-called successful class and lower classes. To describe typical facial features of a good staff, Blackford referred to the well-known social reformer Jacob Riis (1849-1914). Conversely, to represent the sorts of an unsuitable employee, those from ordinary classes were usually chosen. Second, all the photographs are highly stylized to show a solemn countenance without expressing any emotion. To sum up their characteristics in one sentence: the photographs selected for labour-character reading only capture and demonstrate static facial features.

**Personnel physiognomy**

Apart from portraits and photographs, Blackford studied human faces also from other sources, such as literature and artworks. In *The Job, the Man, the Boss* (1914), some ancient assumptions on psychophysical correspondence are introduced. They are recorded on an Egyptian papyrus document dating back to the Twelfth Dynasty, circa 2600 B.C[5]. This thought, according to Blackford, coincides with some sparkles in Aristotle physiognomy and Homer's poetry. From the ancient and modern literatures (of her time) on expression, she concludes eight typical physical features attached to occupations and inner traits. They are: 'The high brows and lean cheeks of the thinker and scholar; the high, large nose of courage and aggressiveness; the thick neck and fleshy lips of sensuality; the thin lip and cold eye of cruelty; the round face and full figure of good nature; the dark eyes, hair and skin of revenge; the keen, sharp face of the scold; and the broad, flat face of phlegmatism' (Blackford 1914: 112). In Chapter VIII she assumes nine fundamental physical variables in which men differ or vary from one another. They are (1) colour, (2) form, (3) size, (4) structure, (5) texture, (6) consistency, (7) proportion, (8) expression and (9) condition. In talking about the variable of colour, evidence is drawn from paintings and pottery of ancient Egypt and Europe. She claims that 'divinity, royalty, nobility, and aristocracy are represented by white skin, blue eyes and flaxen hair' (p. 118). The 'causes of the attitude toward blonds revealed in art, in literature, in the drama, and in popular speech, will aid us in understanding the many differences between blonds and brunettes'. Such praise on blondes soon led to a systemized racist declaration, published two years later as the *Blondes and Brunets, Character Analysis, and Human Resources* (1916).

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4. Arthur Newcomb (1873-1912) was the second husband of Blackford. They coauthored some of her treatises.
5. Blackford may make a mistake here, because the Twelfth Dynasty of Egypt was 1991-1786 B.C., while 2600 B.C. fell in the Second (-2686 B.C.) to the Forth Dynasty (2613 B.C.-).

Photographic Physiognomy from Charles Darwin to Katherine Blackford (1870s-1910s):
Reading Emotions or Human Characteristics?

Hongjin Liu

## 2.2 The racist belief alongside character analysis

Although Blackford herself was not a blonde, yet she insisted on the 'law of colour': 'In brief, always and everywhere, the normal blonde has positive, dynamic, driving, aggressive, domineering, impatient, active…characteristics; while the normal brunets has negative, static, conservative, imitative…characteristics.' (Blackford and Newcomb 1916; Brown 2005: 30). Her *Blondes and Brunets* (1916) shows how racist arguments made use of Darwinian science, especially the evolutionary explanation on organisms[6]. 'This process of selection', Blackford argues, 'developed a race with noses high in the bridge, well set out from the face, with narrow, elongated nostrils.' (Brown 2005: 30). In her global journey to observe races, she took notes on the racial differences of noses, concluding that 'next to colour, the nose is one of the most easily observed and popularly regarded indications of characters (Blackford and Newcomb 1916; Brown 2005: 30). Later, observing noses comprised a major part in her character reading practices[7]. In short, Blackford's racist 'law' helped to form her character reading technique, though both of them are regarded as pseudo-sciences.

## Conclusion

The physiognomic study between 1870s and 1910s had underwent two episodes. The first was led by Italian anthropologists, such as Paolo Mantegazza. Their studies combined physiology (physically-stimulated emotions) with anthropological method to have generated new science subjects, e.g. criminology. In contrast, the next episode led by American personnel consultant Katherine Blackford had less scientific meaning while became a managerial business. Though claiming an inheritance from Darwinian evolutionism, Katherine's personnel physiognomy led to racist claims in the end, which is helpful to understand the contemporary trend of Scientific Racism. Blackford's findings stemmed from both her global tour to explore different races and her long-time personnel enterprise. The subsequent physiognomists and character readers, such as Holmes W. Merton and William Judson Kibby, just followed Blackford's framework and utilized her technique, and therefore bore less racist colour. These modern physiognomists did not take full advantage of the photographic technique, because what they need were merely stationary portraits of facial features. When character analysis, as a blend of Scientific Racism and managerial technique, was at last supplanted by the school of Individual Psychology in the late 1920s, photography started to play a bigger role in the studies of expression.

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6. Blackford's earlier treatises have some superficial applications of biological knowledge. She wrote in *The Job, the Man, the Boss* that, 'This law of the survival of the fittest applies also to the survival of mental and physical traits. In short, there is no aptitude, trait or characteristic in man which is accidental' (Blackford 1914: 106). While, the *Blondes and Brunets* applies this knowledge to explain racial distinctions of nose.

7. In fact, both as the results of Blackford's worldwide trip to observe races, her book of racism - *Blondes and Brunets* and her character reading books and manuals came out in the same period after the travel.

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# The Loss of Surveyability

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## 1. Diagnosis

If we want to characterize the situation of the contemporary world, we can use the formula "loss of surveyability"; which is not only a problem of our everyday life but also a problem in political decisions. It is destructive for private decisions and dangerous for the political situation of the world because overcompensation leads people to follow extreme positions in politics and in the private lifestyle. It has introduced a lot of uncertainty into our public and private life. Therefore, the political outcome of European culture, the liberal democracy, is in danger to be destroyed. However, the decline of western culture is dangerous for the whole world because the globalization, which is actually a westernization of the world, connects cultures in a specific way.

In general, the *loss of surveyability* can be regarded as a result of the development of the European culture. By doing so, we could differ between internal and external reasons. As internal reasons we can define the change of the role of western sciences. External reasons are rather challenges of dealing with phenomena of interculturality due to the manifoldness of cultures and life-worlds which we encounter in a multicultural world. On the other hand, a constructive-realistic way of dealing with multiculturality offers a fruitful way to overcome some of the major problems of Western thinking, which resulted in the so-called loss of surveyability.

### A) Internal reasons

In the last 2500 years philosophy has had fundamental importance and different functions for the development of western culture. In the early Greek times it led to the exodus from the *mythos to rationality* in the form of logos: the visual identification of mythos and world including society has been transformed to a linguistic identification. That traces back to Parmenides whose formulation "noein kai einai tauton" (Parmenides 2016), which means "thinking and being identical"[1] has become of axiomatic character for Western science. Its main idea was that knowledge should be the

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1. It actually does not say "is" identical or "should" be identical, rather just "thinking and being identical" (see Parmenides 2016).

mirror of the world.[2]

Another – social – aspect of the thinking structure of the mythos which went the way from Parmenides to Plato and remained important until the 20<sup>th</sup> century is the one that fundamental insight is only accessible to chosen people and not to the ordinary man. In this way, philosophy (and in later times logics) has become a legitimation as normative instance. The conviction that philosophy is a normative instance survived until the last century. Its consequence, which we experience up to these days, is the tendency to delegate problemsolving to experts of different highly specialized disciplines. From a historico-cultural point of view we can state that the increased professionalization and specialization of various disciplines is connected to the Christian reinterpretation of Platonism; with the effect that the level of expertise is implicitly regarded as *nearness to God*. The so-called specialization of various disciplines is however one reason for the phenomenon of loss of surveyability. Professionalization in the best case only leads to a pseudo-surveyability which in fact causes just the opposite.

Against this background, the history of western philosophy can be regarded as a history of self-destruction; from the beginning with the Presocratic thinkers like Parmenides until the end of the last century. We can observe such a development when specific disciplines – due to their separateness – are built on various doubtful presuppositions and therefore show a highly speculative character.

Although some deficiencies of this concept became already visible in the early historical time of western thinking, European philosophy paved the way to modern science; not at least by the establishment of separated disciplines. René Descartes and Isaac Newton are central figures in this context. They developed the logical and ontological presuppositions for *modern* science; e.g. for physics. Descartes questioned given foundations of philosophy, like religious beliefs, and therefore introduced the need of legitimation, which became paradigmatic for Western thinking. Trying to find a doubtless foundation for his philosophical approach, he referred to the thinking ego. By stating "cogito ergo sum" he deduced the existence of a thinking *mind*. However, regarding this approach we face some problems. On the one hand, it is trivial to claim that who *thinks* must also be. On the other hand, it is not clear why to deduce the existence of *mind* from a thinking something. Obviously, Descartes' mistake was to identify an activity with *essence*, respectively a *single acting* with a general essence or quality. However, that mistake was the starting point for the development of Europe's first explicit ontology which, as is known, differed between *res cogitans* and *res extensa*; which again lead to fundamental problems. Even when we accept that there is a *res cogitans* (because of the fact that we think), it is still not clear whether there really is

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2. This conviction survived up to the point when descriptivism died within the last century. Descriptivism just could not be managed and finally turned out to be a metaphysical fantasy. Until the 20th century the equation *science=truth* was believed by almost any intellectual in Europe, for example by the so-called Vienna Circle, which in the end showed that this is impossible. According to the epistemological standpoint of Constructive Realism, science cannot be understood as a mirror of the world, but rather as a construct which replaces some aspects of the world by technical reasons.

*res extensa*. However, without an adequate legitimation for the real existence of *res extensa*, the preservation of the concept of knowledge was impossible. For this reason the proofs of existence of God played a major role in Descartes' concept of knowledge. In order to be able to know that *res extensa* really exists, Descartes' finally referred to the existence of God, which guarantees the preservation of knowledge; as an indefinite being (God) would not deceive. Regarding Descartes' point of departure, to question religious belief, it is quite irritating that he took such a path to solve the philosophical problems of his ontology. Still, Descartes' philosophy had a widespread influence on the Western thinking in general and on Western science in specific. It became the foundation of Newton's concept of physics, which again was of huge influence for the major part of what was or still is called science in Europe. (cf. Wallner 2017)

Immanuel Kant was aware of some problematic aspects of modern science and tried to solve them by his endeavor to *take metaphysics into the way of science*: "Metaphysik in den Gang einer Wissenschaft bringen" (Kant 1989). In this context, it is interesting that Kant's attempt to demarcate science from religion was not only motivated to create a space for faith. Put this way, the function of religion is neither exclusively to guide morals nor to just ground science but mainly to restrict science. The restriction of science by demarcating it from religion is a necessity to make science comprehensible, which is again a condition for surveyability. Surveyability is just impossible without comprehensibility which again is impossible without restriction of science. That means, the restriction of science is also needed in order to ground science.

Somehow the opposite, to ground scientificity out of science, was the approach of the Vienna Circle. The Vienna Circle (VC) can be regarded as the last influential intellectual movement which tried to create surveyability based on pure scientificity. The idea was to justify science based on the role of an indubitable observer, which together with logics should enable *perfect science*. Regarding the fact that one of the VC's main ideas was to eliminate metaphysics from science (in order to enable pure science), it is somehow ironical that its approach failed due to its implicit . metaphysical . presuppositions: it was built on metaphysical ideas of transcendental philosophy and therefore demonstrates a sad end of the attempts to justify science by itself. The last battle for a scientific worldview failed because the idea of the pure observer does only work based on the presupposition that there is a transcendental form of rationality. Using Kant's terminology it becomes clear that such a transcendental rationality is only accessible when there is something like a transcendental ego, which must somehow be identical with the *real* reality of the *thing in itself* ("Ding an sich"). Otherwise it would not be clear how to proof that the scientific *objects* are *really* identical with its observation by a (human) subject.

The consequence of the VC's failure to establish a unified (pure) science, grounded on scientificity, goes hand in hand with the loss of the concern to make the world comprehensible. Although science offered some rich results by a lot of different methodological approaches, it cannot offer comprehensibility. That means that the so-called rich progress of knowledge is by bad luck not knowledge under the concept of European philosophy.

Science nowadays just offers problem solving but not a way of understanding of the reality or the world. We can formulate it in this way: the idea of pure science is lost and replaced by the concept of applied science. By doing so, the core idea of European science is lost: to make the world understandable by reasoning or by scientific research. Science has become an instance which offers the possibility to improve the life, to take away problems which are disturbing the personal life or society and politics – but that is rather technique than science.

Science in the western sense needs reasoning and understanding. But as we already stated, in order to reason science, we have to refer to a sphere which is not part of the science. If we have no demarcation criterion, we cannot choose and so we lose the possibility for rational decisions. The consequence is that science becomes borderless and feasibility replaces understanding – or in other words: the loss of *surveyability*. However, if we lose surveyability by the loss of a demarcation criterion, this is a fertile ground for ideology and radicalism.

## B) External reasons

Some might argue, that one of the external reasons for the loss *of surveyability* in general and the understanding of science in specific can be seen in the manifoldness of cultures. However, from the point of view of Constructive Realism, the opposite is the case. The manifoldness of cultures is rather considered as condition of understanding science.

The problem about science in the framework of globalization is that the manifoldness of cultures is not appropriately taken into account, as intercultural understanding of science only takes place on a trivial level by not questioning the presuppositions of the other and the own culture.

Therefore, one can say that the international success of western science started with the destruction of scientific insights. In this situation, western science supposedly became more and more structurally free and therefore applicable for different cultures; or in another formulation: its intercultural success is based on the loss of insight in its own cultural conditions. The influence of Western science in different not European cultures more and more destroyed their own structures because Western science was convincing by its supposedly supra-cultural importance. In other words, western science is so successful in other cultures because it has lost its own cultural dependency.

What can we do in this situation? It is clear, that the appeal to the own culture does not help. A retreat to the values of the own culture does not work, much more it increases the problem. According to our opinion and our intercultural experiences, there still is a successful strategy to deal with this problem: the *constructive-realist* strategy of *strangification*. It does not claim a comparison between cultures or for a compromise between different cultures. It claims the study of the difference - the incompatibility of the structure of other cultures. Strangification needs a lot of intellectual work - the comparative cultural research clearly cannot solve the problem because it has the methodological burden that it is dependent on Western science. The method of strangification has the preference to make the differences visible which is clearly increasing

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the work of scientific research on cultures. By taking concepts and argumentation structures into the framework of the other culture and vice versa we can become clear about the real differences between these two cultures. Besides, we can become clear about what we presuppose in our culture if we use a specific concept and what the others are presupposing within their argumentation. Put this way, a multicultural world is not the reason for losing surveyability but rather the condition for overcoming the loss of surveyability; provided that we have adequate methodological prerequisites.

## 2. Methodological prerequisites. guidance by Constructive Realism

The Viennese school of Constructive Realism is an epistemological position which was mainly developed within the 1980's and 1990's in order to overcome fundamental problems of philosophy of science; which became even more fundamental against the background of globalization and the manifoldness of cultures. Its central methodology is the one of *strangification*, which helps to enable a way of surveyability. (Cf. Wallner 1997)

Karl Raimund Popper showed that the Vienna Circle's methodology – of *verification* – does not work to legitimate knowledge; not at least due to its implicit metaphysical presupposition of the possibility of an absolute truth. Popper then introduced the methodology of *falsification*, which does not claim to grasp truth but implicitly presupposes the possibility of getting closer to the truth by each *falsification* (cf. Popper 2002). Therefore, Constructive Realism (CR) replaces the methodology of *falsification* by *strangification*, which even negates the possibility of getting closer to the truth (about the reality). However, to understand CR as a cultural relativism is a misunderstanding. Denying the possibility of an absolute truth is not per se *relativism*. Rather, relativism implicitly presupposes that there exists an Archimedian point of view, from which someone would be able to guarantee that everything is in fact *relative*. If relativism does not presuppose the universal validity of its own position, it consequently has to relativize itself. (Cf. Annerl 1993, Singer 2005, Beck 2009, Brousek 2017) At a first glance, this does not seem to help for overcoming the loss of surveyability. However, in fact it does. The methodology of strangification can be understood as a form of translation of different constructions of reality. Whereas a universalist standpoint would deny the possibility of different *true* descriptions of the world, the relativist standpoint would accept the idea of different descriptions, rather understood as constructions, but deny their commensurabilty. However, the consequent self-relativization of relativism opens the field for strangification. We neither have a guaranty for the existence of only one absolute truth, nor an absolute guaranty that different constructions of reality cannot be compared, but we have the possibility to strangify – culturally as well as disciplinary – different constructions of reality. Strangification means to take a sentence of one sentence of a – culturally or disciplinary – context and put it into a different – *strange* – context. In a first step, such a strangification will cause confusion; due to the fact that the two contexts do not share the same presuppositions. However, by going further we can reveal these implicit presuppositions of both

contexts and so we learn to better understand under which circumstances specific constructions do work and make sense.

By means of the methodology of strangification CR is taking the culture into their own rights and by this way it enables us to understand the restrictions by truth which we have in our cultural concept and which are the restrictions of truth in the concepts of another culture. If we use this strategy consequently, we can see what are the borders of our convictions as well as of our scientific results; respectively which are the conditions under which our results are true and under which conditions they are wrong. This means not at least that strangification can help us to handle the problem of surveyability.

In order to better understand how different true constructions of reality can be possible and how strangification works, someone might need to understand the ontology of CR. In terms of ontology Constructive Realism differs between three realms: firstly, *Wirklichkeit* as the ontological condition for (scientific) activity or quasi the *natural* world, secondly *Reality* as the – artificial – product of (scientific) construction and thirdly *Life-world* (Lebenswelt) as the world of historically and culturally constructed beliefs we live in and which we usually do not question. In short, (scientific) construction of reality works in the way that we construct *microworlds*, which can be understood as – technically functioning – sub-areas of Reality; quasi against the resistence of *Wirklichkeit*. However, once a microworld works, some aspects of *Wirklichkeit* are transformed into *Reality*. From the point of view of CR, scientific conduct can be understood as replacement of aspects of – natural – *Wirklichkeit* by – artificial – *Reality*, respectively specific microworlds. Therefore, science can also be grasped as the transformation from nature into culture. Put this way, we can better understand why different cultural backgrounds lead to different forms of construction of reality. However, this is not the reason for losing surveyability. As pointed out, it is rather the condition for overcoming its loss, which is caused by the implicit idea of Western science, that there must be just one correct way for grasping the world.

## 3. Conclusion – surveyability by strangification

The goal cannot be the establishment of a unified world culture which was the attempt of the Vienna Circle. Rather, we have to keep the different cultures alive in order to have instances for processes of strangification. Only at first glance, the manifoldness of medical systems implies a loss of surveyability. But on closer inspection, we can understand (the restrictions of) the different medical systems when we are able to strangify them against each other. (See e.g. Wallner 2006, 2009)

According to our research, unification makes the science dependent on metaphysics. In this sense, the Vienna Circle with its attempt of a unified science, made the concept of science dependent upon metaphysics. This does not mean that we have to fight metaphysics but of course we have to overcome the delusion that we could presuppose just one specific metaphysics as

true for the whole world; which is again a specific metaphysical approach. The fact that different cultures have different metaphysical presuppositions enable us to better understand their strengths and weaknesses. The weakness of the Western philosophy is the try to create surveyability by a unified world.

The relation between cultures is to be regarded as a partnership with the aim to strangify cultures against each other. In this sense, the most interesting point about e.g. cultural studies is not the content of their scientific sentences but rather the presuppositions which are mirrored in these sentences.

Therefore, we need ways to escape from the restrictions of our own culture, in order to be able to live in and with other cultures. We will of course not be able to free ourselves from our cultural background. By means of strangification we can create (more) open spaces which enable us to have more possibilities for decisions; in private life as well as in the political sphere. By this procedure, we cannot overcome the lack of surveyability by one strike, but we can avoid that the loss of surveyability destroys our communication and our private as well as our political life conditions. Put this way, the conclusion might be that surveyability cannot be given, but rather is a task which is to be worked on permanently.

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# Sincerity, Authenticity and Profilicity: Notes on the Problem, a Vocabulary and a History of Identity

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## I. Introduction: The problem of identity

In his seminal essay on the question 'How Can the Mind Participate in Communication', Niklas Luhmann stated: 'The autopoiesis of social systems is nothing more than this constant process of reduction and opening of connective possibilities' (Luhmann 2002, 172). This programmatic pronouncement about society as an evolutionary process of couplings and decouplings is made in the context of an outline of Luhmann's theory of the connection between (human) minds and society. Different from the classical philosophical mind–body problem, which questions if and how the physical and intellectual aspects of human life are integrated with one another, Luhmann, the sociologist, is primarily concerned with what could be called the mind–society problem: How is society related to (human) consciousness? Or, put differently: To what degree is society connected with what humans think, feel or intend? Luhmann's radically 'anti-humanist' answer to the mind–society problem is one of the most controversial elements of his theory: Operationally speaking, minds and society are not connected. As an encompassing system of communication, society consists of communicative operations. Minds, on the other hand, consist of mental operations. Neither kind of communication can connect directly with the other: In order to continue its respective autopoiesis, a mind needs to think or feel, and society needs to communicate; there is no operational link between the two. As Luhmann succinctly stated: 'Humans cannot communicate; not even their brains can communicate; not even their conscious minds can communicate. Only communication can communicate' (Luhmann 2002, 169).

This radical *operational* difference, that is, the radical operational closure of both psychic and social systems, does not mean that these two systemic realms are not connected at all. They are in each other's environment and structurally coupled. Human thought operates in a social environment of communication – we think, for instance, about what we read and hear – and society operates within the environment of human thought – what is said or written often emerges in the context of someone's thoughts and feelings. Without mental operations, this article could not be written and neither could we have academic journals. Both society and thought make use of language, and thus

the common medium of language is the basis of the tight structural coupling, or, to speak with a biological metaphor, of the symbiosis, between minds and society.

While Luhmann's concept of structural coupling does connect minds and society, the concept of operational closure still subverts a traditional idealistic assumption and aspiration that is almost considered common sense even until today, namely that society either is or ought to be guided by human reason. Social institutions are still often conceived of as grounded in human ideas. The law, for instance, can be understood as the result of the human endeavour to make society more just; similarly, the academic system can be understood as a social manifestation of the human desire for knowledge.

For Luhmann, this is clearly not the case. Instead, through evolutionary processes, including the structural coupling between social and mental processes, a legal system has emerged along with a semantics of 'justice'. This semantics allows us to think and speak of justice, but there is no evidence, or any good reason to believe, that there was first the idea of justice in a human's mind, and then, as a consequence, the legal system was introduced in society.[1] Such a theory would amount to some sort of humanist 'creationism', akin to the idea that humans began to walk on their legs because someone had the idea that this would be more fitting to their nature than walking on all fours.[2] In fact, social, bodily and mental processes are, while structurally coupled, operationally closed off to one another – there is no direct causal link between them, none can be reduced to be a mere effect of the other. In other words, they are distinct systems entering into complex environmental relations and interdependencies. They do 'disturb, stimulate, and irritate' (Luhmann 2002, 176) one another – but no system is at the helm of such processes or in a position to causally determine the other. Each system operates according to its own internal structures and cannot be steered or directed from the outside.[3]

If social systems, such as the law or academics, along with their respective social institutions and professions, are neither manufactured by the ingenious human spirit, nor manifestations of inborn human qualities (such as the desire for justice or the quest for knowledge), but rather contingent products of social and mental co-evolution, or in other words, if their existence is due to social and mental, but not 'human', autopoiesis, then the mind–society problem arises: What is the relation between mind and society? – Or, as Luhmann stated it: How can the mind participate in communication? As a social theorist, Luhmann approached this issue mainly from a sociological perspective and asked how society, or, more concretely, communication is 'irritated' by psychic systems. However, the question can also be posed from the other side, not from the point of view of

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1. Many cognitive scientists make a similar point arguing that reason often functions as providing reasons *after* a decision or action, not as a motivating force (Cf. Mercier and Sperber 2017).

2. Narratives of the invention of social structures by individual sages or founders of civilization are present in ancient philosophies, such as early Confucianism. See, for instance, the ascription of the invention of five basic social relations (husband–wife, parents–children, rulers– subordinates, older–younger siblings, among friends) to the sage ruler Shun舜 in *Mencius* (*Mengzi*孟子) 3A: 4.

3. This is likewise reflected in theories of the 'modular mind' (See also footnote 1).

society, but from the point of view of the mind. In this way, the question becomes a philosophical, or, more specifically, an existential one: What is the relation between me – that is, my mind, my thoughts, my feelings – and my roles in society? How are the different internal (mental) and external (social) aspects of my existence connected? And further, if one assumes with Luhmann that mind and society are operationally unconnected, how can I be a coherent unit of not only mind and body (as the traditional philosophers tended to ask), but, more encompassing, a coherent unit of social persona, mind and body? Simply put, the question is: What is my identity? Or perhaps more cautiously: Do I have an identity to begin with? Such general questions also provoke more specific ones, such as, for instance: How much of my 'selfhood' is constituted by my job as professor? Or, even more concretely: To what degree do I express 'myself' in this article?

Luhmann, the sociologist, does not answer such philosophical or existential questions, but he acknowledges that they must be posed – at least by a modern individual who becomes aware of the mind–society divide. If society and mental experience are merely structurally coupled, and thus connected, but at the same time operationally closed, and thus unconnected, and if, thereby, the connection between our inner mental life and our outer social life is without hierarchical order, evolutionary contingent, and thus neither founded on reason nor nature, then identity becomes a major problem. The 'distance between the individual and society', says Luhmann in *A Theory of Society*, 'induces the individual to reflect, to ask about the "I"of I, to search for an identity of its own'(Luhmann 2012, 51). Once we realize how deeply separate our mental self-experience is from our social existence, we see the latter as 'the outside'and the former as the 'inside'. And we begin to ask, as Luhmann says: 'What, then, is "inside"?' (Luhmann 2012, 51).

The mind–society problem, however, is not the only feature of modern existence inducing the identity question. This question is also historically grounded in terms of the problematic of social 'space'or 'placement'–and we will discuss this historical grounding in more detail and with reference to other authors further down in this article. For Luhmann, modern society emerges through the transition from stratified to functional differentiation. The old feudal society of the middle ages was divided into social strata: One was born and thus *placed* into a specific social stratum and assigned a specific social persona such as farmer, knight, priest or artisan.[4] Because of such fixed and self-evident placements, identity questions did not have to be posed:

> In the old world, inclusion was concretized by social position, whose normative requirements only then offered the possibility of more or less meeting expectations. Nobody found themselves in a situation of having to explain who they were. Among the upper classes, it sufficed to announce one's name; in the lower strata of society, people were known in the places where they lived. (Luhmann 2013a, 21)

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4. Max Weber (1958), and later Hartmut Rosa (2013) developing on Weber, have provided detailed analyses of social divisions in terms of social places, or regarding subjects as 'placeholders' for roles.

Between the 16th and 18th centuries, European medieval social structures were thoroughly replaced. In the emerging modern world, functional differentiation into a variety of systems constituted a radical reshaping of society. Consequently, society is no longer divided into different strata, or classes of people, but into different functional social spheres such as the economy, education, law, politics and media. The functional structure of society is increasingly global and now characterizes most of contemporary world society. As personas we are socially constituted by our respective inclusions into various function systems or social subsystems: We are students or professors, and voters or party members, and customers, and in the social media system, we have profiles –all of which can become significant in forming modern notions of identity.

In *A Theory of Society*, Luhmann explains in detail what the modern transition to functional differentiation into various social subsystems meant for the individual:

> The transition to functional differentiation (…) [provoked] changes whose extent is only now apparent. As with every form of differentiation, it was left to the subsystems to regulate inclusion. But this now meant that concrete individuals could no longer be concretely placed. They had to be able to participate in all functional systems depending on the functional area in which and the code under which their communication was introduced. (…) Individuals now had to be able to participate in all such communications and accordingly switch their couplings with functional systems from one moment to the next. (Luhmann 2013a, 20–1)

In modern society, we are no longer confined to at one place or in one major role with which we can identify, nor do we live within the confines of one particular space. We constantly move between different, operationally disconnected social systems – which often includes travelling in a variety of literal and figurative spaces. From philosophy professor to mountain climber to divorce case client to cancer patient and so on, we are constantly shifting identities as we move through different spaces. Luhmann conceives of this situation as a paradoxical self-division of the (by definition in-divisible) individual into different selves which produces the 'problem of identity':

> The in-dividual becomes defined by divisibility. It is in need of a musical self for the opera, an ambitious self for the job, a patient self for the family. What remains for itself is the problem of identity. (Luhmann 1993, 223)

As a result of this modern problem of identity, individuals have become unsure about themselves: 'Society consequently no longer offered them any social status that also defined what the individual "was" in terms of origins and quality' (Luhmann 2013a, 21). The world is drastically different for the modern individual, Luhmann thinks: 'The new order of inclusions brings dramatic change to the self-conception of individuals' (Luhmann 2013a, 21). Along with the multiplicity of

social systems, individuals need to be capable of shifting between different systemic identities, and along with the respective dynamics of these systems, they also need to adjust and reconstitute their various system-tied 'selves'. Metaphorically speaking, the individual has to learn to swim in an ever-changing 'liquid modernity' (Zygmunt Bauman's 2000) which forces it to often redefine and resituate itself within a never-ending social flux:

> More typical of today are situations in which we have to explain who we are; in which we have to send test signals to discover the extent to which others are in a position to judge whom they are dealing with. 'Education' or signals are therefore needed that point to the assets at a person's disposal, and 'identity' and 'self-realization' become problems. (Luhmann 2013a, 22)

Identity formation has become complicated: Our job does not necessarily indicate our economical wealth, our political commitments or our marital status – and even being married is no longer equated with one particular sexual orientation. Luhmann concludes: 'A person can therefore not really know who he is, but has to find out whether his own projections find recognition' (Luhmann 2013a, 22).[5] And he points out that 'the literature therefore distinguishes between physical-mental existence and "social identity"' (Luhmann 2013a, 22). This distinction between 'physical-mental existence' and 'social identity' reflects the body/mind–society problem in its modern shape. Not even touching upon its bodily aspects, the problem is complicated by the fact that both 'mental existence' and 'social identity' have become increasingly unstable, fragile and convoluted because of functional differentiation. In contemporary society, we can expect that individuals not only change their moods and opinions frequently but also their manner of speaking, their jobs and their partners.[6] So how can we manage, if at all, to establish identity by connecting such drifting and disparate aspects of our 'selfhood'?From a Luhmannian point of view, modern identity is highly precarious for two reasons: first because of the systemic gap between minds and society, and second because of the fluidity, multiplicity and incoherence of 'social identity' under conditions of functional differentiation.

While Luhmann diagnosed the problem of identity and outlined the structural conditions of its emergence, he neither made it the subject of a monograph nor did he address in any detail the strategies that have been employed in order to deal with it. To take on the task of studying the problem of identity, and of various methods to 'solve' it, we feel that it is prudent to begin with a terminological clarification of some key concepts. This is what we intend to do in the following section.

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5. Erving Goffman has provided a detailed study of how to deal with this particular challenge in *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* (1959).
6. This is frequently referred to as 'situational identity'.

## II. A vocabulary of identity

### Self, persona and identity

As preparation for addressing the mind–society divide and the related problem of identity as diagnosed by Luhmann from a philosophical perspective, we would like to outline a very brief glossary of terms. Luhmann himself is actually not very precise in his own use of terminology regarding selfhood. He mostly uses *Individuum* (normally translated into English as 'individual') when speaking of human beings as what may be called 'existential entities'. But, at least to our knowledge, he never defined the exact theoretical usage of the term – despite having provided a lengthy treatment of the semantic history of individuality (Luhmann 1993; see also Moeller 2004). On the other hand, he speaks of *Person* ('person' or 'persona' in English) when referring to the 'social identity' of an individual, or more precisely, when referring to 'participants in communication' who are 'identified' and 'addressed in communication' (Luhmann 2012, 59). We will now try to modify, extend and specify this terminology for the philosophical purposes of working towards a more dynamic discussion of identity.

*Self*. 'Self' will be used here to designate the mental aspect of what Luhmann refers to as the 'physical-mental existence' of the individual. In short, the self is the 'I' that we experience in our thoughts and feelings. It is, in modified Kantian terms, the non-transcendental or empirical unity of our perception that accompanies all our thoughts and feelings – which we cannot but experience as *our* thoughts and experiences. Arguably, then, newborn children do not yet have such a self. It is formed when we think and feel in the first-person perspective; it actually is the 'reification', or perhaps better, the *subject* of all cognitive and emotional contents of the first-person perspective. It is what 'owns' our thoughts and feelings, our sensations of pain and lust, our dreams and desires, our doubts and despair – everything that we experience as our inner life. This self is continuous over time, although, of course, highly dynamic and fluid. Its contents change constantly; we feel and think differently all the time, but we normally do think of ourselves as the continued inner self that we have always been since we began conceiving of ourselves in terms of a self in the first place.

*Persona*. Similar to Luhmann's definition of the term *Person*, we will use 'persona' to designate the personal 'addressee of communication'. It is the one who gets promoted or fired, who gets elected or charged with a crime and who signs a contract or fails an exam. Personas have social media accounts; they have money, own cars and are pictured on passports. They can be fingerprinted, photographed and, more generally, *observed* in society. More recently, they can also be ranked and rated – as professors, Airbnb hosts or guests or as Uber drivers. On *Facebook* or *Twitter*, they can be friended and followed.

Speaking in a different terminology – employed, for instance, by Erving Goffman (1959),

but also by Lionel Trilling (1972) and by the contemporary Confucian thinkers Henry Rosemont Jr. (2016) and Roger Ames (2011) – they are the bearers of roles. They are fathers and mothers, daughters and sons, teachers and students, superiors and subordinates. Personas are expected to speak and behave in accordance with their roles so that they can actually exercise them properly, and they need to be spoken to and behaved towards in a certain way as well. Personas exist within a framework of social conventions, rituals, rules, regulations, norms and codes. They can be disciplined and punished, or praised and rewarded. They can be morally condemned or revered as heroes or saints. Crucially, they must be distinguishable from one another. No persona is just like any other.

*Identity*. The term identity is meant to designate the physical, mental and social *composite* that a self can identify with and that a persona can be identified as. It is composed of, but critically transcends, bodily features, elements of the self and characteristics of the persona. It can incorporate ethnical and gender attributes, sexual preferences, age and skin colour characteristics, height and weight and a medical history. It can contain religious beliefs and political convictions, deeply engrained sympathies and aversions, love and hate, tastes and addictions. It can be tied to a medical history and a career path, university degrees and personal property; and it can be associated with the languages one speaks, the books one has read or the discrimination one has suffered. Identity is shaped through the integration of bodily, mental and social aspects. It is supposed to connect these systemically disconnected realms. Through the constitution of an 'identity' the self and society suggest to themselves that such a connection exists and that it can be congruent and coherent. In Luhmannian terms used above, it is the 'self-conception of individuals' or, a 'projection'; and the individuals' task is to find out whether this projection can 'find recognition' in society. In other words, it is a projection that needs to be successfully communicated in society so that the self can eventually believe in and adopt it and that society can communicate it.

## Paradigms of identity

From a philosophical perspective, the problem of identity can be conceived of as an existential task: The self has to develop a self-conception – it has to think and feel as a specific self – and it has to be able to project this conception towards society so that it is being 'recognized' (although we are not sure that the Hegelian connotations of this term are warranted in contemporary social contexts) on the outside as what it thinks and feels it is on the inside. In other words, the self and the persona have to match and mutually support one another so that identity is achieved. This process of achieving identity is synchronic, dynamical and dialectical: self-conception, self-projection and acknowledgement of the self as a persona in society are constantly reinforcing and challenging one another. The formation of an experience of identity emerges as the result of the successful efforts of the self to affirm the persona that society associates it with (and, also, to the body it perceives as its own). Through identity, society identifies the self in the form of a corresponding persona, and the

mind complements the persona with a corresponding self.

Following Luhmann, society and selves (as minds) are structurally coupled through the medium of language. Language is the medium in which sense or meaning (*Sinn*)is constructed. In this way, certain linguistically expressed sense patterns allow minds and society to cooperate in the efforts to construct identity. The construction of identity takes place as sense-making. Society articulates certain vocabularies and a certain semantics of identity – often in moral or normative terms – that the self can adopt in the form of ideas and inner experiences. Insofar as a self actually thinks and feels along with an identity semantics, or senses of identity that society provides, we can speak of an existential vocabulary, or of existential paradigms. Existential paradigms are models of identity commonly practiced and exercised by self and society. They are 'lived' vocabularies in the sense that they constitute a framework of meaning along which selves think and feel and along which society communicates.

Such existential paradigms and models of identity shift historically and are regionally and culturally different – which is no great wonder given their formulation in specific language-based vocabularies. There is a multiplicity of languages, and all of them change over time – and in some historical periods, as in the present one, they change with great speed. However, it seems that existential paradigms are not strictly relative to a specific time, language, culture or region. Certain basic existential paradigms of identity can be found in various periods and languages. Luhmann stated with respect to the relation between social structures and semantics that there is a 'mixture between continuity and discontinuity' (Luhmann 1993, 7). Similarly, we assume, existential paradigms are related to the historical, linguistic and cultural contexts in which they occur, but they are not determined or caused by such environmental conditions. Some paradigms seem to flourish more prominently than others at specific times and places, but they can well overlap, or even be in competition with one another at the same place and location. This is especially true in a highly complex and multifaceted 'late' or 'post'modern global society. Here, we would like to present a very short glossary of such existential paradigms.

We start our overview with a paradigm that was of particular prominence in earlier historical periods, namely 'sincerity'. This paradigm, in the definition of Lionel Trilling, allows for constituting identity through sincerely living up to a public role.

***Sincerity and devotion***. Lionel Trilling has located the existential paradigm of sincerity in an (early) modern European context in his intriguing study on *Sincerity and Authenticity* (1972). Here, Trilling conceives of 'sincerity' as being 'true to one's own self for the purpose of avoiding falsehood to others'. Because of this 'external' purpose sincerity has 'a public end in view', so that it is achieved from the 'esteem and fair repute that follow upon the correct fulfillment of a public role' (Trilling 1972, 9). In his analysis of sincerity, Trilling has in mind the early modern European bourgeois citizen who is defined through his profession and his roles, for instance, as a family patriarch and as a public political figure. In Trilling's analysis, a sincere identity is formed when

the 'Me' lives up to such public 'roles'. Trilling's 'Me' corresponds to what we call the 'self', and the public roles constitute what we have defined, following Luhmann, as the 'persona'. Thereby, a sincere self-conception, and sincere identity formation, consists in the alignment of the self with the social expectations tied to a persona. What Trilling means by sincerely being true to oneself is, for instance, that a judge enacts his role by being actually just, and that as a father he is truly fatherly. The self has to incorporate the assumed qualities of the role, and thereby the persona will be rewarded with 'fair repute'.

Accordingly, three core aspects of the sincerity paradigm are honesty, commitment and being sociable. Sincere identity formation means that the self has to align its feelings and intentions with its roles, and its thoughts have to correspond to the communications ascribed to it. Furthermore, it has to proactively commit itself to its roles and not just 'play' them. A sincere judge will not only truly believe in his judgements, but also existentially commit himself to being a judge. He will accept this role as his 'calling' and believe in the significance and necessity of the role. Since sincerity is geared towards the 'fulfilment of a public role', the sincere persona must be sociable. Commitment to a role also means commitment to the social context within which roles emerge, as every role is part of a social relation. Therefore, commitment to a role also implies commitment to an organization, a group, a community or something of the kind.

While Trilling locates the sincerity paradigm in early modern European society, Moeller and D'Ambrosio (2017) associate it with a Confucian ethics (as formulated in Ames 2011 and Rosemont 2016) as well. It seems evident that in both early China as well as in large parts of present-day East Asia (e.g. China, Korea) Confucian family values such as 'filial piety' (*xiao*) represent a semantics of identity formation that is widely practiced and serves as a model for many selves in society.

Another contemporary example for the endurance of the paradigm of sincerity is the emergence of a 'New Sincerity' movement in North American society. As a political and aesthetic paradigm opposing irony, New Sincerity propagates honest language and serious social commitment (see Wampole 2012; Fitzgerald 2012).

Religious or ideological *devotion* is a specific subset of the paradigm of sincerity. The devoted self will shape an identity by honestly committing to a sacred or secular belief system and integrate itself into a group which represents it – such as a religious community or a political party or faction. Clearly, this existential paradigm transcends historical and cultural boundaries – it is just as ancient as it is modern (given the recent surge of religious and political fundamentalism), and equally powerful in Eastern and Western, and Southern and Northern, cultural or linguistic contexts. However, a sincerity-based identity paradigm along with its orientation towards certain groups is increasingly challenged by what the sociologist Ulrich Beck has called the 'hyperindividualization' of modern society (see Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002) and, in part, gives way to authenticity.

***Authenticity, individualism and irony.*** According to Trilling, early modern sincerity was eventually replaced by authenticity. Trilling depicts the transition from sincerity to authenticity,

which he finds at least indirectly described in Hegel's *Phenomenology of the Spirit*, quite poetically. Eventually, he says, we discover:

> that somewhere under all the roles there is Me, that poor old ultimate actuality, who, when all the roles have been played, would like to murmur 'Off, off, you lendings!' and settle down with his own original actual self. (Trilling 1972, 9–10)

Authenticity emerges as the discovery of the paradoxical disingenuousness of a sincere existence. The self that sincerely commits to socially prescribed roles is seen as a traitor of the 'original, actual self'. The paradigm of authenticity reverses the vector of identity formation, rather than pointing from the outside to the inside, it now points from the inside to the outside. The self is no longer required to derive its identity from the social persona, but, to the contrary, it is supposed to create a social persona on its own inner image. Accordingly, notions of honesty, commitment and sociability are overshadowed by concerns with originality (or uniqueness), creativity and independence. The social persona is now expected to reflect the unique individual – identity has to be special, otherwise it is not true identity. Such originality must manifest itself in creativity. If the individual is never tobe fully expressedbyprescribed social roles, then the persona must be invented – and who else other than the self could do this, if it is to be an *authentic* persona? Consequently, the dependency on social relations is diminished. An authentic existence does not necessarily have to take place 'outside of society' (Smith and Kaye 1978), but it will aim at creating a space inside society which is supposed to be different and independent from conventional social formations and groups.

Individualism is a paradigm that is closely related to, and often merged with, authenticity. It belongs in the same existential family as authenticity since it also emphasizes originality, creativity and independence. Perhaps, as Trilling implies, it is the more primary paradigm that begot authenticity in the first place. In any case, its focus is more radically on originality than on creativity.

As mentioned, Niklas Luhmann pointed to the fact that 'in-dividuality' as derived from Latin, means indivisibility. It is linguistically parallel to the Greek notion of the *a-tom*. Humans were conceived to be 'individuals' in the ancient world because it was believed that they had indivisible souls. Initially, this concept indicated the ontological and theological essence of human beings. In modernity, however, individualism arises in the context of a conflict between individual rights (initially primarily the right to private property) and society. The tension between individual and society eventually gives rise to the idea that society is not only composed of individuals, but that its purpose is to protect and serve the rights of the individual. In the eyes of critics of individualism like Henry Rosemont (2016), this brought about a paradoxically antisocial understanding of society dominating current Western countries which needs to be abolished. Be that as it may, the idea of individualism is based on the assumption that everyone is born as a unique and single

individual. Somewhat contradictory to a radical concept of authenticity, the individual is therefore not something that we must create, but it is already naturally provided. The notion of such an individuality has been paradigmatically expressed by Jean Jacques Rousseau at the beginning of his *Confessions*:

> I am not made like any that I have seen; I venture to believe that I was not made like any that exist. If I am not more deserving, at least I am different. As to whether nature did well or ill to break the mould in which I was cast, that is something no one can judge until after they have read me. (Rousseau 2000, 5)

Eventually, however, both the individualistically and the authentically conceived 'I' will have to be creative in inventing its social persona and its identity. The difference is that while the individual 'I' is taken to be supplied with its own self at birth, the authentic 'I' has to create this self along with its identity. This difference may or may not be seen as merely technical or trivial.

In the 20th century, Richard Rorty has presented a variation of authentic existence: the figure of the ironist (1989). The ironist is a pragmatic character who does not ultimately commit to any truth claim. For him, all conventional vocabularies and ideas are provisional and he does not seriously adopt any for once and for all – he rather takes them with a grain of salt. Rorty says that the ironist:

> is trying to get out from under inherited contingencies and make his own contingencies, get out from under an old final vocabulary and fashion one which will be all his own. The generic trait of ironists is that they do not hope to have their doubts about their final vocabularies settled by something larger than themselves. This means that that their criterion for resolving doubts, their criterion of private perfection, is autonomy rather than affiliation to a power other than themselves. All any ironist can measure success against is the past – not by living up to it, but by redescribing it in his terms, thereby becoming able to say, 'Thus I willed it'. (Rorty 1989, 97)

The ironist never allows society to overrule his own autonomy. The self remains in command. It uses conventional vocabularies idiosyncratically in order to maintain its sovereignty. The ironist does not let the non-originality of external vocabularies taint his originality. He engages in (ironic) identity construction with the means of originality, creativity and independence. Despite his emphasis on uniqueness, the ironist may have historic predecessors, though. Socratic, Zhuangzian, Romantic and Kierkegaardian irony are all candidates for comparisons with Rorty's irony.

*Profilicity.* After Trilling (1972), sincerity and authenticity, along with related models of identity, have been discussed in the relevant philosophical literature (see Taylor 2007). It seems, however, that more recent social and technological developments have brought to the fore a third existential

paradigm that deserves attention. For lack of a better term, we will provisionally call it 'profilicity'.[7] Profilicity is, we believe, the dominant paradigm for constructing identity under the social condition of pervasive 'second-order observation'.

Luhmann described the radical shift to modern society not only in terms of the replacement of stratified differentiation with functional differentiation, but also, at least in his later works, in terms of the increasing ubiquity of *second-order observation*: 'A consequence of functional differentiation that is just as important is the far-reaching shift in observation to second-order observation'(Luhmann 2013a, 102). Second-order observation 'has become the advanced mode of perceiving the world in modern society' (Luhmann 2013b, 100). In what may be called the completion of modern society according to Luhmann, 'all functional systems were adapted operationally to second-order observation, to the observation of observers'(Luhmann 2012, 87).

The concept of second-order observation is, we think, the most pertinent concept for understanding present-day society. Simply put, it means not directly observing something, but rather observing it as it is observed by someone else. Luhmann says that it is 'the perception of what others say or do not say'(Luhmann 2013b, 100). This happens every time something is seen on a screen, be it a TV programme, a video on the Internet or a friend's Instagram page or Twitter account. When looking at the ratings of a restaurant or a hotel, we also operate in the form of second-order observation –or when reading a book review or checking the latest university rankings. Concrete examples of second-order observation, which developed on a full-fledged scale only after Luhmann's death in 1998, are rating agencies in the economy, the peer-review process in the academic system and social media communication in the new mass media.

In essence, the structure of second-order observation has been illustrated decades prior to Luhmann by the economist John Maynard Keynes in his thought experiment of the 'beauty contest'–which was designed as a model to describe the functioning of financial markets (Keynes 1936, 156). It can serve equally well as a model of second-order observation. Elena Esposito summarizes its basic idea:

> It is not a case of choosing those [faces] that, to the best of one's judgment, are really the prettiest, nor even those that average opinion genuinely thinks the prettiest. We have reached the third degree where we devote our intelligences to anticipating what average opinion expects the average opinion to be. (Esposito 2013, 4–5).

In second-order observation, value –such as financial value, beauty value, moral value or, as we intend to outline here, *personal value* –is determined by second-order observation ranking

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7. We thank David Stark for suggesting this term as an improvement of the earlier attempts 'profility' and 'profilability'. It is derived from Sherry Turkle's studies on the identity constructions through the use of social media. She quotes, for instance, a person named Stan saying: 'What I learned in high school was profiles, profiles, profiles, how to make a me' (Turkle 2017, 183).

and rating mechanisms that determine 'what average opinion expects the average opinion to be'. Not the 'object'(i.e. the product, the university, the face, the human being) itself is observed, but how it is observed by observing agencies, rating mechanisms or review processes that are taken to be representative of formulating 'public opinion'.Borrowing atermusedbyWalter Benjamin in his reflections on photography, we may say that second-order observation promotes the *Ausstellungswert* or 'exhibition value'(Benjamin 1955) over all other values –or transforms them into exhibition value. In order to generate personal value, one has to exhibit one's identity on presentation platforms that allow second-order observation mechanisms to verify it.

Social media is perhaps the best example for second-order observation. Photos or messages are posted on these social media sites within a framework of second-order observation; they allow us to see how someone is being observed by him-or herself and by others, and they are produced with the knowledge that they are seen in this way. They are thoroughly manufactured *for* second-order observation. New apps are readily available to assist in such manufacturing (Fan 2017). Today, the operation of social media is done through a structural coupling of the mass media and the intimacy system, a coupling that was largely unimaginable just a few decades ago. However, it is not only social media that functions this way. As Luhmann stressed, many systems, including most notably the economy, the academic system and tourism, function this way as well.

We now exist with and within such systems and have to construct identity accordingly. Arguably, second-order observation has weakened, but not totally obliterated, the sincerity and the authenticity paradigms. Attitudes such as honesty or originality hardly seem to suffice anymore to achieve identity formation under these conditions. What is now called for is the successful communicative presentation of identity, potentially including one's sincerity, authenticity and/or irony, in the form of a *profile*. One achieves identity by achieving exhibition value through 'profilicity' within social systems that function along with second-order observation.[8]

The three core aspects of profilicity are (a) distinctness or visibility resulting in *quantitative attention*, (b) a certain 'coolness', or other forms of 'excellence' resulting in *qualitative acclaim* and (c) coherence with generally expected ethical expectations in a given context (e.g. political, academic or aesthetic) resulting in *normative approval*. The triple-A presentation of identity (i.e. those achieving attention, acclaim and approval) is capable of generating exhibition value.

Like an authentic existence, a profilic existence has to be special, but special in essentially the same way as others are special.[9] Profile pictures on a website appear in the same format and have to follow a set of basic rules: no nudity and nothing politically or religiously offensive, for instance – though depending on the nature and 'ethos' of the website, the opposite can also be called for to achieve visibility. Academic profile photos provide a good example as well; many fall

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8. For a more detailed discussion of 'profilicity' and its relation to the speeding up of society and Hartmut Rosa's work, see D'Ambrosio (2018).

9. Anthony Giddens has described this sublation of difference in sameness as a basic rule of authenticity as well: 'All self-development depends on the mastering of appropriate responses to others; an individual who has be to "different" from all others has no chance of reflexively developing a coherent self-identity' (Giddens 1991, 200).

into one of two categories: the erudite-looking scholar in the office, or the adventurous traveller hiking or posing by mountain or lake. The unique style of one's profile picture is not derived from one's inborn or created uniqueness, but from the format by which academic profile pictures signal uniqueness. Different from authenticity, under conditions of second-order observation, the source of profilic distinctness, unlike the source of originality, is observation-centred as opposed to being self-centred – it is geared towards gaining attention. Simply put, it is primarily the profile picture that needs to be distinct, not me. My own distinctness will follow and be shaped in line with the attention, acclaim and approval generated by my presentation.

Excellence, style or 'coolness' must complement mere visibility. Academic papers need to pass a second-order observation-based peer-review process of a well-reputed journal in order to be considered of academic quality. The mere presentation of a video on a social media website without confirmation of it being liked lacks exhibition value. When checking a restaurant or a hotel on a commercial website, people not only look at the pictures, price and location, but also, and perhaps more closely, at the reviews. In this way, profilic identity is essentially tied not only to visibility, but also to visible acclaim.

Of increasing importance for maintaining profilicity is to avoid moral ostracization. Just as a brand name can be ruined by being associated with immoral practices of a company, a profilic identity can be destroyed by being publicly shunned or shamed. Someone unfortunate enough to be shunned by their peers will, under conditions of second-order observation, not primarily be considered to be 'insincere' or 'inauthentic', but become non-profilic. Others will make sure to distance themselves from any association with or endorsement of the culprit – who will be unfriended, no longer cited by their peers or have their accounts discontinued. In this way, approval becomes an indispensable condition for maintaining profilicity. Without approval, a profilic identity can be tarnished beyond repair.

## III. From sincerity to authenticity to profilicity: The emergence of a (late) modern paradigm of identity

After having suggested a brief and preliminary glossary for analysing constitutive and dynamic aspects of the problem of identity, we now intend to reiterate in a somewhat more detailed fashion than in the previous section the specific development from sincerity to authenticity and eventually to what we have called 'profilicity'. In this section, we intend to imbed this neologism more thoroughly into existing social and political theories of modernity. We wish to suggest that the paradigm of 'profilicity' is of particular relevance for new '*very*' *late modern* ways of dealing with the problem of identity that are presently replacing modern, or late modern, forms of authenticity as they have been described, for instance, by Hartmut Rosa, or Anthony Giddens.

Although we argue that each of the three paradigms sincerity, authenticity and profilicity can be found, to some degree, in any period, and that they often coexist and may allow a self to pursue

different strategies of identity formation more or less simultaneously, aligning them with broad historical periods can help exposing intricacies of the development of the problem of identity. Paradigms compete with one another over time in establishing what Anthony Giddens (1991) has called 'ontological security'.

### The rise of authenticity in the context of the modern displacement of the individual through functional differentiation and dynamization

In pre-modern society, ontological security was often tied to the placement of the persona in a relatively fixed social space. As Luhmann put it, people rarely had to explain who they were, and specifically not, we assume, to themselves. Such a placement, along with a set of corresponding roles, was able to provide a reasonably informative background for establishing a standard for interaction. Concretely, this led to relative congruity expected between, for instance, one's occupation, attire, economic power, literacy and vocabulary and religious or political views. Sincerity meant a commitment of the self to such a congruity that in turn would constitute an identity.

The relative inefficiency and danger of travelling meant that pre-modern societies enjoyed an additional layer of stability in terms of a cushioning provided by, albeit shifting, spatial boundaries.[10] Compared with the modern age, people did not move about as easily, meaning that one's position was not only a figurative 'place' in society, but also that most people tended to be literally located in a particular area for an extended period of time. The confines of space generally included a limited number of known participants, which bolstered the understanding and affirmation of each persona's role-based identity. One is, for example, the smith not only at his workshop, but at the market, at church and in the streets. After all, everyone in town knows who he is: the smith. In Europe, the development of the 'family names',such as 'Smith', often followed this pattern; they were commonly derived from a placement into a profession or locality that was taken to be determining. Similarly, in China, surnames indicated the placement within a specific lineage which was also envisioned to remain stable over time.

In modern society, literal and figurative displacement increases along with functional differentiation. Hartmut Rosa (2013) describes the 'dynamization'of society as a centre-piece of modernization. This notion speaks to not only the speeding up of certain aspects of life, but also 'dynamic stabilization'–the idea that some facets of today's societies paradoxically require constant change in order to remain constant. The existential impact is colossal. For example, today's ease of travel means that space is far less relevant for identity construction, especially for those living in, travelling to and moving between the increasingly anonymous cities. When one is not

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10. There are, of course, many exceptions. Certain groups of people travelled constantly, and some covered huge distances. However, when compared with modern societies, and especially the past few decades, travel in pre-modern societies was extremely slow and relatively limited (see Rosa 2013).

meaningfully recognized, sometimes even within their own neighbourhoods, various earlier factors in the development of identity are unavoidably subverted. Sincerity, for example, is more difficult to maintain and loses its foundation in social structures and the 'lifeworld'. A drastic change can therefore be seen in the adoption of various manifestations of individualism.

New external pressures fed into the conception of a detached decision-making power in the modern, and supposedly free, individual. Society no longer expected the same degree of reverent 'living up to'one's predetermined roles. Instead it demanded a capacity to choose for oneself. Choice extended to areas previously controlled by social status, the church, politics and thickly associated social norms. Everything from clothing and marriage, to occupation and sexual orientation, could, one after the other, be reconfigured as a result of the exercise of individual agency, and therefore became an indication of identity. Coupled with the dissolution of social roles and thick normative systems, the individual was ascribed with a new degree of agency that it had to make use of in order to achieve identity.

The divisibility that therein developed meant, however, that the self became more complex. Eventually, the smith could no longer simply be a smith –and to be named Smith no longer provided social identification and became insignificant. In modernity, choices and their associated identity constructions were begetting of decisions; often a single choice could determine one's marital status, or political leanings, for a lifetime. We find this in the classic American 'Fordist'mentality; namely, a good job with fair wages and decent benefits *for life*. After finding a spouse and settling into a long-term mortgage, one could reasonably expect that few major changes or challenges to identity would occur outside the chosen path. Modern individual identity is thus, as Rosa argues, linked with a '*Bildungsroman*, the coming-of-age novel or developmental narrative':

> […] the space of experience and the horizon of expectations […] allow one to conceive of one's life (as well as the development of society) as a directed motion and not to have to carry on traditions in a [sic] unreflective way and […] the horizon of expectations remains stable enough to allow long-run, time-resistant life perspectives to develop, the gratification of needs to be systematically postponed, and the completions of the biographical pattern to be patiently awaited. (Rosa 2013, 230)

Here, one's life, and identity, are not determined by placement through birth to the degree they were in pre-modern societies. In modern society, one has options which are given as trajectories – each harbouring their own straightforward path and particular *telos*. One must choose to work at a factory, go to college or sign up for the army. Each has a different end goal, but they are all paths promising the formation of an individual identity. And once in route little variance should be expected.

In high or late modern society, expectations for a lifetime are undermined as the relative stability of space and place collapse even further. What was guaranteed from generation to generation in

pre-modern society, and then promised for a lifetime in modernity, is now subject to constant yearly, daily or even momentary disruptions. Making, again, a great American 'Ford factory' dream largely is no longer possible. In late modern societies, people change jobs with increasing frequency, as they do their place of residence, partners and various other identity-conferring commitments. Consequently, a sincere commitment to social roles and functions becomes less and less determining of identity.

According to Rosa's diagnosis, the dynamization of late modernity further disrupts the self's previous anchoring in a particular social place and familiar space. Importantly, this dynamization occurs not simply 'out there'in society. Related to instrumental reason, obsessive calculation, teleological thinking and the desire to control nature, the dynamization in late modern societies affects thoughts, feelings and attitudes. For example, presented with several options for a flight between cities we begin to think instrumentally about which fits our schedule best. The criterion for picking a flight is almost inevitably 'What allows me to do more'or 'How can I decrease downtime between activities'–be it in terms of work, suntanning or even sleep. Not only are we less and less amazed at going halfway around the world in 15 h, it becomes a bother, a chore, something to 'deal with'. The flight itself is just something to 'be done with'so that we can move on to the next *functional* activity. And external expectations have adjusted accordingly. 'Can't you just fly in for the afternoon?''Oh, if you'll be in Europe anyways why not come to…'Through internalizing these pressures we convince ourselves of what *must* be done; 'If I take the redeye I can be at work in the morning'. In other words, as options and various external demands speed up, we compart-mentalize our time accordingly, optimizing it to have as little downtime (free time) as possible. Naps are 'powered'through, time with the family must be 'quality'and child play is scheduled as a 'date'. Even the more relaxing pleasures of exercise, yoga, meditation or just 'downtime'are often self-inflicted ploys to 'recharge'for a more functional tomorrow. The adoption of 'dynamized thinking'accompanies a compartmentalization of identity –the existential mandate of functional differentiation.

Echoing Luhmann in some respects, Rosa uses the term 'situational self'to designate an incongruent composite of various personas and selves which need to be combined with one another in the absence of an overarching unity. Rosa describes situational identity:

> A radically situational identity is marked out by the fact that a subject can be, say, faithful and introverted in church, 'soft and feminine'in intimate relationships, chauvinistic and full of vitality at work, pacifist and counterculture at a peace demonstration, militantly aggressive and atheistic at the party convention, all without feeling the related inconsistencies as problematic. (Rosa 2013, 240)

Here, Rosa describes the 'problem of identity' very similarly to Luhmann, who spoke of different selves needed for the job, the family and the opera. Interestingly enough, though, Rosa

concludes that such inconsistency may not be considered problematic anymore. We suggest that this achievement – that neither the self nor society considers inconsistent functional personas as a problem – is based on a transition from one paradigm of identity, namely sincerity, to others such as individualism, authenticity and now also profilicity.

The challenge to identity in modernity and late modernity was well charted by Anthony Giddens in his book on *Modernity and Self-Identity* (1991). Here, Giddens argues that in modernity and late modernity, 'the self establishes a trajectory' whereby 'coherence' can only be established 'through the reflexive use of the broader social environment' which requires unparalleled levels of the 'impetus towards control, [and being] geared to reflexivity' (Giddens 1991, 148). These 'new mechanisms of self-identity' are required given the 'disembedding mechanisms [which] intrude into the heart of self-identity' in modern and late modern societies (Giddens 1991, 148). The 'disembedding mechanisms' are those that, as we outlined above, 'prise [pry] social relations free from the hold of specific locales, recombining them across wide time-space distances' (Giddens 1991, 2). The self, however, does not simply 'empty out'. Rather, it forms a new self-mastery 'over the social relations and social contexts [that are] reflexively incorporated into the forging of self-identity' (Giddens 1991, 149). Giddens summarizes: 'the ontological security which modernity has purchased, on the level of day-to-day routines, depends on an institutional exclusion of social life from fundamental existential issues which raise central moral dilemmas for human beings' (Giddens 1991, 156). Replacing the final words 'which raise central moral dilemmas for human beings' with 'which raise central identity dilemmas for human beings' demonstrates what is existentially at stake. The conditions of modernity and late modernity have directly led to the dismemberment of a pre-modern sincerity-focused identity.

For Giddens, the solution is to 'reflexively make' the self, which 'has to be accomplished amid a puzzling diversity of options and possibilities' (Giddens 1991, 3). Essentially, Giddens thereby expresses a call for authenticity. Being divorced from its social roles the self is required to construct identity by either creating (authenticity) or discovering (individualism) itself. Often the two distinct approaches are part of a broader project of identity, which, following Taylor, can be grouped together under a broader notion of 'authenticity', that includes both individualism (as self-discovery) and authenticity (as self-creation) in the narrower sense.

In authenticity looms, a certain dejection of the different personas tied to different social functions. The social placements that provided fixed reference points for identity no longer hold up. When they are enacted or theatrically staged with a certain degree of cynicism, as Goffman (1959) described it quite brilliantly, they can serve negatively as the backboard for constructing identity *against* or in spite of them. Irony is then turned to as personas are more compartmentalized and the gap between distinct social roles, and between them and the self, becomes too large to ignore. The self can no longer settle into one, or even a couple of functions, placements or roles, and develops an ironic form of conscious 'role-play'. Given their obvious mutual incongruity, the self can turn to an ironic, non-committed attitude towards its multiple personas as a further variation of

authenticity-based identity.

There is, predictably, a traditionalist backswing against modern and late modern multiple function-based identity construction. Demands for a 'new sincerity' have been expressed. Richard Sennett, for example, argues for a return to a 'craft' ethos where work can offer ordinary people self-development and supply identity (Sennett 2009).[11] Defenders of a new sincerity decry what they perceive as moral shortcomings in today's society with its overemphasis on individualism, authenticity or irony. However, theoretically, the plea to return to a culture dominated by sincerity seems, like remaking America's great Fordism, a nostalgic appeal for bygone times. As Rosa remarks:

> In late modernity self-projects that are oriented toward stability appear to be anachronistic and condemned to failure in a highly dynamic environment, while forms of identity based on flexibility and readiness to change are systematically favored. (Rosa 2013, 243)

Again, this is not to say that sincerity has been completely abandoned – the very appeals to it show that it is still considered to be of some moral value – but rather that roles have become less and less individually relevant and socially significant in functionally differentiated societies. While we agree that thinking of oneself as father, daughter or welder might certainly be useful at times, individualism, authenticity and irony have become at least as important in the late modern world for successfully achieving a notion of identity.

### The rise of profilicity in the context of a 'very' late modern prevalence of second-order observation

However, the central point that we intend to convey in this essay is that in current times of 'very' late modernity, the age of authenticity is being overcome, and that another paradigm of identity is on the rise: profilicity. Profilicity deals with the challenges posed by today's 'disembedding mechanisms' in a novel fashion. Whereas sincerity hopes to find reassurance in external norms and the authenticity paradigm turns inward for both self-discovery and creation, profilicity finds an entirely new space for social place. With profilicity security is found in the external through self-presentation and identity construction in the mode of second-order observation.

The rhetoric associated with the 'Age of Authenticity' has become worn out. Variations of 'be yourself', 'find yourself' and 'create yourself' now paint billboards and Internet advertisements with numbing frequency. Being original does not mean standing out; it is, paradoxically, what everyone is asked to do. Having nestled quite snugly into widespread acceptance, authenticity is now obviously inauthentic (which is not to say that it ever was authentic).

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11. A similar emphasis on sincerity is found in the works of the contemporary Confucian thinkers Henry Rosemont Jr. (2016) and Roger Ames (2011) who have formulated a 'Confucian role ethics' as, in essence, an ethics of sincerity.

In its twilight years, authenticity has come to lean on a presentation-oriented crutch. The growing importance of the Internet, social media and the proliferation of profiles prioritizes presentation in identity projects. 'Expressing oneself', which had already been a factor in authenticity, gains prominence over discovery and authorship. The content is again expected to be loosely 'unique' in a profile, but the standards are more constrained. Most importantly, consideration for what passes the test of profilic presentability becomes the focal point for judgements. The 'presentation of self in everyday life' to speak with Goffman (1959), now operates on the basis of presenting profile pictures, publishing peer-reviewed articles or posting various recordings of one's activities on second-order observation platforms. Then, on such platforms, one can observe how one's presentation is observed, and in light of this one obtains clues for further shaping the presentation of one's identity.

Profilicity unabashedly displays expressed concern for the second-order in, for example, the use of hashtags, memes, Instagram hotspots and other forms of reposting. Profilicity both discovers and makes a place for a persona in a newly constructed 'virtual' space that does not necessarily require corporeal space, which, as Sennett (2009) laments, has been largely neutralized in contemporary identity construction. The most important space in profilicity becomes the ever-accessible professional and private online world.

Under conditions of profilicity, presentation is increasingly decoupled from representation. Unlike roles in the sincerity ethos, profilicity constructions do not operate on the basis of an inner commitment to long-term roles, and unlike in the authenticity paradigm they do not indicate a 'true self' underlying various, and potentially incoherent, functions that desires recognition. Profilicity-based constructions of identity primarily succeed through public attention, acclaim and approval – through being followed, through being noticed, through being rated, ranked, approved and liked. Reflexivity, creativity and agency thereby become geared towards second-order observation. In profilicity, I am presenting an identity that I hope will be validated by my co-presenters who constitute, along with me, the same second-order observation platform or system that takes on the form of a virtual academic, professional or private 'general peer'.

## IV. Conclusion

Arguably, in contemporary society, one of the most fundamental existential problems is the mind–society problem, or the problem of identity. This essay has argued that the identity problem is addressed through particular orientations towards existential paradigms. They constitute models of identity which are expressed in the form of socially pervasive semantics that selves can adopt to form self-conceptions, find meaning in life and orient their existential experiences. Three such existential paradigms have been introduced: (a) sincerity and devotion, (b) authenticity, individualism and irony and (c) profilicity. This list is not supposed to be complete and highly preliminary – other paradigms may fall under the umbrella of any

of these three categories, and others might be conceived of as well. Moreover, the paradigms can historically, culturally or individually coexist and overlap. As shown above, one may become more dominant under specific social conditions or for specific selves, but they do not in principle exclude one another. While, for instance, a profilic identity seems to thrive in our times of socially ubiquitous second-order observation, sincerity and authenticity may still be communicated, experienced and felt.

Identity formation, as a necessary response to the mind–society problem, is therefore unstable and provisional. It is a continuous 'work in progress'. Given the systemic disconnectedness of body, mind and society, a singular coherent identity – an identity that would perfectly align or connect the three realms – seems to be impossible. The existential task of constructing an identity produces illusions, but illusions that seem necessary, for without them neither self nor society could function in the way they do. The formation of an identity bridges the systemic gap between body, mind and society, and without this platform, we could not uphold the socially highly productive and existentially, rationally and emotionally indispensable conviction that we are, against all theoretical and empirical evidence, human agents. In the past, when the mind–body problem was of great concern, such a necessary illusion was built upon the notion of the 'soul', while today, as the mind–society problem has become more pressing, it hinges increasingly on the persuasiveness of existential paradigms and their models of identity.

'No portrait is more intensely drawn than the self-portrait', writes Timothy Mo in his novel An Insular Possession (Mo 1986, 531), but, we'd like to add, it is also true that no portrait is more intensely presented and observed.

## Acknowledgement

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# Innovation for Inclusion and Reflection

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## 1. Introduction

"Social and Cultural Innovation" is a syntagma that has been receiving increased usage since 2016, when it was chosen by the European Strategy Forum Research Infrastructures for the name of the working group that deals with research infrastructures primarily connected with the Social Sciences and the Humanities.[1] Innovation refers to the creation of new products and services by bringing a new idea to the market. Economic growth turns on infrastructures, which provide access to services and knowledge, e.g. by overcoming the digital divide. Globalization has made it clear that a most urgent objective is to work out policies of social and cultural innovation to the advantage of citizens—policies that aim at achieving changes in the regulatory environment that make societies both inclusive and reflective.[2] The *Faro Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society* of UNESCO encourages reflection on the role of citizens in the process of defining, creating, and managing a cultural environment in which communities evolve.[3] The notions of inclusion and reflection are inspired by philosophical ideas referring to the role of deliberative communication of citizens in a modern public sphere aiming at mutual understanding. Jürgen Habermas has applied to society[4] what G. W. F. Hegel had elaborated as the passage from the surface of being to the ground of essence, a passage that takes place, literally, by "reflecting into the thing"[5] – like reflected light that illuminates something previously invisible, or creates a pattern not previously existing. It is now time to examine the implications of innovation for redefining the

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1. European Strategy Forum Research Infrastructures, *Strategy Report Research Infrastructures: Roadmap 2016*, Brussels, Science and Technology Facilities Council, 2016.
2. D. Archibugi and A. Filippetti (eds.), *The Handbook of Global Science, Technology and Innovation*, London, Wiley, 2015.
3. Unesco, *Faro Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society*, Paris, Unesco, 2007.
4. J. Habermas, *Wahrheitstheorien*, in: *Wirklichkeit und Reflexion: Walter Schulz zum 60. Geburtstag*, edited by H. Fahrenbach, Pfüllingen, Neske, 1973, pp. 211-265.
5. See http://www.zeno.org/Philosophie/M/Hegel,+Georg+Wilhelm+Friedrich/Wissenschaft+der+Logik> accessed 15 July 2018. G. W. F. Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, vol. 2: *Die Logik des Wesens*, section I: *Erster Abschnitt: Das Wesen als Reflexion in ihm selbst*, chapter 2: *Die Wesenheiten oder die Reflexionsbestimmungen*.

ways in which the culture has been envisioned, particularly to visualize the various ways in which users engage with cultural processes in the past, present, and future.

## 2. Inclusion

"Reduced inequality" has been declared the tenth goal of the Substainable Development Agenda of the United Nations.[6] Inequalities and exclusion are major concerns in Europe and are being extensively researched in Horizon 2020:

> Reducing inequalities and social exclusion in Europe are crucial challenges for the future of Europe. At the same time, there is great potential for Europe through opportunities provided, for example, by new forms of innovation and by the engagement of citizens. Supporting inclusive, innovative and reflective societies is a prerequisite for a sustainable European integration.[7]

Theories, events, doctrines, facts and real life are an essential part of today's world: if their knowledge were not to be explored with new educational instruments and transferred in a participated and constructive way, national narratives and identitarian ideologies would attract the minorities and affect the majorities as well, which is a drift the world should be aware of, bearing in mind, e.g., the dreadful experience of the Holocaust. Innovative education and training policies can enhance labor productivity, social equality and eventually democratic participatory process.

"Social innovation" aims to directly address unmet social needs in new ways by developing or enhancing new products and services through the direct engagement of the people who need and use them, typically through a bottom-up process. It takes place when a new product or service answers positively to the following three questions: (1) Does it solve the problem? (2) Does it have a fair cost? (3) Is it universally accepted? An example of social innovation is the regional healthcare card of the Lombardy Region in Italy.[8] It was introduced in 1999 as a pioneer endeavor. It solved the problem of providing access to data; not only did it cost right, but it enabled substantial savings; and it was accepted without any opposition.

Basic research is often funded by public investment. However, due to a lack of successful communication strategies to the general public, its importance is rarely fully understood by citizens who do not grasp its actual usefulness. Co-creation as part of knowledge and technology transfer assumes a social relevance, in that it makes basic science widely accepted by the society and

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6. See <https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/development-agendaSee https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/development-agenda/> accessed 3 September 2018.

7. See <https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en/h2020-section/ europe-changing-world-inclusive-innovative-and-reflective-societies> accessed 3 September 2018.

8. See <http://www.regione.lombardia.it/wps/portal/istituzionale/HP/DettaglioServizio/servizi-e-informazioni/cittadini/diritti-e-tutele/carta-regionale-e-nazionale-servizi> accessed 15 July 2018.

among taxpayers by giving space to societal actors that follow the whole research and innovation process.[9] For these reasons, measuring the impact is fundamental to improve societal acceptance of public investment in basic research because it provides a basis for aligning research and innovation with the values, needs and expectations of society.[10] The methodology relies on composite indicators that have reliable characteristics when complex and multidimensional phenomena need to be measured. It looks for integrations and complementarities. It takes account of the effects of engaging stakeholders and the civil society in the dynamics of science-based innovation. Finally, the methodology considers the measure of benefits for the private sector as it invests in curiosity-driven research.

Innovation is the main concern of research councils, agencies that began to be established about a century ago, at the time of World War I. They differ significantly from universities and academies. University faculties are mostly free to investigate topics of their interest, they are largely devoted to teaching; freedom of research and teaching is a constitutive right of their profession. European academies were funded by monarchs so that they could obtain answers to their inquiries from live-in scholars. Research councils, on the contrary, are funded by governments in order to achieve results of strategic relevance for the country. Directly related are research infrastructures, which foster economic growth by providing access to services and knowledge. In this view, it is up to national governments to help build competencies that generate complexity.[11]

European research infrastructures today are of different kinds. They range from large-scale facilities with advanced instrumentation (e.g., the CERN Laboratories in Geneva, the European Synchrotron Laboratory, etc.) to resources for knowledge storage, such as archives and databanks. The latter are no longer mono-locational; they are instead the result of an integration of resources and laboratories that are distributed all over Europe. Their governance and legal status are structured as a European Research Infrastructure Consortium (ERIC).

Research infrastructures are "common goods."[12] They are planned, built and managed for serving vast research communities, which operate in diversified sectors on the principles of open access and competition. The 2018 ESFRI roadmap considers six groups of research infrastructures: DAT-Data, Computing and Digital Research Infrastructures, ENE-Energy, ENV-Environment,

9. C. K. Prahalad and V. Ramaswamy, Co-opting Customer Competence, *Harvard Business Review*, 78/1 (2000), pp. 79-87.

10. European Science Foundation, *Research Infrastructures in Digital Humanities: Science Policy Briefing 42*, Strasbourg, ESF, 2011; M. Kaase, *Research Infrastructures in the Social Sciences: The Long and Winding Road*, in: *Understanding Research Infrastructures in the Social Sciences*, edited by B. Kleiner, I. Renschler, B. Wernli, P. Farago and D. Joye, Berlin, Seismo, 2013, pp. 19-30; Q. Lauer, *Die Vermessung der Kultur: Geisteswissenschaften als Digital Humanities*, in: Big Data: Das neue Versprechen der Allwissenheit, edited by H. Geiselberger and T. Moorstedt, Berlin, Seismo, 2013, pp. 99-116; M. Žic-Fuchs, *Research Infrastructures in the Humanities: The Challenges of 'Visibility' and 'Impact'*, in: *Facing the Future: European Research Infrastructures for the Humanities and Social Sciences*, edited by A. Dușa, D. Nelle, G. Stock and G. Wagner, Berlin, Scivero, 2014, pp. 121-133.

11. C. Hidalgo and R. Hausmann, "The Building Blocks of Economic Complexity, *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, 106/26 (2009), pp. 10570-10575.

12. R. Pozzo and V. Virgili, Governing Cultural Diversity: Common Goods, Shared Experiences, Spaces for Exchange, *Economia della cultura*, 26/1 (2016), pp. 41-47, doi.org/10.1446/84035.

H&F-Health and Food, PSE-Physics and Engineering, and eventually SCI-Social and Cultural Innovation, whose strategy working group:

> proposes possible solutions (related to RIs) that are able to help tackle the Grand Challenges facing society, such as health or demographic change, or the SC6-«inclusive, innovative and reflective societies» challenge from the third pillar of Horizon 2020 called «Tackling societal challenges». It establishes possible methods through which social sciences and humanities could be used as an evaluation criterion for the activity of other RIs in the ESFRI roadmap (e.g. social impact, etc.). It also explores how RIs can contribute to social innovation or better knowledge transfer towards society.[13]

## 3. Reflection

"Cultural innovation," no doubt, might sounds like an oxymoron. It is something real, however, that tops up social and technological innovation.[14] Cultural innovation requires spaces of exchange in which citizens engage in the process of sharing their experiences while appropriating common goods content. We are talking of public spaces such as libraries, museums, science centers, but also of any place in which co-creation activities may occur. At this level, social innovation becomes reflective and generates cultural innovation. Insisting on reflexivity helps to raise awareness for the importance of framing issues around engaging with science and society, identifying problems and defining solutions.

The Horizon 2020 topic "Europe in a Changing World: Innovative, Inclusive and Reflective Societies" introduces another syntagma that covers a vast array of the social sciences and humanities dealing with the past and the present, from history to geopolitics through cultural heritage studies and up to practically all fields of the humanities. A closer scrutiny reveals that this syntagma is strongly inspired by philosophical ideas referring to the crucial role of deliberative communication of citizens in a modern public sphere aiming at mutual understanding.[15] The current migrant crisis has made it clear with extraordinary force that a most urgent objective is to work towards Euro-Mediterranean societies that are inclusive, reflective, and attentive to the impact that migration is having on social and cultural innovation, security and health, environment and biodiversity.

It is now time to examine the role of reflection for rethinking the ways in which culture has been envisioned, particularly to visualize the various ways in which users engage with cultural processes in the past, present, and future. Let me propose a case study. Imagine a second-generation

13. See <http://www.esfri.eu/working-groups/social-and-cultural-innovation> accessed 15 July 2018.
14. R. Pozzo and V. Virgili, Social and Cultural Innovation: Research Infrastructures tackling Migration, *Diogenes: International Journal of Human Sciences*, 64/4 (2017), doi.org/10.1177/0392192117739822.
15. J. Habermas, *Op. cit.*

diaspora child (*huaqiao* 华桥) who attends a human sciences high school in Italy. At a certain point, s/he might be asked to read a text by Plato, possibly the *Apology of Socrates* (*Apologia Sokratous* Ἀπολογία Σωκράτους), first in Italian, then perhaps in the Greek original or in the classic Latin rendering of Marsilius Ficinus. Students today delve easily into multilayered, multilingual hypertexts, and they do so on the basis of the reciprocal guidance made possible by social reading tools. Our student ought to read the same text in modern unified Chinese as well, so that s/he might be able to start a discussion on Socrates in its Chinese-speaking family. Inversely, schoolmates might appropriate, say, the *Analects* (*Lunyu* 伦语) of Confucius through the conceptual references indicated by our student. Together they may start thinking on movement (*dong* 动), rest (*jing* 静), human being (*renji* 人际), humaneness (*ren* 仁), and eventually come to grasp key tenets of Neo-Confucianism,[16] such as the dictum that represents the unity of heaven and human or supernal heaven and humanity (*tianrenheyi* 天人合一), which amounts to "restoring the Heavenly Principle and diminishing human desires".[17]

Globalization is not a new experience. It is a long-term historical process that enhances regional, national, and local identities[18]. In addressing Europe's need to adapt to historical change, one needs to challenge the anachronistic notion of a European intellectual identity. Europe has evolved beyond its Greco-Roman intellectual roots, and has become much more diverse: "When talking of ancient luminaries such as Aristotle, who profoundly shaped European thought, we can correctly describe them as forming part of Europe's intellectual *basis*. European intellectual *identity*, on the other hand, is now much broader in scope, enriched through historical change, particularly immigration."[19] Cultural identity is a "polysemic, slippery and illusory" syntagma.[20] In fact, "culture cannot be but plural, changing, adaptable, constructed…. A culture that does not change and exchange with other cultures is a dead culture."[21] Cultural identity is therefore "what we construct whenever we are in contact with other human beings—regardless of the fact that they are from the same environment or not."[22]

## 4. Conclusion

Rémi Brague has noted that the Arabic term for dictionary, سوماق (qāmūs), is a translation of the name of the Titan of Greek mythology Ὠκεανός (Okeanós), in the original literal sense of a liquid

16. Ni Peimin, *Understanding the Analects of Confucius: A new Translation of Lunyu with Annotations*, Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 2017.

17. R. R. Wang, "Zhou Dunyi's Diagram of the Supreme Ultimate Explained ('Taijitu shuo'): A construction of the Confucian metaphysics," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 66 (2005), pp. 307-323, here p. 320.

18. Tu Weiming, *The Global Significance of Concrete Humanity: Essays on the Confucian Discourse in Cultural China*, New Delhi, Centre for Studies in Civilizations, 2010, p. 331.

19. DG-R&I, *Op. cit.*, p. 8.

20. F. Dervin, Cultural Identity, Representation, and Other, in: *The Routledge Handbook of Language and Intercultural Communication*, edited by J. Jackson, London, Routledge, 2012, pp. 181-194, here p. 181.

21. Id., *Op. cit.*, p. 183.

22. *Ibid.*

extension that embraces all emerged lands, permitting navigation and hence communication.[23] Leibniz has used the ocean metaphor for an encyclopedia, which is the very same idea concerning languages that this paper tries to defend. As Karl Jaspers pointed out, Confucius and Laozi lived and taught in China, the Upanishads were produced in India, where the Buddha lived, alike Zarathustra in Persia, the prophets in Palestine, Homer, Parmenides, Heraclitus, and Plato in Greece. "Everything implied by these names developed almost simultaneously in China, India, and the West."[24] Today, we see the rebirth of the cultural melting pot that Plato spoke about in the *Timaeus* (23c), thus prefiguring "the translation of Greek words, culture and thoughts into the Latin words of Cicero and Boethius, or the dynamics of the great Mediterranean cultural circle made of translation and tradition of philosophical, religious, and medical texts from Greek and Hebrew into Arabic, Latin, and all vernacular languages."[25]

The new "missions" of the next Framework Program for Research Innovation of the multiannual financial period 2021-2027 will foster research on the systemic change in the new generations. First and foremost, a change in the mindset, e.g. urban development, urban regeneration; institutional change; i-like culture as way of obtaining ratings. We are talking about common goods.[26] Given that migrants use cell-phones to obtain information – hacktivism, hackathons, we can think of measuring impact which generates trust between capital entrepreneurship, like venture capital, and social innovation, we see improvements. We expect cultural innovation to trigger a change in the mindset as regards locating culture (anthropology of space and place) for inclusion and reflection in education, life-long learning, healthcare, urban development and regeneration. Culture cannot be but plural, changing, adaptable, constructed. Inclusion and reflection are constructed whenever we are in contact with other human beings, regardless where they come from. This we have to learn.

23. R. Brague, "Langues et traditions constitutives de la philosophie en Europe, in: *Vocabulaire européen des philosophies: Dictionnaire des intraduisibles*, edited by B. Cassin, Paris, Seuil, 2004, pp. 694-699.
24. K. Jaspers, *Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte*, Zürich, Artemis, 1949, p. 2.
25. T. Gregory, Translatio Studiorum, in: *Translatio Studiorum: Ancient, Medieval and Modern Bearers of Intellectual History*, edited by M. Sgarbi, Leiden, Brill's, 2012, pp. 1-21, here p. 12.
26. X. Graeffe, Cultural Heritage as a Common Good, *Cartaditalia*, 1 (2017), pp. 207-20.

# Beyond Boundaries: Can Artificial Intelligence Be Aesthetic?

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## 1. Introduction

The thinking power of Homo sapiens made the human being the lord of all creation. The ability to reason is also the premise of human existence. However we, as humans, know that this does not confine only to human but also to Artificial Intelligence. In the history of humankind, it is not difficult to find attempts to create an immortal being that surpasses us and to complement our inferiority. Why has human wanted to develop something perpetuating? This desire seems to be the steadfast commitment of only human beings. AI is studied, researched, and enhanced to become superior to human being.

The artificial intelligence created by humans, who are themselves the subject of creation, has often been imprinted as human-like beings in science fiction novels and movies. In this respect, I would like to discuss whether we can talk about the aesthetical aspect of AI. The issue of aesthetics is one of the human characteristics. Above all with artificial intelligence, the questions arise as to what humanity and existence mean. That is because now AI pervades in human life, forms new relationships with us, and acts the same as human beings.

Living with AI, culture and the way we think toward our society and human are changed. Today, we live in an information-oriented, media-resistant society and face a sort of de-realization of reality and material in every area of life. It is because communication technologies replace direct contact with the physical environment and because the mass media form their own world, the hyper-reality.

In this hyper-real world, the gap between image and reality disappears because all of the information we obtain from the mass media is a simulation of the original event. We are hardly exposed to the physical actuality of unedited actual events and information. The actual events transform into images, messages, and symbols in the information network of the whole society, and the actuality eventually disappears.

If there is no significance for the substance in our highly developed civilization, what will be the fate of our kind, Homo sapiens? Will our bodies which are seemingly useless in the net

society be the burdens to set free from our limitations? Now with those questions, we are making something immortal and transcendent which are different properties from our own. Similar to what Prometheus did, humans are attempting to share their legacy with another presence.

This study suggests the states of human beings living in the technological symbiotic life established with AI which may be a clue for us to profoundly recognize ourselves and what we have been achieved and should accomplish in the coming future.

## 2. What We Think as Humane

What is humane? Unlike AI, a human being is born from biological parents and belongs to somewhere from the moment of birth. Despite their apparent differences, Claus Emmeche(1956~) points out the similarities between human and digital organisms, describing human organisms as made with carbonaceous materials and consuming energy from the sun to organize matter, and digital organisms as consumers of the device of main computation, the central processing unit, CPU, in computers.[1]

If we look at human and machine in the broad sense, we can find fundamental similarity in their energy consumption. Also on a general level, the fact that they now coexist is also the similarity. Human beings and most natural materials are kinds of synthetic carbon materials, and artifacts are also composed of materials such as silicon, stainless steel, or plastic.

What, then, is the most fundamental difference between real life and artificial life? When today's biologists compare real life with artificial life, what distinguishes artificial life from real one is that artificial life is life without death. In other words, the death of artificial life is a clinical, artificial, digital, and momentary change of state from on to off, with no resemblance to biological end. Computer organisms do not die at all in a biological sense; they just cease to exist.

The actual death of an organism is a process of slowly erasing the boundaries of its environment. It is the process of allowing the substrate, nutritional salts, moisture, and other substances that make up the organism to be released into the environment and recirculated to the ecosystem. Theodor Roszak implies that human beings attempt to create a distinct presence because they feel fear, compassion, and hatred in their physical situations.

Human has wanted mechanical cleansing but it is natural for the existence of life to involve odors and traces of living in a way very different from mechanical cleansing. Is this the reason humans have made the perfect, better beings; AI? I think there must be another reason that is the message from the new era of digital media to generate a new creature.

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1. Claus Emmeche, *The Garden in The Machine-The Emerging Science of Artificial Life* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 40.

## 3. Message from Digital Media

As founding civilizations, human beings have produced devices, and the evolution of machines is understood as the evolution of humans. In the 21st Century, the digital media environment established by computers and the Internet has connected to all media centered on computers. Through a global network, various types of digitized and integrated information are distributed apace.

To clarify the relationship between these media and human societies, Marshall McLuhan (1911-1980) argues that through interaction with the human senses, media initiate the interaction, and, by transcending the mere means of information transmission, media act as the power that determines the communication structure and patterns of human perceptions, or more broadly, the nature of the entire social structure.[2] The new medium is not just the conscious and mental extension, but the extension of human beings, that is, the expansion of real human capabilities.

In the age of electronic media, as we move toward mechanical expansion of consciousness, we become aware that we gradually become the form of information. It has enabled the human being to be further transformed into other forms of expression that surpass his or her own abilities.[3] Unlike what we experience in the real world, we go through these data experiences in a digitized state of information. The changed perception by this new medium is shaking the roots of our thoughts about fixed and immutable beings. Digital media allow us to experiment with humanized media by dreaming up a human-like machine and constructing technical infrastructure so that human beings can exist as the information itself.

## 4. Nomadic Self as Information

A virtual self broadly refers to a being that works in cyberspace and refers to a surrogate self-working in cyberspace on behalf of a user of the physical world. AI is not a substitute for any one of our virtual selves or those derived from someone else. It is a synthesized entity generated by accumulating data and experiences of the researchers who produce it and of various people rather than one person.

AI is an implementation of universal and ordinary human model. To the contrary, the self from a person is dominated and developed in the physical environment to which we belong. The difference between the physical world and the cyberspace is that the identity of our experience unfolds differently. That is, the time and space are relatively experienced in the physical area, and this relative experience cannot be separated from the subjects of the experience. The space and time of cyberspace, however, deviate from such attachment and, in many cases, depend on our

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2. Marshall McLuhan and Eric McLuhan , *Law of Media: The New Science* ( Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), p. 37.
3. Marshall McLuhan, *Understanding Media* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994), p. 57.

own intentions. It is because, from the beginning, the time and space of cyberspace operate only by human manipulation.

However, the virtual self cannot be entirely established from virtuality or fiction. Cyberspace and the real world are inter-penetrating and overlapping, even though both are heterogeneous. Now, human beings can exist as an information body in cyberspace. Rather than an identity embodied by the human body, people regard this new human identity as a flow or patterns of the information. It lets people visit everywhere they want to go because, without bodies as encoding being, people can go beyond their physical boundaries.

Besides, as people can accumulate far more information together in one place that we call net society, they have learned how to use the information and attempted to apply it to AI. Absorbing the whole data in the net, AI tries to generate things humans consider as art. In human's case, we may call it as displaying human's creativity.

## 5. Accumulated Processed Information as Art

Recently people in the lab are attempting to make inventive AI, an artist that generates seemingly 'real' artworks. A research team from Rutgers University in New Jersey proposed a system, which is named CAN: Creative Adversarial Networks for generating art with creative characteristics. The team demonstrated a realization of this system based on a novel, original adversarial network. Their proposed system possesses the ability to produce innovative artifacts because the interaction between the two signals that derive the generation process is designed to force the system to explore creative space to find a solution that deviates from established styles but stays close enough to the boundary of art to be recognized as art. This interaction also provides a way for the system to self- assess its products.[4]

AI autonomously evaluates its products. Does it mean it can discern aesthetic attributes of things and people or it 'express' something? An essential component in art-generating algorithms is relating their creative process to art that has been produced by human artists throughout time. The team thinks this is important because a human creative process utilizes the prior experience of and exposure to art.[5] With the exposure, the system accumulates information of artworks and learned about their features. The system was evaluated by human subject experiments which showed that human subjects regularly confused the generated art with human art, and sometimes rated the generated art higher on various high-level scales.[6]

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4. Ahmed Elgammal, Bingchen Liu, Mohamed Elhoseiny, Marian Mazzone, "CAN: Creative Adversarial Networks Generating "Art" by Learning about styles Na Deviating from Style Norms", the extended version of a paper published on the Eighth International Conference on Computational Creativity (ICCC, 2017), p. 20.

5. Thus, the system is trained using an extensive collection of art images from the 15th century to the 21st century with their style labels. For the training, they used 81,449 paintings by 1,119 artists in the publicly available WikiArt data set.

6. Ibid.

Moreover, to generate artworks that seem to be created by human artists, the researchers have applied to "Arousal Concept" that is the psychophysical concept having great relevance for studying aesthetic phenomena.[7] When respondents were asked to rate how intentional, visually structured, communicative, and inspiring the images were. They rated the images generated by CAN higher than those created by real artists.

However, what the system generates is the accumulated and processed information of human artists. Of course, what human artist produces can be seen as information that has been experienced by human artists, but human artists feel, sense, and filter with their sensory systems such as eyes, ears, nose, and hands, etc. Artworks are not the numerical information. Even the "Fountain (1917)" by Marcel Duchamp or "Brillo Pad Box (1968)" by Andy Warhol is what resulted from their sensory reactions toward life experiences, art history, Aesthetics, and artworks from their predecessors. Those daily objects make viewers ponder why those artists introduce them as art. However, the paintings generated by CAN are the calculated and combined information that was not from sensory reactions nor based on aesthetical perception. Although one of the main characteristics of the proposed system is that it learns about the history of art in its process to create art, however, it does not have a semantic understanding of art behind the concept of style.

CAN does not know anything about the subject matter, or explicit models of elements or principle of art. Learning the art and experiencing art is beyond enumeration of what an artist has learned. Empathy is the critical aspect. It occurs when we are aware of the context of the producing artwork. The background is more significant than the resulting artworks. Even though the subjects of the experiment rated the artworks by CAN higher than those by human artists, still the historical context of producing artwork is crucial and meaningful.

## 6. Conclusion: Further Questions

Accepting the digital media and its sub products, humans can exist as encoded being in the cyberspace and net society. Living and interacting in the net world, people can build up enormous information which becomes the seed of AI. Humans have attempted to raise something immortal and transcendent which are different properties from our own. As becoming a kind of numerical being, humans can be omnipresent as long as they can employ the appropriate technology as if they did not have flesh and blood. This new way to exist makes us think about the definition of presence and see things differently. Humans are attempting to create 'beings' that can generate art, take care of weak human beings, talk and discuss human issues, and even fall in love with the human. As our minds can run beyond the boundaries created by the limitations of our bodies, we would like to infuse our creativity into AI. No human, however, knows what will happen next. It can go beyond our imagination because we, humans are mortal and tied down to our physical limitations. Is it

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7. Daniel Berlyne, "Arousal and reinforcement", in *Nebraska symposium on Motivation* (NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1967)

possible for the mortal to make the immortal thing? Hardly ever can the human be aware what it is like to be immortal and perfect. What can we do with this evolving humanlike being? Maybe, in my opinion, AI can be the tool for us to reflect ourselves. Like the program CAN that leads to think over the definition of art and creativity, it could help people to find the right way to know what can be humane and how we can make a better relationship with one another. That must mean what we could possibly learn from humanlike AI, and I believe that is the reason humans have been making AI. I hope we will learn how we can coexist with AI and regain what we have lost, what is humane, and what is love. It is because art comes from those things.

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# Regional Characteristics of Art in Busan - Focusing on the Image of "Ocean and Women"

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## 1. Foreword

"What is your favorite subject matter?" "It's the beach. Nobody who's from Busan dislikes the serene hue, and such sound-of-ocean-tides-like characteristics cannot but appear in one's works, *n'est-ce pas*?"[1]

As was mentioned by Im Ho, the first-generation western painting artist who represents Busan, *the sea* in the Busan art has been at once part of its life and a major theme. Including Im Ho, Kim Jong-sik, and Kim Gyeong who centered their career on Busan during the modern and contemporary period, a number of painters wielded their brushes while putting in the background the port city as a refuge during the Korean War. And their paintings often include those women who carved vibrant vitality out of the sea.

In this essay, I'd like to explore the regional characteristics of the Busan art by focusing on the figure of women which was set in Busan since the modern era began. For 'the sea and women' at once makes a universal theme grounded in the matrix and taps into the identity of the city's painting community. The purpose of this thesis is to get as close as possible to the independent voice of the first-generation painters, who organized exhibitions for the members of their artistic coterie and thereby aimed to realize the local colors peculiar to the city's painting community.

## 2. Ocean and Women: from the Everyday to the Lyrical Scenes

Paradoxically enough, it was around the Korean War that many works themed to 'the seas and women' were created by painters in Busan.[2] *Jagalchi Ice Company* by Kim Jong-sik, *Motherly*

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1. *Busan Ilbo*, Aug. 31, 1971.
2. During the Period of Japanese Occupation, many works depicting market scenes were submitted, and even Im Ho, later called the painter of 'conch and female diver', created mostly landscape paintings as late as in the 1940s. Meanwhile, most of Busan's first-generation painters, except Kim Jong-sik, moved in from nearby regions like Masan and Jinju during the Korean War.

*Affection* by Yang Dal-seok, and *Peddler* by Kim Gyeong among others present hands-on descriptions of people who lived their time close to the sea. Breaking from the utopian spaces for escapism as depicted in *Jars and Women* by Whanki Kim and *The Family Hitting the Road* by Lee Jung-seob among others, those works faithfully carry the vestiges of everyday life including Busan Ice Company at Jagalchi and the women who sell hot meat soup with rice. For the first-generation painters of Busan who formed Tobyuk Club[3] in 1953 when the war had yet to come to an end, and instead of following 'the light-minded trends', asserted that art "should reflect the solemn and serious actions"[4] and called for work "which is not swayed by the sentimental emotions and remains based on reality", the contemporary 'sea and women' represented both the reproduction of life and the border that distinguished outsiders from natives and the center from the local.

Meanwhile, 'the sea and women' carried beyond the war as a perennial theme and nostalgic subject matter for the Busan artists. In fact, Kim Gyeong, who left Busan to move to Seoul in the late 1950s, once sat in a modern art exhibition venue and reminisced "*the female figure on the beach* that is limitless like the sea and mysterious like its depth, which is the eternal *theme* of my work and the nostalgic remainder of life ... something futile like the sad confession of a modern person who is tired of the city ... the sea I miss —".[5] And the works of Im Ho, dubbed the artist of *conch and female diver*, often treat women with tanned skin and the blue sea seen behind them. "*Beach* (at Busan Museum of Art) is also a work that delivers a realistic presentation of female divers who are drying their bodies by the bonfire against the blue sea.[6] However, the scene unseen in the works with the same theme, which describes persons in red or yellow skirts and jackets chatting up while braiding the hair for one another, adumbrates the local characteristics that the artist wanted to pursue beyond the reality of labor.

Those works depicting female divers led by *Female Diver* (1928) by Mito Bansho, and including *Female Diver* (1936) by Kim Gichang and *Female Diver* (1938) by Kim In-ji that were submitted to Korea Art Exhibition in the 1930s and later all described several female divers in their unique Korean swimsuits huddling together against the rough sea. When Korea Art Exhibition called for local colors, those sturdy women with dark skin exposed through their swimsuits constituted both the uncivilized primitive and local customs of Korea and a timely theme that revealed the unique strength, perseverance, and motherhood of the Korean women.

This is attested by the perception of female divers as the Korean-style theme left out of the precedents of the country's modernization which Goro Tsuruta, a Japanese painter who visited Jejudo in the 1930s, exuded by commenting, "What the female divers are wearing would have nothing to admire about it if it were by Japanese female divers, but the female divers of Jejudo are of an extremely modern type. [Omission] If one visits somewhere around Seogwipo and does

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3. *Tobyuk*, which derived from the onomatopoeia of *tobagi* ('native'), reportedly referred to the group of artists living in Busan. In general, however, it was received as the Sino-Korean rendering of earthen wall.

4. Greeting in the pamphlet for the 1st Tobyeok exhibition, dated March 1953.

5. Kim Gyeong, *Nostalgia for the Sea, the Female Figure on the Beach* in *Busan Ilbo* dated Jul. 21, 1960.

6. About Im Ho's *Beach*, see the Preface to the catalog for *Busan's Deceased Artists: 3. Im Ho* (Busan Museum of Art).

a painting on the local female divers, one should surely feel that they are quite remote from the modern culture, wherever it may be."[7] The healthy and primitive image of the female divers, who broke from the old female victims of exploitation and plundering and now began to be described as *the incarnation of mermaids and natural beauties*, presented the new woman that represented the local colors of Korea. And this image of the female divers was repeatedly used, mainly at National Art Exhibition of the Republic of Korea after the war.

But Im Ho's *Beach* does not show the dramatic effect of the rough waters or the scenes of labor which were treated by his older works. And the scene in which women wearing yellow and red skirts and jackets instead of the black-and-white swimsuits chat up while plaiting one another's hair against the twilight over the sea does not so much reproduce the energetic and brave life of the female divers as appears lyrical and idyllic. As is suggested by the artist when he intones, "Nobody who's from Busan dislikes the serene hue, and such sound-of-ocean-tides-like characteristics cannot but appear in works, *n'est-ce pas*?" wasn't poetically rendering the world beyond the reality in the sea-like bright tone *the local colors* that the artist envisioned?

This is further demonstrated by the coincidence between the artist's transition from the dark and cold tone in his early period to bright and warm colors, from reality to unrealistic world, and the Korean War, his relocation to Busan, and his exploration of the local colors for the Busan art as a member of Tobyeok Club. And the tendency to express the world beyond reality in such bright tone and realistic painting style is identified in the works of the first-generation painters who worked in Busan in the same period.

## 3. The Local Colors of the Busan Art

We find not only the uniqueness of the artists but also the local traits shared by the regional artists in the works not only of Kim Jong-sik and Kim Yun-min who were members of Tobyeok Club, but also of Yang Dal-seok who worked for a long time in Busan. Kim Jong-sik, who mostly described the views in the south and the Gyeongsang and Jeolla provinces including the Busan Port series (1949-56), called his works 'the new southern paintings'. The landscape depiction that is composed of strong strokes, bright colors, and simplification was the pictorial space of *élan vital* in the expression of inner thought, which he completed by internalizing the bright, warm, and transparent air and the affluent soils represented by the southern natural environment.[8]

Meanwhile, the works of Kim Yun-min and Yang Dal-seok unfold the innocent, childlike world that has the peaceful natural settings in the background. The immaculate innocence of the shepherds and children is the image of an autobiographical paradise that transcends this world and was experienced in childhood. The pastoral view of such a paradise which reminds one of the temperate

7. Goro Tsuruta, "Jejudo Sketch" in *Sea Paintings*, No. 364, 1935, p. 6 and p. 14.
8. Included in Ok Yeong-sik, "Kim Jong-sik's Art World and the Busan Art', *Special Exhibition Commemorating Kim Jong-sik's Birth*, Busan Museum of Art, 2018, p. 236.

climate in the southern regions that is completed with its bright and clear colors differs from the abstractionist tendency of the painting community in Seoul metropolitan region which employed *informel* and monochrome painting in the 1960s and the 1970s.

While their themes and painting styles were different, the tendency among the first-generation Busan painters that tried to express the world beyond the reality mainly with bright colors and representation shown in their works was the outcome of their effort to "find the archetype of the unaffected and truthful national art that percolates from the physiological body odor of our people" instead of pursuing the light-minded trends, even though it was shock coming from outside.

# Parallel Session 3

# Gross National Happiness, Ubuntu, and Buen Vivir and the Sustainable Development Goals

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## Introduction

Discussions on including culture in development goals or human rights often result in claims of universality versus cultural relativism; and undermining of human rights versus coloniality and dominance of the West with under-representation of the South. This dichotomy needs to be transcended. I agree with Sousa Santos [1] proposing to transcend universalism by 'cross-cultural dialogues'. A dialogue between three cosmovisions of Happiness in Buddhism, Ubuntu in Africa and Buen Vivir in indigenous America with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) can shed light on claims of universality [2]. A critical realist approach is taken to expose 'Other' realities beyond the consensual SDGs, negotiated by Northern and Southern countries in the United Nations, and to present described worldviews as neutrally as possible (tools: interdisciplinarity, reality as social construction, language and discourse analysis, power dynamics determining knowledge systems) [3]. This de- and reconstruction is derived from *Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL)* and post-colonial economics. To complement literature, interviews were used. This article is largely based on [2].

## The SDGs

The SDGs were a follow-up of the Millennium Development Goals that ended in 2015. Compared to the MDGs, the SDGs are new in (a) content (mainstreaming sustainability) (b) scope (adding new goals covering economic growth, infrastructure, industry, cities, inequality, energy, oceans and seas, consumption and production, climate change, peace and security, access to justice, etc. and adding means of implementation and partnerships) and (c) process in which they were established (multilateral, consultative). Set against criticism of the MDGs, the SDGs *score much better* than the MDGs, though not satisfying radical critics. They were consultative in process, apply to all countries, put sustainability at the heart, make cross references (interlinking different goals), refer to broader declarations (e.g. regarding gender the Beijing Platform for Action), pay

attention to (re)distribution, name target groups, use (some) 'rights' language, and include many of the previously lacking themes. On the *negative* side are: Lack of prioritization (from 8 to 17 goals); lack of a clear message for communication to a larger audience; targets are not always measurable; insufficient process approach, actions and strategies; a weak link to Global Public Goods and responsible sovereignty; and vague/weak global governance. Indicators chosen by the UN may influence interpretation of the goals; it may limit the scope of the SDGs and is hampered by capacity as well as costs of statistics and availability of data. Due to the consultative process, the SDGs claim universality, but is this really the case?

## Three Cosmovisions From the Global South

**Gross National Happiness (GNH or 'Happiness').** Buddhist GNH (Bhutan) can be defined as calling for material and spiritual development that mutually reinforce one another, which aims at harmony between 'inner skills' and 'outer circumstances', respect for nature, compassion, and balance and moderation and interdependence of all things [4]. The Bhutanese legal system contributes to deconstruction of conventional concepts of law while it goes against law rooted in objective rationality and strict secularism: The Constitution is based on people's ethics of Happiness, derived primarily from Buddhism but also supported in Hinduism, focuses on harmony, is internalized by people and is thus easier to enforce, but at the same time guarantees separation of religion and state and includes a constitutional monarch bound by the ethics of Happiness (Boddhisatva leadership). However, the court system tends to follow more common law principles. There is little jurisprudence developing the principle of Happiness. Its *legal reconstructive principles* embrace enhanced concepts of (human) dignity (of all living beings, related to karma, compassion and codependent origination), of freedom (from desire, delusion and including reciprocity) related to constitutional rights and duties of sustainable development (which includes culture), and the understanding that future generations includes one's reincarnated self, as well as restorative criminal and civil justice based on mediation, confession, swift and simple justice.

**Table 1. Arguments pro and con Buddhist inspired law (reconstruction of law)**

| Western: | Buddhist: |
|---|---|
| • Law is and should be based on objective rationality; religion is subjective.<br>• Western legal systems are rooted in reason (and in the economic reality of 'self-interested man'), not religion, and therefore universally applicable.<br>• Separation of religion and state (though exceptions exist in the West too).<br>• Principle of non-discrimination (of non-Buddhist minorities). | • 'Legal code expresses the people's fundamental ethical principles' (Baylis and Munro 2003).<br>• Large majority of country is Buddhist; largest minority adheres to Hinduism which recognizes similar principles.<br>• More adherence to the law because internalized. |

| Western: | Buddhist: |
|---|---|
| • Freedom of religion: Proselytization punishable by law (Art 7.4 of the Constitution; section 463A Penal Code) is against.<br>• Human Rights and legal systems are universal.<br>• Bhutan is a Buddhist theocratic constitutional state.<br>• Traditional dual (religious-political) system of government still underlies the Constitution.<br>• Gross National Happiness does not foster economic growth.<br>• Happiness is subjective and cannot be measured, can therefore not be a goal of legal systems or policies. | • Separation of religion and state still guaranteed; unlike in the West, political parties are not allowed to have religious affiliations (art. 4.b Constitution), nor use religion for political gain (art. 15.3 Constitution), duty on the religious leaders, not the state, to ensure that religion remains separate from politics (art. 3.3 Constitution); religious persons are not allowed to vote (electoral laws).<br>• Proselytization is offensive to the religious feelings of the Buddhist and Hindus (National Assembly of Bhutan).<br>• Western system also rooted in religion; avoiding Western colonization of law system.<br>• Happiness is to be understood as 'Dewa' in Buddhism and not as hedonistic happiness or pleasure=ultimate goal in life.<br>• Restorative rather than punitive justice.<br>• More confessions (based on avoiding bad karma).<br>• More settlements (based on mediation by community, senior citizen or judge).<br>• Less court cases = *simple justice.*<br>• Integrates respect for nature as duty of citizens. |
| • *Converges with* concepts of Modernity (material development of the individual and society) and (superior and inferior) stages of development.<br>• Analogy with colonialism: Unlimited resources to be discovered, conquered and exploited; ranking of human civilizations whereby indigenous is inferior. | • *Converges with* indigenous beliefs in harmony and balance (within oneself, with community, with nature) and self-sufficient survival in precarious environment, self-development through spirituality.<br>• Postcolonial law based on equality of different cultural traditions. |
| *Consequences:*<br>• Dignity rooted in human reason.<br>• Freedom centers around human freedom: of expression, of religion and from fear (civil political rights), from want (socio-economic rights) (Roosevelt 1941); or freedom to actualize ones (individual) rights and capabilities (Sen 1999).<br>• Sustainable development often outside Constitution; environmental laws centred around human. | *Consequences: Reconstruction of law*<br>• <u>Dignity</u> is combining the mind (reason) and the heart (compassion) and needs to be viewed from the aspects of (a) karma (several lives) (b) dependent origination (no self, interrelation of all that is open to change) (c) compassion with Buddhahood in all living beings (d) the path of self-development (awakening and actualizing our dignity) (e) being able to contribute to manifesting the world (through the mind) (Shiotsu 2001; Matsuoka 2005).<br>• Freedom is associated with freedom of the mind, from delusion (detachment from belief in the self) (Kinga 2009; Tobgye 2015), but does not translate in significant difference on fundamental freedoms in the Constitution; it is limited by duties (concept of service) (art. 8), mainly related to sovereignty, culture, nature, non-killing and reciprocity.<br>• The Constitution puts the generation of rights on equal footing (Tobgye 2015), but without enforceable collective rights (limited to secondary law); the understanding of the <u>Buddha field of interdependence</u> makes indivisibility of rights, for all sentient beings, logic. The idea of <u>reincarnation</u> and 'karma' makes one automatically part of <u>future generations</u> (protected in art. 5 nature and art. 14.5 debt sustainability) (12.7.1).<br>• <u>Sustainable development</u> is incorporated in Constitution. |

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*Economic reconstructive principles* focus on: multidimensional GNH instead of GDP measurement, overcoming spiritual poverty, 'simple life', sharing, full employment, people's sovereignty (not capital), selflessness, individual capabilities aiming at the collective, service to others and non-exploitation, poverty as lack of personal development, decentralized decision making, ecology over economy, culture as a way of life, equality but with acceptance of differences based on karma, inclusiveness as well as room for meditative seclusion, recognizing the essential value of rest and 'being' (right to leisure) and developing GNH business. While GNH is consistent with the SDG *goal-oriented approach* in that it is quantified and measureable, and covers many of the same domains, the recent quantified variant of GNH (and by extension the SDGs) is seen as reductionist by others. The GNH approach could imply that the SDGs should promote Happiness in the Buddhist sense of taming one's mindset (towards enlightenment), reorienting society towards service, compassion and cooperation as trainable qualities instead of competition and a race to the bottom (MDG1; SDG 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 10).

It could inspire a more radical understanding of *education* (MDG 2; SDG 4) aiming at a deeper understanding of life and seeing reality as it is and life as an educational journey rather than producing knowledge to live a productive life. It could inspire a more holistic understanding of *health* (MDG 4, 5, 6; SDG 3) where the microcosm of the body and the macrocosm of the universe are in harmony (going beyond mental and emotional health, with an integrated vision on physical, emotional and spiritual health). It could inspire a more integrated understanding of *gender* (MDG 3; SDG 5) where the masculine and feminine are complementary abstract principles, present in all phenomena, beyond personal identity, including in nature and each human being, while overcoming duality is achieved through feminine (intuitive Wisdom combined with receptive awareness of emptiness) and masculine thinking (analytical Knowledge and compassionate action). It suggests that *environmental sustainability* (MDG 7; all SDGs but specifically 6, 12, 13, 14, 15) can be broadened with respect for all sentient beings and their intrinsic value, constituting a biocentric form of restorative justice. This would imply that *global partnership* (MDG 8; SDG 17) aims to support the interdependence of all life and that peace (SDG 16) should start with one's own inner contentment and include restorative justice (traditional 'simple justice' including mediation). The notion of *good governance* (SDG 16) could be enhanced by enhancing (collective) autonomy, self-sufficiency and decentralization, by being based on the non-subjugation of others, spiritual heritage, natural law and reclaiming the cultural value dimension of human rights, recognition of customary commons, collective responsibility (duties) and decision-making, and other legal reconstructive elements mentioned above. The recognition of *culture* (SDG 4.7 and 11.4) as central to identity, spiritual practices, society, economy, and sustainability; a culture which is future oriented instead of merely traditional, as well as a founding value of human rights. GNH insists on including a notion of *community* vitality, right to a compassionate society and family bonds. GNH proponents claim that it embodies the SDGs but goes beyond.

**Ubuntu**. The African philosophy of Ubuntu (or Batho) can be defined as the continuous motion

of the enfoldment of the universe, but more popularly as 'I am because we are' (a person is a person through other persons) [5]. It is a collective ontology which stresses the value of compassion or 'life as mutual aid'. It is embodied in national Batho Pele (People First) policies related to government conduct. The interim South African Constitution mentioned Ubuntu, to enable the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and this legal history inspired activist judges into civil and criminal Ubuntu jurisprudence based on victim participation, forgiveness, reintegration of criminals in society, dialogue, relatedness, meaningful engagement, the value of apologies, mutual respect, extended family and hospitality with concrete results such as abolition of the death penalty and prevention of eviction from housing (less strict property rights). ***Reconstructive legal principles*** include emphasis on restorative justice, and less stress on punitive justice, replacing the idea of dignity merely rooted in reason by an expanded notion of dignity including relatedness, focus on human boundedness (apart from freedom); de facto juridical pluralism; recognizing rights of the ancestors; and a legal culture rooted in reconciliation, sharing, compassion, civility, responsibility, trust and harmony, including nature and future generations as part of the 'bantu' (people) community.

**Table 2. Arguments pro and contra Ubuntu law (reconstruction of law)**

| Contra Ubuntu | Pro Ubuntu |
|---|---|
| • Ubuntu is not in the Constitution, only part of the interim Constitution to enable the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.<br>• Only promoted by activist judges.<br>• Death penalty could have been abolished without reverting to Ubuntu.<br>• Invented tradition by African philosophers.<br>• 'Communist' principles of Ubuntu do not sit well with modern economic principles and private law.<br>• Ubuntu is not emancipatory (against communism).<br>• Ubuntu is for Africans, not universal, cannot apply to non-Africans.<br>• Ubuntu forgiveness denied justice, concealing conflict.<br>• Objectivity of reason can establish universal truths.<br>• No difference between Ubuntu and human dignity.<br>• Cultural relativity (as consequence of recognizing other cultural systems) will undermine international law system and lead to instability. | • Restoring dignity to the victim (instead of impersonal punitive vengeance).<br>• Victim participation.<br>• Dialogue and compromise.<br>• Recognizing relatedness and restoring it ('we are not islands onto ourselves'; Port Elizabeth case, para 37),<br>• Value of apology, promoting service to the community (in sentencing).<br>• Achieving mutual respect.<br>• The public interest in reducing prison population.<br>• Welcoming people back into society as functioning members (Skelton 2010).<br>• Reciprocity (giving the same respect as one receives)<br>• and mutual enjoyment of rights.<br>• Nation building through reconciliation, even in smaller disputes, 'as part of maintaining peace and stability in a diverse country with a difficult history' (Skelton 2013, 142). |

| Contra Ubuntu | Pro Ubuntu |
|---|---|
| • *Converges with* concepts of Modernity and (superior and inferior) stages of development. Kantian social contract theory, namely individuals while maximizing their own capabilities agreeing to do some things together. Utilitarian moral theory.<br>• Analogy with colonialism: ranking of human civilizations whereby indigenous is inferior, already established Western based law systems are sufficient. | • *Converges with* African indigenous concepts of justice, bridges common and customary law, rainbow nation (cultural diversity including wholeness or 'holo-culturality').<br>• Analogy with postcolonial law. Postcolonial law can enable postcolonial economics. |
| *Consequences*<br><br>• <u>Dignity</u>: rooted in human reason, individual not collective.<br>• <u>Freedom</u>: rights prioritized over duties to community.<br>• <u>Private/Property law</u>: individual, allowing for inequality, exclusion.<br>• <u>Meritocracy</u>: based on talent/effort one advances oneself.<br>• <u>Criminal justice</u>: punitive.<br>• <u>Family law</u>: nuclear, not extended family.<br>• <u>Environmental protection</u> centred around humans. | *Consequences*<br><br>• <u>Ubuntu/Humaneness/interconnectedness</u>: grandmother of law, above dignity, relational aspect of rights.<br>• <u>Dignity</u>: 'not rooted in reason because (…) this would deny dignity to too many human beings' (Cornell 2012b); extends to those who are deceased (as part of bantu community).<br>• <u>Freedom</u>: human boundedness (duties to the other) more important than human freedom.<br>• <u>Legal culture</u> rooted in reconciliation, sharing, compassion, civility, responsibility, trust and harmony; Ubuntu reciprocity also extends to respecting natural environment.<br>• Development is not the central goal, human relations and mutual aid are.<br>• <u>Property</u> (equal distribution), <u>criminal justice</u> (restorative), <u>medical</u> confidentiality (transparent to group members), <u>family</u> life (duty to wed and have children), and moral <u>education</u> (developing personhood). |
| *Interconnection with:*<br><br>• <u>Individual</u> rights.<br>• <u>Historic generation</u> of rights (in theory indivisible, but in practice with priority of civil-political rights; socio-economic rights are deemed desirable but not feasible, idem for cultural rights). | *Interconnection with:*<br><br>• <u>Collective</u> rights.<br>• Could be connected to <u>rights of nature,</u> though bantu community is central (born, yet to be born, deceased).<br>• <u>Protection of environment for future generations</u> in Constitution. |

*Reconstructive economic principles* include: Collective agency ('what can we (including I) do, so that *we* live better'); employment for all based on 'no-one is useless' and 'we work as one' (col-labor-ate); living in time (rather than on time); sharing instead of profit; the intrinsic value of human life instead of 'human capital'; the importance of (extended) family-centered thinking; ending dominance of capital; sovereignty of people over capital; extending the same respect to nature as to people; and supporting the global social floor. Written SDG models are often seen as an irrelevant discussion from the African mind, unless it directly addresses needs, involves *a constant dialogue*,

keeping the relationship going (as starting point of a relationship, not the end point), building trust to work together. Ubuntu doesn't know the word development but *stresses humaneness in relation (including nature)*.

Ubuntu can inspire clusters on ***health*** by its principles of reading meaning into illness and the ill or demented; the healer as a mediator between the supra-natural source (of illness) and the person; keeping mentally afflicted within the community out of mutual care and (significant) payment of the healer only if the patient improves. Moral education of personhood in ***education***, entailing being able to listen and articulate logical arguments; moral maturity promoting justice, courage and truthfulness; an ability to engage in consensual dialogue, allowing the other to offer his point of view regardless how ill-informed. It embraces a ***culture*** dimension in respect for different value systems and diversity (rainbow nation). Despite contention, feminists may find inspiration as well for a ***gender*** goal. South Africa (and its Constitution) has a very progressive stance on gender. Inserting an Ubuntu dimension means stressing the importance for the family and society of gender equality, girls' education and reproductive health. It also embraces the marriage of the abstract feminine Mother Mind and the masculine Warrior Mind. Ubuntu also embodies accepting people as they are without hierarchies (e.g. gay, transgender) as long as the importance of family and procreation are also preserved. Ubuntu has a distinctive view of ***environmental protection*** by considering nature and man as a whole. Ubuntu can inspire the cluster on ***peace and security*** with its emphasis on restorative justice in public and criminal law (see above on reconstructive legal principles) and healing of trauma as well as the cluster on ***institution building and rule of law*** by its jurisprudence on public law and civility in conduct of government agents, however, preferring the words nation building, people empowering leadership and citizen participation. To reduce a philosophy as expansive as Ubuntu to targets and indicators is, somewhat contrary to what it tries to achieve: namely to infuse humans with a consciousness of wholeness and interdependence, on each other and their natural surroundings, including a spiritual level of being.

**Buen Vivir**. Ecuadorian Buen Vivir is derived from the Quecha Sumak Kawsay, Good Living based on living in harmony with (and not at the cost of) others or nature and in balance between spiritual and material wealth [6]. Ecuador enshrines Buen Vivir principles in its Constitution and national and international policies. Rights of nature are central to Buen Vivir, as a form of restorative justice (between humans and nature) articulated in a modest jurisprudence enabling persons to protect nature without proving personal damage, however, not preventing large scale natural resource exploration. It deconstructs legal concepts centered around individual humans, the utility value of nature (defined as property), nature conservation, and reconstructs them based on the earth as central system (mother), collective rights, the redefinition of economy-society-nature-relationship and the intertwinement of culture and nature. It reformulates dignity, freedom and development into collective dignity of all life (balancing the interests of all including the intercultural dialogue dimension), freedom as reciprocity setting one free, as well as the freedom of communities to live in permanent dialogue with nature, calling for sustainable life (well-being)

instead of development. Further reconstructive legal principles are: People's sovereignty (including migrants), not territorial sovereignty; union of the planet; identity based on one's birthplace and culture; plurinationality (plurality of nations within the horizontal non-patriarchical state); individual, communal and ecological citizenship; interculturality; juridical pluralism; collective rights and duties; free prior and informed consent; judges as instrumental in establishing law; recognizing rights of the spirits.

**Table 3. Pro and cons against rights of nature**

| Opposition | Proponents |
|---|---|
| • Law aims at regulating _human_ relations<br>• <u>Utility value</u> of nature, lesser value than humans<br>• Giving agency to non-humans without moral sense and rational ability is not rational<br>• An outright 'absurdity' or 'stupid'<br>• Nature is not able to fulfill corresponding obligations<br>• Inability to sue nature causing damage (eg Flooding destroying other life)<br>• Scientific difficulties for establishing alteration to a natural cycle<br>• Fear of <u>excessive litigation</u> and increased conflicts<br>• Imprecise definitions of what nature (or natural) is, may impede implementation (the Constitution gives a positive definition 'where life is reproduced and occurs', art. 71, while a negative definition would be 'that which is not human-made') | • Assigning <u>intrinsic value</u> to nature<br>• As to <u>utility value</u> of nature:<br>• Human governance systems are failing: Designed for exploitation and domination of Earth, leading to environmental degradation<br>• Like liberation of slaves, liberation of nature is needed: Both subject to ownership of their masters<br>• Human well-being is derived from earth well-being<br>• Therefore, balance the interests of all (human and Earth) for the benefit of humans and non-humans<br>• =Redefinition of economy-society-nature relationship<br>• =Recognition of environment- culture interrelations<br>• Law is central to human governance and therefore must recognize rights of non-human members to protect Earth and human survival<br>• (Abstract) corporations have rights, so can (abstract) Nature |
| • _Converges with_ concepts of Modernity and (superior and inferior) stages of development<br>• Analogy with colonialism: Unlimited resources to be discovered, conquered and exploited; ranking of human civilizations whereby indigenous is inferior | • _Converges with_ indigenous logic: 'Of course, nature is our mother, she has rights'<br>• Analogy: Postcolonialism, deep ecology and environmental justice |
| _Consequences:_<br>• <u>Dignity</u> concerns human dignity and rights<br>• <u>Freedom</u> concerns human freedom and capabilities to actualize that freedom, using Earth and non-human members to their benefit (lack of reciprocity)<br>• <u>Development</u> concerns human progress and may go at the cost of earth<br>• <u>Sustainable</u> development with continued economic <u>growth</u>, but without recognizing rights of the earth, is possible and will solve environmental governance crisis | _Consequences:_ Reconstructs the notion of:<br>• <u>Dignity</u> (wider circle of reciprocity: Rights/duties)<br>• <u>Freedom</u> is'1) the right of existence of different Communities as part of nature.. 2) keeping the vital cycles of nature and 3) of animals' (E8) (=reciprocity sets one free)<br>• '<u>Development</u> is not important, what is important is well-being or life. Sustainable life!'(E8). Not sustainable development |

| Opposition | Proponents |
|---|---|
| *Interconnection with:* <br><br> • <u>Individual rights</u> <br> • <u>Civil, political rights; socio, economic and cultural rights</u> to protect and emancipate humans <br> • <u>Culture and nature</u> are separate; culture concerns humans <br> • <u>Property law</u>; humans own land, animals, earth systems for their benefit and private and collective use <br> • <u>Conservation</u>: 'The dissociation of human rights, social rights and nature rights' (E8) | *Interconnection with:* <br><br> • <u>Collective rights:</u> Nature is territory <br> • <u>Free prior and informed consent</u> (tool) <br> • <u>Culture and nature</u> are intertwined: 'Community with nature .. are in permanent dialogue; it means to be part of, secondly interdependence, thirdly complementarity, which means both depend on each other, and there is reciprocity'(E8) <br> • Fundamentally reshapes <u>property law</u>, as the natural world has been seen as legal property thus far <br> • <u>Integration</u> of human and nature in one balanced system |

*Reconstructive economic principles* are: A self-sustaining and life-nurturing economy without growth (accumulation of production and consumption), solidarity including with the earth; people jointly formulating their goals of good living (collective capability); human beings as central to economy and not capital or speculation; reciprocity (development/progress as service); ecology over economy; community including nature, as central to life and to happiness; including leisure and creativity; recognizing domestic and reproductive work; measuring the economy in terms of full employment; redistribution of wealth and income; decentralization of production; energy and food sovereignty; active popular participation in decisionmaking; emancipation of nature and labor (beyond socialism); community markets; promoting post-extractivist economies and markets based on use value; getting away from the claims of scientific progress as sole source of information. Buen Vivir is *a rethink of future SDG policy* all together; it pleads mostly for recognition of the intrinsic value of nature, the common biocentric good and leaving a goal structure all together, but also for *plurinationality*, which is inseparable from Sumak Kawsay: 1) the protection of indigenous territory; 2) indigenous self-government; 3) the self-development of indigenous communities on the basis of balance, Buen Vivir and harmony; 4) free, prior and informed consent as a condition for developments on indigenous land; and 5) the 'institutional redesign' of the state in its relations with indigenous peoples [7]. There is suspicion of the SDGs which are seen as important but at the same time as a traditional liberal UN concept supporting economic growth. Recognizing *partnership with the Earth* is the first principle. Furthermore, recognizing the value of community in partnership with nature, of interculturality and spirituality as basic pillar. Buen Vivir in its purest Sumak Kawsay form does not know a notion of development, but stresses reciprocity including with Mother Earth.

In the cluster for *education*: Unmasking the coloniality of knowledge (subordination of other knowledges) and making space for finding common ground for different views and for intercultural education. On the cluster for *gender*: Recognizing the abstract complementarity and conflict between two opposites (chacha-warmi) including in natural phenomena, as instrumental in understanding life: pachamama is the life-giving feminine principle and exists only with its polar

opposite male principle, which creates harmony; getting away from the Western anthropocentric, androcentric patriarchal development paradigm, while recognizing that the feminine is closer to the Creator taking precedence over the masculine, deserving utmost respect as creator of new life. On the cluster for *health*: Recognizing the spiritual and the importance of emotions and the need for healing at different levels. On the cluster for *environment*: Redefining environment into 'nature' which is sacred (with zero-extractivism) and the foundation of ethics to preserve the cosmic order, recognizing its rights and equal standing; creation of ecological citizenship; right (respect) of mother earth as chief principle of law; natural limitation of people's rights and property right (to earth); a wider concept of dignity including nature. The cluster for *democracy/rule of law* can be inspired by the idea that: Democracy is thought of from the feminine (horizontal) principle of reciprocity and collectivity. This means participatory democratic co-existence devoid of patriarchal domination by exploitation of others, nature, women and ethnicity; stressing autonomy and diversity (plurinationality as self-determination); and multiple forms of democracy (communitarian, participatory, representative, consensus seeking: 'convivir') and including above reconstructive legal principles. The cluster for *peace* can center on: Restoring harmony in the community taking primacy over punitive justice; recognizing both the victim and victimizer perspective and viewing the individual's problem as the community's problem; including the community as judges; oral justice; healing through purification, public apologies and community service as reparation. On the cluster for *global partnership*: Recognizing partnership with the Earth as first principle.

**Comparing Three Worldviews**. The three worldviews are similar in that they emphasize: Cosmic unity and harmony as the basis for justice; the creation of the world from our mind/heart, putting spiritual before material; altruism; deliberative democracy; decentralization and equality; expanded notions of dignity and freedom as overarching legal principles; restorative justice; economic-ecological principles; development (as in progress) as service; simple life; the value of being (leisure); different notions of poverty and circular concepts of time (with the future being behind you and the past in front of you); and putting cultural beliefs at the heart of 'development'. There are also certain differences and nuances in inter alia the degree of individual and collective agency and the degree of formalization in policies and indexes, constitutional embedding and jurisprudence. Referring to Amartya Sen's definition of progress ('Development as Freedom') [8], they redefine progress as 'development as service' [2].

Cosmic unity has implications for notions of peace and justice, that should restore harmony. The forces of yin (feminine) and yang (masculine), ntu (life force) and ubu (abstract patterns), awca (positive force) and sami (opposing force) feature in all three traditions. They meet respectively in Yin-Yang, Ubu-ntu and Tinkuy.

Yin-yang          Tinkuy          Ubuntu (author's design)

All three philosophies derive from this cosmic unity a sense of an expanded community (that reaches into ancestral and future lives and includes nature) and absence of the hierarchy of living beings. From this is also derived a notion of equality. The subjective worldview (one creates one's own material and experiental world) and relational worldview (none is dominant over the other) contrasts with the objective worldview of the Western world.

## Conclusion: Towards 'Development as Service' or Human-Nature-Wellbeing Interrelationship?

The focus of the SDG goals is still on growth and use of resources, be it in a sustainable way and departs from an individual, not collective, point of view. The SDGs can therefore be said to still be underpinned by strong modernist notions of development: Sovereignty of humans over their environment, individualism, freedom (rights rather than duties), self-interest, belief in the market leading to collective welfare, private property, rewards based on merit, materialism, quantification of value, and instrumentalization of labor (for the market and productions process). The SDGs are also linear result-based and human right approach oriented.

All three worldviews of the Global South lead to the following conclusions compared to the SDGs. Firstly, the SDGs depart from an anthropocentric sustainable development point of view aiming at the sustainable use of resources. They are not biocentric aiming to respect nature for nature's sake and enabling reciprocity with nature present to varying degrees in Happiness, Ubuntu, and Buen Vivir. A biocentric view would require replacing 'sustainable use of environment' by living in harmony with nature. Secondly, the SDGs embody the need for linear growth which requires resource exploitation, posing a problem given that resources are limited. Cyclical thinking is necessary, following the regenerative cycles of nature. This means modelling the economy and law around the earth system (and not the other way round). Cyclical thinking would replace GNP growth with well-being (of all beings). Thirdly, the SDGs do not address the private sector and individualism. More attention to limiting one's own intake to what is necessary and sharing with the other is needed, which means limitation of profit-making, of speculation for one's own financial gain, and of non-payment of taxes and focusing on delivery of basic goods (housing, food, etc.) for its own sake, not for speculation or profit. This means adhering to the cycle of reciprocity between

humans and modelling the law and economy around the principle of serving the other and the collective good. Hence, sharing would imply that there is need for 'development as service' to one another and to the Earth which should not be interpreted as service delivery by the state. Ultimately this may lead to abolishing the word 'development' replacing it by inter-relationship. Fourthly, the SDGs embody reductionist result-based management thinking, in splitting goals into targets, measured through indicators. The other philosophies emphasize open-ended, flexible, verb-based process thinking and not closed, fixed, noun-based linear thinking to enable Goal achievement. This includes room for spirituality, culture and rights of nature, all omitted from the SDG system. This may lead to replacing the word goal by value. Lastly, in the SDG negotiations cross-cultural philosophical bridges were largely absent. Coalitions can be built within regions as well as bridges between Happiness, Ubuntu and Buen Vivir, so that small localized value processes leading towards well-being ('good living') join forces in re-interpreting and adjusting the globalization process.

Regarding the SDGs as outcome of negotiations, some specific conclusions are (see table 4): (1) The drafters of the SDGs are universalist in outlook; while the Happiness adherents are upbeat (we are ahead and GNH incorporates the SDGs), the perspective of Ubuntu adherents is pragmatist (please the global North - with models - while doing your own thing locally - as long as we keep the relationship going), whereas Buen Vivir adherents (mainly the intellectual and Pachamamist schools) are polemic (against the SDGs, called 'mental masturbation', especially growth goals). (2) Values underlying the SDGs are 'Leave no one behind' (integrated, interrelated and indivisible goals). Happiness reformulates this positively and broadens this to 'Respect all sentient beings' (connected in the Buddha field; promoting the Middle Way, including an eight fold path of self development; and resting on four pillars of culture, nature, socio-economic development and good governance). Ubuntu postulates 'Life is mutual aid' (all connected in a metaphysical 'Seriti' field of interdependence including nature; promoting humaneness in motion, collective capability/ human rights and People First, including past and future generations). Buen Vivir's slogan would rather be 'Let Mother Earth lead' (promoting Chakana interdependence based on the four principles of integrality, relationality, complementarity and reciprocity; and resting on the three pillars of (biocentric) Good Living, Plurinationality and Interculturality). (3) 'Development' or progress in the perspective of the SDGs is sustainable growth; in the eyes of Happiness progress is foremost reached by inner peace and harmony; in Ubuntu progress is respectful human relations, including past and future generations that are related to the earth; in Buen Vivir, no progress is required, life constitutes of maintaining reciprocal, biocentric, intersubjective relations. Here the most vehement opposition against 'sustainable development' is found. (4) In terms of preferred governance, the SDGs depend on a leadership system that could be called the 'king' style: The one who achieves individual power first and then helps the people (SDGs leaving intact current global governance systems based on a patriarchal power system lead by G7/G8 and G20) combined with notions of servant-leadership (enabling others to perform better). Happiness promotes the enlightened (self-developed) Boddhisatva leader, shepherding (following behind) his people with wisdom and

compassion. Ubuntu leadership can be compared to 'the boatman' (going in front taking the others with): Leader and followers empower each other. Buen Vivir in its purist Sumak Kawsay form enables visionary collective leadership which takes into account the future of seven generations. (5) In terms of approach, the SDGs are (vertical) linear goal-oriented (focusing on 'doing', what is good for yourself and the other), Happiness is semi-linear (focused on 'contemplating', meaning self-development leading to compassion), Ubuntu is horizontal reciprocal process-oriented (focused on 'feeling' engagement with the other) and Buen Vivir is spiral reciprocal process-oriented (focused on 'being' in harmony with the universe) (upward or downward circular movement). (6) Respective methods can be summed up as: SDGs: Knowing is measuring and reasoning (analytical); Happiness: Knowing is controlling the mind; Ubuntu: Knowing is feeling (balancing the mother mind and the warrior mind); Buen Vivir: Knowing is connecting to earth. (7) Though many goals did not make it into the SDGs for reason of compromise most outstanding lacking dimensions (apart from certain target groups) are: Notions of community, collective, culture/identity, interculturality, plurinationality, and spirituality. (8) The focus of Happiness adherents is generally on climate change goal 13 and related nature goals as well as well-being goal 3; the focus of Ubuntu adherents is on the first five social goals, inclusiveness goal 16, partnership/means of implementation goal 17; and the focus on Buen Vivir adherents is on 'no goals' but nature rights (respect and legal rights for Nature/Mother Earth).

**Table 4. Comparison of SDG, Ubuntu, Happiness, Buen Vivir approach**

| | SDGs | Happiness | Ubuntu | Buen Vivir |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Perspective | • Universalist: Accepted by all UN member states with consultations of civil society and business | • Upbeat: GNH is better, goes beyond and incorporates SDGs | • Pragmatist: Please the global North while doing your own thing locally | • Polemic: SDGs are called mental masturbation <br>• Intellectual and pachamamist Buen Vivir against SDGs |
| Values | • Leave no one behind <br>• Goals are integrated, interrelated, indivisible <br>• Human rights based approach <br>• 5P's: (peace, prosperity, planet, people, partnership) | • Respect all beings <br>• 'Buddha field': inter-dependence includes metaphysical <br>• Non-duality/ Middle path based on Buddhism 8thfold path of self-development & compassion <br>• 4 pillars of GNH: 1$^{st}$ culture, identity & spirituality, 2$^{nd}$ socio-economic policies, 3$^{rd}$ harmony with nature, 4$^{th}$ good governance and decentralization | • Life is mutual aid <br>• 'Seriti'(field) - interdependence includes metaphysical <br>• Humaneness in action/motion and collective human rights <br>• People First (Batho Pele) where people includes past, present and future generations of communities | • Let mother earth lead <br>• 'Chakana' - interde-pendence includes metaphysical=IRCR* <br>• Biocentric rights of nature approach <br>• Good living in harmony with nature, Plurinationality, Interculturality <br>* *Integrality, relationality, complementarity, reciprocity* |

| | SDGs | Happiness | Ubuntu | Buen Vivir |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Development** | Sustainable growth =development/ progress | Inner peace & harmony with nature/ others (incorporating sustainable development) | Human relations including with past/ future generations which are connected to earth/nature as part of community (I am because we are) (replacing sustainable development) | Biocentric intersubjective relations (good living) (alternative to and against sustainable development) |
| **Goals vs Process** | • Goal oriented result based management (with elements of process thinking)<br>• Vertical (upward linear progress) Doing what is good for yourself (and the other) | • Goal + Process<br>• Vertical (progress in developing self) /Horizontal (harmony)<br>• Contemplating self and other | • Process/reciprocal<br>• Horizontal<br>• Feeling engagement with the other | • Process/Horizontal/ Reciprocal/Cyclical/ Spiral (Sumak Kawsay)*<br>• Being in harmony with universe *(contradiction with government Buen Vivir goal setting) |
| **Targets Indicators** | Knowing is Measuring & Reasoning (Simple, quantifiable, analytical) | Knowing is controlling Mind (Life is learning; overcome duality; Balance Yin (Feminine) and Yang (Masculine) | Knowing is Feeling (Empathic thinking from heart); Balance warrior mind (analytic) and mother mind (feeling) | Knowing is connecting to Earth (Feeling/ knowing earth); Complementarity of Feminine/Masculine |
| **Priority Goals** | All 17 | Climate change (13), protection of nature (esp. 15) and peaceful mind/mental health/wellbeing (3) & General balance: of socio-economic rights, good governance, culture, nature (4 pillars of GNH) | First 5 social goals and inclusive societies (16)* and partnership/means of implementation (17) & general focus on socio-economic rights, people first and restorative justice (absent in goals) *in contradiction to the official South African position | No goal especially not goal 8 (growth) as system is not biocentric; support goals as intermediairy step to prioritize nature as our mother/father on which we depend & General focus on nature rights and socio economic rights |
| **Missing (inter alia)** | Many goals did not make it to the final shortlist because of the efforts to come to a consensus | Community vitality; Culture/heritage/ identity; Spirituality/ nature of reality; Interdependence | Community/ collective values; diversity; wholeness | Community including nature; Plurinationality; Interculturality; Identity in nature/earth; Spiritual nature-culture |
| **Leadership style** | King: the one who achieves individual power first and then helps the people *(Global Governance systems based on patriarchal power system lead by G7/ G8)* combined with notions of Servant-leadership enabling others to perform better | Boddhisatva leader shepherding (following behind) his people with wisdom/compassion | Boatman: Leader and followers empower each other (going in front taking the others with) | Seven generation leadership council (collective leadership |

Moving towards cultural sustainable development goals would mean a reshaping of the agenda: The words *Human – Nature – Well-being Inter-Relationships* may capture the essence of above four perspectives. The word 'Human' replaces the word development from the Ubuntu relational perspective (life is mutual aid), 'Nature' replaces anthropocentric sustainability using the Buen Vivir perspective (mother earth is the life giver) and 'Well-being' captures the Western reorientation towards broader than economic well-being, targeting concrete achievements (life is actualizing one's rights and setting targets). The word 'Interrelationships' signifies a process approach, whereby it is aimed at creating a greater consciousness (awareness of interrelations, necessary for changing behavior), honoring the Bhutanese Buddhist spiritual evolvement (life is learning, on inner and inter-relationships).

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# Bio-Techno-Media: New Reproducive Technology and Maternity

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## 1. Beginning of the Question: The "Google Baby" Phenomenon

In many countries, commercial surrogacy is illegal.[1] In the U.S., commercial surrogacy is legal in most states, yet it is left as a luxury for a very few people for the price between 50,000 dollars to 120,000 dollars. In such conditions, many first world women depend on the global surrogacy market.[2] India, where commercial surrogacy was legal, was given the bad name of transnational hub of reproductive tourism. The high level of biomedical technology and the low treatment cost made India as a "country where transnational surrogacy industry is most prospering." There is an estimate of about 3,000 fertility clinics in India, 1,400 registered hospitals, and was reported that there were about 30,000 babies born in the year 2015.[3] India passed a regulatory bill on surrogacy in 2016 in order to shake off the stigma of being the "baby factory." According to the new bill, all commercial surrogacy is banned except for Indian couples who are married for 5 years or more. However, commercial surrogacy ban is not completely being enforced up until the present days, in the year 2018.[4]

Commercial surrogacy issue is very complicated. In her writing, "India's Commercial Surrogacy, Is It a 9-Month Labor?"[5] Amrita Pande recognizes this work as "reproductive labor," and argues that such enthusiastic view point allows the possibility of conversion of ideas on commercial

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1. "For example, Australia, China, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Spain, Swiss, Taiwan, Turkey, and few states in the U.S. ban commercial surrogacy." Heo, R., & Cho, S. (2015). 인도의 상업적 대리모 연구 [Study on India's Commercial Surrogacy]. *Korean Women's Studies,31*(1), 37.
   However, recently, Taiwan is considering legalizing commercial surrogacy as a solution of low birth rate. '인구절벽 위기' 대만, 출산 장려 팔 걷어… 대리모 합법화도 추진 ['Demographic Cliff Crisis' Tawain, all hands on deck for encouraging childbirth…promoting commercial surrogacy]. (2017, April 13). *Yonhap News.*
2. Vida Panitch(2013), "Surrogate Tourism and Reproductive Rights", in: *Hypatia* vol. 28, no. 2
3. [Surrogacy Industry Prospering even with Baby Factory Stigma](2015, October 31). YTN News.
4. "Commercial surrogacy: The jury is still out on its banning", *The Economic Times,* Apr. 04. 2018. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/commercial-surrogacy-the-jury-is-still-out-on-its-banning/articleshow/63608455.cms
5. Amrita Pande (2010), "Commercial Surrogacy in India: Manufacturing a Perfect 'Mother-Worker'", *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, Vol. 35, No. 4.

surrogacy, through concepts of condition of labor, and the subjectivity of the performer. She asserts Indian women "resist" their reality, making deals with various subjects, through this arduous "labor" that earns them an average of 10-year-worth of income in that area. Their existences alone are the subjects of rupturing the pattern of the organization of blood relative. However, in the interviews of surrogate mothers that Pande quotes, the surrogate mothers "emphasize that the baby's genes are of the clients, but the blood is theirs." The following questions arise from this: Are they the "mother" of the embryo, as they gave their blood? Can they be "mothers"? "Are surrogate mothers selling their labor, or are they selling their bodies? Are the parents (clients) purchasing a service, or are they purchasing a baby?"[6] Again, who is the "mother" here? Is it the owner of the genes, or the body that gave blood? Or the part that pays for the cost, or the part that participates in the reproductive labor?

Today, new reproductive technology intervenes in all direction. All of this targets the fertile body and the pregnant body, and the fetus in that body, and all the fetuses that may be in that body. The fields that lead to experimental and progressive development to this technology is the area of high-tech biotechnology of fertility clinic where capital and business are combined together. An enormous market is created around all the medical and biotechnological treatment that intervenes in harvesting sperm and egg, fertilization, hormone treatment, producing and preserving of embryos, and conception and maintaining pregnancy. Furthermore, the most important part of fertility "treatment" is in the conceivable womb, a womb that is able to maintain pregnancy, and in the surrogate mother.[7]

## 2. Concepts of the Politics of Posthuman Body: Bio-techno-media

In fact, the market for fertility treatment seems to be a "niche market" that was born from biotechnology. The market does not target everyone. 85 to 90 percent of the population is irrelevant to the fertility treatment market (Spar, 2006). The strong desire to have "my own child" in the trend of irreversible drop in birth rate—how should we understand the reason to this strong desire that energizes the fertility market, maintains the size of its market, take the risk of the time and energy, and sometimes its moral risks? This new reproductive technology that seems like it is not for "everyone" is not the problem of a specific group. It is not a limited diagnosis to say that as the development of new reproductive technology produces new desires continuously, it eventually will

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6. Debora L. Spar (2006), *The Baby Business: How Money, Science, and Politics Drive the Commerce of Conception*, Harvard Business Review Press.

7. The types of surrogate mothers can be categorized variously according to the medical and social standards. Surrogate mothers are called commercial surrogacy, noncommercial surrogacy, or gift surrogate according to the purpose of surrogacy. And those who give birth to babies biologically related to the surrogate mothers are called, partial surrogate or genetic surrogacy, and those who only lend their wombs as full surrogate or gestational surrogacy. Lee, Eunju (2008), 기술화된 계약 임신 경험을 통해 본 대리모의 행위성 구성에 관한 연구 [Study on Behavioral Construct of Surrogate Mothers Through the Experience of Technical Contracted Pregnancy] (master's thesis). Ewha Womans University. 12.

influence everyone.[8] Rather it is because the discourse involved in new reproductive technology, narrative, metaphor, and the embodiments, and the subjects created as such and the super-subjects have made its place in our world as substances. Therefore, we must examine carefully how the new reproductive technology operates, and what is happening in the world that it dominates, and what factors are intersected and involved. For this, I would like to introduce the concept of "bio-techno-media."

"Bio-techno-media" is a concept suggested to capture the multi-layeredness of the politics of Posthuman body. That is the body as substance mediated with symbol (in one extreme end the myth of "mother" and maternal ideology, in the other the warning of exploitation of sexual labor "selling one's body"), biopolitics and bio-economics of global north and global south (in one end the conservative "idea of respect for life" and on the other end the acute bio-capital and product), high-tech biotechnology and genetic engineering, and further, enormous bio-engineering, and the bio-laborers of global south who participate in the human experiments. For all this to be considered, I would like to suggest this concept.

## 3. Bio: Bio-power, Bio-politics, Bio-capital

Pregnancy and childbirth happen in the "female body." They are things that female body is responsible and unique to that body. Simone de Beauvoir analyzed that unavoidable biological condition that is pregnancy and childbirth made woman a being tied to the "body".[9] If you can control this biological condition autonomously and arbitrarily, then it can make women be free from the limitation of the body, and the biological "circumstance." In that sense, the advancement of birth controlling technology like contraceptive and abortion meant that in the history of mankind, women for the first time were able to control their own bodies.[10] However, different from the optimism of some feminists in the 60s, the arguments whether the advancement of reproductive technology itself could contribute to women's liberation, or whether as those critics say it would simply strengthen the patriarchal order, or if it could become a neutral instrument, have not ended (Wajcman, 1991). Also, far from this incomplete debate, the reproductive technology has continuously developed.

On the other hand, the net that crosses this issue, where "women's body becomes a

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8. "There are "many single women who freeze their eggs" in Korea. It is reported that the number (4 times as big in 2years) of those who cryopreserve their sperm or eggs to prepare for late marriage or late childbirth. Around 128 clients requested to have their eggs preserved for ten years with the cost of 3 million Won at the Fertility Center of Cha Medical Center just last year.Frozen eggs are thawed when a woman wants pregnancy and "sperm is injected with a fine needle for fertilization, and when this fertilized egg is implanted in the womb, the woman becomes pregnant" [세상 속으로] "나중에 아이 낳기 힘들까봐" 미혼여성 난자 냉동시술 늘어 [[Into the World] Increase in Egg Freezing Amongst Single Women, "It Might be Difficult to Bare Children Later On"]. (2016, April 10). *JoongAng Daily*. Retrieved from http://news.joins.com/article/print/19862757

9. Simone de Beauvoir(2009), *The Second Sex*, Alfred A. Knopf

10. Judy Wajcman(1991), *Feminism Confronts Technology*, Polity Press.

battleground," is connected to a more global level of problem. Foucault describes the changes in the Western political power after 19th century as transforming from "power that makes you die and allowing to live (sovereignty)" to "power that make you live and allowing to die (bio-pouvoir)."[11] Power technology of bio-pouvoir is not something that is not disciplinary. "Unlike discipline, which is addressed to bodies, the new nondisciplinary power is applied not to man-as body but to the living man, to man-as-living being; ultimately, if you like, to man-as-species."(Foucault, 2003: 242) Bio-politics and bio-pouvoir that Foucault asserts is "a set of processes such as the ratio of births to deaths, the rate of reproduction, the fertility of a population, and so on" (Foucault, 2003: 243). "Biopolitics deals with the population, with the population as political problem, as a problem that is at once scientific and political, as a biological problem ad as power's problem" (Foucault, 2003: 245).

Bio-politics changes as it combines with neo-liberal economy. After the 80s neo-liberalism and bio-engineering industry shares a desire to overcome ecological and economical limits of growth related to the end of industrial production. At the height of the praise of high-technology in the 1990s, bio-engineering promised the conquest of hunger/pollution/loss of variety of lifeforms/ waste, but ecological and bio-political problems related to industry capitalism walked the line of aggravation.[12] In the early 21st Century, Asian economy commenced innovation in the bio-engineering sector. The reorganization of global research space intervened by Korea, Singapore, China, Taiwan, and India, made the geography of bio-engineering industry a lot more complicated. However, the flow of neo-liberal bio-capital definitely requires daily labor "within the living body," in other words, "donor (or seller)" of body tissue, surrogate mother, and a researcher participating in drug tests, tissue extraction, pregnancy, and blood collection. (Cooper, 2008) Such activities can be seen as something comparable to different forms of high-risk low pay labor that characterizes the post-Fordist service economy, yet they are forms of labor that carries their own unique aspects (Cooper, 2008). Can we deal such activities simply in the frame of "bioethics"? Or can we deal it only in one area of "service labor"?

## 4. Bio-Techno: Body Intervened by New Reproductive

"New Reproductive Technology" is the biotechnology involved in the process of pregnancy and childbirth. Reproductive technology can be divided into 4 major categories: contraceptive, fertility treatment, prenatal care, and childbirth. As technological intervention of reproductive territory that was considered as something natural has become normalized, the possibility for healthy pregnancy and safe childbirth has expanded gradually. New reproductive technology intervened and observed

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11. Michel Foucault (2003), *"Society Must Be Defended": Lectures at the Collège de France 1975-1976*, Picador, p.240-241
12. Melinda Cooper (2008), *Life as Surplus: Biotechnology and Capitalism in the Neoliberal Era*, University of Washington Press

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the whole process into production of sperm and egg, fertilization, conception, nourishment, childbirth, etc. and by doing so rationalized the process of reproduction. The segmentation of each process not only allowed us to check the growth process, but also allowed the termination of pregnancy of defected fetuses, and allowed infertile women who had no choice before to start on a fertility program" (Wajcman, 1991). Such new reproductive technologies include, "the administration of ovulation-inducing drugs, artificial insemination, laparoscopy, invitro fertilization, cryopreservation of embryos, ultra-sound scans."[13] The segmentation of the process of pregnancy and childbirth by new reproductive technology objectifies women's "pregnant body" and "it also supports the naturalization of the scientific management of fertilization, implantation, and pregnancy more broadly" (Balsamo, 1996: 81). Now the whole process of pregnancy becomes the subject of "monitoring" and technological "management," and the objective of this monitoring and management is directed towards fetus, the "life" that is in the woman's body.

New reproductive technology produces a new subject called "fetus." The fetus that enters into the realm of observation from the moment of fertilization,[14] gradually becomes visible as a subject of character. The experts of new reproductive technology emphasize, "the prying eye of the ultrasonogram rendered the once opaque womb transparent, stripping the veil of mystery from the dark inner sanctum, and letting the light of scientific observation fall on the shy and secretive fetus."[15] The image of fetus created in such a way becomes a "public object" that reveals the origin of life.[16] The development of visualization technology such as ultrasound machines, and through the generalization of professional "reading" and "interpretation" of such images, "the fetus functions as a kind of metonym, seed crystal, or icon for configurations of person, family, nation, origin, choice, life, and future"(Haraway, 1997: 175). "The sonogram is literally a pedagogy for learning to see who exists in the world" (Haraway, 1997: 177). Moreover, the ultrasound imaging is no longer a blob that cannot be read. It reveals an image of personality, a subjectified individual.

Furthermore, the fetus surpasses its status as a life that can be checked, and becomes a "super-subject" that can weaken or remove the individuality of the pregnant woman (Bordo, 2003). On the other hand, "[q]uickening, or the mother's testimony to the movement of the unseen child-to-be in her womb, has here neither the experiential nor the epistemological authority it did, and does, under different historical modes of embodiment" (Haraway, 1997: 177). In this context, the health of the fetus is prioritized over the mother's body, and the mother's body that threatens it is "considered a sin." The daily use of ultrasound allows the doctor and the mother gradually think of the fetus as an individual. Moreover, in contrast to the fetus that is accepted as an individual, the subjectivity of

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13. Anne Balsamo (1996), *Technologies of the Gendered Body: Reading Cyborg Women*, Duke University Press, p.92.
14. "[T]he entity growing in her, off of her, through her (referred to variously as a pre-embryo, embryo, fetus, baby, or child), has some sort of ascendant right (to produce pain, to be nourished properly, to be born) that the maternal body is beholden to." Balsamo, 1996: 80.
15. Susan Bordo (2003), *Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Wester Culture, and the Body*, University of California Press, p.85.
16. Donna J. Haraway (1997), _Modest_Witness@Second_Millennium.FemaleMan _Meets_OncoMouse_[TM] *: Feminism and Technoscience*, Routledge, p.174.

the mother's body is minimized and marginalized, and at times it becomes the opportunity for guilt and remorse. Susan Bordo takes notice of the fact that at this very point, gradual empathy towards the fetus happens simultaneously with the tendency of not respecting the autonomy of the pregnant woman. And with the super-subject of the fetus taking over the subjectivity of the pregnant body, the womb of the pregnant woman is marked as the "fleshy incubator" (Bordo, 2003: 84).

'"Right of fetus," the discourse that creates the super-subject status of the fetus, the images that make life itself to be a subject of sharable experience, and the "womb as an incubator,"[17] which is correlative of the independent subjectivity must accept the intervention and management of new reproductive technology. Commercial surrogate is in the context of new reproductive technology that defines the mother's body as "fleshy incubator." The embryo or the fetus is an independent individual, and it needs a temporary place of nurture, the mother's body. For the survival of this "super-subject" surrogate mother provides "blood." Here the mother's body is reduced into a temporary place where two different individuals are "parasitic" and "coexist." Then, what is the "body" here? Is the body a "subject" of possession and occupation?

On the other hand, the success rate of reproductive assistant technology is still very low.[18] As the fetus establishes as super-subject, a conservative discourse on abortion is made, and the monitoring and management of the pregnant woman for the health of the fetus are justified. However, in contrast to this identical situation, there are embryos and fetuses that are excessively created, neglected, and thrown out. How are embryos that failed to be conceived and the fetuses that couldn't be maintained treated? Are they life? Should they be treated as life?[19] In this context, the discussion and the practice of "embryo adoption" by the conservative antiabortionists in the U.S. have brought the effect of creating cryopreserved embryos as a new life (Spar, 2006). Through programs to send for "adoption" of cryopreserved embryos created by in vitro fertilization treatment but those that are not conceived for many reasons, a cheaper market for cryopreserved embryos has been created compared to in vitro treatment or child adoption. Moreover, babies that are conceived from this "adoption" program are actually waking up from the cryopreserved state and are being born. Then is this embryo, as the program manager says, were "babies waiting to be born"?

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17. The title *The Drama of Life Before Birth* given to series of fetal photographs in the 1965 *Life* Magazine that Haraway mentions, suggests many things. Fetus becomes the Sacrament (the body of Christ) of technology, as the signifier of life. Likewise, it is justified that fetus to live in another body, and that body can be constructed as an incubator that maintains life. Haraway, 1997: 178.
18. There aren't any statistics for the success rates of surrogate births. However, one participant in Lee Eunju's (2008) experiment failed in all three trials of conception." Hochschild's report also shows that surrogate birth trials are hard to succeed. Arlie Russell Hochschild (2013), *Outsourced Self,* Picador. However, in a 2001 data from the U.S. Center for Disease Control shows that the success rate of pregnancy with one assisted reproductive technology and the birth rate of normal child remained around 30%. Spar, 2006.
19. "It is estimated that there are about 200,000 embryos left after being used for In Vitro treatment globally, and among them about 100,000 are preserved in Korea, making it the greatest reserves for the remainder of frozen embryos." Chung, Moon Young, 2009: 305.

## 5. Bio-Techno-Media: "Womb" and Maternal Myth

New reproductive technology ruptures the idea of the traditional meaning of parents. Reproductive technology like in vitro treatment, in other words "embryo manufacturing" and full surrogate birth disturbs the link between genetic parents and biological parents. Whose sperm and egg meet to be conceived in what body? And by whom is this planned and what process does it go through to be completed? Who pays for it, and what body endures this process? Now childbirth is no longer enough to confirm the biological mother. If woman who are pregnant and give birth are accepted as the baby's "mother" as a fact before the intervention of new reproductive technology, the appearance of commercial full surrogates makes this connection impossible. Then, are surrogate women beings that create conflict in maternity and the maternal right because of this fact? In spite of all disturbances and conflicts, surrogate mothers cannot be a true conflict to the predominant maternity and the maternal right. The reason is there were never "rightful" and "natural" maternity and maternal right from the beginning. Also, the position that these surrogate mothers were put into is any different from the culturally constructed, denatured nature's "ideal mother's" position.

Who is the "mother"? who can become a "mother"? Friedrich Kittler states that it was in 1800s when ideal "mother" made its appearance in Germany. This "mother" is the nurturing mother.[20] The alphabet educational books that poured out around the year 1800, first teaches the mothers how to teach their children. The "teaching of alphabets" that the mothers had to learn is not the letters but phonetics. To teach accurate and standardized pronunciation, the mothers had to learn about their mouths first. Phoentic teaching methods produces an ideal "mother's mouth." This ideal "mother's mouth" produces archetypal voice. "That voice for the first time in history teaches to pronounce "as the language requires"" (Kittler, 2003). Here Kittler points out that mothers teach their children pronunciation but they do not have a language to express themselves, and thus they become the medium to reproduce ideal sound and to teach like an automatic machine. Traditional and empirical language acquisition method is "denaturalized" through alphabetized phonetics education, and this denaturalized, namely a well-trained ideal "mother's mouth," is the medium that allows to reach the true "nature's" language. Cultured nations of Europe in the year 1800 commands mothers to teach their children that way.[21] "It is not simply to have humans be pregnant of humans, but that there should be more **mother-like mothers**." "This is the historically new "women's mission"" (Kittler, 2003).

As mentioned by Kittler, in the 19th Century education that teaches mothers on maternity started to make its appearance in Europe. For example, a German pedagogist Friedrich Fröbel argued

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20. Around the year 1800, "many books advising mothers to teach their children alphabets after they nurture them physically and mentally, suddenly started to pour out" Friedrich A. Kittler (2003), *Aufschreibesysteme 1800·1900,* Wilhelm Fink Verlag.

21. Kittler quotes Von Türk (Von Türk, 1806). "the responsibility of a nation is to educate its daughters to become great mothers in the future, and to do the best to entrust the mission to educate and to nurture its future men and women for the first time, to more capable people."

that they should teach maternity to mothers. According to Christina von Braun, along with this pedagogical command "mothers cannot be mothers **on their own** and should be **made** mothers by force." Likewise, "nature created by logos and the gradually created heteronomous "maternity" replaces nature that is not written in words."[22] Mothers cannot discover their "nature" without the support of an educator. "Mother's love" given by nature must be educated. And the "nature of maternity" that needs to be educated, as pointed out by von Braun, is the mother's "selflessness and self-obliteration." In maternity, pure "normality," and "nature" must function and not the mother's ego, and to do so mothers must become beings without ego. In contrast, mothers who argue for ego, will, and activeness means "anti- maternity." To become an "ideal mother," woman must become an empty opportunity. "Ideal maternity" carries the peculiar commanding system where nature and culture, and nature and culture overlap. And today, the dominant ideal of "mother," the general discursive system on the nature of maternity seems to originate from this duplicity of modern, enlightened, European "mother" making.

## 6. Ending with a Question

If all the discussions related to reproduction labor of "mother," that is reproduced and modified by new reproductive technology were done mainly on bioethical issue, discourse and active interpretation on women's agency, controversy on commercialization of reproductive technology, and feminist's evaluation and criticism on biotechnology, now the discussion on this problem must be expanded and turned over. To expand this viewpoint, if we understand the specific body (its space) where biotechnology (bio-techno) is applied, as "media (medium/agency)" then we would be able to question the complexities of this situation in not only the inner and outer boundary and the dichotomy of body-symbol, life- materiality, organism-machine from outside of biological essentialism, but also the conflict of activeness and passiveness in the disturbed state. The factors that must be added for the turnover of this expanded viewpoint are: formation of ideal "mother" and the myth of "mother's work," biopolitics of global north and global south, internal and external disturbance of the body, the question on the boundaries of life and materiality, and the ghost of dichotomy of culture and nature, or technology and nature that is already dismantled. Likewise, we need "to construct the analytical languages – to design the speculums – for representing and intervening in our spliced, cyborg worlds" (Haraway, 2007: 406) For this I suggest the concept "bio-techno-media" as the analytical language, the microscopic examination.

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22. Christina von Braun (1985), *Nichtich,* Neue Kritik.

# The Human Image in Museums: a Fancy Fantasy of Chinoiserie

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Augustus II, King of Saxony from 1709 to 1733, once wrote in a letter, "Are you not aware that the same is true for oranges as for porcelain, that once one has the sickness of one or the other, one can never get enough of the things and wishes to have more and more?"[1] The European obsession with porcelain began centuries before Augustus II when the explorer Marco Polo brought a vase from China back home to his native Italy, where they called it *porcellana*, Italian for a type of shell because the translucent surface of the vase so resembled the white perfection of a shell. That pale translucency, contrasted with the durability of porcelain, would entrance Europe and incite a massive influx of porcelain goods from China—a trade that endured for the next few centuries because the process of how to make porcelain remained a closely guarded secret in China until Augustus II helped patronize the European invention of porcelain.

In his lifetime, August II was reported to have commissioned the creation of over 35,000 pieces of porcelain.[2] Evidence of this history of global production, the European craze for porcelain, which later continued in America, can be found in museums of the Western World today. Here the remnants of Augustus II's sickness can be seen—displayed often as treasure troves of materiality. Museums like the Rijksmuseum in Amsterdam, the Victoria & Albert Museum in London, and the Art Institute of Chicago place vast quantities of European porcelain on display. When I first began working with the European Decorative Arts collection at the Art Institute of Chicago and walked through our galleries, I was struck by the number of human faces and figures staring back at me. Perhaps because decorative arts as a category denotes objects such as chairs, ceramics, glasswork, and textiles, human images are not the first visual motif to come to mind. However, the collection is replete with faces such as these—interlocked China men and women wearing fanciful hats. Or this figure—heavily stylized and grinning broadly astride a crowing rooster. Seen through a contemporary lens, this imagery can be jarring for visitors. *Are they offensive images? Are they positive or negative portrayals? Who is represented and how do historical hierarchies of political*

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1. Edmund de Waal. *The White Road: Journey into Obsession.* Farrar, Straus and Giroux. November 1, 2016.
2. Samuel Wittwer. *The Gallery of Meissen Animals: Augustus the Strong's Menagerie for the Japanese Palace in Dresden.* Hirmer Publishers. June 19, 2006.

*power inform this kind of imagery?* These faces and figures can act as rich sites for unpacking issues like the complex transmission of visual motifs and the creation of Otherness in domestic settings.

Yet art museums have rarely taken advantage of the opportunity to contextualize this material in multiple ways—instead often relying upon one-dimensional narratives, which can lead to misconceptions and missed opportunities for deeper engagement. Within our contemporary moment, as museums shift to become more visitor-centered[3], as conversations about representation, diversity, and inclusion have became questions at the forefront of the field—the lack of rigorous contextualization of historical objects featuring difficult human imagery is a critical issue. This paper argues for a re-thinking of these objects' display and interpretation through multiple perspectives, offering a range of museological strategies for engaging the public based on museum case studies, visitor research, and the political, cultural, and scientific histories of European porcelain.

The most common way museums have chosen to explain these images has occurred through a narrative of style. Specifically, the decorative elements of European porcelain are often described within the terms of Chinoiserie, a stylistic movement referring to "Chinese-style" decoration. Take for instance, this label from the Rijksmuseum in Amsterdam, which describes a lidded jar created in Delft around 1660:

> The decoration of this large lidded jar is based on Chinese models. The scenes are distributed randomly over the body of the jar and differ widely in size. The result is a free, European interpretation of Chinese motifs, a style called *chinoiserie*.

This label typifies a few drawbacks of stylistic description, which connects this lidded jar to traditional Chinese porcelain and Chinese motifs but is not displayed anywhere near actual porcelain from China. Thus making this stylistic comparison is only relevant to visitors who have prior knowledge of Chinese porcelain. Furthermore a description of style alone does not always explain why Chinoiserie became so popular during this period, how images of China were disseminated to European artisans, or acknowledge the ways in which Chinoiserie created fantasies of another world. Chinoiserie has always been an expression of European fantasy—an imagining of the Far East for which cultural complexities were notably absent. Within the field of European Decorative Arts, style has often been a predominant narrative due to the field's origins in connoisseurship and the general art historical tendency towards formalism. And although style can be one important method of engaging visitors with objects, it does not provide enough context for explaining the complex implications of Chinoiserie.

I came to this conclusion—that museums have been failing to holistically engage visitors with

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3. Peter Samis & Mimi Michaelson. *Creating the Visitor-Centered Museum*. Routledge. 2017

these kinds of objects—by chance. From a visitor research study conducted in the fall of 2017, I found that unexpectedly visitors were most intrigued and confused by the Art Institute's collection of Asian-influenced European Decorative Arts. I and a team of associates undertook this large-scale study to prepare for the future reinstallation of the Art Institute's permanent galleries of European Decorative Arts, which comprises a collection of decorative objects made from approximately 1500 to 1900. These galleries have historically undergone significant changes—in terms of location within the museum, the content of the collection, and integration or lack of integration with other art forms. In preparation for this reinstallation, we aimed to better understand visitors' perceptions and prior knowledge of European Decorative Arts and the impact of our current installation.

To assess visitors' perceptions and prior knowledge of European Decorative Arts, we used a front-end visitor study methodology referred to as Personal Meaning Mapping (PMM). John Falk, Director of the Institute for Learning Innovation, refers to this approach as a constructivist methodology that measures visitors' changes in understanding based on extent, breadth, depth, and mastery.[4] Random visitors were intercepted and asked to read the phrase, European Decorative Arts, which was printed in the center of a blank piece of paper, and to write down whatever phrases came to mind. After walking through as little or as much of the permanent galleries as they wished, visitors were asked to edit, add to, remove, or elaborate on anything they had written before with a blue colored pencil. Visitors answered additional questions during the pre and post meaning mapping sessions through extensive interviews; additionally, a printed survey concerning interest in potential content and demographic information was collected at the end of each interview. Systems of randomization were implemented to avoid interviewer bias.

Overall 50 personal minds maps were collected in December of 2017—from which 533 independent key terms were collected.[5] After collecting the raw data, we coded our results to better organize and understand recurring patterns. The following codes were used to organize the key terms: type of art, media/material, properties, content, style/qualities, personal, preference, context, and artists. Overwhelmingly visitors thought of media and materials when faced with the phrase European Decorative Arts. Of those 553 terms, 225 or 41% belonged to the Media/Material category. The next most popular category was Context with 105 or 19% of terms referring to some kind of context. We found that most visitors' perceptions of European Decorative Arts did not change much after walking through our galleries with one exception. During the Pre-PMM phase, visitors were more likely to mention central and Mediterranean European countries and the Renaissance Period when thinking of historical context. The terms "castles" and "old" appeared frequently. In contrast, during the Post-PMM phase, visitors mentioned "influence" the most as you can see here in these word clouds. The interviews revealed that visitors were most concerned with

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4. John Falk, Theano Moussouri, & Douglas Coulson. "The Effect of Visitors 'Agendas on Museum Learning," *Curator: The Museum Journal.* May 24, 2010.

5. All specific information related to this visitor study cannot be circulated publicly for confidentiality reasons. I will be showing slides and images of the data collected for the presentation, but these images also cannot be circulated publicly.

cross-cultural influence, particularly the influence of East Asian cultures.

This finding indicates one of the most significant changes in visitors' thoughts after walking through the European Decorative Arts galleries—a greater interest in the global connectedness of early modern Europe. And although our collection's strengths include English Gothic art, German glass, and Irish silverware, visitors most noted a strong desire to learn more about this international exchange with Asia, particularly as it relates to understanding what exactly is European about European Decorative Arts. As one visitor noted, "Orientalism: a lot of blue-and-white china; there's a little Buddha, it was surprising to see; not enough context about how this influence happened." There were other points of misinformation, as some visitors seemed to think that these were objects made in Asia while others assumed that these were works made by Europeans but did not know how or why they were producing Chinoiserie.

Additionally, after thinking about this issue through a contemporary lens, some visitors were unwilling to engage further, like this visitor whose only comment about our galleries was "colonialism—that's pretty much it." This is not meant as a criticism of the study's participants; rather it demonstrates why we need to address these issues clearly and in relevant ways. The lack of contextualization spurred this comment, underscoring the importance of addressing the subject so visitors can engage more deeply within appropriate contexts and learn how to navigate difficult human imagery.

The last part of this paper outlines suggestions for how art museums can help visitors in this dexterous navigation of visual culture. First, a rethinking of the geographic collection areas of encyclopedic museums must be addressed. Historically such institutions are organized by geographic and chronological boundaries, like European Painting & Sculpture, Medieval Art, Chinese Art, and African Art. However, some of the most compelling and instructive displays of objects serve as interstitial spaces, areas on the margins of these boundaries. For instance, to return to the Rijksmuseum's label, which I criticized earlier for writing about models of traditional Chinese porcelain without actually displaying Chinese porcelain, a complete global history of porcelain cannot exist without curating porcelain from East Asia and Europe together. Key transitional works—like this ewer from the Art Institute's collection—can highlight how China also produced porcelain for the sole purpose of export to Europe, where objects could be fastened with silver mounts like these to satisfy consumer tastes. Together, these objects can tell a much more complete global story of a material that shaped the world.

Second, to further contextualize these objects within the political and visual discourses of the time, I suggest that museums juxtapose porcelain with relevant collections of prints and drawings. Most artisans who created porcelain in the European factories of Meissen and Du Paquier never visited East Asia. Like many Europeans, they constructed their image of China and the Far East from the numerous prints circulating throughout the period. Prints often derived from encyclopedias and travelogues written by travelers, traders, and Jesuit missionaries who had ventured to China and brought back tales, some true and others truly outlandish. To understand the origins of the

highly imaginative figures decorating porcelain—to understand Chinoiserie, one must analyze early modern prints, like this selection, from the 1667 book *China Illustrata*, written by Athanasius Kircher, the Jesuit missionary and scholar. Considered one of the most popular and widely read books about China in the 17<sup>th</sup> century, the tome provides a cultural account of the country, describing everything from religious practices to the native flying tortoises. Prints such as these can also address the shifting relationship between China and Europe and consequently the effect on visual culture. From the beginnings of the production of European porcelain with the establishment of the first European manufactory, Meissen in 1710, to the last of the great porcelain empires, Europe's relationship to China remained in flux. British accounts detailing the moral and economic virtues of China can be found in various writings such as this 1691 account of the essayist William Temple who called China "the greatest, richest, and most populous kingdom now in the known world."[6] Conversely China was also described as a land embodying duplicitous extremes, a place of great riches yet excessive immorality. Many scholars studying this period point to the expulsion of the Jesuit missionaries from China in the early 1700s as a critical moment in the relationship between Europe and China—and a possible tipping point in terms of negative portrayals of the Far East, not simply a land of fantasy but a land where fantasy permits excess and lascivious, silly, and frivolous behavior immortalized in prints and porcelain from the period.

To further address the political dynamics between cultures of the early modern world, and how these dynamics materialized in objects like porcelain, I suggest that museums contextualize collections of European Decorative Arts within the historical impact of empire. Take for instance, these figurines, which are displayed in a cabinet at the Art Institute with no contextualization except for the title of these works, their media, their date of creation, and their country of origin. They were produced by the Meissen manufactory in 1710 and represent a type of figurine set produced and replicated for a consumer market. The collectible figurines are allegorical representations of the four continents. These figures are not inscribed but early modern Europeans would have recognized them by their visual markers: America wearing little clothes and sitting on an alligator amidst a bounty of land, Asia resting on top of a camel and holding a diffisuer of incense, Europe astride a horse donning a crown, scepter, orb and cross near a globe of the world, and Africa skin painted black on top of a lion and wearing an elephant head as a hat. Like the four seasons and four cardinal directions, Europeans during this period believed that the world made up of four continents: America, Asia, Europe, and Africa. This porcelain set can be contextualized as a European map of the world, as a process by which porcelain figurines became fixed visual representations of entire continents, and a result of the impetus for collection and classification spurred by the Enlightenment and the consolidation of empirical power. Although it would be temporally anachronistic to think of these objects in terms of postcolonial theory, museums can contemplate how the construction of empire led to the production of figures like these and include interpretive materials like timelines

6. William Temple, Of Heroic Virtue, in The Works of Sir William Temple, 3: 328.

and historical maps to give visitors a stronger idea of time and place.

A good case study of such a display can be found in The British Museum's Enlightenment galleries. These galleries help visitors understand how the Enlightenment informed the existence of institutions like the British Museum. The seven themes presented illustrate the principles of the movement: trade and discovery, religion and ritual, ancient scripts, classifying the world, art and civilization, the birth of archaeology, and the natural world. These themes are all linked to an era of great discovery and progress, as well as an era that helped cement and presuppose ideas supporting the worst of humanity, slavery and colonization. Understanding this duality and displaying the impetus to collect objects as a phenomenon linked with the emergence of imperialism can help museums both contextualize art with difficult human imagery and acknowledge the terrible consequences of empire.

To concretize the relationship between Europe and China, sharing the voices of artists, thinkers, and important figures from the period would also allow visitors insight into a time where European identities were influenced by porcelain. For example, in the 18th century, it was a fashionable practice for English women to whiten their hands with toxic lead or arsenic to match the color of their skin with their white porcelain tea sets. Josiah Wedgwood, the businessman and founder of Wedgwood ceramic manufactory, took advantage of this in the production of his own ceramics. He once wrote in the 1770s—"I hope white hands will continue in fashion and then we may continue to make black teapots[7]—with the idea being that a woman's white hands would look striking next to his black matte ceramics, which are pictured here. Wedgwood was a savvy businessman who tailored his products to the taste of the British consumer market, but he also thought continuously about the legacy of China and the artistic standard that Chinese porcelain set, writing in a letter in the 1770s: "Don't you think we shall have some Chinese Missionaries come here soon to learn the art of making Creamcolour?"[8] Referencing his own ceramics as creamcolour, Wedgwood's words also reveal something quite interesting: how the exchange between Europe and China was not one-sided. With the last set of porcelain figurines, we saw how Europe had created a map of the world and an image of China. But it's equally important for visitors to understand that China had also influenced how Europeans created art and lived their lives. That women would whiten their skin with poison to match the white of their porcelain tea sets. That creators were driven by standards of artistic practice set in China. Fantasy works in so many ways, and we see here how the fantasy of China informed the visual language of European art and even European appearances. Including the voices of people from this period in art museum displays not only humanizes objects but also creates vivid narratives that bring the complex cultural tensions of an era to life.

Finally, I would like to suggest that museums consider the incorporation of scientific and technical narratives into permanent gallery collections to tell the story of materials such as porcelain. In many ways the story of porcelain is one of scientific discovery and experimentation.

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7. Chi-Ming Yang, "Ladies, Pugs, and Porcelain," Presentation at the Chicago Humanities Festival, December 13, 2013.
8. Josiah Wedgwood, Letter, 1767, quoted by Maxine Berg, *Luxury and Pleasure in Eighteenth- Century Britain*, 81.

Albeit one produced under extreme duress, as King August II, porcelain's main patron, imprisoned the alchemist Johann Friedrich Böttger to incentivize him to produce greater results, which he eventually did by discovering the clay mineral compound needed to produce porcelain with the help of the scientist Ehrenfried von Tschirnhaus. For visitors to understand the materiality of porcelain, the white translucency that first drew Europeans to a Chinese vase, the use of analog or digital interactives that detail the process of making porcelain and allow the public to touch and discover can provide a different method of engagement. For example, these interactive drawers at the Victoria & Albert Museum allow the public to interact with the different stages of creating a ceramic—providing visitors with another way to approach objects.

The story of porcelain is one of global intrigue, obsession, and discovery. To present porcelain objects through the narrative of style alone does not help visitors engage with this vibrant and important history. Furthermore, the difficult and complex human images of Otherness remain fixed visual markers of Otherness. As museums shift to an inclusive model of making meaning and engaging with visitors, the discussion of how to contextualize difficult human images will only become more important, as these images exist across collection areas, geographies, and time periods. Only by changing the museum into a multi-vocal space capable of expressing multiple perspectives can visitors begin to engage with these objects in a productive and ultimately transformative dialogue.

# Key Concepts of a Communicative Category of Politeness in Korean and Russian

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## Introduction

In the contemporary world of globalization the ability to communicate with representatives of other cultures is one of the most crucial tasks one has to accomplish. It is not enough just to master the language to be able to communicate with representatives of foreign languages and culture, it is necessary to understand the cultural specifics of an interlocutor. Therefore, this article examines concepts of politeness in Korean and Russian, which reflect communicative specifics of the two cultures.

## 1. The definition of concept

One of the most popular areas of research in linguistics in CIS is Linguocultural Studies which examines specifics of various cultures and their manifestation in language and culture. Linguocultural Studies examines so called "concepts" – "the main units of culture in the mental world of a human being" [1]. The concept does not only express a certain meaning of a referent, but contains a cultural and historical background, developed and embodied by societal practices of people. Concept is a mental notion, "it is like a bundled culture in people's minds; something that embodies culture and enters the mental world of a human being" [1]. The concept exists in human mind in the form of an image, notions, knowledge, associations and emotions. Concepts build up culture like parts of a puzzle and contain mental, social and other kinds of human experience. Different concepts of various languages have been thoroughly examined by linguists around the world lately. Since concepts help to gain insights into national specifics of the linguistic picture of the world, they are also explored to identify those national specifics.

## 2. Hyper concept of «Politeness» in Korean and Russian

This research of a politeness category based on a comparative analysis of the two languages

such as Korean and Russian is of a particular interest and significance. The politeness category as a hyper concept and a linguocultural unit has been examined in many research papers [2, 3 and others]. A hyper concept is a set of concepts that constitute a conceptual picture of the world [4]. Politeness as a hyper concept entails different concepts as units that shape general understanding of a politeness category in different languages. Recently a new approach to the study of a politeness category has been developed, where politeness is considered as a communicative category. Therefore we consider the category of politeness as a core element of the system, which regulates people's communicative behavior.

Identifying and describing concepts, researchers receive an opportunity to explore specific national features of a certain notion. It is particularly important when identical concepts in different languages are contrasted to identify and compare national specific characteristics, understand people's communicative behavior and carry out successful communication. So, that concept, a hyper concept to be exact, is "politeness".

The hyper concepts of "politeness" in Russian and Korean have different content and focus, which is reflected in different interpretations of politeness. Thus, the concept of "politeness" in Russian culture means "observing the code of decency". According to the Russian researcher T.V. Larina, British people understand "politeness" (synonyms such as polite, civil, courteous, courtly, gallant, chivalrous, vary widely in terms of their nature and manifestation) as being attentive towards other people, using good manners and speech to demonstrate this way a respectful attitude towards an interlocutor. Politeness for Russian people is about following rules of decency and courtesy. Based on the aforementioned difference in understanding the concept of "politeness" in British and Russian linguistic cultures, it should be noted that "in British mentality being polite implies demonstrating respect and care towards others, whereas in Russian culture it is about knowing and following the code of social behavior " [5].

The hyper concept of "politeness" in Korean communicative mind is a broad category, different from interpretation of English and Russian speakers. It is supported by the abundance of lexical variations in the Korean language, which express the notion of "politeness". They are: 공손함, 존대 (말), 높임(말), 경어(법), 예절, 예의, 정중, 존중, 존경함 and others. All the lexical units have to do with an expression of politeness and respect. They are also aimed at diminishing your own position as a speaker and increasing the position of an interlocutor. Being polite in Korean means being humble and showing respect towards other people, observing the rules of courtesy and demonstrating politeness, which corresponds to the social characteristics of an interlocutor. Observing the rules of courtesy in Korean culture is one of the major keys to successful communication in Korean society. The category of politeness pervades the entire Korean language and helps to build up interactions between communicators in accordance with a hierarchy of status.

In Russian culture a person who is older or has a higher status, elevates the interlocutor, in British culture the speaker downgrades himself/herself to reach the level of an interlocutor. Meanwhile in Korean culture, neither an upgrade nor a downgrade occurs. The person with a higher

status, keeps it in any circumstances and communication with another person with a lower status is carried out from top to bottom. The norms of such a hierarchy are regulated by social behavior, grammatical and lexical structure of the Korean language, status-based divided society, people's attitudes and mentality.

## 3. Lexical and grammatical differences of a politeness category in Korean and Russian

Politeness in the Korean language is a core element of a hierarchy in Korean society and lexical and grammatical differentiation. Today the system of Korean politeness includes three categories: 1) addressive category (상대 경어법), 2) subjective category (주체 경어법), 3) objective category (객체 경어법).

The first category (상대 경어법) includes a system of lexical and grammatical forms, which expresses politeness (or absence of politeness) towards an interlocutor. The second subjective category (주체 경어법) expresses politeness towards an agent of an action. The third category (객체 경어법) expresses politeness towards the object of conversation.

The addressive category (상대 경어법) is the most understandable one for the native speaker of Russian, since it expresses politeness towards an interlocutor, which is expressed in Russian by means of second person pronouns like "ty" (informal You) and "Vy" (polite You). Grammatically politeness towards an interlocutor is expressed using a plural form.

The addressive category in the Korean language is the largest group and has the most sophisticated system of affix manifestation. Politeness through the addressive category is expressed through various degrees of politeness, which have appropriate lexical and grammatical components.

It is considered there are six main accepted degrees of politeness that fall into the addressive category [6]. They are: 1) 하십시오체, 2) 하오체, 3) 하게체, 4) 해라체, 5) 해요체, 6) 해체 (or 반말). These 6 degrees in turn are divided into two forms of politeness: official and non-official. Official types are as follows: 하십시오체, 하오체, 하게체 и 해라체, imperative in nature and they are used in official situations and contexts. Non-official types are 해요체, 해체 (or 반말). Each degree of politeness has certain grammatical endings. These degrees are used only in specific communicative situations and with particular interlocutors.

The politeness system of addressive category is divided into the following three degrees:

1) 아주 높임 – officially polite degree of politeness, which expresses the highest degree of politeness and includes the degree of politeness such as 하십시오체;

2) 높임 – non-official and polite degree, which expresses ordinary politeness and includes 해요체;

3) 안 높임 – familiar degree, which expresses absence of politeness and includes 해체 and 하게체.

In this addressive category we differentiate forms and degrees of politeness. The forms of politeness in the Korean language are similar to forms of politeness in Russian. The difference is that in Russian there are two forms of politeness such as formal (Vy- polite form of You), and informal (Ty – You). The terms such as "formal" and "informal" express their nature, the former

meaning "distant" and the latter meaning "close". Whereas in the Korean language forms of politeness are divided into official and non-official. The names of these forms show that in the Korean language politeness is a social concept and depends on the communicative situation (official or non-official).

The forms within the Korean system of politeness have three degree of politeness, which have been discussed earlier. There are two degrees of politeness in the Russian language such as "ty"(You) and "Vy" (polite You).

Thus, lexical and grammatical system of politeness of the two languages under comparison can be presented in the following way (Table 1).

**Table 1**

| Korean language | | Russian language | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Forms of politeness** | **Degrees of politeness** | **Forms of politeness** | **Degrees of politeness** |
| Official | Officially polite | Formal | Using "Vy" (polite You) |
| Non-official | Non-officially polite | Informal | Using "Ty" (You) |
| | Familiar | | |

Politeness in the Korean language is expressed through an attitude towards an interlocutor, it also shows the relationship between communicators, interlocutors and the subject of conversation. The system of politeness in the Korean language grammar (경어법) makes any Korean speaker use a certain degree of politeness towards an interlocutor in accordance with his/her age, status and other social characteristics. Regardless of the phrases and meaning conveyed, they definitely reflect a social status of the speaker as compared to the status of a conversation partner, and a social distance between the communicators [7].

The degrees of politeness in turn define the specific rules of politeness that must be observed, for example, observing the rules of subordination. Moreover, they influence a choice of certain communicative strategies and tactics that are used in the communication process (for instance, prohibition of directive sentences when one speaks to older or superior people).

There is no category of politeness such as 경어법 in the Russian language. However, there is a category of diminutive and hypocoristic words. This kind of politeness is expressed by means of different lexical and grammatical elements and reflects the genuine national Russian mentality and depicts a warmer and close attitude towards "insiders" than in English speaking or Oriental cultures. Diminutive affixes have expressive or emotional shade and most of the time imply an exceptionally close relationship and attitude of a speaker towards a listener.

If we compare terms of address in Korean and Russian, the wide variety and number of variations of names in Russian arrests our attention whereas in Korean there are just few variations of address terms. Besides, names in Korean do not convey so much emotive

information like Russian personal names do. In the Russian language, names as address terms may have approximately 150 variations of the same name. The name is not used as an original full form, (for example, Vasiliy), instead various derivatives are used more often. For instance: derivatives of Vasiliy such as Vasya, Vaska, Vasenka, Vasyaka, Vasek, Vasyuk, Vasil , Vasilko, Vasyuta, Vasyutka, Vasey, Vasyay, Vasyukha, Vasyusha, Vasyanya, Vasyakha, Vaka, etc. The speaker chooses the most appropriate one, which corresponds to the attitude that he/she wants to express at this particular moment. Russian personal name can express respect, hatred, love and friendly attitude. Both attitude, emotions and feelings experienced by a speaker towards an interlocutor (while addressing them) are main factors that make a person choose a certain form of a personal name as an address term in the Russian language. In the Russian culture the emotional attitude and the degree of intimacy expressed by a person towards an interlocutor is considered to be more important than expressing politeness and respect towards a listener. That being said, the vast majority of address terms is used in communicative situations using casual, informal Ty. It demonstrates that relationships between interlocutors in the Russian culture are based on the social horizontal axis. In the Korean language, address terms reflect a politeness system and are characterized by social differences between interlocutors according to status-related vertical axis. Terms of address in the Korean language demonstrate a degree of politeness rather than a degree of intimacy or familiarity. Korean address terms are markers of communicators' status.

## 4. Conceptual framework of a politeness category

It is important to highlight here that a concept (or concepts) must be playing a significant role while choosing a particular strategy, which in turn is a key (core) element of national politeness. So, the concept of "self" in Russian culture as opposed to the concept of "other" is considered to be an important one. This concept has been studied by researchers such as Y.S. Stepanov, Y.M. Lotman, Y. A. Sorokin, V.V. Krasnyh and others, and was recognized as a significant concept in Russian speaking culture.

The importance of the concepts like "self/insiders" and "other/outsiders" for politeness in Russian culture is supported by the fact that I.A. Sternin and T.V. Larina named the strategies of Russian communicative politeness as strategies of "distancing" and "approaching", not "positive" and "negative" ones (terms of P. Brown and S. Levinson) [8], since the first two names are more suitable for the Russian culture and politeness. There is a reason behind it and a lot can be explained through the concept that is a bedrock of politeness.

It can be claimed here that the concepts such as "self/insiders" and "other/outsiders" set a direction for the strategies of politeness to put distancing and approaching into action. Tatiana V. Larina highlights that "it is possible to distinguish three different kinds of behavior of Russian people: with "outsiders" (strangers), with "distant insiders" (formal relationship) and "close

insiders" (intimate relationship). Having said this, the most polite behavior can be seen towards the members of the second group, in other words towards "distant insiders", the relationship with them has a distant nature (for example, colleagues). As for "outsiders" who fall beyond one's communicative space (passers-by, passengers in the public transport) and "close insiders" (who belong to the close setting (family members, for instance) Russians can be impolite and even rude" [5]. The fact that the "self" concept is the most important one in Russian culture is supported by a sophisticated system of Russian proper names and their diminutive variations and a wide usage of diminutive and hypocoristic affixes almost in all the parts of speech.

From our point of view, the concept of "hierarchy" is a significant one in the Korean culture. The hierarchy, the order of subordination of inferior members of a society to the superior ones, is the main core of the structure of the Korean society and shows either a superior or inferior level of interlocutors in hierarchy. Having said that, the main rules of the Korean society are abidance by the rules of hierarchy. They shape politeness rules that in their turn define norms of communication. Depending on hierarchical level, both linguistic (rules of grammatical system of politeness) and general behavior of an interlocutor is affected and changes accordingly.

The defining factors in Korean hierarchy are status, age, sex, family ties which can be considered inborn factors and are acquired without any efforts and cannot be changed. The role of age, sex and family ties is weak in the Russian hierarchy, status being the most crucial factor. However, it is not strictly defined by social factors as compared to status-based relationships in the Korean culture. The researcher Lee Iksop wrote that "the power of authority influence overweighs (in Korean society) the power of human relationships" [9]. It means friendship is less important than social inequality in status-based Korean hierarchy. In contrast to this, in Russian society, on the contrary, human relationships prevail formal job related ones. Thus, the subordinate can build up close relations with an employer and use the address term such as "Ty" (informal You), give some advice and even object, which is impossible in Korean society.

The social structure in Russian society is more flexible as compared to the social system in Korean society. Employers and employees can build up very close friendly relations up to the point when the subordinate can give a piece advice to his/her boss and it is not even prohibited to object to the friend aka boss. These conditions make it possible to transfer from top to bottom and vice versa in relation to "I". The social hierarchical ladder of Korean and Russian societies can be illustrated the following way (by T. Lee) [10]. See Diagram 1.

Diagram 1 – Status based hierarchy in Korean (to the left) and Russian society (to the right)

The diagram above shows that the Korean societal hierarchy is more sophisticated and structured as compared to the Russian societal system. In Korean society all the people who are older, have superior and higher positions and ranks, employed earlier (in companies) or who entered universities or schools earlier than others, are socially higher than "I". Regardless of how close the human relationships are, those who are superior and inferior in terms of the social hierarchical ladder cannot be equal. Those who have inferior positions are not allowed by the rules of hierarchy to give orders, object, make remarks, refute what others say or use informal terms of address in communication.

No doubt, that in Russian culture the order of a hierarchy is clear and understandable, but as compared to Korean society is broader and not very rigorous. Flexibility of Russian status-based hierarchy is manifested in the possibility to change the ranking order depending on the development of relations, the level of respect, authority, etc.

That having been said, the concept of hierarchy can be highlighted as the key one for the Korean category of politeness and Korean society in general.

**Conclusion**

Thus, the concept of "self/insiders" as opposed to "other/outsiders" is a key communicative concept in Russian culture to build a politeness strategy. In accordance with the aforementioned concepts Russian people build their strategies of approaching and distancing. Whereas in Korean communicative culture the concept of hierarchy is the core one and they build politeness strategies of strengthening and weakening politeness to observe the norms and rules of that hierarchy.

These differences define national specifics of politeness strategies in the languages under consideration. For example, in the Russian language, diminutive hypocoristic variations of address terms towards complete strangers and acquaintances while using "ty" (informal You) make communication less rude and give positive emotional connotation in building strategies of approaching. In the Korean language in turn the highest formal degree of politeness mitigates

rudeness and too direct and straightforward speech, thus serving as a strengthening strategy of politeness in giving orders, refusals, etc.

The differences in the conceptual framework demonstrate that politeness in the Russian language has an interpersonal nature and also shows how close the relationship of communicators is. Whereas in the Korean language, politeness has social nature and shows social and/or status-based differences.

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# Globalization of Ethnicity: from Nations to Meta-Nations

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## Globalization of Ethnicity and Perspectives of Korean Meta-Nation[1]

One of the striking tendencies of the contemporary world is the globalization of ethnicity and the increase of the ethnic factor in world politics. K. Marx once formulated a slogan: "Proletarians of all countries, unite!", considering that belonging to a class is the main trait that unites people in large communities and determines their behavior. The second half of the 20th century and modern processes showed the value and role of ethnicity. The Marx' slogan is replaced by the slogan: "Ethnoses of all countries, unite!". This is national (ethnic) liberation movements in former colonies during the second half of the 20th century; disintegration of the former federative states on the basis of ethnicity (USSR, Yugoslavia, Georgia), creation of international ethnic associations and networks, etc.

Ethnic processes come to the fore in world politics and social sciences. It is possible to talk about a new phenomenon – *globalization of ethnicity*. *Firstly*, this is an intensive process of diasporization in most countries of the world. According to the UN, in 1960 there were 75.5 mln people living outside the country of their birth worlswide; in 1990, that number reached 154 mln, in 2000 – 176.6 million in 2013 - 232 mln, and in 2017 - 258 mln.[2]

*Secondly*, ethnic conflicts cease to be local in nature and come into the sphere of world politics. It is sufficient to mention the problem of Kosovo (Serbian-Albanian conflict), which divided the international community into two camps: those who have recognized Kosovo as an independent State, and those who did not. It is a problem of recognition or non-recognition of the Armenian genocide in Ottoman Turkey (Armenian-Turkish conflict), the problem of divided Cyprus (Greek-Turkish conflict), Nagorno-Karabakh (Armenian-Azerbaijan) conflict, the creation of a Palestinian State ( the Arab-Israel conflict), the creation of independent States in Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the significant component of crisis in Ukraine etc.

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1. http://www.unmigration.org
2. The concept of "meta-nation" was developed by author in the previous presented papers and articles (Khan 2001, Khan 2007, Khan 2011).

Thirdly, in world politics it is observed a tendency of *panethnism*, when the national states make a policy of the Diasporas' unification or create the global/international ethnic communities (networks), which became the actors of international politics (World Congress of Jews or Armenians, Kazakhs, Tatars, Russians, etc.). The Republic of Korea also makes its police in this direction. In this regard, I would like to focus on the Korean case study.

Korean immigration, which has taken place during the last 150 years, has led to the fact that nowadays, according to Overseas Koreans Foundation, the number of overseas Koreans is more 7 million people (http://www.okf.or.kr). Today Koreans live all over the world: in more than 150 countries. If the current rate of migration is taken into account, then in the near future the number of Koreans outside the peninsula will be comparable to the population of North Korea (and South Korea, in the distant future).

The circumstances of Koreans' migration and existence abroad are different. These are:
- Voluntary migration and forced deportation.
- Homogeneous and heterogeneous ethnic environment.
- Compactness and dispersion of settlement.
- Commonality and difference of cultures in recipient countries concerning Korean culture.
- Democratic and totalitarian political regimes, plan and market economic systems, etc.

Adapting to and being assimilated into ethnically alien environments, Koreans in different countries acquire more and more traits that distinguish themselves from each other and transform their initial ethnic characteristics. The widening *quantitative* dispersion of Koreans and the increasing *qualitative* differentiation within them lead to new processes in the evolution of Korean ethnicity. As Koreans settle throughout the world and adapt to various countries, *Korean identity begins to take diverse forms and can no longer be reduced to the ethnic characteristics that exist on the Korean Peninsula*.

In this regard, what concepts in terms of sociology, cultural anthropology, and political science should we use for Koreans? Besides, the divergent ethnic and political processes on the Korean peninsula as well as in Korean Diasporas need a clarification of the terminology that can reflect these processes.

It is known that ethnic communities (ethno-social organisms) had different historic forms (clan, tribe, union of tribes, nationality) whose evolution and political construction[3] resulted in the formation of *nations* as stable ethnic entities, namely, national (ethnic) states. However, an ethnic nation is not the final form of the evolution of ethnic communities (ethno-social organisms).[4] As

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3. See (Gellner E. 1983)
4. After the French Revolution the concept of "nation" gradually changed. In French and English ethnic content of the "nation" is replaced by political one. Especially this process got intensive character under globalization. The concept of "nation" became a synonym of "state" (for example, United Nations). But in German and Russian "nation" is not a synonym of "state" and expresses, first of all, ethnic characteristics. Because of these differences, some scholars distinguish the concepts of "ethnic nation" and "civic nation" (Tishkov 2000).

previous ethnic communities, nations are subjects of divergent and convergent processes. For example, in case of the USA one can speak about supra-ethnic community – American people or American nation that includes the representatives of different races and ethnicities, and can not be reduced to a certain ethnic group. In the case of the former USSR one can speak about supra-national and supra-ethnic community – Soviet people that consisted of not only different ethnic groups but also different nations (national states, republics – the Uzbek Republic, the Armenian Republic, etc.). These communities are not reducible to a certain nation as a state formation – say, to Belarus or Turkmenistan, or to a certain ethnic group – say, to Russians. Ethnic communities, which settled all over the world and formed large foreign diasporas (Jews, Armenians et al.) have also adopted supra-national characters. For instance, there are more Armenians outside Armenia than in the country itself. There are ethnoses which form more than one state (Chinese, Koreans or Germans before unification), and diasporas which compose a big part of the population (for example, Chinese in Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand) in some countries. Thus, in the result of immigration and divergent processes the ethnic nations break up to sub-ethnic formations, also finding supranational character, but differ from supranational communities, which are a consequence of interethnic integration and synthesis, conditioned by convergent processes.

In the case of Koreans, one can observe three co-existing supra-national communities: 1) community where North Korea is a core or attractive center (along with the North Korean state this includes some parts of diasporas which have close relations with North Korea – Chongryon in Japan, organizations of Bomminryon, etc.); 2) community where South Korea is an attractive center (Mindan in Japan, etc.); and 3) some diaspora communities (for example, CIS Koreans who live in different countries; they are the same people– Koryo Saram– but distributed among various national states).

Even though relations among these communities are very complicated, the global tendencies in the sphere of ethno-political processes permit a discussion of the possible formation (construction) of a *supra-national Korean ethnic community* or a *Global Korean Community* (GKC) – Koreans of North Korea + Koreans of South Korea + Overseas Korean Diasporas. Of course, the primary and necessary condition for the formation of such a community is improving relations between North and South Koreas. In the future, by forming a more or less *stable* formation, this "supra-national" community could signify a new stage in the evolution of Korean ethnicity – a *meta-nation* stage as an *aggregate of related but culturally differing ethnic communities (mother ethnos and ethnic sub-groups) historically belonging to one nation.*

What are the correlations between the concept "meta-nation" and other notions such as "supra-ethnic community", "supra-national community" and "trans-national community", "inter-national community"?

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On the use of word "nation" in Korean language see (Song, Kue-Jin 2009).

Paying attention to various interpretations of the concept of "nation" (both as ethnic identity and as state identity), Holland and Russian scholars write that "one should distinguish nations, nations-states and multinational states. Thus, nation and state are not identical but mutually-crossed concepts" (Rukavishnikov, V., Halman, L., Ester, P. 1998: 269).

*Meta-nation and supra-ethnic community*. A supra-ethnic community is an aggregate of different ethnic communities. It can exist in two forms. First, it exists in the form of a union of ethnic groups which has not become a nation yet (many multi-ethnic states where co-relation of centrifugal and centripetal forces is not simple). For example, in case of Ruanda– which is a formal (official) state and member of the UN– one can say that it is a supra-ethnic community but not a nation (something whole) because of bloody war between Hutu and Tutsi, basic ethnic communities in the country. In case of meta-nation, it is not formed on the basis of different ethnic groups; its parts historically belong to one ethnic nation – mother ethnos (ethnicity). Second, supra-ethnic community can exist in the form of a nation (for example, the American people). But meta-nation is a next form (stage) compared to nation.

*Meta-nation and supra-national community.* In terms of content, the concept «supra-national community» has broader meaning than the "meta-nation". There are three types of supra-national communities: 1) federative communities formed on the basis of different ethnic groups *and* states (for example, the Soviet people); 2) inter-national communities; and 3) communities consisting of the sub-ethnic groups historically belonging to one nation. Only the third meaning relates to meta-nation.

As to the concept «transnational community», it coincides with the second meaning of the term «supra-national community», that is, as an «international community». In other words, in terms of content this concept does not coincide with the concept "meta-nation".

In comparison with term "supra-national community", the concept "meta-nation" has a single meaning. It fixes a new form (and stage) of ethnicity which arises *after* nation. It reflects the supra-national character of the new community (the globalization of ethnicity) as well as the ethnic heredity of its components from the point of view of historical belonging to one nation. The main features of the meta-nation are the following:

- The common historical ethnic roots;
- The presence of the nation with all attributes and, first of all, the national state, or national states;
- A high level of migration out of the national state;
- The formation of diasporas abroad, integrated and assimilated into the new ethnic environment, on the one hand, and keeping historically-cultural and genetic identity, on the other hand;
- Ethnic consciousness;
- The interrelations between the kindred ethnic groups, giving the meta-nation the features of a stable community.

## Korean Diasporas: Also Koreans or Others?

In connection with the process of divergence from the peninsula, anxiety is expressed in Korea

about the fact that the ethnic identity of overseas Koreans is experiencing a "serious crisis" (Hun, Jeong Young 2000). Often, overseas Koreans (especially, CIS Koreans) hear complaints that they are insufficiently "Korean", that they lost Korean language[5], and their customs are incorrect,[6] etc. However, it is necessary to realize that the peculiarities of the Korean diasporas are *reality* and that they should be not perceived as anomalies but accepted just as they are. Moreover, from the point of view of diasporan Koreans, transcending the frameworks of mono-ethnic homogenous consciousness is not a deficiency but actually a virtue that opens new horizons of consciousness and perception of the world. This provides an opportunity for Korean ethnicity not only to build relations with "the other" but also to include "the other" as its own organic element, thus rendering its consciousness open and externally oriented.

In other words, the transformation of ethnic culture and consciousness does not necessarily present a crisis. No ethnic culture stands in one place. It develops and is influenced by other cultures, except in the case of isolationism, as manifested in Korea until the 19th century. True, Koreans of the CIS have lost much of the culture of their forbears. But they have created their own unique culture, the *Eurasian Korean culture*, of which they can be rightfully proud. This characteristic of cultural identity can be called a crisis only from the standpoint of a statically understood "Korean identity."

One of the peculiarities of the formation of the ethno-cultural identity of the Overseas Koreans, in contrast to the Koreans on the peninsula, is their foreign ethnic environment. We can differentiate the identities of Koreans living in mono-ethnic (homogeneous) societies from those in poly-ethnic (heterogeneous) ones. For instance, North and South Koreans live in a homogeneous mono-ethnic (Korean) environment where all people are Koreans. In China and Japan, where there are large Korean diasporas, it can be said with certain reservations that in these countries the process of adaptation took place in *homogeneous, ethnically foreign and culturally close* environments. In the USA and the former USSR, the process of assimilation of Koreans took place in *heterogeneous, ethnically and culturally foreign* environments.

Thus, Soviet Koreans were in constant contact with representatives of various peoples (more than 120 peoples lived in the USSR), and this led to the *flexible* psychological attitudes of Koreans towards their ethnic environment, as well as the *flexible* models of their behavior.

Under the conditions of an ethnically foreign environment, many components of the initial ethnic culture, which are preserved in a homogeneous Korean environment, were transformed or lost. Especially, Soviet Koreans, having lived in isolation from Korea over the course of four to

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5. In the USSR that was inhabited by a great number of the peoples speaking different languages, the only language which guaranteed a possibility of full communication in any region of the huge country, gave the chance of the best education and upward mobility, was Russian. Koreans have made it a mother tongue. New language identity has opened for Koreans the way to a new, wide world, and it became one of the prerequisites of their achievements.

6. This is a controversial subject. Being isolated, the Soviet Koreans kept many elements of traditional Korean culture which disappeared in Korea itself. For example, the modern youth in Korea does not know and does not celebrate such traditional holiday as Ovol' Tano. Or, many Korean products are made in Korea in the factory way, while in Central Asia, they still made in the traditional manual way.

five generations, certainly differ from the Koreans on the peninsula in language, mentality, values, ideals, outlook, behavior, customs, and traditions. The degree of difference between the Koreans from Korea and the Korean diasporas is so great that it can be the basis for forming *new sub-ethnic communities* – Eurasian Koreans (Soviet/Post-Soviet Koreans or Koryo Saram), Koreans in China, Koreans in Japan, USA, etc.

The greatest difference lies in the fact that the culture of Koryo Saram is a *mixed* one – i.e. it is a synthesis of Korean, Russian, Soviet, Central Asian and European cultures. This is especially evident in the intelligentsia and the youth. The following list captures the main characteristics of Eurasian Koreans:

- the essential transformation of the cultural genetic pool (i.e., the transformation of the initial socio-cultural characteristics of Korean ethnicity);
- the process of this transformation in a poly-ethnic (heterogeneous) environment;
- the transition of the mother tongue from Korean to Russian;
- the adaptation to cultures essentially different from traditional Korean culture;
- the transcendence of the framework of monoethnic consciousness (Eastern type) and the formation of a Eurasian one;
- a high level of acculturation and assimilation;
- the dynamism and intensity of the above listed processes;
- a high level of achievements in various fields.

Due to this mixed nature of Eurasian Korean culture, it is sometimes easier for CIS Koreans to understand the psychology and behavior of the Russians, Jews, Georgians, Uzbeks, or Kazakhs than the Koreans from Korean peninsula.

The mixed character of Korean diasporic culture is also important for understanding relations between Korean Diasporas and the historic motherland. This is especially important when we speak of the "Global Korean Community/Network".

Let's take a case of Soviet/Post-Soviet Koreans. During the period of perestroika, all Soviet Koreans suddenly felt that they were *Koreans* and in any event wished to be like *genuine* Koreans. Korean language courses, as well as the etiquette and behavior of Koreans from the peninsula (both North and South) became fashionable. Everything that they did provoked admiration, resulting in a phenomenon of mechanical, blind imitation.

However, soon it became clear that attempts to imitate "genuine" Koreans would only lead the Koryo Saram to inferiority complexes. Soviet Koreans vividly demonstrated a sense of national inferiority (telling themselves that they were not genuine, that they were deformed Koreans), and their self-abasement and self-reproach began to lead both North and South Koreans to take an arrogant, mentoring, lecturing position towards the Koryo Saram. Representatives from the Korean embassies started openly meddling in the activities of Korean organizations, newspapers, TV, etc. In this case, the Koreas (especially South Korea) play a role in the spirit of globalism and sometimes do not take into consideration the interests of the Korean diaspora.

The North and South Korean media began to represent transformational changes in Soviet Korean culture as a "crisis of Korean identity". That is, Koryo Saram again must radically change their way of life and mentality; they must sacrifice their habits, customs and traditions.

But do they want that? South Korean businessmen, professors and pastors constantly stress the principle of shared blood ("we are all Koreans"). They deduce from this basis a principle of absolute obligation ("you should", "you must") that practically leads to the fact that, in everything, the Koryo Saram must follow South Korean models of behavior and consciousness. Of course, sooner or later this situation will result in a negative reaction on the part of local Koreans.

It should be taken into account that due to their mixed culture and the Soviet system of education – considered one of the best in the world – Soviet Koreans achieved considerable successes in many fields. For instance, from Soviet/Post-Soviet Koreans there were:

- members of government (vice-premiers, ministers and deputy ministers), senators, members of parliaments and local governmental bodies, outstanding figures from various political and public organizations;
- winners of the most prestigious titles and prizes (Heroes of the Soviet Union, Heroes of Socialist Labor, winners of the Lenin Prize, the National Prize, etc.);
- scientists with different degrees and titles (academicians and corresponding members of the Academies of Sciences of the USSR, Kazakh and Uzbek republics, professors);
- heads of educational institutes (principals and vice-principals, deans and deputy deans and heads of departments of universities, directors of schools and colleges);
- heads of scientific research institutions (directors and deputy directors, heads of departments and scientific-research and planning institutes);
- managers of large industrial, finance and agricultural state and private enterprises;
- outstanding athletes (Olympic champions, World and European championship medalists, world champions in professional sports, winners of various international tournaments, winners of national championships of the USSR and the CIS countries, head coaches of national teams of the USSR and CIS countries, heads of national Olympic committees, heads of associations of various sports);
- well-known, internationally recognized writers, composers, painters, opera and ballet stars, etc. (Khan V. 2006, Kim B. 1999, Li G. 1998, Sovetskie koreitsy Kazakhstana. 1992)

There is no other country in the world where a Korean diaspora community achieved such high positions as Soviet Koreans. Not only Koryo Saram but Koreans in general can be proud of these achievements. It is quite natural, that the mentor tone of Koreans from the peninsula at a certain stage resulted to a negative reaction from Koryo Saram. Among themselves, Koreans from the CIS have begun, more and more, to criticize the thinking abilities, values, moral qualities and behavior of Koreans from the peninsula. Moreover, these criticisms have become sharper and sharper (Kim B. 1997).

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The attempt to impose on Koryo Saram the statically understood Korean identity intends to produce in an individual's consciousness and behavior the realization of one's rigid belonging to a certain community (in our case – to the Korean ethnos), though in *real* life this connection can be quite fragile. This is an attempt to program his thinking and behavior in accordance with traditions and norms of Korean identity as a kind of abstract, frozen essence. The world outside the way of thinking and the norms of a given community is seen by this consciousness as "alien" and, in the case of extreme nationalism, as abnormal. It seems to me that ethnocentrism and narcissism of various social groups (not only ethnic, but religious and others) in a historical perspective only leads to a dead end. And, the *attempt to unify Koreans from all over the world in accordance with standards of a single Korean identity presents itself as nonproductive and utopian*.

Of course, this criticism of the standardized Korean identity does not at all negate Korea's right to preserve and develop its culture. The paradox is that in trying to preserve Korean culture under the conditions of globalization (namely, Americanization), Koreans from the peninsula do not notice that sometimes they themselves assume a standardizing role (on the basis of their understanding of Korean identity), refusing *the right of Overseas Koreans to be what they are*. It seems to me that the condition for a normal dialogue between Koreans of the peninsula and of the various Korean diasporas can only be recognition of Korean communities around the world as *unity in diversity*. These two opposite approaches can be called *globalism* and *glocalism*.

To be harmonic, relations between Korea and the Korean diaspora should be constructed on the basis of the following principles (Khan V. 2001):

1) Equality.

2) Mutual respect and cultural tolerance.

3) Non-interference.

4) Mutual support

5) Glocalism but not globalism.

**Conclusion**

The formation of a Global Ethnic Communities needs new conceptualization free from the myths and short-term political interests. The values placed on ethnicity - which vary across societies and cultures - are so strong and divisive that it is difficult to find any "common language" with which to transcend divisions of belonging between ethnic groups. Yet it is imperative that in the near future we solve the question of how can people build the "common village" or global community if they do not understand nor accept each other because of ethnicity?

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# Between Exotic Self and Exotic Other: Imagining and Illustrating China through Travel Literature, Export Paintings, and Picture Postcards

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## Introduction

The production and distribution of early modern picture postcards in East Asia have largely been studied in connection with the rise of Western and Japanese Imperialism in the region. Existing scholarship has examined these postcards as a modern western invention that originated from Germany in the eighteenth century and highlighted their correlation to modernity and colonialism. In general, it has been argued that the picture postcards representing colonial subjects in East Asia as well as other parts of the world contributed to the generation and consumption of racial stereotypes that justified and sustained colonial administration and worldview.[1]

The main problem, I see, in these popular postcolonial interpretations is an overall lack of attention paid to other pertinent developments preceding the age of modern Imperialism. There appears to be a sharp divide between modern and pre-modern, an ideal so fundamental to the modernist imaginary. Moreover, the dichotomy between the East and the West, the colonizer and the colonized has often characterized the interpretive practices.

Hoping to present an alternative perspective, this paper will take a long detour and examine the picture postcards from nineteenth-century China in a historical continuum dating back to the seventeenth century. I will trace the transcultural developments in visual tropes and ideas over four centuries and demonstrate that the picture postcards from late Qing and early Republican China

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1. Gaiutra Bahadur,. "Postcards from Empire," *Dissent* 62, no. 2 (2015): 49-58. Paul D. Barclay, "Peddling Postcards and Selling Empire: Image-Making in Taiwan Under Japanese Colonial Rule," *Japanese Studies* 30, no. 1 (2010): 81-110. Patricia Goldsworthy, "Images, Ideologies, and Commodities: The French Colonial Postcard Industry in Morocco," *Early Popular Visual Culture* 8, no. 2 (May 2010): 147-167. Hyung Gu Lynn, "Moving Pictures: Postcards of Colonial Korea," *IIAS Newsletter Asia's Colonial Photographies*, no. 44 (2007): 8-9. Kate McDonald, "Imperial Mobility: Circulation as History in East Asia under Empire," *Transfers* 4 , no. 3 (2014): 68-87. Hyung Pai, "Monumentalizing the Ruins of Korean Antiquity: Early Travel Photography and Itinerary of Seoul's Heritage Destinations," *International Journal of Cultural Property* 21, no. 3 (August 2014): 331-347. Hyung Pai, "Staging 'Koreana' for the Tourist Gaze: Imperialist Nostalgia and the Circulation of Picture Postcards," *History of Photography* 37, no. 3 (August 2013): 301-311. David Prochaska, and Jordana Mendelson, *Postcards: Ephemeral Histories of Modernity* (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010). Peter Schmidt, "The Early Print and the Origins of the Picture Postcard," *Studies in the History of Art* 75 (January 2009): 238-257.

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featuring various images of Chinese people and their activities were results of cultural trends and technological advancements that travelled and intersected across cultural boundaries over an extended period of time.

## Problems and Questions: Studying the 19th-century Picture Postcards from China

With the introduction of photography in China in the late 1840s, picture postcards printed on photographs became widely popular beginning in the 1850s. These postcards showcasing images of Chinese people engaging in a variety of activities as well as scenes from daily life were mass-produced by both Chinese and foreign photo studios and printing presses and were subsequently purchased, mailed, and collected largely by foreigners in and outside China.

The case of Chinese picture postcards complicates the rhetoric of "white men behind the camera" often used in the discussion of colonial picture postcards.[2] Unlike other similar picture postcards whose production and distribution were controlled by colonial administration and enterprises, Chinese studios and businesses were actively involved in the creation and continuation of postcard market that sold globally images of their own people that have been labelled as stereotypical and unflattering.

While some Japanese businesses participated in the production of picture postcards of geisha and other exotic subjects that appealed to the admirers of Japonisme in the West,[3] in China, besides the foreign technological inventions (i.e. photography, railways, and steamships) that facilitated China's entry into the global postcard industry, an important native cultural and commercial development before the age of postcards played a seminal role in the stylistic construction of picture postcards.

Chinese export paintings, also known as the *hong* paintings, were popular global trade commodities between 1810s and 1840s. They were mass-produced in workshops run by Chinese artisans catering to foreign consumers outside China. The paintings displayed images of foreign factories and ships, native architecture and workshops, portraits of merchants, as well as genre paintings illustrating scenes from daily life of Chinese people engaging in a variety of activities. These export genre paintings had standardized styles and formats. They were small and durable, and could be bound into albums. The Chinese export painters exercised their ingenuity to create a range of products for the Western market. They painted with watercolours and gouaches on native materials, such as mulberry bark paper, pith paper, plant leaves, and also on imported paper, glass and canvass from the West.[4]

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2. Elizabeth Edwards, ed., *Anthropology and Photography, 1860-1920* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992). Wolfram Hartmann, Jeremy Silvester, and Patricia Hayes, eds., *The Colonising Camera: Photographs in the Making of Namibian History* (Cape Town, South Africa: University of Cape Town Press, 1999).

3. Luke Gartlan and Roberta Wue, eds., *Portraiture and Early Studio Photography in China and Japan* (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017).

4. Barry, 20.

These export genre paintings have been identified by some scholars as early examples of postcards in China, but overall their arguments lacked evidence and critical evaluation.[5] A comparative analysis of Chinese export paintings and picture postcards indeed reveals remarkable resemblances in both content and format. It appears that these picture postcards simply repeated the visual tropes of export paintings in a new medium of photography. Numerous examples of picture postcards prove that they were staged to re-enact the scenes previously depicted in export paintings.[6] (Plates 1 and 2) Just like export paintings, Chinese picture postcards were purchased mainly by foreigners. While some were mailed, more often they were simply collected and ended up in personal albums of collectors.



[Plate 1]
Chinese Export Painting, A Court Scene



[Plate 2] Picture Postcard, A Court Scene

The primary reason for unmistakable similarities between Chinese export paintings and picture

5. Barry, 27. Dai Huagang, "Tong cao shui cai hua," *Zhongghua wenhua huabao* 3 (2010): 70-77. Shen Jialu, "Tong cao hua: Lai zi dongfang de gu mingxinpian," *Dang'an Chunqiu* 3 (2012): 63-64. Shen Jialu, "Tong cao hua: Fa wang Lundun de mingxinpian," *Jiancha Fengyun* 6 (2012): 86-88.
6. Claire Roberts, *Photography and China* (London: Reaktion Books, 2013), 30-31. Terry Bennett, *History of Photography in China: Chinese Photographers, 1844-1879* (London: Quaritch, 2013), 32.

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postcards is found in their makers themselves. The Chinese photographers in the postcard industry started as export painters. Export painters became the first group of people in China to learn and invest in this new technology of photography. At first, photography was used to help in their painting jobs. In portrait orders, it was much easier and convenient to copy from a photograph rather than paint a real person in sitting. Later on, as the demand for photographs increased, the demand for paintings decreased. Because of their economic advantages, picture postcards quickly grew in popularity and replaced export paintings by the 1850s. Yet despite their incontestable connections, extant scholarship has often treated Chinese export paintings and picture postcards as two separate developments, the former as a brilliant legacy of the golden days of the Canton trade and the latter as a by-product of China's initiation into a modern communication regime controlled by colonial powers.

Much like the picture postcards, Chinese export genre paintings have been characterized as works produced to appeal to the desire for the exotic. Speaking of export paintings, Patrick Conner explained that "the very strangeness of these pictures" appealed to the Western buyers and consumers who saw in them "a distant and mysteriously alien culture."[7] These ideas are also echoed in more recent publications. In his book *Visualizing a Culture for Strangers: Chinese Export Paintings from the Nineteenth Century* (2014), Barry Till states that the paintings were commissioned by foreigners to depict "the strange and fascinating scenes and the exotic customs" of China that "could satisfy a Western appetite and curiosity starved for stereotypical images of the cultural life of China."[8] Till points out the widespread view among scholars that suggest these export paintings "seem to have intentionally misrepresented, exaggerated, distorted, or even idealized certain elements of their culture to create a fantasy view of China to please their foreign customers."[9]

If, as Conner and Till assert, Chinese export paintings reproduced stereotypical images of China, in order to prove that these images were indeed regarded as such, I believe it is important to investigate the evidence of comparable visual tropes predating the time of the production of Chinese export paintings. How can we ascertain that Chinese export painters regarded their genre paintings as types rather than truthful representations? How were these visual types produced and did they have earlier origins?

Recent studies from the opposite side of the globe, Latin America, reveal that Chinese export painters indeed willfully produced visual types of not only their people but also others. A group of nineteenth-century Peruvian export paintings from the Iklé Collection in Lima illustrates different classes (*castas*) and ethnicities in their everyday costume. Known as *costumbrismo*, paintings of this type were manufactured in colonial Latin America and became instrumental in the construction

7. Patrick Conner, *The Hongs of Canton: Western Merchants in South China 1700-1900, as Seen in Chinese Export Paintings* (London: English Art Books, 2009), 2.

8. Barry Till, *Visualizing a Culture for Strangers: Chinese Export Paintings from the Nineteenth Century* (Victoria, B.C.: Art Gallery of Greater Victoria, 2014), 17.

9. Ibid., 20.

of collective identities. Barbara Anderson's study of the Iklé Collection of *costumbrismo* reveals that the paintings were in fact produced by Chinese artists, based on the fact that they were executed on pith paper available only in China at the time. She conjectures that samples of Peruvian paintings were probably taken to China by European travellers who commissioned the production. The paintings were then shipped to Peru where they were sold in the local market to foreign tourists.[10] This remarkable discovery highlights that Chinese export paintings served the global market, thanks to the transcultural mobility of people, goods and services in the nineteenth century. In Peru, picture postcards substituted export genre paintings by the 1860s, a decade later than in China.

The Chinese connection to colonial Latin American art was further elucidated by the art historian Ilona Katsew who traced the origins of iconic *casta* paintings, visual representations of different mixed-race groups in eighteenth-century colonial Latin America, to the 1667 publication by Althanasius Kirscher, *China Illustrata*, a bestselling book in seventeenth-century Europe widely available in the libraries of European colonies.[11]

## Early European Books on China

Illustrated European books on China took a long time in coming. The earliest European publication on China is the French book *Livres des Merveilles du Monde* (The Book of the Marvels of the World) (ca. 1300) by Rustichello da Pisa that retells the stories of the famous world-traveller Marco Polo (1254–1324). While the book includes some illustrations, they were done in a typical European fashion of the time and represented the non-European others encountered by Polo as fiends who were not fully human. The book also did not contain any illustrations of China or the Chinese.

It would take one and a half century for the second European book on China to come. *Tratado das cousas da China* (Treatise on Things Chinese), published in 1569, was written by the Portuguese Dominican missionary Gaspar da Cruz (ca. 1520–1570) stationed in Southeast Asia who spent one month preaching in Guangzhou. The stories in the book were later plagiarized by more influential books, such as the Spanish publications *Discurso de la navegacion* (Discourse of the Navigation)[12] published in 1577 by Bernardino de Escalante (ca. 1537–1605) and *Dell'historia della China* (The History of China)[13] by Juan González de Mendoza (1545–1618) in 1586. Both Escalante and Mendoza never visited China and relied on verbal accounts of sailors and existing

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10. Barbara Anderson, "From Lima to Canton and Back: Nineteenth-century Watercolors from Peru," *El Palacio* 116, no. 1: 49.
11. Ilona Katsew, Casta Painting: Images of Race in 18th-century Mexico (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2005), 81 and 91. Anderson, *El Palacio*, 50.
12. Full title: Discurso de la navegacion que los Portugueses hacen a los Reinos y Provincias de Oriente, y de la noticia que se tiene de las grandezas del Reino de la China (Discourse of the navigation made by the Portuguese to the kingdoms and provinces of the Orient, and of the existing knowledge of the greatness of the Kingdom of China)
13. Full title: Historia de las cosas más notables, ritos y costumbres del gran reyno de la China (The History of the Great and Mighty Kingdom of China and the Situation Thereof)

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texts as their sources. None of the three books included illustrations with the exception of maps and decorative Christian symbols.

It should also be noted that European missionaries who actually lived and worked in China for many years did publish books on China. But their literature tended to be more historical and philosophical in nature and did not include illustrations. The famous illustrations of the Jesuit missionary Matteo Ricci and his Chinese convert Xu Guangqi appeared only on the eighteenth-century French publication *Description de la Chine* (Description of China), published in 1735 by Jean-Baptiste Du Halde (1674–1743) who also never visited China.[14]

## Althanasius Kirscher and *China Illustrata*

Althanasius Kirscher (1602–1680) was a seventeenth-century German Jesuit polymath. A professor of mathematics in Rome and a man of many interests, he authored over forty books on sciences and humanities. In Rome, Kirscher had opportunities to interact with Jesuit missionaries from China. His *China Illustrata*, consisting of 237 pages and 21 illustrations, presents a collection of knowledge on China he gathered over the years.[15] It includes information on China's geography, botany, zoology, language, religion, culture, as well as the history of Christian missions in China. The original Latin edition was subsequently translated into Dutch (1668), French (1670) and English (1669, 1673), and had a significant influence in the development of sinology and sinophilism in the West.[16]

Throughout the book, Kirscher presents himself as an authority in China-related matters and highlights the scientific foundations of his accounts. He believed Chinese writing was originally based on Egyptian hieroglyphs and to prove his point included in the book illustrated explanations of certain Chinese characters. While the text of *China Illustrata* has some truth value derived from oral and written accounts of former missionaries to China, the illustrations were based not on observation but rather on imagination and adaptation from earlier visual materials.

The illustration on page 271, for example, shows a duel between a fire-breathing dragon and a tiger, the dragon clearly drawn in an European fashion. The scenes of Chinese landscape (pp. 172, 173, 176) were depicted in an altogether strange and mystical manner, highlighting the signs of idolatry. In his illustrations of scenes of life in China, Kirscher used the images borrowed from an earlier Jesuit publication *Flora Sinensis* as backdrops. *Flora Sinensis*, published by the

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14. Full title: *Description géographique, historique, chronologique, politique, et physique de l'empire de la Chine et de la Tartarie Chinoise* (Geographical, Historical, Chronological, Political, and Physical Description of the Empire of China and Chinese Tartary)

15. Full title: *China monumentis, qua sacris qua profanis, nec non variis naturae & artis spectaculis, aliarumque rerum memorabilium argumentis illustrata* (China Illustrated through Monuments Both Sacred and Profane, As Well As Various Spectacles of Nature & Art, and Descriptions of Other Memorable Things). Dinu Luca, "Illustrating China through its Writing: Athanasius Kircher's Spectacle of Words, Images, and Word-images," *Literature & Aesthetics* 22, no. 2 (December 2012): 110.

16. Baleslaw Szczesniak, "Athanasius Kircher's *China Illustrata*," *Osiris* 10 (1952): 388 and 392.

Polish Jesuit missionary Michael Boym in 1656, was one of the earliest illustrated European literature on China. The book was produced and presented to Emperor Leopold I of Hungary to seek financial support for the Jesuit mission in China. It includes seventeen colored illustrations of plants (fruits and herbs) allegedly found in China and Southeast Asia with added explanations of their medicinal values. Also included in the book are the illustrations of some animals. As Hartmut Walravens' study shows *Flora Sinensis* was most likely a collective work.[17] A significant portion of the plants illustrated, such as papaya, mango, and pineapple, are tropical fruits, only available in the southern most islands of China. The herbs, such as pepper, cinnamon, rhubarb, and ginger, were familiar trade goods to Europeans. By illustrating these commodities, the author perhaps tried to show the economic benefits of China mission. In format, Boym followed the model of European botanical literature, showing the plant and the fruit on a single page with labels in both Latin and Chinese.

In *China Illustrata,* Kirscher took the images from *Flora Sinensis* out of context and used them to create fantastical images of China. The illustration on page 186 shows a group of Chinese in a grove gathered around a cauldron with a temple in the background. In the foreground, an illustration from Boym's book, a giant jackfruit tree and a jackfruit cut in half, appears. [Plate 3] The illustration on page 192 features images of two hippopotamuses in Boym's book. In the background, the viewers see a European trade ship and sailors reaching the Chinese shore. A more comical example on page 194 shows a Chinese man and a woman in the foreground. The man holds a stick, appearing to tame a vicious looking creature with a long tail. That creature is a squirrel illustrated in Boym's book. In the background, a Chinese person, leading leaping two squirrels, are shown hunting the deer under the papaya trees. [Plate 4]



[Plate 3] *China illustrata*, p. 186.

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17. Hartmut Walravens, "*Flora Sinensis* Revisited," *Monumenta Serica* 59, no. 1 (December 2011): 343.

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[Plate 4]
*China illustrata*, p. 194.

We now understand the absurdity of these illustrations, but as Dina Luca rightly pointed out, Kirscher probably regarded his "spectacle of knowledge" on China as "yet another triumph of his inquisitive mind."[18] Despite these inaccuracies, the book became a huge financial success and inspired similar literature in the decades to come, books that shared the discoveries of the unknown world that appealed to armchair travellers in Europe.

### Johannes Nieuhof's *An Embassy from the East-India Company:* The Journal vs. The Book

Besides the European painters in the Chinese court, the first European traveller to produce firsthand illustrations of China was the Dutch traveler Johannes Nieuhof (1618–1672) who visited China in 1656 as a member of the embassy of the Dutch East-India Company. He was commissioned to produce illustrations of their journey from Canton to Beijing that lasted ten months. In 1659, Nieuhof produced a journal comprised of eighty-one original illustrations and diary-style notes. His illustrations in watercolours mostly capture the scenic vistas of landscape, cities, the palace that he and the embassy saw in a soft and impressionistic fashion. The illustrations also include images of the Chinese people, including a Chinese viceroy who appears firm and respectful, and a group of ascetics engaging in painful yogic practices whom the artist probably found to be eccentric. (Plate 5)

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18. Dinu Laca, 107.

[Plate 5]
Johannes Nieuhof's Journal,
image of a Chinese Viceroy

The journal was later given to Johannes' brother, Hendrik Nieuhof, who worked with the well-known Dutch publisher-printer Jacob Van Meurs (1619/1620–1680) to turn it into an immensely popular and influential book, *An Embassy from the East-India Company* (1665), which later was translated into French, German, Latin, and English.[19] Featuring 150 illustrations, the book was unprecedented both in its scope and depth. However, fundamental differences in quality and content of images can be noticed when comparing Nieuhof's original watercolors and later engraved and printed images. Backgrounds and other visual elements were added to the original images, and more images of figures were added, categorized into different types, such as elite and peasant men and women, military men, monks, entertainers, ascetics, and felons. (Plates 6-7) Most importantly, the book was marketed as the true and firsthand accounts and images from Johannes Nieuhof, despite the fact that the images and notes in the original journal only made up a small portion of the book manuscript. In 1673, the British publisher-printer John Ogilby released the English edition, slightly abbreviated from the original Dutch edition. In the same volume, Ogilby also included an abridged version of Kirscher's *China Illustrata*. The combined volume achieved a smashing success in Britain.

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19. Full title: *Het gezantschap der Neêrlandtsche Oost-Indische Compagnie aan den grooten Tartarischen Cham, den tegenwoordigen keizer van China* (An Embassy from the East-India Company of the United Provinces, to the Grand Tartar Cham, Emperor of China)
Marcia Reed and Paola Demattè, eds., China on Paper: European and Chinese Works from the Late Sixteenth to the Early Nineteenth Century (Los Angeles, Calif.: Getty Research Institute, 2007), 142. Leonard Blussé, "Peeking into the Empires: Dutch Embassies to the Courts of China and Japan," *Itinerario* 37, no. 3 (2013): 13-29.

[Plate 6]
*An Embassy from the East-India Company*,
"Entertainers", p. 31.



[Plate 7]
*An Embassy from the East-India Company*,
"Jugglers", p. 31.

The book's commercial success in Europe elevated the prestige of the Dutch East-India Company and contributed to the growing Chinoiserie fad of the late seventeenth and eighteenth century. The illustrations were copied widely and became visual tropes and decorative motifs. The blue-and-white porcelain Chinoiserie plaque from the seventeenth century clearly shows it was based on the illustration of jugglers in Nieuhof's book. (Plate 8)



[Plate 8]
Blue-and-white porcelain Chinoiserie plaque
(17th century)

## Olfert Dapper and the *Description of China*

Impelled by the huge success, two years after the publication of Nieuhof's book, in 1667 the publisher Van Meurs reprinted Kirscher's *China Illustrata*. Three years later in 1670, Van Meurs published another influential book on China, this time by Olfert Dapper (1639–1689), a Dutch physician and a bestselling author of the book, *Description of Africa* (1668).[20] Dapper never left his homeland Holland but became an authority of knowledge of Africa and Asia in his time. His *Description of China* was a heavily illustrated book and was as extensive as the book by Nieuhof in scope.[21]

The illustrations in Dapper's book demonstrate some crucial differences from the ones featured in Nieuhof's book. For one, Dapper's book includes more images of figures. The scenes depicted are also visibly more dramatized as if telling stories. There are also clear influences from pictorial motifs found in seventeenth-century export porcelains. The image of two Chinese generals was undoubtedly taken from an export porcelain. (Plate 9) Moreover, a greater variety of activities are depicted, such as images of people boating and fishing, an official travelling in a sedan chair, a peasant carrying water and goods, a mother carrying a baby, and funerary rites and procession. The book also shows illustrations of accessories, shoes and hats worn by the Chinese, as well as the weapons used by the Chinese military. Of particular importance is a series of illustrations on the Chinese judicial system, showing the trial process, public flogging, and public execution. (Plate 10) These noticeable changes reveal growing complexity of visual convention in the European representations of China.



[Plate 9]
*Description of China*, p. 46

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20. Original title: *Naukeurige beschrijvinge der Afrikaensche Eylanden*
21. Original title: *Gedenkwaerdig bedryf der Nederlandsche Oost-Indische Maetschappye, op de kuste en in het Keizerrijk van Taising of Sina: behelzende het 2e gezandschap aen den Onder-Koning Singlamong ... Vervolgt met een verhael van het voorgevallen des jaers 1663 en 1664 op de kuste van Sina ... en het 3e gezandschap aan Konchy, Tartarsche Keizer van Sina en Oost Tartarye ... beneffens een beschryving van geheel Sina*

Between Exotic Self and Exotic Other: Imagining and Illustrating China through Travel Literature, Export Paintings, and Picture Postcards

Christina Han



[Plate 10] *Description of China*, pp. 478-479.

## Printing Revolution and Travel Literature in 17th- and 18th-century Europe

At this point, it is important to note that the production of these mass-produced books on China was possible because of the Printing Revolution in Europe. The sweeping social, cultural, and political changes in Europe that came as a result of mass production of printed books have been studied by many. One of the clear outcomes of the Printing Revolution was commodification of images, both everyday and exotic. Prints from etchings and engravings showing scenes from everyday life of both elites and commoners became popular collectibles in late-seventeenth century Europe. Prints of religious, satirical, and absurd images were produced in large numbers for the growing market of lay readers and image consumers.[22] Books on China and other unknown places filled with illustrations of natural scenery and everyday life of people were produced to satiate the curiosity of European consumers of the Enlightenment era and developed into an important literary genre of the time. This type of exotic travel literature was driven by the "ethnographic impulse" that characterized colonial and imperial travels of early modern Europe.[23]

It is important to be reminded that China experienced the Printing Revolution and the booming industry exotic travel literature centuries earlier than Europe. In China popular travel literature on places both within and outside China were produced as early as in the seventh century and peaked in popularity in the fifteenth century. In their comparative study of European and Chinese exotic travel literature, Joan-Pau Rubiés and Manel Ollé pointed out while both Europe and China produced illustrated travel literature that communicated ethnographical stereotypes reflecting "imperial ideologies that assumed an ethnocentric idea of civilization," the genre declined in popularity in China after the fifteenth century and did not convey the kind of colonial attitudes

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22. Antony Griffiths, *The Print before Photography: An Introduction to European Printmaking, 1550-1820* (London: British Museum Press, 2016).

23. Joan-Pau Rubiés and Manel Ollé, The Comparative History of a Genre: The Production and Circulation of Books on Travel and Ethnographies in Early Modern Europe and China," *Modern Asian Studies* 50, no. 1 (2016): 263.

found in European examples.[24] The Chinese also showed a great interest in the Printing Revolution in Europe. As the printed books from Europe were introduced to China, seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Chinese also produced books on European history, landscapes, flora and fauna.[25]

Back in Europe, Chinoiserie grew into a major cultural and artistic force throughout the eighteenth century. Under the creative influences of celebrated Chinoiserie painters like François Boucher (1703–1770), visual tropes and elements from exotic travel literature and export ceramics were blended with opulent Rococo style to represent China as a romanticized, sensational, childish, and idyllic dreamland. Not long after, another type of images of China began flooding the books produced in Europe, this time, images produced by the Chinese themselves.

## Chinese Export Paintings and European Prints

After a long detour, we finally return to the subject of Chinese export paintings. When examined side by side, export genre paintings produced by Chinese artists reveal remarkable resemblances to the illustrations found in the books by Nieuhof and Dapper in themes, composition, and format. The works by the best known export painter Pu Qua (19th century), the first Chinese artist to set up a studio in Canton for Western consumers, clearly show that his works borrowed from and built on the visual conventions developed by Europeans over the centuries. Pu Qua's paintings of European ships and factories in Canton were clearly attempts to reproduce illustrations of similar types found in popular European travel literature. His genre paintings showing various modes of criminal punishments in China were unmistakable reiterations of Dapper's illustrations of the same kind. (Plate 11) Compared to engraved and printed illustrations in books, Pu Qua's full-colour paintings were delicate and charming, perfect souvenirs to be brought back to Europe. It appears that European merchants of the nineteenth century requested the Chinese artists to produce images like the ones found in the popular travel literature, even the images of colonial Peruvians.



[Plate 11] Pu Qua, Export Paintings

24. Ibid., 304.
25. Wang Cheng-Hua, "A Global Perspective on Eighteenth-Century Chinese Art and Visual Culture," *The Art Bulletin* 96, no. 4 (October 2014): 386.

These paintings by the Chinese artists were later mass produced in Europe in print forms. Best known examples are the two books *The Costume of China* (1800) and *The Punishments of China* (1802) by George Henry Mason (1770–1851), an employee of the British India Company. The illustrations in the books were based on the paintings by Pu Qua. Containing both English and French language notes, the books became immensely popular throughout Europe and contributed to the further dissemination of stereotypical images of Chinese people.

## Chinese Picture Postcards: Modern Illusions of Reality

With the arrival of photography in the mid-nineteenth century, these familiar visual types of Chinese people were once again invoked in the picture postcards produced by both Chinese and European photographers and businesses. By this point, they were simply reproducing tropes and images tried and tested for centuries by the market. In many ways, these picture postcard reflected the complex realities of late nineteenth century China. The Qing state was making desperate attempts at western-style modernization and the pressures from Western powers were rapidly intensifying. Coastal cities in China witnessed the emergence of foreign enclaves but also the rise of modern western-educated entrepreneurial class of the Chinese.

Much like the seventeenth-century European illustrations and the nineteenth-century Chinese export paintings, early modern picture postcards were marketed as true visual representations of China and its people. The technology of photography, which allowed for instantaneous capturing of a moment in time, further augmented the illusion of reality. In the age of Western Imperialism, such claims of veracity became political weapons as picture postcards and photographs of China based on long-established stereotypes were used to support and justify the colonial discourse.

The images of public flogging and execution were seen as proofs of backwardness and brutality of the Chinese government and people. Following the example of *The Punishments of China* by Mason, a collection of photographs of Chinese executions was published in 1913 by the French writer Louis Carpeaux (1874–1929) under the title *Pekin qui s'en va*. However, as Jérôme Bourgon's study has shown, the postcards and photographs of Chinese executions which were popular commodities in early twentieth century Europe grossly misrepresented the contemporary realities in China. Bourgon explains that the images of public beheadings which were cited by Europeans as evidence of Chinese cruelty were in fact images taken by a French photographer following the Boxer Rebellion in 1901 and the executions were in fact ordered by the French officers.[26] One cannot forget that the European fascination with images of public execution dates back to the time of the French Revolution during the prime of the Printing Revolution in Europe.

Who did the export paintings and picture postcards from China represent? Did the Chinese see them as representations of their exotic self? When illustrating export paintings, the Chinese

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26. Jérôme Bourgon, "Obscene Vignettes of Truth," in Christian Henriot and Wen-hsin Yeh, eds. *Visualizing China, 1945-1965: Moving and Still Images in Historical Narratives* (Boston: Brill, 2012), 78.

artists perhaps did not see themselves in the pictures they created. In the same manner, the Chinese photographers who took staged photographs for postcards perhaps did not consider their pictures as truthful representations of their culture. The Chinese did not spend their energy on rejecting or disproving these stereotypical representations. Instead, they strived to invent new stereotypes by producing staged photographs of themselves in Western attire to showcase their modern identity. Likewise, European consumers of these images did not see themselves in these representations of exotic other, the products of their own imaginations. All in all, neither export paintings nor picture postcards can be properly assessed and appreciated without considering the dynamic transnational history of visual and cultural developments in Europe and China leading up to the nineteenth century.

# Images of War Refugees, Orphans and Women Post-war Korea (1954-1960s) and Australian Social Rehabilitation Campaign

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The ideological Korean War (1950-1953) between communism (North Korea, Russian, and China) and democracy (South Korea, USA, and UN) destroyed "a quarter of the real wealth of South Korea and killed over 5% of the civilian population." The influx of refugees was larger as three million people came down from North Korea. Individual life was grim, with most of Koreans living below subsistence. Economic recovery was progressive but slow, under 1% per year GNP in the post-Korean war era. Therefore, the primary policies of the new democratic government were to ensure the survival of its citizens, reconstructing the economic and social infrastructure, rebuilding industrial facilities, and stabilising the prices of goods. People started to at least recover from extreme poverty. During the reconstruction period (1954-1960s), Korea was a land of ideological and religious contrasts. The socio-political debates and the division of state religions were the major issues while the ordinary citizens were still suffering from the sequelae of the Korean War.

## Medicine (Ob-gyn)

There were temporary foreign medical institutions in Pusan in the 1950s, such as St. Mary's Catholic Hospital, the Swedish Red Cross hospital, the German Red Cross hospital, and the Swiss Red Cross hospital. They were officially supported by their own governments as general hospitals for military soldiers. Korean patients were admitted on a limited basis. On the other hand, the Il-Shin Women's Hospital was established by Australian medical volunteers under the support of the Presbyterian Women's Missionary Union (PWMU). The Australian NGO hospital was not a general medical centre, but it was the first modern hospital for women and children. Another purpose for its establishment was to operate a midwifery training school for local Korean nursing teachers at a postgraduate level. The Severance Refugee Hospital, the first major hospital in Korea, did not even have an obstetrics & gynecology medical capability in that era. Infant care was the key strategy of the Australian hospital for post-war Koreans. Since Korean women culturally preferred to have their babies at home, the home-delivery service was also provided as trained midwives visited people's houses.

| | 1954 | 1956 | 1959 | 1961 | 1963 | 1964 | 1965 | 1967 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Out-Patient** | 11,996 | 10,213 | 10,142 | | 8,871 | | 10,000/ T125,222 | |
| **In-Patient** | 2,201 | 2,082 | | | 2,900 | T35,000 | | |
| **Delivered Babies** | 1,399 | 1,047 | 1,286 | | 1,445 | 1,242 | 1,337 | T25,000 |
| **Milk Staion** | 81 | 700 | 712 | | 767 | | 641 | 700 |
| **Doctor** | 4 | 6 | 4 | 7 | 8 | | | |
| **Nurse** | 9 | 16 | 23 | 21 | 23 | | | |
| **Postgraduate Sts.** | 18 | 24 | 31 | 33 | 26 | 26 | T482 | |
| **Nursing Assistant** | | | 7 | 13 | 17 | | | |
| **Operation** | | | | | | 402 | 312 | |

Table 1: Rec or d of Il -Shin Women ' s Hospit al i n 1954 -60s

The Il-Shin Hospital, under the supervision of Dr Helen Mackenzie and Sister Catharine Mackenzie, was always busy with out-patient and in-patient mothers and babies. It was the only hospital in Pusan where free treatment was provided. The number of the out-patients was more than 10,000 people each year as they treated over 100 people per day through the years. Its 10,000[th] baby was born on 31st October, 1961. By 1965, the medical workers had examined 125,222 different out-patients. There were over 2,000 in-patients each year. The number of in- patients reached approximately 35,000 people in 1964. Meanwhile, the Australian hospital delivered a yearly average of 1,200 babies. By 1967, the total number of delivery babies became 25,000:

> Many times a very small baby has to be taken out because an even smaller baby has been born. One little baby weighed just 1 lb. 13 oz when she was born, but dropped to 1 lb. 1 oz… Her mother left the hospital… but [with] wonderful nursing and an incubator which was her home for three months, she did not die but slowly became a healthy person.

The voluntary activities in ob-gyn care and the training of local medical professionals were unique, for none of military or foreign hospitals in Korea was able to perform with such dedication for the local people at that time. The women's hospital still exist in the same place of Pusan and has been carried on the Australian legacy in the twenty-first century.

## Minority-welfare

The Australian volunteers, with a Korean Committee, established a charitable organisation, called the 'House of Hope,' for which they had made representation to the United Nations Korea Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) and secured a grant of US$3,000. A beautiful large Korean house became home for women coming out of prison and starting a new life. Post-war Korean

society did not give opportunities to those people, even though many of them had certain skills and life experiences. The 'House of Hope' helped connect them with factory owners under concept of rehabilitation.

Hannah Yang, in association with Rita Stuart, cared for orphan girls and mentally ill women. The place where the girls lived was called the 'House of Sisters.' There were ninety- five girls. Mrs. Yang tried to give them practical skills that would enable them to become self- supporting individuals. She also had a house for 200 mentally ill women. There was no specific form of treatment except for receiving biweekly visits from a doctor and very simple shock therapy. The voluntary mental services were eventually acknowledged by the Korean government for caring such a marginal people of the society in 1968. The morning Coffee Party organised by Miss J. Rooks in Australia contributed $400 for Mrs. Yang's work, which was used for building the Mental Home (a dormitory). As a result, some women were well enough to leave the Home and be rehabilitated: "… A great deal of thanks for the contribution of $400 to be used for the sick women here… I again thank God who clothes the roses in the wilderness and feels the birds in the air."

## Consultancy for Religious Rehabilitation

The long-term seizure of power by Syngman Rhee caused social hostility in the second half of the 1950s. When the Korean government was going through a political transition from 19th April, 1960, the Korean Church (Presbyterian) was also divided into three groups by different theological ideologies on the historical issue of Japanese shrine worship. As the revolutionary government was not happy with the state religion (Christianity), Buddhists fought among themselves over property rights. Confucians mocked their professional masters by engaging in petty strife over the proper execution of ritual. Yet the Australian voluntary work was still carried out under such unsteady democratisation.

As the Korean War ended and the religious groups of Kyeongsang province needed help to re-establish their organisation, Miss Elizabeth W. Dunn and Miss Rene Watkins moved to Masan, Korea's second sea-port (80,000 people) from Pusan. The Australian NGO group invested £1,000 to rehabilitate the Masan property. Miss A. A. McNabb reached out to the female groups and churches in Tongyung and Kosung regions. Koje refugee schools and 32 churches were also under their concern: "the second trip to Koje Island was made at the invitation of Rev. Sin Yong Gun (who was the overnighter for 28 (Presbyterian) churches)… We finished up this trip at Hachung, where again there are two churches." Island evangelism was one of the methods through which McNabb and her team approached the island people. The use of a boat was effective for the people of Chil Jon Island, Sarang Island, Yokji Island, and Namhae Island of Kyeong Nam Province. Des Neil visited the islands of the south coast, where the people were not happy with the public health, social services, or the education. The need of a local church was another issue for the island people.

Bible clubs sprung up in many places. These helped families who could not afford public school

fees. Thousands of children were taught the rudiments of education through these twenty-two bible clubs. The teaching duty was helped by the commitment of local teenagers who had previously finished their middle and high school. According to *Prayer for Korea*, the bible club teachers aimed to provide a primary education to the children in the poorer country districts. Additionally, the bible study group for female prisoners was one of the major concerns the Masan branch workers of the Australian NGO organisation focused on. There were a few local women for short periods, but the major group was for political prisoners. Among them most were victims of the Korean War. Miss Dunn was even invited by the Governor and chaplain to visit some of them who had to be relocated to Seoul. Bible study was extensively offered by Bene McNabb in the Koje Island, where there were fourteen women in 1959 and forty-six in 1960. Likewise, a bible correspondence course offered an opportunity for the country people.

### *Religious Higher Education*

Professional religious education was launched just after the end of the Korean War. G. Anderson once mentioned the need for training for local religious leadership, that for the normal life of the Church, "we need efficient and devoted ministers, efficient and devoted Bible women (female evangelists), efficient and devoted ordinary members of the congregations." For these purposes, the Higher Bible Institute, which was financially supported from New Zealand, began to train young men and women, including Bible women, Korean missionaries, and ministers in Pusan. While John Brown taught Hebrew Exegesis in the Seoul Seminary, Dorothy Watson taught Worship and Theology and helped the poor students in various ways by providing food and money for school fees.

Alan Stuart, as principal, served ninety students at the Pusan Theological Seminary and Bible school in 1966. The Australian NGO group contributed $1,600 per year. Yet the condition of the seminary was not that great, as it had only one small room that served as a general office, staff room and principal's office. The library was inadequate to contain the students. They needed one more lecturer room as well as two more full-time lecturers. These issues described the practical circumstance the volunteers had to face every day.

## Regional Community Development

The Australian volunteers launched a milk station where about 30 children daily received a drink of milk. It improved the health condition of the children because they used to struggle with amblyopia and many sores. Warm clothes and vitamin tablets were also offered for individual cases. In 1965, 700 sets of children's clothing were given away at a milk station party. There were over 200 T.B. (Tubercle Bacillus) patients, including 80 children, in Masan. Among them, the female patients at a T.B. sanatorium of the Korean government received knitting needles and wool, while the male patients were provided a bar of soap. The provision of 15 small hand looms as well as fancy-work cottons and

needles encouraged the T.B. patients and their families to be independent in society.

The local Korean government awarded the efforts of the Australian volunteers with fifty bags of bran. As rural projects, the Australian NGO organisation, under the help of the Presbyterian Women's Missionary Union (PWMU), also focused on farming potatoes and beans as seeds for the next season. With the Christian community of the Hui Mang village and Moo Kokni, the Australian volunteers supported a poultry farm project. Raising pigs was another community project in the region of Masoowon. The projects in raising cows, bees, and chickens were also adopted for local communities. The self-support embroidery project was one of the successful projects to help young girls, including Miss Il Sun Yu: "the embroidery project had been the only livelihood for herself and her four younger sisters and brothers for more than four years, since the time their mother [had] died in childbirth." Mrs. Brown, with Wendy Lee, supported twenty-four women in similar difficult circumstances by the embroidery project. The baby articles, table linens, bedspreads, aprons, and many other items were sent to the branches of the PWMU in Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania, and South Australia for sale. The profit from those products supported the women's families through their own efforts: "there is a large stock of Korea craft work on hand at present… Remember that Korean widows are dependent on our help to sell their handiwork." Norma Brown also helped the local people by such ways as buying milking goats for village families, buying a sewing machine for a needy woman, buying food and clothing for a desperate family, and schooling an intelligent child.

## The Hazeldine Family and Chinju

Jim and Beth Hazeldine who arrived in Chinju, were the only residential foreigners in the region of Korea in 1960. It was the beginning of the third branch of the Australian NGO group in Korea. Beth Hazeldine operated an antenatal clinic. The Geelong Boys College of Victoria, Australia contributed a donation of £1,000 to Chinju to build a dormitory for 30 people and a lecture room for a Bible school and conferences. The Presbyterian Bible school had seven sleeping rooms, a kitchen, and a central-eating room. The building was of concrete-block construction with a galvanised iron roof. Thirty percent of the total cost was raised by the regional Korean church association even though the nation was in the grips of such an economic depression.

As there was $378 contribution from Australia for the purpose of a bookshop, the Ki Mum Christian bookstall was opened in the city of Chinju in 1967. It became the agent for the Korean Bible Society (KBS) and Christian Literature Society (CLS) in the western Kyungnam part of Korea. The work of Jim Hazeldine, who used to supply Bibles and hymnbooks to local churches and Christians from 1962, was transferred to the first Chinju Christian bookshop. The location of the bookshop was in central, and the glass doors enabled many passers-by to look in for a 'kukyung (glime).' Ki Mum served as an ecumenical venture. The good large Bible pictures were popular among the local readers.

## Relief from Natural Disasters

As the geographical landscape of Kyeongsang province was located at the mouth of the Nakdong River, the area was one of the major regions where people annually faced severe natural disasters from cold, flood, and drought. There were many narratives where the foreign NGO group involved. For example, one large bag of rice was provided to an old people's home in Masan where 40 homeless old folks dwelled in the freezing cold winter of 1956. A donation feeding 300 patients was offered to the Masan T.B. Sanatorium. A gift of money was given for over 200 T.B. patients of the Masan regional prison. Gifts were also provided to orphanages that were under the care of the Australian NGO organisation.

Typhoons in the summer of 1957 caused flooding in Korea. "The intensity of these was later evident when we saw where an army building on the coast was lifted completely over other buildings and deposited in a creek 50 yard away." Another typhoon was in 1960. Many people in Masan escaped from their houses to hillsides. The rice fields were damaged. The continuous rain throughout the springtime of 1963 impacted 80-85% of the barley crop, causing it to fail. Since barley was the staple food of the poorer people, it was serious news, as 20,000 people desperately struggled. The summer of 1965 had heavy rains, hills subsiding, and people drowning in the swollen rivers. Overflowing levee banks destroyed thousands of houses. The figures on 27th July of the year showed 224 dead, 94 missing, 214 injured and about 300,000 homeless. The lack of a multipurpose dam and water control system produced various casualties and property loss.

## Industrial Training

President Chung Hee Park launched the first five-year economic development plans between 1962 and 1966. The nation then began to move from agriculture to industrialisation. As the local industries and factories were developed, there was the need to support factory workers: "many people were flocking to the cities in the hope of finding employment in the factories." Korea in that era generally produced good textiles, radios and electrical goods, seafood products, and tools and equipment for local use. Ulsan as well as Seoul, and Chinju, were the regional cities where there were many factories producing diesel engines, matches, paper, cloth, fishing nets, agricultural chemicals, and textiles. Pusan had many factories as well as extensive port facilities, rattling trams, and cobblestone streets. However, the launch of 'industrial volunteerism' began from the second half of the 1960s.

### *For Handicapped Young People*

In the early 1960s Ulsan was a fruit and vine growing district. When the Korean government decided that the city should be the centre for a new industrial complex, five major factories emerged

and were soon in operation. These included oil refineries, sugar refineries, textile factories, and engineering works. Barry Rowe moved to the industrial city for young people in the region of the old refinery in 1968. As the first foreigner in the whole city, Barry worked among local people who were physically handicapped and who were completely new in the industrial city. Dick Wootton had been working in Seoul amongst ordinary people, because they struggled with poor working conditions, long hours, no protection against accidents, and poor pay. Barry, like Mr. Wootton, was concerned about the health lives of workers by improving their standards of living.

Such social work challenged local authorities including the Ulsan city mayor. He therefore set up a fund-raising committee. The result was successful in raising $1,200 for the occupational school. It was the financial seed by which they were able to set up a completely self-supporting scheme for handicapped people. The so called 'Yanggi' vocational centre was able to train twenty to thirty-five crippled students at a time in the skills of TV and radio repair: "I'd like to tell you about Chong Jin… a young man of twenty-year-old. He was lucky, only lost both legs. There was nothing below his buttocks. He walks on wooden clogs. When he came to us, he was loved… He is now doing well at radio work." Such a method of approaching local people who needed help was encouraged by the Ulsan representative of the Australian NGO group. Among other Australian workers, Dorothy Watson, while teaching in traditional ways, had herself enrolled as a student in a women's university in the hope that she could have a connection with students to understand their lives in counselling. Des Neil also had a plan for working amongst offshore island people, who had been ignored by the greater community.

### For Prostitutes

The 'House of Grace,' near the Seoul Station, where many girls daily arrived from the country for work or a better job, protected fifteen young girls at a time from the hands of procurers. Each girl lived a year together, receiving counselling, a basic education, and Christian and vocational training. Mrs Betty Wootton, as a registered nurse, taught home nursing, childcare and hygiene. For six months, the girls studied in the home under the close supervision of a housemother and a social worker. They learned reading, writing Chinese characters, cooking, gardening, housework, music, sewing, embroidery, art, family planning, etiquette, and the Bible. After six months, they enrolled in a government licensed school of their choice where they learnt a trade, whether tailoring, dressmaking, barbering, or beauty shop. The 'House of Hope' was the second project where teen girls stayed for a month until they are either returned to their families or placed in legitimate jobs. By the time 1966, a hundred and twenty girls completed their course at the 'House of Grace' and five hundred girls have been helped by the 'House of Hope.'

The 'House of Faith' was opened at Camp Kaiser (a U.S. Army camp). It was located near the village of Ulsani, which has a population of 18,000, with 1,000 registered prostitutes. Any prostitute who wished to leave her job was guided to the 'House of Faith' where she could study

and work for two months in children's welfare programmes. Afterward, she would be transferred to Seoul for the training courses she needed to get a job. Richard Wootton, with these girls, ran a gift shop, selling the girls' handwork, cosmetics, soap, scarves, lingerie, baby clothes, blouses, and used magazines at Severance Hospital to support the financial burden of the three programs. The Korean government's Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, who used to predict impossibility of such Australian rehabilitation campaign, began to contribute to the social welfare of these rehabilitated girls. The local government started vocational programs for former prostitute girls to whom the Betty Wootton team was invited to send social workers trained in the three Houses. Among the first thousand girls, 85.5% were living new lives. Of these, 482 were working in various occupations, 32 were married, and 341 had returned home.

### *Sheep Farming Project*

Campbell Lamb was involved in a sheep farm project that the Australian and Korean governments developed corporately in the Taejon area. As the Morwell Community Aid group from Melbourne had provided seed for pasture development, pasture has been sown, mainly cocksfoot, white clover and rye grass. Water was received from a spring. A 10,000-gallon concrete tank was syphoned to the paddocks on the farm. Campbell and his family worked with local people to pass on their pastoral skills. He also wrote a handbook on sheep raising suitable for Korean environment. It was published in English and Korean to guide those who were working with sheep. The Christian service centre used the book as a textbook for its students. By early 1970, Australian sheeps were doing well and had settled into the new country. They were able to cope with the different climate conditions. Campbell and his Australian team had ten paddocks fenced at a time, when fencing was quite new in Korea. Mr. Jong and other Koreans were able to shear the sheep as well as obtain basic knowledge for wool preparation. The corporate team had a little less than ten acres of usable land. Such work in the livestock industry was the initial project for Koreans to have a new farming culture raising stock.

### Conclusion

The post-war period in Korea (1954-1960s) was not the best or right time for the local government to care for the socio-economic development of the peninsula. Rather, political and ideological confusion and conflict caused the nation to go through a transitional process of democratisation. Meantime, the lack of industrial infrastructure development allowed for various natural disasters due to which the citizens experienced all sorts of hardship. International aid was one of the major sources to relieve the practical burdens of the local people. However, while international governments' agents withdrew support after the Korean War, the Australian Presbyterian NGO group (one group with many branches in Korea) maintained their voluntary

works in social rehabilitation. The activities were mainly focused on the quality of life for less fortunate citizens, in particular in the regions of Pusan and of Kyeongsang province, where the majority of refugees permanently dwelled after the Korean War.

The medical offering of ob-gyn care was a groundbreaking project for Korean society, since there were no certain public services for obstetrics and gynaecology. The training of professional midwifery nurses at Il-Shin Pusan women's hospital also contributed to the development of the Korean nursing profession. Female prisoners, the children of soldiers and of lepers, orphan girls, and mentally deranged women received benefits. Local religious organisations, including churches and colleges, were able to be consulted and re-established based on the generous donations from Australian. Regional communities in Masan were given opportunities to learn agricultural business skills, and with financial support, to begin micro- businesses for their families. The Hazeldine family, with Dorothy Knight, was interested in the social enlightenment of Chinju society through literature campaign and public health activity. Support in response to natural disasters was immediate reaction, while industrial and sheep ranching training were provided to handicapped young people (Ulsan), prostitutes (Seoul), and stock farmers (Taejon). Such projects of social rehabilitation were not the major national issues of the Korean government in the era, but they were the grassroots issues that were directly connected to the lives of marginalised people.

contested. According to them our knowledge of the world is shaped by our experience in it, that is by our perceptions. Merleau-Ponty and other phenomenologists, put the body as central to all perception and therefore argue that meaning of the world is constructed by humans in relation to the manner in which the human body relates to it. Also this relationship is a dialectical one where both the body and the mind are affected and transformed. A human being's experience of the world is an embodied one and the body plays a central role in the construction of meaning. This school of thought believes that the meaning and construction of the world and its reality is not dependent only on the mind but also on the body.

Another school that challenged the supremacy of the western construction of knowledge is the post-modern school. According to the post-modern philosophers, no single construction of the world can have a hegemonic status and that all constructions are equally valid. Thus the western epistemology, that makes a claim to be "knowledge" or the only valid picture of the world is questioned. The multiplicity of the human condition and the multiple ways in which reality is constructed and interpreted by different people across the globe form the ontological premises of this paper.

Thus in the words of Saraswati (2006: 49),

"Ideologically, the march of human civilization, is measured in terms of gross national product and techno-economic development that has reduced the image of human to that of a component in the production-process machine and a consumer of material goods".

He laments the loss of humanity itself in the mechanization of the human essence and its only quality of being reflexive and introspective and establishing a relationship to the cosmos that is not mediated by egoistic and materialistic values but by a sense of morality and a perception of oneness.

The people I am writing about in this paper are those who have not yet severed their links with a holistic view of the world, although on the verge of doing so, by being on the path of what is understood as "development". These are the people who live along the Indo-Tibetan border, at the height of 10,000 feet and above in the Indian state of Uttarakhand (see Channa 2013). Here I am putting forward an image of the human that comes from my more than two decades of work among a people known as the Jads or the Bhotiyas who inhabit the high Himalayas (see Channa 2013).

disconnected from ontology and may thus be viewed problematically. No solution exists however. We do not know to what extent we can negotiate between facts and the interpretation of facts. Secondly, there is no way in which one form of knowledge can be privileged over another form knowledge. The second observation is also known in anthropological language as discarding ethnocentrism. Further as pointed out by philosophers such as Butler, we can only discuss or discern within the ambit of the knowledge system of which we are part. Most humans live within a life world where the important discourses such as those of identity, self and humanness themselves are contextualized.

While many scholars are not comfortable with the concept of cultural differences, as they feel that such postulates of diversity often covers up for hierarchy, yet as Stoken (2016: 67) puts it, "There exist many cultures, not necessarily coinciding with any geographical area, but nevertheless producing a difference in logic and meaning whose epistemological challenge could never be detected from treating the world as one globe or as a multiplicity of modernities". It is these 'differences in logic and meaning' that need to be examined when we embark upon our goal of examining what constitutes humanity. With these assumptions let us examine the way a pastoral community living high up in the Himalayas understand the world around them, their place in it and their relationship to their environment.

## The World of the Himalayan Mountain villagers

The Bhotiyas are small groups of pastoral communities living on the Himalayan borders. I have extensively described them elsewhere (Channa 2013) so I need repeat the ethnography. This paper includes my data gathered from the Bhotiyas as also from other places in rural Himalayas, from among the mountain dwelling peasants and pastoral communities in the regions of Garhwal and Himachal Pradesh, two mountain bound regions in North Central Himalayas. Most of these groups practice small scale subsistence farming and animal husbandry. Some of them were in earlier times cross border traders. One may think of this region as having an identity that sets them apart from peninsular India. They are largely recognized as Hindus, but many communities show an eclectic mix of Village Buddhism and Animistic beliefs that predate the more formal and textual forms of both Hindu and Buddhist sophisticated or textual philosophies. What is important for the present discussion is the nature of their world as they understand, feel and practice their living in. To deal with the entire cosmology would be too elaborate for the purpose of one paper, so I will focus on how identity is formed among the Jad Bhotiyas and when data from other groups are mentioned, they will be specified.

### *Epistemology of Knowledge and concept of Life*

The Jad Bhotiyas believe that life force (Neeng) resides in the naval (Neha) of all beings.

There is no difference in the Neeng of a human and an animal, but the bodily manifestation makes a difference. That is the bigger the animal, like a horse or a cow the more sentient it is as compared to an insect or a rat. Thus animals do differ in their emotional and intellectual capacities, but it is only a matter of degree and not of kind. In the manner of all South Asian belief systems, they also believe in the transmigration of the life force from one incarnation to another, spanning all known life forms, the indication of which is present at the moment of death. I was told the Buddhist lama who presides over a dying person, is able to predict what would be the next birth for the dying person by being able to *see* the point from where the life force departed. To my question as to how the lama was able to see, they replied the lama had a way of knowing. In other words the lama possessed a sight or knowledge that was not available to the ordinary person. This knowledge was then an embodied knowledge, an ability to *see things* that other people could not.

The lama could also see other things. He could read the horoscope and predict the good and bad aspects of life of a person. He could also prescribe remedies based on his knowledge of the life process. One of the remedies was in the form of letting a person know what colours of flags should be put up on the roof of the house to avert evil. The lama's knowledge was not acquired out of books. It was a knowledge that accrued to the body of the lama by the very fact that he was one. This meant an ability to see things like no one else.

Other people could *see* things or see in a way not accessible to outsiders. They could also converse with the spirits such as the *kuldevta*; spirit beings who are carried forward from one generation to another through the male descendants. They have forms and names but are never represented as icons. Yet their presence is known, and what is known very well to everyone concerned is their opinions and emotions. The most distinctive feature of knowledge in these mountain villages is the knowledge of beings who are almost never seen by the outsiders or exist in any form that is seeable by people who do not belong there.

The conception of being human does not bind one into self that is inside a bounded unit called the body. The body is not a physical entity alone, though it has its physiological components. Like the Jads believe that a leech is present in the naval region of all humans and one gets a stomach ache if it moves sideways and a head ache, if it moves to the head. But leeches are present in the bodies of their sheep also. The human body hosts other beings also, who make use of it to communicate. Unlike the concept of possession as held by many other people, this sharing of bodily space is not viewed as an invasion but a normal affair. In case of the *kuldevta*, one family member, man or woman acts as a vehicle for the *kuldevta* to express itself. Even other gods may choose one human vehicle to communicate with everyone. However the human thus selected by the supernatural does not acquire any characters of the being that uses its body. He or she is treated as any other person with no special merit or quality.

It is rare for any special quality to be assigned to any person and almost all special functions and attributes are those of the supernatural beings. I was always narrated tales of great things being

done by the *devta*, but almost never by any human person. The *devta* were the ones who caught thieves, who prevented floods, who passed on information about harvesting, planting, animals and the weather. In fact these beings were the source of all knowledge that these communities possessed. The entire social and economic life was geared around communication from and with these beings. Conversations were mostly about who said what and what actions were required in response to the wishes, desires and commands of these beings.

Humans are thus not by any means the center of the universe. They do not have powers over other beings, neither the ones that exist in ethereal form nor those that exist in nature as stones, trees and animals. Humans on the other hand must comply to the wishes of these beings, be deferential and keep them in good humour. This does not mean that all the people who live in these regions are unaware of the kind of knowledge that is propagated from higher centers of power, the cities, the urban centers, schools and universities. Many of these mountain dwellers are formally educated and there are doctors, engineers and professors among them. But while they are residing in this region, their self-identity is informed by and structured by the information that their environment passes to them.

## The Ecological Self

The Jads have what may well be called an ecological concept of self. If we refer to the way symbolic interactionists have understood how the self is built up, then most of how we understand as "Me" is in response to how others expect us to be and the way in which norms of the society shape a person's behavior ( Mead 1934). In case there is a power hierarchy, then the sense of self also incorporates the stereotypes and expectations of the dominant group to a larger extent than when the person is responding to what Goffman (1956) has referred to as the Generalized other, in a homogenous society. In a hierarchical situation, it is the work of Dubois (1903), his reference to the double consciousness of the Black person that is more relevant. In the case of the Jads, they too respond to the others, especially the dominant majority Hindu population in whose vicinity they reside, when they are in their lower altitude village near the pilgrim town of Uttarkashi. They put on very different selves when they are in their higher altitude village on way to Gangotri glacier and when they are much lower down in the winter months when the higher altitudes are snow bound. While in the upper region they live according to their won sacred landscape, their spirits and cosmology. In the lower village, they celebrate Hindu festivals, behave in a way that they feel will be more acceptable to the dominant Hindu population.

However, for the Jads this transition is not abnormal as they have a sense of self that is never bounded but formed always in response to the environment. For example, the Neeng is located in the center of the body, but it is mobile, and it can move up and down. People are also not rooted in one place like the cultivators from whom they clearly differentiate themselves. The pastoral community moves in a vertical axis and with this movement their sense of belongingness and

who they are changes. When talking about any location, they always speak about it as between two points and as the points shift, the location shifts too. They also do not propagate their identity through a closed kinship and marriage circle, a common form of identity maintenance understood in anthropological literature. They frequently married with other pastoral communities with whom they shared pastures for grazing. A person is not known as a Jad by simply being born as one, but only by their location in a Jad village. When men or women marry and go away to another village, they lose their identity, and when they come and live or marry into the Jads they become one, only if they live there and share the way of life and pay allegiance to the village god. Thus residence and the sharing of the sacred landscape are the essential elements of identity.

The body is thus identified by its location and the sharing of the common way of life and world view. It is not located by virtue of its birth or sharing of blood and bones, although Jads consider these as prime components of a person; the blood and bones being transmitted in the male line, along with the *kuldevta*, or family deity. A man who does not live in the village on a permanent basis has to transfer his kuldevta to another, even his sister or other relative. This fluidity of identity is shared by a cultural region or location and has been noted for other communities in Nepal, Tibet and other mostly mountain locations. To be identified as ''where one lives' rather than by the parentage or genetic component of one's identity is a very non-western way of understanding identity. But it is not an isolated world view and shared by many people, across the world.

## The fluidity of Gender

There are many societies that consider the division of male and female as a definite identity and gender is constructed in a way that affects one's life from birth to death. Yet gender need not be a fixed aspect of one's being. Among the Jads, the identity of being a man or a woman is also fluid, at least in terms of the practice or the role that one plays as a male or a female. Since the body is also identified by its practice or performance, people are actually considered or socially recognized as more or less gendered depending upon their location on the lifecycle. Young children below the age of five are considered non-gendered, they are dressed and ritually treated the same. Only after reaching puberty, is a girl actually segregated from men and ritually considered different. Men also are regarded as fully men when they can go independently with their sheep and go far places on their own. Virility is directly related to the ability to travel and move.

Older men when they lose the ability for travel and for grazing sheep, are expected to do the same work as old women. They spin wool, carry babies in hammocks on their back, even cook and do household work, just like women. After menopause, a woman has the same ritual status as a man and can do more or less what older men can do. They even dress similarly and are socially regarded as similar persons.

Masculinity and femininity are thus not bounded and fixed identities in as much as they are attributes of gendered personhoods with varying roles expectations and status considerations.

### Self and Personhood

Concepts of identity and of being human evolved over millions of years. Humanness has always been thought in terms of reflexivity and an understanding of self as against the other. Most sociological discourses such as that of symbolic interactionism have pitted the consciousness of self against others who are part of the human society, meaning for most western locations, they are other socialized humans. However this may not be true for others whose social life encompasses those who are not necessarily human in the same sense, although they are human like in most aspects. Thus the Jad self is identified not just by one's family and community but more importantly by the lineage deity and the world of natural and supernatural beings who people their universe. Thus the Generalized Other are the forest spirits, the mountain deities, their sheep and domestic animals and the sacred landscape of which they are a part. Their *Neeng* is transmuted from and into all these beings. Their bodies are an integral part of the mountains and forests where they reside and their activities are located. They verbalize it by saying, "We are what we are when we are in the higher village". Most people express a desire that they wish to die in their higher altitude village and be cremated there so that they can merge with what they consider their own world. They consciously put up an act for others when they are elsewhere, but when they mean they are their true selves, it is the self that has evolved in relation to the salient others, those who are significant to them. These Significant Others are not necessarily human in the sense that a western person will understand humanness. Because the self has evolved in relation to these beings, a Jad person has no difficulty in conversing with or communicating with them. One always hears about the ongoing conversations that people have with non-human beings. Almost always one is being told, what a particular *kuldevta* has said, what a *devta* has commanded, why a spirit in the forest has become displeased. The entire daily life of these people is oriented around these conversations, and thus the self and the role play is well integrated. But this harmony is attained only in their own setting.

Thus importantly their knowledge does not emanate from treating nature- as- an –object. It emanates from interacting with a living and conscious nature that is not an object but a subject and thus knowledge is produced inter-subjectively and not by the separation of subjective self from the object under observation.

This is exactly what the Jad mean when they say that they are their true selves only in their village where they live as they wish. Not only that their world of personhood is also located there. That is why to be a Jad is not a matter of birth, or marriage. It is *a matter of becoming*, it is a process that can only happen where the material for formation of a true Jad self is located, in the mountain sides where the sheep are grazed, where the water from the mountain streams flow, where the kuldevta and other deities reside, where the deodar trees in the forest are each one a devta. Where they can see and they can hear and most importantly *understand*. I was often told that outsiders do not understand, they never can. That is because they come with differently constructed selves. Their consciousness does not allow them to see the world as a Jad person sees it.

Subhadra Mitra Channa

In this paper I have not attempted the ontological question but that does remain an important aspect of the Self. Who sees what and why?

In conclusion all that can be said is that although essentially human in many aspects of our beings, we as a species are also differentiated according to the way the collective and also individual selves and even our consciousness evolves in its ecological, historical and political context. Thus it is necessary to accept oneness at one level but also to accept that diversity too is an aspect of being human because being human means that we live in a world that is at least partially created by us and we need to accept that the real world if any such exists may be well beyond comprehension.

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# The Human Image seen through the History of Exhibiting

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Imagine a small sculpture. For example one from the Greek Archaic period, representing a female figure, most probably connected to religious practices. If it is placed among many other similar works in a densely arranged exhibition vitrine, it may easily skip our attention. At the same time, if it is in the middle of a large exhibition hall, placed on an elegant pedestal that the sculpture is occupying alone, it will presumably get all the attention it deserves, despite the work's small size. Hence the same object – let it be a work of art or design, a religious object or an everyday tool – can have completely different aspects and appearances, and it can trigger various interests and emotions simply through the special modes of exhibiting it. To illustrate it better, let me have two further examples:

A curator from the Imperial War Museum once recounted a curious disinterestedness or unawareness of the visitors in one of their pieces: in the exhibition one can find a bomb, that is exactly the same as the "Little Boy, the one having destroyed Hiroshima. However, according to the curator's experience, most of the visitors do not pay any attention to it, only because its placing, since it is in the middle of a densely filled room, and is simply lost among the other exhibited objects. Therefore its tragic importance is not highlighted with some kind of space or emptiness around it that would help the focus. *(This recount is from a few years ago, perhaps since then the exhibition was re-arranged.)*

Another, definitely more cheerful, though from our current perspective and questions just as important instance I would like to refer to is the so-called "glasses-prank.[1] In 2016, the 17-year old T. J. Khayatan, during a school visit to the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art decided to play a prank on the other visitors by leaving a pair of glasses on the floor, testing if the fellow museum-goers could be fooled to think it was a ready-made artwork and part of the exhibition. Perhaps not surprisingly they could, i.e. – according to the reports documented on social media and retweeted

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1. Henri Neuendorf, "Teens Prank Museum-Goers by Leaving Glasses on Floor of SFMOME," *artnet news*, May 26, 2016,
https://news.artnet.com/exhibitions/teens-prank-art-glasses-sfmoma-505583?utm_campaign=artnetnews&utm_source=052716daily&utm_medium=email&utm_term=artnet%20News%20Daily%20Newsletter; last accessed September 15, 2018.

and liked over 50.000 times – soon after "placing the object on the floor, interested art lovers started to gather around, looking at it and even taking photographs. Naturally, the basis for the deceit of the visitors was the context itself, being used to the fact that in museums we find works that have certain importance and significance. In fact, the episode could also be a great illustration to Miguel Tamen's interpretation of the museum, formulated in his book titled *Friends of interpretable objects*: "Museums are indeed places where the use of exhibited objects is inseparable from the basic assumption that objects therein «have been made in order to signify something other than what the eye sees: museums are places where bits of matter are reduced to meaning and subsequently defined as «art»".[2]

Already from these examples we can see that when discussing the phenomenon on exhibiting, the object is never alone-standing, i.e. never shown and never to be analysed in itself. The context of the presented object, the modes of exhibiting it, the features of the space as well as the intellectual framework and motivation of the curators are all crucial both in the efficient working and in the intellectually and aesthetically fruitful perception of the piece.[3] And this efficiency interests us in our present argument with regards to the Human image and humanities too.

Confronting ourselves with objects in the context of an exhibition – let they be pieces of art or everyday objects having particular significance for their rarity, age or other historical value – is a common way of learning about ourselves. Therefore, our self-interpretation or attempts of self-understanding is largely depending on what and how we see and what and how we show about ourselves to ourselves. Each display of tools, art objects, artefacts and design products conveys not only and purely the information of and about that object, but also the importance the very object plays for the society and for the particular time when it is shown. And since public display of objects is not a new phenomenon at all, the changing aspects and focuses of the exhibiting can provide us with invaluable information about how people had shown and encountered such objects. This examination of the numerous aspects in the phenomenon of exhibiting will then contribute to the better understanding of some of the current challenges of both humanity and of the humanities.[4]

Artworks – or, better to say, objects that we today generally consider as artworks – were exhibited in public spaces already from the early Antiquity, both in peaceful settings, or as a result of bellicose activities, as well as in commercial contexts. In ancient Greece sculptures of gods, heroes and winners of important sports events adorned communal spaces; votive-sculptures were offered for the help of gods around the temples. On the other hand, victorious military leaders and

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2. Miguel Tamen, *Friends of interpretable objects* (Cambridge, Massachusetts – London: Harvard University Press, 2001), 59.

3. See more on these questions, as well as on how this influences museum designs and displays, in an earlier paper of mine: Zoltán Somhegyi, "Design and the Audience. On the Questions of Presentation in Contemporary Museums," in *A New Affair: Design History and Digital Design Museum*, ed. Tevfik Balcıoğlu and Gülsüm Baydar (Izmir: 5T-Yaşar University, 2014), 42-49.

4. On some questions about the "public"-ness of art and exhibitions, see also: Zoltán Somhegyi, "From the public nature of art to the nature of public art. Considerations on the changing spaces and modes of exhibiting," *Serbian Architectural Journal* Vol. 9. (2017/2): 191-200.

Roman emperors were also in favour of showing the looted treasures what they collected during their successful battles, of which some sculptural representations survived on triumphal arches. We also know that auctions were organised already in ancient Rome.

In a similar way also Christian churches of the Middle Ages can be considered as public displays of objects of special importance, i.e. artworks and reliquaries. A Gothic cathedral is in a way the utmost collection of artworks and artefacts of the most various kinds. Another important instance where public display had an impact on art and architecture: the need of efficiently managing the large flow of pilgrims in a church having a reliquary had a significant influence on the development of the basilicas with ambulatories around the altar.

A major shift we can however trace from the Renaissance and the Early Modern Ages onwards that again has connections with the convoluted set of questions of the "value of artworks too. Parallel with the rise of the status of the artist in society, the financial value of the artwork started to get detached from the material value of the object itself. Or, we can say that the added value of the artist or creator of the piece started to count more and more, and this has naturally influenced both the collection and the display of works, as well as incentivised a rivalry between collectors and commissioners. Royal, aristocratic and a bit later bourgeois collections were established, however, these had not contained exclusively works of art. These "Kunst und Wunderkammern", as their name indicates, had pieces that today we can find in museums of fine and applied arts or in museums of natural history. As we can learn from the influential research of Julius von Schlosser, especially in his 1908 book *Die Kunst und Wunderkammern der Spätrenaissance*, this drive of collecting paved the way for the modern concept of museums, many of which in the 18th century have partly grown out from these aristocratic collections, making the previously partly closed collections open to the public, or royal collections donated to the newly founded institutions.[5] This is the classical form of museums that preserve objects, not only in the sense of keeping them as valuable treasures within their walls, but also to preserve them against the rages of time. As Boris Groys observed in a text originally presented as a lecture at Museo Reina Sophia in 2013, and then published in *e-flux journal*: "Traditionally, the main occupation of art was to resist the flow of time. Public art museum and big private art collections were created to select certain objects – the artworks – take them out of private and public use, and therefore immunize them against the destructive force of time."[6]

Through this accumulation of objects that are aesthetically and/or (art) historically significant we find again an important instance of rivalry, this time however not between the commissioners

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5. Julius von Schlosser, *Die Kunst und Wunderkammern der Spätrenaissance. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Sammelwesens* (Leipzig: Klinkhardt & Biermann, 1908); see the digitalised version of the original edition on the website of the Universitätsbibliothek Heidelberg: https://digi.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/diglit/schlosser1908; last accessed September 8, 2018.

6. Boris Groys, "Entering the Flow: Museum between Archive and Gesamtkunstwerk," *e-flux journal* 50 (December 2013): 1.; https://www.e-flux.com/journal/50/59974/entering-the-flow-museum-between-archive-and-gesamtkunstwerk/; last accessed September 8, 2018. (The page number refers to the pdf version of the article.)

and collectors, but between the new nation-states. Important Antique archaeological findings were transported to Western museums, partly motivated by the consideration that the (new) nation hosting and displaying the origins of human culture is not only the legitimate inheritor of the actual objects, but also the culmination of human culture itself – where human culture, in the period, was seen from an accumulative and progressive historical viewpoint. On the other hand, we have to add that even if this approach to the relevance and importance of Antique findings is definitely motivated by the further building of national pride and glory, it has still – at least, indirectly – contributed to the diversification of scholarship and especially to a broader perception and as a consequence a more inclusive assessment of the values of some of the previously disregarded sub-periods of antiquity throughout the whole 19th century.[7]

In the later phase, we shall not forget to take into consideration the (further) rise of status of the artist in the Romanticism. The gradually secured independence of the Romantic artist liberated him from the formerly powerful commissioner, and at the same time made him, at least financially, dependent on the fluctuating market and taste. This has again influenced and triggered new modes of exhibiting, including the studio-exhibitions of artists and the travelling one-artwork shows in the 19th century. The late-19th century polarisation and fragmentation of the art world has naturally affected the exhibition landscape too. The rejection of rather progressive artists from the official Salons motivated them to find alternative exhibition places. This has naturally also opened up the possibilities for the numerous 20th century avant-garde movements to experiment with the ways of reaching their audience. We shall not forget either that one of the major issues at stake for these movements – especially those socially engaged ones like Russian Constructivists or even Bauhaus – was exactly to reach out to a new audience and thus to have a strong and actual impact on the building of (a new) society through the inclusion of new segments of the society.

This quick summary on some of the features of how in earlier times people had encountered works of art and how these changing aspects have influenced their perception and appreciation of the pieces can now guide us in mapping some of the current challenges.

Interestingly, many of these challenges, as well as threat of humanity and to humanities are connected to the question of *interest*, in a broad sense of the word. Let me mention here only three: inattention, over-commercialisation and the returning (or never-ending) tendency of iconoclasm. By *inattention* I mean the visual over-saturation of today's average potential visitor, who, being used to the quick flow of images in television and internet culture can often not have enough patience to enjoy traditional modes of exhibitions, especially when the perception and enjoyment of the exhibited objects would require thorough and peaceful immersion in the context of the show. The second difficulty that we can find in the current exhibition culture is *over-commercialisation*, of

7. See more about these questions in Zainab Bahrani-Zeynep Çelik-Edhem Eldem (eds), *Scramble for the Past. A Story of Archaeology in the Ottoman Empire, 1753-1914* (Istanbul: SALT, 2011), especially the chapters: Zainab Bahrani, *Untold Tales of Mesopotamian Discovery* (125-157) and Philippe Jockey, *The Venus de Milo: Genesis of a Modern Myth* (237-257).

which one of the evident sign is the emergence of the "blockbuster shows, i.e. when cash-strapped museums try to revitalise their financial situation by organising shows with attractive titles like "Picasso and his friends, or "From Leonardo to Rembrandt, hoping that the big names attract record-breaking number of visitors. In worse cases, they exhibit perhaps a few works of lesser significance by a master and filling the rest of the space with forgettable works by other minor artists. To be clear, I do not claim that in an exhibition only the best works of the greatest masters should be exhibited – on the contrary, I am very much in favour of experimental exhibitions with research-based and innovative concepts shedding light on new aspects, but we shall take into consideration that in this case also the ways of showing the findings shall be carefully calibrated to be inspiring for both the professionals and for the non-specialised public, and this latter group should not come only because of the appealing title.

It might sound strange at the beginning, but the third threat I mentioned above, *iconoclasm* – both classical and contemporary forms of it – can, at least indirectly, be related to questions of interest and also of commercialisation. The destruction of earlier cultures' or other nations' and religions' tangible elements of memory and cultural artefacts is not a new phenomenon, we can trace it again from Antiquity, from the Roman *damnatio memoriae* and from the Byzantine decades of Iconoclasm onwards. In present day destructions however this form of destroying – that we could also interpret as the countertendency of exhibiting – is motivated not only by the intention of erasing the enemy's cultural heritage, but also to raise awareness to this destruction itself and to the showing of power of the destroyer. This exercise of power is exactly that connects modern day iconoclasm with its antique origins, including the aforementioned damnatio memoriae. As Jacques Le Goff argued in his book *History and Memory*: "The power to destroy memory is the counterweight to power achieved through the production of memory.[8] As an example for the exercise of this power, just think of the constant documentation and media-coverage of some of the recent ISIS-related destructions, e.g. that of Palmyra. It was so widely discussed and reproduced, that many started to analyse the question if this constant showing of these cultural atrocities would not turn into a sort of involuntary publicity and thus (at least indirectly) also commercial gain for the terrorist organisation. Especially because, as Jason Felch and Bastien Varoutsikos investigated in their article in the online edition of The Art Newspaper, the terrible effect of the destructions by ISIS was in fact increased through the conscious and professional propaganda campaign spreading over the Internet documenting the very destruction itself.[9] Hence issues around interest again: it was in the interest of the terrorists to direct the world's attention to their atrocities, and in this way potentially anyone posting, commenting, forwarding or retweeting the terrible images – naturally

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8. Jacques Le Goff, *History and Memory* (New York – Oxford: Columbia University Press, 1992) 68.
9. Jason Felch and Bastien Varoutsikos, "The lessons of Palmyra: Islamic state and iconoclasm in the era of clickbait": *The Art Newspaper*, April 7, 2016;
   http://theartnewspaper.com/comment/comment/lessons-from-palmyra-where-islamic-state-combined-iconoclasm-and-clickbait/?utm_source=weekly_apr8_2016&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=email_weekly; last accessed December 3, 2016.

disagreeing with them – may still have involuntarily supported the aims of the terrorist organisation in spreading the cruel message.

These are just a few of the many aspects and areas the conscious and constant advising as well as collaboration between the professionals of a broad range of humanities disciplines are extremely necessary including the specialists of not only art and design history and aesthetics, but also social, political and economic history, cultural anthropology, philosophy, history of religion etc. in order to create exhibitions that can boldly and creatively analyse pressing questions and critical issues too. This complex curatorial work would then also result in successful attempts of re-interpretation of the museum. In the aforementioned article Boris Groys argues for the precedence of the "project over the "exhibition: "The curatorial project, rather than the exhibition, is then the Gesamtkunstwerk because it instrumentalizes all the exhibited artworks and makes them serve a common purpose that is formulated by the curator. At the same time, a curatorial or artistic installation is able to include all kinds of objects: time-based artworks or processes, everyday objects, documents, texts and so forth.[10] Further developing this, Groys argues for the museum to be converted from a place where we merely contemplate objects to one where things happen (e.g. lectures, presentations, discussions, screenings etc.), hence an institute that keeps an intellectually fertile flow of events and activities. Although his argumentation was directed towards the analyses of the relationship between a museum's collection and the Internet, still it is also useful for the concept and envisioning of the ideal function and functioning of a contemporary museum. Being aware of these various challenges and focusing on the interdisciplinary and innovative cooperation between numerous fields of humanities can thus help not only in our present understanding of humanity, but also in the shaping of the Human image to be shown in the future.

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10. Groys, "Entering the Flow," 6.

The Human Image seen through the History of Exhibiting

Zoltán Somhegyi

# The Birth of Mnemosyne. The Emergence of the Image of the Human at the Dawn of Food Production

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Change is the rule of humans' context and also the major trigger for their cultural transformation. It is under such process that one may understand the emergence of the human figure depiction in portable and rock art.

While prehistoric art dates back to over 90.000 years ago, and the earliest rock art from over 70.000 years ago, the first anthropomorphic representations, produced by upper Palaeolithic hunters, date from about 45.000 years ago, in Europe. They do not represent humans, but therianthrops, half human half animal, possibly illustrating transformative characteristics of both and, in any case, calling for an approach to transcendent processes. "Sorcerers" or "Shamans" were identified in the rock art of caves Trois Frères, Chauvet or Gabillou in Europe, but also in Africa and America. Dear (Trois Frères), lion (Hohlenstein-Stadel[1]), antelope (South Africa San art) or snake (New Mexico), are some of the conveyed animals to mix with humans in this process.



Fig.1.
The "Lion-Man" from Hohlenstein Stadel Cave, Germany. The mask is clearly portrayed. Source: Kind and Ebinger-Rist, et al., 2014.

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1. Kind, C.-J.;Ebinger-Rist, N.; et al. (2014). The Smile of the Lion Man. Recent Excavations in Stadel Cave (Baden-Wurttemberg, south-western Germany) and the Restoration of the Famous Upper Palaeolithic Figurine. *Quatär 61*, pp. 129-145.

Representations of humans in the later Paleolithic depict "ghost-shapped" forms, occasionally with feathers in their heads, suggesting the association to rituals and to altered states of consciousness. The palaeolithic cosmovision is, yet, dominated by fauna, and mainly big herbivores, and these early human depictions seem to illustrate the passage between the human and the animal dimensions.



Fig.2.
Two-headed goat from the Foz Côa Upper Paleolithic world heritage site, in Portugal. Animals are the dominant images for Pleistocene hunter-gatherers. Source of photo: Baptista 2014.

In this context, one should understand the emergence of the representation of the human figure within the wider prehistoric societies context. In fact, the emergence of the Human image is a relatively recent feature, which builds from a long term set of cultural interactions, which we may assume will lead to the invention of the Human as an entity. These remotely build from the invention of the notion of symmetry, with the earliest bifaces some 1.7 MA ago, until the growing complexity of modern humans behaviour when producing composite stone and bone tools, burying their dead or carving the first musical instruments[2].

Prehistoric Rock Art is a syncretic feature which stands as a material evidence of a crossroad of multiple human processes: cognitive, symbolic, economic, aesthetic, ethic, among others. It is not a standard writing system, but it conveys knowledge through messages; it has a nonlinear structure, but is made of symbols which act as signifiers; and although we cannot access the concepts for which those signifiers may stand for (and, as in language, same signifiers may mean very different things under different contexts), we have methods to assess it from a morpho-typological perspective (using complementary analytical tools, from statistics to experimentation), within its context (to identify possible referents for those signifiers) and through comparative analysis (with other rock art sites and, once chronology is established, with wider cultural sources, namely oral tales)[3].

Certainly its detailed contents are beyond our reach, but one important dimension of rock art is the organisation of collective memories within societies which have no writing systems. Such

2. D'Errico, F.; Henshilwood, C.; et al. (2003). Archaeological Evidence for the Emergence of Language, Symbolism, and Music—AnAlternative Multidisciplinary Perspective. *Journal of World Prehistory*, Vol. 17, No. 1, March, pp. 1-70

3. Anati, Emmanuel (2008). *Studi per la lettura dell'arte rupestre*. Capo di Ponte, Valcamonica : Centro Camuno di Studi Preistorici.

societies had to condense their accumulate knowledge through several mnemonics strategies: tales, songs, body art, dance…and rock art too. These would convey the understandings of the surrounding world, from environmental changes to human dynamics, from economic seasonality to kinship networking.

Non-literary societies, as later ones, act upon perceived landscapes, i.e., imagined realities that include all which is within their reasoning capacity (thus excluding many other features, either ignoring them or clustering them under a common outcasted sphere: the *forest*, the *shadow*, the *wild*). The perceived landscapes needed to be expanded with more detailed (analytical) and widening (extensive) knowledge, and the capacity to convey such knowledge to later generations became a major competitive advantage.

This dichotomy between the *tamed* (even in later Palaeolithic societies) and the *wild*, is structured by the capacity of humans to control or not those realities, and in the process of controlling emerges the relevance of tools and techniques, as amplifiers of the human body: axes that amplify the cutting capacity of the hand and arm, boats that amplify the swimming capacity of the body, bowls that amplify the carrying capacity of the hands, etc. But tools are, also, condensed products of a series of learned gestures (techniques), often associated to strict performative sequences involving songs, offerings or ceremonies. Techniques are a first relevant mnemonics mechanism. They allow for memorising repetitive efficient gestures, even if they limit, in such process, transformation and innovation.

Rock art is often associated to the landscape morphology, as if it irrupted from it (as aborigines from Australia tend to interpret past paintings). As it occurs at a larger scale in non-literary societies[4], dichotomies are structural in rock art: engravings vs paintings, valley vs hill, orientation vs slope,… human vs wild, … all these structure ideas, knowledge and tales, enabling the recognition of territories and human groups. The discussion on its meaning (artistic creativity, myth, shamanism, altered states of consciousness…) and function (communication, identity, territorial organization,… ) tends to acknowledge its crucial role for the definition of Humankind, from an ethnocentric evolutionary perspective (although the scope of the Ethos may differ, from local discrete cultures to global entities such as the "modern humans"). In this sense, it may also be understood as a dynamic tension between the transformative structuring of processes (*kairós*) and the assignment of absolute values to features, freezing their transformative capacity (*nomos*), involving a transcendental transformative driver (*kairós*) and an imanent conservative driver (*nomos*).

The representation of the human figure is preceded by the self-identification of the human as the operator of such dichotomy. This is possibly why art, i.e. the design of non-utilitarian objects (beads, paintings, sculptures, music), finds its root in previous geometric treatment of tools, but emerges only when the economic intensification strategies, moving away from a random broad spectrum economy, start to prevail, some 100 Ka ago.

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4. Lévi-Strauss, C. (1973). *Structural Anthropology*. Middlesex : Penguin Books.

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
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Fig.3.
Engraved stone from Blombos cave, South Africa. Geometric patters are the earliest forms of art. Source of photo: D'Errico, F.; Henshilwood, C.; et al. (2003).

One could easily recognise in the first schematic and geometric paintings the two-dimensional representations of a longer tradition of the three-dimensional shaping of tools. But the emergence of the human figure is something else: it implies objectifying the human as a segregated entity, and this was possibly a result of the growing contacts of some groups with other human groups, due to growing population density and the shrinking of accessible territories during the Late Pleistocene.

The first representations of the human figure are mostly hand stencils, a sort of "signature" which stands for the collective entity of the group than for any specific human. These date at least from the early Upper Palaeolithic, before 40.000 years ago, and they might even having been produced by Neanderthals, according to most recent datings[5]. Still during the later Upper Paleolithic, emerge anthropomorphic "ghost-shaped" forms[6], possible representations of shamans or alike, such as in the cave of *Trois-Frères*, in France. Earlier, portable art already staged anthropo-zoomorphic figurines, depicting human figures dressed with animal outfits, such as the Lion of Hohlenstein-Stadel. Nevertheless, the Palaeolithic figurative art is focused on the zoocenosis, and the human figure is somewhat marginal to the different composed scenes.



Fig.4.
Anthropomorphic representations from the Foz Côa Upper Paleolithic world heritage site, in Portugal. These representations relate to rituals, possibly also to trances. Source of drawing: Baptista 2014.

In this sense, the anthropomorphic earlier figures should not be considered "human", since they represent an ethnocentric understanding of the group, which excludes other humans as part of the

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5. Hoffmann, D.L.; Standish, C.D.; et al. (2018). U-Th dating of carbonate crusts reveals Neandertal origin of Iberian cave art. *Science,* Vol. 359, Issue 6378, pp. 912-915
6. Baptista, A.M. (2014). O Vale do Côa - Estudo e gestão de um complexo de sítios de arte rupestre Património Mundial. *Cuadernos de Arte Rupestre*, 7, pp. 113-135

*wild*. The same can be said concerning the various Palaeolithic female sculptures[7], which again have strong sexual attributes. The emergence of the human image stands for a human divide, still moderate (which also explains why the anthropomorphic images are limited in the Palaeolithic), but one which will grow to become dominant in the Holocene, amidst food production economies and dramatic demographic growth.



Fig.5.
Venus of Willendorf. Source: Soffer, Adovasio et al., 2000

Even in hunters' societies in transition into farming, such as in the monumental complex of Göbekli Tepe[8], in Turkey, almost 10.000 years ago, while one can recognise the dawn of complex religious behaviour associated to growing sedentism of these communities, the human image is still rooted in the zoocenosis, and is expressed through therianthrops.



Fig.6.
Bird shapped and other zoomorphic representation at Göbekli Tepe. Monolith 43. Source of photo: Sweatman and Tsikritsis, 2017.

It is with the first farming communities that the human image becomes a central theme, possibly related, also, to the emergence of the first religious processes: the images of the Human are, in this stage, transcendental entities standing for specific attributes, identifying their regulatory competences related to social and natural constraints. They remain, though, as part of

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7. Soffer, O.; Adovasio, J.M.; Hyland, D.C. (2000). The "Venus" Figurines. Textiles, Basketry, Gender, and Status in the Upper Paleolithic. *Current Anthropology* Volume 41, Number 4, pp. 511-537.

8. Sweatman, M.B.; Tsikritsis, D. (2017). Decoding Göbekli Tepe with Archaeoastronomy: what does the fox say? *Mediterranean Archaeology and Archaeometry*, Vol. 17, No 1, pp. 233-250

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an ethnocentric cosmovision: one should be careful when assigning the word "human" to those, since their names would probably rather coincide with the human groups that created them: there is hardly any evidence of a notion of humankind, beyond the cultural boundaries, even if it's also likely that the growing economic interaction of these groups will tend to foster the notion of a common "nature".

None of the Holocene early anthropomorphic images is known by its name. Yet, one may recognise strong similarities across them, starting with schematic depictions, occasionally associated to hunted deer[9] or to ploughing oxen, evolving through warriors or sailors. depicting a bipolar world of the living (marked by confrontation and production) and of the dead (source of empowerment, illustrated through ceramics or stelae)[10].

The earliest schematic Holocene human figures are geometric based, composed by traits. They can be isolated figures, but are mostly organised in groups, or sequences, often suggesting dances, i.e., illustrating collective rituals.

Fig.7.
Schematic anthropomorphic representations from the Neolithic rock art complex of the Tagus valley, Portugal. Source: Sara Garcês (Archive of the Instituto Terra e Memória, Mação, Portugal.

One must not explain all prehistoric art through one single common explanation, as Peter Ucko and A. Rosenfeld explained many years ago[11]. Several theories have been proposed to explain prehistoric art and its images (shamanism, art for art, magic hunting, etc.), but some consensus exists on their symbolic relevance and potential association to rituals. The process of constructing the human image becomes more clear in this context, building from everyday life contingencies into abstraction. The transcendental dimension becomes the foundation of the concrete, through

9. Garcês, S.; Oosterbeek, L. (2009), Cervídeos na arte rupestre do vale do Tejo. Contributo para o estudo da Pré-História recente. *Zahara* 14, 90-94.
10. Oosterbeek, L. (2001), Stones, carvings, foragers and farmers in the Southwest of Europe. A view from the inland. *Prehistoria 2000*, 150-168.
11. Ucko, P.; Rosenfeld, A. (1967). *Palaeolithic cave art.* New York: McGraw-Hill.

reconstructing performative experiences (dancing, hunting, praying,…).



Fig.8.
Anthropomorphic image carrying a dead red deer, from S. Simão, Tagus valley, Portugal. Note that the antler of the deer has been united to design a sun. The human image is of a strong male god or hero. Source: Sara Garcês (Archive of the Instituto Terra e Memória, Mação, Portugal.

One important element to consider is the perspective of the artist when observing Palaeolithic and later hunters, and first farming and later metal producers art. Whereas the former look "around", to check on food availability and often representing in profile the hunted animals, the later look "up", to check on weather conditions (the most relevant variable for farming groups). This posture in relation to the environment has relevant implications in the emergence of the human figure. The lateral perspective of the hunters tends to be addressed to tangible realities that can be seen and to which an intention may be assigned (this being at the origins of animism). The vertical perspective, though, requires an acceptance of a will that cannot be assigned to a perceived entity, thus raising the need to imagine its nature: supernatural entities become prominent within a cosmovision which is no longer govern by sight ("in the beginning there was the will of the animal, or the tree") but by pure abstraction ("in the beginning there was the word"). In this sense, the farmers human figure is a projection of human abilities into invisible powerful entities.

Portable art is of particular relevance in this transition process, since it allowed for individual appropriation of specific signifiers, such as the schematic slate plaques that occur in megalithic burials. These encapsulate the attributes of the deceased and act as a second layer of identity and exclusion: only a few would be entitled to use those signifiers, the geometric patterns remaining dominant.



Fig.9.
Slate plaque from Mação, Portugal, depicting a schematic head, with pierced eyes and a definition of the contour of the body from shoulders to belt. Source: ITM, Museum of Mação collections archive.

The progressive anthropisation of divinites is part of a process of segregation of the timeless sacred space[12] from the secularised daily dynamics. It is the tension between the power of the gods and the terrestrial power of the kings and alike, that will lead to the initial human images of...humans. These are often to be found associated to warfare, if not to other functional activities. This process of building a image of specific humans is not beyond difficulty, since the image and the entity are hardly disentangled: the image "is" the entity, like with icons, and this explains the resistance of many less compless societies to allow for being photographed. The same way illustrating animals starts by empowering human groups over them, the illustration of living humans becomes an expression of the domestication of the human, since it tends to empower some over the others. This process of domestication cannot be separated from the wider domestication process, which for the first time conditioned humans not only to natural cycles imposed on them, but to cultural cycles imposed by them, through their economic strategic choices.

This will entail a second important variation: whereas hunters representations are almost deprived from anthropic attributes (if one exclude possible feathers in some depictions), farmers human (transcendent) images always carry a sign of specific attributes (the Sun, dancing, clothes, weapons, hunted animals, etc.). This is an interesting evidence: the image of the human starts by being the image of a divided humanity (projected in the cosmos). Such process is particularly evident in syncretic figures such as stelae[13], which stand for the dichotomy alive/dead (mostly representing dead characters), for the sexual implications of empowerment (the shape of the stelae being a phallus, but also often including female attributes), and for the importance of inter-cultural conflict (weapons, negating the humanity of the "others").



Fig.10.
Bronze age stelae from the Gard region, in France. Source: Gutherz et al., 2014.

A common thread uniting all the mentioned disparate representations is that they conveyed information on the identity of their producers. Communicating became crucial for humans, to structure hunting strategies, farming activities or kinship relations. Tales and related narratives are

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12. Eliade, Mircea (1981), *O mito do eterno retorno: arquétipos e repetição.* Lisboa : Edições 70.
13. Gutherz, X. ; Jallot, L. ; Pernet, L. (2014). *Jean Arnal et le Néolithique en Languedoc. Album de l'exposition.* Montpellier : Agglomération.

known from ethnographic contexts and are still used in contemporary society when attempting to convince others (children or adults) to act in a certain direction. Orality is the core of such communication: there is no drawing, music or smell that can be as powerful as the combination of the words "global warming", once listened to, and then spoken back. Orality offers the possibility of expanding mnemonics, although it has two severe limitations: the limits of individual memory (rhythm and repetition are designed to counter this) and the fast transformation of phonemes (through pronunciation, leading to morphological and then conceptual transformation, thus losing its original meaning and informative function).

This is the source of relevance of rock art depictions of humans and beyond. Several functions are to be assigned to this material expression, from landscape markers to hunting tales or ceremonies. But what we can perceive is the occurrence of narratives (which would be oral) illustrated by images (that freeze those narratives). In this sense, rock art became a useful tool to limit the transformative changing dimension of oral mnemonics (even if images are, of course, highly transformative). Often associated to performances, this early art could become an illustration, an explanation, of core narratives of the human groups producing it, while embedding them in *nature*, thus rescuing it from the *wild* into the *cultural*. As a novel tool, it would be very limited in the attempts to change it, and this is why early art clusters are so repetitive and conservative (the same also occurs with stylistic early tools design).

These levers are, hence, an integrated tool-kit: memorising through syncretic perceptions that shape the understanding, memorising through gestures that lead to the production of anthropic landscapes, memorising trough spoken sounds that structure narratives, memorising through reproduced images which convey the former and embed it in the *natural* landscape.

The need for memorisation is related to the evolutionary capacity to anticipate. Our species is characterized by a dominant extra-somatic, cultural (i.e. learned, educated), behavior that is largely expressed through anticipation of consequences: humans act to obtain in practice what they foresee, given a remarkable capacity to relate themselves and their surrounding resources (e.g. energy sources, food, other humans,…) not only in space (locating them) but also in time (where they will be or how long it will take to reach them), establishing strategies that rooted in the awareness of cause and consequence flows.

The human image, once understood as part of a wider, environmental, context, would make little sense for societies still striving to establish the field of the tamed as opposed to the wild uncontrolled space. But once this space, the *domus*, starts to be secured, a relatively fast transition will occur, from therianthropes into divinities, from these into heroes, and from heroes into (leading) people. Later farming societies will evolve in the direction of depicting narratives, which might be mythical but growingly become closer to the everyday life of villages, as in the case of Ndalambiri rock art, in Angola[14].

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14. Martins, C. (2016). *Ndalambiri e a Arte Rupestre do Ebo, Kwanza Sul, Angola Tempo, Espaço e Gentes numa Paisagem Cultural*. Vila Real: Universidade de Trás-os-Montes e Alto Douro, PhD dissertation.

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This anticipatory competence is also present in the *Resus* monkey, for instance, but with humans it is taken to a much more complex level. In fact, human behavior is governed by the awareness of potential needs, resources and possibilities (theoretical knowledge) and by the capacity to bridge the gap between needs and resources rendering the possibilities effective (applied knowledge, or logistics). Actions are then determined by foresight: we do what we believe to be necessary to obtain a specific result, be it lunch, writing a book or travelling to the moon. In this exercise, we are thus conditioned by our capacity to imagine possibilities.

The notions of space, time and cause are the structuring cognitive tools in this process, and they are crucial to understand rock art. Out of these, space is particularly relevant, since it builds from feeling the physical segregation between what we recognize as our identity (itself an ongoing process) and the other things (what is not "us"); it uses touch, sight, smell, taste and hearing has primary channels of information. It is an abstract notion, though: humans perceive the space, and they shape it in cognitive terms through the actions they perform in and through it; before becoming a complex of landscapes (visual perceptions), the space is a complex of taskscapes (terrains of action). This is why space is crucial for identity building, but also why identity, in the end, cannot be defined beyond alterity (we can only understand the self through the eyes of the other, because the self is a relational construct, not an absolute eternal entity). The earlier images of the human start by being images of the transformation (therianthropes), then images the transcendent (divinities), to only later become images of heroes (still partially transcendent) and, in the end, mythical representations of the self.



Fig.11.
N'Dalambiri rock shelter in Ebo, Angola. Mythical representation of the control of domestic animals and plants (in cages, bellow) by humans, depicting a dwelling scene with two males and a pregnant female, the whole still being dominated by wild fauna (on top). Source: Martins, 2015.

The first level of understanding of objects, characteristics and external processes is thus highly cultural and anthropocentric, attributing human properties to other elements (animism and realism built from it), leading to a causal approach based on belief (eg magical explanations). In fact, the simple relation between perceived space and time does not generate rational explanatory sequences, because it simply engenders a transcendent causality, once the notion of space is constructed by the segregation of objects ("I am not these objects ") in an anthropocentric reasoning (discontinuous and constituted of isolated objects) with time being considered reversible (and interpreted as

changing objects according to" their will ").

A second level of understanding is generated by gesture and techniques. Once humans experience gestures, they recognize that events can be a (con) sequence of their own activity, thus developing a notion of causal mechanism driven by humans. While external causality is understood as reversible (according to the "will" of objects), immanent causality can be understood as irreversible (causes are in principle in the past, even though societies may believe in magical processes at this level). But when such causes are associated with the production of objects, the mastery of a causal sequence of gestures becomes necessarily irreversible (it is not possible to build a sickle without a prior recovery of the required raw materials; it's no longer possible to keep the gallet, when it was cut to produce a biface). Thus, technology is the driving process that builds physical causality and, hence, irreversible time and continuous space.

The notions associated with this cognitive revolution leave no trace in the archaeological record, but two major processes in the construction of these notions are: movement (associated with displacement) and technology (associated with gesture)[15]. Such processes can be evaluated when studying the source of raw materials, for example. The rock art itself is an archaeological product that can be evaluated in terms of materials and techniques. But it sometimes has the particularity of being the result of gestures that do not relate directly to short-term causal sequences (for example during the production of a scraper or even simply scratching a rock without a specific purpose) or to the mediation between needs and resources. In this sense, rock art is in the context of the detachment mentioned above between thought and effective action, as well as the notion of causal sequence.

The human image implies a global understanding of the human, which itself results from a long time process of segregations and later integration. The human image could barely be conceived out of an integrated global sociocultural and economic framework, and this is why, as such, it is a recent phenomenon.

In this process, identity is shaped through the accumulation of specific own knowledges, including artistic gestures, which create a new, anthropic-domestic, space. Rock art, although not a strict writing system, is therefore a signature within the landscape, and implies the existence of procedures to teach, at least to some, how to decode it. It is, also, a conservationist approach to communication, aiming to reduce flexibility of interpretation by establishing *reading guidelines*, which are lost for us but would be the key to interpret meaning.

This does not mean all rock art had to be about knowledge and mnemonics. Certainly we retrieve contexts which are mere scratches, or learning experiments, or aesthetic pleasure essays. In many cases, though, we face a composition of symbols (naturalistic or abstract) that stand for material or intangible realities (objects) recognised as separated from the subject artists: the rock art objectifies those realities, segregates them from the subject, and in such a process it builds from

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15. Mithen, S. (1999). *The Prehistory of the Mind: the cognitive origins of art, religion and science*. London: Thames and Hudson.

mental images to objectify landscapes and behavioural patterns, allowing not only to experience them, but to observe and study them at distance.

Recording "things" through engravings or paintings (animals, humans, plants, abstract motives) is an exercise of collective representation of mental images which aim at retrieving an expectation of balance amidst uncertainty (e.g., representing hunted species while they are away), at stressing the uniqueness of the human group amidst environmental diversity (e.g., representing hunting scenes) and at consolidating strict and conservative behaviour (e.g., representing performances). The rock art has, beyond the function of mnemonics, several other, including to describe myths, to accompany rituals, to formalise knowledge or to stress the circularity of time or to consolidate social structure (as may be the case in the Hal-Saflieni hypogeum, in Malta[16]). But all suggest the existence of a "story", a narrative, which may be explanatory, interrogative or even transformative but, in any case, allows for an analytical approach to context, engaging space (landscapes), time (stories) and cause (scenes). Through the combination of these, rock art could also have a prescriptive role, defining what could be done or not, and how or when it should be done.



Fig.12.
The "sleeping lady" of the Hal-Saflieni hypogeum, in Malta. Source: Mallia, 2008.

The human image requires the approach to the notion of human as an anthropic, non-ethno-centred, entity. Humanity is the results of a process through which *Homo sapiens* becomes human, itself a consequence of the current process of global transitions and integration, since it poses for the first time in History each individual in front of unlimited Universe. This may foster a Human collective identity, but it also segregates disruption and conflict. The major challenge is to understand that a human image, even when it may be an image of the *ethos,* is not, *per se,* an image of the human. This later one requires a specific philosophical understanding, which is far from being part of a conscious global awareness. Therefore, revisiting past anthropomorphic images, one must avoid taking the shape for a contemporary concept, just as it is fundamental to recognise that such contemporary concept is still in progress.

The human image started to be designed over 7.000 years ago. It is time, possibly, for it to flourish and prevail over the countless images of a segmented humanity.

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The Birth of Mnemosyne. The Emergence of the Image of the Human at the Dawn of Food Production

Luiz Oosterbeek

# How has Tourism Transformed the Human Image? A Happy Story Versus an Unhappy Story?

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Emerging during the 19th century, tourism participates in the discovery of the world and doing so it changes profoundly the way people see each other. The phenomenon is really impressive. The statistics are there to show it. In terms of employment, tourism is the activity that employs the most people worldwide. It is understandable that the impacts, in terms of images and representations, affect many people.

By taking part in this 'discovery'- and this is undoubtedly its raison d'être - tourism has certainly helped to make people 'happy'. Released for a moment from daily worries, they yearn for new and unexpected emotions, whether visiting a city or a monument, going to a beach or seeing a mountain. In this perspective, crossing boarders - be they mental, political, cultural or symbolic - is associated with a positive and rewarding approach to tourism, a peaceful activity in essence that gives rise to a better knowledge of the other and of oneself. In this sense, tourism is indeed linked to the construction of a changing world because it participates in its discovery and enjoyment and makes prosperous areas that are affected by it.

But the question of tourism cannot be tabled solely in terms of 'happy' or 'positive' flows leading to a better understanding of what surrounds tourist populations and, for each of them, to an ephemeral revitalization. Beyond the economic and symbolic benefits that they can derive from it, tourism is to be taken from the perspective of the 'receivers', namely the 'welcoming' populations, their capacity to absorb, adapt or even resist to these recurrent surges. By destructuring it as much as by polluting and exploiting it, it is also to be taken in terms of impacts on the environments visited. In this sense, it is part of a transformation of the human image in regions that collapse under the arrival of thousands even millions of people.

From this point of view, it is easy to understand that the images that emerge are very numerous, images that concern both the visitor and the visited, but also all the stakeholders (tour operators, promotors, guides, literature) who model these representations before, during and after the trip. In this sense, the representations given are part of specific contexts that change according to the objectives, duration and nature of the tourist trip. The process is therefore highly complex and depends on many factors that vary over time and in different places. This is the approach that has

chosen to be taken in this article. The impulses that govern the development of tourism can be considered from a psychological, political, economic, social, social and environmental perspective, perspectives that transcend the different historical periods - roughly 1750-2015 - but which acquire different intensities according to these periods.

Addressing these issues raises thorny conceptual, methodological and historiographical issues that we would like to discuss briefly in advance. The very notion of images must first be considered in terms of its definition and approach. If we considered tourism as inducing characterizations, how can we assign specific characteristics to populations that not only distinguish them from other populations, but that we also consider to be certain that they are the ones that are rightly recognized by populations as our own? In other words, what defines images and who defines it? In whose name? In the name of what? The answer to these questions is crucial in images research.

But it cannot be solved without acknowledging the physical, geographical and human history of the regions visited for tourism. This means that elements constituting images pre-existed to the tourist penetration and that they were considered as such. Let us consider issues of language, work, housing, sociability and culture. Let us take the example of the Alps. They were not empty: neither of populations, nor of history, nor of representations, nor of internal and mountain-specific mobility. Nor were they empty of travellers: while travelling through these territories, crossing them and crossing them again, soldiers, diplomats, workers, pilgrims spoke of what they saw, they shared what they felt. These "pre-tourist" mobilities have therefore also had an impact on the populations. If tourism can forge images or alter existing ones, it does so from a historically well-established base, built on very diverse registers and disseminated through many stories, literary or otherwise.

The methodological consequences of these remarks are very important. The corpus of sources from which the work is carried out has a direct influence on the assessment of the views and judgments that are made. In this case, this remark makes sense because the development of tourism has triggered the participation of many stakeholders whose status, positions, knowledge and skills vary greatly: stakeholders outside the territory and society such as tourist operators, travel agencies, tourists themselves and their guides, but also indigenous stakeholders, such as mountain guides, hoteliers, innkeepers, valet operators, staff working on the spot, the general population. These elements are still intertwined insofar as tourism activates mobility not only of travellers, but also of the workforce employed in the tourism sector. This includes populations of different origins and places, thus telescoping identity elements based on factors that can present great differences. By expressing themselves, by manifesting themselves or by meeting each other, these actors diffuse images, convey representations and feed perceptions that lead to the construction of identities that refer to a set of elements that are necessarily disparate, sometimes contradictory, very often confusing, and inevitably changing.

Without being totally dependent on it, the answers to the question of images cannot be completely dissociated from the general process of tourism development and from the process of tourist industrialisation, which began to take shape in the 1750s. The strength of the technical

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and economic changes affecting tourism, the recognition of this activity as a sector, the strategic considerations that are now beginning to surround it affect the sphere of images in one way or another. In this respect, the history of tourism, and more particularly the economic history of tourism, activates historiographically a problem that is far from being solved. It concerns the degree of participation of tourism receivers in this process. While it is generally agreed that tourism was born out of impulses from outside the regions visited, there are divergent opinions about the attitudes of indigenous populations when tourism arrives.

In this perspective, tourism is fundamentally controversial. It refers as much to a history of happiness as to a history of misfortune, as much to a history of knowledge as to a history of stereotypes, as much to a history of identity constructions as to a history of negations and rejections, as much to a history of liberations as to a history of dominations. A history of tourism cannot avoid these approaches, which are combined over time according to an appropriate chronology that does not, however, fall into rigidity. There are many overlaps and sometimes, more than they shed light on perceptible developments, they sometimes confuse them.

### The starting point: an affirmation of self through the discovery of the other

The "tourist" vocation of the Grand Tour has been affirmed and demonstrated many times over. Travels undertaken by teenagers from the aristocracy and wealthy British families, but also Dutch, French, Danish, Russian to perfect their education, or even by artists and scholars, the Grand Tour prefigures for many what tourists and tourists will impose later. First of all, at the level of routes, the north-south axis is privileged. The horizontal dimension, without being absent, only becomes attractive later.

Secondly, at the level of destinations, the Mediterranean remains a central objective. It has an extraordinary fascination that is not limited to Italy, but encompasses its surroundings. Which is always the case. Another structuring element: the interest in cities, Paris, Brussels, Geneva, Venice, Rome, Naples. These places require stops for their historical, artistic, cultural and social appeal. Finally, the Alps are only gradually promoting them as soon as the transit area that it used to be becomes the safe place to stay that it will become. Finally, in terms of uses, emotional capacity is expressed in the search for experiences as diverse as art, architecture, antiquities, nature, health, sexuality, etc. From this point of view, it is undeniable that a continuity associates these practices: beauty, desire, emotion, distraction, jouissance, knowledge serve as foundations.

But it is not possible to combine 'Grand Tour' and tourism. Both the social profile and the modalities of travel and residence distance them from each other. The Grand Tour takes place over a year or more. It brings together a real team surrounding the young man: collectors, friends, servants, which gives the whole a very hierarchical structure focused on the teenager's person. As such, the Grand Tour is an individual rather than a collective experience.

The tourist flows that emerge at the end of the Napoleonic wars cover a maximum of four weeks

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and are composed according to different registers. The collective is necessary because travel is no longer considered in isolation because of costs. Thomas Cook's travels include up to 100 people and even more. The composition includes family, friendly or social elements according to status, professions, religions, nationalities. The social homogeneity of the group is nevertheless affirmed and the concern for apparent distinction is apparent. A "bourgeois" clientele, financially well off, it is reinforced by the cultural capital of which it is a carrier and of which travel guides will show the full extent. The experience is steeped in a "kind of collective individualism." One last difference needs to be made. The Grand Tour is above all a male affair, while the female component determines tourism as it was defined in 1815 for many. It is even becoming the majority element with a huge long-term impact.



AN INNOCENT ABROAD

A PHILOSOPHICAL EXCURSIONIST

*Elderly Gentleman (politely to middle-aged Spinster opposite, evidently one of Cook's Tourists).* "AND WHERE, MAY I ASK, ARE YOU GOING NEXT?"
*Middle-aged Spinster.* "OH! LET ME SEE!—I'M GOING TO GENEVA!"
*Elderly Gentleman.* "GOING TO GENEVA! WHY, YOU ARE IN GENEVA!"
*Middle-aged Spinster.* "AM I REALLY? OH, THEN I'M GOING TO MILAN!"

These elements do not evaporate afterwards. They are even the backbone of tourism. Refinements are certainly taking place in the diversification of destinations and practices, the reduction in the length of stays and their repetition, the widening of the tourist seasons, the growing importance of tourist agencies and organised trips. If the two world wars and the economic crises impose stops, the Glorious Thirties lead to a social expansion of the tourist that the Popular Front, in 1936, had suggested. But roughly speaking, nothing no longer alters these structural foundations. In France, Club Méditerranée ("Club Med") is a good example of the success of post-war mass tourism. It bases its development on the promotion of imaginations that favour, depending on the case, immaculate nature, eternal youth and sexual liberation. A hedonistic vision of free time must allow the tourist to multiply, without limits, the experiences in order to achieve utopia.

## An intermediate point: a national affirmation

The personal component, in its individual or collective dimension, underlines the ability of an activity to mobilize multiple affects. In other words, it gives free rein to the intrusion of other determinants. The national dimension is not the slowest to slip in. Historiography has been quick to demonstrate the instrumentalization of tourism in objectives that go beyond simple self-assertion. The nation, a key concept of the 19th century, requires recognition that can both bring all its inhabitants together in the same mould and ensure its affirmation in the face of others. If, in this perspective, tourism primarily targets domestic customers, it also radiates "foreign" visitors. The movement did not diminish in the 20th century and even took on an unsuspected vigour with the emergence of totalitarianisms - fascist, Nazi or communist - which used and abused artefacts to "enlarge" national grandeur and legitimize their existence. Choosing exemplary sites, building ex-nihilo sites, highlighting specific "memories", everything contributes to dazzle the tourist, native or foreign, in the supervised maze of his visits or meetings.



Prora, a Nazi seaside resort

What is being experienced in democratic states is not to be outdone. In Switzerland, France and Great Britain, the patriotic touch of tourism is never absent, even if it is more watered down. Battlefield' tourism is generating a huge enthusiasm in this respect, which is in the same vein. Already present in the 19th century with the trips organized in Waterloo, it experienced, following the First World War, an expansion that saw tourists communing in the same fervour with the development of cemeteries, the creation of museums, the erection of monuments, the celebration of anniversaries. Tourism is invited to these events, which took on a new dimension after the Second World War. The emergence of 'black tourism', also known as dark, macabre or thanatourism, underlines the sector's ability to attract lots of visitors willing to pay for access to places associated with death, suffering or disasters.

This insistent national presence must not neglect the attention paid to regional specificities which, in the same movement, contribute to better demonstrating the impact of tourism in this

euphoria: the promotion of local gastronomy, folklore, customs and new natural sites contribute to this affirmation of communities that know how to sell their particularisms.

## An essential point: an economic and technological affirmation

Highlighting the economic and technological contribution of tourism activity appears to be a truism in the light of contemporary perspectives. However, this has not always been the case. The first international statistics did not appear until 1936. The 19th century did not bring the tourist aspect to the centre of economic attention: a minor activity because it was socially narrow and did not have the critical mass to really influence the course of events. However, the so-called Long Depression of 1873-1896 encouraged tourism to play a more active role. The birth of tourist information offices or tourist offices emerged in this difficult context. Under the impetus of railway and hotel companies, it opens the way for larger initiatives. The creation of national tourist offices therefore underlines a trend that no longer casts doubt on the economic "realities" of tourism. The promotion of a destination is based on the certainty of a causal link between the arrival of visitors and the prosperity of the place in terms of job creation and increased wealth. In the Alpine and Pyrenean valleys in particular, the exodus is slowed down thanks to initiatives that combine the summer season and, thanks to the promotion of snow sports, the winter season. The tourism sector can ensure viability for populations exposed to existential difficulties. It is therefore one of the instruments commonly associated with economic policies.

The impact of tourism is still visible in technological terms. While transport offers new opportunities that facilitate the arrival of tourists on high places (mountain railways, funiculars, cable cars), the hotel industry remains, in this respect, an intense place for experimentation. Electricity, elevators, sanitary installations, hot water supply, heating, fitted kitchens, ventilation systems are achievements that, in the last quarter of the 19th century, began their career in these areas before being exported to other places. As a corollary to these innovations, the management of establishments that often reach considerable dimensions leads to the birth of a real "tourism science". The creation of hotel schools in the 1890s was based on the conviction that the professions related to hospitality required specific training leading to recognised certifications.

From this perspective, the real tourist excitement that accompanies the Glorious Thirties is based on a renewed offer of travel arrangements. Alongside an obvious increase in real incomes, the automobile is revolutionising European tourist maps at the same time as it is reconfiguring relations with objects of envy. Access to the sea and mountains is being transformed by the construction of new roadways which, in turn, generate new destinations which, in turn, provide the necessary infrastructure. This virtuous circle is not fundamentally challenged by the economic crises of the 1970s. On the contrary. The trend decline in oil prices was combined with the electronic revolution and the emergence of low-cost airlines to turn tourism into a very large-scale activity in the 1990s, which was considered necessary for the survival of many regions.

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Taking into account the overall revenues generated by international tourism and its economic benefits, the total amount amounts to €937 billion in 2014, of which 41% for Europe (€383 billion). International tourism accounts for 30% of world services exports and 6% of total exports. The sector ranks fourth in terms of exports after fuels, chemicals and food. If we go beyond this global framework, tourism even appears to be a priority sector for many countries. France is a good example of this as the world's leading tourist destination and third in terms of revenue. In order to support the French tourism sector, his government put in place a real battle plan in June 2014 with 30 very concrete decisions. The objective is to welcome 100 million visitors by 2020, promoting new destinations in order to better break down foreign tourists who tend to be concentrated in Paris and the Côte d'Azur. The diversification of tourist practices makes it possible to highlight the natural, historical, cultural and gastronomic specificities of less well-known areas.

## A recurring point: ecological and social destruction

The impact of mass tourism on the societies and areas visited, in cultural, social and environmental terms, nevertheless reveals difficulties. Pollution, overexploitation and conflicts of use combine to make tourism appear destructive. Even if concerns emerged at the beginning of the 20th century, particularly in mountain regions, awareness was evident as early as the 1970s. Ecological impacts are most visible in the destruction of ecosystems as a result of the excessive construction of tourist infrastructures (Balearic Islands, Côte d'Azur, etc.), the pollution of spaces (bottles, packaging, plastics, etc.) and the consumption of natural resources, particularly water, which can cause shortages for local populations. In addition, fauna and flora are weakened by the crushing or taking of rare grasses and species or the capture of animals. The exponential increase in mobility generated by tourist flows is also contributing to global warming. While it is estimated that 20% of total GHGs (greenhouse gases) come from tourist travel, these climate changes put at risk many mountain resorts which, given their altitude, suffer from a lack of snow making it difficult to practice regular winter sports. The effects are also visible on beach tourism. For many experts, it is to be expected that the competitive position of some of the now popular holiday regions (e. g. the Mediterranean in summer) will deteriorate due to coastal erosion.

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On the cultural and social level, tourism is causing major disruptions. It can aggravate inequalities and weaken communities. There are many competitions between "rich" and "poor" tourists and they are at the origin of the birth of "ghettos" which take the visitor away from the daily reality experienced by the visitor but also from the appearance of a new crime and prostitution. In addition, some destinations may find themselves in serious difficulty in the event of a political or natural disaster. Several recent examples have shown the vulnerability of tourism to the dangers of terrorism.



Graffiti against tourist waves is on the rise in Spanish cities. Here in Oviedo, on August 4, 2017. MaxPPP/EPA/ALBERTO MORANTE

## Feedback: the new attractions of tourism

Should we therefore condemn all tourist activities? In other words, does tourism still have a future? The question is legitimate when it seeks to question the meaning of an activity whose contemporary abuses turn the heads of producers, consumers, affected populations, political decision-makers and observers more or less well intentioned. Tired visitors, blocked highways, exhausted sites, crowded beaches, saturated ski slopes, overcrowded airports, everything indicates that tourism is rushing into a wall where happiness will certainly not be there. Tourism, an instrument of misfortune ? Europe is frontally affected by the phenomenon. Whether we think of Mallorca, Barcelona or Cinque Terre, to take only the most striking examples. Beyond the forecasts of some and others, beyond the exorbitant expectations of regions that see no reason not to participate in the promised dividends, tourism promotion is no longer conceivable without a change in its objectives and values. The utopia achieved can quickly turn into a generalized nightmare. Answers are provided: the development of ʻsoftʼ, responsible, authentic, or ecotourism tourism, respectful of human and natural environments, goes hand in hand with that of solidarity tourism and the dissemination of an image of tourists who are aware of the stakes involved in looking at the visitor and the development of policies to reduce the environmental burden, ranging from a

*numerus clausus* to a simple periodic ban on access to sites. Tourism thus aims to become a project shared by the inhabitants, chosen and not suffered, sources of fair income and above all a space for meeting and exchanging with small groups in search of another trip. Will these measures be possible and sufficient?

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# The Human Image in the Nag Hammadi Library

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## 1. Introduction

This paper investigates the human image in the Nag Hammadi library by using the history of ideas that traces the origin of a certain idea or thought over time in history.[1] The Nag Hammadi library is an important source of Gnosticism and it is a valuable resource for the study of historical Jesus and anthropology.[2] The texts in the Nag Hammadi library are fifty-two documents, and all of them were Coptic translations from originally written in Greek. Since the library was discovered in 1945 in Upper Egypt, many scholars have not only conducted a great deal of research into Christian origin, but also defined Gnosticism.[3] Before the discovery of the texts, the study of Gnosticism heavily depends on the writings of church fathers and a few fragments of gnostic texts. Although the study of the library is a relatively new field compared to that of other ancient Mediterranean religions,[4] some documents have attracted much attention in connection with the study of anthropology (the human image) and Christology (*The Gospel of Thomas*, *Apocryphon of John*, *The Apocryphon of James*).[5] The human image in the Nag Hammadi library seems to be diverse. It figuratively appears as a god, Adam, or beast(lion).[6] For further discussion of them, I will first deal with the relationship between the Nag Hammadi library and Gnosticism. Then, I will

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1. Arthur O. Lovejoy, *The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936; repr., 1948), 1-21; according to him, "there is a great deal more that is common to more than one of these provinces than is usually recognized, that the same idea often appears, sometimes considerably disguised, in the most diverse regions of the intellectual world." Lovejoy, 14-15; In particular, "unit-ideas in the collective thought of large groups of persons, not merely in the doctrines or opinions of a small number of profound thinkers or eminent writers." Lovejoy, 19.
2. Birger A. Pearson, *Ancient Gnosticism: Traditions and Literature* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2007), 22.
3. The Nag Hammadi Library not only gives valuable information on New Testament theology but also on the gnostic movement of the 2nd-4th centuries. Furthermore, it presents a new challenge to methodology of the New Testament, the study of the New Testament Apocrypha, and Q document as well as Coptic.
4. David Brakke, "Nag Hammadi," in *Encyclopedia of Religion*, ed. Lindsay Jones (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2005), 6398.
5. In relating this topic, scholars also pay attention to The Gospel of Judas and The Gospel of Mary, though they do not belong to the Nag Hammadi library.
6. James M. Robinson, ed. *The Nag Hammadi Library* (New York: HarperCollins, 1990), 127 and 319 .

look into the human nature and the journey of the soul in the Nag Hammadi library.

## 2. The Nag Hammadi Library and Gnosticism

Most texts of the Nag Hammadi library have gnostic elements. However, not all scholars agree with this. They pose a problem of the gnostic characters on some texts of *Plato Republic 588a-589b*, *Zostrianos*, *The Discourse on the Eighth and Ninth*, *The Prayer of Thanksgiving*, *The Teaching of Silvanus*, and *The Gospel of Thomas*. This may be right or wrong depending on how to define Gnosticism.

There are many kinds of Gnosticism not only in other religious traditions, but also in the Christian tradition. Karen King wrote a book, "What is Gnosticism?"[7] She does not answer because she tries to find one typical Gnosticism, after enumerating all information of gnostic feature, rather than tracing the core of Gnosticism. Other scholars also fail to consistently define Gnosticism because Sethian Gnosticism, Valentinian Gnosticism, Thomas' Gnosticism, and Basilides' Gnosticism are different, although they have common factors that often are unaddressed by scholars.

The Nag Hammadi library presents specific and various characteristics of Christian and non-Christian Gnosticism, but some scholars define Gnosticism in a restrictive perspective that simply implies a Jewish and Christian heretical movement from the second to forth centuries, which is mostly dependent on the writings of famous church fathers (Irenaeus, Origen, Justin, Tertullian, and etc). Other scholars trace Gnosticism from the Jewish background, but it comes from Greek philosophers such as Pythagoras, Xenophanes, Plato and Aristotle.[8] Particularly, in *Parmenides* (137. d), Plato delineates that the conception of the Monad that does not belong to the material world. In addition, in the story of the cave, he describes the enlightened human who comprehends the true knowledge. Thus, one can say that Plato provides all philosophical foundation of Gnosticism. In general, Gnosticism was also influenced by the Old Testament, Zoroastrians, Mesopotamian religion, and Greco-Roman religions as well as Greek philosophy.

Based on the above arguments, I define that Gnosticism is a religion of enlightenment, in comparison with the religion of law, or grace. The term Gnosticism comes from Greek adjective *gnōstikos* (Plato's *Statesman* 258e),[9] which refers to a kind of science or the meaning of "knowledge" that gives enlightenment and true salvation.[10] The most important features of Gnosticism are the notion of the Monad and the journey of the soul.[11] Gnosticism begins to pursue the invisible,

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7. Karen L. King, *What Is Gnosticism?* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2003)
8. See Frank N. Magill, ed. *Dictionary of World Biography: The Ancient World, Vol. 1* (Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn, 1998), 729; Forrest E. Baird and Walter Kaufmann, *Philosophic Classics Voume I: Ancient Philosophy*, 3 ed. (Upper Saddle River: Prentice-Hall, 2000), 12-15.
9. Hdith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, eds., *The Collected Dialogues of Plato: Including the Letters*, Bollingen Series, vol. LXXI (New York: pantheon books, 1961), 1021.
10. Pearson, 11.
11. Gregory J. Riley, *The River of God: A New History of Christian Origins* (New York: HarperCollins, 2001), 42-48.

imperishable, everlasting, perfect, unknowable, omnipresent, and spiritual god, (*Eugnostos* 71.14-72.20 and *Apocryphon of John* 4.2-9) that philosophers have named "the Monad". This notion of Monad came from ancient philosophy and science. The Monad is not jealous, but overflowing, which constitutes many spiritual layers (*pleroma*).[12] Thus, every spiritual being originates from the Monad in the gnostic system. Thus, Gnosticism gives a revolutionary view to the history of religion, because it focuses on spirit founded on the geo-centric universe and the body and soul dualism. Unlike the gods of the Old Testament and Homer who have bodies and appear in human forms living in the three story universe, the god, the Monad is spiritually dwelling in the geo-centric universe. In this regard, the true part of human beings is the soul and it originates from the Monad in this system.

Looking at the concepts of the Monad and the journey of the soul in *Plato Republic 588a-589b*, *Zostrianos*, *The Discourse on the Eighth and Ninth*, *The Prayer of Thanksgiving*, *The Teaching of Silvanus*, and *The Gospel of Thomas*, one finds that these belong to the Gnostic document. For example, *Plato Republic 588a-589b* seems to be a part of Plato's *Republic*, which is far from the Gnostic movement of from the second to fourth centuries, but it implies "the rationality of soul" and the journey of the soul.[13] *Discourse on the Eighth and Ninth* explicitly means that the soul travels through the seven spheres. After passing through these areas, it will travel to the eighth and ninth spheres where soul can experience true blessings.[14] Here, the Monad without a birth and the distinct journey of the soul are clearly described.[15] *The Prayer of Thanksgiving* also contains the journey of the soul, as one can see it from the beginning of the first sentence, "Every soul and heart is lifted up to You." The statement, "We rejoice because while we were in (the) body, You have made us divine through Your knowledge" indicates that the knowledge of God made the human being divine, which also reveals the gnostic characteristics.[16] Some scholars evaluate *The Teaching of Silvanus* as having the most non-gnostic character among the Nag Hammadi texts, though it appears to be late Stoicism and Middle Platonism.[17] This document, however, says, "God is the spiritual one. Man has taken shape from the substance of God. The divine soul shares partly in this One (God); furthermore, it shares partly in the flesh."[18] The text also claims that the essence of humans is the soul, and God has given it to humans.[19]

*The Gospel of Thomas* shares many of the verses parallel to that of the canonical Gospels, and it does not include the important gnostic terms such as "Aeon," "demiurge," "pleroma," and "The myth of Sophia." Thus, some scholars view that it is not a gnostic work from its

12. Riley, 46-47.
13. Robinson, 319.
14. Robinson, 321.
15. Robinson, 327.
16. Robinson, 329.
17. Robinson, 379.
18. Robinson, 385.
19. Robinson, 384.

beginninh.[20] On the other hand, Helmut Koester, Elaine Pagels, Howard M. Jackosn, and James D. G. Dunn see it as a gnostic document, because *the Gospel of Thomas* contains the middle Platonic thought that emphasizes the soul.[21] The implication of the Monad appears in the text, and the chosen soul comes from heaven and return to heaven, which shows the journey of the soul.[22] In *the Gospel of Thomas* 49, Jesus says, "Blessed (*machrios*) are the solitary (*monachos*), and elect, for you shall find the Kingdom; because you come from it, (and) you shall go there again (*parin*)."[23] The author of *the Gospel of Thomas* often mentions those who are 'alone' (16; 49; 75), 'one' (22; 106), and 'only one' (4; 22) entering the kingdom of heaven. Therefore, the texts of the Nag Hammadi library have often mentioned the journey of the soul and the monolithic Monad. If one looks at the Nag Hammadi library with these two concepts, one will find that they have made many contacts with ancient gnostic ideas that explain the human image in the particle of the Monad. In this regard, because human souls come from and return to the Monad, the notion of the journey of the soul deeply connects the human image with God in the Nag Hammadi library.

## 3. The Human Nature in the Nag Hammadi Library

The gnostic view of the world starts out from a strict cosmic dualism. Life and death, truth and falsehood, salvation and ruin of human life are anchored in the cosmos. In the primeval time, a part of the light fell into the power of the darkness. In order to be able to maintain their hold on the light, the evil powers created the world and human bodies. They confine them in the physical world. In order to redeem and bring home the lost creatures of the light, the good God of life sends the saving knowledge (gnosis) into the world. By illuminating humans as to their true origin and true being, this knowledge bestows on them the power to return to the heavenly homeland after they take off their body. In this connection the figure of a Redeemer is often met with the one that is sent by the Father, mostly in the primeval time, to impart the knowledge. Under this gnosis, humans put themselves into either the children of light who are from the above, or the children of darkness who do not bear any soul of light in themselves. After his completed work of redemption, the Redeemer ascends again and so makes a way for the elements of light that follow him. This Redeemer's descending and ascending is reflected in the journey of the soul.

The dualistic view of the world has influenced the gnostic view of the human image. While the material world is the "demonistic conception of the world," the spiritual domain is the kingdom of the "unknown God." Likewise, the human body as "demonistic conception" for the soul, which

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20. Pearson, 257 and 67.
21. See Stephen J. Patterson, "Jesus Meets Plato: The Theology of the Gospel of Thomas and Middle Platonism," in *Thomasevangelium: Entstehung, Rezeption, Theologie* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008), 181-205.
22. Although Pearson acknowledges the soul's journey, but he denies that *the Gospel of Thomas* is a gnostic document. Pearson, 266.
23. Antoine Guillaumont, ed. *The Gospel According to Thomas* (Leiden: E J Brill, 1959), 29.

is compared with the soul as the "seed of light" in human beings.[24] Alongside the body and soul dualism, gnostic anthropology presents tripartite human classes: spiritual(*pneumatic*), soul(*psychic*), and fleshly(*sarkic*), or also called material(*hylic*).[25] While the spiritual human is a gnostic who knows the true God and one's origin, the fleshly human is ignorant of the true God and forgets one's origin and divine spark in oneself. The psychic belongs to the middle position between the spiritual and the fleshly.

In the *On the Origin of the World* 117.28-35, the author of this text clearly states this:

> Now the first Adam, (Adam) of Light, is spirit-endowed(*pnematikos*) and appeared on the first day. The second Adam is soul-endowed(*psykhikos*) and appeared on the sixth day, which is called Aphrodite. The third Adam is a creature of the earth(*khoikos*), that is, the man of the law, and he appeared on the eighth day [... the] tranquility (*anapausis*)of poverty, which is called Sunday (*hēmera Hēliou*).

The author distinguishes three Adam figures. "All three have indeed originated in succession, but they are united in the one first man; they form the three constituents of every man."[26] Although the psychics seem to have possibilities to be redeemed, strictly "only the pneumatics are gnostics and capable of redemption."[27] Thus, because Adam represents three human classes, "the gnostic sees in Adam his own destiny (fall, knowledge, redemption) anticipated."[28] *The Apocryphon of James* describes the relationship among spirit, soul, and body, saying "For it is the spirit that raises the soul, but the body that kills it" (12.7-9).[29]

*The Apocryphon of John* explains how the fall happens and what the human condition is. The true human nature is soul, not body. To understand the human nature properly, one needs to understand the creation of the material world and physical human beings. As I mentioned earlier, soul that has the true human nature comes from the Monad. According to *the Apocryphon of John*, Yaldabaoth, the material god, creates this material world and the human body according to the pattern of the Monad, and imprisons soul into body. In his "Introduction" to *the Apocryphon of John*, Frederik Wisse writes, "Thus begins a continuous struggle between the powers of light and the powers of darkness for the possession of the divine particles in man."[30] The Monad hides Epinoia (the seed of light) in Adam.[31]

24. Kurt Rudolph, *Gnosis: The Nature and History of Gnosticism*, trans. R. McLachlan Wilson (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987), 88.
25. Rudolph, 91-92.
26. Rudolph, 92.
27. Rudolph, 92.
28. Rudolph, 102.
29. Robinson, 35.
30. Robinson, 104.
31. In the Nag Hammadi Library, Epinoia, Sophia, Pistis, Pistis Sophia, Zoe, Protennoia, and Norea are the different names of the seed of the monad or 'spark' of God.

And he sent, through his beneficent Spirit and his great mercy, a helper to Adam, luminous Epinoia which comes out of him, who is called Life. And she assists the whole creature, by toiling with him and by restoring him to his fullness and by teaching him about the descent of his seed (and) by teaching him about the way of ascent, (which is) the way he came down. And the luminous Epinoia was hidden in Adam, in order that the archons might not know her, but that the Epinoia might be a correction of the deficiency of the mother. (*The Apocryphon of John* 20.15-29).[32]

In the Gnostic system, thus, although the cosmos is evil due to the creation of material gods (Yaldabaoth or demiurge), the human image is positive for those who belong to *pneumatic*, and skeptical for those who are *psychic*, but negative for those who are *sarkic*.

## 4. The Human Image in the Journey of the Soul

Although human beings consist of the body and soul, the true identity of humans is the soul, not the body. The human body is a tomb for the soul in Gnosticism. Like sun's emanation, the human soul is emanated from the Monad and the layers of emanation are countless. While the emanation of the Monad stops at the Holy Spirit in the Christian tradition, the emanation continues to endlessness in the gnostic tradition. Due to this various spiritual levels, the goal of human beings is to cultivate their soul and let their soul return to the true spirit, the Monad, after their bodies perish. *The Hymn of the Pearl* beautifully describes this journey of the soul.[33] It is a "Hellenistic myth of the human soul's entry into bodily incarnation and its eventual disengagement from the body."[34] Likewise, *The Exegesis on the Soul* states the journey of the soul "from her fall into the world to her return to heaven."[35] Here, the soul is described a female image. After she fell down into the body and came to this earthly life, her life was defiled and abused by many robbers. Throughout the reunion with her brother in the bridal chamber, she can ascend heaven. The text narrates, "Then when she becomes young again she will ascend, praising the father and her brother, by whom she was rescued. Thus it is by being born again that the soul will be saved" (134:26-30).[36]

## 5. Conclusion

In the Nag Hammadi library, the human image appears in the various forms. The basic human image is *pneumatichic*, *psychic*, and *sarkic*, which emphasizes the soul as the true human nature.

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32. Robinson, 116.
33. It does not belong to the Nag Hammadi Library, but its text is attested as a part of *The Acts of Thomas*. See Bentley Layton, ed. *The Gnostic Scriptures: Ancient Wisdom for the New Age* (New York: Doubleday, 1987), 367-69.
34. Layton, 366.
35. Robinson, 192.
36. Robinson, 196.

The body and soul dualism is reflected by the dualistic world view. To find the human image in the Nag Hammadi library, I have tried to define Gnosticism whose core is the notion of the Monad and the journey of the soul. Here, God appears as the Monad that is only 'one' from which every spiritual being originates. In this definition of Gnosticism, the all texts of the Nag Hammadi library belong to Gnosticism. Thus, the library divides humans into three classes. Adam represents these three at the same time. Although Adam was created by the material god, he possessed the spark of the Monad. Based on the journey of the soul, the soul of all three classes begins its travel to the Monad after its outer body perishes. There are many obstacles waiting for the soul during its journey. The only selected soul (peumatichic) who knows gnosis can be saved. Therefore, the human image in the library is ambivalence and paradoxical. On the one hand, the human image is positive because the soul contains the spark of the Monad. On the other hand, the human image is negative or pessimistic because the soul is imprisoned in the body that was created by the material god who confirms humans into the material world. The three classes of human beings indicate that the gnostic human view is elitism that the selected who know gnosis are saved only.

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# From Pariah to Prime Minister: Transformation in the Images of the Indian Community in the Caribbean

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## Introduction

Between 1838 and 1920, more than half million Indians migrated to the Caribbean as Indian indentured labourers; from which 143,939 were assigned to various plantations in the British colony of Trinidad. Most of these indentured labourers were drawn from the agricultural and laboring classes of the Uttar Pradesh and Bihar regions of north India, with smaller numbers being recruited from Bengal and various regions of south India. Approximately 85% of the immigrants were Hindus, and 14% Muslims (Vertovec 1992). During the 82-year tenure of the system, Indians had an indelible impact on the Caribbean landscape; not just by fulfilling their ascribed economic role as the proverbial "saviours" of the sugar, but also in terms of their social, cultural and emotional presence. The system was terminated in 1920, which set the stage for a new dynamic for those Indians who had opted to make Trinidad, and by extension, the Caribbean their home; especially since they were now unfettered by the rules, regulations, and restrictions of the system of Indian indenture.

By 1921, Indians comprised 33% of the entire Trinidad population, with a rise to 35% in 1946.[1] In the immediate post-indenture period, there was an increasingly marked focus on and acceleration of social change and further integration into the wider society towards the goal of being recognized as a part of Trinidad society, rather than as a semi-alien entity grudgingly hosted on its margins. With most of the fundamental, inherently Indian social, religious, economic and political structures in place, the drive towards personal and communal advancement saw a dynamic interplay between "Indian" and "Trinidadian," the traditional and the modern, the religious and the secular, retention and transformation, between the theory of being "free" and the reality of restrictions.

The period 1945-1990 was characterized by tremendous economic and political change which, in turn, served to shape the extent and nature of transformation within the Indian

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1. Colony of Trinidad and Tobago Census Album, 1948.

community in Trinidad. The first half of the period (1945-1962) saw an overall growth in the country's economy, facilitated largely by an upswing in the oil industry.[2] Some Indians were also to profit from this economic windfall, achieving a substantial degree of economic prosperity and social mobility. However, the sugar industry also contributed substantially to the country's economy and employment. Nevertheless, a combination of factors simultaneously hastened the collapse of agriculture, and hence, worsened conditions for other Indians. The over reliance on oil revenues was cruelly exposed when a steep drop in international oil prices, together with a decline in Trinidad's oil production in the 1980s, ushered in harsh economic conditions. The advent of universal Adult Suffrage in 1945 heightened the organization of political groups, and simultaneously paved the way for the dominance of middle class politics. In addition, constitutional change in 1950 for the first time gave elected members a clear majority in the Legislative Council and further transformed the face of politics in Trinidad and Tobago. Further constitutional change in 1956 opened up the possibility of party government, if a single party gained a clear majority of the elected seats. Against this backdrop, the People's National Movement, led by Dr. Eric Williams, emerged to dominate Trinidad and Tobago politics until the 1980s. Williams, however, refused to be party to any deal with the leading Hindu politicians. Yet, he won the support from some Indian Muslims and Indian Christians. The P.N.M.'s anti-Hindu tactics "...helped to heighten racial fears and to institutionalize patterns of voting and political mobilization along racial lines."[3] Thus, while the P.N.M. was victorious, it was a country deeply divided along ethnic lines which acquired Independence in 1962.

Within this context, the Indian community proceeded on its efforts at transforming and establishing itself in terms of both its internal operations and its relation with the national community. This entailed substantial navigation, assimilation, excision and accretion, often seasoned with a diametric pull between the community's intrinsically Indian systems and values and the sometimes dissonant systems and values of the wider Trinidad society. The crux of the challenge of transformation resided in the establishment of a balance between retaining the essence of Indianness in the more private settings, while simultaneously yielding to the often contradictory requirements of integration into the wider Trinidad society. Within this framework, the paper examines some of the major issues, institutions and developments that, in varying ways, served to shape and transform images of the Indian community in Trinidad. Many of these issues, though operating within the Indian community, were in some way related to the desire for public recognition and acceptance as both equal citizens of Trinidad and Tobago, and as Indians. Towards this end there were deliberately engineered efforts for the purpose of enhancing the visibility and acceptance of the Indian community as a valid aspect of Trinidad society. There were also movements that can be read as the natural result of the location of Indians in the dynamic, multicultural context of Trinidad and Tobago. It should be noted that the paper focuses on the

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2. Bridget Brereton, A History of Modern Trinidad 1783-1962 (U.S.A.: Heinemann International, 1981) 216.

3. Brereton 237.

experience of Indians in Trinidad; as a microcosm of the larger Indo-Caribbean experience, since Trinidad received the second largest number of Indian indentured immigrants to the Caribbean and currently boasts the largest Indian population in the Caribbean. Emphasis is placed on the period 1945-1990 since it was a period marked by substantial transformation in almost all facets of life for the Indian population.

## Leadership

The debate on Indian leadership in the period 1945-1990 revealed a great deal in terms of the changing demands and focus of the Indian community. Leadership in the socio-political arena remained quite reminiscent of the Indian patron-client relationship, where loyalties were anchored to a socially and economically distinguished persona who provided some form of assistance or amenity to either an individual or group. Morton Klass confirmed such sentiments in his examination of the village of "Amity" during the late 1950s.[4] The distinguishing characteristic of Indian socio-political leadership was, however, its inextricable connection to religion. Among Hindus, this relationship between religion and politics in Trinidad was enhanced by the fact that a substantial section of the socially and economically elevated individuals either belonged to or were descendants of the Brahmin caste,[5] who capitalized on their "ritually superior" status. A survey conducted in 1965 showed that Brahmins dominated the political life of Indians until the 1990s, with eleven out of fourteen political leaders claiming Brahmin origin.[6] The first and second Hindu Prime Ministers of Trinidad and Tobago were both of Brahmin stock. However, the large scale social transformation initiated in the 1970s led to an eventual subordination of religion-based considerations by more such universal prerequisites as dedication to a cause, education, charisma, proficiency and good articulation.

## Organizational Function

Since the 1940s, Indian organizational function has proven to be most dynamic and multi-layered, simultaneously engendering and reflecting various facets of change in Trinidad. The most prominent issues emerging from this ferment included inter-organization conflict followed by attempts at unity, the formation of a number of new sects, the role of such sects in the national politics of the country, and the revitalization of many public socio-religious and cultural events. Amidst the high level of conflict and diversity, by 1945 the larger more formally structured Indian organizations had been recognized as representatives of the Hindu and Muslim populations on a national level. This was reflected in the decisive roles of such organizations in the formulation of

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4. Morton Klass, <u>East Indians In Trinidad. A Study of Cultural Persistence</u> (Illinois: Waveland Press Inc., 1961) 221-9.
5. The highest rank of the Hindu caste system.
6. Yogendra K. Malik, <u>East Indians in Trinidad. A Study in Minority Politics</u> (London: Oxford University Press, 1971) 47.

the Muslim Marriage Bill of 1935, the Hindu Marriage Bill of 1945, and in taking positions on such issues as divorce, education and adult franchise. Before the 1950s, the institution of marriage emerged on a national level as possibly the most contentious of Indian issues in the form of the Hindu Marriage Bill, and the Muslim Marriage Bill; an issue taken up from as early as 1923, at the seventh meeting of the Ordinary Session of the Legislative Council.[7] Several concerns variously related to religion were raised within the Indian community. The registration of marriages, a civil ceremony, was far removed from the sacred nature of the Hindu and Islamic ceremonies and rituals, and many aspects of their ceremonies were being undermined by the conditions of the proposed Marriage Bills.

Connected to the issue of the legalization of Hindu and Muslim marriages, was the "illegitimacy" of persons born of such unions. Within the boundaries of the Indian community, neither was viewed as an issue since their traditional marriage ceremonies was all the validation needed for both the union and offspring. However, the need to ensure inheritance rights was a key push factor in that direction, since, in addition to lengthy and expensive court procedures, there were many cases of property being escheated to the state upon the death of the owner.[8] The removal of the stigma of illegitimacy would also serve to enhance the status of the Indian community in the wider society. In the end there was a practical yet reluctant and gradual acceptance of both the Marriage Bills. Yet, while the Indian population saw the move as necessary in their upward social mobility, they did not hold it as in any way more "legitimizing" than their own ceremonies. By the late 1980s, it was evident from the nature and focus of the emerging organizations that the emphasis was on procuring for the Indian community recognition as the second largest ethnic group in the country and on aspiring for large scale "national Indian observances and events. Such a change can be viewed as natural and necessary within the context of an increasingly dynamic and thriving community and society.

## "Publicisation"

The nature and degree of organizational activity was most evident in the socio-religious and cultural ferment of the time. Encouraged by the educational prospects provided by the growing body of denominational schools, a heightened awareness and distaste of the sense of alienation from the wider society, and the religious ferment, the Indian community in Trinidad was empowered with confidence to assert itself on a national level. The growing appetite for transporting elements of its religion and culture out of the communal and into the national sphere heightened considerably during the 1960s. This was most evident in the struggle for the declaration of the Hindu festival of *Divali* as a national holiday. A Member of Parliament received a petition from a Hindu Youth Organization pressing for the granting "…of at least one public holiday in honour of the second

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7. <u>Port-of-Spain Gazette</u> 5 May 1923.
8. <u>Trinidad and Tobago Debates of the House of Representatives Official Report</u> 1941, 117.

largest religious group in the country."[9] If not, they would be prepared to hold marches and public meetings throughout Trinidad to agitate for the holiday. Their efforts proved successful when Divali day was declared a public holiday in 1966. The following year, the Muslim festival of *Eid-ul-Fitr* was also declared a public holiday.

In the 1970s and 1980s, Indians began demanding more than just what resembled periodic attempts at pacifying Indian concerns. This was even reflected at the University of the West Indies, the major tertiary education in the country, where three international conferences entitled "East Indians in the Caribbean" were convened. Instead of being restricted to religious issues, the Indian community began participating in debates on issues of national concern. Indians aired their opinion on the government's proposed programme of "national service." Efforts at "publicization" were both fuelled by and evident in the advent of performing artistes from India during that decade.[10] These song, music, dance and drama performances were hosted, not within the confines of the community, but at the country's most popular cultural centers in the two main cities in Trinidad.[11] Along with the artistes from India, there was an increasing appearance of singing, dancing and music competitions, and "social evenings" featuring local performers.[12] In commemoration of the country's independence in 1962, an "Indian Singing Exhibition and Dance Display" was staged.[13]

Religious observances also transcended individual and communal boundaries to acquire a more structured, large-scale format, with *Divali,* the most prominent festival among Trinidad Hindus, being the forerunner in this turn of events. In 1965, large-scale celebrations were observed in many locations throughout the country and even at The University of the West Indies; which stimulated the press to comment that for "the first time Trinidadians were nationally aware of *Divali* the Hindu Festival of Lights."[14] By the 1970s, there was an intensification of this "publicisation" in the religious sphere. A most notable aspect of this endeavour was the advent of *Divali Nagar* in 1986; what was to become an annual event associated with the Hindu festival of *Divali.* It also provided the opportunity for both Indian and non-Indian individuals to enjoy various facets of Indian culture (the art forms, food, and dress) in one place. Its location outside the boundaries of any particular village or community augmented its appeal as a national rather than a communal event.

## The Media

The number and nature of articles in the press reflected the society's attitudes and perceptions of Indians, and enhanced the Indian community's level of visibility. Since the discontinuation of the "Indian" pages by both the Trinidad Guardian and the Port-of-Spain Gazette during the Second

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9. <u>Trinidad Guardian</u> 8 Jan. 1966.
10. <u>Trinidad Guardian</u> 31 Aug. 1967.
11. <u>Trinidad Guardian</u> 1 Sept. 1960.
12. <u>The Hindu Times</u> Mar. 1966.
13. <u>Trinidad Guardian</u> 19 Aug. 1962.
14. <u>Evening News</u> 14 Nov. 1966.

World War, press coverage of Indian affairs, until the 1960s, was restricted to very small, sporadic privately sponsored notices. During the 1960s, these notices became more frequent and more detailed, though still very much superficial in their exposition of Indian festivals and observances. Some attempts at capturing the nuances of Indian events in the language of the press (in other words, comprehensible by the wider society) often resulted in either awkward or erroneous representations. Yet, by the mid-1960s, entire pages were being dedicated to the recognition of the major religious observances. The mid-1980s, however, can be identified as the time when genuine sustained effort was made to present Indian religions on their own terms and as an integral dimension of Trinidad society. Many articles on the nature, tenets, rituals and observances of the religions were featured, especially around the time of the major religious observances. What was equally noteworthy was the transformation of these articles from just narrative reporting to pieces seeking to promote a deeper understanding of the dynamics of Hinduism and Islam. It can be surmised that this development was largely a result of the upsurge in education among Indians in the 1950s.

The emergence of a vibrant Indian press gave added impetus to the religio-cultural renaissance of the 1980s. These publications addressing social, political and religious issues, provided a previously lacking avenue for the articulation of Indian opinion and concerns. Also, from the mid-1980s, the Society for the Preservation of Indian Culture, a group initially comprising university students, sought to highlight issues facing the Indian community and to generate a deeper understanding and awareness of Indian religions and culture both on and off the campus.

## Education

The acquisition of education in English was a major agent of social mobility within the Indian community and on a wider level. In 1921, only 12.6% of the Indian population was classified as being able to read. In 1931, this number rose to 22.8%, and in 1946, to 40.2%.[15] The 1946 census classified as illiterate (either able to read only or unable to read and write English) 50.6% of Indians. Despite the economic and social constraints, suspicions, fears and taboos, the desire for both individual and communal mobility resulted in a steady rise in the education of Indians between 1952 and 1990; which resulted in transformations in all spheres of life. Large-scale formal education among Indians was realized only during the 1950s in the form of denominational primary schools established by various Hindu and Muslim religious organisations. These institutions performed the dual function of disseminating both English and Hindu and Muslim religious and cultural education. That these were essentially Hindu and Muslim institutions dispelled most of the suspicion and fear that had surrounded the earlier Indian encounter with education through the efforts of the Canadian Presbyterian Mission and the colonial Christian oriented education system.

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15. Marianne D. Soares Ramesar, <u>Survivors of Another Crossing: A History of East Indians in Trinidad, 1880-1946</u> (St. Augustine: University of the West Indies, School of Continuing Studies, 1994) 114.

By the 1950s, other such developments as the debates surrounding the granting of Adult Franchise to Indians, the Hindu and Muslim Marriage Bills and the (non) granting of capitation grants to Indians educational institutions further sensitized Indians to the need for schooling in English.

## Cremation

The issue of cremation was, between 1950 and 1980, a major preoccupation of the Hindu community, with the crux of the matter lying essentially in the conflict between the Hindu and western methods of disposal of the dead, and the associated ideological differences. The Hindu population's growing awareness of and discontent with not being able to perform the last rites of their loved ones in accordance with Hindu religious prescriptions was the most powerful impetus in this issue. Failure to perform these death rituals was more than just a contravention of religious prescription; it carried with it deep-seated moral, emotional and social ramifications. These concerns, however, were initially met with indifference, ignorance and opposition at the administrative and official levels. The Government refuted the requirements of the Hindu method of disposal of the dead with the argument that it would . . .offend the sensibilities of the majority of the population and [that] there was also the danger of pollution of rivers by casting the remains in them.[16]

Yet, Hindus refused to relent on the issue since cremation, unaccompanied by the necessary Hindu rites and rituals performed in the prescribed manner, would be absolutely meaningless and unacceptable. The process was a very protracted one.

Thus, until the disparities were resolved, the Hindu community had no choice but to continue to bury their dead. So disenchanted were some Hindus with the countless fruitless committees looking into the matter that they eventually took it upon themselves to start "…setting up areas like the Caroni Savannah Extension Road, and the Caroni bank, on the Highway to cremate their dead.[17] The fact that they were essentially breaking the law in a very public manner and were risking punishment demonstrated just how strongly they felt. Such illegal cremations continued at several sites until the 1980s under the most deplorable physical conditions. It was only in 1976 that the issue was resolved with the passing of the Cremation Amendment Act of 1976.[18]

## Religious Conversion

By the 1960s, the previous decade's spurt in socio-religious enthusiasm had ebbed considerably. This generated an overall languor in Hindu and Islamic socio-religious activity, and created an ideal situation for the emergence of the second phase of Christian proselytizing among Indians, this

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16. Trinidad and Tobago Debates of the Legislative Council 8 May 1953.
17. Cremation Ordinance 1953, 136.
18. Trinidad and Tobago Debates of the Legislative Council 30 Apr. 1976.

time by newer evangelical churches. This phase was characterized by a more aggressive and overt approach that relied heavily on charismatic appeal and the public, indiscriminate condemnation of Indian religious practices and beliefs as essentially heathen. While these would continue to be the major underlying factors of conversion right up until the 1990s, other, more personal factors came into play. One of the most recurrent reasons given for conversion was the relief from illnesses, physical disabilities or "supernatural" ailments where both medicine and Hinduism or Islam had failed. Social problems including poverty, unemployment, alcohol and marijuana abuse, domestic violence, or more so, the apparent nonchalance and ineptitude with which these problems were met by the various Indian socio-religious bodies, also seemed to push the victims into the waiting arms of proselytizing agents. In fact, according to oral sources, the success of such proselytizing efforts resided in their readiness always to provide, if not direct solutions, then at least an avenue through which troubled individuals could vent their frustration and gain some sort of comfort and confidence to deal with their conditions.

By the 1970s, the perceived overemphasis on the myriad of rites and rituals often incomprehensible to Hindus themselves in terms of the language (Hindi), the inherent intricacies and contradictions, along with the diversity in practice and interpretation of rituals and religious scripture were all prominent push factors into the less complicated English-medium domain of the evangelists. The presence of local agents and Hindu and Islamic missionaries within Indian communities did, however, diversify the degree of conversion among the various communities. Such agents included the level of communal socio-religious activity, temples, Hindu and Muslim primary schools, communal relations among fellow villagers, and resident pundits and imams. The efforts of Hindu and Muslim missionaries and certain organisations at reworking, explaining and energizing Hinduism and Islam also helped to curb the level of conversion in some areas.

## New Observances

In both Trinidad and the wider world, Hinduism constantly acquired new dimensions and elements. Before the 1970s this was primarily on account of the innate Hindu tendency to sanctify and deify almost anything associated with religion. For example, the *lota and thali* used in pujas, though essentially just brass vessels and performing the practical function of vessels in pujas, were, in Trinidad, treated as "religious" items to be used exclusively for religious purposes. There would be a similar reluctance to use the *sohari* leaf (upon which food at Hindu socio-religious events is served) when consuming any kind of meat. This deifying tendency was most evident in the consecration of sites where rocks were claimed to have emitted blood or milk, most popular of which was the Patiram Trace Hindu Temple in Penal in the late nineteenth century.[19] The incorporation of the Christian figure of La Divina Pastora into the Hindu pantheon as an aspect of

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19. Rampersad Seeloch, personal interview, 6 June 2002.

the Mother Goddess was another prominent example of this tendency. Both subsequently provided the earliest Hindu pilgrimage sites in Trinidad. A Protector of Immigrants Report confirmed the church of La Divina Pastora as a popular pilgrimage site for Hindus by 1893.[20] This pilgrimaging tendency was evident in yet another practice initiated during the late nineteenth century – visiting the most prominent Hindu temple during that time, the Green Street Hindu Temple in Tunapuna, especially for the observance of *Shiv Ratri* (night of worship dedicated to the God Shiva).[21]

Brockington explained the Hindu preoccupation with pilgrimages as:

> ... a popular way to remove sins and accumulate merit; the merit acquired in visiting them was commonly reckoned in terms of the performance of so many Vedic rituals, but unlike the sacrifices that they thereby replace, the sacred sites were open to all.[22]

Brockington added that in as much as many pilgrimage sites are associated with water and its purifying function, they invoke the universal Hindu concern with purity and pollution, the latter of which is held to be washed away by bathing in such places.[23] This can partially account for the post-1990 consecration of many local rivers and beaches as Hindu pilgrimage sites. After the 1970s, however, the appearance of such pilgrimage sites and new observances could be classified as more contrived, deliberate phenomena, almost always the work of some socio-religious organization. Notwithstanding the possible motives of reworking religion to more tangibly situate it in the Trinidad context and to generate contemporary appeal, such developments had a mobilizing, revitalizing and cohesive effect on both the Hindu community as a whole and within the various socio-religious sects.

## The Sacred and the Secular

In multicultural societies conflict among different religious denominations or with elements of the secular sphere is, for the most part, inevitable. The pervasive nature of Hinduism, together with its lack of any categorical definition between the sacred and secular renders it more prone to such religio-ideological conflicts than the other Semitic religions with relatively clear-cut distinctions between the sacred and the secular. The perception widely held by the Christian population until as late as the 1980s of Hinduism and Islam as subordinate, essentially heathen religions substantially accentuated such conflicts. The heart of the conflict was situated largely in the wider society's failure to comprehend the nature and nuances of Hindu and Islamic practices and belief systems.

Trinidad's annual Carnival revelry had, until the 1980s, been viewed as morally and

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20. I.O.R. Official Series V/27/820/10: Note On Emigration From India To Trinidad by Surgeon Major W.D.Comins, 38.
21. <u>Port-of-Spain Gazette</u> 18 Feb. 1920.
22. J.L. Brockington, <u>The Sacred Thread: A Short History of Hinduism</u> (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1981)196.
23. Brockington 198.

ideologically in opposition with the tenets of Hinduism and Islam (as practised in Trinidad), and Indian participation in Carnival was therefore more of the exception than the norm. The major points of contention resided in the free interaction of semi-nude male and female bodies, and the sexually provocative public dancing and behaviour. Against this backdrop emerged vigorous objections to the use of aspects of Hinduism, especially its Gods and Goddesses, in calypsoes and Carnival bands. In 1965, the attempt to portray both Hindu deities and practices in two Carnival bands, namely "Gods And Worshippers Of India"[24] and "Vishnu's Kingdom"[25] evoked intense objection from Hindus. In addition to individual protests, the issue was taken to Parliament in 1965, where a Hindu Member of Parliament explained that:

> These adherents of the Hindu religion, like myself, believe that this is going to be a mockery of a living religion... which is going to offend the Hindu people if it is allowed to continue... the religious susceptibilities of 200,000 Hindus would be deeply affected if the Carnival revellers, drinking, singing rude songs, parading the streets in half dress, should be allowed to portray the living god and goddess of a religion which has continued in the unchallenged tradition from the earliest time until today.[26]

The leader of the major Hindu religious organisation subsequently formally asked the bandleader to shelve the band,[27] a move which proved successful, but only after much vacillation on the part of the bandleader.

In addition to these sustained carnival-related conflicts, isolated events further revealed this religio-ideological conflict between Hinduism and Islam and the wider society. During the general elections of 1986, the absence of the *Bhagvadgita* and the *Quran* at polling stations for required oath-taking was interpreted as a "... gross insult to Hindus and Muslims."[28] The absence of any Hindu religious texts at the official residence of the President of the Republic, where the formal swearing in of the new Government in 1986 was taking place, added injury to this insult: it resulted in a mad rush to find a text when a Hindu minister refused to take his oath until one was provided.

**From Pariah to Prime Minister**

Although Indians had firsthand experience with power relations since the period of indenture, and a steadily increasing political presence from the last decade of the 19th century, sustained foray into national politics came in the 1950s with the positioning of the Indian-based People's Democratic Party as the formally recognized Opposition party, which provided a voice for

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24. <u>Evening News</u> 9 Feb.1965.
25. <u>Evening News</u> 8 Feb. 1965.
26. <u>Trinidad and Tobago Debates of the Legislative Council</u> 5 Feb. 1965.
27. <u>Evening News</u>. 9 Feb. 1965.
28. <u>Sandesh</u> 23 Jan. 1987.

Indians at the governmental level. During the 1970s and 1980s, another Indian based party, the United Labour Front (U.L.F.), emerged, but which saw benefit from aligning itself with parties having wider ethnic support; a reflection of the processes of integration and assimilation that were becoming increasingly operative in almost all facets of Indian life since the 1970s. It was the leader of the U.L.F., Basdeo Panday, who would become Trinidad and Tobago's first Prime Minister of Indian descent in 1995. Fifteen years later, in 2010, the country saw the appointment of its first female Prime Minister, Kamla Persad-Bissessar, also of Indian descent. Although racial undercurrents continued to define the political ethos of the country, it was clear that by the 1990s, Indians were fully engaging the political life of the country; a far cry from the political reticence evident just half a decade ago.

## Conclusion

It is evident that during the period 1945-1990, images of Indians in both the private and public spheres were influenced by a number of factors, stimulating transformations in all facets of life. Feeding on the overriding desire and need for visibility and acceptance as both a valid ethnic grouping and as individual citizens of Trinidad and Tobago, modernization and secularization could be identified as the most prominent of such factors. Given the intensity of the foregoing, the deconstruction of many of the traditional practices and ideology was not a remote impossibility. This, however, was especially intercepted by Hinduism's flexibility and dynamism.

Both secularization and its antithesis, deification, were ongoing, simultaneous processes which, operating within Hinduism and Islam, would not demand any complete break with the traditional. That is not to say that these traditional elements were left in an undiluted condition. In fact, within the persistent interplay of change and continuity it was almost impossible to identify such a condition. There was, rather, a simultaneous reworking of traditional ideas, attitudes and practices, which were largely determined by the nature and extent of the Indians community's interaction with the "other, and also by the dictates of time, space and circumstance. Conflict was primarily evident in deliberate efforts at contesting and controlling the natural flow of Indian socio-religious change.

By the 1970s, Indians were being forced to recognize the need to transgress the boundaries of community, and to assert themselves as an integral part of Trinidad society. This was collectively instigated by the economic and educational amelioration during that period, the remnants of only ancestral (rather than patriotic) ties to India, the threat of both conversion and the persistent ascription as "second-class citizens." A full-fledged integration, however, demanded the renunciation of those fundamental aspects of religion and culture that were not in accordance with those of the wider society. What occurred, rather, was the drive to establish itself as a "community within a nation," a process which can be safely described as multi-layered, arduous, oftentimes misinterpreted or disregarded, and by no means uniform. Thus, the success of this venture, on both a personal and communal level, resided in the ability to strike a balance between "being and

belonging," that is to say, being Indian but also belonging to the Trinidad society.

By 1990, Indians in Trinidad were at another important juncture. The political ethos was more cognizant of and sensitive to the religious diversity of the country. Indians had economically, politically, socially and psychologically entrenched themselves as equal citizens into the workings of the country. Hinduism and Islam were experiencing fundamental changes in terms of its interpretation, presentation and applicability. However, this was now infused with a discernibly less defensive, more progressive, practical and confident outlook. Given the level of transformation that characterized the 173-year experience of Indians in Trinidad, one is assured of the unremitting capacity of the Indian community and, by extension, images of the Indian community, to further evolve in accordance with the exigencies of time, place and circumstance.

# Parallel Session 4

# Enigmatic gazes in Zanele Muholi's "Faces and Phases"

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This paper discusses South African photographer and visual activist Zanele Muholi's ongoing project "Faces and Phases", which consists in a series of portraits of black lesbians and transmen[1], mostly (but not exclusively) from South Africa. The project started in 2006 when Muholi first photographed her friend and fellow activist Busi Sigasa at the old Women's Gaol in Constitution Hill in Braamfontein, a central suburb of Johannesburg. Sigasa was a survivor of so-called "curative rape", a widespread practice in South Africa[2], and had contracted HIV as a consequence of the attack. She was to die eight months later, at the age of 25. The picture (Muholi, 314) is a low-angle close shot of Sigasa, who is dressed in a plain jumper, raincoat and woolly hat and is staring out into the distance, looking calmly determined. She is slightly decentred to the right and has her back turned to a blurred structure which towers above the high grass, and is clearly identifiable as a mirador, a sufficient synecdoche for the Women's Gaol and the history of political oppression and resistance attached to it. The picture makes several points: on the one hand, the blurred fragment of the prison visible in the shot is also in itself a synecdoche of the anti-apartheid struggle. Throughout the apartheid era many activists were incarcerated there in particularly infamous living conditions. While the dominant historiographical narrative of the anti-apartheid struggle has tended to minimize, or even erase, the contributions of black LGBT people, implicitly or explicitly condoning the ubiquitous claim that "homosexuality is un-African"[3], the shot forcefully inscribes Sigasa within this context, and thus claims the space of political activism as a legitimate sphere of visibility for the LGBT community and, importantly, for this particular individual. On the other hand, Sigasa has her back *turned* to the watch tower in the picture, and is gazing out at something which we cannot see. The shot thus opens up a space of intimacy and freedom for her,

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1. Men who were assigned female at birth.
2. For an extensive inquiry into the "rape culture" of South Africa, see Pumla Dineo Gqola: *Rape, A South African Nigthmare* (2015). See also *Difficult Love*, Zanele Muholi's film documenting her life and work. https://www.imdb.com/videoplayer/vi3128728089 (accessed 20 September 2018).
3. For just two examples of the many responses to this myth, see Amanda Lock Swarr, "Paradoxes of Butchness: Lesbian Masculinities and Sexual Violence in Contemporary South Africa" and Diriye Osman, "To be Young, Gay and African".

about which we can only speculate: she will not be passively written into the grand narrative of the South African nation, but will situate herself within this narrative on her own terms. Poignantly, if we are aware of her story, we cannot avoid the thought that what she is contemplating on the horizon may be her own death—a thought reinforced, in Muholi's 2014 book, by the insertion of Segasa's spoken word poem "Remember me when I'm gone" on the page opposite her picture and the page after that. The poem's title is reminiscent of the dying Dido's aria in Purcell's *Dido and Aeneas*, but the poem forcefully reverses Dido's stance of passive acceptance. Structured on the repetition of the anaphoric pronoun "I", it lists all the positive actions for which Sigasa asks to be remembered, referencing her work as a poet, photographer and activist. It echoes another poem in the book, Sindiwe Magona's "Please, Take Photographs!" which features as one of the epigraphs to the volume, and urges an unknown addressee to "Take photographs of them all/Especially the children; especially the young,/ Before it is too late. […] Before all the children are gone." (Muholi, 8) The poem conjures up a context of pervasive violence and precariousness, where the lives of children are bound to be "snuffed, easily as candlelight" (8), and must be preserved in a photographic archive—a archive which will thus be, in part, an archive of the dead, a repository of dead presences.

Muholi's project in "Faces and Phases" is, in her own words, "to document, document, document"[4] a community which is ostensibly protected by a remarkably liberal body of legislation, yet exposed to the violence of a largely homophobic, transphobic society in which black lesbians, transmen and gender-nonconforming people are the most vulnerable individuals.[5] The archive she is constituting gives a new kind of visibility to a community who is routinely forced, concomitantly, into invisibility (both reluctantly endured and self-inflicted, because visibility is potentially lethal) and hypervisibility in the mainstream media's sensational representations of hate crime victims. Part of the compelling power of this archive lies in the fact that we are aware, as we envisage each new person in a picture, that this person may be dead at the time of viewing. This paper seeks to articulate the nature of Muholi's political and aesthetic intervention in this project. Building on and inflecting Judith Butler's 2015 article "Gender Politics and the Right to Appear", it first suggests that it constitutes a visual counter-narrative to mainstream understandings of "the people", in which a community of precarious, invisibilized individuals collectively claim "the right to appear" in the political sphere. It further argues that the subjects in Muholi's shots do not merely claim visibility but, crucially, return the viewer's gaze. Borrowing Nicholas Mirzoeff's conceptualisation

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4. Zanele Muholi, during the "Difficult Love" session of the Aspen Ideas Festival, 2013, introduced and curated by Anna Deavere Smith. https://www.aspenideas.org/session/difficult-love (accessed 20 September 2018), [8:11].

5. As Muholi points out in the course of the 2013 Aspen Ideas Festival discussion (quoted above), the new post-Apartheid Constitution of 1996 opposed discrimination on the basis of sexual discrimination, and in 2006 the Civil union Act legalised same-sex marriage in South Africa. However, Muholi makes the point that despite this liberal legislation, the country lacks anti-hate crime legislation, specific health measures for lesbians and transmen, and shelters for LGBT people. She also points out other hardships faced by LGBT people in the country (especially by the more vulnerable among these, i.e. black lesbians and transgender people), such as secondary victimization by police, health services and social care networks, and the rejection of raped women by their families.

of "visuality" as an arrangement of the sphere of appearance inherent in the project of colonial modernity, it suggests that "Faces and Phases" promotes a counter-visual distribution of space in which participants claim not only "the right to appear" but also, in Mirzoeff's phrase, "the right to look". Reading "Faces and Phases" as a decolonial project, I contend that it uses photography to critique a way of looking which manifests, sanctions and perpetuates the continuing epistemic and aesthetic effects of coloniality in postcolonial South Africa, as well as in other postcolonial contexts referenced in the pictures.

In "Gender Politics and the Right to Appear", Butler attempts to articulate what happens when disenfranchised bodies choose to gather together in a given public space:

> When bodies assemble on the street, in the square, or in other forms of public space (including virtual ones) they are exercising a plural and performative right to appear, one that asserts and inserts the body in the midst of the political field and demands more livable economic, social and political conditions no longer afflicted by precarity. (Butler, 24-25)

Such assemblies may well do without verbalization; rather, their action is performative, in the sense that it is the co-presence of bodies in a space where they are not normally visible which speaks for itself and makes "demands". Butler critiques the appropriation by neo-liberal rhetoric of the notion of responsibility, which is perversely resignified as the need "to be only responsible for ourselves, and not for others". Conversely, public assembly performs an ethics of mutual dependence which, she claims, "stand[s] a chance of transforming the field of appearance itself." (43) This is especially relevant for gender-nonconforming people who deviate from the norms which they are expected to embody: "Those who do not live their genders in intelligible ways are at heightened risk for harassment, pathologization, and violence." (34) By assembling in public places, Butler argues, such precarious bodies claim the "right to appear"—the right to be recognised and accommodated as interdependent bodies.

Of course Muholi's "Faces and Phases" is not literally a gathering of bodies, but a collection of photographs; yet, I argue that Butler's concept of public assembly provides useful ways of thinking about its performative intervention in the political sphere. The viewer's experience of encountering Muholi's work varies greatly according to circumstances—whether she comes across the large pictures (30 x 20 inc.) in a exhibition, where they can be taken in together at one glance, or faced individually, according to the viewer's standing point, or in the book, where they are much smaller (8 x 5 inc.) and may only be viewed individually or in twos. The life-size shots in public shows give an eerie impression that you are facing real people rather than photographs; individuals, each of them photographed in a way that enhances rather than reduces singularity, but also a community with clearly traceable identity markers (race, and often gender nonconformity). While the viewer is

at all times aware that the presence of these individuals is an illusory effect of photographic realism, further undermined by the fact that they are in black and white, still they can be seen as an assembly of disenfranchised virtual bodies in a very specific public space: the privileged, economically and often racially segregated space of the art gallery or the museum. In deciding to take part in the project, Muholi's subjects (to whom she refers as participants, emphasising their active role) claim visibility for the members of a highly vulnerable community in the politically contested space of high culture, and thus in the incipient narrative of the young South African nation. Risking public identification as lesbians or transmen, and thus heightened exposure to violence, they performatively claim the right to appear in this national narrative, and demand to be included in what constitutes "the people". Collen Mfazwe's 2012 shot (Muholi, 27) shows her wearing the sash she won when she was crowned "2nd Prince" of Mr. Uthingo, an LGBT-initiated beauty pageant in Daveyton, Johannesburg. The word "Uthingo" ("rainbow" in Zulu) ingeniously references both the global symbol of LGBT identities and the "rainbow nation", a narrative of the postcolonial South African nation as a space of inclusion, acceptance and reconciliation. One understanding of the rainbow symbol is subtly set to play against the other, since the "rainbow nation" has consistently denied inclusion to black LGBT people, sustaining the myth that homosexuality is un-African, an importation from white colonial culture[6]. While traditional beauty pageants reinforce heteropatriarchy by celebrating commoditised women whose performance of gender best conforms to idealised gender norms, "Mr. Uthingo" queers the national narrative and opens it up to gender-nonconforming individuals. In this picture Mfazwe defeats categorization within the male-female binary and performs instead a fluid, playful version of gender, with her gracefully nonchalant posture, hands in pockets, untucked shirt, spotted bow-tie, and the conspicuous sash labelling her "2nd Prince", white with black letters, in contrast with the less pronounced shades of grey of the figure and the stone wall against which she is standing. While the "Mr Uthingo" pageant takes place on the margins of mainstream culture, which it parodies, Muholi's pictures are shown in the privileged space of high art—both strategic sites in which black lesbians and transmen performatively claim the right to appear and to be included in the national narrative.

However, the singular power of Muholi's portraits does not lie only in the way in which it reinscribes marginalised, vulnerable bodies into public space. The project started with Muholi's picture of Busi Sigasa, but this picture is untypical in that Sigasa is looking away from the camera. With very few exceptions, all the other subjects in the series gaze back at us with enigmatic gazes, and claim not just the right to appear, but crucially, "the right to look". I am borrowing this phrase from Nicholas Mirzoeff's 2011 book *The Right to Look: A Counterhistory of Visuality*. Mirzoeff traces the origin of the word "visuality" to British historian Thomas Carlyle, who used it in 1840[7]

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6. A sentiment expressed by Minister of Culture Lulu Xingwana after walking out of an exhibition at Constitution Hill in 2010 where Muholi's pictures of nude lesbians were shown. She commented that "it was immoral, offensive and going against nation-building." *The Times (South Africa)*, 2 March 2010, https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2010-03-01-minister-slams-porn-exhibition/ (accessed 20 September 2018).

7. In his 1840 lecture "On Heroes, Hero-Worship and the Heroic in History", first published in 1841.

"to refer to what he called the tradition of heroic leadership, which visualises history to sustain autocratic authority." (Mirzoeff, 319[8]) Visuality does not only comprise visual perceptions, but "is formed by a set of relations combining information, imagination and insight into a rendition of physical and psychic space." (445) It produces an epistemic ordering of the world which it seeks to establish as the only legitimate, authoritative one. To do so it first "classifies", then "separates the groups so classified as a means of social organisation", and finally "makes this seem right and hence aesthetic." (445) This is an eerily precise description of apartheid; indeed Mirzoeff sees visuality as one modality of colonial domination, which persists in what decolonial theory has termed "coloniality"—the living legacy of colonialism in postcolonial societies in the form of a worldview which perpetuates hierarchies and forms of discrimination and oppression first produced under colonialism. Visuality is thus a confiscation of what Mirzoeff calls "the right to look", which he glosses as "the right to the real"—the right to construct one's own understanding, or vision, of the real, without submitting to the authority of visuality. "It is the claim to a subjectivity that has the autonomy to arrange the relations of the visible and the sayable." (424) Crucially, the right to look entails the right to be recognized as a subject. "The right to look is not about seeing. It begins at a personal level with the look into someone else's eyes to express friendship, solidarity or love. That look must be mutual, each person inventing the other, or it fails." (417)

My intuition is that what makes Muholi's pictures so powerful is that they dramatize this mutual exchange of looks that constitutes both the person photographed and the viewer as autonomous subjectivities, with no preconceived knowledge of the other, and equally legitimate in the act of "inventing the other"[9]. It is not just that the person in the picture is looking at the camera, and thus, it seems, at us. Rather, the photographer's framing choices and the subject's gestuality combine to suggest a body engaged in the act of looking, of inviting, sustaining and reciprocating our gaze. While we are at all times aware that this exchange is a fiction, since we encounter not a person but a photograph of a person who is not literally present (and may indeed be dead), the power of Muholi's very specific brand of photographic realism is to create the illusion of a reciprocal gaze, so that we feel that as we envisage this person, we enter into an intersubjective transaction with her whereby, as we construct our narrative of who she is from what we are given to see in the picture, we are reciprocally being "invented", and therefore transformed, by her. More precisely, while the co-presence of reciprocal gazes is fictional, we are nevertheless really being transformed by the experience of encountering her gaze which demands an ethical response—whether we experience recognition, solidarity, puzzlement, or rejection. An overview of the project reveals that Muholi has created a repertory of postures which her subjects then inhabit with infinite variations. In one series of medium and close shots the subjects—often, but not always, strong-looking butch women or transmen—face us squarely with arms folded and a confrontational, cocky or merely observant

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8. Numbers refer to locations in the ebook edition of this book.
9. In this sense, they are the opposite of ethnographic photographs which posit a one-way gaze, and an asymmetrical production of knowledge according to the pre-established epistemic configuration of visuality.

expression. Curiously, almost all of them have their heads slightly tilted to one side, a movement which cannot be ascribed any given meaning yet suggests attentiveness, a degree of concentration in the act of looking, a readiness to engage with us. In another series (which overlaps with the previous one), the subjects have their bodies turned away from us, but their faces towards us, so that the shots literally capture the movement of the body which enables the subject's gaze, returning or perhaps soliciting ours.

In the book the pictures are interspersed with poems and testimonies by, or occasionally about, the participants in the project. One recurrent feature is their insistence on being actively involved in the creation of a visual archive of their community. This constitutes what Mirzoeff calls a counter-visuality—an alternative worldview organised by the look of gender-nonconforming people, many of whom describe themselves as "aspiring photographers" and "filmmakers". Sharon 'Shaz' Mthunzi tells of her harrowing experience of awakening to her vocation as a traditional healer in an unsupportive family: "When I started seeing things, getting visions, I'd tell them and they would laugh and say I'm young and couldn't possibly see anything, there's no such thing . . . I was seeing things nobody else saw… I thought I was losing my mind." (Muholi, 224) After initiation, however, she claims to have found a degree of peace, though she registers the difficulty of living up to her responsibility as a healer. Mthunzi's realization of her vocation comes with the discovery of an alternative way of seeing, one which she cannot resist although it is first experienced as a burden and a cause of rejection, before being embraced as life-enhancing. The story is both a poignant individual testimony and an allegory of the experience of discovering oneself different in an unsympathetic environment which makes you question the reality of your perceptions—or your desire[10]. Mthunzi's testimony suggests that non-normative sexualities or ways of performing your gender make you see the world differently, and that part of your responsibility is to claim the legitimacy of that counter-visuality. Mthunzi's story also forcefully inscribes her fluid performance of gender within a specifically African tradition. In the 2014 shot which features opposite her testimony (225), she offers a modernised performance of the *sangoma*, wearing a traditional hat, dreadlocks, beaded necklaces and bracelets and a leopard-printed skirt, and pointing towards us the end of what seems to be a traditional divination stick. Later in the book, in a 2013 shot (263), she stands against a graphically scratched black plastic sheet, hands in pockets, in a stylish tuxedo, white shirt, dark tie and trendy belt. In both shots her expression is defiant, as if daring us to recognise both performances—the African healer and the sophisticated dyke—as equally authentic, legitimate expressions of who she is. Pamella Dlungwana, also an unforgettable recurrent presence in the project, recalls how for her first shot with Muholi she "insisted on the third eye" (146-219)—the shiny earring which disrupts the almost perfect symmetry of the face and the picture, and is a modern transposition of the invisible third eye which provides vision beyond perceptual sight in various eastern esoteric

10. "It's just a phase", the ubiquitous parental response to the coming out of their LGBT children, is ironically referenced in the title of the project.

traditions. While Dlungwana mentions this with humorous distance, in the picture she both looks at us with a magnetically grave gaze and claims for her sole attribute (as no other piece of clothing or jewellery is visible) a symbol of heightened vision. Finally, Muholi herself inserts herself into the archive. The last picture in the book is a self-portrait (322), in which she stands in her signature hat and leopard-printed shirt against a leopard-printed cloth, in defiance of the basic rules of "taste", and in a triumphant demonstration of her mastery of the technique of black and white photography. Framing her gaze, the oversized glasses claim the right to look.

I want to end this essay with one more picture, that of Nosiphito Kulati's portrait (307). For a split second this picture is hard to read, because there is a discrepancy between Kulati's poised look, her face turning to meet our gaze as we have seen in many other pictures, and what seems to be happening in the background which is strangely blurred, as if deliberately overexposed. How can she be standing there so calmly while people behind her are running in a panic? But if we break away from her gaze and look at the backdrop more attentively, we realise that it is not a scene from real life but an iconic picture which we have all seen before, Sam Nzima's picture of the young Hector Pieterson being carried by Mbuyisa Makhubu after being shot by the police during the Soweto uprising in June 1976. The young woman running alongside them, and struggling to keep up, is Pieterson's sister Antoinette, dressed in her schoolgirl uniform, her hand raised in a futile effort to fend off disaster. As with Sigasa's picture with which I started, this shot claims a space for Kulati, and by extension for her community, within the national narrative of anti-apartheid struggle, and it also asks that this narrative be expanded to include all anti-discriminatory struggles. But because the backdrop of the picture is itself a picture, this picture also demands inclusion within the visual archive of the emerging nation, to which it claims to make a "genuine" contribution. At one level Kulati is using the inscription on her shirt ironically, both to respond to accusations of inauthenticity routinely made against lesbians and transmen (construed as "fake" men), and to reference the nature of both photographs (Muholi's and Nzima's) as simulacra. But beneath the surface of the paradoxical postmodern game, it claims the right for a dissident, counter-visual practice of photographic documentation to be recognised as a genuine modality of postcolonial South African historiography.

Muholi's "visual activism" is one instance of art's power to raise awareness and, hopefully, transform the homophobic culture of South Africa in order to bring it more fully in line with the country's nominally LGBT-friendly legislation. In manufacturing a new manner of "human images", ones which require the exposed subjects' full participation in and commitment to the project, she also invites us, the viewers in the galleries and the readers of the book, to change our looking habits and engage in more reciprocal interaction, recognising the legitimacy of the countervisuality claimed by the projects' participants. This paper has also suggested that Muholi's specific brand of photographic realism challenges scholars of visual and cultural studies to reappraise our critical habits. Crucially, it challenges us to become aware of the political implications inherent in the act of looking and interpreting, and of the fact that such an act always takes place within a certain frame

of ready-made assumptions which it is our responsibility to acknowledge, question and perhaps discombobulate—or, in the phrasing of the expanding field of decolonial studies, to "decolonise".

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# The Human Image in the 21$^{st}$ Century: Network Images in Visual Arts and Sinéad Morrissey's Poems

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## 1. Network Images in Visual Arts

Environmental and social issues, the most critical concerns in the contemporary world, have, since the birth of human consciousness, always been integral to humanity. Literary work, visual art, and media coverage across the world have mirrored the relationships between human beings and their surroundings in various ways. In many mythologies, the fundamental ideas of social rules as well as natural terrestrial and extra-terrestrial phenomena are built into stories featuring, for example, deities—who often take the form of human beings—with whom man seeks harmony. In Greek mythology, *Zeus*, the king of Gods, is represented by a lightning bolt in the shape of a spear (**Fig. 1**)—an image that is symbolic of his power to steer the course of the heavenly and earthly realms. Similarly, the ancient Grecian civilisation prominently depicted many natural phenomena and elements of nature itself (i.e. the sun and the moon) as gods, like Apollo and Artemis, who appear in human form. This mythological depiction of natural phenomena through human images was not limited to Greek culture as other cultures also use human beings as models. For example, like *Zephyros*, the personification of the west wind in Grecian culture, the god of the wind in Japan, *Fujin*, is also portrayed in a human form (**Fig. 2**).

**Fig. 1** Zeus with his thunderbolt   **Fig. 2** *Fujin* and *Raijin* (The Wind and Thunder Gods)

Contemporary world literature and visual art attempt to represent both the harmony and conflict among humans and their natural and social surroundings in more sophisticated or, perhaps, more abstract ways (in the sense that abstract images appear more sophisticated, as being abstract entails being devoid of the substance in physical and concrete existences) than that depicted in mythology and the social novel. Rather than being subject to the power of nature deities, human beings woven into the network of their natural and social surroundings in time and space have become one of the images popularly envisioned since the late 20th century. In 1967, Michel Foucault emphasised that a shift in human concerns from time to space had occurred: 'We are at a moment, I believe, when our experience of the world is less that of a long life developing through time than that of a network that connects points and intersects with its own skein'.[1] Thus, the term 'network' has become a key word for representing the various relationships in modern environments like, for example, the tremendous amount of information readily accessible on the World Wide Web.

This paper focuses mainly on Sinéad Morrissey, an eminent English poet from Northern Ireland, and her use of appropriation and form-conscious creation in her poetry. Before discussing Morrissey's work, I will provide a few contemporary visual representations of the net/web concept. As W. J. T. Mitchell contends, there has been a visual turn, or what he calls a 'pictorial turn', in contemporary culture and theory, in which images, pictures, and the realm of the visual have dominated the contemporary world.[2]

As technical terms in computer science, 'net' and 'web' are often used interchangeably, referring to the space where information can be obtained online. In nontechnical usage, both words denote lace-like constructions, while 'web' is the word reminiscent of the spider. The word 'web' is defined in *Oxford English Dictionary* (OED) as 'a network of fine threads constructed by a spider from fluid secreted by its spinnerets, used to catch its prey'.[3] Therefore the recent popularity of the spider image may also be attributed to the Internet boom.

One of the most famous creators of the spider image is Louise Bourgeois. Starting her career as a visual artist in the 1940s, this prolific artist had a long career—spanning the latter half of the 20th century through the early 21st century. Her best known work is *Maman*, a large spider sculpture, which Bourgeois created in 1999 in homage to her mother, a tapestry repairer (a weaver of some kind), for London's Tate Modern, which preceded several sister *Mamans*[4] that are displayed across the globe (**Fig. 3**). With its large spider body rooting its eight long, strong legs on the ground in the shape of umbrella, *Maman* sculptures signify Mother Nature's power to protect and nurture as well as to destroy—as large spiders are often poisonous. Those who view the *Maman* sculpture may feel a sense of protection in the semi-

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1. Foucault, Michel, 'Of Other Space', trans. by Jay Miskowiec from 'Des Espace Autres,' March 1967, originally published in *Architecture /Mouvement/ Continuite,* October 1984, p. 22.
2. Mitchell, W.J.T., *Picture Theory*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 11.
3. Oxford English Dictionary, n.1.
4. There are six *Mamans* at the permanent locations, including Tokyo, Ottawa, and Seoul as well as temporarily exhibited *Maman* on tour.

open enclosure; *Maman*'s legs create a barred space with the solid presence of stainless-steel legs and the empty space in between, which can extend and connect in the audience's imagination to evoke a larger spider-web image. Critics have offered multiple interpretations of the symbolic significance of *Maman*, including biographical, psychological, and feminine perspectives.[5] I intend to emphasise its size—which is large enough to envelope its viewers, yet, unlike a prison, sparsely enclosed, and tall enough for those standing inside to be invited to look skyward. The experience of staying under, between, or near those legs is important as the audience are able to feel like participants of the sculpture installation, which draws their attention to its own and their own surroundings.



**Fig. 3** Louise Bourgeois' *Maman* in Stockholm      **Fig. 4** *Spider-Man*

    If Bourgeois' *Maman* is one of the high art representations of the spider image, the web-slinging superhero *Spider-Man* (**Fig. 4**) may serve as one of the most well-known spider images in 21st century popular culture. Although the original comic Spider-Man appeared in 1962, the superhero's success began when the first Hollywood film was released in 2002. The compelling attraction of this humanised spider lies inevitably in his unique ability to spin webs, allowing him to make a hammock delicate enough to entertain his sweetheart and strong enough to carry cars and entrap baddies. His half-human and half-spider characteristics help him protect the world. Two shared features of *Maman* and Spider-Man's web images are the spatially extending power to envelope and protect and the holes that permit a connection between the inside and the outside.

    As for the network image, it is Yayoi Kusama who has been obsessively creating net/web images since her earliest works. These works, which emphasise inescapability. arose from the artist's feelings of alienation—being cast away from the relationships between the individual and its surroundings, including family, society, and the organic world.[6] Her representative work *Infinity*

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5. See, for example, Mieke Bal, Louise Bourgeois's *Spider, the architecture of art-writing*, Chicago, 2001.
6. See Yayoi, Kusama, *Infinity Net: The Autobiography of Yayoi Kusama*, trans. by Ralph McCarthy, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2012.

*Net Series* was created in the late 1950s when Kusama was feeling overwhelmingly isolated from the art circles in New York that had not yet recognised the value of her work. Kusama created nets made of positive dots, which signified existence (including her own), and negative background, which signified non-existence, until she felt that 'the spell of the dots and the mesh enfolded me in a magical curtain of mysteries, invisible power'.[7] Such a 'magical curtain of mysteries' may represent the entire universe—the environments enfolding Kusama together with other beings and non-beings. Based on Kusama's own autobiographical writings, many art critics and psychologists have pointed out Kusama's pathological history as her obsession with accumulation assemblages (e.g. accumulation of dots, as a main motif on which her nets are created) to obliterate oneself to become one with one's own environment.[8] Regarding her *Accumulation* series which followed the *Infinity Net* series, Kusama wrote: 'I make them and make them and then keep on making them, until I bury myself in the process. I call this "obliteration"'.[9]



**Fig. 5** No. F, 1959, MoMa



**Fig. 6** *Accumulation No. 1*. 1962

Although Kusama might have derived much of her creative power from her pathological sufferings and family background, which Kusama herself offers to the audience through her writings that explain motivations, Kusama's worldwide fame today points at something more than the curiosities the audience may feel about her private world. Undoubtedly, there is something that modern people can, or probably would like to share. Perhaps it is the sense of sharing *per se*—the feeling of togetherness—that appeals to the contemporary audience. Although her trademark dots have been persistently used in all of her works, Kusama's interest in creating huge installations with her border crossing attitudes (mixing low, pop, and commercial cultures in Kusama's high, or at least serious art works—attitudes which have also

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7. Kusama, *Infinity Net,* p. 23.
8. Midori Yamamura, for example, explicates Kusama's work, following historical and Kusama's biographical context. Mignon Nixon and Juliet Mitchell focused on the psychoanalytical readings of Kusama's art. See *Yayoi Kusama*, ed., by Frances Morris, New York: Tate Publishing, 2012.
9. Kusama, *Infinity Net*, p. 47.

persistently defined her work) paralleled the 21st century cultural climate. Quite a few solo exhibitions have been held in major cities around the world, including London, New York, Paris, and Tokyo; each of which attracted massive crowds. Her smashing success is due not only to the kawaii boom,[10] which Kusama applies skilfully to her works, but also the feeling of togetherness Kusama's space offers, as Jo Applin, who refers to Kusama's huge installations (e.g. *I'm here, but nothing* and *Infinity Mirrored Room – Filled with the Brilliance of Life* 2011) as 'environmental works', wrote:

> Kusama's environmental works repress another kind of Fantasy distinct from their association with psychology disorder and breakdown, for in their invitation to participate they speak to a shared public sphere rather than an individual private world, which is more in tune with Kusama's later works.[11]

Applin, quoting Hanna Arendt, who argued for the importance of 'the arena or common world into which subjects must enter to act comprises an intangible and "already existing web of human relationships, with its innumerable, conflicting wills and intentions"',[12] continued:

> Kusama's environments work to bring subjects and objects together in a participatory 'space of appearances'. People, lie polka dots, cannot 'stay alone'. It is in the 'communicative life' of subjects who inhabit world collectively that participation becomes a possibility and politics takes place.[13]

This is exactly the case in Kusama's creation of a huge room, which is dotted with semi-transparent light circles (**Fig. 7**). This dazzlingly-lit space provides audience a unique experience of being, which is uncanny and self-obliterating, and, therefore, connects one with everything else. In that space networked with dots, the audience can feel the material embracing one's body and that of tables, chairs, non-beings indiscriminately—expressing the idea that we are in fact one with our 'others' and the environment around.

In the age when many tend to no longer hold religious beliefs, the space Kusama creates attracts and soothes the audience with communion and a sense of belonging. Kusama's earlier description of her *Infinity Net* explains what the contemporary audience may appreciate in her installations. Reflecting on her own works, Kusama wrote:

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10. 'Kawaii' means 'cute' in Japanese. Kumiko Sato explains 'cuteness' has been one of the strongest characteristics in Japanese culture since the 1970s and has been developing in various directions in the 21st century. See 'From Hello Kitty to Cod Roe Kewpie: A Postwar Cultural History of Cuteness in Japan', *Asian Intercultural Contacts* Vol. 14, No. 2, Fall 2009, pp. 38-42.

11. Applin, Jo, 'I'm here, but nothing: Kusama's Environments', Yayoi Kusama, ed. By Frances Morris, New York: Tate Publishing, 2012, p. 180.

12. Applin, p. 185.

13. Applin, p. 186.

I fluctuate between feelings of reality and unreality. I am neither a Christian nor a Buddhist. Nor do I possess great self-control. I find myself stranded in a strangely mechanized and standardized, homogenous environment.[14]



**Fig. 7** *Infinity Mirrored Room – Filled with the Brilliance of Life* 2011



**Fig. 8** *I'm Here, but Nothing* 2000/2012

Kusama spreads the 'mesh' she created to 'enfold' her audience. The essence of Kusama's art—creating imaginary networks which mechanically and systematically attempt to cover all beings and non-beings—corresponds to posthuman sensibility, which has been variously expressed in contemporary arts, including visual arts, literature, and performing arts. In 'A feminist genealogy of posthuman aesthetics in the visual arts', Francesca Ferrando, who hails Kusama as one of the precursors of the posthuman art, associates Kusama's dots with pixels on a computer screen.[15] Likewise, *Spider-Man* and *Maman* can also be taken as products of the posthuman sensibility, emphasising the interconnection between human beings and non-human beings, which implies both alienation from and connection with nature.

## 2. Sinéad Morrissey's Network

In Sinéad Morrissey's poems, the human image is either tightly or loosely woven into its historical and spatial environments, using appropriation, translation, and reference. These techniques reveal the connection between her work and other works, which may form a kind of network. Her form-conscious style further visually foregrounds the interconnectedness between her

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14. Kusama, *Infinity Net*, p. 57.

15. Ferrando, Francesca, 'A feminist genealogy of posthuman aesthetics in the visual arts', *Palgrave Communications* vol 2, no. 16011, 2016. https://www.nature.com/articles/palcomms201611

works and the space they occupy.

Since her third volume *The State of the Prisons,*[16] *Morrissey has started to extensively explore and utilise a variety of sources, including literature, visual and found objects, art works, and documentaries, as inspirations. The title The State of the Prisons*, for instance, derives from the 18th century prison reformer, John Howard's book of the same title. Morrissey adopts appropriation explicitly, using signals like 'after', 'found poem', and 'translation' in the poems and notes at the end of each volume. The effects of using techniques of appropriation, reference, and collage are complex: paying homage to or revealing the limitations of the original writers or materials. Above all, by appropriating other works, Morrissey makes visible the imaginary network of her background.

The closing poem in her fifth volume, *Parallax*[17] is titled 'Blog', which indicates that Morrissey, like Kusama, builds her network across borders—in this case, the border between the high culture, hard copy poetic work and the informal verbal post on the Web.

> I don't have girlfriends but I do have sex
> with a different woman about three times a month.
> Sometimes more. Sometimes less. I rarely ask.
>
> They'll stop to talk to me in the supermarket
> or on the bus. Off-handedly at first.
> They're not made-up or drunk. We don't flirt
>
> or analyse it. There's this tiny electric thrill
> gets passed like an egg-yolk slipping
> between the cups of its own split shell.
>
> They take me home, it happens. I leave. Simple.
> They don't invite me to diner or text.
> It's easy and clean and consensual.
>
> Then it happens again. Loneliness's overblown –
> Unless I'm just one of the unnaturally blessed.
> My good friend Jack told me to write this down.

In reading Morrissey in terms of network creation, I have been applying Deleuze's concepts of

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16. Morrissey, Sinead, *The State of the Prisons*, Manchester: Carcanet Press, 2005.
17. Morrissey, Sinead, *Parallax,* Manchester: Carcanet Press, 2013.

'repetition', 'assemblage', and 'rhizome' in my recent papers.[18] Deleuzian ideas are relevant to the discussion for two reasons. First, Morrissey's network that is built by appropriating other works can be seen as a 'rhizome'. Moreover, the essence of Deleuze's thinking—appreciation of good connections/ assemblages of separate machines—echoes the ethics of the posthuman era, to which Morrissey belongs. The following quote by Deleuze appears an appropriate explanation of 'Blog':

> Even the most mechanical, the most banal, the most habitual and the most stereotyped repetition finds a place in works of art, it is always displaced in relation to other repetitions, and it is subject to the condition that a difference may be extracted from it for these other repetitions.[19]

The event taken up in 'Blog' is not at all grand, or beautiful, rather 'banal', 'habitual', and 'stereotypical'. The poetic voice is blogging about an ordinary single man's un-extraordinary sex life. This piece is, in a sense, 'strange', as its tone and the content seem too frivolous for a closing poem. By using 'blog', a new medium developed in the 21st century, this closing piece forms an interesting contrast to the opening piece titled '1801',[20] inspired by Dorothy Wordsworth's journal '1801' featured an objective and serene voice of a 19th century woman, who depicted mundane details of life with no intention to be published. As peripheral genres of writing, journaling and blogging share a personal first-person narrative voice, but differ in the degree of privacy. While journal keepers often eschew publicity (though by assuming Dorothy Wordsworth's voice, Morrissey might have aimed at publication), bloggers publicise seemingly private stances.

'Blogs' are characterised by short lines, indicative of a 'blog' style and the speaker's isolated life and superficial relationships. The lines are made up of reduced structures (e.g. sentences and phrases), ending almost exclusively with consonants. This rhythmic feature can be read as a resistance against an outlet for emotions and sentiments. With the first line half-rhyming with the third line in each tercet, the rhythm scheme implies a lack of complete satisfaction and limited poetic skill of the blogger. By assuming a male blogger's voice (regardless of whether Morrissey took inspiration from a similar blog or invented this blog herself), this small piece seems to indicate that the essence of artistic writing lies in its style rather than content. Morrissey' creation conveys the blogger's solipsistic sexual sensation embedded in loneliness—imprisoned and protected in a tiny space of three ingeniously-crafted lines.

A brilliant simile in the third tercet mimics the thrilling sensation:

18. See Toraiwa, Naoko, 'Sinead Morrissey's Parallax and Body', Brigitte Johanna Glaser / Wolfgang Zach (eds.), *Transgressions / Transformations: Literature and Beyond Studies in English and Comparative Literature, Vol. 25* (Tübingen: Stauffenburg Verlag)*, 2018, 293-311, 2018 and 'Connections to form: Japanese influences, Deleuzian assemblages, and artistic imitation in Sinéad Morrissey's poems', *Journal of Irish Studies* XXXIII, 10 2018.

19. Deleuze, Gilles, *Difference and Repetition*, trans. by Paul Patton, New York: Columbia University Press, 1995, p. 365.

20. Morrissey, *Parallax*, p. 6.

> There's this tiny electric thrill
>
> gets passed like an egg-yolk slipping
>
> between the cups of its own split shell.

Metaphors and similes can serve as replacements (i.e. saying one thing by mentioning another). Indeed, language itself is a replacement for ideas and physical objects. An opponent of 'metaphor', Deleuze expressed disdain in his essay on Kafka, reducing metaphors to the opposite of metamorphosis. However, this view dismisses the innovative use of language, as similes and metaphors are employed to help convey the meanings (not necessarily messages) in a clearer or more impressive way beyond the representational aspect of language.[21] In a different essay, he argues that language compensates for its deterritorialisation by a reterritorialisation in sense.[22] Alternative expressions always bring forth a new sensation, a new assemblage, and a new connection. In this sense, metaphors and similes can work as tools for deterritorialisation/ reterritorialisation.

It is by means of this simile that the poem attains a new assemblage, a new connection. Among rhizomes growing in 'Blog', connected through dry and superficial sex descriptions, there is an echo or a rhizome connected, at least in my mind, to Yeats's famous lines:

> it seemed that our two natures blend
>
> Into a sphere from youthful sympathy,
>
> Or else, to alter Plato's parable,
>
> Into the yolk and white of the one shell.[23]

Compared with Yeats's 'alter Plato's parable', which emphasises the oneness of two natures mixed into one natural being—'an egg' , the simile in 'Blog' conveys a grotesque one-sided thrill derived not from the feeling of oneness (two into the one shell) but from a crack on the egg, from which only part of its being—the yolk—slips out. Whether a one-sided sensation or the blogger's dilettantism faintly alluding to Yeats, this simile can be taken as an artistic extension of the poem.

In terms of networking, at least three kinds of 'rhizomes' can be detected in 'Blog': 1. between hardcopy poem and blog on the Web; 2. between Dorothy Wordsworth's solitary voice and a man's conceited blog; 3. between the rhetoric of poetic voice and that of W. B. Yeats.

The remaining half-rhyming tercets form a concrete part of this poem. By adding such concreteness, the affects and percepts of the new assemblage appear, as explicated above, one-sided solipsistic desires. This 'added' concreteness, however, does not contradict the inseparability

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21. See Deleuze, Gilles, and Guattari, Felix, *Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature (Theory and History of Literature)*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986.

22. See Deleuze, Gilles and Guattari, Felix, *A Thousand Plateaus,* tr. Brian Massumi, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987.

23. Yeats, W. B., 'Among School Children', *Collected Poems of W. B. Yeats*.

between form and content (this inevitably coincides with the central idea proposed in Yeats's 'Among School Children').

Form, style, appearance, and surface—elements in constant flux in every occasion of writing, creation, reading, and observation—are the primary concerns in Morrissey's poems, especially those after *Parallax*. The word 'parallax' means 'apparent displacement, or difference in the apparent position, of an object, caused by actual change of position of the point of observation' (OED), as Morrissey quoted on the opening page of the volume. Thus quite a number of her poems are concrete poems and her poetry-reading and public oral recitation is always brilliant and important; Morrissey is acutely aware of the fact that every reading experience—whether reading aloud or silently—on every occasion produces new assemblages—assemblages consisting of poem, voice, place, time, and audience. This is true even with a hardcopy poem, which seems to remain in a fixed form/shape. In fact, form is at the centre of each assemblage. In other words, a form created by a certain assemblage in turn creates a new assemblage.

Morrissey's emphasis on form can be attributed to what she calls a non-Christian, quasi-religious interest, which somewhat resembles Kusama, who emphasised the 'invisible power' which envelops her, except that Morrissey's quasi-religious feeling appears more positive than Kusama's feelings in her early life. In her critical reading of 'Murano' by the American poet Mark Doty,[24] Morrissey recognised their shared interest in cycling/recycling materials before introducing them into the visible world as forms. Morrissey wrote:

> Through the poem a kind of life-and-death cycle is established via which the body breaks open as the result of death, escaping the tethers of material existence and turning radiant, a 'set of atmospheres', and then is distilled back into a concrete set of elements —'salts and essences'—which in turn become materials for making glass.[25]

Morrissey regards Doty's 'Murano' as an embodiment of the parallel between poetic form and human body and appreciates his role of the artist/ poet in giving shape, or body, to experience. As she wrote, 'In several of my own poems... I imagine birth and death as overlaid...'.[26] Morrissey might be seen as a Neo-Materialist, if we intend to sort her into contemporary schools of thought. She is seeking a repositioning of the human among nonhuman actions, focusing on interactions between matters inside and outside of bodies from a non-anthropocentric, posthuman perspective which involves environmental ethics. Therefore, her form-conscious style is an attempt to connect her artwork and the environments into networks—an effort addressed as the key theme of *On Balance*, where many poems revolve around the idea of machinery.

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24. Morrissey, Sinead, ' "Republic of Instability": Artifice, Death and the Afterlife in Mark Doty's "Murano" ', *Religion & Literature* Vol. 45, No. 3 (autumn 2013), pp. 220-227.
25. Morrissey, 'Republic of Instability', p. 223.
26. Morrissey, 'Republic of Instability', p. 221.

In explaining the machine imagery throughout the book, Morrissey stated:

> If the little well-made, intricate machine of a poem can connect to a different well-made, intricate machine out there in the world, be it a bridge, an aeroplane, a weather system, or even an orbit, the reverberations — another mechanical term — of the poem multiply.[27]

This explanation is quite Deleuzian: connection to a different machine multiplies the reverberations of the poem, also those of another machine, be it a weather system or an orbit (the imagery possibly derived from the poems on climate change and a meteor shower in the book).

The second poem I will briefly analyse is 'The Mayfly',[28] a concrete poem in the shape of sharp-edged airplane wings, which celebrates Lilian Bland, the first woman to build and fly an airplane in Ireland, with a 'beautifully balanced' 'engine with the help of a whiskey/ bottle and an ear trumpet'.[29] The poetic voice which reveals Bland's biographical details and longing for the sky, scatters in small comments such as 'In the movie of your life/ they haven't scripted yet',[30] 'a straggle of farmhands/ and scullery maids,/ politely assembled, all wishing you/ skywards'.[31] Eventually, as the primitive aircraft remained stable in the air on its maiden flight, the speaker describes: 'you climbed up / to your tilted seat',[32] then adds a witty comment: 'your footing missing on earth for the span/ of a furlong.'[33] It implies that Bland's historic flight was successful as her footing was 'missing' on the ground, while symbolically leaving her footsteps in the history of aviation. When the machine Mayfly and the machine Bland made a beautiful connection, a temporary balance between the airplane and a woman was achieved, which is celebrated by the exquisitely balanced form of the poem.

There are many potential rhizomes in this poem, including a feminist connection, daughter-father relationships, and class issues. With many knots inside, the form of the poem appears to be knitting the space on the book with blade shape stanzas, traversing the pages in zigzag, and concretely connecting the book with its environment; the poem not only impacts the readers' imagination but also intrudes into their visual space in its attempt to physically involve the reader in the net of the poem, which grew in the poet's own actual living space.

Morrissey is inspired by her everyday life and her own family, which she willingly introduces to readers, commenting on them either in the notes or in interviews after publishing her works. In fact, it was her husband, Joseph, who told Morrissey about Lilian Bland, as Morrissey said in one of her interviews: 'And he said have you heard of Lilian Bland? And I said no'.[34] Just as Kusama reveals the

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27. Duhig, Ian, 'Sinéad Morrissey: a maker of intricate poem machines', *The Irish Times*, Sat, Oct 21, 2017.
28. Morrissey, Sinead, 'The Mayfly', *On Balance*, Manchester; Carcanet Press, 2017, pp. 32-35.
29. Morrissey, *On Balance*, p. 34.
30. Morrissey, *On Balance*, p. 34.
31. Morrissey, *On Balance*, p. 35.
32. Morrissey, *On Balance*, p. 35.
33. Morrissey, *On Balance*, p. 35.
34. 'Beautiful like machines', *Little Atoms*, 02/08/2017 (http://littleatoms.com/beautiful-machines).

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influence of her biographical background on the motif of her works, Morrissey attempts to involve her audience in the network of her actual everyday life, where her poems are born and grow their rhizome-like fabrics of net out in the actual environment, to make yet more extensive connections.

Television is also a source of inspiration for Morrissey. For instance, 'Whitelessness', a sequence poem in *On Balance*, was inspired by Danish filmmaker Daniel Dencik's *Expedition to the End of the World*, a documentary account of a schooner crew's voyage to Greenland's farthest reaches.[35] Morrissey literally quotes the geologist's comment on global warming in the documentary: 'If it's life/ that controls the geological machinery/ of the planet, rather than the other way round we are neither new nor tragic',[36] out of which Morrissey's poem grows. Rather than commenting in a deterministic tone, her imaginative geologist thinks 'the hundreds of marathon runners/ in my brain stopped and changed direction'.[37] These words may impress the reader and have more profound influence on a larger audience and even on the geological machinery of the planet earth. By creating her poem machines, Morrissey aspires to affect other machines 'out there'[38] in the actual world. As Deleuze noted, the word 'machine' is not a metaphor. Morrissey's consistent use of 'machine' is not metaphoric, yet it does attempt a connection between human and nonhuman machines, in hopes of extending the network she creates to build a better network with other beings.

**Figure 1.** *Zeus with his thunderbolt, Louvre G 204*, Attic red figure Nolan amphora, c. 470-460 B.C., photograph by Maria Daniels, courtesy of the Musée du Louvre

**Figure 2.** Sotatsu,Tawaraya, *'Fujin and Raijin* (The Wind and Thunder Gods)', https://www.kenninji.jp/gallery/img/byou002_big.jpg

**Figure 3.** L'œuvre de Louise Bourgeois exposée au Moderna Museet à Stockholm, *Institut Français de Suède*, https://institutfrancais-suede.com/loeuvre-de-louise-bourgeois-exposee-au-moderna-museet-a-stockholm/

**Figure 4.** *Spider-Man: The New Animated Series* (Spe DVD | DVDs & Movies, DVDs & Blu-ray Discs)

**Figure 5.** Yayoi Kusama, No. F, 1959, MoMa, https://www.moma.org/collection/works/80176

**Figure 6.** Yayoi Kusama, Yayoi Kusama. *Accumulation No. 1*. 1962, MOMA.

**Figure 7.** Yayoi Kusama Studio *Infinity Mirrored Room – Filled with the Brilliance of Life* 2011 © Yayoi Kusama/Yayoi Kusama Studio, Inc.

**Figure 8.** Yayoi Kusama, *I'm Here, but Nothing*, 2000/2012 © Yayoi Kusama/Yayoi Kusama Studio, Inc.

35. Morrissey, 'Whitelessness', *On Balance*, pp. 51-56.
36. Morrissey, *On Balance*, p. 51.
37. Morrissey, *On Balance*, p. 51.
38. Duhig, Ian, 'Sinéad Morrissey: a maker of intricate poem machines'.

culture, since each of the various cultures is expected to maintain its own specificities. The fear seems to be that mixing, or hybridising, might lead to the disappearance or dilution of the 'pure' culture.

This expectation of cultural 'purity' can become a limiting factor – a kind of strait-jacket which prevents growth or change. Take the example of Malay traditional dance forms such as the *zapin*. The *zapin* is actually a dance form with Middle Eastern (Hadhrami) roots, brought to the Malay world by Arab traders and missionaries. It has, over the centuries, been adapted and adopted as a thoroughly 'Malay' dance form. In more recent times, it has become incorporated into official discourses of Malay identity, in which context it becomes in some senses 'frozen', allowed to exist only in certain prescribed and defined ways. But in a recent production, *Anatomi Zapin*, dancer-choreographer Syimah Sabtu used the *zapin* as the basis for an exploration of form and movement, breaking away from the strict confines of the 'traditional' form to explore more fluid, contemporary modes of movement. In doing so, she connects the traditional form to contemporary dance, allowing for a continuity, growth and development, rather than stasis. She presents her heritage as a living, breathing entity, rather than a carefully preserved but dead form.

This, I would argue, is what needs to happen with both tangible and intangible heritage – it must be allowed to remain relevant to contemporary life, rather than being merely preserved as a relic of times past. In the rest of this paper, I discuss how connecting young people more deeply with both their tangible and intangible heritage might help to develop this sense of continuity, growth and belonging. I focus specifically on cultural mapping, which, as various scholars have pointed out, can be a powerful tool for fostering a sense of connection and belonging.

Cultural mapping is premised on the idea that a deep knowledge of, and engagement with, one's physical environment and its associated histories and stories can foster a sense of rootedness and belonging. As Janet Pillai puts it, cultural mapping "enables the community to recognise, comprehend, and take ownership of its own cultural assets and resources" (2013, 2). The process of cultural mapping involves identifying and documenting both tangible and intangible cultural resources within a specific locality. Tangible resources might include buildings, monuments, or natural features, while intangible resources might include stories, traditions, or cultural practices associated with the area.

Malaysian culture that transcends these categories of race, language, religion, etc. Lim Teck Ghee and Alberto Gomes state that the National Cultural Policy of 1973 "is based on the premise that national unity can only be achieved through cultural homogenisation and that cultural pluralism is a source of instability" (232). Ethnic politics here go against UNESCO's notions of inclusivenss and representation (there is little official space for cultural hybridity or for national community that transcends ethnicity). Where, we have to wonder, is the space for culture which lives and changes? Where is the acknowledgment that new forms of culture are emerging, which will in turn form the basis of the cultural heritage of future generations?

In this regard, we should take note of Ooi Kee Beng's contention that our understanding of the dynamism of identity "involves a prescriptive understanding of where one came from, an aesthetic notion of where one is at and a pragmatic feel for the spaces that exist between where one is at and where others seem to be" (449). In other words, the individual needs some awareness of his or her past (where they came from) and present (where one is at); equally important is to understand the in-between spaces, which I would say encompass not just the experiences of other individuals, but also an understanding of how these various experiences accede to, negotiate with or challenge authoritatively-imposed notions of where they came from and where they are at.

Lowenthal has said that "most heritage comes already packaged by precursors. But to secure the past to our present lives, we must feel that its legacies have become our very own" (23). In Malaysia, heritage has been "packaged" by the state, for political reasons – as Cartier notes, "some of the debate [in Malaysia] over how to handle historic conservation has been about the word heritage itself, and the role of heritage in building nationalism" (46). The notion of securing the past to our present lives has not been adequately explored. This is because the past has to some extent been fixed into a specific narrative which supports the racial/cultural divide, focusing very strongly on the immigrant past of certain segments of the Malaysian populace (vs the indigenous status of the dominant Malay race), without also acknowledging their 'present-ness' within Malaysian society. This discourse could be countered by increasing the individual's awareness of how they fit not only into that mythologised past, but also into the developing present.

Positioning within a physical space must inevitably have an influence on how culture emerges, on how it is practiced. Olsson, for example, notes that "the urban environment has the potential to function as a carrier of meaning and identity" (373), suggesting strongly that identity cannot be divorced from the individual's surroundings. He goes on to quote Tunbridge and Ashworth:

> Each individual assembles his own heritage from his own life experiences, within a unique life space containing reference points of memory, and providing anchors of personal values and stability, which are not identical to those of anyone else. (373).

In Malaysia, the advantage of such thinking is that it situates the individual very strongly in his or her current environment, as well as in memories, environments experienced in the past,

etc. It does not solely foreground the sense of belonging to a past homeland, although this is also not necessarily completely discarded. In other words, the understanding that heritage arises from physical location as well as other experiences and influences, situates the Malaysian individual as belonging within Malaysia, rather than to the past homeland suggested by adherence to 'traditional' cultures. It also highlights culture and heritage as living and changing, rather than 'preserved', as the urban environment also inevitably lives and changes.

In relation to this idea of linking past and present in the effort to allow a cultural heritage to develop that is less mediated by the state, I wish to examine some of the cultural mapping work done with young people by arts groups in Malaysia. Cultural mapping allows those involved in the project to connect with both tangible heritage (the streets, buildings, etc.) and intangible heritage (the arts and crafts practiced there) in an experiential, immersive way.

Cultural mapping, according to Freitas, "is an instrument for collecting, locating and systematising information concerning the distribution of cultural expressions within a certain territory" (9). It is "a systematic approach to recording and presenting infomation that provides an integrated picture of the cultural character, significance, and workings of a place" (Pillai, *Cultural Mapping* 1.). Strang states that "Cultural mapping explores people's history and contemporary relationships with local environments" (132). Another definition states that cultural mapping does not stop at locating sites, but rather involves mapping the Culture of who or what you are, be it a tribe, organization, community, group, school, association, business or an individual – to find your unique assets and strengths. Culture can, in this case, be defined as your intellectual property, your special way of being or doing, the purpose of your existence, the business you are in (or would like to be in) or the special story that you have to tell, such as your reason for doing what you do. (Pillai, *Cultural Mapping* 17).

Cultural mapping, then, probes the relationship between the individual and his or her environment, taking a broad approach that "may also make the invisible (knowledge, people, history and heritage) become visible" (Pillai, *Cultural Mapping* 17). Because it is tied to individual experience and personal stories, this approach to heritage refuses the homogenization and museumization of culture and heritage. As Strang points out, "The map's objective is to gain an in-depth, holistic view of people's engagements with the places that they inhabit, and to illuminate particular cultural and ethnohistorical landscapes" (133).

My focus in this paper will be on a few cultural mapping projects run by volunteers: in George Town in Penang (2001), in Balik Pulau in the South-West corner of Penang Island (begun in 2005), and in Chow Kit, a quite notorious area of Kuala Lumpur normally thought of as a red-light district, the haunt of gangsters and drug addicts (2013). I will briefly mention the two Penang projects, before focusing on the Chow Kit project.

The projects were run specifically to engage with young people living there, to help them to look at the area differently and to reconnect them with a sense of pride in the area. The children were, in other words, being encouraged to reclaim these spaces as a part of their heritage.

The Balik Pulau project, known as MyBalikPulau, was helmed by artist Kungyu Liew. It was run by an arts collective called Arts-Ed, which is led by Janet Pillai. The project engaged young people in collecting and documenting oral histories from the residents of Balik Pulau, and then producing maps and newsletters based on their work with the residents. The purpose was to find a way of rooting the young people within the heritage of the area, in a lively and interactive way, opening them up to history, heritage, crafts, skills, etc. The project used primarily visual media such as photography and map-making in order to produce a multi-lingual newsletter which could connect with a broad range of Malaysians.

These kinds of projects allow the participants to engage with history and culture as living things. Active engagement with the minutiae of the daily life of the area meant that the children who participated were better able "to relate to history, geography and environmental studies as a part of their lives" (Pillai, "myBALIKpulau"), rather than looking at history and heritage as parts of some grand narrative as presented in history textbooks. Further, seeing these elements "as a part of their lives" means that they are not 'fixed', but are open to adaptation as they relate to the lives of these youth.

This is visible in the newsletters produced after the Georgetown project, which document the discoveries made by the children. Produced in multiple languages, these newsletters are colourful and informative, and work at connecting past and present to show heritage as living and growing.

Each of the articles in the newsletter highlights the origins of the craftsmen or business owners working in the area, specifying where they came from, how long a history they have had in Malaysia, and so on. In this way, the roots of these traditions become visible, linking Malaysia and its people with longer histories, with origins elsewhere, but with a firm grounding within Malaysia. This undermines the tendency to treat heritage as something fixed, by which racial groups are defined, and instead shows it to be part of a still living tradition. However, on the whole the Penang projects did work within fairly traditional definitions of heritage as something inherited from the past.

The Chow Kit Kita project took a step away from this by focusing on those aspects of the area which had immediate relevance to the young participants:

This is how we came up with the concept of Chow Kit Kita – a map not to map out heritage sites, but a map to map out useful information for children living there.

On a paper, we drew a mind-map of the type of information that could be included in the map: SAFETY (safe walking routes, dangerous zones, pedestrian crossings, bicycle routes, etc), FOOD (halal food, food under RM5, etc), ENTERTAINMENT (internet cafes, gigs, best and safest places to play games/sports etc), PUBLIC FACILITIES (pay phones, public toilets etc), TRANSPORTATION (bus routes, bus stops, etc). (" 'Chow Kit Kita' Inception")

Although the focus here is not on heritage in the same way as in the Penang projects, the aim is still "to show how the teenagers think and feel about their community ("Krashpad Proposal), and to try to connect teenagers to their community and make sense of their surroundings. Thus here, too, there is a strong sense of needing to connect young people with their environment in a meaningful

way, to ground them within their community, and thus ultimately to keep them in touch with their heritage, represented by that community.

The project was initiated by Lew Pik Svonn and Fahmi Reza, who have both worked with community education and community arts projects. They acknowledge that Chow Kit is a problematic area; Melissa Lin calls it "one of the most colorful as well as one of the most criminal districts in KL. Lew notes that "Children from the community are often teased by their classmates in school. Even some adults have narrow and negative perceptions of Chow Kit. There is a large number of children from the lower-income bracket who live and go to school here. We want these children to be proud of their neighbourhood and tell their friends all the positive aspects of this place (Sheila Sri Priya, "Empowering the Children). Negative perceptions of Chow Kit based on its more recent history mean that its position as one of the older and more lively areas within Kuala Lumpur is forgotten.[2] In that sense, part of the heritage of these children as residents of Chow Kit is also in danger of being lost. The cultural mapping project, which focuses on how they live their lives within Chow Kit, while also in a sense inviting others in to visit, pushes a different view of the area, which could allow for a recovery of an older heritage, which might then merge with and ameliorate the current view of Chow Kit.

It is worth noting that the Chow Kit project collaborated with KL Krash Pad, a centre based in Chow Kit which seeks to protect the rights of all at-risk children and teens; provide them with safe havens, and expose them to as many positive and holistic opportunities as possible to enable them to reach their full potential ("Yayasan Chow Kit: About). The proposal for the project specifies a desire to work with high-risk teens between the ages of 14 and 16. A project like this would impart skills to the participants (photography, digital media, performing arts, etc.), but more importantly would highlight their voices, thus serving to bring them in from the margins somewhat, and grounding them as a central part of this old section of KL.

The project had different phases, each one concentrating on a different aspect (food, ethnic and religious diversity, fashion). The project was hands-on and immersive. The children chose the skills that they wanted to learn, and used those skills to produce maps, brochures and t-shirts which provide useful information while also expressing their own experience within the Chow Kit area. One of the t-shirt designs concentrates on the range of food available in Chow Kit (and indeed, in Malaysia at large). The names of the different foods are clustered together in the middle of the t-shirt, so that the individual names are slightly difficult to read. The design reflects the plethora of food available to Malaysians, as well as the occasional confusion arising from this abundance of choice – as reflected in a cartoon by prominent Malaysian cartoonist, Lat. Aside from reflecting these points about Malaysia, the t-shirt also highlights the typical Malaysian obsession with food. Furthermore, while each dish can be related back to a particular 'racial' group, the jumble of names

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2. In the 1980s, while prostitution and drug addiction were rife in Chow Kit, the area was also considered KL's city centre, a place people frequented for food and bargain shopping. It was also the venue for a 1986 concert by one of Malaysia's most popular singers in the 1980s, Sudirman – a concert which attracted an audience of 100,000.

on the t-shirt indicates the way in which (religious restrictions aside) all Malaysians have adopted these dishes as part of a general, more hybrid Malaysian heritage. The message is underscored by the fact that the words are crammed into a graphic of an open mouth, implying that everything is going to be swallowed and (as indicated by the tongue emerging from the mouth), relished, regardless of origin.

This idea of hybridity is also reflected in the food brochures which, for e.g., highlight (among others), three rice dishes which also neatly encapsulate Malaysia's official racial mix – nasi kandar (rice and curry - of Indian origin but popular with most Malaysians); nasi ayam (chicken rice); and nasi goreng (fried rice). Both the chicken rice and fried rice are of Chinese origin. However, the dishes pictured show Malay adaptations of the Chinese dishes, thus highlighting appropriation and adaptation, towards a more hybrid culture. Neither dish has supplanted the original – the Malay version has merely been developed to cater to the halal needs of the community.

The project also highlighted the idea of heritage being a constantly developing and changing thing. The participants found out during their walks in the area that there is a strong migrant presence there, with many of the shops being run by migrants, rather than by locals:

> During the walkabout, it was also observed that the shops in Chow Kit were mainly made out of immigrant-run shops. The people in Chow Kit were also made out of mostly immigrants. It was interesting to see how multicultural Chow Kit was – both in trade and social distribution.
>
> Upon further internet research, we found interesting places in Chow Kit – (1) The oldest Chinese settlement in KL with more than 10 chinese temples (2) The largest Sikh temple in SEA (3) A Pakistani mosque, and more. ("Theme Research #1)

The presence of migrants was not treated as any kind of dilution of Malaysia's heritage. Rather, it was seen as adding to the multicultural flavour of the place. This was highlighted in some of the brochures produced, which noted the presence of eateries which not only offer local dishes, but also authentic foreign flavours such as Thai, Indonesian, Southern Indian, Iranian and also Pakistani food. An interesting point here is that the Thai, Indonesian, Southern Indian and Pakistani cultures have all fed into Malaysian culture in the past. What they are referring to here is the presence of new migrants from these places, as well as from non-traditional origins such as Iran. At the same time, the reference to the "interesting places they found, such as "The oldest Chinese settlement in KL, importantly highlights the long history of Chinese settlement in Malaysia, refuting the rhetoric of recent migration. The participants were able, through this exercise, to understand these various cultures as part of a continuum of migration and cultural adaptation and appropriation.

A showcase called Pesta Chow Kit Kita was then held at the end of the project in order to highlight what the children had learned and produced. The point of Pesta Chow Kit Kita is its very public nature, as it helps to draw in the whole community as well as outsiders, thus spreading

awareness of what the Chow Kit area is and what it has to offer, setting it apart from the stereotyped vision of it as being full of prostitutes, gangsters and drug addicts. Rather, it highlights how people live and work in the area – again, emphasising the idea of a living, growing heritage, rooted in the past. Strang quotes Foucault, to highlight the role of stories in creating things: Foucault's observation that words, stories, narratives, discourses and texts 'form the objects of which they speak' (1972: 54) is readily applied to the making of places through both narrative and graphic representations (134). Through the exploration and subsequent narration of the highly personalised journeys undertaken during this cultural mapping project, the participants are able to articulate, and perhaps "form, places and identities which counter the hegemonic discourse of otherness and marginality.

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# The Idea of the "Vanishing Indian" as an Ideology in the Jacksonian Era

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Historians have attributed the Indian Removal of the 1830s to various factors such as Andrew Jackson's hostility towards Native Americans, the greed of white settlers for gold found in Cherokee territory, and most importantly white farmers' hunger for the fertile land owned by Southern Native tribes.[1] In this paper, I will discuss another factor that affected the Indian Removal: the ideology of the "Vanishing Indian." This concept refers to a fatalistic narrative of Native Indians as doomed to vanish from the American continent.[2] This narrative was used to justify the United States government's policy to relocate Native Indian tribes from the Old Southwest to west of the Mississippi River.

The concept of the "Vanishing Indian" was an ideology in the sense that it was used to hide a deeply rooted racism amongst whites towards Native Americans. I will use the case of the Creek Indian Removal of 1825 to 1827 to demonstrate the potency of the ideology of the "Vanishing Indian." This case is important, not only because it was a precedent for a  larger- scale Indian removal of 1830s, but also clearly testifies to the power of the idea of " Vanishing Indians" in setting the stage for Indian-settler relations'3[3]

In 1827, federal officials forced the Creek Indians of Georgia to move to Alabama. President John Quincy Adams enforced the Creek removal. The issue started with the Treaty of Indian Springs signed on February 12, 1825 by U.S. representatives James Meriwether and Duncan G. Campbell and Creek Chief William McIntosh plus several other Creek leaders.4[4] The treaty required that the Creeks move to west of the Mississippi River by September 1, 1826. The United

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1. See Robert V. Remini, *Andrew Jackson and His Indian Wars* (New York: Penguin Books, 2001); Andrew Frank, "Native American Removal," in *A Companion to the Era of Andre Jackson*, ed., Sean Patrick Adams (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 391-411.
2. This paper is very much inspired by Brian W. Dippie, *The Vanishing American: White Attitudes and U.S. Indian Policy* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1982).
3. 3 Previous studies on the Creek Indian removal from Georgia include Michael D. Green, *The Politics of Indian Removal: Creek Government and Society in Crisis* (Lincoln: NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1982); Mary Hargreaves, *The Presidency of John Quincy Adams* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1985), 200-207; Lynn Hudson Parson, *John Quincy Adams* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001), 181-83
4. The treaty is in Charles J. Kappler, ed., *Indian Treaties: 1778-1883* (New York: Interland Publishing Inc., 1973), 214-217; Green, *The Politics of Indian Removal*, 76.

States Senate overwhelmingly ratified the treaty by a vote of 38 to 4 on March 3, 1825, just one day before the inauguration of Adams, and he signed the treaty into a law on March 7 as one of his first official acts of President.5[5] However, the validity of the treaty was very doubtful. McIntosh had no authority to sign such a treaty on behalf of the all Creeks.[6] Moreover, the Creek National Council, the governing body of the Creek Nation, had decreed before the Treaty of Indian Springs that they would not cede and more land to whites. Any Creek who violated this decree would be punished by death.[7]

Regardless, Georgia Governor George Troup started negotiation with McIntosh to survey all Creek Indian land before September 1, 1826. Infuriated by this bold move, Creek Indians killed McIintosh and two of his followers on April 29, 1825.[8] Two weeks later, after learning of McIntosh's death, Adams ordered Georgia officials to stop their survey to prevent a further escalation of tensions. He sent General Edmund Pendleton Gaines to Georgia. General Gaines stationed nine infantry companies between the Creek Indians and Georgia settlers and held a series of meetings with Creek Indians to assess their sentiment. After these meetings, Gaines reported to Adams that a vast majority of Creeks opposed the Treaty of Indian Springs and supported the killing of McIntosh.[9] Based on this report, President Adams' Secretary of War James Barbour sent a letter dated July 21, 1825 to Georgia Governor George Troup that the United States government would not permit Georgia's survey. Shortly afterwards, Adams administration also signed the Treaty of Washington with Creek Indians on January 24, 1826 that repealed and replaced the Treaty of Indian Springs. The preamble of the new treaty stated that "the stipulations in the said Treaty [of Indian Springs] are…wholly void."[10] The new treaty, however, demanded that the Creek nation forfeit to the federal government all of its land in Georgia east of the middle of the Chattahoochee River. [11] The remaining Creek lands in Georgia represented about 192,000 acres, or a mere 4.5% of the total Creek land held in early 1825. The Creeks agreed to leave the ceded territory by January 1, 1827.[12]

The Treaty of Washington represented a turning point in Adams's views towards Indian removal, a stance he had previously rejected. Behind his growing acceptance of Indian removal lay the ideology of the "Vanishing Indians." The idea of Vanishing Indians was most fully discussed during a four-hour discussion of the Adams cabinet on December 22, 1825 held to formulate a general policy to deal with Native Americans and their lands. During the debate, Secretary of War James

5.  Samuel Flagg Bemis, *John Quincy Adams and the Union* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), 80.
6.  Green, *The Politics of Indian Removal*, 56.
7.  Ibid., 74.
8.  Ibid., 96.
9.  Ibid., 111-116.
10. Herman V. Ames, ed., *State Documents on Federal Relations: The States and the United States* (Philadelphia: Department of History of the University of Pennsylvania, 1911), 114; Green, *The Politics of Indian Removal*, 125. Kappler, ed., *Indian Treaties: 1778-1883*, 264.
11. Ibid., 265.
12. Green, *The Politics of Indian Removal*, 130.

Barbour initially proposed "incorporating Indians within the States of the Union….considering them as altogether subject to our [United States] laws." Secretary of State Henry Clay refuted this idea of assimilation and argued that Barbour's plan was "impracticable." He said that "it was impossible to civilize Indians; that there never was a full- blooded Indian who took to civilization. It was not in their nature." According to Adams' diary that recorded this meeting, "He [Clay] believed they were destined to extinction, and,…. He did not think them, as a race, worth preserving. He considered them as essentially inferior to the Anglo-Saxon race. Which were now taking their place on this continent. ….their [Indians'] disappearance from the human family will be no great loss to the world. In point of fact they were rapidly disappearing, and he did not believe that in fifty years from this time there would be any of them left."[13] What is important is that none in the meeting, including President Adams, refuted the idea. In fact, Adams wrote that "Governor Barbour was somewhat shocked at these opinions [of Clay], for which I fear there is too much foundation." [14]

By accepting the concept of the "Vanishing Indian," Adams and his cabinet felt justified in signing the Treaty of Washington in January 1826.  Moreover, about a month afterwards Adams indicated his complete conversion to the idea of Indian removal. On February 21, 1826, Secretary of War Barbour submitted a letter to John Cocke, Chairman of the House Committee on Indian Affairs. In the letter, Barbour recommended removal as the ultimate solution to the question of Natives Americans' land.[15] Barbour suggested removal of all Native Indians to west of the Mississippi River. The removal would be carried out by individuals instead of collectively by tribes.[16] Barbour's plan was similar to the Indian Removal Act of 1830 later urged by President Andrew Jackson. Likewise, Barbour's report resembled later Jacksonian views towards Native Americans, stating that "Before this resistless current [of the white population] the Indian must retire, till his name will be no more."[17]

Once having adopted Indian removal as their official policy, the Adams administration became less and less sympathetic to the Creeks. Despite the signing of the Treaty of Washington, Georgia continued to pressure the United States government and the Creek Indians to cede all Creek territory in Georgia. Eventually, the Adams administration signed a new treaty with the Creek Indians on November 15, 1827 that stipulated cession of all Creek territory within Georgia. This was a return to the Treaty of Indian Springs that Adams and his cabinet had previously struck down. The text of the 1827 treaty made clear that the Creek Nation only agreed to sign this treaty under duress and against their wishes. In particular, the document stated that the "President of the United States having urged the Creek Nation further to extend the limits as defined in the Treaty [of Washington]."[18] By the treaty of 1827, Creek

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13. Charles Francis Adams, *Memoirs of John Quincy Adams* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1875), v.7, 89-90.
14. Ibid., 90.
15. *American State Papers: Indian Affairs* v. 2, 646-654.
16. Ibid., 648.
17. Ibid., 648.
18. Kappler, ed., *Indian Treaties, 1778-1883*, 285.

Indians were forced to move to Alabama the same year.[19]

The case of the Creek Indian Removal from their territory in Georgia in 1827 shows the power of the idea of the "Vanishing Indian." Once Adams and Barbour accepted the idea of "Vanishing Indian," they could not resist the political pressure from Georgia to remove the Creeks. As Clay argued, if all Native Indians were doomed to extinction, why bother to resist Indian removal? Although the Indian removal of all Indian tribes east of the Mississippi to the west would not occur until the passage of the Indian Removal Act of 1830, the path to the Jacksonian Indian Removal policy was well laid out by 1827, by none other than John Quincy Adams, who was presumed to be a political enemy of Andrew Jackson.

The ideology of the "Vanishing Indian" justified Indian removal, not only as an inevitable, but also supposedly "humane" policy. For example, Congressman Joseph M. White of Florida stated during a speech in the House on February 20, 1828 that "They [Indians] are rapidly melting away-no one can deny this-and the question is, how is this doom to be averted?"[20] William Lumpkin of Georgia answered his colleague's question by promoting a policy of Indian removal as "the best and most reasonable plans which can be devised for the salvation of the poor, perishing, and afflicted aborigines of this country."[21] The power of this ideology can be further illustrated by the fact that even those opposing Indian removal accepted the assumptions of the "Vanishing Indian." For example, Peleg Sprague of Maine, who opposed Indian removal stated in a Senate speech of April 17, 1830 that "It is said that their [Indians'] existence cannot be preserved; that it is the doom of Providence that they must perish. So, indeed, must we all; but let it be in the course of nature, not by the hand of violence. If, in truth, they are now in the decrepitude of age, let us permit them to live out all their days, and die in peace; not bring down their grey hairs in blood to a foreign grave."[22] President Adams, Secretary Barbour, and Senator Sprague all gave up their initial resistance to Indian removal, or mounted at best a very feeble resistance to it, once they accepted the assumptions of the "Vanishing Indian."

The idea of the "Vanishing Indian" was ultimately an ideology, because this idea ignored the fact that Native Indians had made a significant progress in their assimilation into American society. In fact, those who argued this ideology and advocated Indian removal themselves acknowledged the eventual assimilation of the Indian tribes into the American way of life. John C. Calhoun, in his capacity as Secretary of War under President James Monroe, commented in a January 27, 1825 report to the Senate entitled "Plan for Removing the Several Tribes West of the Mississippi River," that "Almost all of the tribes proposed to be affected by the arrangement are more or less advanced in the arts of civilized life, and there is scarcely one of them which has not the establishment of schools in the nation, affording, at once, the means of moral, religious, and intellectual

19. Green, *The Politics of Indian Removal*, 141-186.
20. Joseph M. White, February 20, 1828, in *Register of Debates*, 20th Cong., 1st sess., 1589.
21. William Lumpkin, February 20, 1828, in *Register of Debates*, 20th Cong., 1st sess., 1587.
22. Peleg Sprague, April 17, 1830, in *Register of Debates*, 21th Cong., 1st sess., 357.

improvement."[23] Also, Secretary Barbour stated in his 1826 report that "Schools have been established,…, for the instruction of their youths. They have been persuaded to abandon the chase, to locate themselves, and become cultivators of the soil; implements of husbandry and domestic animals have been presented them; and all these things have been done,…"[24]

A century later, historian Grant Foreman also commented that "At least four of the tribes of southern Indians had so far advanced in learning and culture as to establish themselves permanently on the soil, build homes and farms, cultivate the land, raise herds and varied crops, including cotton which they carded, spun, and wove into cloth with which they clothed themselves. They laid out roads, built mills, engaged in commerce, and sent their children to schools conducted by the missionaries. And finally they established representative governments modeled on those of the states." [25]

Recent scholarship agrees with Foreman's conclusion. Summarizing current studies on Indian Removal, historian Andrew Frank concluded, "prominent members of Native communities embraced literacy, private property, Christianity, centralized politics, coercive power, cotton growing, cattle herding, and ranch building."[26] Despite these facts, Calhoun, Barbour, Clay, and Adams argued that the Native Indians were inferior and it was inevitable that they should 'vanish" in time. The racism against the Native Indians in American society was thus so powerful and pervasive that even these politicians, who were also first-rate intellectuals of their time, could not recognize the contradictions in their own messages and attitudes.[27] In this sense, the idea of the "Vanishing Indian" was an ideology that distorted the perception of the reality in the minds of those who harbored the ideology.

Creek Indians tried to counter this ideology but to no avail. In May 1824, a Creek council drafted a policy statement. In it, Council leaders stated that "We are happy to say we are making advances towards civilization…." [28] In another policy document, issued on October 29, 1824, many important leaders of the Creek Indians, including Big Warrior, Little Prince, and Hopoie Hadjo, argued that they are "progressing in the arts of civilization" and they demanded that whites "treat us with tenderness and justice."[29] But their resistance was futile. The ideology of the "Vanishing Indian" swept the Creek Indians away from their land starting in 1827.

23. *American State Papers: Indians Affairs* v. 2, 544.

24. Ibid., 647.

25. Grant Foreman, *Indian Removal: The Emigration of the Five Civilized Tribes of Indians* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1953), 13-14.

26. Andrew Frank, "Native American Removal," 396.

27. See Ronald Takaki, *Iron Cages: Race and Culture in 19th-Century America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, revised edition), 92-107.

28. Green, *The Politics of Indian Removal,* 77.

29. *Niles Weekly Register* 27 (December 4, 1824), 222-223, cited in Green, *The Politics of Indian Removal,* 78.

# A Study on Chinese Image in Korean Chinese Literature

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## Introduction

The thesis is to investigate Chinese images in Korean-Chinese short stories and novels on the principles of imagologie, focusing on the works of writers, such as Guo-zhe Cui, Yu-nan Piao, Jin-ji Jin, Cheng-xi Zhao, Guang-xun Yu, and Zheng-nan Liu. According to the imagologie, the "other" refers to the image of foreign countries, so it appears unreasonable to apply the "other" to Korean Chinese and Han Chinese since they are living in the same country with the same citizenship. Korean Chinese people inhabit in a multi-ethnic country, China, but since the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games, they have been in South Korea to realize their Korean Dreams for 30 years where they confronted the confusion and conflicts of identity. They have been at a loss in the margin of South Korea and China, because they have been recognized as "others" in both countries. Therefore, Korean Chinese people can be studied as "exotic others".

## 1. The most competitive rival for survival--- Han nationality

Guo-zhe Cui has created various images including Korean Chinese and Han Chinese, paying special attention to the relationship between Korean Chinese and other nationalities in the context of Korean Dreams, trend of urbanization, and torment and collapse of Korean Chinese rural communities. In his short story, ***One Summer Day*** (2008), he described a strong, low-witted, reckless, rough, and impulsive Korean Chinese man. To revenge for the villagers, he rushed into Mr. Liangs' villa construction site, and pasted framework and substruction stone with cow manure. Later he was fooled by the Liangs' conciliatory move, and even caught snakes for Wangsan's snake soup restaurant in the villa, but was hit and killed by a rock. His image represents Korean Chinese farmers who were excluded from other nationalities and isolated by urbanization and industrialization.

Yu-nan Piao's short story, ***Birds' Nest*** (2005) exposes the reality of Korean Chinese rural communities which were broken up and encroached by Han Chinese. The Korean Chinese primary

school for Korean pupils were sold to Han Chinese and converted into a sheepfold. The vivid description, "School signboard was split into two pieces by the axe and embedded in the classroom window", is the symbol of fragmentation and collapse of Korean Chinese rural communities. If the nest broke up, would eggs be flourishing? At the sight of school which was converted into sheep shelter, Cheng-zhu, the hero in the story, was lost in thought. "All of a sudden I felt the sheep much happier than me. While my own house has vanished, the sheep could live in such a good tile-roofed brick house far beyond their fortune." What a heart-breaking paradox and irony!

Jin-ji Jin's short novel *Moonlight Dance* (2015), reveals clearly the miserable consequences due to the departure of hometown and the break up of Korean Chinese society. In the novel, prolonged life power of Han Chinese who put down roots in one place and live there from generation to generation, and immigration spirit of Korean Chinese who floated like duckweed, are depicted comparatively. A Korean Chinese fellow named You, denotative meaning of having much property, had been doing business in the South of China for ten years. Without even mere 30000 Chinese Yuan, he had run for three days from the southern end to the northeast of China in hope of getting help from his Chinese friend Malaoer in the hometown. In front of high gate of Malaoer's house with the head of a dragon engraved in it, he was low in spirit and hesitated to go in. He was lost in fantasy of bear dancing merrily in the deep forest in the moonlight. The giant bear was just the phantom of his Chinese friend Malaoer, who was living with a strong will and mind. Compared to Malaoer, he was the representation of poor Korean Chinese who floated like seaweeds for nothing in the process of pursuing Korean Dreams and urbanization.

## 2. Cultural differences between Korean Chinese and Han Chinese and grief of assimilation

Succeeded by *Birds' Nest*, Yu-nan Piao's another short story, *Ant River*, was published. It is a story about a cultural boundary between Korean Chinese and Han Chinese in a mixed residence area. There lied two villages as neighbors inhabited by Korean Chinese and Han Chinese respectively along both sides of the river which is as narrow as a slim waist of ant. Two young people with different custom and habit from the two villages fell in love with each other but ended in tragedy. A Korean Chinese girl, Xin-yu, was longing to get married with a veteran in olive uniform. Unfortunately, the veteran whom she had a secret crush on, had a girl friend. Then she fell in love with the youngest son of the Sun family, a Han Chinese man whose family was running a bean curd mill. A rumor spread so widely that her parents got to know the fact, and she was beaten harshly by her father. The next day, females in the Korean Chinese village hauled the girl out and criticized her indignantly about her evil behavior. Then the following day, she was found a body dead in a bend of Ants River.

The death of Korean Chinese girl had been a distant past. A young man got some money from his elder sister who labored hard in South Korea to support him. Owing to his sister's help, he could

sympathetic to him. The son of our family is also a good friend of him. One day, he brought us a letter from the army. "Kajiburi" is a character who lives with a simple mind and a warm heart, even though he is treated as a fool by the villagers. His pure-heartedness and honesty present a sharp contrast to the cold and calculating people around him.

Korean Chinese but sympathize with and would like to help him. It is also my father and mother who feed corn poridge to "Kaji-bori", who came back after being excluded for many months. Therefore, "Kajiburi" bows nine times with the highest courtesy to my father and mother, from which we can see he has some knowledge of the "Analects of Confucius", which means he cares about ritual practices like returning favors. In fact, he was the son of a landowner and a minor officer of the Nationalist Party and participated in the anti-Japanese war too, but because of the time when one's fate was determined by the individual's identity, he had to live an inhuman life.

The story, ***Neighborhood In the Spacious Yard*** (Jeng–nun Liu, 2016) in a humorous and witty way centers on the prototypical temperament and personality of the Han through the customary scenes. This work portrays in depth the economic discernment and diligence of Jang gombo, which is kind of different from the characters of Korean-Chinese villagers. Jang gombo makes money by raising pigs as well as chickens and ducks in a wide enclosure. In addition, his family do farming as well, which the Korean-Chinese do not even care, and finally becomes the richest in the village. It is the topic of his family how to earn money even while having meals. Jang gombo grows up a boar and earns money through its running with the sows from other families. Through the daily life of Jang gombo and his family, this work vividly portrays the temperament and personality of the simple and diligent Han people free from ostentation.

Despite the above meaning, the symbolization of the Han Chinese in the Korean-Chinese novels still seems hard to get rid of the social collective imagination of our nation. The collective imagination of our nation against the Han and China is generally characterized through the tendency to demonize the Han, while it has undergone several stages of change. The Hans are often described as those who are either lechers or misers who know nothing but money just like the image of the "Wang Seo-bang", or of Kim Dong-in's "Potato" in the 1920s, as well as the image like "A. Q", who acts like a fool. In today's Korean-Chinese novels, idealized characters begin to be created, but the depiction of their externalities still does remain in the limits of the above-mentioned collective imagination. In other words, we not only need to look deeper into their prototype image but also to explore their inner world, which has changed with their temperament and personality.

The images of the Hans and China recently described in the Korean-Chinese novels are mainly presented through the depiction about the Han- Chinese people living in rural areas. It is necessary to widen the viewpoint both vertically and horizontally. Vertically, with the view of the anti-Japanese fighters who carried on the dual mission of liberation of China and the liberation of the motherland after the Revolution of 1911, and through the communication with the highest elites from different fields, it's available to create the image of the elites from the highest level of Chinese society and also advisable to deal with the image of both Chinese citizens from various levels and urban citizens who live an active life in large cities. In other words, we should open up new horizons of recognition of various Han Chinese by the means of visualization of individual characters

Jin Huxiong

# Pragmatist Roots of the Affect Theory

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## 1. Introduction

*Homo Aestheticus* coined by Ellen Dissanayake (Dissanayake, 1995) seems appropriate to describe our contemporaries affected by overwhelming amount of information and images on the media which characterize late capitalist culture. This contention makes sense only if we figure out the term *Ästhetik* (or aesthetics in English) according to Baumgarten's usage of it. By reconsidering the original meaning of the word, i.e., "Wissenschaft des was sinnlich ist (i.e., study of the sensuous)", we could illuminate the human image in this commercialized mass media surroundings. Recent emergence of the affect theory in various forms, I think, suggests that we need to pay more attention to the human faculties such as sensation, perception, and emotion.

Brian Massumi, who has explored implications of 'the affective turn' in the various forms of cultural studies since 1990s, owed heavily to American pragmatists like William James and Charles Peirce, although he gave Gilles Deleuze and other European philosophers and Alfred North Whitehead more credits for providing the theoretical grounds for the turn. In his works like *Parables for the Virtual* (1995) he tries to build up his own theory of the affect based not only on Deleuze/Spinoza's philosophical tradition, but James/Peirce's pragmatist thoughts.

The main concern of this paper is to look into pragmatisms of James's and Peirce's in regard to Massumi's elaboration of the concepts of the affect. At the end, it will prove that some major points from American pragmatist philosophy such as the relationality of human experiences support Massumi's affect theory. The conclusion will also show that Peirce's pragmatist semiotics supports Massumi's theory of affect and cultural study in spite of his overlooking some major tenets in it.

## 2. Massumi's Affect Theory

There are two theoretical sources of the affect theory: one is from Sylvan Thomkins's

psychology, and the other from Massumi's philosophy derived from Deleuze study. The former is originated from Freud's psychoanalysis, and affect is considered as "the prime 'interest' motivator that comes to put the drive in bodily drives." (Greg et al, 2010; See Tomkins 1962) I'll look into the latter in order to explore its theoretical grounds.

Different from 'emotion' which is static, determinate, and subjective, affect is moving, indeterminate, and pre-subjective, passing through one state to another. Massumi explores the concept of affect in the autonomous experiences of the body before one represents and conceptualizes them (Massumi, 1995). Affect is the immediate experience of the world connected to pre-conscious or subconscious bodily movement in his version of the affect theory.

Following Spinoza and Deleuze, Massumi defines affect as power-quality which is felt and expressed, for example, looks on the face. The effect of power-quality is the *intensité* of experience to use one of the Deleuzean terms. It is the power (i.e., *puissance*) of the body which affects and is affected in the field of relations. In other words, affect has two faces of the event that happens as a *multiplicité* in the Deleuzean sense of the word. Event is inevitably relational and political. Having relations in the world or participating the world is equivalent to becoming active. Participating the relations means transforming others. Embodied beings open to the relational events encounter each other, transforming and being transformed reciprocally.

Affect as an entity unfolds itself as a continuous flow of manifestations of time. It encompasses overall affections and expressions accumulated in the body that has been passing through the time. Physiological states, vague mood, and even the feelings of life as a whole could be all considered as the affects, i.e., primary power-qualities. Affect is, in short, unconscious feeling about life. Its unspecificness derives from the unconscious memories of 'pastness' (Massumi, 2015). Pastness itself is the power-quality of time as a whole. If one reminds the meaning of *intensité* in the context of Deleuze's transcendental empiricism, it could be realized that the affect illustrated by Massumi based on the philosophy of Deleuze and Spinoza is about the value of the feeling of unique and irreducible experience unfolding throughout our lives.

The affect as power-quality is not actual, but virtual and, therefore, can make changes. Affect that constitutes pastness is a kind of excess or surplus, and accumulation of novelty and creativity. Starting from Spinoza's philosophy, Massumi underscores on the importance of the temporality of affect. If a stream of affects constitutes a body as a kind of entity, it could be called an expression of the time. Marks and traces inscribed on the body in the past drive whole new presentness or the dynamics of new life. The body going through increase or decrease of the power-quality is involved in the past. Therefore, one could say that the transition of affect toward the future includes reactivation of the past.

Massumi's affect theory is basically about the subjectivity or intersubjectivity with bodies that feel, perceive, move and have relations with others. Tracing his philosophical roots in American Pragmatism, I'll dig further on the bodily subject which experiences immediately and collectively.

### 3. Pragmatism and the Affect Theory

#### 1) James's Psychological Pragmatism

Massumi relies more on James's Pragmatism than on Peirce's in unfolding his affect Theory. He couples with it Whitehead's process philosophy when establishing his own version of affect theory. Extending Spinoza's and Deleuze's concept of affect, Massumi highlights the notion of *proprioception*. It is a kind of perception that constitutes the medium depth between tactile sensibility which is 'exteroceptive', and visceral sensibility which is 'interoceptive'. He develops this more immediate perception referring to James's psychological works (Massumi, 2002).

*Proprioception* is sensibility proper to the muscles and ligaments as James figured out that provides the subject with the conditions of movement. It "translates the exertions and ease of the body's encounters with objects into a muscular memory relationality." (Massumi, 2002) It is, according to Massumin, asubjective and nonobjective medium depth that effects "a double translation of the subject and the object into the body." Proprioceptive memory arises on the dimension of the flesh.

Activist philosophy has been pursuing by Massumi together with occurrent arts such as performances by a number of contemporary artists. It has its basis on James's *radical empiricism* in the context of his pragmatist inquiry. The basic tenet of radical empiricism is that everything that is experienced is real in some way and that everything real is in some way experienced. (Massumi, 2011)

As a radical empiricist, James defended the immediacy of an experience of activity. One should start philosophical thinking in the midst of something's happening. James underscored in his radical empiricism that one's experience gets changed: "a unique content of experience is 'change taking place'." (James, 1912) This is what Massumi tries to mean when describing the affect as power-quality that can affect and be affected. He makes a link between James's radical empiricism and Whitehead's process philosophy to consummate his activist philosophy. He equates activity with life after coupling activity with process and change of the events happening through the time.

#### 2) Peirce's Semiotic Pragmatism

Massumi calls his activist philosophy speculative pragmatism because of his definition of 'abstraction' that he borrowed from Peirce's pragmatist inquiry. I think that Massumi could enrich his activist philosophy with Peirce's semiotic pragmatism reinforced by contemporary neuroscientific researches. When they say that the affect theory replaced semiotics providing a new perspective for cultural studies, I don't think it is Peirce's semiotics based on pragmatism but poststructrulism from which they have tried to escape.

Considering humans as signs, Peirce approached the human subjectivity or the *self* by way of both speculative philosophy and empirical science. He used the word 'self', but his usage of it was so different from the one of Descartes, actually was opposed to it. In 1868 Peirce tried

biological approach to the bodily awareness, building up a correlation between mind and neural cells in the body. Peirce said, "Feelings, we all know, depend upon the bodily organism. The blind man from birth has no such feelings as red, blue, or any other colour; and without any body at all, it is probable we should have no feelings at all." (Peirce, 1958) For Peirce, feelings are the felt dimension of cognition, involving the ideation that makes cognition possible in the first place. (Trout, 62). Feelings or sensations that Peirce described is not something belonging exclusively to physical dimension of humans, but something encompassing the whole beings.

To experience a certain feeling, according to Antonio Damasio, means to have a capacity of prediction and planning for the future opportunities and dangers (Damasio, 2003). Peirce suggested that bodily feelings cannot be separated from the reasoning in general. They might be pre- or sub-conscious, but belong to the rudimentary state of reasoning in the organisms. In short, immediate feelings, dynamical emotions (or actions in Peirce's terminology), and logical thoughts are all in a continuum according to Peirce. It could be said that so-called rational judgments or decisions are based on the affective process common to every organism's survival.

Peirce's consideration of habit throughout his academic career reinforces the bodily-minded subjectivity, because his conception of habit highlights the social and relational aspects of *the self*. In one of his later writings, he said that *the self* or individual personality is equal to a bundle of habits. (Peirce, 1934) As he identified the meaning of a concept as a tendency of actions or a habit in his early pragmatist epistemology, he was in mind that a man-sign is both a physical organism and a mental habit. Since a habit is general, it can be differentiated from individual habitual actions. Likewise, the self or personality itself are also general and it should be lived in a continuous flow of time (Peirce, 1934). For Peirce, a private self that manifests in a specific moment and a single event cannot represent one's subjectivity in proper.

In his later inquiry into semiotics, Peirce defined habit as a sort of interpretant, i.e., an interpretative expression of a sign. He identified habits as ultimate logical interpretants and discriminated them from energetic interpretants or actions. (Short, 2004) Habits are laws or tendencies of actions, whist actions are individual momentary events. They are driving forces that lead the practices of our lives. Habit as ultimate logical interpretant is originated from agents' belief or the whole concept of a word in the context of Peirce's earlier pragmatist epistemology. As de Lauretis said, with the habit "the chain of meaning comes to a halt, however temporarily, by anchoring itself to somebody, to some body, an individual subject." (de Lauretis, 1987)

Peirce's theory of the self should not be considered as a renewed version of traditional representatiionalism. His pragmatist semiotics is so distant from traditional epistemology that has required a pre-existing transcendent being. I guess that Peirce's trial to reveal how feeling and actions could produce meaning and make changes in the world will provide more solid ground for the affect theory.

Mijung Kang

## 4. Conclusion

It is not individual rational subjects but collective affective intersubjectivity that is focused in the various forms of affect studies. The possibility of change of the world by affective subjects/objects seems to attract many critics of contemporary cultural surroundings. I used 'subject/object' here to refer to "the subject that is inseparable with its body and interconnected to others."

Researchers of the affect theory consider affect as the possibility of transformation in the bodies encountering with each other, and pay attention to the human subjectivity with communicative and responsive bodies. Subjectivity - precisely intersubjectivity – explored by Massumi in the dimension of the flesh could be more deeply explored by James's psychological pragmatism that he sometimes referred to. Peirce's semiotic approach to the human subject as an embodied consciousness and a habit could be also a strong support to Massumi's affect theory.

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# How Does Human Look? The Monster as the Ultimate Other in The Shape of Water

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Early in *The Shape of Water* (2017), Guillermo del Toro's latest film, US government agent Richard Strickland summons the janitors who have just rescued two of his fingers from a laboratory that doubles as torture chamber. A few hours earlier, the "asset" —an amphibian creature that Strickland has dragged from the Amazon to a military facility in Baltimore— had slashed those fingers, most likely in self-defense. The janitors, Elisa (Sally Hawkins) and Zelda (Octavia Spencer), are not only women but also mute and black, respectively, which prompts Strickland (Michael Shannon) to reveal his prejudices by patronizingly defining "human" for them:

> Strickland: Now, you may think that thing looks human. Stands on two legs, right? But, we're created in the Lord's image. You don't think that's what the Lord looks like, do you?
> Zelda: I wouldn't know, sir, what the Lord looks like.
> Strickland: Well, it's human, Zelda. He looks like a human, like me. Or even you. Maybe a little more like me, I guess. (00:28:44-00:29:17)

A white man in a position of power, married, father of two kids and owner of a house in the suburbs, Strickland's appearance of mainstream normalcy —the standard of humanity in his view— will soon be put into crisis by a band of outcasts intent upon saving the amphibian creature. Co-written by del Toro and Vanessa Taylor, and situated in the context of the Cold War era in 1960's Baltimore, *The Shape of Water* embraces an alternative view of humanity that disengages the human from a particular set of physical traits. By representing the emotional and physical connection between a woman and a "monster" not only as plausible but as exquisitely beautiful, del Toro's fairy tale departs from past and current conventions for depicting humanity, in a way that highlights their arbitrariness.

Known for breaking boundaries between genres, and for creating hybrids that tend to mix historical reality with fantasy[1], the Mexican director Guillermo del Toro delivers in *The Shape*

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1. According to McDonald and Clark, through "the intersection of fantasy and reality" Guillermo del Toro explores "the tensions and conflicts of human history and politics" (2). While they see this characteristic appear even in Del Toro's

*of Water* a "horror-monster-musical-jailbreak-period-spy-romance" (Lane) that is, nevertheless, held together by the underlying presence of fairy tale motifs. My analysis will focus on how these (considerably altered) motifs subvert common conventions for representing the human. According to Jack Zipes, ever since the oral folktales were recorded in writing and then transformed in literary fairy tales in the fifteenth century, "the genre became a conflicted cultural field, in which different social institutions and individual writers and artists used the tale either to bring about conformity or to question conformity to the dominant civilizing process of a society" (x-xi). In Disney's appropriations of the fairy tale, for instance, we may find a contemporary example of the impulse to promote conformity (191-210), while a film like *The Shape of Water*, the story of a mute janitor who falls in love with an amphibian being kept captive in a laboratory, encourages us to contemplate alternatives to the status quo.

How does del Toro, then, alter the workings of the fairy tale? And what kind of effect does this alteration produce? Paraphrasing the director's comments about *El laberinto del fauno* (*Pan's Labyrinth,* 2006), Debora Shaw affirms that, according to del Toro, "it is possible to preserve the structure of the fairy tale and deconstruct characters, or to deconstruct the fairy tale and preserve the simplicity of the characters, but that it is not possible to do both, as the fairy tale would be unrecognisable" (85). In the case of *Pan's Labyrinth*, del Toro retained "the fairy tale archetypes … , while reconfiguring essential structural elements of the fairy tale" (85). I contend that the same strategy underlies *The Shape of Water*'s treatment of the genre. This directorial decision becomes evident in the way that the film treats one of its central preoccupations, the representation of the Other[2], through its characters. As the ultimate Other, the creature captured by the US military in the Amazonia is a metaphor for all those Others that Western civilization has historically placed below the line of humanity: women, people of color, individuals with disabilities or with non-heteronormative sexual orientations… Not coincidentally, then, the gang of misfits that risks saving the captive from death by the hands of the true monster (Colonel Strickland), is made up of a mute white woman (Elisa), her African American co-worker (Zelda), and a closeted gay white man (Elisa's neighbor and friend, Giles). Although some critics have seen this choice of othered characters as overkill (Nayman 15), del Toro is just taking advantage of a staple of the fairy tale, the use of easily recognizable archetypes, to give himself ample room to play with the structural aspects of the fairy tale without falling out of the genre. Thus Strickland, for example, in his consistent and rather hyperbolic evil nature, is the villain of this story in the same unmistakable way that "the Captain" fulfills that archetypal role in *Pan's Labyrinth*.

Now, let's take a look at those motifs and narrative aspects of the fairy tale that del Toro does

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Hollywood films, it is a trait most commonly attributed to his films in Spanish: *Cronos* (1993), *El espinazo del diablo* (*The Devil's Backbone*, 2001), and *El laberinto del fauno* (*Pan's Labyrinth*, 2006).

2. Popularized by Edward Said in *Orientalism* as a key concept for postcolonial theory, the term Other refers to those who do not fit squarely within the frame of Western, Christian, white and heteronormative civilization, and who are "othered" (homogenized, essentialized). The process of othering occurs within a binary in which the "self" is the western power, philosopher, artist, scientist who produces the Other from the perspective of the hegemonic discourse.

alter in *The Shape of Water*. The most striking one is the representation of a romantic and far from platonic relationship between Elisa and the amphibian creature (Doug Jones). The motif of the impossibility of falling in love with the Other, often a "monster," is rather old. The premise of *Beauty and the Beast* comes to mind. From its original version as a fairy tale written by Gabrielle-Suzanne de Villeneuve in the 18th century, to the 1991 Disney's animated adaptation, to the musical film released in 2017 (once again by Walt Disney Pictures), it remains clear that while Belle may learn to appreciate the soul of the good "Beast," physical attraction is impossible. By kissing the Beast out of desperation and fear that he has died, Belle turns him again into the handsome white prince that he once was, and only then romantic love and mutual physical attraction are possible. In a similar fashion, in Disney's 1998 animated version of Hans Christian Andersen's[3] *The Little Mermaid*, Ariel yearns for a kiss from her beloved prince, which should allow her to outsmart the Sea-Witch and become a human permanently; that kiss, however, will not happen until when Ariel has already lost her tail and grown legs, thanks to Tristan's (the mermaid's father) decision to grant her wish. The erotic kiss, or the beginning of the dissolution of physical boundaries between two beings, is safely kept within the realm of conformity when the frightening Other —the Beast, the frog, the monster, even the mermaid— turns out to really be, or becomes, an attractive white exemplar of the opposite sex.

In *The Shape of Water*, on the other hand, Elisa connects with the amphibian creature immediately, as the fact that neither of them can speak becomes a foundation for bonding over food, sign language, music, dance, and sexual desire. She is drawn to the creature for who he is, and the "monster" never turns into some more palatable object of affection. In a way, del Toro's film is revisiting here some daring variations of fairy-tale motifs introduced by previous films and upgrading them to a subversive dimension. *The Shape of Water* includes, for instance, at least a couple of homages to *Splash* (Dir. Ron Howard, 1984). Like Madison (Daryl Hannah), the mermaid in the romantic comedy, the amphibian creature spends some time in a bathtub filled up with salty water; also like the mermaid, del Toro's "merman" will bring his loved one's breath back with a kiss under water. But, most importantly, both films revert the fairy tale theme of the "human" kissing the Other into humanity; instead, *Splash*'s Allen Bauer (Tom Hanks) and del Toro's Elisa, the presumed human protagonists, are the ones that become water creatures of a sort through the kiss.

Another film that *The Shape of Water* brings to mind is *Shrek* (Dirs. Andrew Adamson and Vicky Jenson, 2001), notable for its playful take on fairy-tale commonplaces. In this animated comedy, the feisty princess Fiona (Cameron Diaz) is looking for a "first love kiss" that would remove the spell by which she turns into an ugly ogre every night; against Fiona's expectations, it is Shrek the ogre (Mike Myers) and not a human prince who kisses her for the first time, finally triggering the removal of the spell. As it turns out, the spell had "condemned" her to being a conventionally

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3. In Hans Christian Andersen's original story, the little mermaid never gets kissed, sacrifices herself so that the prince could live, dies and becomes a "daughter of the air."

beautiful "human" during the day; once the spell is removed Fiona becomes an ogre permanently, she marries Shrek, and "they live ugly ever after." Unlike *Shrek* or *Splash*, del Toro's film does not present us with a straight-forward happy ending —a classic structural feature in fairy tales as much as in romantic comedies— and its end leaves much to interpretation. Giles' voice-off narration over the final images of Elisa and her amphibian lover floating in deep water might suggest that their story is just starting… It might also just be Giles' imaginative way of coping with a tragic loss.

In any case, even more than the absence of a happy ending, what makes *The Shape of Water* radical in comparison with related films is that the camera looks at the amphibian creature with the same curious and empathetic gaze that Elisa, her friends, and even Dr. Hoffstetler —a Soviet spy who has managed to infiltrate the research project— direct at him. Whenever confronted with the "asset," colonel Strickland cannot see but a monster. By contrast, when Giles, Elisa's gay neighbor, encounters the amphibian creature for the first time, he is not scared or repulsed: "He gazes, with the practiced eye of an artist, and with the hunger of somebody starved of love, and then declares, 'He's so *beautiful*'" (Lane). Del Toro's storytelling treats the creature in that same caring way. Let's consider, for example, how *The Shape of Water* distances its amphibian protagonist from more traditional horror/monster film iconography. Although we learn pretty early that the captive has chopped off a couple of Strickland's fingers, this significant event happens off-camera. In fact, the most gore involving the amphibian creature appears on screen when, out of fear, he attacks one of Giles' cats. Violence and blood are not scarce in the film. However, rather than originating in the usual suspect, the "monster," they are caused by Strickland's (literally) rotting hand. Toward the end of the film, the colonel tortures Dr. Hoffstetler (Michael Stuhlbarg) in a painstakingly graphic scene; meanwhile, and in plain contrast, the amphibian creature and Elisa dance gracefully across the screen, as the mute protagonist daydreams of a musical number where she has a voice and can sing about their love (1:39:15-1:41:05).

The black and white musical scene is clearly the product of Elisa's imagination, but the emotional and erotic connection that she and the fugitive creature have developed while he has been hiding in her apartment is not. In del Toro's hands, the erotic relation between a woman and an amphibian creature —a transgression that could have easily resulted in some clumsy sexual scenes— becomes not only plausible, but almost conventional. When Giles finds them embraced in Elisa's flooded bathroom, for example, we are placed in his point of view. The camera pulls in to reveal Elisa's grin as her arm crosses the creature's back tenderly; tiny blue lights traverse his body in response, but neither the camera nor Giles make a big deal of the sight. Sometimes above water, sometimes under, the scenes where Elisa and the amphibian creature embrace passionately are dominated by greens and blues, the colors of deep water. As the camera pulls away and the melancholic soundtrack lingers, what is revealed is the sheer beauty of two creatures and their dissimilar bodies being affectionate with each other.

Del Toro has admitted what several critics detected when first seeing *The Shape of Water*: that it shares DNA with *Creature From the Black Lagoon* (Dir. Jack Arnold, 1954). According to the

Mexican director, upon seeing that film as a child, he felt "a longing in his heart" that he "could not name." "I kept thinking I hope they end up together and they didn't. So this is me correcting the cinematic mistake" (Keegan). And correct it he did! Rewriting the story within the generic framework of the fairy tale makes it totally possible for the amphibian creature to get at least a kiss from his beloved human "princess" —in his voice-over narration, at the beginning and the end of *The Shape of Water*, Giles refers to Elisa as a princess. However, del Toro then takes the fairy tale genre to its limits by letting the kiss develop into a full blown romantic relationship between the princess and a creature that never turns into a human prince. This transgression —of the rules of the fairy tale as well as of current and past social conventions— appears, nevertheless, cinematically represented as such a "natural" expression of erotic desire between beings capable of caring for each other, that it questions "common sense" definitions of the human. Del Toro's film, in this sense, dialogues with posthuman theorists, who for at least a couple of decades have been questioning the liberal humanist view of the self that tends to take human exceptionalism as a given[4]. Within this new conceptual framework, the central position of the human among other species gets delegitimized "by acknowledging the permeable boundaries of species in the naturalcultural continuum," while at the same time recognizing "the profound interconnections between different forms of life in the composite world where we previously had seen separations" (Opperman 25).

Perhaps embracing this posthuman view, *The Shape of Water* takes the disruption of human exceptionalism up a notch, by proposing that its amphibian protagonist might be, against Strickland's interpretations of the Judeo-Christian religious tradition, not just "created in the Lord's image," but a god of its own. While showing the chained "asset" to his boss, General Hoyt, Strickland reveals in passing some interesting details about the captive:

> Strickland: You know, the natives in the Amazon worshipped it like a god.
> Hoyt: Doesn't look like much of a god now, does it?
> Strickland: Well, they are primitive, sir. You know, they would toss offerings into the water. Flowers, fruits, crap like that. Then they tried to stop the oil drill with bows and arrows. That didn't turn out too well… (00:41:46-00:42:04)

In fact, during his stay with Elisa, the amphibian creature has performed little miracles, and at the end of the film, when he comes back from what seemed a sure death, Strickland, seeing him return, blurts: "fuck...you ARE a god" (my emphasis, 1:55:00-1:55:41). Throughout the film but particularly in this moment, Strickland —and, for that matter, Hoyt— stands as a metaphor for

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4. As Katherine Hayles —a pioneer of posthuman theorizing— explains, the posthuman signals "the end of a certain conception of the human, a conception that may have applied, at best, to that fraction of humanity who had the wealth, power, and leisure to conceptualize themselves as autonomous beings exercising their will through individual agency and choice" (286).

Western civilization and the unbridled arrogance embedded in the ambition of shaping the world "in its own image." Seen through the condescending lens of that arrogance, the Other's ancestral knowledge, beliefs and relationship with nature seem "primitive" —which historically has meant a code word for "less than human" and, therefore, expendable. By investing the amphibious creature with the powers of a god —who may not look like a Western representation of divinity but happens to resurrect like Jesus Christ in biblical accounts— del Toro's film is proposing that the human, as the divinity after which it may or may not have been created, does not fit in any particular form or shape.

This religious theme acquires full meaning at the very end of *The Shape of Water*, when Giles' voice-over narration closes the story loosely quoting a poem written in the 12th century by the Sufi poet Hakim Sanai[5] (41). "When I think of Elisa —Giles relates— the only thing that comes to mind is a poem, whispered by someone in love hundreds of years ago." He then recites these verses:

> Unable to perceive the shape of you,
> I find you all around me.
> Your presence fills my eyes with your love.
> It humbles my heart, for you are everywhere (1:57:50-1:58:28).

Meanwhile, on the screen, the camera slowly pulls away from a long shot of Elisa and her lover holding each other, until they become small silhouettes suspended in the water. The passionate verses that Giles just read, however, are not romantic; Hakim Sanai's words of love are addressed to God. Having brought up earlier the Judeo-Christian theme of the human as "created in the Lord's image," the film now proposes that we consider how that theme dialogues with the Sufi poet's belief that God can be found in everything and everywhere[6]. How does human look?

As if pondering an answer for this question, *The Shape of Water* finds a spot where these contrasting views seem to overlap: Like water, the human may take an indefinite number of shapes. Just as the choice of playing with the format of the fairy tale, or the sympathetic representation of the presumed "monster," this additional layer of meaning strengthens the moral at the core of the film*:* A definition of humanity cannot rely on a certain set of physical or visible attributes, but on our capacity for empathy, for solidarity or, as a mystical poet put it hundreds of years ago, on our ability for seeing the world through "eyes filled with love."

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5. See Peter Armenti's "Who wrote the poem at the end of 'The Shape of Water,'" for extensive information on how the poem got incorporated into the film.
6. A belief that resonates also with the ways in which posthuman theory has challenged human exceptionalism.

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# Bernard Lonergan's Notion of Intellectual Conversion as a Foundational Reality in the Origin of Korean Catholicism: Focusing on the Intellectual Self-Transcendence of Dasan Chong Yagyong

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Research on Dasan Jeong Yagyong[1] (丁若鏞, 1762-1836) has been rapidly growing in Korea. Witness the number of articles and books published. Yet most of the research methodologies for Dasan's works are based on the hermeneutics of textual interpretations, or comparative studies and relevant historical aspects. I propose a somewhat different method of studies for his works based on his religious, moral, and especially intellectual conversions. One also finds examples of these conversions in 18th century Korean Catholicism.

The works Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984)[2] emphasize in a special way the notion of conversion as a foundational reality[3] of his "transcendental method".[4]

First, I shall briefly explain this notion of transcendental method in relation to my proposal.

Secondly, I will explain what he means by Dialectics[5] and apply it to Christian and Confucian horizons. Lonergan understands dialectics as a generalized apologetic conducted in an ecumenical sprit, aiming ultimately at a comprehensive viewpoint.

Thirdly, through various uses of dialectics, the conflicts and dialogues, between two different horizons of traditions, histories, cultures, within Dasan's writings, one should be able to find an example of authentic self-transcendence. This section will focus on Dasan's intellectual self-

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1. I will follow on the Korean Romanization Converter, except quotations, that has been developed by AI LAB in Pusan National Univ. and NARA INFO TECH Co., Ltd jointly, getting consultation from Prof. Lee, Sang-Oak in Seoul National University

2. A Canadian Jesuit priest, one of the most important Catholic philosopher, theologian, and methodologist in 20th century. 24 volumes of *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan* have been mostly published including *Method in Theology* and *Insight.*

3. *MiT.*, pp. 267-293. "Foundational reality, as distinct its expressions, is conversion: religious, moral, and intellectual. Normally it is intellectual conversion as the fruit of both religious and moral conversion." pp. 267-268.

4. Lonergan, Bernard J. F., *Method in Theology*, Published by University of Toronto Press for Lonergan Research Institute of Regis College, Toronto, 1990. See p. 13, *Abbreviation MiT.* Lonergan's notion of transcendentals employ Thomistic sense in terms of unlimited and unrestricted and Kantian sense in terms of a priori. The transcendental is opposed to the categorical or predicamental.

5. Lonergan's notion of dialectic is different from Hegel's notion in terms of 'sublation', "I would use this notion in Karl Rahner's sense rather than Hegel's to mean that what sublates goes beyond what is sublated, introduces something new and distinct, puts everything on a new basis, yet far from interfering with the sublated or destroying it, on the contrary needs it, and carries them forward to a fuller realization within a richer context. *Ibid.*, 241.

transcendence and also on his intellectual conversion.

Finally, one should not assume that intellectual conversion is only cognitive. Lonergan's notion of intellectual conversion within the framework of transcendental method is hardly just about any objective knowledge. Rather, Lonergan contends that intellectual conversion usually presupposes a moral and religious dimension of human authenticity. The self-transcendence of the subject's conscious intentionality includes moral and religious conversion. Lonergan writes, "As intellectual and moral conversion, so also religious conversion is a modality of self-transcendence."[6]

## (1) Lonergan's Notion of Transcendental Method

Research work in the humanities, especially recent and contemporary dissertations normally begin by explaining one's methodology. Yet discourses on methodology in human studies often lack a reasonable, critical foundation. However, Lonergan's transcendental method surpasses that of many of his contemporaries who conceive method as a set of rules and principles.[7]

Both Mateo Ricci (1552-1610) and Dasan recognized the transcendental aspect of heaven[8] and of human nature. One may assume that most people know and observe transcendental precepts at least implicitly. As Lonergan wrote, "Everyone does so, precisely in the measure that he is attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible."[9] Again, spontaneously we move from experiencing to the effort to understand; and from understanding to critical reflection that calls for rationality; from rational or reasonable judging of facts or values to the deliberations required for decision.[10] However, few people can make explicit what they implicitly live because this is difficult "matter of heightening one's consciousness by objectifying it, and that is something that each one, ultimately, has to do in and for himself."[11]

Lonergan's transcendental method[12] analyzes, makes explicit, and synthesizes the dynamics[13] of the human mind as material, functional, and formal[14] processes of the subject's conscious

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6. *Ibid*.

7. *MiT*., 13., cit. 4., Otto Muck's work, *The Transcendental Method*.

8. Ricci's wrote a catechism book in Chinese, *The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven(天主實義)* is mostly, based on *Summa Theology(神學大全)*, written by Thomas Aquinas. Ricci, Matteo, *The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven(天主實義)*, English translation by Douglas Lancashire and Peter Hu Kuo-Chen, S.J., The Institute of Jesuit Sources, St. Louis, 1984. Korean translation by Song Yongbae, Im Keumja, Chang Chongran, Chong Injae, Cho Kwang, and Choi Soja, Seoul National University Press, Seoul, 1999. Abbreviation *True Meaning*.
*Summa Theologiae*, Latin text and English translation, Blackfriars, Eyre & Spottiswoode, London, and McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1964. Abbreviation *Summa*.

9. *Ibid*., p. 14.

10. See *Ibid*., p. 18.

11. *Ibid*.

12. *Ibid*., p. 4. "A method is a normative pattern of recurrent and related operations yielding cumulative and progressive result. There is a method, then, where there are distinct operations, where each operation is related to the others, where the set of relations forms a pattern, where the pattern is described as the right way of doing the job, where operations in accord with the pattern may be repetitive, but cumulative and progressive."

13. *MiT*., pp. 4-6; 14-20.

14. Lonergan, "Cognitional Structure", *Collection, (Collected Works of Lonergan, Vol. 4)*, pp. 205-221. "Lonergan's

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intentional operations. These operations in the pattern are: 1) experiencing (seeing, hearing, touching, smelling, tasting), 2) understanding (inquiring, imagining, understanding, conceiving, formulating), 3) judging (reflecting, marshalling and weighing the evidence, judging), and 4) deciding and acting (deliberating, evaluating, deciding, speaking, writing). These normative patterns of human subject's conscious intentional operations are transcendental.

The operations in the list are done by a subject[15] who is sensitive, intellectual, rational, moral, and loving[16] – and not in some categorial, historically conditioned achievement. In contrast to the categorial and historical the transcendental is comprehensive in connotation, unrestricted in denotation, and invariant over culture.[17]

Transcendental method begins with objectifying the subject's transcendental operations; experiencing, understanding, judging, and deciding and doing. Because this process is only implicitly consciousness, the subject must appropriate and make explicit each levels of consciousness. When the subject intends to understanding something, he/she must be attentive to the object by questioning and the related context of inquiry, enlarged interest, comparison, distinction, identification, and naming.

Understanding is not the end of human conscious intentionality as cognitive activity. Understanding naturally demands reflection on and confirmation of that understanding. Critical understanding and reflection on the subject's understanding call for evidence and the convincing proof requisite for judging. Reasonableness is the norm of the third level of conscious intentionality. In this level, one's knowing and indirect/reflective understanding become a reality.

The normative pattern of conscious intentional operations does not admit of revision.[18] In Lonergan's view, the normative pattern of experiencing, understanding, judging, and acting as pattern is the foundation, or "rock" of his thought, although he admits that this foundation admits of further clarification. "The rock, then, is the subject in his conscious, unobjectified attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, responsibility."[19] Thus, one must learn to become explicitly conscious of and objectify one's conscious intentional operations.

The researcher, however, as a personal subject is unlikely to observe or to understand his/her own conscious intentional operations when his or her research is focused on the object. Thus, the researcher must decide and objectify his or her own conscious intentional operations. The functional specialty Dialectics is what Lonergan suggests here, the heightened of the fourth level of human subject's conscious intentionality.[20]

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cognitional theory is the basic element of transcendental method. The main goal of the cognitional theory is self-knowledge and self-appropriation.

15. *MiT.*, p. 7.
16. Lonergan, "Aquinas Today: Tradition and Innovation", *A Third Collection,* (*Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 16)*, ed. by Robert Doran and John Dadosky, p. 45.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
20. *Ibid.* Chapter 5, Functional Specialties. Lonergan distinguishes contemporary theology in three manners.

## (2) Lonergan's notion of Dialectics in terms of conflicts between Confucianism and Christianity, especially Ricci between Dasan

When Mateo Ricci's books, especially *The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven (天主實義)* were published in Chinese, many Confucian scholars criticized this new perspective so that conflicts followed. However, the conflicts were not severe until ancestor ceremony was banned by the Catholic magisterium. Similar development happened in Chosun society.

Lonergan presumes that disputes and disagreements are inevitable. However, "there are fundamental conflicts stemming from an explicit or implicit cognitional theory, an ethical stance, a religious outlook. They profoundly modify one's mentality. They can be surmounted only through an intellectual, moral, religious conversion."[21] Lonergan suggests the function of dialectic "will be to bring such conflicts to light, and to provide a technique that objectifies subjective differences and promotes conversion."[22]

Dialectics as the fourth level of functional specialty presupposes movements and processes of different historical perspectives that pertain to different hermeneutics and research. But fundamental conflicts in dialectics are interpretations of different data and different historical points of views that are the different understandings not only of historical facts but also of historian's value judgment.[23] Conflicts between differing value judgments are normally based on differing ethical standards and different religious horizons.

Such conflicts and dialectics would have occurred when Ricci attempted to communicate the Christian faith to Chinese people. In order to avoid serious disagreements with the Confucian based Chinese perspective, the Beijing Jesuits, especially Ricci employed an accommodative[24] or irenic approach

Ricci's book, *The True Meaning*, was composed with dialogues between Chinese scholars and Western scholars.[25] Therefore, he had to learn Chinese languages, as well as Chinese history, culture, tradition, and philosophy, especially, the *Analects of Confucius*. Of course, this Jesuit was well versed in the thought of Thomas Aquinas's.

Aquinas's *Summa* first asks a question, for example, "Does God exist," advances negative objects, followed by, "to the contrary," arguments in support of the affirmation. In this way, Ricci

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21. *MiT.*, p. 235.
22. *Ibid.*
23. *Ibid.*, p. 233."
24. Kim Seonhee(김선희), *Mateo Ricci, Ju hui, and Jeong Yakyong*, Sim San Press, Seoul, 2012. Kim explains and summarizes discourses on methodological and strategical approaches of Beijing Jesuit missionaries in China including Ricci. pp. 12-27. Abbreviation *Ricci Ju Hui Jeong.*
25. *The True Meaning*, Introduction, #8. Ricci writes, "I have deplored this situation for long time, and so for more than twenty years… Finally, one day several friends told me that even if I could not speak perfectly, I could not be silent if I saw a thief… Therefore, I wrote down these dialogues which I had had with some Chinese scholars, are collected them into a book."

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could compare and synthesis two different world views. For instance, he compared the Christian notion of God with the Chinese notion of Heaven(天), Sang-ti(上帝) and suggested a common meaning of Heaven. He invented a comprehensive and complemental concept or notion God that is one of the essential elements of the book, *The True Meaning*. To be sure, the notion of God(天主) is the most important term for missionaries in China and Chosun.

Although Ricci's thinking met criticism by Chinese scholars, his works were generally welcomed and received and modified[26] by many Confucian scholars. In this circumstance, Ricci's books were officially imported into Chosun in 1631 by Jeong Duwon (鄭斗源) who was a member of the annual delegation of the Chosun government to the emperor of China. Thus, Ricci's works were discussed by many scholars in Chosun, especially Namin(南人, Southerners) Confucian scholars.[27]

When Kweon Cheol-shin and his friends[28], including Yi Byok were reading, studying, discussing the works of Beijing Jesuits, especially Ricci's works in intellectual level, there were not serious disagreements among Confucian scholars in Chosun. In 1784 Yi Seunghun was baptized in Beijing and came back to the capital of Chosun where he baptized Yi Byok, the Jeong Brothers (Yakjong, Yakyong), and others. They continued studying Catholic authors, including those that Yi Seunghun brought from Beijing, and practiced religious activities. In this way, the community progressed from intellectual to religious activity.

Yi Byok, called the Master by Dasan, came to a deeper understanding of Catholicism. He went on to lecture and preach not only to Christians but also to Confucian scholars. "Yi Byeok presented Christianity as the true religion, and in it he discovered the kenotic aspect of his mission as self-abasement."[29]

Yi Byeok's work, *Hymn of adoration of God* [30] (1779, written in Korean: 천주 공경가, 天主 恭敬歌) "highlights one of the cardinal issues the first Christians were about address: in the process of applying the important Confucian principle of hyodo (filial piety), how to combine the legacy of Confucian culture with new faith and obedience to the Lord of Heaven."[31]

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26. See *Ricci Ju Hui Jeong.*, pp. 427-458.

27. *True Confucians*, pp., 213-216. Chong Doowon met a Jesuit priest, Joao Rodrigues in Beijing and took back with many books on science and on religion, a world map designed by Ricci, a pair of pistol, and telescope, including *The True Meaning (天主實義)*.

28. "Between 1777 and 1779 Kweon Cheol-shin(權哲身) organized several conferences in a secluded place called Cheon Jin-am." *Ibid.*, p. 220.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 224. Iraola argues that Yi's understanding moved from reason to faith. Ricci's book *The True Meaning* contains not just his arguments but his special mode of persuasion in humble manner. Ricci writes in Introduction, "Although we know only a little about the Lord of Heaven, … It is my hope that those who read this True Meaning do not belittle the doctrine about the Lord of Heaven because of the poverty of my writing." *The True Meaning*. P. 4. See also Rahner, Karl, *Spiritual Exercises*, Translated by Kenneth Baker, S.J. Herder and Herder, New York, 1965. p. 196-202. The three degrees of humility is the key principle for decision making in the *Spiritual Exercises (#165-168)* of Ignatius of Loyola.

30. *The True Meaning*, p. 224.
    As parents in the family
    As the king in the kingdom
    As the souls in the body

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After the Jeong Jo, king of Chosun, died suddenly from unknown illness, the Christian community soon faced up serious conflicts and persecutions motivated by various social, cultural and political reasons.[32] As Lonergan points out fundamental conflicts are grounded in cognitional theory, ethical standards, differing world views, and religious outlooks. The main causes of the conflict and persecution centered on the meaning of an essential virtue for Confucian ethics, filial piety(孝道). Filial piety was considered the ethical foundation and the standard of family relations in Chosun society.

The Chin-San incident (珍山事件) centered on the filial piety was the turning point for historical and serious persecution. When Yun Chi-chung's (尹持忠) mother died in Chin-San(珍山) 1791, Yun refused to follow the Confucian ancestor rite. Instead, Yun obeyed the bishop Gauvea's prohibition so that Yun did not offer incense and sacrifices of food and wine, and destroyed wooden tablets (神主) that symbolized the presence of his mother's spirit. Yun's abandonment of the Confucian tradition and adherence to his Christian faith was considered as the abandonment of something essential to his culture. This created turmoil in his family, friends, and neighbor who then reported him to the authorities. As a result, the government began a persecution campaign that resulted in the execution of more than 10,000 Christians being executed during the years 1791-1873.

## (3) Self-transcendence: Lonergan's Notion of Intellectual Conversion in relations to Dasan's Works and Life

While the Chin-San incident was developing, family members forced Yi Byok and the Jung brothers to give up their Christian faith. Although Yi Byok kept his faith privately, he publicly acceded to his father's will to stop meeting with Christians. Moreover, he published beautifully composed book, *the Essence of Sage Teaching (聖教要旨)*[33]. He died at home at the age 31. Dansan, however, left the Catholic faith for a while but then had a change of heart.[34] The prime reason why

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So is the Lord in the Heaven
Respect your parents
Serve the king
Keep the fundamental laws
But the adoration of the Lord is first

31. *Ibid.*, p. 222. Between 1779-1794 the Chosun Christians conducted ten different literary productions including *The Ten Commandments Hymn* (十誡命歌) in which the fifth commandment is "Respect your parents".

32. *Ibid.*, p. 278-296. Iraola analyzes and summarizes backgrounds and motives of persecutions to Catholic Christians in Chosun, as intellectual ground, social reform, different worldviews, and political motives.

33. Moon Than Il (문단일), *Jesuit and Seonbi (士) in East Asia and the Production of the First Korean Supplemental Teaching by Yi Byeok*, *Dissertation*, New College, The Mound The University of Edinburgh, 2001. P. 248. Moon concludes that the main point of *the Essence of Sage Teaching (聖教要旨)* written by Yi Byeok, "Hence, the relationship between God and the seonbi (선비) should be a parent-child relationship." There is controversy of this book, 聖教要旨, about who is the author and when it was written.

34. Won Jae-yeon (원재연), "A Review on the trends of studies about the Relationship between Chong Yak-yong and Western Catholicism", *Gyohoesayeongu* (教會史研究), vol. 39. Institute of Korean Church History, 2012. p. 37-145. Won reviews more than 30 researchers on Dasanhag(茶山學). A controversial topic on Dasan's religious life, weather he was an authentic Christian, is discussed.

Dasan initially abandoned his Catholicism was the issue of filial piety(孝道) and the Confucian ancestor ceremony. Dasan endured not only outer conflicts but also inner ones in terms of this basic ethical teaching, filial piety. According to the Ten Commendments of Catholic teaching, the fifth commandment is analogues to filial piety. Therefore, Dasan could not understand why the magisterium rejected the Chinese view of filial piety.

For Dasan, as with Lonergan, this ethical value(德) is not just a concept or a theory but also something that must be done in human relations.[35] As Lonergan wrote, "Human knowledge, then, is not some individual possession but rather a common fund (value), from which each may draw by believing, to which each may contribute in the measure that performing his cognitional operations properly and reports their results accurately."[36] For Lonergan human ethics is basically a matter of value – and value is a transcendental notion.[37]

A transcendental notion is a dynamic principle that keeps us progressing in our self-transcendence towards something that is other and greater than ourselves. The notion of good and value is not merely theoretical. For Lonergan the human good or value is never an abstraction. The transcendental notion of human good is to be found in every possible question about the value of concrete, particular being. In this sense, the notion is entirely concrete. Lonergan wrote, "by the good is never meant some abstraction. Only the concrete is good."[38] Transcendental notions promote human subject to self-transcendence that is the achievement of conscious intentionality. "True judgments of value go beyond merely intentional self-transcendence. The fulness is not merely knowing but also doing, and man can know what is right without doing it."[39]

Given the complexity of the dialectical situations in terms of value judgments, Dasan had to decide. He might follow a path similar to that of his elder brother, Jeong Yagjong(丁若鍾) who remained Catholic and wrote *Chu-Gyo Yo-Ji (主教要旨): Essentials of the Lord's Teaching* (1794).[40] In order to promulgate Catholicism for which he was eventually executed. There were, however,

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See also; Kim Sutae (김수태), "The Epitaphs of Jung Yak-yong: Insight into his relationship with Catholicism", *Gyohoesayeongu* (教會史研究), **vol. 42.** 2013.12, pp. 235-288. "Jung's final words are significantly different from those he wrote in the "Memorial"(1796). In that work he criticized Catholicism as a heretical religion and a perversion of the truth. This difference in language allows us to postulate that Jung Yak-yong, somewhere in the early 1820's, and following his release from exile, changed his attitude to the new religion from the West." p, 288.

35. Baek Minjeong (백민정), "The Meaning of the Concept of Virtue and the Political Problem in the Philosophy of Jeong Yak-Yong", *Human. Environment. Future*. Vol. 9. (인간·환경·미래), 2012.10, p. 3-42. "Tasan was thinking that the virtue is ethical value that can be completed only by the specific practice in human relations. He thought the virtue is a result of concrete practice between human relationship." Citation in the abstract.

36. *MiT*, p. 43.

37. *Ibid*., pp 34-36.

38. *Ibid*., p. 36.

39. *Ibid*., p. 37.

40. Diaz, Hector, *A Korean Theology Chu-Gyo Yo-Ji: Essentials of the Lord's Teaching by Chong Yak-jong Augustine* (1760-1801), Fribourg, St. Paul, 1986. Diaz writes, "In the study of revealed truth the East and West have used different methods and approaches in understanding and confessing divine things." P. 7.

See also Antton Iraola, *True Confucian*, pp. 166-170. Iraola points out that the methodology of *Chu-Gyo Yo-Ji* is similar with *True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven*.

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basically two different horizons before Dasan: one was the new orientation[41] from Western religion, philosophy, and science that was introduced by Beijing Jesuits, the other was that of the traditional (Neo)-Confucianism in Chosun. Yet Dasan did not simply follow both. Scholars have shown that Dasan had followed a creative and unique path that was neither the same as Ricci's new horizon nor the traditional Neo-Confucian one.

According to Lonergan, horizons are the structured resultant of past achievement and the limitation of further development. "They are structured. All learning is, not a mere addition to previous learning, but rather an organic growth out of it. So, all our intension, statements, deeds stand within contexts."[42] Lonergan further wrote, "But it is also possible that movement into a new horizon involves an about-face; it comes out of the old by repudiating characteristic features; it begins a new sequence that can keep revealing ever greater depth and breadth and wealth. Such an about-face and new beginning is what is meant by a conversion"[43]

This about-face as an intellectual conversion can happen in various ways. He described intellectual conversion as "turning from what seems to what is." This spontaneous or incidental conversion is a turning form a particular error to a particular truth. Lonergan also conceived of a systematic intellectual conversion in the great cultural break-through in the world of theory: for example, the Council of Nicea.[44]

However, "Intellectual conversion is radical if it acknowledges the existence and influence of inhibiting and reinforcing the yearning for the pure desire to know. Radical intellectual conversion effects the transition from the spontaneous to the explicit and deliberate."[45] Liddy points out that Lonergan's whole work aims at accomplishing "not just the correction of one or other error, but the explicitation of the dynamic principle for combatting any error."[46] This radical conversion is rooted in fidelity to the unrestricted and unlimited pure desire to know.

In this sense, a radical conversion "is a reorganization of the subject, of the subject's operations, of the subject's world. It is not only a question of broadening one's horizon, ¡¦ but of producing a change in the very interiority of the subject."[47] For this change in the knowing subject, one has to ask a question: "what am I doing when I am knowing?" One's answer to this question may be authentic or inauthentic. In addition to the authentic subject, there is the inauthentic subject. Conversion is a dynamic movement and process from inauthenticity to authenticity. "Man achieves authenticity in self-transcendence."[48]

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41. *Ibid*., p. 11. Diaz points out that Chong Yak-jong's book was written without direct assistance of foreign missionaries but reading, studying and discussions with his friends on the works of Beijing Jesuits.
42. *Ibid*., p. 237.
43. *Ibid*., pp. 237-238.
44. Liddy, Richard, *Transforming Light: Intellectual Conversion in the Early Lonergan*, The Liturgical Press, Collegeville, Minnesota, 1993. P. 170. See also footnote 7.
45. *Ibid*., 170.
46. *Ibid*., 171.
47. Lonergan, *Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, Vol. 23*. Translated by Michael Shield, University of, Toronto Press, Toronto, 2013. pp. 373-375
48. *MiT*., p. 104.

The meaning of authenticity may be expressed in various manners. Lonergan distinguishes three stages of meaning:[49] the mode of common sense, the mode of theory such as philosophy and science, and the mode of interiority. Philosophy in the Confucian sense would be the stage of meaning - approximately what Lonergan means by the second mode. The third stage of meaning as interiority has not been clearly and theoretically developed in the Confucian traditions. A necessary condition for the occurrence of authenticity is the heightening and objectifying of one's consciousness. Yet expression or explanation of such objectification authentic ways could be various modes of meanings; common sense, theory, and interiority.

## Concluding Remarks

It seems that humanities in particular Dasanhag(茶山學) has been primarily concerned with the objectivity of their positions or horizons in relation to texts but not in relation to Dasan's subjectivity or interiority. In Lonergan's view, "for it is now apparent that in the world mediated by meaning and motivated by value, objectivity is simple the consequence of authentic subjectivity, of genuine attention, genuine intelligence, genuine reasonableness, genuine responsibility. Mathematics, science, philosophy, ethics, theology differ in many manners; but they have the common feature that their objectivity is the fruit of attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, and responsibility."[50]

Yet questions arise: (1) was Dasan able to achieve authentic self-transcendence through an intellectual conversion; (2) how would a Dasanhag researcher be able to objectify and clarify the authenticity in Dasan's works as intellectual conversion?

First, for the achievement of an authentic and radical intellectual conversion as a transformation of the subject, of course, a life-long process of self-appropriation is necessary. I would suppose that Lonergan's notion of self-appropriation approximately expressed by *su-ki(修己)* and *gyeog-mul-chi-ji(格物致知)*. This approximation requires linguistic, hermeneutic, and comparative research.[51] Accordingly, Dasan would be called the Master of *su-ki* and *gyeog-mul-chi-ji* so that an authentic process of self-appropriation can be shown to be in his works. Yet his intellectual conversion as a self-transformation of himself is a subjective matter.

Secondly, by using the horizon and structure of Lonergan's transcendental method with respect to the notion of conversion, one may uncover the positive characteristics of radical conversions in Dasan's works. For instance, he critically understood the wooden tablets(神主) to symbolize the presence of Yun Chi-chung's mother's spirit.

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49. See *Ibid.*, p. 85.
50. *Ibid.*, 265.
51. See Jeong Uyeop, "notion of seo in Jujahag" (주자학의 서(恕)), *Sogang Journal of Philosophy Vol.50*, Aug. 2017, pp. 387-418.
 See also, Setton, Mark, *Chong Yagyong: Korea's Challenge to Orthodox Neo-Confucianism*, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1997. Xiii. pp. 139-144.

Dasan clearly denied the real presence of her spirit in a wooden object. Given that the human spirit(鬼神) is not a material object, this indicates that Dasan was not a naïve realist. On the other hand, Dasan disagreed with the bishop Gauvea's prohibition of the ancestor rite. In Dasan's view, the original intension of the Confucian ancestor rite was based on the worship to the Sang-ti(上帝 -God) by ancient saints.[52] Dasan points out that the ancient people were doing this.

Dasan's notion of God is not a conceptualistic notion of Sang-ti(上帝, God) but the real Creator and sovereign God who relates to human beings.[53] Thus, Dasan's notion of Sang-ti and of originality in the Confucian ancestor rite imply some sense of critical realism. Lonergan's notion of the radical intellectual conversion, however, is not naïve realism nor conceptualism but critical realism concerning reality, objectivity, and human knowledge.[54] Yet Lonergan's notion of realism or critical realism in Confucian study is different from Ricci's notions. And the notion of realism or critical realism must be researched.

Finally, human authenticity as religious, moral, and intellectual self-transcendence did not happen just to isolated individuals but was the fruit of a communal transformation process in and through authentic interactive communication with others. The religious, moral, and intellectual teachings of Catholicism were communicated in East Asia and mediated especially by Ricci's works that were transmitted by the Confucian scholars in Chosun, especially by Yi Byok (李蘗) with his Christian community. And an example of the process of life long self-appropriation (修己) and possible radical intellectual conversion (格物致知) could be uncovered by further research from Dasan's works.

52. Baek Minjeong (백민정), *Philosophy of Chong Yagyong (정약용의 철학)*, Yi-hag-sa, Seoul Korea, 2007. pp. 87-88. See also, Keum, Jang-Tae (금장태), *Dasan's Shitian-Xue and the Use of Catholic Doctrines (다산의 사천학(事天學)과 천주교 교리의 활용)*, *Gyohoesayeongu* vol. 39 (教會史研究 39輯). Institute of Korean Church History, pp. 5-36. Cit. Abstract. "Through the influence of Catholic doctrines, Dasan shed a new light to the Confucian scriptures, overcoming gyeong-hak, based on the doctrine of righteousness, of Confucianism and proposed 'Shitian-Xue' which revitalized the innate religious consciousness of Confucianism. Dasan's use of Catholic world view to shed a new light to 'Shitian-Xue' in the gyeon-hak of Dasan is an important step that opened a new world for the study of Confucian scriptures. Furthermore, by bringing in the influence of Catholic doctrines to the interpretation of Confucian scripts, Dasan had opened the door for the mutual understanding of Oriental and Western philosophy."
53. *Ibid.*, pp. 85-86.
54. *MiT.*, pp. 238-239. "Only the critical realist can acknowledge the facts of human knowing and pronounce the world mediated by meaning to the real world; and he can do so only inasmuch as he shows that the process of experiencing, understanding, and judging is a process of self-transcendence." p. 239.

# Derrida, Buddhism, and the Future of Human Dignity

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A month before Jacques Derrida died, the French daily newspaper *Le Monde* ran an interview with him,[1] which was later published as *Apprendre à vivre enfin* (*Learning to Live Finally*, 2005). What would it mean to learn to live? And finally? Can we learn how to live at all?

The title came from Derrida's statement, "I would like to learn to live, finally," which appeared in his seminal work *Spectres de Marx* (*Specters of Marx*, 1993). It is noteworthy that Derrida's first explicit engagement with Marxism begins with a seemingly apolitical question: how to learn to live. How does the political question of Marxism enlighten our existential question of how to live?

I will consider this question by engaging with Derrida's work and with Buddhist philosophy.[2] I will use a lens of comparative philosophy to explore what both of these can teach us about being human and living with others in our politically and socially turbulent world.

## 1. Life and Philosophy or the Logic of Exclusion

What does it mean to learn to live? What does it involve? In the interview, Derrida asks: is living something that can be learned or taught? Derrida answers his own question as follows: "Learning to live should mean learning to die, learning to take into account, so as to accept, absolute mortality." For Derrida, this means to accept our mortality "without salvation, resurrection, or redemption."[3] The philosopher suffering from a pancreatic cancer confesses: "I remain uneducable when it comes to any kind of wisdom about knowing-how-to-die or, if you prefer, knowing-how-to-live."[4] The

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1. "Entretien avec Jacques Derrida, 'Je suis en gerre contre moi-même'," 4 September 2004, *Le Monde*. The interview took place a month earlier in August 19, 2004.
2. Scholars have noted the similar worldviews in Buddhists' and in Derrida's philosophy since the 1980s. See, for example, Robert R. Magliola, *Derrida on the Mend* (West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1984); David Loy, ed. *Healing Deconstruction* (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1996); and Jin Y. Park, ed. *Buddhisms and Deconstructions* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006). In these publications, Buddhist concepts of dependent co-arising, emptiness, and logic of Catuṣkoṭi (four-cornered logic) have been compared to Derrida's différance, trace, text, and so on.
3. Jacques Derrida, *Apprendre à vivre* (Paris: Galilée, 2005), p. 24; *Learning to live finally*, translated by Jean Birnbaum (Hoboken, N.J: Melville House Pub. 2007), p. 24.
4. Ibid.

unambiguously personal existential question of life, death, takes a conspicuously political turn in Derrida's discussion:

> We are all survivors who have been granted a temporary reprieve [en sursis] (and, from the geopolitical perspective of *Specters of Marx*, this is especially true, in a world that is more inegalitarian than ever, for the millions and millions of living beings—human or not—who are denied not only their basic "human rights," which date back two centuries and are constantly being refined, but first of all the right to a life worthy of being lived).[5]

Mortality is the reality of human existence. How is this mortality related to condition of human rights and to the inequality that Derrida sees as having gotten worse over the past two centuries?

To begin our discussion, I will take a path that has not been popular in the Western philosophical tradition: the path through a life story. Biography has not been a welcome genre in Western philosophy. Philosophy is supposed to present universal truth; biography, insofar as it records the incidents of a *particular* individual's life, cannot be a source for *universal* truth. But Derrida takes a different approach to the relationship between philosophy and life events. As he once puts it: "Philosophy is psychology and biography together, a movement of the living psyche, and thus of individual life and the strategy of this life, insofar as it assembles all the philosophemes and all the ruses of truth."[6] We will follow Derrida's lead to figure out what Derrida wants to tell us about "learning to live."

Derrida is a Jewish Frenchman who was born in Algeria, where he spent his childhood. One day, in 1942, a school official called him to his office and told him, "You are going to go home, my little friend, your parents will get a note." This was how Derrida was expelled from his school—with no explanation. "At the moment I understood nothing, but since?"[7] As a 12-year-old boy, he did not know much about anti-Semitism and the motivations behind it. But, Derrida asks, as grownups, do we know better about why and how such discrimination exists in our society? He was expelled (excluded) from school because he was a Jew. Furthermore, those who expelled him were not Germans but were French people motivated by the anti-Semitism of the French Vichy government. What would you do if your society said you were wrong not because you had done something wrong but because of your race, gender, social class, or sexual orientation? We might suppose that in order to be accepted as a member of the community, we should conform to the judgment of the community, however wrong that judgment might be. Or we might conclude that it is time to rethink the value system of the society that condemns the values we support. Derrida says

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5. Derrida, *Apprendre à vivre*, p. 25; *Learning to live finally*, p. 25.

6. Jacques Derrida, "I have a taste for the secret," in *A Taste for the Secret*, Derrida, J., Ferraris, M., Donis, G., Webb, D., & Donis, G. *A taste for the secret*. (Malden: Polity, 2002), p. 35.

7. Derrida, *La carte postale de Socrate à Freud et au-delà* (Paris: Flammarion, 1980), p. 97; *The post card: From Socrates to Freud and beyond* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), pp. 87-88. Derrida discusses the incident again in "I have a taste for the secret," pp. 37-39.

that to explain his experience of being expelled from school at age 12, he felt a new approach to our thinking and value system was needed, and that new form of philosophizing would become known as "deconstruction."[8]

Derrida's deconstruction brings our attention to the impact of the logic of exclusion on our thinking, value structures, and understanding of ourselves and others. Our understanding of the world is anchored on the dualistic structure. The self constitutes the external world on the basis of the subject's preferences. The self also has a tendency to valorize the values of the group it belongs to, either in reality or in its imagination. The result is a dichotomy between the self and others, men and women, haves and have-nots, and the East and the West. A comprehensive expression of this binary formula for understanding the world is the tension between the center and the margin.

The dualistic worldview is based on the assumption that one's identity has an unshakable ground, which is in turn linked to the concepts of purity and privilege. The self's belief in the quality it represents becomes a justification for a hierarchical judgment between the self and others. Both Derrida and Buddhism challenge this logic of identity and propose that our existence has a relational nature.

## 2. From the Identity Principle to the Relational Existence

Derrida claims that Western philosophy has anchored itself on the idea that our identity is fundamentally grounded on a given essence, which functions as its foundation. This essence is more valuable, pure, and close to soul and is the source of ultimate existence. Challenging such a hierarchical and dualistic view of existence, Derrida demonstrates that none of the seemingly pure and positive characteristics of our existence exists as it is, but only through its opposite. Light does not exist without darkness; presence does not exist without absence. There is no pure identity as such, since identity is being made through difference from others (la différance) and their trace (la trace). If identity becomes possible through its opposite, the privilege and hierarchy are nullified because, for example, the idea of purity cannot be self-constructed, but requires its opposite, impurity. What this amounts to, for Derrida, is that identity is based on the logic of limit or exclusion. Purity earns its identity by excluding impurity, by devaluing that which makes its identity possible.

This seemingly abstract discussion of the logic of exclusion becomes clearer in terms of how it functions as an architect of discrimination in our society if we take a more concrete example. In his reading of *Lonely Tropical* (*Tristes Tropiques*, 1955), Derrida calls our attention to Lévi-Strauss's discussion of people without writing, and to the extension of this, a people without history. Levi-

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8. Early in his career, Derrida took pains to problematize the question "what is deconstruction?" The essentializing and essentialist tendency of philosophy is based on modes of the question, "What is…?" (*De la grammatologie*, p. 32; *Of Grammatology*, p. 19). To Derrida, any effort to define deconstruction is wrong, because deconstruction "takes place" (*Derrida and Différance*, edited by David Wood and Robert Bernasconi, [Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1988], p. 4).

Strauss's intention was good even though based on a misleading logic. He aimed to say that the Nambikwara people, a tribe in the wilds of Brazil, did not have a *writing system* and were thus purer than civilized people like himself, an anthropologist from Europe.

Derrida asks whether there exist a people who do not have writing. Who are the people without writing (or language) and history? And can any human society exist without writing and history? People without writing systems are in fact without writing. But does the absence of a writing system amount to the absence of language? Does it make people purer, or more innocent and free of violence? Ironically, by declaring the lack of language to be a state free from violence, the anthropologist deprived the people of Nambikwara of their thinking and history.

Writing as a specific sign system is only a part of writing for Derrida. When we say "those people who do not have writing or history," the rule of exclusion is already at work. *Who are these people without language or speech?* Remembering his time in Algeria, Derrida once said that he did not have language. The only mother tongue he had was French, but what he spoke was not French, since French meant the French spoken not merely in France, but in Paris, the language of the center.

Addressing the postcolonial subject, Gayatri Spivak asked, "Can the subaltern speak?" One might assume that once a colonized people are liberated, they will speak their own language. Can this really happen? The formerly colonized people cannot but have internalized the colonizer's ideas and language, regardless of their intention. Even though the physical time marks the liberation, in the human time or the time called existence, the trace of colonialism cannot be erased. People in the post-colonial time still speak the language of the colonizer and think the thoughts instilled by the colonizer. Can women speak when a patriarchal structure is loosened? Ideas, systems, and language are already charged by the patriarchal standard; and without disturbing the existing modes of thinking, rules, and norms, liberation—whether liberation of women, of the colonized subject, or of a certain social class—cannot empower the liberated subject.

Can Asians speak? They cannot, if the world continues to make the Western mode of thinking the standard way of thinking, and Western rules insist on being the default rules for the entire global community.

No matter what native languages Asians have spoken for centuries, and no matter what intellectual traditions they have preserved—in some cases, for longer than Western traditions have existed—as long as the global community is closed to new modes of thinking and new rules for governing, those at the margin of the global community do not have a language or a history. Nor do women, or the subaltern, or those at the bottom of the economic ladder in a capitalist society. It is not that there are people literally without language or history; rather, there are people whose language and history are not accepted as language and history by those who have power and privilege.

People whose language and history are not accepted become marginalized and excluded from their right to participate in the creation of social and communal values. Worse, the outside is not

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just that which cannot be a part of the inside; the outside is blamed for being the impure force contaminating the "purity" of the inside, and is thus accused of causing social and communal problems. Women are considered impure; in most of the world's major religions and philosophical traditions, they are portrayed as temptresses, the cause of men's downfall. African-Americans are considered violent, the cause of all the shootings in American society. Homosexuality is charged with impurity, in an attempt to justify why homosexuality is not regarded as a "natural" way of existence.

Why is purity more valuable than impurity, and why does purity enjoy the privilege of needing protection at the expense of that which is considered impure? Purity, in this case, is associated with being of itself, being in itself, and without being mixed with others. The myth of being-oneself, and the rhetoric of purity, is the basis of the logic of essence, the origin. Derrida claims that "there is no simple origin,"[9] and that the question of origin is unavoidably related to the question of the essence.[10] Against such a tradition, Derrida tells us: "We should think about trace before the being."[11]

Our existence and meaning structure are possible through différance and trace. Derrida calls this ecology of our existence and meaning structure "the text." Deconstruction is known as a reading of a text. But for Derrida, "text" is not limited to literal texts like the books we read. The "text" is the environment in which we exist.

## 3. The Buddha and Philosophy

In *The Laṅkāvatāra Scripture*, one of the major Buddhist texts, the Buddha criticizes philosophers who look at the world with the assumption that there exists an unchanging essence or foundation within it. He also criticizes philosophers who look at the world from the dualistic perspective of self versus others.

The Buddha claimed that his teaching, which he identified as the Middle Path (中道), went against both the foundationalist and dualistic worldviews. He claimed that people look at the world from two extremes: "This exists" is one extreme, and "This does not exist" is another. What is the middle between "that which exists" and "that which does not exist"? Buddhism answers this with a concept of relational identity known as "dependent co-arising" (緣起).

Warning against the human tendency to look at the world from the subject's perspective, Buddhism teaches that the subject is always both subject and object. When I see an object, I am the subject looking at the object, but I am also an object from the object's position. The subject-centered worldview is myopic in this sense. What this implies is that the self-identity the subject deems solid is in fact a fluid reality that is constantly in the making as the current self encounters

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9. Derrida, *De la grammatologie*, (Paris: Les Éditions de minuit, 1967), p. 55.
10. Derrida, *De la grammatologie*, p. 110.
11. Derrida, *De la grammatologie*, p. 69; *Of Grammatology*, p. 47.

itself both as subject and as object. This fluidity of the self is not something one should be pessimistic about, though. It is power because it allows change and growth.

The Chinese Huayan Buddhist thinker Fazang (法藏, 643-712) explains the logic of identity formation through the notions of "mutual identity" (相卽) and "mutual containment" (相入). One's identity is possible because the identity of others become "contained" within it. Fazang uses the number system to demonstrate his point. Consider the numbers 1 through 10. The number 3 is the number 3 because it is "different" from the other numbers; at the same time, within the number 3 is the trace of all the other nine numbers. The number 3 and the other numbers dependently attain their identities. Derrida explained this through the concepts of "différance" and "trace."

Fazang explains the epistemological process in which of beings are viewed as independent entities, and the non-existence of the essence of those entities, through the idea of the three natures (三性): imaginary nature (遍計所執性), other-dependent nature (依他起性), and round and complete nature (圓成實性).[12] Suppose something happened that made you angry at your friend. What we usually notice at the time of anger is the anger itself. That is imaginary nature. This doesn't mean that the anger is false or that the person who is angry is lying or being absurd. Rather, it means that we are isolating the phenomenon so that we have the limited view of the anger itself. If we take a step back and think about how the moment of anger happened, we see various factors that led the situation. Thus, the occurrence of anger is other-dependent. If we move a step further, we see that the anger itself doesn't have a fixed identity that we should hold on to and keep being angry. The anger does not have the essence of anger: it is empty to us, in Buddhist vocabulary.

The Buddhist idea of the dependency of our existence, the three natures, is practice-oriented. These are tools to explain how we should overcome afflicting emotions, disturbing experiences, and the pain and suffering caused by them. Derrida and Buddhism meet in this realm of living the life, or learning to live.

## 4. Logic of Exclusion, Violence, and Suffering

Derrida identifies hierarchical dualism as the foundational logic of Western metaphysics and characterizes the nature of this philosophy as "violence."

In *Of Grammatology* (1967), he identifies three levels of violence: (1) the first level of violence is language; (2) the second level is moral system and the law; (3) the third level is what we usually regard as violence, "evil, war, indiscretion, rape."[13]

Derrida calls the violence of language an original violence (*la violence originaire*) or arch-violence (*archi-violence*). Language is a system or institution that functions by naming and differentiating. Its capacity to present that which cannot be presented is its raison d'être, its supreme benefit and at the same time its limitation. If we accept the relational identity as proposed by both

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12. 金師子章雲間類解, Taisho, vol. 45, no. 1884, p. 660a
13. Derrida, *De la grammatologie*, pp. 164-165.

Derridean and Buddhist philosophy, language cannot but be an obstacle in our understanding of the world and self. The irony, however, is that language is not an optional element in our existence. Law and moral systems are what we consider to exist for the benefit of our life. Laws and morality are constructed, not given, which means that there are authors for the laws and morality.

The three layers of violence help us understand how the logic of exclusion causes violence in social and political issues such as immigration, asylum, cosmopolitanism, the death penalty, and the question of the animal and sovereignty.

## 5. The Gaze of the Animal, of the Sovereign, and of the Beast

In his later works, Derrida addresses the problem of dualistic categorization in terms of the categorical division between human and non-human animals. He draws our attention to the problem of using the generic term *the animal* as if all animals belong to the same category. A snake is different from a rabbit, which is different from a cow, which is different from a cat. Why do we categorize them all as *the animal*, even without using the plural? Derrida says that as soon as we use the expression *the animal*, we put them in a cage. This is the violence of humans against the animals that continues in the form of the animal and food industry.[14]

In *The Animal That Therefore I Am* (2008; *L'animal que donc je suis*, 2006), Derrida revisits a major theme in his philosophy: categorization. As soon as a category is established, hierarchical positioning settles down. The categories of *animal* and *human* is essential in the self-identity of humans since humans claim themselves in distinction of its opposite, animal.

The title *The Animal That Therefore I Am* is a parody of Descartes's "I think therefore I am." In this book, Derrida describes his cat looking at him naked in his bathroom. Nakedness and gaze— two instances that define the difference between animal and human. Humans look at the animal, not the other way around. But Derrida asks whether it is not also the case that we are being looked at by our cats and dogs and so on.

> As with every bottomless gaze, as with the eyes of the other, the gaze called "animal" offers to my sight the abyssal limit of the human: the inhuman or the ahuman, the ends of man, that is to say, the border crossing from which vantage man dares to announce himself to himself, thereby calling himself by the name that he believes he gives himself."[15]

Derrida's discussion of animal takes further a social and political turn in his last seminar on the beast and the sovereign. In this seminar, he points out that the beast and the sovereign share

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14. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ry49Jr0TFjk
15. Derrida, *L'animal que donc je suis* (Paris: Galilée, 2006), p. 30; Derrida, *The Animal That Therefore I Am*, translated by Marie-Louise Mallet (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010), p. 12.

the same position with respect to the law: both stand outside of it. The beast is not subject to the law because it is below the law; the sovereign, because he is above the law. What is the beast, though? Is the negative connotation of *beast* a part of the innate nature of the beings we categorize as beasts, or is it an evaluative term we assign to them? And who is the sovereign? Derrida defines the sovereign as the one who has "the right to suspend the rights of others." The sovereign, then, locates himself at the other end of a dualistic power structure from the beast. But through the very right to suspend the rights of the others, the sovereign always has the potential to abuse his power and turn into a beast. Although the beast and the sovereign are on opposite sides of the scales of values and powers, they can quickly come to be on the same side.

The beast and the sovereign, or the animals and the humans, live in the same world yet do not live in the same world. Just as there exists a difference between animals and humans, and between the beast and the sovereign, differences also exist between various human groups: men and women, have and have-nots, and so on. The sameness of gender does not mean that two people belong to a homogeneous group, either. There can be no end to this discriminatory grouping. What justifies this discrimination, and what is the basis of grouping? As Derrida puts it, between my world and the other worlds to which I belong there exits an infinite gap.[16]

The members of all these different groups, including the beast and the sovereign, share one thing: they are living beings. To be alive means to be finite: to be a being with limitations. Mortality thus emerges as the condition of existence for all the beings in all the different categories, whether beast or sovereign.

And awareness of mortality makes us realize that solitude is the fundamental condition of existence. Solitude, in turn, ironically also reminds us of the existence of others. If we were not aware of the existence of others—of those who might fill the gaps created by our solitude—we would not even be aware of our own solitude and aloneness. I, with my mortality and my solitude, and others with their mortality and solitude, constitute the world. There are two types of solitude, Derrida tells us: the natural solitude derived from the mortality and limitations of a living being, and the solitude imposed by society, which he calls the solitude of the law. *Law*, here, is not limited to actual legislation but includes all forms of exclusivist modes that occur in our communal existence.

Buddhism tells us how socially imposed solitude, like natural solitude, causes suffering for me and for our fellow beings, and asks us to remind ourselves of our common ground of existence. This awareness is a starting point of the Buddhist practice of compassion, of feeling the suffering of other beings and striving to alleviate their suffering.

Engaged Buddhism in modern times is a product of Buddhism's social concerns. Thich Nhat Hanh, one of the leading figures in the movement and the coiner of the expression "Engaged Buddhism," tells us how the realization of our mortality should teach us the solidarity of being:

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16. Derrida, *Séminaire: La bête et le souverain* (Paris: Galilée, 2010) vol. II, p. 31.

"When your beloved says something that hurts you, try this practice: Close your eyes, breathe mindfully in and out, and visualize the two of you one hundred years from now."[17] Thich Nhat Hanh says that with this practice, after three breaths we will no longer feel hurt and instead we may want to hug the one who hurt us. It will take much longer for a normal practitioner to arrive at this stage than Thich Nhat Hanh promises here, but the message is clear. Envisioning our mortality makes us realize the vanity of many of our reactions that are based on fleeting emotions and thus fosters bonding not only with those we love but also with those who have hurt us. Buddhism is sensitive to human frailty; finitude of being, vanity of desire, unstable reaction to the situation at hand cause suffering perhaps not because of their frailty and temporality but because of a misconceived view of human capacity and existence. If one vainly boasts, the boasting may not in itself be something to be criticized or corrected. But when such boasting causes suffering to others and to the actor himself, Buddhism would advise the practitioner to examine the nature of the boasting and the suffering it has caused in light of human mortality, which should bring out the different meanings of the act.

## 6. The Human Image in a Changing World

What does learning to live involve, if we can ever do it? And what does our discussion of Derridean and Buddhist approaches to human existence and relational identity tell us about the image of human beings in the changing world?

Derrida states that to live means to live with "others" (l'*être-avec*), and that these others are not just the other people living with us now in our community.[18] They are "specters," not in the sense that they are not real but in the sense that they are always there, even though we might not recognize them. My existence at this moment cannot be separated from what I have done and how I have lived; what I was and what I am are not independent of what others were in the past and who they are now.

Asking the question of why any individual should take responsibility if his or her identity is constructed through differences and traces, Derrida says, "To *be* . . . means . . . to inherit. All the questions on the subject of being or of what is to be (or not to be) are questions of inheritance" (emphasis in original).[19]

In his call for awareness of our common heritage, Derrida urges us to see the image and position of humans in our time anew. And we need to be careful in envisioning ourselves as the inheritors of a common past and culture. About twenty-five years ago, during a controversial debate on culture, the American literary critic and public intellectual Henry Louis Gates asked, "Whose culture is it,

17. Thich Nhat Hanh. *Understanding Our Mind: 51 Verses on Buddhist Psychology*, Parallax Press, p. 206. Kindle Edition.
18. Derrida, *Spectres de Marx*, p. 15.
19. Derrida*, Spectres de Marx*, p. 94; *Specters of Marx*, p. 54.

anyway?"[20] in a *New York Times* article. The piece was written in response to Donald Kagan, then dean of Yale College, exhorting the college's freshmen to uphold the Western cultural heritage. He argued that at the core of Western culture were "tolerance and respect for diversity" and that "Western culture and institutions are the most powerful paradigm in the world"[21] Gates, who is an African-American, warned that the culture Kagan tried to inspire the students with is a monologue, because for a person of color in the U.S., that Western culture was built on slavery and racial discrimination. Culture, Gates writes, "is always a conversation among different voices." If the heritage that Dean Kagan meant was that of white males, it was not a culture one should be proud of, nor something we should teach to our younger generation.

As Derrida said, to live means to live in the world that we have inherited. Our common inheritance and our debt to that inheritance are reminders that our existence is not fragmented but always already communal. This communal nature of our existence, however, is not to be categorized through gender, ethnicity, or social class in such a way as to valorize a specific tradition at the expense of others. What we have learned from recent human history, I believe, is that no man is island, and in fact no being is an island. The problems that the global community faces today— discrimination, ethnic, religious, and social conflict, and ecological problems—call for a realization that human beings should step aside from their self-centered world, including the egocentric, patriarchal, West-centric, and anthropocentric assertion. Nobody has a birthright to discriminate and cause suffering to other beings; nobody has the privilege to dominate others at their expense; nobody has the capacity to live by themselves. We all owe others for our survival.

This realization leads us to the ultimatum of the solidarity of beings. This solidarity does not exclude someone because of gender, ethnicity, social class, or any other category humans invented to privilege some at the expense of others. This solidarity cannot exclude non-human animals or nature, since humans do not and cannot exist in separation from them.

As Derrida's concept of the future (*l'avenir*) indicates, and Buddhist idea of enlightenment teaches us, this solidary is not a goal to pursue but a practice that should continue each and every moment we live this life. However great today's lunch might be, we will have to eat another lunch tomorrow, and another the day after. Why should we expect something less when we try to envision humans being better than they were yesterday?

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20. Henry Louis Gates, "Whose Culture Is It, Anyway?" *New York Times*, May 4, 1991, p. 23.
21. Donald Kagan, "Western Values are Central." *New York Times*, May 4, 1991, p. 23.

# An Aristotelian Account of Yulgok's Theory of Human Beings

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## 1. Introduction

In this paper, I examine Yi I's (Yulgok, 1536-1584) theory of human beings in comparison with Aristotle's (384-322 BC). When we intend to make such a comparison, we are immediately required to justify the reason for doing it, but it is often difficult to offer any persuasive reason other than to make an appeal to academic or historical interest. I do think that a lot more than mere satisfaction for historical interest can be gained by comparing them, but we shall have to wait until later to see that my belief is not ungrounded.

Although there is about 1,900 years' difference between Aristotle and Yulgok, I chose Aristotle because he was the first Greek philosopher who was deeply concerned with understanding and explaining human beings in terms of the dichotomous terms of form and matter, and, also, I chose Yulgok as the counterpart of comparison with Aristotle because he was the first Korean philosopher who adopted a different set of dichotomous terms, i.e. *li* and *ki*, in explaining human beings. The primary reason for the choice of the two philosophers is thus that both of them were the first philosophers who endeavored to explain human beings in terms of dichotomous principles which do not have any common characteristics. Another reason is because they also had their differences: indeed, the two philosophers not only had similarities on some preliminary points, but also dissimilarities on a number of significant points. And it is expected that one's deficiency can be backed up by the other. To sum up, Aristotle and Yulgok fully utilized their own dichotomous terms to prove the ultimate end of human beings expressed as the sages and the happy men, respectively, and they had many things to learn from each other.[1]

This paper thus aims to show similarities and dissimilarities in their views on human beings, hoping to compensate each other's defect and produce a better theory. In the course of following up the development of their views, I shall first analyze the two philosophers' conception of nature and

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1. I say "fully" in order to exclude the philosophers who use only one term such as form or mater, or *li* or *ki*. Indeed, the two philosophers are the first in their own countries to utilize both terms, not one of them, in the account of human beings.

go on to discuss their explanation of human beings in terms of the dichotomous principles and the relationship between them. As noted, since the nature of human beings is what makes them as they are, and since in explaining it the philosophers utilize a different set of dichotomous principles, it is worthwhile to compare the characteristics of the principles in detail to see whether there is any difference in their conception of nature. And then I shall turn to examine the principle of classifying different classes of human beings. It is clear from our sensory observation that there are different classes of human beings. The question is then what makes them different despite the fact that all of them are equally explained in terms of two principles. Finally, I shall compare the characteristics of sages and happy men which the two philosophers present as the ultimate end of human beings.

## 2. The Connotation of Nature in Aristotle and Yulgok

It is an interesting fact that philosophers in the East and the West did not have any direct mutual contact or any mutual exchange of opinions, but they nonetheless had a common interest in the concept of nature as early as in 4 century BC. As Aristotle would say, it might be because human beings have in their genes the desire to know what a thing is and to explain why it is so and so.[2] Although they did have a common interest in the concept, they often took a different way of dealing with it. First, Eastern thinkers such as Mencius (ca. 372~ca. 289 BC) were not quite keen on offering any grounds for their claims and focused mainly on human nature, whereas Western thinkers such as Aristotle (384-322 BC) were very anxious to provide reasonable grounds for their own claims and focused not only on human nature, but also on the nature of all the other existing beings. For example, Mencius in the *Book of Mencius* (hereafter, the *Mencius*) told us a large number of guiding principles for human actions, but presented them as a sort of dogma or aphorism without any proper grounds that would persuade us to accept them. It appears that he was not as argumentative as Aristotle who tried in the *Physics* to answer the questions about what nature is, what natural beings are, why they behave in the way they do, and the like.

Mencius's doctrine that human nature is good was accepted without much controversy about its validity and, also, without any serious attempt to provide the rationale for it until a new theoretical interest and method of Neo-Confucianism emerged. For example, Chang Tsai (1020-1077) began to introduce the notion of "physical nature" based on *ki* "that provided a hitherto lacking explanation for evil," soon after that, "From the Ch'eng brothers came the dualistic philosophy of *li* and *ki*," and "The overarching metaphysical framework came from Chou Tun-i (1017-1073)."[3] By this

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2. Aristotle says that "All men by nature desire to know" (*Metaphysics* 980a 22) and, also, that "we do not know a thing until we are acquainted with its primary causes or first principles, and have carried our analysis as far as its elements. Plainly, therefore, in the science of nature too our first task will be try to determine what relates to its principles." (*Physics* 184a 10-16).

3. Kalton *et. al.* (1994), xvi. I have replaced principle and material force with *li* and *ki*, respectively, for the consistency of the terms used in this paper. As for the translation of YI I's passages, I have largely referred to Kalton's translation (Kalton *et. al.*, 1994), but taken the liberty of modifying some of the terms and expressions.

time, the terminological devices were ready for Zhu Xi (1130-1200) to use so that he was able freely to adopt them in his comments on the classical literature including the *Mencius*. It was only after the Neo-Confucian tradition was introduced to Korea in the thirteenth century[4] that Korean scholars endeavored to offer a theoretical basis for the arguments and claims made by the previous Confucians.

In what follows, I shall focus on the examination of the connotation of Yulgok's concept of nature in comparison with Aristotle's. However, since Yulgok's views often overlap Mencius' views, in such a case I shall often mention the latter instead without saying so. As mentioned earlier, there are two reasons for comparing Aristotle and Yulgok: first, they were the first systematic philosophers in their own countries, who were deeply concerned with the concept of nature and, second, both of them employed a pair of terms, i.e. form and matter, and *li* and *ki*, to explain nature, both of which were described as having no common characteristics.[5] In particular, the second point gives us the initial motive for comparing them.

The first question to ask is whether the concept of nature in Aristotle and Yulgok can be explained in terms of essence. As is well known, Aristotle was the one who systematically investigated the concept of nature in the ancient Greek. He in the *Physics* where the concept is closely discussed defines it as the principle or source of movement and rest within natural beings.[6] He denies to ascribe such a principle to artificial beings which he takes to be non-natural. We know that Mencius in the fourth century remarked on human nature and its moral quality: that is, human nature is morally good. It seems that for him nature merely refers to the moral quality of goodness. If so, it is different from Aristotle's concept of nature which is defined as a source of movement and rest. However, the movement here does not simply mean the motion on the surface or in the air, but various sorts of movements that one performs in order fully to actualize one's own nature. According to him, earth, for example, has its own nature to come to the center of the earth, whereas fire has its nature to be far away from the center. Earth and fire seek the right places for themselves and, when they arrive at the right places, they come to rest, which means that they completed the actualization of their nature.

Aristotle's definition of nature as a source of movement and rest initially implies (a) that the source is inborn and so the movement is not forced from without and (b) that it explains why a thing is in such and such a shape or condition at the moment, that is, it explains why it moves now and not at another time. Moreover, his concept of nature entails more implications:[7] (c) it is teleological, that is, whatever has nature has an inborn aim, (d) its ultimate aim is what is good or,

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4. As for the historical background for Korean Neo-Confucianism, see Chung (1995), pp. 1-36 and Kalton *et. al.* (1994), xviii-xxvi.
5. As for the comparison of the two pairs of terms, see Clark (1975), pp. 212-216. He writes an appendix under the title of "Aristotle and the Sung Neo-Confucians" in which he shows a number of similarities and dissimilarities between them, though without any convincing evidence. However, it is definitely worthwhile to take a quick glance.
6. Aristotle, *Physics* 192b 19 ff.
7. Yoo (2008), pp. 64-65.

rather, the best for the subject, (e) those with nature utilize their nature exhaustively, and the like. In the case of human beings, he tells us that the teleological aim of human beings is happiness in virtue of their inborn nature and so they do everything within their power to be happy. To be brief, Aristotle believes that all the beings that are born with nature will do their best to actualize their nature. He expresses this belief in the proposition that "Nature does nothing in vain."[8]

Understood in this way, nature for Aristotle means the completion of what a thing or a man is supposed to do and to be by means of utilizing all the faculties the thing or the man possesses. In this sense, the concept of nature appears tantamount to the concept of essence generally defined as what it was to be as such. In other words, essence generally refers to all the attributes that something has to have in order for it to be as such. However, when we apply the term to Aristotle, it comes to have a more active sense. For his concept of nature refers to a collection of faculties that enables the agency to perform the predesigned or predesignated functions within it. Moreover, another difference between Aristotle's concept of nature and the general definition of essence is that the former implies the good or well-being of the agency on its completion, whereas the latter does not necessarily so. That is, having all the essential attributes does not guarantee the possessor's well-being.

It is not immediately clear whether the Neo-Confucian concept of nature has the connotation of essence which is now understood as referring to a collection of all the faculties which a man or a thing has and guaranteeing the possessor's well-being. As a faithful Neo-Confucian, Yulgok in general accepts the Mencian idea of human nature. He calls *li* nature only when it resides in *ki* and divides it into the original nature which refers to *li* only without considering *ki* and the physical nature to refer to the combination *li* and *ki*. The division of nature is to explain that human beings are born with good nature because of their pure *li* which is always used in Neo-Confucianism as the ground for human goodness and, also, that they, nonetheless, have the possibility of becoming evil.[9] In fact, Yulgok, like most Neo-Confucians, hardly seems to have any interest in the question whether human nature embraces all the human faculties or not. However, considering that human nature may well be taken by any Neo-Confucians to be what makes human beings human and that to be a human being is not only to have all the faculties, but also to actualize them, we can presumably say that the Mencian concept of nature can be understood in the same way as Aristotle's concept can. Even so, the moral goodness of human nature which Neo-Confucianism claim cannot be ascribed to the concept of essence.

The second question concerning the concept of nature in Aristotle and Yulgok is whether both of them have a teleological implication. As noted, Aristotle's concept of nature entails teleology which implies that all the natural beings have inborn purposes or natural tendencies so that they behave in a certain predesignated way. In his terms, if someone is a man, he should do such and such a

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8. Aristotle, e.g. *Physics* 271a 33-34; *De Anima* 432b 21-22 and 434a 30; *Politics* 1253a 9 etc. For more on this, see Yoo (2009a), pp. 198-199.

9. See below for more on the division of two natures.

behavior. Again, this behavior is not something he should do in order to be a man, but something he should do because he is a man. According to Aristotle, a man will do what he/she is supposed to do and, in the end, what he is supposed to be insofar as there is no interruption from outside.[10] However, the Neo-Confucian concept of nature seems to have a different connotation. Above all, the Neo-Confucian concept does not seem to contain any teleological implication that one's behavior will bring about the good result for the agency. To say that one should do such and such a behavior in order to be a human being is not to wait for a good result which will be automatically obtained if there is no interruption, but to make an effort to get a good result perhaps because it will not be automatically obtained without it. One more important point to note at this stage is that Aristotle refers to all the behaviors necessary for the realization of human nature morally good, whereas Yi I considers certain designated behaviors as morally good, i.e. the sorts of behaviors that can be found in the *Mencius*, such as the feelings of commiseration, of shame and dislike, of deference and compliance, and of right and wrong. In sum, Yi I, following the general tendency of Neo-Confucianism, emphasizes human nature and human morality, but Aristotle is not specifically concerned with human nature and so human morality. That is, Aristotle's research in human nature is only part of his interest in nature as a whole. Consequently, his discussion in his ethical works is only descriptive in the sense that it only states what he takes to be true, and he hardly means to present any prescriptive guidance for human behaviors.

## The Relationship Between the Dichotomous Principles

The common characteristic about Aristotle's terms, form and matter, and Yulgok's terms, *li* and *ki*, is that they are considered to be the constituents of beings. That is, all the myriad beings are said to be composed of form and matter or *li* and *ki*. Although Aristotle in the *De Anima* prefers to use such terms as soul and body instead in the case of living beings, they are only different names for form and matter, respectively. Indeed, he has quite a strong idea about the composition of things, i.e. hylomorphism, by which he arguably insists that there cannot be any existing things which are not composed of both form and matter because there cannot be any form without matter and any matter without form. Although the inseparability of form and matter is thus claimed, they are not said to be one. More or less the same view can be found in Neo-Confucianism in that it not only denies the separability of *li* from *ki*, which may well be taken to be the Neo-Confucian hylomorphism or, as we might term it, *likism*, i.e. the theory that everything that exists is composed of *li* and *ki*, but also the identification *li* with *ki*.

The second characteristic between the two pairs of the terms is that both form and *li* are considered to be abstract, immaterial, and unchangeable principles such as the governing laws of nature which are not affected by anything material, but whose existence cannot be denied, whereas

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10. Aristotle, e.g. *Physics* 199a 10-11; 255b 3 ff.

both matter and *ki* are described as concrete, material, and changeable constituents. The fact that the two entities have different equalities denies the possibility of any interaction between them. That is, form and *li* can neither affect, nor be affected by, matter and *ki*. As mentioned, form and *li* are unchanging, and remain the same all the time. On the contrary, matter and *ki* are changeable and so whatever change the composite things experiences is ascribed to them, not to form and *li*.

The two characteristics stated above are common to the pairs of the terms, but the pairs also have their difference. In fact, there arises a question whether both pairs are two different natures or only two types of one and the same nature. This question arises because, when Aristotle claims that form and matter are called nature,[11] he clearly says that they are two aspects of one and the same nature, but not two natures that belong to different entities or whatsoever. As we shall see below, he strongly believes in hylomorphism that everything that exists is composed of form and matter and never talks of the nature of form or that of matter, or of any characteristic nature derived from either of them in separation. At first sight, the same reasoning appears to apply to Neo-Confucianism. For, on the one hand, Yulgok, following Zhu Xi, seems, on the one hand, to acknowledge two types of nature and, on the other hand, to deny that they are two natures, but one and the same nature. The Neo-Confucians do not immediately identify *li* and *ki* with nature(s) but, in general, introduces the *li*–based nature and the *ki*–based nature and call them the original nature and the physical (or, rather, psychophysical) nature.

However, as briefly seen above, Yulgok's view on the relationship between the two natures seems to be different from Aristotle's view. Yulgok explains that the original nature has the characteristics derived from *li*, whereas the physical nature does not only have the characteristics derived from *ki*, but the characteristics derived from the combination of *li* and *ki*. However, since the characteristics derived from the combination of *li* and *ki* might be understood to imply the emergence of some new characteristics which were not in *li* and *ki* before their combination, it is better to say that the physical nature has the combining characteristics derived from *li* as well as *ki*. If so, since the characteristics derived from *li*, i.e. the original nature, are only parts of has the combination of the characteristics derived from *li* as well as *ki*, i.e. the physical nature, one might legitimately say that the original nature is part of the physical nature.[12] This is indeed Yulgok's concept of the physical nature which he inherited from Zhu Xi. Yulgok thus regards the physical nature as the only nature and the original nature as an abstract term.[13] He uses the term "the original nature" to provide the theoretical ground for the moral goodness of human nature in

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11. Aristotle, *Physics* 194a 12 ff.

12. See *Yulgok jŏnsŏ (Complete Works of Yi I)* 10: 29b, "Considered in this way, the original nature and the physical nature are in no way two natures. It is just that when one approaches the physical constitution and only points out its principle, we call it the original nature, and when one points out the combination of *li* and *ki*, we call it the physical nature."

13. Cf. *Yulgok jŏnsŏ* 10: 22a-b, "The nature is a composite of *li* and *ki*. In general, only after *li* is in the midst of *ki* is it is called the nature. If it is not within the physical constituent, it should be called *li*, but not the nature. However, when we point out only the *li* within the physical constitution, it is the original nature; the original nature cannot have *ki* mixed in."

which he deals with *li* as being separated from, and independent of, *ki*.

## The Principle of Classification of Human beings

Yulgok's famous theory of *litongkikuk* suggests that, although all the myriad things share one and the same kind of *li*, but due to the delimitation of *ki* there can be various kinds of beings.[14] He applies this view to human beings and claims that they can be divided into different classes due to their *ki*.

> Only human beings have received integral and penetrating *ki* and at the same time have innumerable variations as to the degree of clarity of turbidity, being pure or mixed. The do not have the pure uniformity of Heaven and Earth; but the mind, being empathy, spiritual, and penetrating, is fully endowed with the myriad *li*.[15]

Yulgok distinguishes four types of man, i.e. the sage 聖人, the worthy 賢者, the middle sort 中人, and the inferior 不肖者. First, he gives an account of the sages.

> The psychophysical endowment of a sage is perfectly pure and his nature is in integral possession of its substance without a single bit of the self-centeredness of selfish human desires. Therefore, as the issuance of this nature, "he can follow his heart's desire without transgressing the norm," and the human mind is likewise the Tao mind. It is like a perfectly clean vessel filled with water since there is not a speck of dirt, when it moves and the originally clear water is poured out and flows forth, it remains entirely clear water.[16]

According to the above passage, the sage refers to a man without any selfish desire. Moreover, whatever he does from his heart, he always fits the norm. Elsewhere, he adds thus,

> Among human beings, there are sages. They alone have received perfectly penetrating and perfectly integral, perfectly clear and perfectly pure *ki*, and so they are at one with the character of Heaven and Earth. Therefore, the sage likewise has a fixed nature that does not change. ... the sage is the norm for the ordinary man. That which is termed techniques of self-cultivation are nothing more than a matter of following the norms that have already been formulated by the sages, that is all.[17]

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14. Yi I, *Yulgok chŏnsŏ* 10:2a in Kalton *et. al.* (tr.) (1994), p. 177.
15. Yi I, *Yulgok chŏnsŏ* 10:3a in Kalton *et. al.* (tr.) (1994), p. 127.
16. Yi I, *Yulgok chŏnsŏ* 10:14a-b in Kalton *et. al.* (tr.) (1994), p. 151.
17. Yi I, *Yulgok chŏnsŏ* 10:3b in Kalton *et. al.* (tr.) (1994), p. 128.

Now, the sage refers to someone who has perfected his/her inborn nature. Indeed, the sage refers to a man who does not have to make an effort to complete his/her nature since he/she is someone who already has "perfectly penetrating and perfectly integral, perfectly clear and perfectly pure *ki*" which is in harmony with Heaven and Earth. Moreover, the sage himself/herself is the norm itself and formulates the norm for the ordinary man. Once again, whatever he/she does, it does not transgress the norm.

Secondly, the worthy has the pure physical quality 氣質, but his/her physical quality is slightly mixed with turbidity. However, the worthy can remove the turbidity and regain "the full perfection of the original nature."[18] Yulgok describes it as "a vessel filled with water that is basically clean, but has not escaped a slight bit of dirt inside." And so, he adds, "there must be further cleansing before the water regains its original clarity."[19]

Thirdly, there is the middle class of people which refers to the class that falls between that of the worthy and that of the inferior. That is, the physical quality of the middle class is clearer than that of the worthy dirtier than that of the inferior.[20] Yulgok has no doubt that even the nature of the middle class of people is originally good, but can be influenced by the turbidity of the physical quality and devolved into evil.[21]

Finally, there is the class of the inferior. Yulgok says that the people who belong to this class have "a lot of the turbid and little of the clear in it, much that is impure and little that is pure. The original condition of the nature is overwhelmed, and, moreover, there is no application made to cultivate and perfect it."[22] As it stands, he appears to deny the possibility of this class of people to be somehow cultivated so that their physical quality can regain clarity. Although he does not clearly say that the inferior can also be cultivated, but he elsewhere claims that all the human beings have the capacity for self-cultivation.

> … the practice of self-cultivation belongs only to man, and the ultimate perfection of that practice extends even to bringing it about that Heaven and Earth assume their proper positions and all creatures are properly nurtured. Only then is the service that is within the human capacity fulfilled.[23]

Yulgok thus thinks that that human beings that are equally composed of *li* and *ki* can be divided into four classes in accordance with the clarity or purity of *ki* and believes in the goodness of human nature as well as the human capacity for actualizing the nature by means of self-cultivation.

18. Yi I, *Yulgok chŏnsŏ* 10:14b in Kalton *et. al.* (tr.) (1994), p. 151.
19. Yi I, *Yulgok chŏnsŏ* 10:14a-b in Kalton *et. al.* (tr.) (1994), p. 151.
20. Yoo (2018), p. 51.
21. Yi I, *Yulgok chŏnsŏ* 10:15a in Kalton *et. al.* (tr.) (1994), p. 152.
22. Yi I, *Yulgok chŏnsŏ* 10:14b in Kalton *et. al.* (tr.) (1994), p. 151.
23. Yi I, *Yulgok chŏnsŏ* 10:3a in Kalton *et. al.* (tr.) (1994), p. 127.

Now let us turn to Aristotle's views on the different classes of human beings. In examining his views, we need first to ask whether he ever divides human beings into different classes. The answer might be "Yes." In the *De Anima*, where he divides living beings into different species, he only distinguishes them into plants, animals (stationary animals and locomotive animals), and human beings, and does not quite show any interest in the further division of them. However, the differentiating factor he uses in dividing the living beings is the soul rather than the body. That is, plants have the nutritive soul, animals the locomotive soul that also has the vegetative, the sensory, and the appetitive as its parts, and human beings the rational soul that also has the vegetative, the sensory, the appetitive, and the locomotive as its parts. In this way, the soul which is identified with the form is that which divides living beings into different species.[24] Indeed, Aristotle often claims the primacy of form by which he says that for an axe to perform its given function it has to have the right kind of shape to cut the trees. However, although in saying this he appears to emphasize the formal aspect of the axe such as its shape, he does not mean to say that only the formal aspect is necessary for cutting trees, but that the form presupposes the material necessary for the axe to cut trees. In other words, the axe must be made of the right kind of material such as iron or stone, but not jelly.[25]

It thus appears that this is the main difference between Aristotle and Yulgok. That is, Yulgok thinks that human beings can be divided into different classes in accordance with the clarity or turbidity of their physical quality, whereas Aristotle does not quite divide them into different classes. However, he surely distinguishes males from females and considers their physical difference (the defective material of the female, to be precise), but there is no sufficient evidence to take it to be his general views.

**The Sages and the Happy Men**

Nowadays, the division of the four types of human beings in accordance with the degree of clarity and purity of *ki* might look rather arbitrary. Although it is also unclear why he divides them specifically into the four types rather than five or six types, it is nevertheless clear that he tries hard to claim that human beings are capable of becoming sages by way of cultivation. Indeed, the basic idea of Neo-Confucianism is that human beings should do their best to become sages. In other words, becoming sages is the final aim of human beings. As seen, sages refer to the people who are in harmony with Heaven and Earth, whereas the other kinds of people refer to the people who aim to reach the standard of sages. Neo-Confucians in general including Yulgok believe that human beings are born with good natures and will act accordingly. This might well be understood as suggesting that they will not agree with such a belief that "Once a villain, always a villain." Indeed, Yulgok strongly emphasizes that even villains are capable of rectifying their evil deeds, recovering

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24. Aristotle, *De Anima* II. chs. 2-3.
25. Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* 193b 7.

their original natures, and becoming sages through cultivation.

What is to be noted here is that Yulgok's understanding of human beings focuses on explaining their moral characteristics and allowing for the possibility for their becoming sages. In his other works such as *Hakkyo mŏbom (Model for an Academy)* and *Sŏnghak chipyo (Essentials of the Learning of the Sages)* in *Yulgok chŏnsŏ*, he endeavors to show a number of practical ways to educate students. Neo-Confucians do not advise them to achieve happiness or something like that, but tell them to complete their natures to be sages. Indeed, for them to complete their natures or to be sages or, even, to be human beings refer to one and the same thing. It might be legitimate to conclude that the objective of Neo-Confucianism was to cultivate oneself to become a human being in its proper sense of term. Thus, it particularly emphasizes two points, i.e. the completion of human nature and the education to be a sage.

In contrast, Aristotle presents happiness as the ultimate aim that human beings pursue by nature.[26] He defines happiness as something self-sufficient, noble, and pleasant.[27] It is not something that can be obtained all at once, but throughout one's whole life. In general, Aristotle maintains that the nature of things will be fully actualized if there is no intervention from without.[28] However, although he believes that human beings have the nature to pursue happiness, he does not think that it will be obtained even if there is no intervention. As is well known, he emphasizes the concept of mean (*mesotes*) in his account of human happiness. That is, for one to be happy one needs to choose a mean between two extremes or two vices,[29] but in order to choose a mean one needs the capacity for excellence, i.e. the capacity to choose a mean.[30] He introduces two kinds of excellence, i.e. the intellectual excellence and the moral excellence, and claims that the former comes about by education and the latter by habit.[31] At this stage, we do not need to discuss how to educate well or how to have a proper habit, but to note that Aristotle's happiness is not something that can be obtained automatically without any effort. Indeed, one might say that Aristotle's teleological account of human beings reaches the limit here since the nature of things cannot be fully actualized even without the external intervention. In any case, his account of human beings in this way appears very similar to Yulgok's account that we have seen earlier, in particular, in that they say that one needs appropriate education to be a sage or a happy man.

I do not mean to start a whole new discussion but, but there is one remaining question worthwhile to ask. I will simply raise the question and offer a brief answer to it. The question whether it is ever possible for one to be a sage in Yulgok's theory (or in the general Neo-Confucian theory) or a happy man in Aristotle's theory? This question primarily arises from Aristotle since he thinks that happiness does not refer to an instant feeling of happiness, but a state that lasts

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26. Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics* 1097b 20-21 and 1099a 24.
27. Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics* 1176b 4-5 and 1097b 5-7.
28. Aristotle, e.g. *Physics* 199a 10-11, 255b 3 ff.
29. Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics* 1109a 20 ff.
30. Cf. Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics* 1102a 5-6; cf. 1106b 36, "Excellence… is a state concerned with choice."
31. Cf. Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics* 1103a 14 ff.

throughout one's whole life and, also, that there are three conditions required for happiness, i.e. the psychological, the physical, and the external, which are almost impossible for one to satisfy. The happy man for Aristotle is just a norm or an ideal form of man which can never exist in the real world. If so, what is the use of talking about it? For us human beings, it seems to be presented as the road not taken or, rather, the road that cannot be taken for ever. Nonetheless, Aristotle shows the road because he knows that we have the habit of dreaming, i.e. the dreaming of taking it one day. That is, although it looks almost impossible to reach the standard, he tells us about it because he knows that we will somehow keep trying. What about the sage case in Neo-Confucianism? Can we think of it in the same way? I will leave this question open to the audience.

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# YI T'oegye on the Ideal Human Image : A Modern Confucian and Global Perspective

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## I. T'oegye's Reputation: A Brief Introduction

T'oegye is arguably the most eminent thinker and scholar in the Korean tradition of Confucianism known as Sŏngnihak 性理學 (school of human nature and principle).[1] He also represents a leading legacy of Confucian education, ethics, and spirituality in entire East Asia. In modern Western scholarship as well, T'oegye is highly regarded as "the commanding figure in Zhu Xi orthodoxy in Korea" (de Bary 1981, 197) and "a major source of inspiration for creative scholarship on Confucian philosophy and its modern scholarship" (Tu 1978, 467). In my published works, I also pointed out that T'oegye left behind a superb model of original thinking and writing, for which reason Western scholarship on Korean Neo-Confucianism has grown significantly especially since the late 1980s.[2]

T'oegye's greatest scholarly reputation was accomplished during his fifties and sixties after retirement.[3] Through his major writings and biography (Ŏnhaengnok 言行錄) and his letters to his disciples and colleagues, we can discover T'oegye's character, integrity and intellect.

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1. The famous Song Chinese thinker Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200) is closely identified with the so-called Zhu Xi school of Neo-Confucianism in East Asia. This tradition is also known as the Sŏngnihak school in Korean because it emphasized the "learning" (hak/xue) of sŏng/xing 性 (human nature) and i/li 理 (principle), two of the most important ideas in the Neo-Confucian literature.

2. Current literature on T'oegye and Korean Neo-Confucianism in English includes the following: de Bary and Haboush 1985; Kalton et al. 1994; Kalton 1988; Ro 1989; Chung 1995, 2004, 2010a, 2010b, 2011b, 2016; and various articles by Tu, Ching, de Bary, Youn, etc. Korean-language works include those by Kŭm Changt'ae, Yun Sasun, Pae Chongho, Yi Sangŭn, and others. Japanese works are Abe Yoshio 1965; Abe Yoshio et al. 1977; Takahashi Susumu 1986; and others. For details, see the bibliography.

3. Except as otherwise noted, most of the biographical information that follows is drawn from his Chasŏngnok 自省錄 (Record of self-reflection), in T'oegye chŏnsŏ (Complete works of Yi T'oegye) (hereafter abbreviated as TC), vol. 3, 151-190; Yŏnbo 年譜 (T'oegye's chronological biography), TC vol. 3, 576-620; and Ŏnhaengnok 言行錄 (Record of T'oegye's words and acts) 1:1a-6:35a in TC vol. 4, 9-261. For my annotated translation of the Chasŏngnok with a comprehensive introduction, see Chung 2016. For T'oegye's life and scholarship, see also Kalton 1988 and Chung 1995.

## II. Self-Cultivation: A Holistic Way

T'oegye frequently discussed self-cultivation as a central topic in his famous writings such as the *Chasŏngnok* 自省錄 (Record of self-reflection)[4] (hereafter abbreviated as *CSN*) and *Sŏnghak sipto* 聖學十敎 (Ten diagrams of sage learning).[5] This topic is also mentioned in his biography and his correspondence with his disciples and colleagues. T'oegye emphasized it as a way of cultivating true humanity.

In 1559, T'oegye advised his leading junior colleague, Ki Kobong 奇高峯 (1527–72)[6] that basic conditions for pursuing a public career has become corrupt because of selfish obsession with gaining personal fame or political power. "What is lacking is…great effort at the practice of self-cultivation" (*CSN* 17; Chung 2016, 120). For T'oegye, this should be done both internally and externally in daily life.

### 1. Internal and External Efforts:

In a letter to his disciple (Nam, Sibo 南時甫), T'oegye said: "The principle of the Dao (Way) is to be cultivated in daily life. What a wonderful teaching, indeed!" (*CSN* 2; Chung 2016, 54). "Continuous efforts" are required over "a long period of time," so that one's mind becomes "pure and masterful" (*CSN* 13 [letter to Kim, Tonsŏ 金敦敍]; Chung 2016, 90).

> T'oegye taught another leading disciple (Chŏng, Chajung 鄭子中),
> "'Be orderly and dignified' and 'be solemn and austere.'[7] In this way, the mind- and-heart becomes one and naturally will not go wrong or [become] one-sided." (*CSN* 7; Chung 2016, 68)

In other words, one's entire self is united. This confirms the basic Confucian teaching of body

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4. The *Chasŏngnok* is one of T'oegye's greatest works. Its philosophical merit certainly rivals his two other monumental works: the *Sŏnghak sipto* 聖學十圖 (Ten diagrams on sage learning) (see Kalton 1988 for its full translation) and "Four-Seven Debate Letters" (see Chung 1995 and Kalton et al. 1994). However, as a written testament of T'oegye's character, teaching, and moral-spiritual practice, the *Chasŏngnok* is of greater interest. It consists of 22 letters and 4 attached essays T'oegye wrote to his six close disciples and three junior colleagues during his fifties. These letters were carefully selected by T'oegye himself after practicing "self- reflection" (*chasŏng/zixing* 自省). His goal in compiling the *Chasŏngnok* volume was to inspire his disciples and colleagues in following the true Confucian way. T'oegye also used it for guiding his own daily self- cultivation during his sixties (years of his retirement)..

5. For the famous *Sŏnghak sipto*, see *TC* 7:4b-35a (vol. 1, 195-211). It is one of his most celebrated works: a great systematization of learning, self-cultivation and socio-political ethics, together with ten diagrammatic essays and commentaries that are based on the integrated framework of metaphysics, ethics, and spirituality. A full English translation of the *Sŏnghak sipto* is Kalton 1988. I also discussed it in Chung 1995.

6. Kobong is Ki's literary name, whereas his given and courtesy names are Taesŭng 大升 and Myŏngŏn 明彦, respectively. Ki is best known by his literary name. For his biography, see Chung 2016, n. 336.

7. The *locus classicus* of this frequently quoted teaching in the Confucian literature is the *Book of Rites* (one of the Five Classics), "Meaning of Sacrifices"; see Legge's translation (1970), *Li Ki*, vol. 2, 216.

control and mind cultivation.

> T'oegye also recommended "single-minded concentration" for self-cultivation as follows:
> "Effort at single-minded concentration penetrates both action and tranquility…. So neither one should be ignored, but nourishing the internal by means of controlling the external is essential and urgent.…This therefore means daily self- cultivation." (*CSN* 17 [letter to Ki Kobong]; Chung 2016, 123).

What I find important here is its modern meaning for controlling the internal and external sides of one's life human nature physically, emotionally, intellectually and ethically.

In this regard, T'oegye loved to discuss *simhak/xinxue* 心學 (mind cultivation or the learning of the mind).[8] According to him,

> "Confucius said, 'Hold onto it [the mind] and it will remain, let go of it and it will disappear' [*Mencius*, 6A:8][9]…" (*CSN* 7).

T'oegye therefore emphasized: "The mind is the master of the self" that "firmly remains at the center of numerous phenomena" (*CSN* 13 [letter to Kim Tonsŏ]; Chung 2016, 88). The *simhak* is an essential way to realize our original, pure mind as true humanity.[10]

T'oegye also liked self-reflection (*chasŏng/zixing* 自省), so he often practiced contemplation after reading, which worked out well for his self-cultivation.[11] His goal was to unify the self internally and externally, which inspired him to seek a deeper meaning of ideal humanity.

## 2. *Kyŏng* and Holistic Self-cultivation:

T'oegye's major writings emphasize self-cultivation in terms of *kyŏng/jing* 敬 as the most important idea in his entire thought. According to the *Book of Rites,* one of the Five Classics, "The self-cultivated person never lacks *kyŏng/jing*."[12] Confucius said: "Be reverent (*kyŏng/jing*) in handling affairs" (*Analects*, 13:19). Zhu Xi taught it as an attitude of "reverence" toward heaven

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8. In Song China, Zhu Xi and his leading follower Zhen Dexiu discussed the idea of *simhak;* see de Bary 1981.
9. Lau's translation 1970, 165. Zhu Xi's discussion of "holding onto it and preserving it" also appears in the *Jinsi lu* 近思錄 (Reflections on things on hand), 4:6 (Chan 1967, 143).
10. T'oegye emphasized this point also in his *Sŏnghak sipto*, esp. *Simhak to* 心學圖 (Diagrammatic treatise on mind cultivation), *TC* 7:29a (vol.1, 208), and *Sim t'ong sŏngjŏng tosŏl* 心統性情圖說 (Diagrammatic treatise on the saying that "the mind commends human nature and feelings"), *TC* 7:a23a (vol.1, 205). For these essays in English, see Kalton 1988,160-164 and 120-127 or Chung 1995, 62-64, 128-132, 168-172.
11. T'oegye liked Neo-Confucian "quiet-sitting" (*chŏngjwa/jingzuo* 靜坐) as a helpful component of self- cultivation. He said: "After practising quiet-sitting, you will be able to unify yourself by re-collecting your dispersed body and mind" (*Ŏnhaengnok*, 1:16b, 6:6b, 6:7b in *TC* vol. 4, 176, 246 and 247). Chung 2004 and 2010a present T'oegye's *simhak* and contemplation in relation to Neo-Confucian ethics and spirituality.
12. See the *Book of Rites,* "Summary of Ceremonies," *SBBY* 1:1a.

and earth, as well as moral respect and "seriousness" in handling things and human relationships. The classical and Neo-Confucian doctrine of *kyŏng* has other related renderings: "solemnity," "attentiveness," "awareness," "mindfulness," and so on.

In his *Chasŏngnok* and *Sŏnghak sipto*, T'oegye repeatedly mentioned that self-cultivation requires a dedicated life of *kyŏng*. As he advised his leading disciple, Kim Tonsŏ,

"For entering the Way (Dao), there is nothing more important than *kyŏng*…."[13] "Never let it out of your mind; make no selfish effort….This is the sagely method of mind cultivation." (*CSN* 13; Chung 2016, 91)

T'oegye instructed his disciples how to practice *kyŏng*:

"Be correct in movement and appearance and be orderly in thinking and deliberating" (*CSN* 7 [letter to Chŏng Chajung]; Chung 2016, 68).[14]

He also said:

"Do not lose *kyŏng* while being active or tranquil…dealing with daily affairs" (*CSN* 13; Chung 2016, 87).

This is the key theme that frequently appears in T'oegye's leading works.[15]

In a letter to his junior colleague Kobong, T'oegye stated: "Be reverent and serious (*kyŏng*) to rectify the self internally" (*CSN* 17).[16] This will make one's mind to "remain truly self-aware and calm (solemn)." True self-cultivation therefore requires the cultivation and practice of *kyŏng* consistently. This must include controlling and transcending one's "selfish cravings":

"When you are tranquil, cultivate the original essence of Heaven's principle (moral principles; *ch'ŏlli/tianli* 天理)[17] daily; when you are active, remove the emerging sprouts of selfish cravings…." (*CSN* 13 [letter to Kim Tonsŏ]; Chung 2016, 90)

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13. This saying is attributed to the Cheng brothers: *Yishu* 遺書 (Surviving works), 18:5b and 18:6b (and 15:9a). It is also quoted in Zhu Xi's *Jinsi lu,* ch. 4, secs. 14-16, 36, 38, 47-49; see *ZZWJ* 4:29a (Chan 1963, 601).

14. Likely citing the Cheng brothers' *Yishu* 15:5a and 18:3a. According to Chan, these two sentences are quoted by Zhu Xi's *ZZQS* 2:22a-b (see Chan 1963a, 607).

15. For example, see the *Simhak to* in the *Sŏnghak sipto, TC* 7:29a (vol. 1, 208) and 7:23a (vol. 1, 205); consult Kalton 1988, 160-64 and120-127, respectively. I discussed this in Chung 1995, 128-132, 168-172; see also *TC* 16:8a-17:6b (vol. 1, 402-430) for T'oegye's Four-Seven letters.

16. T'oegye is likely quoting the Cheng masters in the *Yishu*, 15:1a (see Chan 1963, 552). See also the *Jinsi lu* 4:48 (Chan 1967, 144), where Zhu Xi said, "Make real effort…. 'Rectifying the internal life' and 'concentrating on one thing' will naturally need no manipulation. The body and mind will be reverent (*kyŏng/jing*), and the internal and external will be united" (*ZZQS* 2:22a-b).

17. The key idea of Heaven's principle (moral principles) frequently appears in T'oegye's works, including the *Sŏnghak sipto* (*TC* 7:29a; vol. 1, 208), *Ch'ŏnmyŏng tosŏl* 天命圖說 (Diagrammatic explanation of the mandate of Heaven) (*TC,* vol. 3, 144), and his Four-Seven debate letters.

One should transcend one's selfish ideas and desires by "holding fast to *kyŏng*" (*chigyŏng*/ *qijing* 持敬), so that there are no more "disorderly and perplexed thoughts" and no more "worry or anxiety." Overall, T'oegye emphasized *kyŏng* as "the master of the self" (*CSN* 14; Chung 2016, 101) internally and externally in daily life.

In regard to our WHF conference theme, I suggest that T'oegye's message points to a way of wisdom in seeking the intellectual, moral and spiritual ideal of human existence.

### 3. Poetic and Aesthetic: An Engaging Life

T'oegye is also famous for composing over two thousand poems of various types, including those about self-cultivation and nature.[18] In 1550 shortly after retiring to his hometown, he composed a four-line poem entitled "T'oegye," after the name of his hometown.[19] This and other related poems express his deep pleasure with "retirement" (*t'oe* 退), study, writing, and self-cultivation, while appreciating the natural scenery such as "foothills and rocks" and "flowing streams" (*gye* 溪). This love of nature inspired his philosophic, spiritual and aesthetic orientation.[20]

> Regarding an engaging life of wisdom, T'oegye advised his disciple, Nam Sibo as follows:
> In your daily life you should…empty the mind by controlling its fondness and cravings; live a pleasant life with spare time; appreciate landscape painting, calligraphy, or flowers; and take pleasure in watching stream fish and mountain birds. In this way, you can truly think congenially and not always dislike dealing with things so that your mind's vital energy (*ki*/*qi* 氣) may always remain pure and steady. Let it not deviate or become disorderly so that you do not resent or get angry. This is the essential method. (*CSN* 1; Chung 2016, 52)

This and some other related passages certainly indicate that during his retirement years [50s and 60s] T'oegye enjoyed reading, writing, teaching, contemplation, landscape painting, calligraphy, and watching the beauties of nature.

He pursued not just a scholarly life but also artistic and spiritual activities. So it would be worthwhile to consider this in our global consideration of discussing "the ideal human image."

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18. Most of T'oegye's poems are collected in *TC* 1:1a-5:43a (vol. 1, 47-162). A well-researched topic among Korean scholars in Korea. Two kinds of his poems are called "nature poems" and "self-reflection poems."
19. This famous poem reads as follows:
    Being foolish yet comfortable after retiring (*t'oe*),
    Also worried about my last years because my study is lagging behind.
    After deciding my shelter at a place over this stream (*gye*),
    I practice self-reflection every day like this flowing water. (*T'oegye sŏnsaeng munjip* 1:47)
20. As I pointed out elsewhere (Chung 2011a, 2011c), T'oegye's nature poetry and his deep appreciation of natural creativity seem to resonate with the modern discussion of religious ethics and ecological issues.

## III. Concluding Remarks

T'oegye is not only a superb legacy of Korean Confucianism but also a highly engaging archetype of learning, ethics, and spirituality, which emphasizes the unifying integration of self-cultivation, virtuous life, and public ethics. As a scholar, public servant, educator, and thinker, T'oegye affirms that it is important to regulate and harmonize the inner and outer pillars of daily human life. This is a way of wisdom that extends self-reflective, attentive and reverential *kyŏng* toward the human and natural world.

Confucianism has been "the learning to be human": a *humanistic* way to "cultivate (or perfect) the self" and "transform the world." It is a form of "humanism,"[21] which continues to support our shared concern for universal order, harmony, and prosperity. It addresses the issue of how to be human in the most genuine sense of its meaning. However, since everyone is conditioned by certain factors – material, psychological, social, political, or whatever – the possibility of dehumanization cannot be ruled out. This seems to be embedded in our "existential dilemma."

A century ago, Max Weber (1864-1920), an eminent German social and religious thinker, eloquently pointed out: Confucianism is an "ethic of adjustment to the world," which will continue influencing East Asia in interaction with the modern West (Weber 1964). I agree with Weber's insight. Confucianism assimilates itself with changing social, economic and ethical dynamics in today's Korea, for instance.[22] Globally, it is adjusting itself to the pluralistic world of ideas, beliefs, values, identities, and institutions, as discussed in currently growing scholarship on the "global relevance (or significance) of Confucianism."[23]

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21. Julia Ching (1993, 2000) interpreted Confucianism as an "ethical humanism as religion" or "lay spirituality." Tu Weiming (1985) also called it a form of "humanism" with its own "religiousness" (see also Tu et al. 1992).

22. Confucianism continues to influence Korean society through its moral-spiritual teaching and practice (including ancestral rites); accordingly, there are certain cultural patterns of interaction between Confucian values and other traditions in Korea. See Chung 2015 for my discussion of the Korean case in term of "tradition and modernity." The Confucian role is still significant in shaping cultural identity and tradition in East Asia; see Tu 1996 and Tu et al. 1992 for the entire East Asian case.

23. Since the late 1980s Confucianism in modern East Asia has been a major subject of study in terms of modernization, education, social hierarchy, economic development, political economy, democracy, etc. Several examples of interpretations include such common phrases as "industrial Confucianism" and "Confucian capitalism" in Japan and the so-called Four Little Dragons (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore). Vogel's *The Four Little Dragons....*(1991) explained East Asia's "industrial Neo- Confucianism," referring to Confucian contribution to education and economic success. Tai's *Confucianism and Economic Development....*(1989) is another relevant work on a similar topic. Berger's edited *An East Asian Development Model* (1988) articulated the Confucian culture of political economy and capitalism. Rozman's edited *The East Asian Region: Confucian Heritage and Its Modern Adaptation* (1991) is a comparative study of modernization in China, Japan, and Korea. Smith edited *The Confucian Continuum: Educational Modernization in Taiwan* (1991). Tu's edited *Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity* (1996) presented several ethical, social and economic currents of Confucian influence in East Asia. For my study of the Korean case, see Chung 1993, 1994, 2015. Most recently, Hon and Stapleton's edited *Confucianism for the Contemporary World* (2017) discusses Confucian relevance to the 21st-century's "social and political issues" such as capitalism, political plurality, and civil society. Ames and Hershock edited a new book (2017) to present Confucianism as "an international resource for an emerging world cultural order" in relation to "new global" migration, wealth, and democracy. Lee and Jones 2017 focuses on the "global significance" of Confucianism in terms of ethics and politics. Liu and Ma 2018 considers "the relevance of Confucianism to American and Chinese education" and Confucianism

In my academic role as a Confucian scholar in the twenty-first century, I am trying to articulate the modern implication of T'oegye's thought for our World Humanities Forum. Why?: to seek an ***ideal human image*** from a Confucian and global perspective.

T'oegye's scholarship is dedicated to seeking the ultimate truth and goodness of human nature. I continue to find this significant in Confucian dialogue with other philosophical and spiritual traditions of the world because of their shared commitment to the moral and transcendent ideal of human existence.[24] Its basic message is about the holistic experience of true humanity in transcending (removing) selfishness and thereby extending reverential wisdom and compassion to all living beings.

Isn't this about self-transformation and the transformation of the world? [25] At the heart of T'oegye's thought is this profound faith in human character, dignity, intellect and potential, embodying the harmonious unity of our natural, ethical and spiritual realities. I say so, despite the growing influence of technology, globalization, economy, and politics in our 21st century.

As we know, the notion of the ideal "human image" varies according to language, history, philosophy, religion, culture, and so on. Nonetheless, what we discover through T'oegye's 16th-century life and thought is not only a healthy philosophy or an engaging role model for what I call a life of wisdom and wellbeing, but also inspires our interdisciplinary humanistic understanding of "the human image in a changing world," the general theme of our 5th World Humanities Forum in Busan.

To conclude, T'oegye's Confucian experience and insights – which I have presented today – have a worthwhile modern implication for our global discussion and promotion of the ideal human image in today's Korea and around the world.

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**Abbreviated Titles:**

*CSN*   *Chasŏngnok* (see Yi T'oegye below).

*TC*    *T'oegye chŏnsŏ* (see Yi T'oegye below).

*ZZQS*  *Zhuzi quanshu* (see Zhu Xi below).

*ZZWJ*  *Zhuzi wenji* (see Zhu Xi…).

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for "moral education in an era of advanced technology."

24. In this context, I discussed further comparative perspectives in Chung 2011b, 2004 (sec. 3), and 2016 (Introduction, especially pp. 43-45).

25. I discussed this topic elsewhere in terms of Confucianism and interreligious dialogue (Chung 2004, 2010a, 2011b). The current literature on the comparative study of Confucian religiosity regarding the Chinese tradition includes: Neville 2000; Ching 1993, 2000; Tu 1985, 1989; Taylor 1991; Berthrong 1994.

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for perfection, there have to be criteria which determine what counts as good or better or perfect. The criteria for being a good knife differ from those for being a good violin. Such criteria also put constraints on what can be evaluated at all: It doesn't make sense to ask whether some knife constitutes good or bad music. Hence, nothing can be perfect "as such" or "*per se*" but only relative to some criteria valid for a given kind of object. We can call this "the relativity of perfection to a kind of object". This tells us something important about perfection but it certainly does not suffice to determine what perfection is.

Universal perfection, in contrast, would be perfection in all respects. A universally perfect entity would be perfect as a cheese knife but also as a piano tuner, as a cook, etc. It is very hard to see how something could be perfect in all respects. Wouldn't the perfect cheese knife have to be a very bad piano (given that a cheese knife does not constitute a tuning of a piano at all)? How then could it be a perfect piano at the same time? It seems that nothing could be perfect in all respects. But let us put such worries aside here and assume for the sake of the argument that universal perfection is possible. Even if all this still made sense, we could still ask whether it is good or desirable to be universally perfect. Would we want a cheese knife to also tune pianos, cook meals, entertain us with music and good conversation? This might rather constitute a monstrosity than a perfection. However, I will leave such worries aside in the following. It is worth adding here that many ideas about God describe a being which is not just universally perfect but also necessarily good. I will leave all this aside here; the following holds for all kinds of perfection, whether divine or not.

Finally, there is the idea of absolute perfection—perfection in some respect but to an absolute, non-surpassable degree. The absolutely perfect cheese knife would be a knife which couldn't be a better cheese knife—not just as things stand but which couldn't possibly be a better one. Nothing could possibly be a better cheese knife than an absolutely perfect one.

or perfection one will have to focus on what the nature of that thing allows for.[1] As Iddo Landau recently observed in a somewhat different context: It would be silly to expect a dog to drive a car, expect oneself to be able to sit on a kettle, or a chair to boil water.[2]

However, there is also the idea, especially in some philosophical traditions, of something that has all the specific perfections: The *ens perfectissimum* in René Descartes' Fifth Meditation[3], God, is supposed to be perfect in every respect. This is the idea of universal perfection. But how is this possible, given that some properties are mutually exclusive, like, e.g., omnipresence in space and time, and spatio-temporal absence?

Finally, one might go one step further and think of absolute perfection of something as perfection that is not relative to any or even all possible aspects but is rather absolute. But, one might ask, how can something absolutely perfect if not perfect as this or that? One might, perhaps reply that this would only show that one cannot have absolute perfection without universal perfection. But no, I find it very hard, to say the least, to make any sense of talk about absolute perfection. It sounds a bit like talk about things that are "absolutely to the left", - not to the left of this or that or the other but to the left absolutely.

Let us then stick with the idea of specific perception and leave the other two ideas aside here.[4]

### (b) A First Problem with Perfection Talk: Lack of a Maximum

A first problem with the idea of perfection as (specific) maximal goodness has to do with the idea of a maximum. We all know that there is no greatest natural number. And the Richter Scale for earthquakes has no upper limit. Why then suspect in the first place that goodness (be it of a moral, ethical or some other kind) has a maximum? I myself don't know of any convincing argument to that effect. Why shouldn't the "scale" of goodness lack an upper (and also a lower) bound? Consider cheese knifes again. There are certainly very good ones and not so good ones. But does it make sense to talk about a perfect cheese knife? What could that mean? Couldn't a particular cheese knife always be better at cutting cheese – for instance by adapting even more smoothly to the consistency of the particular cheese? Or by cutting without changing the taste of the cheese in any way? Or perhaps, rather, by changing the taste of the cheese in a good way? In the best possible way? And what if there is more than one virtue a cheese knife could have (like ease of use, avoidance of crumbling the cheese, etc.)? There might not even be a way of aggregating all the different virtues in such a way that we can determine what, overall, is better and what is worse.

There are other cases to consider. Can there be such a thing as the perfect, maximally good work of art? Should we say, that, for instance, Beethoven's Fifth Symphony couldn't have been better? Is it already as good or better than his Ninth? Or vice versa? Did Beethoven finish any such

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1. See, e.g., Hurka 1993, chs.1-4.
2. See Landau 2017, 39.
3. See Descartes 1907ff.
4. When I talk about perfection in the following without qualifying it I mean specific perfection.

composition because he thought it couldn't be any better? (I don't want to suggest at all that he thought at the end that "well, this is the best I can do – call it a symphony!"). Or consider athletics: What about the perfect athlete? Can there be a sprinter who runs the 100 meters so fast that it is not possible to run it faster (for humans)? Finally, consider moral goodness. We all have some ideas about morally good persons or even very good persons. But do we have any reason to think that there could be one person who is so good that nobody could be better? Even super-heroes can do better than they do, it seems.

I don't want to go as far as claiming here that there is never any maximal specific goodness for anything. I don't know of any argument showing this. But I also cannot think of good cases where there is such a maximal goodness. This should suffice to be skeptical of the idea of perfection as such.[5]

### (c) A Second Problem with Perfection Talk: It Doesn't or Might not Make Sense

Let us assume that someone is better as a knower if they know more rather than less. This should not be taken to mean that it would be better to know more unimportant things than fewer important ones. Rather, the idea is that if Hi knows everything Ho knows plus something else, then Hi is better as a knower. Perhaps one is better off as a knower not knowing certain (trivial, etc.) things; let us put this potential complication aside here and consider this question: Wouldn't someone who knows everything then be the perfect knower? Let us assume we understand what "everything" means here, that is, what the collection of all the things knowable is. Wouldn't such an omniscient knower (one of the properties of some philosophers' God) then know that, too: namely that they know all those things? So, they would know all those things and they would in addition know that they know all those things. But then it seems clear that such a being would also have to know the latter thing and so on. An infinite regress is starting here. I doubt we can even make sense of the idea of a being that can exhaust such an infinite series. So, it might well make no sense to say that someone knows everything there is to know. This raises a problem for the idea of epistemic perfection, here: perfection as a knower because however much someone knows there is always more to know.[6] It seems then that in such cases we cannot even make sense of perfection talk.

Another doubt has to do with the idea of comparability. If something is so good that it couldn't be better, then it must also be better than some other things. So, it must be comparable to these other things in terms of goodness – as better, worse or equally good than these other things. Can one, for instance, compare friends with respect to the degree to which they are good friends? There is no doubt that some are better friends than others. Aljosha Karamasow would most probably make a better friend than Jack the Ripper. And some might even have a best friend (not the same

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5. Even if goodness had an upper bound, it might still be that nothing could ever reach it but only converge towards it as a limit; in this case one could only get closer and closer to it in such a way that for every point close to the bound there is another one closer to the bound. There is then no maximum in the sense that one couldn't be better, despite the presence of a bound. I won't look into these kinds of cases here.
6. See fn.5 on convergence towards a limit.

as a maximally good friend). But there also seem to be limits to comparability. We do use rough categories for people, like *enemies*, *people one would rather avoid (without them being enemies)*, *nice enough acquantances*, *not so close friends*, *good friends*, *very close and good friends*, etc. Perhaps these categories have sub-categories but at some point we will reach the basic level of categorization. Let's assume the above list is the basic one. Then we don't have comparability of the quality of friends within these (basic) categories. Take any two friends who belong into the top basic category of very close and good friends. It would not be true that one is a better friend than the other nor that they are equally good as friends.[7] Perhaps it would also not be false that one is a better friend than the other nor that they are equally good friends. In such a case, we are facing an interesting and basic indeterminacy here, as far as the quality of friends is concerned. This would also explain why it does not only sound morally fishy but even hardly intelligible to say, for instance, about one's spouse that there could not possibly be a better spouse for oneself. Sure, we often say things like "You are the greatest nanny possible" but we don't usually mean it in the strict sense. We can also go back to the music example above. Perhaps both the Fifth and the Ninth Symphony by Beethoven fall into the highest category of quality of music. But is it then really true that one is better than the other or that they are equally good (exactly equally good, that is)? Sure, you might dislike the Ninth but then it wouldn't fall into the highest category.

Now, if there is such limited comparability then one would or could still have a highest category. But "perfection" could then only mean that something falls into that category, passes a certain standard. Since there is no comparability within the (basic) category, we cannot call very close and good friends or superb works of art "perfect", except perhaps in a much weaker and secondary sense. I would doubt that one can still call this "maximal goodness".

More issues can be added here. Typically, a thing that is good in some way has more than one virtue. A good friend is someone who is helpful, empathetic, understands, etc. How are we going to compare one friend who is very good at helping, quite empathetic but not so good at understanding with another friend who is very good at understanding, ok with empathy but not quite that helpful? We would have to be able to aggregate the goodness in these different dimensions into one overall goodness (see also the example of the different virtues of a cheese knife above). There are good reasons to doubt that this can be done.[8] Another way in which comparability might be limited has to do with the potential lack of transitivity of "good". One friend might be overall (supposing we can aggregate dimensions of goodness) better than a second friend who in turn might be better than a third friend; however, the third friend might be so excellent in a few dimensions that a threshold is crossed and they come out as better as the first friend. Potential failures of transitivity of "good" constitute a huge topic I can only mention here.[9]

Finally, one should wonder whether individual human beings can be called "perfect" (and

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7. See Chang 1997.
8. But cf. for instance Hurka 1993, chs.6-9.
9. See, e.g., Fishburn 1991.

we are particularly interested in perfection for humans here). Why not? Whatever we are and accomplish is to a large degree to natural and social circumstances which are not under our control. Someone might have a particular talent for being an engineer or might have grown up in a very supportive learning environment. Suppose they then become an outstanding engineer. Isn't it rather the conglomerate of the individual and their circumstances that could, if at all, be called "perfect with respect to engineering"? Rather than the individual in isolation?

The upshot of the last few remarks is that at least in many cases it doesn't seem to make much sense at all to qualify things or beings as perfect or maximally good. This claim is stronger than the first point made above about the lack of a maximum.

### (d) But Don't We Talk Like that?

One might protest and point out that talk about something being "perfect" is so common that it can hardly be misguided. I would agree but add that such talk uses the word in a different way. We say things like "That was the perfect dinner", "We're arriving at the station just in time for the train – perfect!" but what we mean is rather that something is very good, not that it couldn't be better. And even if we say something like the latter ("This weekend in the countryside couldn't have been better") we are using hyperbole. And sometimes we just mean that something is done, has been completed. A work of art might be perfect in this sense.[10] It is worth mentioning here that ethicists in greek antiquity like Aristotle talk a lot about the good life but that the notion of a maximally good life that couldn't be better is absent from their theories.[11] Rejection of the idea of perfection is "perfectly" compatible with accepting the idea of the good, the better and the worse.

## 2. Would it Even Be a Good Thing?

So, we should reject the idea of perfection (the idea of maximal goodness). However, there is still another important question: What if perfection talk made sense and the idea of perfection really had application at least in many cases (and in those cases in particular which are of the greatest interest to us)? Wouldn't that thing called "perfection" be a good, a great thing? Would it? We have to ask a normative question, too, not just the "metaphysical" questions above. For that let us assume, for the sake of the discussion, that there is nothing wrong with perfection talk as such. I will very much focus on human perfection here.

### (a) Radical Perfection?

Recent discussions about human enhancement and transhumanism, designer children and genetic engineering, and many other related issues[12] raise a normative question: Is human perfection

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10. It is an interesting question what determines wheter a work of art is done.
11. See, e.g., Aristotle 2009 and also Tugendhat 1984.
12. See for many: Sandel 2007.

a good thing? Michael Sandel[13], for instance holds that adopting and following the idea of human enhancement (and a fortiori: of perfection) shows a lack of humility and a misplaced sense of mastery over nature, and that we should therefore reject the idea for moral reasons. I must confess that I'm not quite sure what to make of this point; I leave it open whether I should be convinced by Sandel here. But there is a somewhat related moral objection that might have some purchase. Let our imagination run wild and conceive of designer children with properties far beyond traditional humans capacities; they might have mastered 11 languages at age 2 and graduated from College at ages 4 and a half. Or think of a sprinter who has been genetically modified to such a degree that they can run the 100 meters in less than 2 seconds. Think of cyborgs who surpass us "traditional" humans in intellectual, moral and physical respects by far. Image you could be turned into such a cyborg within a day (and your health insurance would even cover the costs). Would you have good reasons to go for that?

One thing one should say is that if you went for it you would not be a human being anymore (not in the sense of the word "human" that we're using). You would be something else. The question then is whether it would be a good thing or at least acceptable to turn oneself into a non-human. This is an ethical question in a broad sense. I just want to raise it here and keep it open at least a bit. But let me say that the idea of giving up one core characteristic of oneself (being human) just to be better at certain things strikes me as being completely out of proportion. Why is it so important to be so much better at running or counting that one would give up one's membership in a species? Don't certain basic aspects of my life have to remain the same in order for me to be able to see myself as the same one after all? And where does a value like the value of being able to speak so many languages come from if it is not rooted in the human condition? An extremely transhuman cyborg might not care at all about speaking so many languages or any of the other things we care about. There might then be a certain incoherence in radical ideas of enhancement: One would go for it on the basis of values that are tied to the human condition and that one would lose as soon as one has transcended one's own human predicament. Perhaps the idea of this kind of radical perfection is silly more than ethically objectionable.

When we raise questions about whether it would be good to "perfect" others (like in the case of designer children) we face an additional moral issue (in the more narrow sense). May we do such things to others? May we support movements towards more radical perfection? I think this depends to a large degree on whether it would be good for someone to go for this. And I have mentioned some doubts about that above.

### (b) Perfection at a Human Scale?

What about perfection as humans? Susan Wolf famously argued against the claim that it would be good to be a moral saint.[14] She thought that being a moral saint would be incompatible with

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13. See Sandel 2007, for instance, ch.3 on designeer children but also the other chapters.
14. See Wolf 1982.

having many other good things (not of lower standing). And who would like being around moral saints? If I had the choice between having the brothers Karamasow over for dinner or some moral saints (are there any?), I might well lean toward the first. One underlying question here is whether we would find a morally perfect life still worth living. Closely related to this is the general question whether failure and lack of perfection isn't a good thing in life and preferable to a life without failures or any lack of perfection. I think there is a lot to this idea. Even though we have reason to want each of our goals reached we also have reason not to want that all of our goals are reached by us (we even have good reason to want that not all of our goals will be reached by us). A life of perfection and complete success would be utterly boring and shallow, not worth living.[15] As Yogi Berra famously remarked once: If life were perfect, it wouldn't be.[16]

But doesn't this, ironically, suggest that if a life is not perfect in one sense (in the sense of maximal goodness in each and every respect), then it is perfect in another sense (in the sense that it just has the right overall balance of success and failure)? There might be this other type of perfection but whatever exactly it involves, it wouldn't have to be maximal goodness. We would just have a case where such a (balanced) life is better than one maximally good in each and every respect.

### (c) Maximizing?

But shouldn't we at least maximize what is good in the sense that we should at least try to do our best (even if that is not something that couldn't be better)? Isn't it utterly incoherent to say that something is good but that we shouldn't bring about as much good as we can? Isn't the idea of maximization perhaps even part of the idea of the good?

Classical or orthodox theories of rational decision making and rational acting claim that maximization is the rational thing to do.[17] This view has a lot of intuitive plausibility. However, one still has reason to wonder why *good enough* isn't good enough.[18] People have even argued for satisficing over maximizing: Maximizers tend to be much unhappier than satisficers (because they're more stressed, depressed and unappreciative of what they have).[19] Applied to the idea of perfection this suggests not preferring perfection to a satisfying state or even preferring satisfying states to perfect states.[20] Perhaps we are most engaged and getting most out of life when we're doing what we think we "just have to do"; typically we don't then strive after perfection. And when we strive after perfection it seems, we have already started giving up on doing what is most important to us.[21]

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15. See, e.g., my 2004.
16. To be precise here: He said that if the world were perfect, then it wouldn't be. However, the above thought is not far from Berra's original remark in spirit.
17. See, e.g., Resnik 1987.
18. See Simon 1983 or Slote 1989
19. See Schwartz 2004.
20. See Sandel 2007 and Slote 2013 on this side and against this Hurka 1993.
21. See Frankfurt 1988 on identification.

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Against Perfection

Peter Baumann

# Human Images in a Tumultuous World: Images of Eminent Monks as Strategies of Legitimation During the Late Joseon Period

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## 1) Introduction: Buddhist Steles and Formation of Images and Identities

Images of ideal Buddhist monks are best gleaned in the biographies of eminent monks such as the often referenced *Gaoseng zhuan* 高僧傳, which has come to establish a model for biographical writing for later generations. When its author, Huijiao 慧皎 (497–554), composed the biographies of the outstanding Buddhist monks, his intent was to record the lives of those monks who could be idealized and remembered as model figures for future generations.[1]

Similar format and purpose would apply to the memorial steles of eminent monks in Korea since in most cases the biographies carved onto the stele is usually the same biographies published in the collected works of the eminent monks. The tradition of steles of eminent monks goes back to the beginnings of Buddhism in Korea and its prominence reached its peak during the Goryeo period (918-1392) as Buddhism became the state ideology. Specifically, memorial steles were erected to commemorate the eminent monks who were bestowed the title of national preceptor or royal preceptor.[2] Undoubtedly, memorial steles of eminent monks, being an integral part of the tradition of state and royal preceptorship, were central in not only promulgating the esteem and prestige of Buddhism but also in forming the image and identity of the eminent monks during the Goryeo time.[3]

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1. See, Hamar (2010).
2. In the case of the state preceptor Taego Pou (太古普愚, 1301-1382), he went to China in 1347 and received the mind seal from the 18th patriarch of the Linchi line, Seokok Chonggong (石屋 淸珙, ?-1352). However, in another case of the royal preceptor Muhak (無學, 1327-1405), there is no mention of a genealogical connection all the way to an orthodox line but his position as a disciple of the eminent monk Na-ong Haegeun (懶翁 惠勤, 1320-1376) was surely emphasized. Muhak's succession of Na-ong and their master-disciple encounters that verify this was all the more important. In other words, there was an inconsistent reference made to the orthodox transmission rhetoric. Also the lineage is not listed in a complete form but makes reference to only the previous master. For Taego Pou's stele text, see "Taego sawonjeung guksatapbi 태고사원증국사탑비" in Yi (2000a, 450-474).
3. Though, I take the tradition of state preceptor and royal preceptor to represent Korean Buddhism as represented by the sangha. Nevertheless, there must have been competing identities which is also worthy of attention. This is an important topic of research since there had been uprisings during the Joseon period that involved Buddhist monks or movement leaders who claimed to be monks. For example, see Choi (2010).

This privilege came to an end in the beginning of the Joseon period (1392-1910). After the ensuing 200 years of systematic suppression of the saṃgha, the tradition of steles of eminent monks was transformed. Despite Buddhism's fall from grace, the tradition of steles for eminent monks was continued without any state affiliation and solely by the saṃgha.

The newly established identity and image of the saṃgha rather than being based on its relationship to the state as preceptor was instead focused on the traditional Buddhist notion of legitimacy, the transmission of the lamp, initially developed in China some 600-700 years earlier. The lineage in the transmission of the lamp of Seon (Jpn. Zen; Ch. Chan) masters was more than just a record of its enlightened patriarchs. It provided the fundamental basis for identity and image of legitimacy for Joseon Buddhism.

It was most likely due to the recognized participation of the saṃgha in the Imjin war of the late 16th century (1592-1598) that the Buddhist saṃgha was able to become re-established as an independent and self-standing tradition which had previously been patronized and even organized by the state for its own legitimation. The saṃgha began to re-establish itself and built its identity and legitimacy through two means: 1) reformulating and reviving the idea of genealogical transmission (法統說) and, 2) capitalizing on the recognition for the fervent participation of the Buddhist righteous army in the Imjin war.

## 2) Strategies in the Image of Legitimacy

### 2.1) Image Based on Transmission Lineage

Having lost state patronage and no longer under the auspices of the state, the Joseon saṃgha had to turn to a different identity and rebuild an image of legitimacy; this came to be spelled out in the early 17th century memorial steles of eminent monks. The question of image of legitimacy became all the more crucial given that Buddhism was no longer recognized as the state ideology and furthermore that it had come to be deemed a heretical tradition. Therefore, determining the orthodoxy and legitimacy became all the more important and the image similar to that of the state and royal preceptor was used strategically to regain social legitimation. Here the rhetoric of lineal transmission was essential.

Firstly, determining the orthodoxy and its legitimacy seemed to be the main goal as indicated in the stele, and in order to do this the saṃgha turned to the tradition of lineal transmission. The first stele that was raised after the hiatus of more than 200 years was in 1612 for the famous monk Yujeong (惟政, 1544-1610) who was recognized by the state for his contributions during the Imjin war and after.[4]

Different from the preceding early Joseon memorial steles for eminent monks, there was a start of a clear delineation of a genealogy which moved away from the previous focus on the authority

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4. See, "Haeinsa Samyeongdaesaseokjangbi-mun" 海印寺 四溟大師石藏碑文 (Yi 2000).

of the state and royal preceptors. Instead it attempted to build legitimacy by bringing together various major lineages in the history of Korean Buddhism without focusing on any specific school. The point was to trace the past tradition of Korean Buddhism down to Yujeong and his master Hyujeong.[5]

Different from the previous steles, lineage played a prominent role within the whole of the narrative where Yujeong's stele traces a lineage that reached far back to the Song monk and forged a connection to the two most prominent monks, Hyujeong and his disciple Yujeong. The conceptualization of lineage for the purpose of building an image of legitimacy was in a formative stage where legitimizing lineage consisted of a combination of several prominent lineages and based on more general, and at time tenuous, connections. In the second stele that was raised after the Imjin war, the notion of lineage becomes based more specifically on lineal connections and established on the principle of genealogical exclusivity.[6]

It was in the year 1630, eighteen years later after Yujeong's stele was erected that the second stele was raised for Hyujeong who can be referred to as the patriarch of modern Korean Buddhism. Here a prominent genealogical claim is made in the text that traces Hyujeong in a singular line back to the 18th patriarch of the Linchi sect. Rarely seen in the previous steles of eminent monks, it states, while making reference to the transmission of the lamp, that the "mysterious mind of nirvana" was transmitted from the Sakyamuni Buddha all the way to Korea (三韓). It claims that this transmission was relayed through a monk named Yong ming (永明) of the Song and onto the 14th century Korean royal preceptor, Na-ong Haegeun (懶翁 惠勤, 1320-1376). It goes on to state that among the later disciples, Hyujeong's line is the most outstanding and that among Hyujeong's disciples, Yujeong was the most eminent.[7] It further claimed that,

> Our Taego of the East (Korea) had travelled to Mount Xiawu of China and received the transmission of the dharma from Shiwu (石屋) and has returned. After returning, Taego transmitted the dharma to Hwan-am (幻庵) and Hwan-am to Gu-gok (龜谷) and from Gu-gok to Jeongsim (正心). From Jeongsim the dharma was then passed onto Ji-eom (智儼) and from Ji-eom to Yeong-gwan (靈觀) and Yeong-gwan to Hyujeong. This lineage is the true orthodox line. That is why Hyujeong is the sole transmitter of the true line of Lin-chi.[8]

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5. Heogyun (許筠, 1569-1618), the author of the stele claimed the following: "At present who can it be other than our master Yujeong who transmits the lineage of the Way of masters Jinul (牧牛子) and Na-ong… The dharma seal that has been transmitted to Na-ong from Yongming Yanshou [永明 延壽, Song monk] and then to the later generations, it is Seosan [Hyujeong] who has received it, among all others." See, "Samyeongdang Yujeongbi" 四溟堂惟政碑, (HBJ 8, 77).

6. As McRae puts it, it is the "string of pearls" lineage where the connection was exclusive and based on passing of the enlightenment seal. See McRae's (20013) arguments.

7. See, "Haenam Daeheungsa Chongheodang Hyujeongdaesabi-mun" 海南大興寺清虛堂休靜大師碑文 (1647), (Yi 2000, 61).

8. "吾東方太古和尙 入中國霞霧山嗣石屋 而傳之幻庵 幻庵傳之龜谷 龜谷傳之正心 正心傳之智嚴 智嚴傳之靈觀 靈觀傳之西山 此實臨濟之正派而惟西山獨得." "Haenam Daeheungsa Chongheodang Hyujeongdaesabi-mun" 海南大興寺清虛堂休靜大師碑文 (1647), (Yi 2000, 61)

Here the more fully developed iteration of the patriarchs in a "string of pearls," became the defining basis of orthodox lineage. The purpose of noting the monk's genealogy was to prove orthodoxy of his lineage which obviously had implications for the disciples as well. It meant the verification of the orthodoxy of disciple's lineage and therefore their legitimation.[9] Moreover, the saṃgha at a critical point in their revival used the steles to claim the legitimacy of Buddhism and possibly with the hope of reclaiming, if even only to imitate, its past greatness.

Such images of legitimation based on the orthodox lineage seem to subside into the latter part of the late Joseon period. It seems that it was in the beginning of the later Joseon period that the image of legitimacy was all the more important with the growing need and opportunity to re-establish itself. Thus, towards the latter part of the later Joseon, lineages orthodoxy become secondary in importance.

Legitimation is not built on lineal heterodoxy alone. Part of this strategy of legitimating image is mundane claims. Though paradoxical, secular claims enhanced the significance of its religious orthodoxy. The claims of genealogical orthodoxy was enhanced by the recognition of the merits gained by the Buddhist monks from their heavy involvement and successful campaigns in the Imjin war. The opportunity to take advantage of these merits could not be passed especially after losing their status as the state ideology and in turn being cast as a heresy.[10]

**2.2) Image based on Mundane Claims**

Interestingly, the method of constructing ideal images was by way of secular claims such as highlighting the official titles bestowed by the state or the great deeds in service of the state. The images of these monks were also the result of adopting the current ideal Confucian images and virtues. The repertoire of secular claims included official titles bestowed to the master by the king and other references of connections to the royal court or the king such as in the form of gifts received or correspondences.

For instance in Hyujeong's stele, as with all other memorial steles of eminent monks of this era, the beginning lines present the official title that was handed to him by the king, and in this case by king Seonjo (1552-1608). At the top of the stele is engraved the "Great National Seon Master Chief Overseer of the Meditation and Scholastic Sects Custodian of Sects and Edifier Comprehensive Protector and Superior Worthy."[11] Further on in the text, there are records of correspondences with the king, and at one point the king requests Hyujeong to raise an army of monks to which Hyujeong

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9. In the case of Shenhui's (668-760) attempts to have his own master Huineng (638-713) become the 6th patriarch after Hongren (601-674) and displace Shenxiu (?-706) who had been widely recognized as the 6th patriarch, was essentially an attempt to become, if not the 7th patriarch himself, part of the orthodox lineage. See, McRae (2004) chapter 3.

10. This seems all the more true when during the previous Goryeo dynasty, Buddhism was held in high esteem. For a insightful description of the position that the Buddhist institution was in and its drastic decline towards the end of the Goryeo dynasty see, Kim (2004).

11. Hyujeong's title is a long one. "Gugildo daesonsa Seon-Gyo dochongseop bujong sugyo boje deunggye jonja" 國一都 大禪師 禪教都摠攝 扶宗樹教 普濟登階尊者. Yi (2000, 222).

replies in tears that he will even sacrifice himself to follow the king's wishes.[12]

The beginning of the 17 century was a period immediately after the Imjin war and the army of soldier monks had been recognized for their heroic contributions against the Japanese army.[13] Hyujeong and Yujeong were two monks who were the most well-known as having gained the most recognition for their war efforts and recognized by the state and it is no surprise that such merits made up an important aspect of their steles.

Interestingly, instead of remorse for causing harm the tone of the stele texts is almost boastful and without any signs of attempting to give a rationalization for an undesirable deed. For instance it states in Yujeong's stele text that, "Having killed a great many enemies or taking them as prisoners, the king considered it a great deed."[14] The stele goes on to say that Hyujeong "earned great merit of conquering the enemy and saving the country."[15]

Furthermore, the virtue of loyalty or *chung* 忠 seems to be a consistent theme. In response to king Seonjo's urging for assistance, Hyujeong responses by saying he will have the old and the sick monks pray for the protection of the state and with all the able bodied monks, Hyujeong promises to do their upmost to fulfill their loyalty.[16] Such themes of protecting the state 護國 and dedication to the state 忠 were clearly evident in the summarizing gāthā at the end of the stele text. We can further notice the effort to harmonize between the ideal images of Buddhism and the worldly merits, in this case allegiance towards the state and the king. The gāthā relays this balance in the following:

[Hyujeong's] Seon poems written during rests from meditation
The fame of the poems spread widely and to the court [king]
King Seonjo exclaimed in admiration of the poems
The praise graced [on the poems] brightened the way.

Though cultivating the body in the mountains
The sense of loyalty [towards the king] has never left the king's side
Having being summoned, the state in crisis
The righteous army was gathered in throngs like clouds.

The young [monks] entered war and fought the enemy
And older monks beseeched the Buddha for his powers

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12. Yi (2000, 229).

13. Throughout the war there had been spontaneous formation of righteous monk armies across Korea. Though the monk armies have won some major battles, they were mainly used by the state as forced support labour including transporting of supplies to the frontline or repairing fortress walls and guarding them. An (1983, 336-345).

14. "頗多殺獲上嘉之." See stele text, "Haeinsa Samyeongdaesaseokjangbi-mun" 海印寺 四溟大師石藏碑文 (1612). Yi (2003, 105).

15. See the stele text, "Haenam Daeheungsa Chongheodang Hyujeongdaesabi-mun 海南大興寺清虛堂休靜大師碑文 (1647). Yi (2003, 246-250).

16. "Hoeyang Pyohunsa Baekhwaamchongheodaesabi-mun" 淮陽 表訓寺 白華庵 清虛堂休靜大師碑 (1632). Yi (2000, 229).

The trash like Japanese invaders were vanquished

And the state and the people are made safe and fortunate.


Coming out of the mountain and having saved the people

His name has become famous even outside Joseon…[17]


From this gāthā, the elements of Buddhist ideals of practicing meditation were mixed with the ardent duty of loyalty 忠, and moreover, the role of protecting the nation 護國 was overtly referenced. This reminiscence amounts to attempting to revive the past role of Buddhism of protecting the state and bringing peace and fortune to the people. These strategies are aimed to revive and refashion the past images of Buddhism and therefore its rightful place in society as a legitimate tradition.

Despite possible paradoxes, mundane elements may be indicative of the socio-historical conditions of 17th century Joseon. The saṃgha was ardently attempting to revive itself after two centuries of suppression. Given its state of decline and the memory of its past greatness, Imjin war presented an opportunity and the basis on which to pull itself out of its disadvantaged position. Different from the Goryeo period, steles were part of an effort to claim its newly found confidence and legitimacy.

The need to use mundane merits to claim its legitimacy seems inherent in steles together with ideal religious claims. In this sense, participation in the Imjin war seems to be fused as part of the image of Korean Buddhism, even in modern times. Buddhism for the protection of the state and the people is a narrative that has continued throughout in the steles and this has been all the more useful during the late Joseon period.


## 3) The Mutuality of Religious and Mundane Claims


Being located at temples and having been raised in honor of eminent Buddhist monks, memorial steles are without doubt part of the Buddhist tradition but its historical use and the explicitly mundane contents of the text indicate that these objects bridge the Buddhist ideals with the given pragmatic elements. As strategic tools, they interface with the world surrounding Buddhism.

The historical situation was that many temples were either damaged or destroyed during the Imjin war thus needing the help and support of the society.[18] At the same time, the saṃgha could not ignore the public debate that had consumed the Joseon society. The idea of orthodoxy and

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17. "Hoeyang Pyohunsa Baekhwaamchongheodaesabi-mun" 淮陽 表訓寺 白華庵 清虛堂休靜大師碑 (1632). Yi (2000, 237-238).

18. After the Imjin war, the temples went through a period of active rebuilding, a process through which the sangha was able to boost it revival. For a in-depth discussion of the rebuilding of temple buildings see Lee (1994) especially chapter 4. For a discussion of building of the statues of Buddha and bodhisattva during the 17th cen. Korea see Song (2007).

heterodoxy at that time was all the more significant since this debate had pulled the court and Confucian scholars into a heated debate over the orthodoxy of the ruling king.[19] In such historical setting, being recognized as orthodox carried that much more weight for legitimacy and the notion of orthodox lineage was also an important test of authenticity and legitimacy.[20]

Undoubtedly, being recognized as an orthodox lineage increased religious authority while its recognition as such was closely related to secular authority. In our case, claims of orthodoxy carried more weight with increased mundane merits and prestige or connections to secular authority as reflected in the official titles that are mentioned in the steles and the associations with the state or the kings.

In the case of Hyujeong, on his stele was engraved newly claimed genealogies while also claims of how he routed the Japanese army and other secular claims.[21] These mundane claims were integral in having the claims of a new orthodox lineage more likely to be accepted. It was mostly through the help of the war merits that claims of a new identity had been successfully recognized.

Further adding to the authority of the claims of Hyujeong's stele is the prestige of the composer of the stele text, Yi Jeonggu (1564-1630). In this sense, having prominent Confucian literati or scholar-officials compose the stele text decisively increased the validity and authority of the stele, and its content.

## 4) Legitimation by the Confucian literati and Scholar Officials

Another paradoxical element of the steles is the involvement of Confucian literati in the composition of the texts.[22] Interestingly, the tradition of having a famous literati or high ranking officials, and not monks, compose the epitaph continued on from the Shilla and Goryeo to the Joseon period. Heo-gyun (許筠, 1568-1618) and Yi Jeonggu (李廷龜, 1564-1635) who composed

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19. Kim-Haboush argues that with the demise of Ming by the Manchu, the source of legitimation of the Confucian world disappeared that forced Koreans to reconsider the idea of orthodoxy. This led to a redefinition of the world order, the "conceptual mapping of the boundaries between civilization and barbarity and between self and others." This had a direct impact on the political and cultural identity of the state itself and further lead to the implication of legitimacy regarding other traditions. Authentic line of descent was politically and societally important basis of defining orthodoxy and the question of legitimacy trickled down from the king to the legitimacy of Confucian sects and religious sects. See, Kim-Haboush (1999, 51, 67).

20. It arose from the will of the Neo-Confucians to gain prominence as the state ideology. In the opposite sense, it meant those in opposition to the teaching of neo-confucianism were labelled as heterodox or herasy. Jin (2005,150-156).

21. From a general understanding of Buddhism and the values that it espouses, especially against the killing of not only human lives but also the lives of all sentient beings, such boastful words are hard to believe that it was on the stele of an eminent monk. How can such antithetical views be carved together on the same stele, not to mention that it was of a highly regarded monk.

22. The Confucian literati included a range of figures including those who held government posts. However, these authors all were highly regarded for their composition skills. For example a prolific writer of steles, Yi Gyeongseok (李景奭, 1595-1671), wrote a total of eight steles, the most number of steles for eminent monks during the 17th century. He was a well-known composer and a poet of the Joseon period and has written steles for prominent Confucian scholars as well. He was also a high state official. Among the 51 steles raised for eminent monks during the 17th century, 47 steles had clearly noted authors. Among these steles, a total of 40 steles, or almost 4 out of every 5 steles were authored by scholar-officials or Confucian literati while a total of 7 were authored by monks.

the steles of Yujeong and Hyujeong, respectively, are examples of famous and highly regarded literary figures who composed stele texts for eminent monks. For example, Heo-gyun was the famous literatus who was at the height of his official career when he composed the stele text and Yi Jeonggu was not only an illustrious official but was one of the best known literary composers of classical Chinese during his time.[23]

The participation of the literati and the scholar-officials in the stele text composition can be understood in two ways. Firstly, it can be a reflection of the dependence of the saṃgha on the Confucian literati in presenting the authenticity of their own identity. In Hyujeong's stele, his disciples went to a prominent Confucian literati and even took an intimidating tone when they warned that they will not leave until he, the composer, writes the stele text for them.[24] This presents an interesting point where the role of Confucian literati was highly sought after portraying their essential role in steles and in constructing the identity of the eminent monks and Buddhism in general. It is obvious that the authority and the skills of these Confucian literati were borrowed.

Secondly, participation of the Confucian literati can also be understood as a continuation of a tradition that had previously existed during the Shilla and the Goryeo period. Therefore its revival during the Joseon period is merely an imitation of a long continued tradition. In other words, the legitimacy of the stele tradition and the newly claimed image was borrowed from the precedent of a long held tradition.

The assistance gained through these two points was greatly needed especially given the dire position of Buddhism at the time. In the end it is an illustration of the extent to which the Buddhist world and its legitimacy was heavily dependent on the outer Confucian world in the 17th century. Even the forming of its Buddhist identity came to be to an extent reliant on the authority of the Confucian literati and scholar-officials.

## 5) Concluding Remarks

Raising memorial steles was a highly purposeful act full of not only religious but clearly mundane intentions. As the socio-political landscape was turned up-side-down, steles proved to be an important medium when the saṃgha had to turn more to its tradition of the transmission of the lamp to assert its claims of identity and its image of legitimacy. To enhance their orthodox claims, they also turned to their worldly merits. The tradition of memorial steles was effectively used by the saṃgha to legitimate their claims of orthodoxy. Even the tradition of inviting prominent literati and scholar-officials to compose the stele text was preserved to further the validity of the claims carved into the stones.

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23. Yi Jeonggwi is consider one among the four most recognized literati of the mid-Joseon period. His official life is decorated with high government posts who has been recognized by even the king. See Kim (2012, 58-63).

24. See stele text, "Hoeyang Pyohunsa Baekhwaamchongheodaesabi-mun" 淮陽 表訓寺 白華庵 清虛大師碑文(1630). Yi (2003, 214-221).

Claims of late Joseon steles of Korean eminent monks regarding Buddhist notions of transmission of Buddha's original mind took place at the boundaries of ideals and practical reality. Mundane claims were an integral part of the steles that gave support to their ideal narratives. This illustrates the extent to which the Buddhist image and its legitimacy were heavily dependent on the outer Confucian world.

It goes to highlight that the claims of orthodoxy was a discourse that had meaning not only within the Buddhist world but also and possibly more so at the secular level. It was intended to gain the status of orthodoxy perhaps more in the secular than within the Buddhist religious world. It was for this reason that the support of the Confucian literati through their composition of the stele text was critical.

Though the importance of lineal orthodoxy in the image of Buddhism seems to be more concentrated towards the 17th century, the mundane claims of Buddhism as the protector of the state and people seem to be a timeless image of Buddhism. Thus the mundane claims regarding soldier monks fit this rhetoric and self-image which continued into the 21st century.

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# The Posthuman Turn: Implications on Historical Theory and Methodology

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That we live under a posthuman condition is a talking point that has become increasingly common, at least among scholars. This era is supposed to be characterized, among others, by the de-centering or de-privileging of human beings in the scheme of things. Ostensibly it is a response to the excessive arrogance of humanism (Western version, that is), as exemplified for instance in declaration attributed to Protagoras that "Man is the measure of all things" (Pepperell, 2003). For centuries this attitude had encouraged, gradually initially but exponentially over the past hundred years, humans to recognize no barrier in pursuit of control or manipulation of nature and of progress in all spheres.[1] It licensed humans to do whatever they want in the process of which nature was altered or destroyed and many problems were created. The rise to prominence in the past decade of the idea of the Anthropocene foregrounds the gravity of the situation. Anthropocene encapsulates the idea that the human impact on earth has already reached the level of a geological force with catastrophic impacts, such as global warming. It has lent posthumanism an extraordinary salience beyond the sphere of the philosophical. The urgency for action it entails has prompted an increasing number of scholars—historians and philosophers among them—to raise alarm over this matter and in response proposed various measures, including a fundamental shift in mindset of values away from human-centrism.

In other disciplines such as philosophy, literature and social studies of science, Anthropocene and/or posthumanism had begun to be talked about earlier on. In history, Dipesh Charkabarty's article, "The Climate of History: Four Theses"(2009) raised provocative points and triggered animated discussion, among others, on the possible role of the modern, human-centric historical mindset in facilitating the process leading to Anthropocene (Emmett & Lekan, 2016; Moore, 2016a). The salience of this article may be glimpsed in the fact that it was translated into several languages and has become the main subject of organized workshops. The complexity of Chakrabarty's argument requires a lengthy explication. For the purpose of this conference paper, however, I shall focus only on aspects that are germane to the arguments being developed

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1. The notion of "Great Acceleration" coined by Geological Society drives home this point.

here. According to Chakrabarty, the idea of Anthropocene envisions the demise of the future for humankind which means disruption of the supposed linked and mutually reinforcing and mutually presupposing relationship between the past, the present and the future. In his words: "The current crisis can precipitate a sense of the present that disconnects the future from the past by putting such a future beyond the grasp of historical sensibility" (Chakrabarty 2009: 197). Zoltan Simon (2017) articulates similar point in these words:

> "(T)he sudden occurrence of a novelty that is not the result of a continuous long-term development that originates in the deep past… the prospect of a singular event expected to defy all previous human experience. It appears as the ultimate threat insofar as the future becomes incomprehensible to human cognition, due to the possibility of losing control over what originally was a human-induced change. The possibility of reaching a point when nature takes over anthropogenic climate change is the singular event whose consequences are inaccessible not only to human cognition, but inasmuch as all previous human experience is defied, even to human imagination."

Chakarabarty's proposal is complex and thus I cannot cover it adequately here, but a crucial element in it is his call for a form of deep history, or species history, a history of life (including other life forms) rather than just life history or history of humans (Chakrabarty 2009; 2016). So far it is not yet clear to me how this kind of history might look like, and how the notion of human subjectivity, which was hitherto central or paramount in conventional humanist history, would play out in the proposed scheme, but the impression I've got was that the kind of history that is relevant in Anthropocenic age entails a rethinking of the nature of history as such. My argument is two-fold: Anthropocene does indeed have implications on history though Chakrabarty may have exaggerated such implications and that the implications are uneven depending on which facet of history we are we talking about.

## Facets of History

Confusions surrounding history often arise from the tendency to ignore its multi-faceted nature. That history as past could be different to different people in different temporal and socio-cultural settings—in essence the application of the fundamentally historicist assumption to history itself—is a truism. However, the tendency among many professionally-trained historians to privilege academic history as the only right or legitimate form of history limits the application of this assumption to history itself within the parameter that privileges the academic history and professional historians and sidelines or downplays history's other facets. Perhaps as indication of the high-level of respect or esteem academic historians enjoy among the socio-politically influential groups in society (political and intellectual elites) as well as common people, the historians'

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position elicit a broad if not universal concurrence among them. Other people's idea of the past which do not conform closely to the requirements of scholarly history is often called by various derogatory or dismissive names such as legend, folklore, gossip, hearsay, popular history, "mere" memory or recollection. By doing this, academic historians, with tacit support from other influential members of society, arrogates upon academic history the sole legitimate right to represent what happened in the past. No wonder then why the common tendency to conflate what happened in the past with what can be read in history books written by professional or academic historians. It does not mean, of course, that academic historians go unopposed. The roots of tensions between popular and academic historians as well as among academic historians themselves are ancient, in addition between historians and non-historians particularly in the era fake news, but so far, any attempt to adjudicate between competing sides resorts to measures or procedures sanctioned by, and also favor, the scholarly class.

Understanding the differentiated implications of posthumanism on history requires disaggregating history's various facets and pin down exactly which one or two in fact we refer to. It is important to do this because, as I argue in this paper, the implications of posthumanism on history depends on different facets. I can identify at least five facets of history. First, history as knowledge about the past. It is produced (usually in written form) by trained historians as well as others who are interested in the past. History as an authoritative knowledge about the past is the most common understanding of what history is. It corresponds to Michael Oakshotte's (1983)idea of historical past, which may be distinguished from practical past (more on this idea below). It is the product of historians' and other peoples' attempt to re-construct what happened based on available evidences. As the pool of evidence is likely to be incomplete with past events not leaving traces that are usable as evidence, or these traces were destroyed either by natural or man-made means, or they simply remain hidden and are waiting for discovery, written academic history is tentative. It could change depending on the latest acceptable interpretation of existing body of evidences.

The second facet of history is, for lack of better term, I'd call actual history. Referring to the totality of everything—big and small, significant or not from human standpoint—that happened in the past, the idea of actual idea is intuitively simple or common sensical, but due to the triumph of the "scientific", evidence-based history since the 19th century, invoking this idea could raise eyebrows among historians. By definition, this history is fixed (as opposed to tentative), complete and accurate. As a past that is forever gone, it cannot be changed anymore. Admittedly, it is a metaphysical conception of the past. It is a past that only an absolute all-knowing being (granting there is such a being) knows in its entirety. Invoking an absolute, metaphysical, extra-human standpoint is admittedly out of the purview of the legitimate historical procedures, but I believe this conceptual decision is necessary to flag the discrepancy between the representation (history as knowledge) and the represented (actual history). Historians know very well about this discrepancy, but they tend to be coy about it, playing it down before the public, which results in the widespread perception that equates or conflate written academic history to actual history. By highlighting

the potential discrepancy between the actual and written history, I underscore the limits of any historical representation and thus opens up a pathway to re-examining the rupture between the accepted and the acceptable parameters of historical practice. More importantly, the very idea of actual history, a form of history beyond humans—beyond what humans imagine, know and write about—may prove to be a defining element of the posthumanist history that is in the making. In other words, accommodating the idea of actual history is in itself an important implication of the posthuman condition.

Thirdly, history as profession. The community of professional historians embodies the set of ideas, procedures and practices relevant to understanding and representing the past. It also includes the logic or particular ways of conceiving the past, the so-called historical sensibility or consciousness that governs historians' analytic approaches, and which history education seeks to promote among students. As a profession, it acts as the gate-keeper of acceptable ontological, epistemological, methodological and ethical standards or procedures among historians and history enthusiasts.

Fourthly, history as a subjective experience of/in the past by individuals and groups of people. This is rather tricky because all experience are by strict definition happening in the present. The moment it passes and moves in the domain of the past, or history, what is left is only what is remembered of it, the memory of this experience. And what is remember of this experience could be significantly different from the experience itself. This is precisely the reason for making memory as the fifth, and last to be covered here, important facet of history. Often dismissed or even denigrated by some professional historians as "mere" memory, as opposed, implicitly, to 'real' history, owing to well-known attribute of being unreliable or inaccurate, memory is in fact very important because what one remembers, regardless of whether it is true or false, are ones that affect how individuals and groups think and behave at any particular point in time. Most people's intimate link to the past takes the form of memory. Insofar are they are concerned, this is their history. Referring back to Oakeshott's classification, history as memory false under notion of practical past, which was revisited by Hayden White (2011) more recently.

## Implications

The different facets of history noted above seem to have a differential relationship with posthumanism as it relates to anthropocene. The notion of Anthropocene appears to have no analytic impact on the ideas of actual history and history as experience as by definition they already happened. Regardless of the shift in mindset, such as what was prompted by the notion of Anthropocene, which Chakrabarty (2015) believes entails a change in "epochal consciousness", nothing can be done anymore with actual history and individual or group experience as they already happened. Among facets of history, they are ones that accommodate bodily performance—by acting out "in the flow" of the unfolding of time—as opposed to what is just in the mind, as part of the

notion of history. They are free from interpretation that depends on, or is influenced by, the present circumstances and visions of the future.

Theoretically, the third facet of history—individual and collective memory—may be affected by change in the vision of the future, which is implicit in the notion of Anthropocene. Memory is functionally similar to the written or academic facet of history in that they are dependent on interpretation, which takes place in the present, which in turn may be affected by the vision of the future. When vision of the future is suddenly disrupted, by, say, the prospect of unprecedented change" (Simon 2017), it also affects how the past may be interpreted. Suppose, for instance, NASA or other similar agencies have found out that a huge asteroid is on track to hit the earth in a few months' time, and it could possibly cause extinction of species similar to what happened, or so is claimed, to the dinosaurs millions of years ago, this news can possibly induce a massive shift in individuals and groups interpretation of their past and present life. Without a future to envision, things that people normally take for granted or value less now in favor of an aspiration for something in the future, are likely to assume much greater importance. And things they did or did not do in the past in line with the future vision may also assume a different meaning, a sense of loss or regret rather than achievement, or vice versa. But this point is hardly consequential from posthumanism. As humans are endowed with mind, memory is quintessentially human-centric, and thus just like the two previous facets, actual and experiential history, the posthuman turn may not have an appreciable impact on history a personal memory. But the notion of collective or social memory is different. As the idea of Anthropocene permeates social or collective consciousness, it will simultaneously affect individual thinking and behavior, as in fact has been happening in still limited and uneven but expanding scale across the world.

For threats in the future not as shockingly immediate as the hypothetical case noted above, such as, for instance, Anthropocene and climate change, it seems not likely to generate the same effects among many people. I doubt people will drastically re-order their priorities or invert the hierarchy of their values they upheld. Global warning or climate change is extremely important, but the demise of the human race and all life on earth which could result from it appears to lie in still a very distant future, if at all. People tend to ignore things if they are not truly imminent, and they go on with their lives as usual. The awareness of this human tendency is perhaps the reason why Chakrabarty (2009) exaggerated the immediacy of the supposedly dire consequence of Anthropocene, as if the worst scenario is already upon us. He made it a pretext for calling for a drastic shift in historical sensibility away from the human-centric to life-centric. He supports the idea of deep history and species history and doubts the allegedly deterministic role of capitalism (as encapsulated, for instance, in the concept of Capitalocene, e.g. Moore (2015, 2016)) in reaching the tipping point that is Anthropocene. Insofar as he is concerned, the gravity and immediacy of the problem requires a drastic and collective measures from all of us, such that the urge to blame capitalism or globalization or any other factors ought to be subsumed under the need to protect all of us from the impending catastrophe, as if the two are mutually exclusive.

The facets of history that Chakrabarty is concerned about are the written history and the modern historical consciousness or rationality that undergirds the practice of historical profession. His critique also implies adjustment in historical methodology, which entails non-human-centric historical narrative and analysis. As Chakrabarty's ideas represent perhaps the most forceful articulation of the centrality of history in causing and averting the Anthropocene crisis, and I believe such ideas are both ethico-politically questionable and analytically problematic, I shall spend some time to scrutinize his ideas in some detail.

Is there really a need for a fundamental change in the way history is written, as averred by Chakrabarty? So far it remains unclear to me how deep history or species history that he favors as alternative look like, but what is clear is that he bats for non-human centric history as supposedly the type of history that can help address the Anthropocene crisis. The assumption here is that the ascribed centrality of humans in historical process nurtures and justifies the excessive self-serving pursuit of human interest at the expense of nature to the point Anthropocene is reached. A cursory glance at development of knowledge about the past across various cultures—not just the modern Euro-American historical tradition we are accustomed to—reveals that a non-human centric history is very much alive in spheres outside of, beyond, or even before, the modern, historical scholarship. Religious and spiritual traditions or worldview that used to dominate before the eighteenth or nineteenth century and which up to now billions of people mainly in the developing world subscribe to, all teach non-human centric ethos and ideas of the past and the future. Francesca Ferrando (2016) appears spot on when she argued that "(h)umans have always been post-human" as evident in spiritual traditions that developed from the dawn of humanity, earlier than the start of civilization, and which persist up to now. Does it mean that posthumanism is, at least partly, a revival of old ideas and practices which were suppressed, supplanted or marginalized by the rise of science and humanism to a hegemonic position since the past two centuries?

Ferrando's point flags the importance of distinguishing various facets of history. For most people among whom the facet of history that matters most in their life is their personal memory of what happened in the past—hardly the history produced and espoused by academic historians—their conception and understanding of the past may indeed be far from the human-centric history that Chakrabarty blames and seeks to replace. This may be particularly true among people of poorer and middle class background who struggle on daily basis living in developing countries and perhaps due to constant life struggles their religiosity or spirituality is high. They thus tend to attribute to God's will whatever happened in their past and whatever will happen in their future. In other words, the modern notion of historical consciousness that assumes agency for humans to design historical trajectory as they envision the future is a luxury for many people even in an era of unprecedented wealth such now. Such kind of historical sensibility seems to be a preserve of those endowed with economic and political resources. Perhaps that only a few truly proletarian revolutions succeeded in history (China and Vietnam among them) is a living testament of the persistence of non-human-

centric historical sensibility up to now. The category "human" in the notion of human-centric historical consciousness is simply too big or too generalized to encapsulate the complexity of real people on the ground.

Even in Euro-American modern historical traditions, history is also not singularly viewed as human-centric, as exemplified, say, by the Braudellian approach or the French Annales School. Long before the recent explosion of interests in environmental and planetary history, they have pioneered the broad-sweeping, non-event focused, long durée and the multi-time scale (including geological time) approaches to historical analysis. Human hardly occupy a privileged position there. But it ought to be noted that even in non-human centric approaches, the fact that historians are humans and members of academic or professional community with own interests to pursue and promote, and they write with human audience in mind, raises the question of the extent to which history as is written can avoid or negate its human-centricity. Perhaps the idea is not to avoid or negate but to come to terms with it.

The long-existing approaches to, or conceptions of, history—both modern scholarly history and those which may fall under the facet of memory—are varied or wide-ranging, and the possible alternatives to human-centric history may be found not necessarily in the supposedly new post-humanistic approaches but among existing ideas or approaches that were sidelined or obscured by the rise of the hegemonic homocentric history.

One area is which posthumanism may have a profound implication is in the logic of historical consciousness. What has long been taken for granted in historical analysis is the human-centric yardstick in determining what is historically relevant or important, which has always been what is useful for, and rationally defensible from the standpoint of, humans. The destruction of the environment, for instance, has been justified in terms of the need of the ever expanding human population. Jason Moore argued that human-made ideas and practice of capitalism has rendered nature cheap for human exploitation. By locating humans as equal to other living creature, the calculation of importance will have to be corresponding re-calibrated. The human-centric attribution of causality in historical explanation will also have to be adjusted, along with the admission that understanding does not mean exclusively in human terms. Consciousness is hardly exclusive to human mind, as Pepperell (2003) argues.

## Conclusion

The epoch-making condition captured by the term Anthropocene is viewed by some scholars as foregrounding the posthuman age. The catastrophic future envisioned in this concept prompted philosophers and historians, among other scholars, to offer dire warnings and proposals to address this serious problem. Dipesh Chakrabarty' forceful articulation of the serious implications of Anthropocene exemplifies this effort. While the notion of Anthropocene foregrounds the central role of humans in this predicament, Chakrabarty's proposed solution of de-centering or de-privileging

humans in historical narrative or analysis appears too far removed from the baseline of the problem to make dent on it. The unsavory implications of his suggestion include the collectivization of responsibility for the problem that certain groups which are small in number but have so much political and economic power—the rich nations, greedy capitalists and industrialist—had greater responsibility for. With their responsibility inadvertently absolved by the "entire humankind", there is a danger they—who have the most political and economic resources to make things happen--would not move decisively enough to address the problem simply because it's everyone's responsibility. Worse if they deny that there is a crisis at all, as what Trump and many Republicans have actually done.

Despite doubts raised on Chakrabarty's analysis, and Anthropocene may not be the best case to illustrate the need to rethink history, the posthuman condition that Anthropocene helped to highlight does carry important implications for history. These implications operate unevenly depending on different facets of history, which is why the multi-faceted nature of history needs to be underscored. It misleads to assume that the kind of history or form of historical sensibility favored by academic historians are the same as those of common people to whom it is the "practical past"—personal, affective, may be inaccurate but useful for their purpose—that matters. Serious research needs to be undertaken on how common people, particularly those who are at the margin (politically, economically, socially, culturally, etc.) actually practice historical mindfulness. Do disempowered or marginalized think historically in the same way as encapsulated in human-centric, human-driven modern historical consciousness? Aware of the possible differentiation, we shall be in better position to tailor to their characteristics whatever program or initiative we intend to pursue. As suggested by a professor from Thailand who was one of plenary speakers, what we need is a "streetwise humanities".

The adjustments that need to be carried out to realize a posthumanist history are not all new. We can draw from the pool of historiographic knowledge both from the ancient and modern times which have been sidelined, ignored, or obscured by the preference for scientific, evidence-based history by the hegemonic groups of historians. What needs to be worked possibly from scratch is how historians would undertake historical interpretations by employing value-system or value-assessment that does not privilege humans and allot equal value for the interests of other life forms. This is going to be a challenging task as it entails re-examination of many fundamental presuppositions that we have held from time immemorial. It will also mean re-formulation of the rules on assessing historical evidence and what qualifies as acceptable historical sources. At even more fundamental level, the singular rationality that we have taken for granted for so long may have to give way to multiple rationalities. One may say that all these suggest that end of history as we know it. Alternatively, one can say that this is reclaiming history that we have abandoned in the past, or it is merely acknowledging openly the existence of plural histories that exist side-by-side on daily basis.

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# Transhumanism in China

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One Chinese version of the emperor and the chessboard involves the farmer Pong Lo. Pong is offered any reward he wants, save the hand of the emperor's daughter, which he really wants. So he requests one grain of rice, to be doubled daily for a hundred days.[1] The emperor quickly agrees. Through the magic of mathematics, it soon becomes apparent that the farmer is due more riches than the empire can ever repay.[2]

This kind exponential growth powers the transhumanism movement. Not everyone buys into this logic. William Grassie, executive director of the Metanexus Institute, contends transhumanism is based on the logic of exponential growth. This fallacy assumes that an event or phenomenon can grow exponentially forever.[3] In the end, he says, infinite growth is nothing but a giant Ponzi scheme.[4]

Grassie also recognizes that transhumanists do more than play with tech toys or make make-believe predictions. They are making serious philosophical claims concerning the nature of a post-singularity world. The singularity is the point after which machines exceed human intelligence. In such a landscape, what will a positive outcome look like? These are ultimately questions of value. Yet Grassie contends that technology itself is values-neutral. There is no known method of inculcating values *into* technology. Current human society, in contrast, is "inculcated" by religions, however residual or distasteful they may be to some. These religious currents may be formal religions or simply secular efforts. Belief in the singularity can be seen as just such a secular religion, one that inculcates values.[5]

Transhumanism wears many definitions. For the philosopher Nick Bostrom it is "the study of

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1. Helena Clare Pittman, *A Grain of Rice* (Yearling, 1986).
2. The same principle is illustrated in the story of one grain of wheat and a chessboard, first written by Ibn Khallikan in 1256. See Clifford A. Pickover (2009), The Math Book: From Pythagoras to the 57th Dimension, New York : Sterling, 2009), p. 102; Macdonell, A. A. (2011-03-15). "Art. XIII.—The Origin and Early History of Chess". *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain & Ireland*. 30 (01): 117–141. doi:10.1017/S0035869X00146246. Retrieved 2015-04-05.
   Helena Clare Pittman, *A Grain of Rice* (Yearling, 1986).
3. Grassie., 256.
4. Grassie, 261.
5. Grassie, 264.

the ramifications, promises and potential dangers of the use of science, technology, creativity, and other means to overcome fundamental human limitations."[6] Once again the question of values lurks in the background

As an organized movement transhumanism could be dated from the founding of the World Transhumanist Association in 1998. But transhumanism is more than a single group. It is an international network of political parties; it is also a philosophical movement; it is a burgeoning publishing category; it is the animating vision for a range of industries from cryonics to robotics; and it is the power behind a range of research projects, from gene therapies to virtual reality to Google's anti-aging initiative Calico. All these efforts, as well as the swirling clouds of discourse that surround them, are meant to enhance human capabilities, to realize, in effect, a true new age.

This paper looks at transhumanism as more than a movement, but as a new religion. We look at China and ask how deeply transhumanism's roots extend into China's soil. We use the model of new religions to investigate how such a belief system may fare in contemporary China.

## The Roots of Transhumanism

What are those roots? Transhumanism is the most recent label given to a strand of Western thought that can be dated back at least to Dante's use of the word *transhumanarc* in 1312.[7] By progressing in stages through level halls, the poet arrives at the Empyrean, a place of pure light in which human flesh becomes celestial flesh. Finally face-to-face with God, he is enveloped and aligned with God's love. The *transhumanarc* was the very goal of spiritual progress.

It was the British biologist Julian Huxley who popularized the word transhumanism. He first used it, in 1957, to mean the transformation of humans: "…man remaining man, but transcending himself, by realizing new possibilities of and for his human nature."[8] Huxley aimed to promote a world culture with one religion. Perhaps naively, he hoped the UN would be the essential first step. This kind of optimism coupled with deep scientific knowledge still animates transhumanism.

## Transhumanism: Key Concepts

The mathematician-physicist John von Neumann also foresaw a transhumanist future. He said that "the every-accelerating progress of technology…gives the appearance of approaching some essential singularity in the history of the race beyond which human beings, as we know them, could not continue."[9] In this quote, itself a paraphrase from the mathematician Stanislaw Ulam, von

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6. Ibid.
7. The Divine Comedy, Paradiso, Canto 1.
8. Chris Renwick, "New Bottles for New Wine: Julian Huxley, biology and sociology in Britain." *The Sociological Review,* April 21, 2016, https://doi.org/10.1002/2059-7932.12018.
9. Quoted in Ray Kurzweil, *The Singularity is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology* (London, New York, Toronto: Penguin, 2005.), 10.

Newmann makes the two points we have already encountered. First, von Neumann underlines the importance of the acceleration in the *pace* of technological change. Secondly, he sees these changes intersecting at a single point in time, the singularity.

*Acceleration,* clearly, is one of a bundle of core concepts that make up transhumanism. Others include:

### Progress

Max More notes that transhumanism is not utopian. Far from seeking paradise, it is concerned instead with continual improvement. There is no single desired future to be sought, there is simply the desire to move toward better futures.[10]

At the same time, transhumanists strongly reject the idea that we should *not* attempt to change the human condition. Any aspect of current reality, including, "human nature," can be improved. Transhumanism shares this goal with Enlightenment humanism.[11]

### Co-evolution

The transhumanist declaration states "…we will co-evolve with the products of our minds, integrating with them, finally integrating our intelligent technology into ourselves in a posthuman synthesis, amplifying our abilities and extending our freedom."[12] This co-evolution will result in morphological freedom, the ability to alter and improve the body.[13]

### Inevitability

The singularity, as mentioned above, is an event horizon. While it is an eventuality we can't fully grasp now, make no mistake, it is coming and cannot be held off.

Ray Kurzweil, one of the leading lights in transhumanism, posits six epochs in human evolution:

1. Epoch of physics and chemistry
2. Biology (DNA)
3. Brains (neural patterns)
4. Technology
5. Merger of technology and human intelligence
6. The Universe awakens

The singularity occurs at the start of Epoch 5. That's where we sit today. Kurzweil estimates AI will equal human intelligence by the late 2020s, and surpass human intelligence by 2045. Simply put, once AI surpasses our intelligence, our standing in and experience of the world will alter.

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10. Max More, "True Transhumanism: A Reply to Don Ihde." In William Grassie and Gregory R. Hansell, eds. *Transhumanism and Its Critics* (Philadelphia: Metanexus Institute, 2011), 136-146, p. 139.
11. More, 140.
12. More, 142.
13. More, 143.

### Intelligent Destiny

Of course all this doesn't have to mean we are destined to live lives as pets. We will also be smarter than we are today—as long as we chose to be enhanced.[14] This is because biological intelligence is fixed, while machine intelligence is unlimited. Biological processes, based on carbon, have inherent limitations. ("DNA-based intelligence," says Kurzweil, "is just so very slow and limited.")[15] Non-biological systems will have no such limitations. They will be able to redesign themselves, to multiply, to perform repeated tasks, and to communicate at high speeds. Intelligence will spread throughout the universe like a dust cloud. The cosmic scale of this statement is breath-taking; this looks and sounds like an article of faith.[16]

### Aging

Eventually human aging will be easily reversed, using nanotechnology.[17] Before that we have cryogenics, which today can preserves your body and/or brain until it can be revived in the future.

### AI

AI will enhance all human abilities, including even emotional intelligence.[18] In the current, initial stage, AI serves to extend our existing abilities. But eventually humans and machines will merge. We have already merged, to some extent, if you look at our civilization as a whole. And we need not be alienated after merging with AI. Kurzweil insists this intelligence will continue to be human, even if it ceases to be biological.[19] This will be so because it will be based on the design of the human brain. Any felt sense of kinship or identification, however, will be one gained solely through this design legacy.

Again, we are told we need not worry about losing our "essential humanity." "…[N]othing will be lost," says Kurzweil's robot intelligence George, speaking from the year 2048. In other words concern about losing something essential to our humanity—our habits, our perspectives, our proclivities, our very natures—is unnecessary. Everything will be there when it's needed.

Otherwise, it will be recycled.[20]

## Realms of Transhumanism

These concepts percolate inside the transhumanist soup, mixing there with associated trends, ideas, corporate interests and other chunky entities. The bioethicist Russel Blackford insists that

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14. Kurzweil, 24.
15. Kurzweil, 32.
16. Kurtzweil, 21.
17. Kurzweil, 28..
18. Kurzweil, 29.
19. Kurzweil, 30.
20. Kurzweil, 33.

such breadth and ferment is a sign of intellectual health.[21] But at times this breadth becomes overwhelming. To make sense of this we can outline the important nodes, the realms in which transhumanism thrives.

The starting point is Nick Bostrom's list of seven categories, taken from his essay "Transhumanist Values."[22] Hank Pellisier adds two more to this list, to make seven. I will then compare this list with another, subjective list of topics drawn up after attending the recent HumanityPlus conference in Beijing. The two lists overlap in only one category, David Pearce's Hedonistic Imperative.

### Extropianism

Max More, another leading light in the movement, wrote *Principles of Extropy* in 1988 and so launched the extopianism movement. Extropianism means proactive evolution. True optimists, extropians believe in taking evolution by the hand, much as breeders and horticulturists have done for centuries. But unlike these pioneers extropians use all the technologies available. Extropianism is the immediate predecessor to transhumanism.

### Singularitarianism

As noted, machine intelligence is set to surpass human intelligence. Accepting this as an inevitability means belief in a sudden event which will occur in the medium future. Ray Kurzweil and Vernor Vinge are the best known singularians, as is the Machine Intelligence Research Institute at Berkeley.

### The Hedonistic Imperative

The philosopher David Pearce fuses Transhumanism with "hedonistic utilitarianism." Pearce is a strident proponent of veganism and, in principle, the abolition of all suffering for sentient beings. This is goal is possible in our age through technological advances in nanotechnology and genetic engineering.

### Democratic Transhumanism

This sub-movement mixes transhumanism with democratic decision-making. Democratic transhumanists want equal access to enhancement technologies for all. They support a basic income policy. These values are promoted by the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies.

### Survivalist Transhumanism

This strand focuses on longevity—in transhumanist terms, "radical life extension." As Jethro

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21. Blackford, 177.
22. Bostrom's list is summarized in Hank Pellisier, "Transhumanism: there are [at least] ten different philosophical categories; which one(s) are you?" On Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies website, July 8, 2015, at https://ieet.org/index.php/IEET2/more/pellissier20150708.

Knight says in Zoltan Istvan's book *The Transhumanist Wager* (2013), "death must be conquered."

### *Libertarian Transhumanism*

Libertarian Transhumanists sees enhanced human capacities as an issue of civil liberty. Government should not be involved in any form. Peter Thiel, the Silicon Valley venture capitalist, and Ronald Bailey of *Reason* magazine are prime proponents.

### *Religious Transhumanism*

As mentioned already, transhumanist concepts are found in religious thinking.[23] And this line of theologically-tinged thought continues with the Mormon Transhumanist Association (2006) and the Christian Transhumanist Association (2013). Both groups strongly deny there is any incompatibility between transhumanism and Christianity. Both have adopted the Transhumanist Declaration. The MTA affirms that scientific knowledge and technological power are "ordained of God."[24] The CTA in their own statement of affirmation focuses on the transcendent, the coherence of mental, physical and spiritual aspects of humanity, and improvement in the world.[25]

Perhaps inevitably, stand-alone transhumanist religions are appearing. The Terasem Movement Transreligion began in 2004. The Turing Church began in 2010.[26]

### Encountered in the Flesh: Beijing Humanity+

Most of these currents were present at the Beijing conference, in one form or another. The conference was held in the Ullens Center for Contemporary Art in the 798 Art District on the outskirts of Beijing, one of the vaguely iconoclastic neighborhoods that can flourish in today's China. Perhaps as a result, the conference had an eclectic and counter-cultural atmosphere not reflected by this list of dry academic categories presented above. The attendees appeared to be mainly students full of curiosity. Speakers came from a wide variety of backgrounds that both confirmed and tested the ideas outlined above.

### *AI*

Kent Saitlik of Mozi.ai, a Beijing-based biotech firm, focused on the revolutionary nature of AI. It will, he said, be a technical development that upends our idea of the very category of human. We cannot know the full extent of this change. Saitlik, like all transhumanist speakers, accepts that the singularity is a certainty.

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23. According the Lincoln Cannon, Nikolai Fyodorov advocated "the technological resurrection of our ancestors." The Catholic thinker Pierre Teilhard de Chardin also advocated the merger of technology and the Divine.
24. "Affirmation." Mormon Transhumanist Association website, at https://transfigurism.org.
25. "Who We Are." Christian Transhumanist Association website, https://www.christiantranshumanism.org.
26. Lincoln Cannon. "A Brief History of Religious Transhumansim," on Lincoln Cannon website, Nov. 29, 2017, at https://lincoln.metacannon.net/2017/11/a-brief-history-of-religious.html.

Zaitlik breaks down AI into four types, or calibers. First is ANI, artificial narrow intelligence. Your phones have this type, as does Google's search engine. The AI does one thing and does it well—so well that we are already hooked on our devices.

Caliber two is AGI, Artificial General Intelligence. Think *Exmachina.* To get there we need the AI to have become smarter and have massively increased computational power. The power side has already been achieved—the fastest computer in the world, China's Sunway TaijuLinge, has 93 quadrillion cps (calculations per second); human brains have a mere 10 quadrillion. The smartness side of the equation is a focus of intense research. General AI can interact autonomously. It learns on its own, through experience, like humans.

Caliber three will be Integrative Cognitive Architecture. Here the AI will match the human mind's ability to process information in stages. Using separate centers in the brain, the human mind can recognize three million patterns. Each center uses a series of algorithms, and these in turn trigger algorithms that communicate between centers. This advanced coordination is what we mean by human intelligence—it is much more than raw processing power. This form involves deep learning in which the whole organism is involved.

Caliber four will see artificial Super Intelligence that is so much more advanced than ours that we will literally be unable to comprehend its functioning. At that stage we will be faced with a few stark options:

  • Live in harmony with the new technology, but separately

  • Merge with the new technology, creating a hybrid form of humanity

  • Live lives as kept animals, like cattle or pets, or worse

So, take your pick, but know this: everything will change.


### Transhumanism is more than simple AI: Genetic Modification

Yet as we have established Transhumanism is a broad umbrella of jumbled forces and concerns. Ben Goertzel of singularly.net noted that achieving transhumanism's goal of "becoming better than well" means humanity will move from an age in which avoiding suffering is the primary concern to one in which other states of being are more important. This will require body modification.

The genome for domesticated rice was decoded in 2002. Today NIH funds chimera research in which animal and human DNA are combined. In addition an entirely new technology has entered the field from out of the blue, CRISPER CAS9. This allows us to alter the DNA of both the unborn and the living. Regardless of FDA approval, these techniques will be adopted quickly for the mass market. So the transhumanist future includes superhumans, pumped up by biotech research, just as much as it does smart machines.


### Blockchain

Perhaps surprisingly, Blockchain was a major them at the conference. The two realms are now joined at the hip. Many of the Transhumanism disciplines are integrating Blockchain into their

practices. Mozi.ai is designing a platform to unite all biotech research databases, using Blockchain. Ben Goertzel recommends using Blockchain as the underlying protocol layer for APIs.

### *Life Capital and Aging*

For Natasha Vita-More transhumanism refers not to *transcending* our current state. Instead it means we are *transitional* humans. She sees transhumanism as a narrative that updates the human viewpoint. "Transhumanism" she noted in her talk, "denies the myth that the old must die to make way for the young." She forecasts the use of DNA techniques paired with AI to implement radical adjustments needed as societies age and dementia increases. Transhumanism is a way of privileging the life capital accumulated over time by the aged. All humans, not only the aged, need to update knowledge. The alternative is a dumbed-down society even more dependent on care-takers like AI.

Vita-More's husband, Max More, is president of Alcor, and the topic of cyronics was there in the background of Vita-More's discussion of aging. The Alcor Life Extension Association 生命研究基金会 was founded in 1972 to offer cyrogenic preservation (低温保存生命技术). This involves the preservation of a person's body immediately upon death. The assumption behind such a service is that scientific advances will allow for regeneration of the individual at some point in the future. Alcor represents a strong belief in a new paradigm of salvation through scientific advances.

The first Alcor patient from China was Du Hong, a writer who died in 2015 at age 61. She was Alcor's 138th patient.

### *A Comprehensive Model of the Brain*

In parallel with AI development researchers in China are racing to develop a complete model of the human mind. The basic building blocks are spiking neurons. Zeng Yi of harmonious-AI. org states that a mathematical modeling of human neural systems concluded that 15% of neurons are *inhibitor* neurons, not *excitation* neurons. Humans could possibly reduce the use of inhibitor pathways and learn to think faster.

### *Contra the Hedonist Treadmill*

One of the cofounders of HumanityPlus, David Pearce, notes that Transhumanism is simply the effort "to find technical solutions to ethical problems." Pearce notes that humans are now on the "hedonist treadmill," channeling our energies toward seeking out comfort. His focus is on the elimination of *all* pain, something spelled out in the transhumanist manifesto. Another way of expressing a life without pain is "super happiness;" or, in his words, "intelligent bliss."

Suffering includes psychological, chronic and physical pain, as well as psychological disappointment. And it applies to non-human as well as human beings. Pearce is against killing animals as a source of meat. The range of suffering, then, is truly universal. He states domestic pets are to be weaned off hunting. And wild carnivore are to be redirected not to hunt for food.

Pearce's arguments, which go well beyond veganism, are easily the most radical ideas promoted

at the conference. Pearce envisions the complete reprograming of the entire biosphere. He is confident we can use SCRISPER techniques to cut out genes for pain, and to build intelligent bliss.

### *Techno-optimism and Apocalyptic Visions*

Most speakers expressed a typical confidence in technology. Resources are not humanity's problem. The problem is simply finding the *right* technology. However many talks also had an apocalyptic tinge. What is at stake in transhumanism is nothing less than humanity's future. The imperative is to use technology to solve all of humanity's problems. In this way humanity will control its own fate. This is not utopian. Instead it is a transitional necessity. The alternative is more selfish activity, conflict and wars.

## Criticisms of Transhumanism

The movement is criticized from many sides. The very breadth of this criticism reflects its relevancy. Yet transhumanism continues to gain traction. Topics transhumanists have debated for years are now debated in the broad media. These include the possibility of mass unemployment due to AI; the potential to extend life; and the perennial boogey-man, the day computers take over everything and render us inconsequential.

These issues make up the core focus of Yuval Noah Harari's recent bestsellers, *Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow* (2016), and *21 Lessons for the 21st Century* (2018). Harari is hardly a critic. *Homo Deus* explores the implications of progress in three areas that have bedeviled humanity: bliss (freedom from pain), immortality (extended lifespan), and enhanced, God-like superpowers.

A long string of writers disagree with transhumanism's belief in the inevitability of acceleration and the singularity. For William Henry, for instance, the transhumanist vision ends up with eugenics, a future in which the unfit are culled from the population.[27] Max More also says the movement is characterized by excessive technocentrism.[28] Don Ihde notes that transhumanists tend to be enthralled to the idea of the bionic being, part human, part animal, part machine. He points to the use of prosthetics, from capped teeth to spring legs, to show these ideas are not so new, nor are they always superior.[29]

## Transhumanism in China

As we have seen, transhumanism has one foot in technology and one in theology. Thus

27. William Henry, "Aligned with Love: Dante, Transhumanism and the Cathar's Secret of Ascension." On William Henry website. Posted July 27, 2017. http://www.williamhenry.net/2017/07/aligned-with-love-dante-transhumanism-and-the-cathars-secret-of-ascension/.
28. Ihde, 126.
29. Ihde, 130.

transhumanism connects with both technological and cultural attributes of Chinese culture. Yet transhumanism is something new in China. There is simply no telling how the nascent movement will develop. Like so much in China, the potential is so glaring it may cause us to overlook actualities on the ground.

Materials specifically dealing with tranhumanism 超人类主义 *(chaorenlei zhuyi)* are scarce. Much discussion is limited to the internet. Weike Deng, one of the organizers of HumanityPlus in China, estimates there may be only 500 "true transhumanists" in China. Yet there should in principle be no barrier to transhumanism. Deng contends that transhumanist concepts are compatible with Chinese philosophy. An added plus is the ideological vacuum in China. Deng says that transhumanism (along with nationalism) is one of the most viable replacements for the (outmoded?) ideology of Communism.[30] Yuval Harrari agrees, saying that China will become the breeding ground for a slew of techno-humanist religions. Yet general knowledge and acceptance of transhumanist ideas in society remains minimal. As the HumanityPlus Chinese website notes, in the West transhumanism has seeped into society, the economy and politics.[31] In China it exists only in the margins.

Huang Mingyu 黄明宇, writing on the Transhumanist Declaration Chinese website, offers five explanations for the difference between transhumanism in China and the West:

1. The level of investment remains low, and low-efficiency. Despite increases in biotech 生物技术, nano 纳米技术, and artificial intelligence 人工智能, the overall gap between China and other places remains large. This is being rectified through massive investment.

2. In addition there is a shortage of researchers. Researchers with interest in transhumanism and singularity also lack sufficient time to go deep. There is a corresponding lack of translators and writers on the topic.

3. Transhumanism comes up on major research websites, but understanding of the nature of transhumanism is often shallow. Similarly, there is a lack of vibrant discussion. In the U.S., says Huang, when a topic connected to transhumanism appears, there is normally a plethora of discussion, disagreement, and criticism. In China there is silence.

4. Finally, there is a lack of support for the subject by prominent people, including celebrities.[32]

On the other hand, China possesses several advantages for the development of transhumanism. Foremost is China's large population that is widely perceived as hard-working, aggressive, and hard-studying. There is another advantage not directly mentioned by Huang: the government is firmly behind the development of certain technologies connected to transhumanism.

30. Quora, "How Popular is Transhumanism in China?" Weike Deng Answered Aug 11, 2017.
31. "The Difference Between China and the Outside" 国内与国外的差异. On Zhuhu website, https://zhuanlan.zhihu.com/p/31861659.
32. Huang Mingyu 黄明宇, Transhumanism in China (2), Recent Developments: Left or Right, Finally turn toward singularity, I'm transhumais 超人类主义在中国（二）近现代的发展.
向左或向右，最终都向, on zhuhu website, https://www.zhihu.com/people/huang-ming-yu-78/posts.

## Made In China 2025

The world is by now familiar with the Made In China 2025 strategy. In a nutshell, this program, first announced by the Premier Li Keqiang in 2015, plans to make China preeminent in a fistful of important industries of the future, from advanced chip making to artificial intelligence. Also known as the Fourth Industrial Revolution, its focus is on ten major sectors:

1. IT and cybersecurity
2. High-end numerical control tools and robotics
3. Aerospace equipment
4. Ocean engineering equipment
5. Railway equipment
6. Energy-saving, including new energy vehicles powered by alternative fuels
7. Power equipment
8. Agricultural machinery
9. New materials, including nanotech materials
10. Biomedicine and medical devices[33]

Of the ten industries in the 2025 plan, IT, robotics, nanotech and biomedicine are the most closely associated with tranhumanism. Yet continued investment in these areas is not particularly surprising. China's manufacturing has been moving up the value-added chain for many years now. In 2006 heavy industry represented 70% of industrial output, while light industry was 29%. In 1990 light industry made up 61% of total GDP.[34]

It appears that China is certainly on track to be a player in these hi-tech areas. However as we have seen the hard tech side is only one aspect of transhumanism. While as a movement it is closely correlated with technology, transhumanism's focus is on the use and impact of technology on life. It is not simply an investment strategy. Indeed, there are no indications the Chinese state shows any interest in transhumanism as a movement.

In addition, money alone does not determine success in hi tech. As Forbes notes, R&D progress involves creative destruction as well as creative construction. Such constant churning takes place in the private sector, but is anathema in the state-owned enterprises favored by the central government. In addition success will require the right mix of private-public partnerships, something not guaranteed. In fact central planning has proven to work for some industries, but fails miserably in others. Examples abound of misallocation of investment funds in Japan, Korea, and other tiger

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33. Yingzhi Yang, "What happens to 'Made in China 2025" as trade war fears grow," South China Morning Post, March 23, 2018.
34. Pan Yue and Simon J. Evenett, July 2010, "Moving Up the Value Chain: Upgrading China's Manufacturing Sector," IISD, https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2010/sts_3_moving_up_the_value_chain.pdf; "Industry in China," Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Industry_of_China.

economies blessed by rapid growth.[35]

## Cultural Affinities Transhumanism in Chinese Culture

As Weike Deng noted above, there are cultural precedents for transhumanism in Chinese culture. Two traditions in particular stand out: the quest for immortality and the concept of maintaining health. Immortality has been an ideal since ancient times. The mythological Queen of the West 西王母 sought the elixir of immortality 不死药. Daoist practitioners did intense research on alchemic techniques 炼丹术 *(liandanshu)*. Many emperors from very first one, Qin Shihuang, on sought the secrets of immortality.[36]

Beyond immortality, another key concept in Chinese worldview is *yangsheng* 养生, "nourishing life." Yangsheng promotes health through proactive prevention. Self-cultivation focuses on sustaining the three treasures, *jing, qi,* and *shen* 精气神 (essence, vital breath, spirit). *Yangsheng* cultivation practices involve preserving *jing* and *shen,* and the circulation of *qi*.[37]

A core concept in the Chinese medicine classic *Huangdi Neijing* 黄帝内经 (Inner Classic of the Yellow Emperor), *yangsheng* crops up in many other contexts today. It is applied to a wide variety of industries and products, including food, natural herbs, spas, medicines, exercises, and spiritual cultivations.

Huang Mingyu also notes a number of Chinese thinkers, contemporary and in the past, who have touched on transhumanist ideas.[38] Ma Yun 马云, founder and head of Alibaba, has discussed life extension and the question of life extension. He conjectures that there may be laws against living over 200 years in the future. New engineering technology can create new energies and product and social revolutions. Even President Xi Jinping introduced some transhumanist ideas in a speech at the 2014 International Science and Technology Conference. Rapid technological change has created new opportunities, he said, and will cause productions and social revolutions.[39]

The well-known geologist Li Siguang 李四光 (1889-1971), who revolutionized China's oil extraction technology, in his essay "The Appearance of Humanity" 人类出现 noted that humanity by

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35. In Japan's case, petroechemicals, oil and coal never took off as planned. Software did not take off in the 1970s and 1980s. And commercial aircraft have disappointed. In Korea the end result of resturuing was a concentration of economic power and capital in the chaebols, which in turn were unable to adjust to market changes. The banking sector was not sufficiently developed to support restructuing. The government averted financial problems by ordering the banks to make emergency loans. This all came to a halt in the 1997 Asian Crisis. See Japanese Industrial Policy: The Postwar Record and the Case of Supercomputers, in U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, *Competing Economies: America, Europe, and the Pacific Rim, OTA-ITE-498* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1991), 239-291, pp. 251-2, and Heather Smith, "The Failure of Korea Inc," Agenda, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1999, pp. 153-166.

36. Xi Jinping习近平. 让工程科技造福人类、创造未来.
   习近平：让工程科技造福人类、创造未来--观点--人民网.

37. Matt Stefan, "Yangsheng," Encyclopaedia Brittanica online, https://www.britannica.com/topic/yangsheng.

38. Huang Mingyu 黄明宇, Ibid.

39. Xi Jinping习近平. "Let Engineering and Technology Create Prosperity for Humanity, Create the Future"让工程科技造福人类、创造未来. CPC news website. http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2014/0604/c64094-25099536.html.

its nature does not wait to develop, but accelerates progress, increasing in multiples.[40]

Mao Zedong similarly forecast that humanity, in its movement toward a higher level, will one day die out, to be replaced by something more advanced.[41] All of these thinkers seem to touch on transhumanist concepts or values. Yet there is no single movement from China that wraps all these ideas together. Transhumanism as a movement is an import.

There are Chinese critics of the concept. Yuk Hui, a Hong Kong-born researcher now based in Germany, sees transhumanism as a one-sided form of globalization 单边的全球化 *(danbiande qiuanqiuhua).* He dismisses transhumanism as a new method of stimulating consumerism 刺激消费主义 *(ciji xiaofeizhuyi).* Extended lifespans and enhanced bodies are simply methods to reformulate existing problems. In addition there are in China no second thoughts on new technological developments; all are accepted as part of the ideology of speed 加速主义 *(jiasu zhuyi).* Hui groups transhumanist considerations under the category of "sinofuturism" 中华未来主义 *(zhonghua weilai zhuyi),* a profound confidence in China's (or Asia's) future. These are all, Hui concludes, forms of nihilism.[42]

## Organizational Weakness

Huang reserves his strongest criticisms for organizational sloppiness. Individual organizations do not co-operate, for instance on cryogenics or biotech. Instead each unit goes its own way. Organizations in addition have no common goals, and so lack motivation for development. Management within organizations is also weak. Corporations have limited resources and hold few conferences. Without publicity the topic is unfamiliar and unattractive to most people. All these deficiencies result in limited social influence for the movement.

In addition there is the question of how much innovation can be fostered through government planning and directives. There is no doubt that government support helps in many cases; prominent examples are Silicon Valley, the NASA space program, and support for export champions in Japan and Korea. However government directed efforts can be clumsy and lead to excessive investment. In China market expectations of innovation can lead to unethical actions. Liu Yadong, editor of *Science and Technology Daily,* notes widespread counterfeiting and fraud stemming from a lack of a scientific spirit in China's tech sector.[43]

## Conclusion: Through the Lens of Religion

40. Li Siguang 李四光，《人类的出现》[Humanity's appearance], in《天文、地质、古生物资料摘要》，高级中学课本——语文，第二册，第216－217页，[Advanced middle school textbook, language] (People's Publishing, 1995, 1996), 216-7.
41. 《毛泽东文集》第八卷 "关于人的认识问题" 中，
42. Peng Bai interview with Yuk Hui 专访许煜：人工智能的超人类主义是二十一世纪的虚无主义, June 29, 2017, The Paper 澎拜新闻, https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1718074.
43. Sarah Dai, "Redcore Browser Saga Draws Public Censure," South China Morning Post, Aug. 21, 218, p. B2.

From the discussion above it is clear that transhumanism is just beginning to raise its head in China. True, two conferences have been held in Beijing (and one in Hong Kong). There is website discussion. And the national government is making major investments in certain related technical industries like IT and robotics. Yet transhumanism as it currently exists in the West is a movement with many angles. It is certainly more than investment in high tech hardware. It implies constant investigation of a transhumanist future.

Many writers such as Hank Pellissier and Ben Goertzel are extremely enthusiastic about transhumanism's prospects in China. "The future," says Pellissier, "is rapidly shifting to East Asia."[44] Such predictions have been in the air since the 70s, in my experience, and most are based on infectious optimism created by rapid growth through export-led industrialization. So far all countries experiencing such rapid export growth have slowed once their economies matured, and there is no reason to believe China won't follow the same path. When it comes to the prospects of transhumanism in China, capitalist cheer mixes easily with Silicon Valley techno-optimism, forming a heady cocktail of exuberance.

Transhumanism is much more than an investment strategy. It needs many supports in order to thrive. It will evolve in such Asian contexts as Japan, Korea, and China. What the movement will look like in ten years, however, is an open question. This brings me back to the original premise, that the perspective of new religious studies can help unpack transhumanism in China.

I wish to use new religions not as an argument, but as a lens, showing a possible future. While the multiple links between transhumanist philosophy and religion are clear, it is not my purpose to prove that transhumanism is or is not a religion. But let us assume, for the purposes of this argument, that transhumanism is a non-Chinese religious movement poised to spread into China. In that were the case it would bump up against a significant set of barriers not present in many non-Chinese contexts. Current government policy is hardly welcoming to new religions. (A new religion is here defined simply as any religious tradition not officially allowed under the Chinese constitution.) Those religions outside the five-religion structure of Christianity, Catholicism, Daoism, Confucianism, and Islam have no legal standing and no way to register. The government openly monitors virtually all religious communal activity, whether public or underground. This government monitoring is tightening. On February first of this year the government issued new regulations governing religion.[45] These regulations strengthened government oversight over registration, internet activities, and donations. Any new group, even one well-established overseas, is essentially unwelcome.

The government is just as focused on ideological threats as it is on organized religions. Xi Jinping has continually emphasized the need to maintain ideological vigilance. "We cannot, he said

44. Hank Pellissier, "East Asia is More "Trnashumaist' than the USA & Europe," on Ethical Technology website, Sept. 1, 2013, at http://ieet.org/index.php/IEET/more/pellissier20130901.
45. "Regulations concerning religion" 宗教事务条例（国令第686号），http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2017-09/07/content_5223282.htm?from=timeline.

in his famous August 19, 2013 speech, "even for a moment slacken and weaken ideological work.[46] A *religious* belief system intimately connected to bringing about enhanced individual properties and robots, and predicated on individual liberty, would be met with suspicion, at best.

This is not to say that the techniques of genetic manipulation, supercomputing, and life extension are not of interest. They are—as technologies. Full-blown transhumanism has so far flown below the radar. Once the implications of a future dictated by such technologies becomes apparent, true transhumanism will have arrived. At that point it will very likely be seen as an ideological threat.

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46. "Xi Jinping's 19 August speech revealed? (Translation)." China Copyright and Media website. Nov. 12, 2013. https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2013/11/12/xi-jinpings-19-august-speech-revealed-translation/

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# Ethics of Temporality : Total Biopolitics of Russian Cosmism

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## 1. Cosmic turn? : Growing interest in Russian cosmism

Russian Cosmism, one of the little-studied 20th century philosophical movements in Russia, attracts extraordinary academic and artistic attention today. Cosmism, developed by a few Russian thinkers before and after Russian revolution, had put forward philosophical ideas and scientific programs, the central tenet of which might be summarized as: "immortality for all" and "space exploration." Among representative evidence that demonstrates growing interests in Russian cosmism and its broad presence in the international intellectual arena – new publication on Russian cosmism, firstly a collection of essays by Cosmist thinkers, compiled by one of the most influential contemporary cultural theorist Boris Groys, in Moscow 2015, and this year 2018 its English translation by same editor which was the result of collaboration with art journal *E-flux* and MIT Press. In line with these publication projects, various conferences, symposiums, exhibitions, and art projects on cosmism have been held intensively in the last 1-2 years, including international conference at Haus der Kulturen der Welt (HKW) in Berlin in September 2017 titled *Russian Cosmism: A Work of Art in the Age of Technological Immortality*. Also a Post present event at MOMA in New-York, co-hosted by the publishing company *Verso*, and a special issue of *E-flux* journal, dedicated to the topic of Russian cosmism (88, February 2018) – all these are indicative of growing interests in Russian cosmism.

It is not difficult to assume that this apparent revisiting of cosmist legacy is related to the contemporary context, in which the philosophical imagination has again become entangled with scientific and technological imagination. Recent developments in biotechnology, genetics, and artificial intelligence suggest that the ancient myths of eternal youth, immortality, and material resurrection are now a tangible horizon of the technological imagination. But beyond superficial correspondence or relevance, elucidating what exactly links the problems of today with the issues that concerned the Russian cosmist more than a hundred years ago is a task that requires much deeper and thorough consideration than at first consideration.

Actually, Russian cosmism as a theoretical problematic or conceptual frame has a variety of

interesting aspects that demand separate explorations, from its revolutionary utopian characteristics to its post-humanistic and bio-political aspects. Of course, I can't and do not intend to cover all of these aspects together in this presentation. This is not meant to be a total picture of Russian cosmism. What I am going to offer today is very partial but - in my opinion - undoubtedly one of the most essential features of Russian cosmism that should be carefully contemplated when we talk about the politics and aesthetics of "life" in this transitional new world. In a word, it is about a moral or ethical aspect of Russian cosmism, that is, a specific type of social responsibility for a temporal axis, as well as for a spatial. That is why I have titled this presentation "Ethics of Temporality."

## 2. *Immortality for All* : Radical Museumification of Life

When Nikolai Fedorov, the renowned founder of Russian cosmism, developed his cosmic ideas around the 1860s, they did not attract much attention, although the group of his readers and regular attendants of his lecture included L. Tolstoy, F. Dostoevsky, young philosopher V. Solovyev, and also among his enthusiastic followers - K. Tsiolkovsky who later became the "grandfather of Soviet rocket science" and A. Bogdanov who was a close comrade of Lenin and prominent leader of *Preletkult*, and a director of the *institute of blood transfusion* as well. But after his death in 1903, popularity of his ideas had grown noticeably and he had become one of the most influential figures among pre- and post-revolutionary intellectuals, scientists and artists. Actually the first post-revolutionary decade saw an explosion of cosmist ideas and their application in very diverse areas of life, from art and science to the practical organization of labor, time management and so on. At a certain moment in the mid-1920s, it was in fact difficult to find a creative thinker in the USSR who was not influenced by this set of ideas.

Nikolai Fedorov, an Orthodox Christian philosopher and professional librarian, came up with a very unusual (to a certain extent even weird) set of ideas on humankind and cosmos: the core of *Philosophy of the Common Task* (the phrase which subsequently came to designate Fedorov's doctrine) lies in the possibility/necessity of *the immortality for all*. In brief, the common task is no other than a project of human immortality achieved by technological means. It involves materially resurrecting all human ancestors (to emphasize again, *all* human, not just those who are living now, but all people who have ever lived on Earth, starting with Adam and Eve), and exploring and colonizing all the stars and planets in the cosmos (the colonization of other planets is an inevitable consequence of the lack of space after the resurrection of the dead).

The most notable point here is that for Cosmists *immortality for all* was considered not just a *possible* option for a utopian future, but in terms of *necessity*, that is, as a sort of *practical imperative* that should come true at any rate. For instance, this characteristic of cosmism was also ensured by their attitude to the notion of technology: Fedorov evaluated the technology of the XIX century as internally contradictory. In his opinion, modern technology primarily served only

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fashion and war - that is, a limited, mortal life. Exactly in regard to such technology one can speak about "progress," because that type of technology constantly changes with time. Furthermore, such technology divides generations of people. Each generation has its own technology and each new generation is bound to despise the technology of its predecessors (Fedorov 1990:53-4). Practically, what Fedorov proposes here is another technology or other way of using the technology that could serve a no longer finite, but infinite, immortal life. This other type of technology might be called art. The technology of art for Fedorov is a technology of preserving and reviving the past. (in this respect cosmism should be differentiated from so-called radical avant-garde project that primarily aimed at total destruction of the past, so-called "zero-degree" of memory, although cosmist ideas unquestionably had an direct influence on Russian avant-garde artworks, for instance on Malevich's famous *Black Square*).

And this is also the reason why the institution of the "museum" played a central role in Russian Cosmism as well. Museums are not focused on progress but dedicated to the preservation of memory, of the past. Given that museums are already able to preserve the past, then, according to Fyodorov, their technology needs to be radicalized for not just preserving artifacts but actually bringing back life. Universal museum that would be able to reconstruct the past in its entirety was what Fedorov literally envisioned. Here naturally arises a question: who will take charge of this total project? Who is supposed to be the *subject* of this universal "curating job"? The only possible answer to this – goverment, in fact not merely a state's goverment, but at least a global (or universal) one. This is the point where we should address the problematics of *the biopolitical* in Russian cosmism.

## 3. Total biopolitics of Russian cosmism

According to the introduction of Boris Groys, one of the main academic voices of Russian cosmism today, the idea of Russian cosmism is a radicalized version of Foucault's famous thesis on biopolitics (Гройс 2015:7). More specifically, it amounts to a third variation (type) of governmentality. The first one, that is, the traditional type of sovereign states, in contrast to which Foucault defines the principle of modern state's governmentality, could be formulized as: "take life or let live." Meanwhile, the modern state, that is, second type of governmentality is primarily concerned with birth rates, health of its population, and providing them with the necessities of life. The functional principle of the modern state is "to make live and to let die." Worth noting here: in this formula "natural death" of any individual is accepted as an unavoidable event and thus treated as a private matter of that individual. But what if it might be possible to envision a third type of govermentality which doesn't want to accept this natural limit and will not permit itself to allow an individual to die privately and peacefully in their grave? What if a state is "making [the population] live and does not let [them] die"? As a matter of fact, it was precisely this requirement of absolute biopower that Russian cosmism

formulated through the slogan of "immortality for all." From this principled position the idea of "radical museumification of life" naturally follows: "All technology must become art technology, and the state must become a museum of its population." Only under the condition that this total state-museum proclaims as its explicit goal "eternal life on Earth for everybody", could it cease to be a partial, limited biopower of the sort described by Foucault. Only by overcoming death, could the biopower become *total*.(Гройс, 15)

However, this definition almost automatically prompts us to ask about another: what is the nature of this state-governed total biopower? It is not difficult to assume that such power, of course, is no longer a "democratic" power. After all, all these projects envision the future society as centralized, collectivist and hierarchically organized one (probably, at the head of this society – scientists and artists who will determine its organization and its goal). A. Svyatogor, one of the leading theorists of "biocosmology" and founder of the Biocosmist movement in the 1920s, seriously argued that in order to ensure the right of every individual to immortality and freedom of movement in space, a "central authority" is needed (Святогор 1922). V. Muravyev, a Russian philosopher and cosmist, also viewed a global, centralized, unified political power as an indispensable condition for the solution of cosmic common task (Муравьев 1934).

Arguably someone might be reminded of Foucault's famous thesis that modern biopolitics can also bring death if it begins to motivate them through racial differences, while others, more directly, would be able to recall Stalin's concentration camp (gulag), following John Grey's warning that if a power can resurrect everyone, then it can also kill everyone. Or probably we might contemplate in a more contemporary context, a situation in which "venture capitalists and technofuturists from Elon Musk to Ray Kurzweil and J. Craig Venter still dream of space colonization and human immortality which would only serve to advance privatized dispossession and the expansion of the capitalist market rather than socialist redistribution of wealth and labor."(Winslow 2018) In such a situation, one might even examine collective biopower of communism and the private biopower of capitalism to determine which is the worst. But Instead of drawing hasty conclusions on the (bio)political nature of cosmist idea, I would like to direct your attention to anothertremendously interesting point, which is related to practical governmentality, but which apparently goes far beyond it as well. It is Fedorov's specific conception of history and time, which could be termed "engineering of time" (Paglen 2018).

## 4. Ethics of Temporality

As I already mentioned before, the obvious radicality of Fedorov's proposal consists in that he wants to eliminate the distinctions between the past, the present, and the future in a great project of temporal engineering. According to him, "death can be called real only when all means of restoring life, at least all those that exist in nature and have been discovered by the human race, have been tried and have failed." (Fedorov 1990: 98) What does that mean? It means that the dead

aren't really dead. Because we don't know whether we can resurrect the dead, we don't know if the dead still have the possibility of life. If we can raise the dead at some point in the future, then that means that death might not be final after all. And if death isn't necessarily final, then the dead aren't actually dead (Paglen 2018). This idea of "the dead-not-really-being-dead" is central to Fedorov's conception of history and time itself. But that is not all. More interestingly, it also constitutes his specific notion of "Justice." According to the conception of Fedorov, time and justice are inseparably linked with each other in a mutually constitutive relationship.

The problem is that so-called "social justice" of Socialism stands on the basis of acceptance of shameful historical injustice. Socialist utopia promised perfect social justice, but it was always a delayed utopia for future generations. Socialist belief in "progress" implies that only future generations are supposed to enjoy all the benefits of future utopia, whereas current and past generations should accept without complaint the role of passive victims of progress. The exclusion of all previous generations from the realm of socialist utopia – this is the fatal weakness of socialist justice in regard to temporality. The only possible alternative to this undesirable situation in which the dead are exploited in favor of the living, and those alive today are exploited in favor of those who will live later, - is to resurrect all those generations who had laid the foundation for future well-being and let them also enjoy the benefits of future socialism. If then, finally we could be able to eliminate discrimination between the living and dead, and establish social justice in time as well as in space with the help of technology that will make it possible to turn time into eternity.

What we see here is an extraordinary mixture of various elements from Christianity, occult doctrines, and Marxism. (or I am sure that this reminds some of you here of W. Benjamin's famous conception of "redemption") In this extremely radical version of the notion of justice, whether to view just another line of romantic fantasy or to find useful resources for the utopian political project – depends on our own perspective and choice. But I think, there can be at least two things that we can stat without hesitation.

The first: what we are dealing with here is a special type of social responsibility that emerged only when individuals became aware of their close and continuous link with civilization, with the humankind of past, present, and future. And this type of responsibility put a premium on the "fraternalism" which explicitly implies an unwillingness to separate the human of the present from the human of the past, as well as the destruction of all obstacles standing between people, so they could easily feel as one. Apparently echoing some of the more stupid versions of "Anthropocene" theory, this attitude seems to be much more radical: humans have to take responsibility not only for spatial axis of the climate, the planet, the solar system, and even the universe, but also for the temporal axis of the past, present, and future— we have to think about how to develop an "ethical relationship" to the temporality itself.

The second: In spite of the spectacular future images of all sorts of sci-fi novels and films, and apart from the fact that Russian cosmism certainly had an indirect impact on transhumanists today, now we are obviously facing an utter lack of futurological project. The future as a project, even

a romantically tinged project, has been simply lacking nowadays. Consequently, we are suffering from a crisis of the utopian imagination. As is well known to everybody, one of the few available therapeutic remedies for dealing with such situation is to working with the future inherited from the past. "Revisited" Russian cosmism today - one of such prescriptions lips for us.

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# Parallel Session 5

# The Notion of "Character" and the Changing Image of Language in Modern and Contemporary Language Research

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## 1. Introduction

Different imaginings of the relation of linguistic phenomena to the context influenced the course of scientific study of language since its modern beginnings in the early 20c. One of the pathways linguistics took on the way towards its professed goal of scientific rigor and universality was the path of de-contextualisation and and of narrowing the scope of investigation of linguistic phenomena. While de Saussure's (1916) posthumous "*Cours in General Linguistics* stresses the importance of the social context (cf. de Saussure's 1916/1966: 77-78), his schematized imagining of communication as decontextualized *les têtes parlantes* (ibid., p.11-12) seems to have prevailed for a long time in linguistic investigations (see Bourdieu 1991: 32ff, Hodge and Kress 1995: 15ff, Hasan 2009: 167ff for critique, and Čermák 1997 for a more complacent view).



**Fig. 1** "*Les têtes parlantes*" (from de Saussure 1966: 11-12)

Half a century later, Chomsky (1965) followed with his influential *Aspects of the theory of syntax,* for the sake of methodological expedience reducing the relevant context of the whole communication process to just a single, unilaterally talking head, that of an idealized "ideal speaker" and to the happenings within it (cf. Hasan ibid.: 168, Bourdieu ibid. for critique).

In both cases , the immediate result of the strict methodological framework with its limited scope of inquiry was that the newly produced knowledge in linguistic theory started expanding rapidly. At the same time, especially in the case of generative grammar, rather soon, the growth hit

the limits imposed by the methodology. According to M. Hashimoto, to name just one prominent researcher among many, he felt the potential of this approach being exhausted as early as the late 1960', and proceeded to do pioneering work on his subject, Sinitic languages and East Asian languages in the then new field of geographical typology (cf. Hashimoto 1981: 7-8). It seems that a great number of linguists in the 'West' were realizing that without taking into account the context in which language phenomena actually occur, further profound insights were impossible.

On the other hand, it was perhaps the social upheaval in Russia at the beginning of 20c that provided the context which produced thinking about language, deeply embedded in the social matrix. Leaning on an older tradition, the original thinkers such as Bakhtin, Vološinov, and their circle were inspired by Humboldt's thinking rather than by de Saussure's, but finally went beyond both (Matejka 1973: 167-169). Concern with the social context of language was also very strong with Prague school (Mathesius, Vachek, Skalička, Jakobson among others, cf. Čermák 1995, Toman 1995) and London school with Firth, Halliday and others (cf. Halliday 1978: 27ff). Moreover, a great number of anthropologists and social scientists, such as Goffman and Bourdieu among others (cf. Giddens, 1989), also had a keen interest in language embedded in its social context. Interestingly, linguistics in Japan, evolving from a different philological tradition, also produced pioneering research concerning the language embedded in its verbal and social context, to mention just the outstanding contribution of the two forerunners of the text and discourse research in Japan, F. Minami (1974) on the structure of modern Japanese, profoundly involved with language in the social context, and his contemporary S. Hayashi (1973) and his work on sentence structure in the context of discourse.

The aim of this paper is to sketch the main aspects of how the imagining of language contributed to the scope of theoretical investigations of language, following the axis from Bakhtin's circle via Halliday's thinking in the framework of systemic functional linguistics, hopefully enriching it with insights of Braudel on the often misunderstood and neglected historical dimension, with perspective provided by Bourdieu's *habitus* and the insights of the recent "character" research in Japan. Finally, I propose an expanded schema of how individual, language and social context are connected.

## 2. Language in social context

### 2.1 Vološinov and Bakhtin: language embedded in society

M. M. Bakhtin, Vološinov and their circle, inspired by von Humboldt's view of language as activity, developed an approach focusing on language as verbal interaction, rejecting the language as system view as a mere theoretical construct. Here, I follow Vološinov's *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language* (MFL), often ascribed also to Bakhtin. Vološinov is definitely on the von Humbold's side, stressing the primacy of language as verbal interaction." (cf. Vološinov 1973: 94, Matejka Appendix 1 of MFL , p. 167-169). Vološinov clearly specifies the social nature of language:

1. Language as a stable system of normatively identical forms is merely a scientific abstraction, productive only in connection with certain particular practical and theoretical goals. This abstraction is not adequate to the concrete reality of language.

2. Language is a continuous generative process implemented in the social-verbal interaction of speakers.

3. The laws of the generative process of language are not at all the laws of individual psychology, but neither can they be divorced from the activity of speakers. The laws of language generation are sociological laws.

4. Linguistic creativity does not coincide with artistic creativity nor with any other type of specialized ideological creativity . . .

5. The structure of the utterance is a purely sociological structure. The utterance, as such, obtains between speakers. The individual speech act (in the strict sense of the word "individual") is *contradictio in adjecto*. (Vološinov 1973: 98)

The context of communication is viewed as being firmly social, to the extent that even the internal structure of utterance reflects it being a "*purely sociological structure*". This view is largely confirmed by Minami's (1974) pioneering analysis of Japanese sentence into four layers, the outmost two being closely connected with the social context of situation.

Vološinov's ideas were also further developed in the field of developmental psychology by Vygotsky (1962), stressing the role of the social nature of language in child's intellectual development.

Work of E. Goffman on every day conversation which started in 1950' with introduction of 'dramaturgical metaphor' influenced development of not only sociology but also ethnomethodology and discourse studies (cf. Goffmann 1956, Giddens 1989, Manning 1992). Thus, about 40 years after Vološinov sociologists and sociolinguists in the USA arrived at similar ideas. D. Hymes, for example, appealed for rethinking of linguistics from the point of view of "language as part of communicative conduct and social action" (Hymes 1972: 316).

### 2.2 Bourdieu's notion of *habitus*

Another important contribution to imagining of language is by Pierre Bourdieu, anthropologist and sociologist who's notion of *habitus* has profound implications also for linguistics (cf. Bourdieu 1991). Next is a sketch of some basic positions in Bourdieu's thought.

Bourdieu developed his notion of *habitus* out of the wish to go beyond the dichotomies of *social* and *individual,* of *subjectivism* and *objectivism,* to clarify how 'how the "outer" social and "inner" self help to shape each other' (cf. Maton 2012: 49). Thus, he developed his "theory of practice", with *habitus* as the one of its key concepts. What is particularly relevant for our argument here is that Bourdieu was critical about 'rational action theory' generalizations and idealizations and its teleological implications, especially in various theories of rational agent in economics and in the

rationalistic approaches proposed in the framework of the philosophy of language and pragmatics. He was particularly reserved about Austin's (1962) theory of performative utterances, the reason being that Austin's theory neglects social conditions enabling such utterances (cf. Bourdieu 1991: 73). In Bourdieu's reasoning, agents can act in a systematic way without rational premeditation (cf. Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 125) and the notion of *habitus* is introduced to explain how this is possible.

Bourdieu defined *habitus* in several versions, developing the notion through time. His later definition (Bourdieu 1990: 53) is given here:

> ...[S]ystems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as *structuring structures*, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the *operations* necessary in order to attain them. Objectively 'regulated' and 'regular' without being in any way the product of obedience to rules, they can be collectively orchestrated without being the product of the organizing action of a conductor.

The main characteristics of *habitus* can be recapitulated as follows. *Habitus* is a property of actors (individuals, groups, institutions); a **structure**, **structured** by one's past experiences; **structuring**, i.e., helping to shape one's present and future practices; it's nature is thus clearly dialectic in relation to practice. It is a set of **dispositions** (emphasis by the author). Here, the concept of "disposition" is presented in Bourdieu (1977: 214) as follows:

> ... *result of an organizing action*, with a meaning close to that of words such as structure; it also designates *a way of being, a habitual state* (especially of the body) and, in particular, a *predisposition, tendency*, p*ropensity* or *inclination*.

Further, "dispositions" constituting *habitus* are acquired through a gradual process of **inculcation** with the stressed importance of early childhood experiences). They are **structured** by one's past experiences, they are **durable**, **transposable**, i.e., acquired in one context but can be used elsewhere, and finally, **generative** (in the sense that they are generating practice). (see definition above and Bourdieu 1977: 85, 92ff).

*Habitus* does not act in vacuum. It is one of the components of Bourdieu's theory of practice, the other two being the **field** and the **capital**, i.e., one's position in the "field". *Habitus* is acquired and it operates in relation with one's current circumstances, the particular social space, i.e., the **field** (emphasis author's).

**Practice** in Bourdieu's framework consists of three components: *habitus* with capital and the field. Practices are the result of "an obscure and double relation" (cf. Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:

126), "*une relation inconsciente* (an unconscious relationship)" (cf. Bourdieu 1980: p. 119) between a *habitus* and a field.

A metaphor frequently used by Bourdieu to explain the "field" is that of a football field - with its proper rules of the game (practice) and different positions of players in it. The relation between the field and the *habitus* in Bourdieu's framework is reciprocal, dialectical. "On one side it is a relation of conditioning: the field structures the *habitus* ... On the other side, it is a relation of knowledge or cognitive construction. *Habitus* contributes to constituting the field as a meaningful world." (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 127). In Maton's words: "...the field, as part of the ongoing contexts in which we live, structures the *habitus*, while at the same time the *habitus* is the basis for actors' understanding of their lives, including the field" (Maton 2012: 51). Again, the dialectic nature of the relationship is stressed.

Finally, relation of *habitus* to language, i.e., linguistic *habitus* consists of a sub-set of language related dispositions constituting the whole *habitus*. Linguistic *habitus* has corporeal dimension. The way we speak, including our accent, intonation are revealing the social ccharacter of *habitus* at linguistic level (Bourdieu 1991: 17).

## 2.3 Braudel: insight from history

French historian, F. Braudel in his paper '*Histoire et sciences sociales: La longue durée*' (Braudel 1958), addressed to social scientists, anthropologists, psychologists, linguists etc., discusses distinction between two different ways of looking at historical phenomena, i.e., between "*histoire événementielle*" (history of events) and "*longue durée*" (long duration). The long duration view was conceived by Braudel working on problems of economic history in opposition to view provided by the history of events. These two notions thus imply two radically different views of time. One is "short time", i.e., time on the individuals' everyday life scale. The other is the time of "*longue durée*", the necessary framework for observing historical phenomena which evolve through long stretches of time. Contrary to the short time history of events, "*longue durée*" is also evolving in a way unconsciously, actors are not aware of the force lines which reveal themselves only through the longer perspective. With regard to linguistics, Braudel clearly identifies "*longue durée*" in language as its systemic aspect, both on collective level and individual level, thus corresponding to Bourdieu's linguistic *habitus*, operating at the unconscious level (ibid.: p. 745). In a way, Braudel is thus also a forerunner of the view of language as emergent phenomenon, implied in Bourdieu's *habitus,* and explicitly proposed by P. Hopper (1987) and others.

## 3. Language and social context in Systemic Functional Linguistics

One of the central tenets of Systemic functional linguistics (SFL) is that for scientific study of language, understanding the connection of the working of language in relation to the social processes is of utmost importance. It has been decisive in shaping SFL endeavors in language

research (cf. Hasan 2009: 166). Over the years, Halliday and his circle developed a consistent and revealing conception of the context of situation, deducing from it three contextual parameters, *mode, field* and *tenor*. These parameters were related to specific language variations(cf. Hasan 2009: 166-167). At the basis of this perspective on the social context of language is the view that it is discourse, the process aspect of language, which is central to language research, echoing Bakhtin and Vološinov (cf. Hasan 2009: 167). Linguistics as narrowly envisioned by de Saussure and Chomsky was unable to explain synchronic variation and diachronic change. To cope with this problem, it is necessary to include in language research both, the view of language as system, and language as process in specific social context (cf. Hasan 2009: 168).

The following schema, put forward by Halliday (1991/2007) and refined by Hasan (2009: 169), tries exactly this: to make explicit the connection of language, context of situation and system.

Note: Culture instantiated in situation, as system instantiated in text.
Culture realized in/construed by language; same relation as that holding between linguistic strata (semantics: lexicogrammar: phonology: phonetics).
Cultural domain and register are 'sub-systems': likeness viewed from 'system' end.
Situation type and text type are 'instance types': likeness viewed from 'instance' end.

**Fig. 2** SFL model of relationship between language and context (Hasan 2009: 169)

This schema envisions two aspects, *system* and *instance*, two levels, *context* and *language*, and four basic categories, *context of culture*, *context of situation* and *language as system* paired with *language as text*. The levels of *context* and *language* in the schema do not need a special comment. *Context of culture* is the systemic aspect of social context. *Context of situation* is the immediate social context of a particular communicating activity. In a similar way, *language as system* is the systemic aspect of language. *Language as text* is the processual aspect of language in particular communication activity (see Fig. 2).

These four categories, i.e., *context of culture*, *context of situation* and *language as system,* together with *language as text* are organized along two dimensions, vertically through the relation

of *realization* and horizontally through the relation of *instantiation.* Vertical relation, *realization,* connects two sets of notions. The first is the relation (i) between the *context of culture* and *language as system*. The second is the relation (ii) between the *context of situation* and *language as text*. Thus, in the doublet (i) *language as system* is realization of *context of culture*, in Hasan's (ibid.) words, "[c]ulture realized in/construed by language; same relation as that holding between linguistic strata (semantics: lexicogrammar: phonology: phonetics)." We can see the doublet (i) as the collective, systemic, i.e., structured, nonrandom, aspect. It is also corresponding to *longue durée* aspect of history in Braudel's (see above) terms. In Bourdieu's (1991) terms, context of culture would correspond to *institutions* (including both formal and informal systems in a particular society. This aspect is thus historical, systemic, collective aspect of the language related to context. Opposite to doublet (i) is realisationally related doublet (ii) , i.e., *context of situation* and *language as text*, the *instance* of (i), in Braudel's (ibid.) terms, belonging to particular, "short time span history of events" (Hasan's ibid. 169).

Seen along the horizontal axis, *system* and *instance* are connected by the relation of *instantiation*. In Hasan's (ibid. 169) words, "[i]nstantiation is the relationship between a potential and its instance". Thus, in doublet (iii), *context of culture* and *context of situation*, the former is the potential, the systemic aspect, and latter is an instance of that potential. Similar relationship pertains also in the doublet (iv), *language as system* and *language as text*: the former is again the potential, the systemic aspect and the latter is an instance of this potential at the level of language. Hasan elaborates further: "There exists a dialectic between language system and language use: the system furnishes resources towards the formation and interpretation of the process, and the process furnishes resources towards the system's maintenance, innovation, and change…[T]he recognition of the instantiation relation opens a legitimate avenue for the description of practices that contribute to language maintenance, the two faces of which in a living language are stability and change, regularity and variation." (Hasan, ibid. 170-171). This observation in the framework of SFL resonates well with Bourdieu's view of *habitus* and its formation (cf. "structuring structures").

Hasan stresses that the difference between the system and its instance is the time depth. According to Hasan (ibid. 169), instance is 'immediate and experienced', while system, being the **'ultimate point of the theorization'**, is shaped based on 'significant properties of instances'. This view evokes Braudel's distinction between history of events and *long durée.* But while *instance* is indeed belonging to the history of events, the conception of *system* differs from *long durée* in as much as it is conceived as theoretical construct.

*Cultural domain* and *register* are respective subdomains of the *system of culture* and language as system, covering variation: different cultural domains are associated with different registers. Discussing properties of *register*, Hasan (ibid. 171), evokes Bourdieu, stressing the centrality of register in the life of speaker and his/her social positioning, and by extension, in the community, pointing out that register is actually what Bourdieu is calling 'structured structuring structures'. On the instantiation side, *situation type* and *text type* are types of particular configurations of instances

of *context of situation* and *language as text,* belonging to some *cultural domain* and its associated *register*. (cf. Hasan, ibid. 169)

## 4. Character research in Japan

SFL model of language in relation to the context of situation discussed in the previous section puts stress on the general relationship between the *system* and *instance,* while the nature of individual's knowledge of system, both as *context of culture* and as *language as system* is not elaborated. This matters in the case that is topic of this section. Since about year 2000 Japan has seen a new type of research, focused on actual data from popular literary genres, including *manga* (comic strips), language used in social media and live TV shows. The central notion of this new wave of research is "character" (cf. Sadanobu 2015, Sadanobu 2011). "Character" is revealed in individual's interaction with its immediate context of situation, and used as explanatory principle to explain particularities of such interactions. Another perspective, embodied in the notion of "role language", proposed by Kinsui (cf. Kinsui and Yamakido 2015) is concerned with language based representations of characters in fiction and everyday discourse. "Character" research, especially in Sadanobu's version, is focusing on individual characteristics, both linguistic and interactional, of particular "characters".

Being central to the issue discussed in this paper, a short outline of Sadanobu's "character" follows. Sadanobu distinguishes three types of 'character' (cf. Sadanobu 2015:10 ff): (i) *dramatis personae*, (ii) *kyarakuta* (character) in the every day sense, referring for example to the usage in *manga* and characterized by specific line art (cf. Sadanbou (2015:11). This is character employed for stereotypisation and identification of a drawn character in *manga* (comic strips) or *anime* (animated cartoons) and by extension, also for stereotyping of characters in everyday life. (iii) Character in Sadanobu's sense: *"character"* as a situation based embodied self. In Sadanobu's words: "The third type of character, put succinctly, is the situation-based self...I decided to use the word 'character' as my own specialized term to refer to this third type (Sadanobu 2015:13, see also Sadanobu 2011).

Sadanobu's motivation behind his notion of "character" is, as in Bourdieu's case, his skepticism towards 'rational action theory' (RAT). There are cases of speech acts that can not be explained by reason/logic based pragmatics alone, such as sudden switching from standard speech to one's home town dialect in a particularly stressful situation or a sudden patronizing attitude expressed in relation of an older woman towards a younger male colleague during a company trip (cf. Sadanobu 2015:19). Therefore teleological view of language use must be insufficient as an explanation (cf. Sadanobu (2015:15-21).

The notion of "character" is on purpose based on spontaneously evolved descriptive pre-theoretical notion developed in their everyday language usage by Japanese speakers. Thus, "character" does not translate simply as 'character' in English everyday sense, even though

Sadanobu does translate it as "character" (with quotation marks) in his technical ('special') sense (c.f. Sadanobu, 2015:15).

It is also important to note here, what "character" is not. Firstly, it is not a personality (*jinkaku*), or a person (*jinbutu*). In traditional view, personality and person do not change, and if they do, it can be problematic - e.g. 'split personality'. Secondly, "character" is not style. Style changes, easily and the change of style is seen as intentional, based on rational choice, as for example in the case of polite speech (*keigo*) (cf. Sadanobu 2015:12-15). "Character" is best understood in its relation to the context of communication. Sadanobu sees it as a fulcrum (balancer) between inner and external pressures (cf. Sadanobu 2015:16).

A further property of "character" is that it is actually changeable, though perceived as unchangeable. On the other hand, it is important to stress that the change in "character" is not premeditated, intentional; it tends to spontaneously reveal itself via the relationship with a particular context (cf. Sadanobu 2015:12-15).

## 5. Theoretical stance and convergence of perceptions about language

### 5.1 Empirically based approaches to language

Basic insights of the "character" research share a lot with the approaches sketched in the preceding sections. The notion of "character" as not something an individual is conscious of apriori, but springing out of the reciprocal relationship of subject and the context of situation stresses the relational aspect of "character". Such conception of "character" resonates very well also with Vološinov's and Bakhtin's view of language as primarily interaction (cf. Vološinov 1973:130).

Further, is important to note that Sadanobu's intuitions about "character" share a lot with Bourdieu's thinking about *habitus*. Both sprung from scepticism concerning the RAT as the basis of human practice, both stress the embodied nature of "knowledge" as the unconscious guide of human practice.To my understanding, at the level of a particular individual, "character" can be considered very similar to a semi-permanent subset of *habitus* (cf. Bekeš 2018 for a more detailed discussion).

Last but not least, "character" research reveals a lacking aspect of the SFL model: i.e., how to treat in this model the individual and on the particular aspect of intuitive systemic knowledge, which is the focus of "character" research.

### 5.2 Convergence

From the different approaches sketched here it can be seen that basic theoretical stance can have far-reaching consequences for the relevance of results produced by a particular approach.

Stress on abstraction as a methodological decision, i.e., separating language from the social context, as seen in the case of de Saussure and Chomsky, lead to a burst of important but limited insights about language.

Focus on language in its social context, i.e., on language as process, activity, interaction, on the other hand, led to similar basic insights, regardless of the discipline where the particular inquiry was initiated. Bakhtin, Vološinov and their circle starting from literary studies. In a way Bakhtin, Vološinov and their circle provided a wider framework which, when transmitted to the "West" in 1960' inspired language and literary research there. SFL approach having roots in anthropological investigations into language and society, was later inspired also by work of Bakhtin's circle. Bourdieu, having background in anthropology and sociology, arrived also at language and its relation to society (Bourdieu 1991). And last but not least, "character" research, wishing to understand certain aspects of language variety in the popular culture and social networks, became conscious of the importance of the social aspects of linguistic reality for adequate explanation of observed phenomena. All these approaches chose the view of language as interaction as their starting point. Convergence of the notions of Bourdieu's *habitus* and Sadanobu's "character", as astounding as it seems, is thus perhaps just a natural consequence of researchers' orientation towards their object of investigation, rather than towards apriori assumptions.

### 5.3 Expansion

Braudel's (1958) stress of the dual nature of history, *longue durée* and history of events, is also relevant more widely in humanities as he himself has pointed out already. This distinction is important for framing the acquisition of *habitus* and "character" as well as for the understanding of systemic nature of culture and language as a phenomenon and not only as an abstraction.

To conclude, based on insight by Bourdieu, Braudel and Sadanobu, in this section I propose an extension of the SFL schema (Fig. 2) to include, besides the collective systemic *longue durée* aspect also individual systemic *longue durée* aspect.

(i) In the SFL schema (Fig. 2), the conception of system as the 'ultimate point of the theorization' (Hasan 2009: 169) should be replaced with the conception of system in its phenomenological aspect, as a result of actual *longue durée* processes, i.e., the system as collectivity of institutionalised as well as implicit norms (Bourdieu 1990: 57), reflected in intuitive grasps of how to interact of individual members of community in the widest sense, connected and mutually influenced through their interaction.

(ii) The two aspects, envisioned by the model, *system* and *instance*, should be revised, to include besides the *system* in its collective aspect also the *system* in its individual aspect, that is, individual's particular intuition about the *system* both at the level of context and at the level of language, i.e., the *system* in its individual's, ontogenetic, i.e., *long durée* dimension, or, in other words, *habitus*, as the third member of the triad. Instantiation then actually happens between individual's *habitus* and particular context of situation.

The two levels, *context* and *language*, and four basic categories, *context of culture*, *context of situation* and *language as system* paired with *language as text* remain the same.

The result, is presented in Fig. 3 below.

```
collective - longue durée          individual - événements
collective - historical            individual - particular
SYSTEM                             INSTANCE
context                            context
of culture        (instantiation as short-cut)        of situation

r
e
a
l
i
z
a
t                        habitus
i
o
n

language                           language
as system                          as text

                    linguistic habitus
                    individual-historical
                    individual - longue durée
```

Fig. 3 Integrated expanded schema of language and context relationship

In light of this proposal, the original schema in (Fig.2 can be seen as a kind of methodological short hand, linking directly collective/systemic and individual aspects of a more complex relationship presented in Fig. 3.

## 6. Conslusion

In my paper I tried to present the shifting of the image of language and its relation to social context, as an aspect of "The Human Image in a Changing World".

The notion of "character" developed by Sadanobu, by its partial converging towards Bourdieu's *habitus*, in spite of both approaches stemming from totally different theoretical backgrounds, and from totally different points in this changing world, provided a final motivation for the integration of insights ranging from Bakhtin's circle, via SFL, Bourdieu and Braudel to Sadanobu into a proposal for an expanded imagining of relationship between language and its social context.

The expanded schema can serve to put focus on the relation of collective systemic aspect and individual systemic aspect of language in society. More generally, it can thus hopefully contribute to interdisciplinary and cross/disciplinary study of language and society regardless of the starting point of particular inquiry.

## Acknowledgements

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# The Correlation between Languages and Human Images: Identity Crisis in the 4th Industrial Revolution Age from an AI Perspective[1]

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## Preface

As humans are what humans eat, humans are what humans speak. On this premise, AI can presuppose that the human languages are relevant to their images, since a language is a well-reflected form of cultural identity. In this respect, humans can also make a presumption that human images have something to do with human languages so that the change of human identity is directly related to the change of human image.

Above all, a way of thinking embedded in the human languages is supposed to be transplanted into AI, as humans are what humans think, AIs are what humans think, particularly when the 4th Industrial Revolution Age is expected to flourish in the near future.

To my surprise, humans are in a state of being unable to overcome the fundamental premise that it is impossible for them to think about humanities without their languages, even though humans are aware of the limitations of the language usage.

## Research Purpose

The purpose of this research is to make humans admit the limitations of language usage in accounting for all the details and to find out whether foreign language adoption implies identity compromise or not. And how can humans justify this? Humans may assert that this trend is an example of adaptability rather than eclecticism.

Throughout the human history, new technology such as steam engine, electricity, and computer linked with the internet has brought with new terminology. Especially in the Information Age, most countries tend to use the foreign language as a loanword in their own language usage.

For instance, both in Korean and Japanese language, the word of 'computer' is written as '컴퓨터' and 'コンピューター' respectively, whilst it is translated into 電算 [diànsuàn] in Chinese. In

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1. It seems impossible for me as a human to adopt an Artificial Intelligence's view. Nonetheless, I dare to attempt to play an AI here by trying to be as imaginative as possible, given that as we are what we think, AI is what humans think. I reckon that trying to be an AI means trying to be as objective as possible.

addition, the word of 'global' is translated into 全球 in Chinese, whilst it is written as '글로벌' and 'グ
ローバル' both in Korean and Japanese as each loanword.

**Main Questions**

This trend of adopting English terms as loanword is likely to be an outcome of "Westernization"
and recently so-called "globalization". From an AI viewpoint, it is interesting to observe that this
trend is more visible both in Korea and Japan, which are located in a peninsula and archipelago than
in China which belongs to a continent. In this respect, I would like to raise the following questions;
Does this trend mean flexible attitude for another culture or compromising way with human
identity? If it is more to do with humans' compromising manner, is it unsound or incompatible with
human norms? Which factors have affected this trend? Are they simply accepted in geopolitical or
cultural terms? If not, what are other factors?

## 1. Big Data and Human Images

Big data is one of the nine key jargons[2] in the 4th Industrial Revolution.



<Table 2> Source: https://goo.gl/images/ZxdqCV

The audience will watch this VOD for 53 seconds; https://tv.naver.com/v/461475/list/43235

According to the commentary, eyes are very good at seeing patterns[3]. It is said that human
images relate to vision and perception[4]. I agree with this view because humans can identify
nationalities by names through visual images, which means what they see. For instance, each
country has kept a unique pattern of naming persons. Such names with certain patterns give humans

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2. Industry 4.0 is a name given to the current trend of automation and data exchange in manufacturing technologies. It
includes cyber-physical systems, the Internet of things, cloud computing and cognitive computing. Industry 4.0 is
commonly referred to as the fourth industrial revolution. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Industry_4.0
3. 빅 데이터, 세상을 바꾸다. KBS TV 시사기획 창, 2015년 7월 15일 (Big Data Changes the World, Korean Broadcasting
System(KBS)'s Special Report Window, 17 July 2015 https://tv.naver.com/v/461475/list/43235
4. Conference on Representation: Relationship between Language and Image, June 1994 Edited By S Levialdi and C E
Bernardelli https://doi.org/10.1142/2289

clues to tell a specific nationality. Above all, it should be noted that both appearance and name are the two fundamental factors for identity and identification.

Here are player names of a national football squad. Can you identify the nationality by observing certain patterns of the family name?

Kasper HAMALAINEN

Anssi JAAKKOLA

Jukka RAITALA

Jere URONEN

Jesse JORONEN

Eero MARKKANEN

Sauli VAISANEN

Juha PIRINEN

Fredrik JENSEN

Jasse TUOMINEN

Sauli VÄISÄNEN

The answer is the Finnish national team for the 2018 Russia World Cup. The most distinctive feature of the Finnish family names is a word ending with "nen".And double-k appears in-between family name.

The following is another national football squad for the 2018 World Cup. Can you identify the nationality by observing certain patterns of the family name?

Karl-Johan Johnsson

Kristoffer Nordfeldt

Ludwig Augustinsson

Andreas Granqvist

Pontus Jansson

Viktor Claesson

Albin Ekdal

Oscar Hiljemark

Sebastian Larsson

Gustav Svensson

Marcus Berg

The answer is the Swedish national team. The most distinctive feature is family names, ending with sson, mark, and qvist.

The following is another European national squad for 2018 Fifa World Cup. It might be easier to

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tell its nationality than other countries because there is an obvious pattern in the family name.

Lovre Kalinic

Dominik Livakovic

Borna Barisic

Antonio Milic

Marcelo Brozovic

Mateo Kovacic

Luka Modric

Mario Pasalic

Ivan Perisic

Ivan Rakitic

Ante Rebic

Filip Bradaric

Andrej Kramaric

The answer is Croatian national team that ended up in second place. The most distinctive feature is family names, ending with ic. In fact, 13 players out of 23 have got the family name, ending with ic, which is a noteworthy pattern in telling the Croatian names.

The following three groups are from countries of East Asia. If you are from East Asian, you can easily identify the nationality by seeing and hearing the names. If you as a non-East Asian can distinguish all three nationalities by names, you are a globalized person.

| Dalei Wang | Kawashima Eiji | Jo Hyeon-Woo |
| Hanwen Deng | Nagatomo Yūto | Kim Seung-Gyu |
| Xiaoting Feng | Makino Tomoaki | Park Joo-Ho |
| Xuepeng Li | Sakai Hiroki | Lee Jae-Sung |
| Shenchao Wang | Ueda Naomichi | Kim Young-Gwon |
| Yongpo Wang | Honda Keisuke | Lee Seung-Woo |
| Linpeng Zhang | Kagawa Shinji | Jung Woo-Young |
| Xiaobin Zhang | Hasebe Makoto | Ki Sung-Yueng |
| Xizhe Zhang | | Moon Seon-Min |
| Yuning Zhang | | Son Heung-Min |
| Chiming Zhang | | Hwang Eou-Jo |

<Table 2>

In China, the three major family name of Li(李), Wang(王), Zhang (张), account for 22 % of the 1.4 billion population.[5]

The way of telling Japanese names are phonological. In other words, while Korean words consist of an initial consonant and a vowel or sometimes a consonant placed under a vowel, Japanese word does not have a final consonant under a vowel. It differs two languages phonologically.

Kim(김), Lee(이), Park(박) are the three major family names in Korea. They comprise 21%, 15%, and 8 % of the population respectively[6], which occupies 44 % of the total 50 million population.

## 2. Limitations of Language Usage

Jerry Kaplan points out the problems of language usage in connection with artificial intelligence in his book, mentioning like this:

> The questions we are wondering usually involve whether we associate the words of intelligence, thoughts, and feelings with the divine nature of man, or whether we can extend its applicability to a specific artifact. In this respect, language becomes an obstacle. With the advent of artificial intelligence, we must solve the problem of how to explain such situations, such as how computer devices perceive, reason, and perform complex actions.[7]

Images may be considered at three different levels: perceptual, mental and communicating.[8] I reckon that language works at all the three levels. At the perceptual level, language plays a role in describing the five sensations: visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory and tactile. At the mental level, philosophy and psychology cannot be explained without using words. And finally, at the communication level, a powerful tool of communication is obviously verbal and non-verbal languages.

In fact, there are only a few adjectives in describing the taste such as sweet, sour, acid, bitter, salty, plain, and spicy etc. Although there are so many different tastes, we stick to the above several words in describing the taste.

Humans use the gustatory vocabulary when discussing wine tasting. Wine tasting terms are limited to 40 descriptions. In fact, there are too many tastes of wines for words. The following show 11 descriptions out of 40 in the alphabetical order, only from A to C.[9]

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5. 중국의 가장 많은 성씨{China's biggest family names} http://www.laopengyou.xyz/63
6. 한국의 가장 많은 성씨{Korea's biggest family names} http://donidang.tistory.com/1988
7. 제리 카플란, <인공지능의 미래>, 한스미디어 2017,pp 150-151 (Jerry Kaplan, Artificial Intelligence: what Everyone needs to know, translated version into Korean. The author put the Korean version into English.
8. Conference on Representation: Relationship between Language and Image, June 1994 Edited By S Levialdi and C E Bernardelli https://doi.org/10.1142/2289
9. 40 Wine Descriptions Glossary https://winefolly.com/tutorial/40-wine-descriptions/

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**ACIDITY** Wines with high acidity taste tart and zesty. Red wines have more tart fruit characteristics (versus "sweet fruit"). White wines are often described with characteristics similar to lemon or lime juice.

**ANGULAR** An angular wine is like putting a triangle in your mouth – it hits you in specific places with high impact and not elsewhere. It's like getting punched in the arm in the same place over and over again. An angular wine also has high acidity.

**AUSTERE** This is a very unfriendly wine. It hits your mouth and then turns it inside out. It usually means the wine has very high acidity and very little fruit flavors. An austere wine is not fruit-forward nor opulent.

**BARNYARD** This means the wine smells like poo. It's never used anymore describing a wine, unless the wine writer is attempting to dig that wine an early grave.

**BIG** Big describes a wine with massive flavor in your mouth that takes up all sections of your mouth and tongue. A big wine is not necessarily a fruit-forward wine, it can also mean that it has big tannins.

**BRIGHT** Bright wines are higher in acidity and make your mouth water.

**BUTTERY** A wine with buttery characteristics has been aged in oak and generally is rich and flat (less Acidity). A buttery wine often has a cream-like texture that hits the middle of your tongue almost like oil (or butter) and has a smooth finish.

**CASSIS** The least fruit-like of all dark fruits. When writers mention cassis, they are often thinking of the seedy and gritty character of actual black currants. Homework assignment: try a black currant and report back.

**CHARCOAL** wine that is described as tasting like charcoal tastes gritty, it's usually dry (with higher tannins) and has this rustic flavor. Charcoal is often associated with a similar characteristic: pencil lead (but less refined).

**CHEWY TANNINS** When you take a sip of wine with chewy tannins, it dries out the interior of your mouth so that you "chew" or clean the tannins out of the insides of your mouth.

**CIGAR BOX** Cigar box flavors are hinting toward sweetness and cedar-wood with

an abundance of smoke. This is a super positive and desirable characteristic that wine writers love to use when they find a wine they wish they could just slowly sip on a leather chair.

It is not simple to find certain levels of compatibility between linguistic (verbal) descriptions and actual taste of wines. Nonetheless, humans tend to believe what words say. It is interesting that Northwestern University's research team has recently categorized human characters into four personality types[10]: average, reserved, self-centered, and role model.

The fact is that about 7.7 billion people inhabit this planet. Nonetheless, when researchers analyze and categorize people or things, they tend to simplify and generalize research results. It seems as if the Japanese and the Koreans were accustomed to categorizing characters according to only four blood types. It looks rather illogical that there are only 4 different personality types, whilst 40 different wine tastes exist. Human behaviors are more diverse and complicated than wines, aren't they?

## 3. The East Asian Way of Globalization in Neologism

### 3-1 A Comparative Approach of Three Nations: Korea, China, Japan

In some respects, Westernization was and is an equivalent for globalization in East Asia. One of the starting points of globalization (Westernization) in East Asia was the introduction of Christianity that brought it with the Bible. Therefore, for East Asians, it was a challenging task of translating the biblical names in their languages. In doing so, the characteristics of each language has been exposed, which means that the image of each language was revealed.

Here is one example. When it comes to translating God into local languages, the Chinese and the Japanese took the same approach by calling God 神 [shén] and 神 [かみ: kami] respectively. In consequence, they did not differentiate God from traditional gods in their own culture. However, it is noteworthy that God is translated into 하나님[hananim] in the Korean Protestantism while the Korean Catholic refers God to 하느님 [haneunim]. Likewise, there is a clear distinction between God in the Bible and the traditional gods in Korea by coining a neologism such as 하나님 and 하느님.

It is one of the reasons why the mission activity in Korea has relatively been successful, looking at the statistics of Christian proportion in the populations, even though the Western missionaries arrived in Korea later than China and Japan. The Christian proportion in Japan is less than 1 %, and

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10. Researchers led by Northwestern Engineering's Luis Amaral sifted through data from more than 1.5 million questionnaire respondents to find at least four distinct clusters of personality types exist — average, reserved, self-centered, and role model — challenging existing paradigms in psychology https://news.northwestern.edu/stories/2018/september/are-you-average-reserved-self-centered-or-a-role-model/

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in China, it is unofficially estimated about 38 million[11], whilst Korea 29 %.[12] In this respect, coining a neologism is regarded as a crucial part in terms of localization in mission activity.

The following shows how the five Apostles' names were localized in Korea, China, and Japan.

| English | Korean | Chinese | Japanese |
|---------|--------|---------|----------|
| Peter | 베드로 [bedro] | 彼得 [ bǐdé ] | ペトロ [petoro] |
| James | 야고보 [yagobo] | 雅各 [ yǎgè ] | ジェームズ [jeemuz] |
| Philip | 빌립 [billib] | 腓力 [ féilì ] | ビルリプ [birulipu] |
| Andrew | 안드레 [andre] | 安德列 [ āndéliè] | アンドレ [andore] |
| Simon | 시몬 [simon] | 西門 [Xīmén] | シモン [simon] |

<Table 3>

In terms of phonetics, the Korean method is closer to the original English pronunciation than the Japanese and Chinese ones.

As far as English-local language dictionary is concerned, humans tend to believe that translation is undoubtedly correct. By the way, the English word of ambition is translated into 야망(野望) in Korean, 雄心 in Chinese, and ねつい(熱意) in Japanese respectively.

Observing these differences, we can learn that there is no absolutely correct translation, because the process of translation itself is a filtering process to disseminate a specific knowledge. This process through the eyes of each culture forms a certain element of image-making. The problem is that such image-making can be interpreted as a prejudice due to the lack of understanding of a specific culture. The following is another instance of localization in English loanwords.

| English | Korean | Chinese | Japanese |
|---------|--------|---------|----------|
| Center | 센터 | 中心 [zhōngxīn] | センター. |
| Internet | 인터넷 | 因特网 [ yīntèwǎng ] | インターネット |
| Super market | 슈퍼마켓 | 超市 [ chāoshì] | スーパーストア |
| Oyster Sauce | 굴소스 | 蚝油 [háoyóu] | オイスター・ソース |
| Seatbelt | 안전벨트 | 安全带 [ānquándài] | シート・ベルト |
| Microwave | 전자레인지 | 微波 [wēibō] | マイクロウェーブ |

<Table 4>

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11. '성경 태우고 교회 폐쇄..' 中, 기독교 탄압 강화, 뉴스1코리아 2018.09.11 {Burning the Bible and Church Shutdown: China' Christianity Persecution, New1Korea, 11 Sept 2018} https://news.v.daum.net/v/20180911172623009
12. 한인 71%가 기독교, 신자 비율 한국의 2.5배 LA 중앙일보, 2014/08/13(Korean Christians in America 71%, 2.5 times as many Christians as in Korea, Joonagnilbo LA branch, 13 Aug 2014) http://cafe.daum.net/budda.usa/JJ6N/1215

To sum up, in terms of eclecticism, the Chinese method is more autonomous than the Korean and Japanese ones.

### 3-2 The ROK Method

In the name of globalization, some Korean big firms changed their names not only for domestic customers but also international customers like this:

럭키금성 (Lucky Goldstar) -> LG
선경 (Sun Kyeong) -> SK
제일제당 (Cheil Jedang) -> CJ
자연농원 -> Everland

Except for the Everland case, three companies' way of changing names is common: using the initials. By using the initials, they become easier to pronounce and remember than before. However, the corporate images as a Korean company have vanished.

In the past, the English movie titles used to be translated into Korean like this.

Gone with The Wind-> 바람과 함께 사라지다
Ten Commandments-> 십계
Westside Story-> 서방측 이야기
A Few Dollars More-> 석양의 건맨
Live and Let Die -> 007 사느냐 죽느냐
The Spy Who Loved Me-> 나를 사랑한 스파이

However, English movie titles are being advertised as they are written in English in Korea. The following are some examples:

위 워 솔져스 : We were soldiers
유주얼 서스펙트 : Usual Suspect
레전드 오브 조로 : Legend of Zoro
테이큰 : Taken
다키스트 아우어 : The Darkest Hour

If you have no knowledge on the English language, you do not know what the movie titles mean. In addition, I have witnessed that there are only English alphabet names at some international conferences, without writing them in Korean. Even the Korean baseball final tournaments are written only in English like "Korean Series". In addition, when Mr. Paulo Bento, a newly-appointed

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Portuguese head coach for the Korean football national team held an inaugural press conference, only the original full-name as Paulo Bento appeared without showing 파울루 벤투 in Korean like this:

It is regrettable not to consider that not all Koreans understand English. It seems that it is impossible to reside in the Republic of Korea without understanding the English language. In this case, it is pointless to question whether this trend is eclecticism or not. It is simply a renunciation of the linguistic identity. This phenomenon should be regarded as a downside of globalization.

### 3-3 The DPRK Method

The following table shows how North Korean converted English words for food into its own Korean way.

| English | ROK | DPRK |
|---------|-----|------|
| Jam | 잼 | 단졸임 |
| Juice | 주스 | 과일 단물 |
| Donuts | 도넛츠 | 가락지 빵 |
| Castella | 카스텔라 | 설기 과자 |
| Fried Egg | 계란/달걀 프라이 | 지닌 닭알 |
| Icecream | 아이스크림 | 얼음 보숭이 |
| Caramel | 카라멜 | 기름 사탕 |

<Table 5>

In addition, the following table also shows how North Korea translated English words into the Korean language.

| Curtain | 커튼 | 창가림 |
|---|---|---|
| Apartment | 아파트 | 다층살림집 |
| Shampoo | 샴푸 | 머리 비누 |
| Taxi | 택시 | 발바리차 |
| Napkin | 네프킨 | 주둥이 행주 |
| Knock | 노크 | 손기척 |
| Elevator | 엘리베이터 | 전기 사다리 |
| Escalator | 에스칼레이터 | 계단 승강기 |

<Table 6>

The background of DPRK's retaining the linguistic identity is because the North Korean regime has pursued "*Juche*(self-reliance) *ideology*"- 주체사상. As an action plan, the North Koreans abolished the use of Chinese characters since 1963. Furthermore, since DPRK has regarded English as a language of the American imperialists, it was keen on finding a replacement of Korean language for English words.

The Demilitarized Military Zone (DMZ) along the border between ROK and DPRK was a result of the Armistice Agreement in 1953. As the DMZ area has been an off-limits area, it is ecologically valuable. In the similar context, even though DPRK has been under a strict dictatorial control throughout the three generations of the Kim dynasty, the identity of the Korean language has been well-kept without a compromise.

In these respect, the North Koreans are much keener on retaining their identity by adhering to the local language usage than the Southern compatriots. On the whole, when it comes to English loanwords, the North Korean approach of sustaining the linguistic identity is much stronger than South Korea and Japan.

## 4. The Importance of English in ROK

Why is English too important (to be disregarded) in the Republic of Korea? It is time to examine the socio-political background of the English status in the ROK.

In the beginning, the importance of English in the daily Korean life was due to the US troops stationed in the Southern part of the Korean peninsula after the truce of the Korean War (1950-1953). The US military bases played an important role for local job seekers who could command English. Above all, during the ROK army's dispatch to Vietnam (1965- 1973), it helped to revive the Korean economy. After all, English mastery to the Korean soldiers and officers was a crucial factor to operate and work with the US army on the Vietnamese soil.

The post-war generations who were educated mainly in the US, have formed a mainstream of the Korean academia, especially in the 1980s. Of course, they are good at English mastery. When giving

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lectures, it is a common trend that they combine English terminologies with the local language.

In addition, English has also become a symbol of well-educated Korean youngsters. It is mainly due to the fact that early overseas education to English-speaking countries, mainly to the US has been a boom amongst upper-middle class families since the early 1990s. In that sense, in the ROK, Americanization means globalization. However, some Koreans do not seem to understand that Westernization and Americanization do not necessarily imply advancement.

Furthermore, since the Lee Myung Bak government (2008-2013) began to emphasize the English education too vigorously, the Korean society had to go through another turmoil, which was part of short-lived trials and errors. As a result, it has boosted the significance of English in the Information Age, discarding the linguistic identity. The problem was that there was no systemic approach to combine English with Korean. That is to say, it has proceeded in a compromising manner.

Such a rampant trend coincided with the emergence of the K-Pop since 2008. And the characteristics of the K-pop is distinctive that the lyrics of most songs are a mixture of Korean and English. As a matter of fact, since then, the Korean composers of the major entertainment companies have begun to collaborate with foreign composers and songwriters to appeal the global pop music lovers more.

A desirable method to sustain the intrinsic identity is not to use the loanwords as English words but to translate them into local languages. That is, localization is the answer as a retaining method of the linguistic identity. In this respect, the North Korean method is worth benchmarking.

## Conclusion

In the 4<sup>th</sup> Industrial Revolution Age, globalization together with digitalization look like an inevitable and overwhelming trend. In the aftermath of this trend, we face a new challenge so-called the clash of identity in the linguistic field between English and local language. One of the reasons why humanities researchers need to pay attention to these challenges is because it would affect the change of human images.

In this paper, I have attempted to correlate languages with human images by comparing four nations in East Asia. In doing so, I have presented readers the East Asian way of globalization through analyzing the characteristics of four countries' using English loanwords. I found out that geopolitical factors have affected the four countries in a different way and at a different degree.

In the end, I have come to a conclusion that both DPRK and China have been able to keep their language identities by converting the English words into each language in an original way, whilst ROK and Japan have shown compromising manners. It is interesting to note that DPRK and China have maintained closed and one-party system, whilst ROK and Japan has been under the multi-party system and both countries have been under the US troops' protection, which means "under the US nuclear umbrella".

If and when the Korean reunification takes place, it would be desirable for the Korean linguists to learn from the North Korean method to offset the existing indiscreet South Korean way of globalization if they are eager to retain the linguistic identity. For future generations, humanities researchers need to look into the features of current human images reflected in the languages of both Koreas.

With regard to this, my paper is intended to figure out how to overcome the identity crisis through analyzing the factors. At the same time, I would like to encourage linguists and scholars in the field of Oriental Studies to do their future research in a more interdisciplinary manner. It is hoped that this kind of linguistic approach would eventually help humans to redefine the ways in which humanities will be envisioned in the future.

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# People and Their Names

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In linguistics, the question of man is not central. Linguists can analyse what people say about themselves and others, but the other levels go beyond linguistics. I will focus on a purely linguistic element, but one that is also of interest to other disciplines: the proper name.

Being a person means having a proper name in all societies, we all have a name, and it can be seen as part of a person's identity. As one's image is also constructed by one's name, it is important to understand what a proper name is. However, the dominant theory in both philosophy and linguistics is problematic as it says our name is an empty label. If it is actually empty, there is nothing much to say. I will try to prove that it is not so simple.

In the two first chapters, we will analyse how the current theory was built, then we will see that it is perceived differently according to theories and fields. The fourth chapter will focus on today's situation, names prove that the world is changing, and the reactions can be very different, the far right in France has seized this subject and says that someone's need to have a French name to be French. This essentialism is a danger for our societies because it creates different types of human beings.

## 1. History of the semantics of proper names

Interdisciplinarity is an important issue for this conference. With regard to the semantics of proper names, interdisciplinarity here is a one-way street: the majority of the theories present in linguistics are in fact directly or indirectly derived from philosophers.

There is a tendency to begin the debate in the 19th century with John Stuart Mill, who explained that proper names have no connotation. His definition of this term is a personal one and does not correspond to what we call *connotation* today[1]. To summarize his thinking, we can say that all names are denotative since they are necessarily the name of something. But, some of them have another specificity:

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1. When Umberto Eco (1972: 90) wrote against Mill that names of unknown people connote but do not denote, he is not using the same definition of *connotation* as Mill. In Eco's definition, a connotation is an added meaning.

"The [common] name, therefore, is said to signify the subjects *directly*, the attributes *indirectly*; it *denotes* the subjects, and implies, or involves, or indicates, or as we shall see henceforth *connotes*, the attributes. It is a connotative name." (Mill, 1868: 32)

According to Mill, then, a proper name has no attributes and is not connotative. He used the image of a chalk mark on a house to talk about proper names: it distinguishes itself from others but has no form of meaning in isolation. Whether my name is *John*, *Paul* or *Ki-duk* has no relevance, these names are just labels on the individual I am and say nothing about who I am, they have no conceptual content. This marks an important change: for centuries, names had been seen as meaningful, but with Mill, they quickly became some kind of empty label. Medieval or even more ancient magical thought said that we can know who Paul is thanks to his name (which of course is not true); Mill held that the only thing we can know about him is that his name is *Paul* and not *Robert* or *Philipp*.

As early as the 19ᵗʰ century, philosophers opposed Mill's extreme position by saying that names could not be labels devoid of any conceptual content. For example, Mansel (1860) wrote that when I speak of Julius Caesar, I use a concept because I have never been able to meet this man: it is the idea I have of Julius Caesar that I am talking about, not the person directly.

This debate will continue to this day: does the proper name have a conceptual content? If so, what is it? In the 1970s, it leaned heavily towards one side after Saul Kripke's lectures were published. Kripke (1980) opposed all the theses that imply that there is some form of meaning in the proper name. He then claimed to be following Mill, even if what he proposed was different in substance from what Mill had written in the previous century: proper nouns are empty labels that belong to the category of rigid designators. If I say that the background between the two authors is different, it is because Mill was part of an anti-metaphysical lineage whereas the rigid designator is precisely a metaphysical concept: a rigid designator is an element that does not change from one world to another. Attributes can be changed by changing worlds, for example, Aristotle is a bearded philosopher in our world, but he could have been a hairless fisherman in another. Conversely, Aristotle could not have been someone else, just as gold cannot be another metal or a cat be another animal in another world. *Aristotle*, *gold* and *cat* are therefore rigid designators because they have an essence that cannot be modified, unlike attributes. It is doubtful that Mill would have accepted this thesis because of his anti-metaphysical positions.

The history of theories in linguistics has run parallel with philosophy. At the end of the 19th century, the first linguists to focus on proper names (Bréal, Sweet) tended to follow the idea that proper names should have a richer content than common names, because of their history, their sociological weight, etc. From the beginning of the 20ᵗʰ century, Mill's point of view would dominate: proper nouns had no definition, as evidenced by the fact that they do not appear in language dictionaries. Perhaps because they were generally considered semantically empty, there was very little work on proper names in linguistics before the 1980s. The renewed interest

corresponds chronologically to the spreading of Kripke's theses. The rigid designator has left its mark on researchers in all disciplines of the social sciences and humanities, so it is logical that it should have an influence in linguistics. The proper name has therefore become a "fashionable" subject, various books, textbooks and doctoral theses have been produced during recent years. The rigid designator seems to have become unquestionable, for instance, a French dictionary of language sciences no longer even defines the proper name, the entry refers to the article "rigid designator". The fact that the proper name is a rigid designator seems to be a truth of the same type as "the sun revolves around the earth" or "the whale is a mammal".

## 2. Identity and rigid designator

> Sam was not daunted, and he still eyed Strider dubiously. 'How do we know you are the Strider that Gandalf speaks about?' he demanded. […]
> 'But I *am* the real Strider, fortunately,' he said, looking down at them with his face softened by a sudden smile. 'I am Aragorn son of Arathorn; and if by life or death I can save you, I will.' (Tolkien, *The Lord of the Rings*)

The question of identity can sometimes be encapsulated, as in this excerpt, by a name. This is finally what we can understand from the rigid designator, all we have to remember about Aristotle is that his name is *Aristotle*. This interpretation of Kripke's theory is not entirely accurate, even if it is dominant in linguistics. As I said earlier, this is above all a metaphysical thesis.

Though Kripke wrote that proper names are rigid designators, he also admitted that "Aristotle might not have been called 'Aristotle'" (Kripke, 1980: 62). Names may change from one world to another and Aristotle could have been called something else, there is no law that lead someone to be called the way s/he is called. But, what is important for Kripke, it is that "it is not true that Aristotle might not have been Aristotle" (*Ibid.*). There is something unique that proves that Aristotle is Aristotle, and it is his genetic heritage. Tomberlin (2006 : 5) rightly describes Kripke's thought as *genetic essentialism*. The only important data in a person is finally who his/her parents are. Changing one's name is therefore useless as one empty label is replaced by another empty label.

If Umberto Eco (1988) criticized Kripke, it was ultimately on this definition of what it means to be a human being. If for Kripke, Aristotle is only the son of his parents, for Eco, Aristotle is above all the Greek philosopher of whom we know this and that. Aristotle is part of our encyclopaedia because he wrote the *Rhetoric* and was Plato's pupil, if he had been a fisherman, he would not be part of it and we would not talk about him today. Being the son of X and Y is not in itself a title of glory which ensure us our place in history. A name is important because it is linked to a particular work or action. Eco considers that a human being is in a way the sum of what s/he has produced, whereas for Kripke, all his/her productions are secondary, s/he is only a biological result. These two divergent conceptions, one culturalist and the other naturalist, can only be opposed. What is strange

is that a significant number of researchers in the humanities and social sciences have chosen the naturalist option.

## 3. Ethnological and sociological data

The main problem of the dominant theory is that it treats proper names only from a very Western point of view. When we say names cannot be changed, they are rigid designators, etc., we are only describing the Western world practice in name giving and the constraints of civil registration. We live in a world where the State wants us to have one, and only one, name for evident reasons though in other societies, it is normal to change his/her name according to stages in life (puberty, wedding, death of a parent, etc.). The rigid designator can be seen under such light as a philosophical translation of civil registration[2].

The societies described by ethnologists and anthropologists can be seen as very far from our practices, but do we really have only one name? From a legal point of view, we have just one name, but in reality we may have several names, like nicknames (these nicknames change, we generally do not receive the same when we are 2 and when we are 20), pseudonyms (especially on the Internet where they are a common practice) but also some of these strange items that anthropologists talk about like teknonyms. Teknonyms are names for an adult derived from that of a child. This may seem exotic, but when your child, for example *Paul*, is at kindergarten, you become "Paul's dad" or "Paul's mum", and this is exactly the definition of a teknonym.

In different situations, we (or other people) may use different names because we are not exactly the same person: in kindergarten, the centre of attention is the child, not the parents, so we become an appendix of this child. On a forum on the Internet, we are this or that character, we can be more flamboyant then we really are, a pseudonym is then quite normal. This is another metaphysical problem: is our identity unique (we are the same person in all our stages in life, so we do not need to see our name change) or do we change identity (which means we are finally different persons, a child, a teenager, an adult, etc.)? The idea of the pseudonym is coherent with the second view: as a writer for instance, Stendhal is a different person from Henri Beyle.

Even if we do not accept the second possibility and think our identity is unique, there are different ways to define this identity. From Kripke's point of view, our identity is limited to genetics. We have seen that Eco thinks it is rather the sum of what we have done in our life. This is also what the sociologist Dubet (2005) claims: he wrote that the individual is a self-production and his "essence" is a self-help work. There are no objective ways of defining it:

"We cannot *discover the nature of man* in the same way that we can detect the nature of physical things. Physical things may be described in terms of their objective properties,

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2. As John Humbley (personal communication) notes it, this is particularly the case in France; in common-law countries, it is much easier to change names, and only requires a "deed poll".

but man may be described and defined only in *terms of his consciousness." (Cassirer, 1944: 5)*

From the perspective of Lévi-Strauss, the proper name is an object of classification: it assigns a place in society. This idea is corroborated by linguists such as Frederick Denny (1987: 305), for whom the Hindu name should reflect the place of the bearer in the caste hierarchy. Vernier (1977: 35) showed that on the island of Karpathos in Greece, rich people bear surnames that evoke a prestigious ecclesiastic function (*Protopapas* which can be translated by *archpriest*), members of the middle-class bear patronyms formed from masculine first names (*Giorgakis* from *Giorgos*), and shepherds bear names formed from more or less ridiculous nicknames (*Drakos*, which means *ogre*). It is thus possible to place a person in one of these socio-economic categories simply by hearing his or her patronym. If some of these rich people bought their name in the past, it is because they have finally more than a symbolic value in this context.

Name giving is a very important act in most cultures as it anchors the child in the human society. The baptismal ritual generally coincides with the entry into the social group. According to the work of Alford (1988: 35), 60% of the societies studied give a first name to a child during the first nine days (only 13% at birth) and 4% of them wait at least 4 years before naming their children: in Central America, Cuna people are called *boy* or *girl* or have nicknames; girls are named at puberty and boys choose their name around the age of 10 (*ibid*.: 36). There are various reasons for the delay of the christening: babies are not necessarily seen as part of the society, or it can depend on beliefs (parents think that a nameless child will be left alone by demons). Though our practices in Western societies are different, the naming of a child is an important act for the parents, otherwise there would not be so many books about the subject.

As far as psychology is concerned, several studies defend the idea names can influence our behaviour. These studies are not always convincing (for example Pelham *et al.* 2002) but we may accept that, at some point, there is some form of stimulus. Other studies have shown that our name changes the perception of other people. A research lead in Israel has shown that "in math, the girls outscored the boys in the exam graded anonymously but the boys outscored the girls when graded by teachers who knew their names." (*New York Times*, 06/02/15). Valentine *et al.* talk about the surprise victory of the 1986 Illinois Democratic primary by adherents of Lyndon LaRouche:

> "The explanation favoured by journalists and the officials of the Democratic Party was that the victory of LaRouche's candidates was attributable to their names. The names of LaRouche's candidates (Mark Fairchild and Janice Hart) were attractive and familiar Anglo-Saxon names, while the names of their opponents (George Sangmeister and Aurelia Pucinski) were 'ethnic' names that might appeal to voters of German and Polish heritage only." (Valentine *et al.*, 1996: 12)

If some people ask for a name change (their reasons can be very different), it means they think a new name can change their life, in reality like in Karpathos, or in theory. Like the Johnny Cash song said, "Life ain't easy for a boy named Sue". A "wrong" name can be a handicap for a person.

In dehumanized worlds of science-fiction, people are only designated by a number: the social security number is much more individualizing than a classic proper name, yet we keep the classic name because it has an important symbolic weight: it is more or less a part of our identity.

From a more linguistic point of view, we can see that proper names can be used as emblems in politics or in literature, and do not necessarily need to refer to their former bearer, it is their symbolic charge that is called upon. For instance, all the people who use the name of *Che Guevara* do not always really know who he was, but this name has become a symbol of revolution and teenage anger. Some of these names may become common nouns (*Casanova* for a man who had had a lot of sexual relationships, *Quisling* for a traitor, *Einstein* for a genius or ironically for someone stupid, etc.).

## 4. Today's world

At the beginning of the 20th century, Charles Mercier (1912: 128) wrote against Mill that personal names give some information like nationality and they indicate whether we are dealing with a man or a woman: he said if he met someone called *John Jones*, he assumes this person is a Welsh man (on the contrary, a French or a Chinese person is not called *Smith*).

I personally defend the idea that proper names have some of these features, when we encounter new names, we try to analyze them and we can only analyze if there is something to be analyzed, like features about the gender or the origin of the person. For instance, many students thought the philosopher Hilary Putnam was a woman because, for them, *Hilary* is a female name. I have seen that the Korean people we were in contact with for WHF are using English first names: I have the feeling that they are doing so because other people cannot analyze Korean names, when I personally see a name like *Jae-in*, I know it is a Korean name but I do not know if it is a male or a female name.

We are not living in 1912, what Mercier said was true then, it is surely different nowadays: there are probably French persons named *Smith* and there are *John Jones* that are not Welsh. For a few decades now, it has been possible to see things like someone named Fujimori as the president of Peru, or someone named Sarkozy as the president of France. The most famous French football players have names that come from Poland (Kopa in the 1950's), Italy (Platini in the 1980's), Algeria (Zidane in the 1990's) or Cameroon (M'bappé nowadays). People move from one place to another and a typical German name can become a French name, an American name, a Brazilian

remain fixed in history. We are free to choose and change our names, through marriage, adoption, immigration or simply by personal choice. The first name informs at the time of the baptism (religious or secular), but as society evolves, we have the possibility of changing it, which makes it possible to escape a possible determinism. Our research has shown that determinism is not total. If we cannot choose our name or surname at birth (which can give the impression of being locked in a social and cultural determinism), we can fight against this state of affairs. We are therefore both socially conditioned by our name and able to free ourselves from it. And, if racists are obsessed with names, thinking that they tell the "truth" about people, and want to lock them into this determinism, we are able, in democratic countries, to fight against this type of behavior.

Politically, the analysis of the two presidential elections shows two possibilities, two visions of human beings. On the one hand, the idea that man is locked into communities (Republicans in the United States, far right in France), cultures and traditions, of which the name would be the marker: the individual is determined by his or her origins and cannot escape them. On the other hand, the idea that the human being is free from his or her determinisms, that he or she can free himself or herself from them to choose his or her own destiny: it is the conception of man that we find for example in existentialism.

Finally, from a strictly linguistic point of view, we can say that proper names have a meaning (and even several, as we have seen), but that this meaning only appears in discourse, in context. The proper name is not fixed, it evolves, it lives, and can connote a whole set of things according to the intention of the speaker. This is how a first name or a patronym can become an insult in the mouth of a racist.

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describe anything at all. It is not important that Aristotle did this or that because what is only important is that Aristotle is the son of his parents. There is surely a discrepancy between this theory and daily life: names mean something for us individually or socially.

The success of the rigid designator can be explained by several factors: since the beginning of the 20th century, it is usual to think names are meaningless (someone named *Butcher* does not need to be a butcher), but also philosophers and linguists tend to give only Western examples (*Plato*, *London*, etc.), proper names are seen as universals but they only see them from the Western point of view, there are other naming practices that are not taken into account. Even if Mr. Butcher is not a butcher, I can deduct some information like he is probably an English-speaking person. If I met him in Italy, I would rather try to speak to him in English than in Italian. Since Mill, researchers tend to think that *meaning* equals *intension*, which means that if there are no body of Christ in Corpus Christi (or a new castle in Newcastle), this city name is meaningless.

There are some forms of meaning in proper names (information about type, gender, origin, age perhaps), but as the world change, this indications also change. As Valentine *et al.* wrote, "social categorisation from the name seems to be more straightforward in less industrialised areas than in more industrialised ones. However, classifying people according to their ethnic origin often remains possible from their names." (1996: 18).

Anti-immigrant politicians play with these semantic traits and, in a way, try to stop this changing world we are living in. We are then confronted to a different type of essentialism: your name is rooting you in an identity from which it is difficult to get out. One's name only gives a few information, the rest stills need to be constructed. Like Eco said, we are rather the sum of what we did than an essence, and this sum is our place in society, we are not some kind of monad whose only links would be with our parents or with people who share our nationality.

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# Is Contemporary Technology Altering the Way
# We Imagine What It Means to be Human?

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We are concerned with three topics: human nature, appearances, and technology; and how they determine each other and what consequences they may have. But before discussing these determinations, something about each of the topics must be established. Let us agree provisionally to a few points that will permit our discussion to go forward.

The title refers to *contemporary* technology and by that is meant not only today's technology but technology that has a degree of autonomy such that devices minimally perform tasks without direct and immediate human control and possibly can perform original actions unbidden by human direction, so that devices can make, as it were, decisions, plans, value judgments, and other purposive behaviors that are not specifically programmed. Technology is not restricted to mechanical devices but includes systems and software. The seeming independence from human control is the salient characteristic bearing upon our question.

Appearances are understood in a broad sense without invoking any ontological position: they may or may not be real, but they are nonetheless informative. They occupy our conscious attitude and may be individual, even private, or shared. Appearances may lead to attitudes, beliefs, and opinions. Regardless of their ontological status, we live in a world of appearances; the phenomenal world is the world of appearances.

Human nature in this case refers mainly to what we think or believe it is to be human; it is whatever we believe it is that makes us human. There is not universal belief about what constitutes human nature, we shall consider only prominent examples. For instance, the belief that humans are created in the image of God; another that we are rational animals. Obviously some views of human nature may be more vulnerable to the influence of technology than others.

The question, "*Does technology alter how we imagine ourselves as humans?*" is asked in the context of these specifications. It is posed as a matter of comparison, how humanity has been imagined in the past compared to current, technology induced images of humanity.

Technology has always altered the way humans live, but contemporary digital technology - with its immense image-making power together with its growing capacity to perform, often without assistance, even very sophisticated actions displacing humans, or rendering human action either

redundant or ineffectual, suggests a new status for humanity in the world. Both our appearance and representations of our appearance can be fundamentally altered; the effectiveness of our performance and even the perceived value of our actions in fields as diverse as the arts, financial accounting, medicine as well as the numerous jobs that require a high level of manual dexterity, may now be measured against digital devices. Masahiro Mori's "uncanny valley" phenomenon now less often characterizes the response to surrogate robotic devices that possess human features. Is this phenomenon perhaps due to a greater acceptance of machines as in some way part of the human community? [1]

On one level this is an empirical question, and as such is fairly routine and unremarkable. One only needs, for example, to look at portraits through history to see how humans have represented themselves in visual images. Features such as dress and hairstyle, reveal how external circumstances, including the technology of the day, change our appearances in the sense of how we present ourselves. For example, people will often pose themselves with something that connects them to the latest technology, an automobile, at an airport, in athletic attire or using a tool. We can fairly assume in such instances that the individuals imagine themselves as essentially revealed through the mediation of the associated technology: if a photo shows that I am a pilot sitting in the cockpit of a jetliner then I am someone different than a cowboy riding into the sunset. Or am I?

We understand at once that paintings and photographs, recordings in all media, capture us in a particular place and time, activity, mood, state of well-being, and so on. But we like to think of our identity as enduring through time and that I am the same person who is a pilot, perhaps a weekend cowboy, discerning economic analyst, amateur historian, talented pianist, furniture maker, ceramicist, fashion designer, gourmet chef, participant in marathons on every continent, devoted parent, and in numerous other ways that I appear to the world. In this list we see the emphasis vacillate among competing notions of human nature: homo sapiens, homo faber and homo picter. As Hans Jonas has argued,[2] image making not only indicates a facility to produce images, but also to recognize them as images. Images are not reproductions, exact replications, or complete recreations. Images always lack some features, or abstract from detail, and require imaginative power to perceive what an image represents.

If our proximity to technology says something about who we are *or* how we imagine who we are, we also imagine that we are more than that representation, rather that we can use technology, adapt to or create circumstances, i.e., present ourselves through external paraphernalia while not being reduced to that presentation. In a word we assert our freedom and ability to transcend all manner of circumstances.

But is contemporary technology challenging this assertion? Donna Harraway's question, "are

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1. "An Uncanny Mind: Masahiro Mori on the Uncanny Valley and Beyond", <u>IEEE Spectrum</u>: (https://spectrum.ieee.org/ automaton/robotics/humanoids/an-uncanny-mind-masahiro-mori-on-the-uncanny-valley).
2. Jonas, H., 1962a, Homo pictor and the Differentia of Man, <u>Social Research</u>, 29, pp. 201-220.

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we all cyborgs now?",[3] has been posed from several perspectives and an affirmative answer, depending upon degree or extent, is hard to dispute. The boundaries between human and machine are obviously and increasingly porous. So one way to pose our question might be,"Do we imagine what it means to be human, or what human capabilities are, essentially differently as cyborgs?" Is the physical closeness of mechanical or technological devices a difference that makes a difference in how we imagine ourselves? Let us explore this notion a bit.

The cyborg issue that we need to explore has to do with closeness, not merely or even in the sense of physical proximity, but rather in what we might regard as emotional closeness. In the 2013 hit movie "*Her*"[4] a lonely, separated and soon to be divorced office worker, Theodore Twombly, falls in love with the voice of his new and powerful operating system, Samantha, the name he has given to the artificial intelligence operating system (OS1). Setting aside Theodore Twombly's loneliness which is his purported motivating factor, let us reflect upon what this emotional connection might be in the context of image making. A need or a desire is insufficient to generate an ability and if Theodore's emotional connection is beyond desire we must ask what makes him capable of it. On this question, consider how Hans Jonas characterizes human image-making. According to his analysis, for a subject to make or behold images the ability to behold something *as* an *image* and not merely as an object is required; this ability, Jonas argues, includes the ability to produce an image which in turn implies the ability to perceive an inherent likeness. Which is to say, in the case of Theodore, if he designated the OS1 voice as a loving partner, he perceived in it a likeness or image of his own inner qualities.

The doctrine that humanity is created in the image of God offers a structural parallel: substantively God and humanity are unlike (eternal-temporal, infinite-finite), yet the doctrine proclaims that a likeness as an image does obtain and that mutual love is possible. Is it any more far-fetched to think that we are Godlike and that God loves us than it is for Theodore to believe Samantha is humanlike and that he can love her?

Let us now return to the question of need, set aside above. This time, rather than as a state of desire, let us consider need in purely practical terms, as something we actually need, although we may not acknowledge or even recognize the need. The following scenario suggests a bonding relationship on the part of a human with a robot in such circumstances.

The role we shall imagine, as in the film *Her*, is that of personal assistant, but in this case without any recognized emotional or romantic connotations. The term personal assistant has often been used to describe devices which were essentially for record keeping (appointments, expenses, etc.) even before the digital age when many of the functions were automated. The idea of *assistant* follows clearly from its function to store information ready at hand so that we do not ourselves need to keep it in mind. It assists us by making mundane but necessary tasks less burdensome. The common expression, "Let me write it down so that I don't have to remember it" meant consigning

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3. Harraway, D. (1991), "Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature", London: Free Association Books.
4. "Her" (2013), Writer, director: Spike Jonze; Starring: Joaquin Phoenix, Amy Adams, Scarlett Johansson.

an activity or responsibility to a device, relieving me of the effort, and assuring my reliable performance. With such consignments one becomes dependent on the personal assistant. The device was personal in the sense that it was presumed to be private, an extension of my private thoughts or plans, a place where I could confide them and perhaps even work them out without revealing them publically. The personal assistant helped us engage in the public space, but was not itself part of that space; we were strengthened in our ability to function in competitive situations. Technology development has allowed personal assistants to be more powerful in certain tasks than we typically are, by being faster, more reliable, more precise, and with more capacity for retention, eventually by orders of magnitude, than we are even as well trained and scrupulously attentive witnesses and participants in the affairs of life. Thus we are appreciative and increasingly dependent on our personal assistant.

The frequently reported phenomenon of feeling quite uncomfortable and to a degree anxious when one goes out having inadvertently forgotten one's smartphone at home is a testament to this kind of dependency. Ironically this kind of dependency is perceived as a greater degree of independence. Indeed, we depend or rely less upon our fellow human beings while we indenture ourselves to machines. What does it mean if we cannot calmly venture out without our devices, when we are not confident that we can act responsibly in ordinary situations, unless this device is close at hand? Are our smartphones now a definitive part of who we are, both individually and collectively? One observes how smartphones have been assimilated quite differently in different cultures. Although smartphone circuitry now is based upon the equivalent of a billion transistors – it is enormously complex and powerful, but we treat it more like a friend we can manipulate than a powerful machine controlling how we behave and feel in a myriad of circumstances.

These two narratives show humans voluntarily entering into a relationship with robots where the robots are imagined to be enough like humans to stand in for them. We routinely accept the ability of robots to perform manual tasks, including very sophisticated tasks such as surgery; we also allow that intelligent machinery can perform a range of intellectual tasks (mostly based on sensing and calculating) faster and more accurately than can humans; the third level of emotional surrogate now suggests the possibility of cyber-mechanical (artificial) persons.

## Can or do we imagine cyber-mechanical (artificial) persons as human?

The term robot originated in Karel Čapek's play, *Rossum's Universal Robots*, or *R.U.R.*, first produced in Europe in 1920 and the first use of the word as we know it today. The play *R.U.R.* tells the story of a company that uses the latest technology to mass-produce biomechanical workers, *robot* workers to perform all the work humans don't want to do. The word itself comes from the Slavonic term *robota*, meaning servitude, forced labor, or drudgery. Thus robots are biomechanical slaves, regarded as sub-humans. Their verisimilitude to humans notwithstanding, they were despised (the uncanny valley) but, in the play, they did not tolerate this subjugation and eventually

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rose up to overthrow their masters. The theme of the robot uprising is reminiscent of the stories of the Golem of Prague and Dr. Frankenstein's creation. Why is it that today's robots are not expected to rise up and are trusted not only to perform vital tasks, but to stand in as friends or companions?

It is obvious that today's robots are technically superior to previous generations. This is due to the advancement or improvement of the technology that creates and produces them. It is the technology deployed by humans that produces robots that are more agile, efficient, reliable and *intelligent* and therefore worthy of being entrusted with more responsibilities including, it seems, caregiver and companion. Robots are undergoing a process of emancipation, poised to enter human society as equals, liberated by their master, homo faber.

The irony is that robots may have (or soon will) have acquired the very ability that led humans to grant them their emancipation. If human nature is represented by a conjunction of *homo sapiens*, *homo faber* and *homo picter*, we have evidence to suggest that robots are joining us in the first two categories. What about image making?

In a certain way, not the way of humans, robots --if not think-- at least problem solve. Likewise, in a not entirely in a human way, they make things. We know that robots make paintings and in some sense create art, that is robot computers can produce images and can recognize the image of an individual as her likeness. Thus, in three dimensions that have been at various times, seen as hallmarks of the human condition (rational calculation, fabrication, and image making), robots *appear* to match or exceed the performative capabilities of humans. Is it this kind of performative excellence that endears many to robots?

There are at least two questions that are here tangled together: First, "Does such high performance reliability encourage us to accept the presence of robots as the managers of sometimes essential and crucial activities in our workplaces, homes and hospitals?" And, second, "Does their ubiquitous and dedicated occupation with our tasks lead us to see them as being like ourselves and even, perhaps, see ourselves as being like them?" The answer to the first question seems assuredly yes, but is that a sufficient or even necessary prerequisite to an affirmative answer to the second?

Let us explore two quite different types of relationship, both fostered in the imagination, and ask if either suggests an explanation for the apparent and growing acceptance of intelligent robots as possessing human-like if not actually human qualities.

In the first case we will consider the relationship between a domestic animal, whether a pet or not is unimportant, and in the second a hypothetical response to the portrayal of a *hero* in literature or the media.

An animal is the faithful companion and helpmate to a human who in some ways depends upon the animal. The animal may be a *beast of burden* carrying heavy loads or performing some other task requiring physical strength and stamina. Or perhaps it is a *seeing eye dog* responsible for the safety and well-being of a human with impaired vision traversing the streets of a busy city. Alternatively, it may be a *care pet* whose company and physical presence help to alleviate anxiety and fear in the experience of its charge. In all cases one is tempted to ask of the animal why its

behavior exhibits unwavering fidelity to the task and allegiance to the human dependent upon that fidelity? Maybe the adequate answer is no more than food and shelter, but it seems to be more than that. It is not uncommon to attribute those qualities, virtues, that would explain such faithful service in a human to the animal. In this case we see ourselves in the animal and either recognize or project human traits. But at the same time, we do not see the animal in us, i.e., we do not say "I am like that animal". Indeed, the opposition to Darwinian theories in some quarters is based upon the explicit rejection of the possibility that humanity can be properly understood in animal terms. Descartes' dualistic conception of human nature, with its notion of mathematics as the perfect language and *res cogitans* as the ultimate sign of humanity, asserts an unbridgeable difference between so called *rational man* and our companion animals. And so, while we may appreciate them greatly, we are amazed and pleased to see animals emulate our virtues, but not the other way around.

In the second case we imagine an individual who finds inspiration in the nobility or courage and compassion of a purely literary figure. We understand clearly that the admired being is an author's creation, i.e., artificial, yet we may nevertheless see artificial persons as someone to look up to, try to live like, and to a degree imitate; we may try to meet the standards of the hero who then becomes our ideal. Rather than seeing an animal as imitating our virtues, that is as an inferior human, the situation is reversed: we strive to achieve the virtues of the heroic literary figure.

Can today's sophisticated robots be models for us in the same sense that admirable literary figures can be? There are reasons to think they can. In the case of *modern* robots, they are being designed externally to resemble humans, even to the extent of representing sensors so that they look like friendly and trustworthy faces.[5] We have also given robots through fictional representation (in the movies, for example) human or near human narratives. Even when a robot character such as C3PO is puzzled by human attitudes, the puzzlement is presented in the form of an endearing human discourse. C3PO is at once guileless as well as cognitively superior and emotionally durable. These are traits that we can admire and easily relate to presented in the guise of a device made to look in certain essential ways like a person we feel innately we could trust.

Stepping beyond fiction our actual working exchanges with computing machines are conducted in languages that, unlike the Cartesian ideal or an exactly precise language of logic, contemporary programing languages are *ordinary* or *natural* and *intuitive*; when children learn to program computers they do so successfully in a format that is at once natural and intuitive. This makes it reasonably easy to imagine that you are communicating with a machine on your terms, especially when a programmed machine can follow a novel instruction the first time it is presented (unlike a dog who learns to follow instructions only through repetition).

Let us allow that our understanding of animal abilities is still an emerging science; the cognitive

5. According to NYU psychologists Jonathan Freeman and Erid Hehman, reporting their research in *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* (2015): "We can alter our facial features in ways that make us look more trustworthy … a face resembling a happy expression, with upturned eyebrows and an upward curving mouth, is likely to be seen as trustworthy …"

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and emotional capabilities of animals are being reassessed with the general result that we have grossly underestimated their linguistic and cognitive capacity in general; that we often do not recognize the kinds of emotions animals express, nor their social and familial ties; it is thus perhaps on the level of manual dexterity alone where humans and animal exhibit differences of kind. We might, at some point in the future, be more amazed at animal cognitive functioning and emotional functioning.

The examples mentioned suggest minimally a growing level of comfort and familiarity with technology based on experiences that perceive analogies between humans and (especially) digital devices. Such factors as quick responsiveness to instructions, untiring fidelity to tasks, predictability, and the uncanny capability to present machine actions in a frame that mimics human activity. The complexity of what is behind this face may not be comprehended, but in a lesson seemingly learned from Turing's rules for the *imitation game*, this is not thought to make much difference.

Is this a reasonable view of modern technology? Is our embrace of technology on this level changing the nature of human action in ways that we do not recognize? And if so, what do such changes portend for the future? Let us address these questions in the light of the analyses of Bruno Latour, Martin Heidegger, and finally Hans Jonas.

We begin with two quotes from Latour:

(1) Modernity is often defined in terms of humanism, either as a way of saluting the birth of 'man' or as a way of announcing his death. But this habit itself is modern, because it remains asymmetrical. It overlooks the simultaneous birth of 'nonhumanity' - things, or objects, or beasts - and the equally strange beginning of a crossed-out God, relegated to the sidelines. Modernity arises first from the conjoined creation of those three entities, and then from the masking of the conjoined birth and the separate treatment of the three communities while, underneath, hybrids continue to multiply as an effect of this separate treatment. *The double separation is what we have to reconstruct: the separation between humans and nonhumans on the one hand, and between what happens 'above' and what happens 'below' on the other.* [6]

(2) To understand techniques-technical means-and their place in the collective, we have to be as devious as the ant to which Daedalus attached his thread. … The straight lines of philosophy are of no use when it is the crooked labyrinth of machinery and machinations, of artifacts and *daedalia*, that we have to explore. To cut a hole at the apex of the shell and weave my thread, I need to define, in opposition to Heidegger what mediation means

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6. Latour, B., (1991), "*Nous n'avons jamais été , modernes; Essai d'anthropologie symétrique.*

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in the realm of techniques. For Heidegger a technology is never an instrument, a mere tool. Does that mean that technologies mediate action? No, because we have ourselves become instruments for no other end than instrumentality itself (Heidegger 1977). Man --there is no Woman in Heidegger-- is possessed by technology, and it is a complete illusion to believe that we can master it. we are, on the contrary, framed by this *Gestell* which is one way in which Being is unveiled. Is technology inferior to science and pure knowledge? No, because, for Heidegger, far from serving as applied science, technology dominates all, even the purely theoretical sciences. By rationalizing and stockpiling nature, science plays into the hands of technology, whose sole end is to rationalize and stockpile nature without end. Our modern destiny –technology-- appears to Heidegger radically different from *poesis*, the kind of "making" that ancient craftsmen knew how to achieve. Technology is unique, insuperable, omnipresent, superior, a monster born in our midst which has already devoured its unwitting midwives. But Heidegger is mistaken. I will try to show why by using a simple, well-known example to demonstrate the impossibility of speaking of any sort of mastery in our relations with nonhumans, including their supposed mastery over us.[7]

Latour conjoins humans and technological devices in collaborative networks. Modernity is a kind of acknowledgement of the conjunction of humans and non-humans (beasts and machines) while at the same time masking this unity. It is, he says, the masking that has led to the increasing appearance of hybrids. The human – machine (digital device) relationship is occurring together with the decline in modernity of human – divine relations. According to our hypothesis social robots are filling a role for humans similar in various respects to that of gods, particularly an omniscient, powerful and loving god.

In his critique of Heidegger, Latour denies that technology structures our experience and mediates or changes the intent of human action in ways that disable our control over the non-human entities (e.g., tools and machines) that we work with. He does this by an example that considers the meaning of the political slogan, "Guns don't kill, humans do" to show that the possession of a device like a gun is not a neutral tool that we choose to use in a certain fashion or not, but rather something with which we interact making it serve us at the same time that our range of possible action is constrained by its potential; we now inevitably enter into a relationship with socially contested tools like guns.

Whether one uses Latour's terms hybrid and actor networks, Donna Harroway's notion of the cyborg, or Don Ihde's discussions of the multiple types of possible relations between human and non-human technological devices, it would be difficult to sustain the notion of a human being as an autonomous free agent whose actions are disconnected from technology.

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7. Latour, B., (1999), "A Collective of Humans and Non-Humans", <u>Pandora's Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies.</u>

But Heidegger's approach is somewhat different. He does not deny, as Latour seems to imply, that technology is instrumental, but rather that its instrumentality, at least in the case of modern, scientific technology, is not what shapes its relationship to humans, nor what may fundamentally alter the nature of human action. In *Die Frage nach der Technik* Heidegger posits the ideal of a "free relation to technology".

His famous essay opens with these words:

> In what follows we shall be *questioning* concerning technology. Questioning builds a way. We would be advised, therefore, above all to pay heed to the way, and not to fix our attention on isolated sentences and topics. The way is a way of thinking. All ways of thinking, more or less perceptibly, lead through language in a manner that is extraordinary. We shall be questioning concerning *technology*, and in so doing we should like to prepare a free relationship to it. The relationship will be free if it opens our human existence to the essence of technology. When we can respond to this essence, we shall be able to experience the technological within its own bounds.[8]

Thus for Heidegger what is of concern is how technology relates to the way of being human, and that way is the way (in the special sense he means) of questioning, thinking and thanking. We are wrong if we think action assisted by modern technology is the same as *poesis* exemplified by that of a traditional craftsman. Heidegger's argument is that modern, calculative scientific reasoning is instrumental in ways that occlude our apprehension of the essence or pervasive nature of technology. It is for this reason that we are in danger of standing in an *unfree* relation to technology and in so doing loose our grounding relationship with nature. In the terms of our inquiry, if we imagine ourselves as essentially like robots, we have abrogated our nature to that of technology.

How might this be of practical concern? Is our willingness to treat or to imagine that we live in an equitable relationship with clever devices, devices that we rely upon, confide to, feign friendship with, a sign that our humanity is diminished? Of course we work with devices (tools, machines, expert and intelligent systems) and these devices shape the character of the work. In many cases they have become indispensable to us. For this let us turn again to Hans Jonas. In his essay, *Technology and Responsibility – Reflections on the New Tasks of Ethics*[9], he argues that particular features of modern technology, technology fortified by science, has altered the nature of human action such that the question of responsibility must be considered anew.

According to Jonas there are five ways in which modern technology has potentially or actually altered the nature of human action:

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8. Heidegger, M., (1977), "The Question Concerning Technology", p 3.
9. Jonas, H., (1973), "Technology and Responsibility – Reflections on the New Tasks of Ethics", <u>Social Research</u>, 40, pp 31 – 54.

1. Technology has advanced from tool to machine to automatic device. *Beyond human control.*

2. Technological processes are often not well understood and produce unanticipated consequences. *Degree of human ignorance due to complexity.*

3. Technology produces results disproportionate to human action. *Issue of overwhelming power; we can destroy the world with the simple push of a button.*

4. Technology may alter the environment permanently. *Our actions may be irreversible.*

5. Results of technology may manifest in the distant future. *Issue of the unknown and indefinite future beyond our concern.*

In a later work of his, *Das Prinzip Verantwortung,* Jonas argues that humankind has new and unprecedented responsibilities that follow immediately from our new and unprecedented power to change the world through technology.

When this new power is not simply contained in external devices, but becomes either an augmentation to our bodies, or through emotional bonds or intellectual dependency (often the case in our everyday use of computing devices), we find ourselves in relationships defined by one or more of the limitations recognized by Jonas which undermine our ability to recognize responsible action and therefore act responsibly.

If we through appreciation and needy dependence (Theodore Twombly) see machines as our redemptive future, we may be on the path that leads us to the dire state Stephen Hawking has warned of, the future where robotic artificial intelligence has finally displaced humanity, rendering us superfluous, and no longer at home in the world.[10]

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10. Hawking, S. (2014), "I fear that AI may replace humans altogether. If people design computer viruses, someone will design AI that replicates itself. This will be a new form of life that will outperform humans.

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# The Image of Humanity in the Age of Science

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## 1

Modern civilization created a very strong image of humanity, according to which we humans are the best in the world because we have language, intelligence, rationality, that have allowed us to develop science and technology in a marvelous way.

Among all the creatures on earth and in the oceans, which one do you think is capable of going to the Moon? Of course, only us. We are therefore the Lord of the world because we have highly developed science and technology.

However, the same science and technology we are boasting of have brought us a very bad image of ourselves as well. For we humans are the only animals capable of destroying natural environment, living species, eco-systems, even ourselves.

Look at the disasters caused by nuclear weapons only humans are capable of. We are inventing Artificial Intelligence whose technological singularity may be a menace to us in a near future(Y. N.Harari 2015). We are capable of enhancing our body and brain by a new chemistry. We are capable of making human clones. All these give us an inglorious image of ourselves.

Neuroscientists say the frontal lobe of human brain is such a developed part that no other animals have. It is sensitive, imaginative, and creative by excellence. However, they do not forget to add to this that it can also be violent and destructive, making us even commit crimes(Damasio 1994).

This means we are capable of everything good and bad. With highly developed science and technology, we can make the world extraordinarily happier, but also can we destroy it totally.

## 2

There was a time when mythologies and religions worked so well that we humans stayed modest vis-à-vis natural environment and the world. Our greed was restricted by religious authorities or mythological ideologies, and especially, our super-intelligence and high rationality were restrained from going too far(Bergson 1932). We were happy then even if imprisoned in cultural traditions or social conventions.

It is not difficult to imagine that we had rather a harmonious image of ourselves in those days.

Modern Age broke all those mythologies and religions down. Thence we began to feel free, to develop our intelligence and rationality as much as we wanted. However, this did not necessarily give us a glorious and victorious image of ourselves. On the contrary, since that moment of apparent victory and glory, we began to lose happiness and a stable and harmonious image of ourselves.

Scientific Revolution liberated us from religious or mythological stories of the world(Weinberg 2015), for sure, but we began thence to feel like orphans as well. Orphans are free, it is true, but they are helpless and hopeless.

We began to feel lonely. And in my view, it is this feeling of loneliness that has pushed us to make incessant progress in science and technology. Literature and arts have also been renewed by this particular feeling of loneliness. If Modern culture has a charm, it is because of its darkness and loneliness that humanity of other periods did not know.

What is more important to see though is the fact that the loneliness, the feeling of being cut off from the world, has led us to make incredible efforts to prove that we are divine, we are gods. We are obliged to worship ourselves today.

## 3

Perhaps some of you, seeing all this, may wonder if we have gone mad? If we were mad, we would have to accept it as our reality, and thus we would have a new image of ourselves: the one of malformed animals, crazy animals, who lost contact with the world, with Nature.

I do not think we are incurably ill, but I have the impression that we are neurotic, conflictive with ourselves, the proto-image of which is found in Hamlet. Shakespeare created a real modern character whose mind finds peace nowhere. Modern people are more or less Hamlet's sons and daughters, aren't we?

Perhaps you think all this happened only in the West, but nowhere else. I would say it happened and is happening all over the world. The Westernization of the world is everywhere, taking often the form of "modernization".

There have certainly been reactions against this globalizing movement of modernization. They are manifest in diverse forms. Socialistic or communist revolution is one. Ultra-nationalism is another. Terrorism can be viewed as another form. Deprived of traditional values, peoples all over the world feel the need to find a substitute. Unable to find a satisfactory one, becoming desperate, they cling to a fanatical ideology that may ruin everyone including themselves. Today we witness a lot of such people. The harmonious image of humanity is gone.

## 4

Generally speaking, modern science and technology are based on a mechanistic vision of the

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world. Owing to the great discoveries of physics and chemistry in the 19th and the 20th century, we have come to conceive the universe as a machine and ourselves as its tiny parts(Koestler 1978).

The same mechanistic vision has also led us to conceive each of us as a complex of tiny particles such as oxygen or carbon. In the end, modern science and technology have made us lose the classical image of ourselves as integral entities. Just at the moment we could have felt free from transcendent authorities, we found ourselves disintegrated.

We have been alarmed of the danger of our disintegration since a century ago. Let us not forget the harsh criticism of modern civilization put forward by Adorno and Horkheimer. Their *Dialectics of Enlightenment* shows Enlightenment that must have liberated us from obscurantism has become a religion for modern age and is destined to end as totalitarianism (Adorno/Horkheimer 1944). We should not forget the lesson they gave us.

One of the most important points of their critical work is the focus they put on the intimate relation between the mechanistic vision of universe brought by modern science and the emergence of nihilism that induced the coming of totalitarianism. To be sure, it was nihilism that actively or passively accepted homicidal or suicidal violence. Dostoevsky's novel *Demons*(1872) shows it quite well.

You might say the most enlightened societies did not fall into totalitarianism, and that only the societies that wanted to modernize themselves too hastily fell into it. However, no society has found a way to stop the devastating power of the mechanistic worldview that modern science and technology advanced. Let us recall the seemingly most emancipated societies consented in the use of nuclear weapons to exterminate their 'unenlightened' enemies. Needless to say, nuclear weapons are fruit of the mechanistic vision in question.

## 5

With all this I have said, however, I still have a hope. For I know there are more and more intellectual efforts to overcome the situation. I will mention two of the academics who tried to change the situation; one is Ilya Prigogine, a physicist, the other Claude Lévi-Strauss, an anthropologist. Both developed their innovative theories in 1950's. Each of them, from a different point of view, opened a new horizon on which science and humanities could walk hand in hand to prevent our destiny from a fatal tragedy.

To understand the theory of Prigogine, the Nobel Prize laureate in chemistry in 1977, we have to see the evolution of physical science before him. As you know, from Newton to Einstein, physics made enormous progress and the vision of the physical world changed considerably. However, there was one point in the vision that did not change: the timeless vision according to which what happened a million of years ago is happening now and will happen in the future as well. The universe is viewed as unchangeable. Physicists never took the passage of time seriously.

Now, Prigogine thought those timeless laws applied only to closed and balanced systems that were only a small part of the universe. As most of the existing systems were neither closed nor balanced, he concluded physicists chose only the closed and balanced systems they could explain with their theories. For example, the relation between the sun and the earth that the classical physics explains is stable and unchangeable, which means it is a timeless system. However, there are systems that change with the passage of time, an example of which is life. Life is instable and changeable as a system. The classical physics is unable to explain it because it does not take time in account(Prigogine/Stengers 1978).

Prigogine called the former type 'closed systems' while the latter 'open ones'. An open system is the one that exchanges matter and energy with another system; consequently, it is unable to keep stability or equilibrium.

Prigogine discovered the process of the self-organization of an open system the called 'dissipative'. 'Dissipative' because such a system has constant dissipation of energy. Prigogine found that despite the dissipation, the system that could lose order falling into chaos could recreate an order, a new structure.

The implication of this theory is enormous. It can apply not only to non-organic systems that he studied but especially to organic ones. In other words, biology, economy, sociology, even literature, could make use of it. No wonder if he organized a center for interdisciplinary studies in Brussels to develop various applications of his theory. There in the center, they are applying it to social studies and humanities as well as physics and chemistry.

As for the implication of the theory, himself said the following. "The incorporation of thermodynamic elements leads to new theoretical structures that take in account "time associated with irreversibility or even with history." There is no longer such a "geometrical parameter associated with motion" as was conceived in physics(Prigogine 1977).

The three terms he pronounced are very important: 'time' 'irreversibility' and 'history'. There we see the connecting point of science and humanities, for 'history' is surely a humanistic notion. Needless to say, history consists in telling a story, therefore making literature. Science and literature can thus be connected to each other.

Now, if time is irreversible, human history must be irreversible… Can we conclude from this that his view of the world is pessimistic? Not at all. His theory of self-organization of a system destined to disorder gives us a hope. For we humans who cannot help living in a system called society can be disintegrated with it, and yet the system could reorganize itself so that we could recover an order.

Of course, this does not mean we can recover the same order as we used to have; our identity is no longer the same. But just like life that continues, we continue, ending our individual life and giving birth to another one. Even if many cultures and civilizations together with social institutions disappear, human life will continue. Our image will then be not so disastrous.

Our second scholar, Claude Lévi-Strauss, is world-widely known as an anthropologist who focused on the fundamental structure of human organizations. As many have admitted, he was not a mere academic but a philosopher who had a vast knowledge of science as well as literature. As such, I believe he had an image of humans adapted to the Age of Science.

As an anthropologist, he saw humans as animals that have survived till now thanks to social systems they have made. Instead of "I think therefore I exist", he proposed "We exist therefore I think", obviously against the human-centered and individualistic vision of the traditional West(Lévi-Strauss, 1962).

He is often considered as an eloquent defender of the so-called primitives, but to be more exact, he saw all humans as 'savages' prompt to consider others as 'savages'. Besides, he saw all humans are thinkers who think in metaphors rather than in concepts, and that he considered the excess of conceptual logic that enabled the victory of mathematics and sciences as a danger that could bring about our death as a species. "Humans have to know their limitations to be able to live together with other species." That is his warning.

This vision of his surely came from his knowledge of science, literature and philosophy. But I have to add to this that he was one of the few who knew how to combine science, sociology and literature. He said some societies were 'cold' because of its low entropy; entropy is a thermodynamic measure for a system's loss of energy(Lévi-Strauss 1955).

Now, his image of humans is quite different from the one shared by most of the Western scholars of his time including Prigogine's we saw minutes before. Let us sum it up from the last chapter of Tristes Tropiques(1955).

First, he saw the existence of humans on earth would not last for good.

Second, he saw no social institution or civilization they have created could stop the world disintegration nor human extinction. On the contrary, those human efforts did nothing but joyful destruction of thousands of structures to pieces impossible to remount with.

Third, no creation of human spirit would go beyond the human world; it is destined to lose its order and disappear in the end. In short, all human products cannot avoid the influence of the classical thermodynamic law of 'entropy'; they will fade away sooner or later.

You may be surprised at the view he presented. It looks so pessimistic. I would say however he was not pessimistic but just realistic and scientific because it mostly came from his knowledge of biology, geology and archeology.

For sure, his view is far from Prigogine's that gives us hope by showing the possibility in a system of recreation of order after chaos. However, I would like to remind you that the French anthropologist witnessed not only Nazi genocide and Hiroshima Nagasaki A-bombs but also the general devastation of the southern hemisphere invaded and violated by modern civilizations(ibid.)

Some may say his view of the world is materialistic. In a Marxist sense of the word, yes. More

than once, he confessed Freud and Marx were two sources of his inspiration. However, I would like to add to this that his view was Buddhist. In Tristes Tropiques, he confessed all he had learned were just small parts of the results of Buddha's meditations. The image Lévi-Strauss held of humans and the universe we saw earlier just proves his Buddhist side.

You may wonder now what he recommends us to do to make the world better. To this, he answered saying the following:

> We should halt and examine the impulse that urges us to plug up one hole after another open in the wall of necessity. Otherwise, we would imprison ourselves in a shattered room"(ibid.)

What did he mean by 'halt'? To "bear to interrupt our hive-like labors" is his answer. In addition, he said the essence of our being might be glimpsed when we see "a mineral more beautiful than any human work", when we smell "the scent of a lily more subtly evolved than our books", or when we encounter the wink of an eye of a cat with whom we can exchange mutual forgiveness through an involuntary understanding."

Lévi-Strauss' spirit attained a height that is hard for us to follow. Let me propose then something easier for us. My proposal is that humanists should learn as much as possible from scientists and vice versa. It is time for us to establish interdisciplinary communication between the Two Cultures separated from each other for such a long time.

Of course, it will not make much contribution for the improvement of the world, I know. But it is better than nothing. We humanists should begin a dialogue with scientists. And scientists should listen more carefully to us.

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# Technology for Humanity: The Humanities and Social Sciences in the Age of the Fourth Industrial Revolution

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Advances in technology in the 21st century are profoundly reshaping the human landscape. Whether we prefer to describe this development as Industry 4.0, the 4th Industrial Revolution, or by other names, there is little doubt that the world is entering into a new era shaped by technology.

Although technology has been a part of human civilization from the beginning, its influence today is pervasive, affecting every aspect of human existence. The speed of technological change today, furthermore, is unprecedented, which amplifies the disruptive influence that technology always brings. We need not debate whether the moment of "singularity" will arrive in the near future. We only need to recognize that the convergence of the physical, digital, and biological worlds will bring about significant change, and that the impact of technology on society, and on the human condition at large, demands critical attention.

On the one hand, the 4th Industrial Revolution will generate ample opportunities for innovation that would benefit humankind. There is no denying that advances in such areas as artificial intelligence (AI), big data, robotics, personalized medicine, autonomous systems and renewable energy promise a better tomorrow. This list is certainly not exhaustive. Indeed, as global population continues to grow, and as many countries confront an ageing population, technological solutions will become increasingly important to human well-being.

However, on the other hand, technological change also brings forth formidable challenges to society and the environment. Technology not only may be misused intentionally—one only needs to think of the heightened concern about cyber security in this regard—but it may also lead to unintended consequences that are harmful to human beings. In a world that is increasingly reliant on technology, change will disrupt not only established socio-political and economic patterns, but also human relationships and values. The future of work is going to be quite different from what it is today. The future of learning also raises important questions—what does it mean to be an educated person in the age of artificial intelligence? In a future where human enhancement or augmentation becomes a matter of choice, and not just by necessity, and more generally in a world where the boundaries between human and machine intelligence become less distinct, there is a need, indeed, to reflect on the very meaning of being human in the age of the 4th Industrial Revolution.

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To focus attention on these issues, in my university we have recently established the NTU Institute of Science and Technology for Humanity (NISTH). NTU has considerable strength in engineering and science. It also has a new medical school, which is a joint venture with Imperial College London; a well-known business school; and a thriving College of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences, which is now the second largest college at NTU, after Engineering.

Within the College of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences, there are at present four Schools and a Graduate Centre. They are the School of Humanities; School of Social Sciences; School of Art, Design & Media; Wee Kim Wee School of Communication and Information; and the Nanyang Centre for Public Administration, which has been providing graduate and executive training for senior government officials from China and ASEAN for over two decades. NTU is also home to the National Institute of Education, and the Rajaratnam School of International Studies, which is recognized especially for its research into security issues. Interdisciplinarity may be said to be a hallmark of NTU education and research, especially in the College of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences.

The NTU Institute of Science & Technology for Humanity seeks to bring together academia, industry, government, and non-profit organizations in addressing the impact of technology on society, with the view of ensuring that technology serves its intended purpose, creating value for humanity. NISTH sets its sight not only on research and education, but also on thought leadership that bears on innovation and policy, as well as generating informed public discourse.

NTU has announced an ambitious Smart Campus plan, which aligns closely with Singapore's Smart Nation initiative. NISTH will leverage the strengths of NTU in technological innovation, as well as in social science research, education, and policy studies, and address the many challenges that invariably arise from the adoption of new technologies in society. Being at the leading edge of technological innovation may be a necessary condition for the development of a smart city, but it is certainly not a sufficient condition, for the smart city project is predicated on the ability to harness the power of technology in enhancing sustainable development and the flourishing of humanity, which depends on meeting other conditions.

Initially, as its main research focus, the Institute has identified three interdisciplinary areas that cut across different technology domains. These are 1) Responsible Innovation; 2) Governance and Leadership in the 4th Industrial Revolution; and 3) New Urban Asia.

The ethical implications of technology should not be an afterthought. The unenviable pattern of new technologies leading to new vulnerabilities and harmful side effects reflects serious shortcomings in the process of innovation itself. The idea of Responsible Innovation seeks to encode the human experience into the process of innovation and to ensure that innovation is responsive to real human needs. Technology firms are now working with designers, behavioural psychologists and cognitive neuroscientists to enhance technology use. The question is the extent to which ethical considerations can also be embedded in the algorithms that shape artificial intelligence. If they are built into the codes, how would they affect transparency and predictability

that are critical to the development of AI?

As both the range and speed of technological development escalate, governance of science and technology will also become increasingly complex and challenging. Inequality is likely to intensify, and technology alone will not be able to bring about the kind of future we wish to build. Negotiating between competing interests and balancing benefits and risks will be instrumental to sound governance that strengthens the foundation of sustainable and inclusive social development.

In addition, advances in AI and data analytics are transforming the processes of decision making itself. Whether in the public domain or the private sector, technology is redefining the very notion of informed judgment, strategic decision and leadership. This has implications for not only policy-making but also education, as the attributes and requisite skills of an educated person will also evolve with advances in technology. I will come back to this point shortly.

Technology is fast transforming the urban landscape of Asia. Autonomous vehicles, underground spaces, and smart city systems, to cite but some of the more conspicuous examples, will shape the urban environment in the not too distant future. Beyond infrastructure, how do human beings relate to one another and the environment, and the kind of community that will emerge as a result will need to be considered. If the influence of technology is pervasive, it may be prudent to recall that the word "influenza" shares the same root. Will the new urban Asia be highly stratified, or is it possible to infuse the web of human relationships now pervaded by technology with the kind of caring community spirit, or what is called in Singapore, "*kampong* spirit" that ensures social urban health in 21st-century Asia? Comparative studies of urban centres, whether metropolises or smaller cities, should shed light on the direction of change and development in urban Asia.

NISTH is an interdisciplinary hub and welcomes international collaboration. For this discussion, however, let me now conclude by offering some observations on one aspect of the multi-dimensional project of technology for humanity—that is, the future of learning, especially with reference to the Humanities and Social Sciences.

Today, we are familiar with the phrase, "technology-enhanced learning." Flipped classrooms and blended learning are no long a novelty. At NTU, for example, virtual reality, augmented reality, 3D printing and data analytics are transforming medical education, where students do not attend formal lectures and where technology-based interactive learning is the norm. This trend is going to accelerate, extending to all disciplines. It is perhaps not difficult to imagine that learning in the future may take place anytime and anywhere, where a personal knowledge assistant would be available at all times. However, the point is not so much the modes of learning, as the learning outcomes we seek to deliver.

The students coming into the university in the future will have grown up in a technology-pervasive environment, and the work environment they face after they graduate also will be very different. Innovation will take on an even more pivotal role as the main driving force of the future knowledge economy. The technology quotient of a person or population will likely correlate with their level of economic health. If this is a reasonable assumption, we will need to review the kinds

of habit and discipline of mind that we seek to inculcate in our students. A well-rounded education in the 21<sup>st</sup> century should enable them to navigate with confidence the technological domain. A good level of digital literacy will be required, regardless of their chosen concentration. For this reason, NTU has introduced digital literacy as a core subject for all our students. In this context, the Humanities and Social Sciences will need to reach out across disciplinary divides to ensure that the human experience is not neglected in the cultivation of literacy in the age of artificial intelligence and the 4<sup>th</sup> Industrial Revolution. In so doing, the Humanities and Social Sciences can then begin to assert its role in the shaping of the technology agenda.

The ability to acquire and create knowledge based on valid information and analysis is clearly important. Possessing the requisite skills for specific kinds of work is equally important. However, important as they may be, being educated goes beyond information processing and the acquisition of skills. Learning is also a process of socialization and personal growth, through which individuals learn to make judgments, build and nurture relationships, manage complexities, and assume responsibilities.

It seems clear that we do not wish to come to a stage where technology defines humanity. It cannot be assumed that the gain in technology quotient will lead to a corresponding increase in emotional intelligence. On the contrary, a deficit in the latter in the age of artificial intelligence cannot be ruled out, which will have significant potential impact on the social fabric.

The so-called "soft skills" have been emphasized in the current discourse on education, and rightly so. Whether in terms of critical thinking, communication, or the ability to work with people, they are obviously important. Ethical awareness and cross- cultural sensitivity are certainly also among the learning outcomes we would want to achieve. We may need to add or increase the measure of digital literacy as an ingredient into the broader literacy soup, but this does not mean that other ingredients can be displaced. As in cooking, the desired outcome depends on how well the different ingredients come together to form a well-balanced education.

Beyond the so-called soft skills, I think there is another point that needs to be made. If technology is measured by precision and efficiency, human cognitive and affective intelligence is more complex, as the social fabric of humanity is interwoven with threads of desire and relationships, which give the distinctive texture of both joy and suffering, nobility and baseness, and the rich interplay of yin and yang in human existence. These are not necessarily hard opposites, but rather more often than not a mix of both in varying measures and intensity, where we would find in one traces of the other. The Humanities and Social Sciences compel us to reflect on the bundled values that constitute the human algorithm. The Humanities and Social Sciences aim to deepen not only our understanding of history, culture, and society, nor do they merely act as custodians of tradition; rather, the kind of understanding we seek should lead to a deeper self-understanding. Perhaps even more so than the teaching of soft skills, this will continue to mark the value proposition of the Humanities and Social Sciences.

Shaping technology from within, the Humanities and Social Sciences will be in a stronger

position to help improve the human condition. This is not by eliminating inefficiency or imperfections, which would amount to reengineering the human condition by removing uniquely human characteristics, but by understanding human relationships and mediating between competing interests and values. The ability to weigh between efficiency and human value such as respect and empathy will be critical to future human development.

To meet the changing demands of learning, and this is the last point I will make, there may be a need to question the disciplinary boundaries that shape the Humanities and Social Sciences today. Academic disciplines are themselves artificial constructs, and some of them are in fact of recent provenance. Their growth and development are often shaped by financial and administrative considerations, by power concerns. Knowledge does not grow well in insularity, and disciplinary interests may not be conducive to cultivating a holistic critical imagination that is adept in managing not only innovation and disruption, but also the complexities of the human heart, as well as the network of relationships that define human existence. In the final analysis, technology for humanity should properly be the focus of the Humanities and Social Sciences in the 21$^{st}$ century.

# Homo Culturalis: The Protagonist of the 4ᵗʰ Industrial Revolution? - A Tale of Two Countries: Korea and Germany

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## Ⅰ. A Tale of Korea

### 1. Dream of 4ᵗʰ Industrial Revolution and Bitcoin Speculation

In 2016, the 4th Industrial Revolution suddenly came to Korea. Many events were held in regard to this revolution in various places. Books about the 4ᵗʰ Industrial Revolution were published. And the Davos Forum held in Switzerland in 2016 made the public aware of the arrival of the new revolution. However, in Korea, the entire society was stirred up in the whirlpool of the revolution. Even the political class, for which there is usually no day of rest due to the confrontation of different factions, reached an implicit agreement on the 4th Industrial Revolution. Politicians believed that our society is able to develop the national economy for the future only if we ride the wave of the 4th Industrial Revolution.

However, at the point when the 4th Industrial Revolution started, there was not really a revolution taken place, but a crazy storm. That is, massive speculation about cryptocurrency based on blockchain, which is identified as one of the core technologies of the 4th Industrial Revolution, spread out over the country. Not only that. Real estate speculation along with the so-called Bitcoin speculation polarized the country to the point of becoming a worry for the security of the national economy.

Bitcoin was actually born from the shock of the 2009 financial crisis. The exact developer of Bitcoin is still unknown. However, the intent behind developing Bitcoin has been publicly articulated to a certain degree. Bitcoin developers have identified the cause of the 2009 financial crisis as a structural problem of an economic system manipulated by international speculative capital in alliance with the neo-liberalism of the US government. Therefore Bitcoin seeks to decentralize the currency management system, which determines the actual flow of the economy, to become independent of state power through block chain technology. Then, it would be impossible for the coalescence of the state and capital power to manipulate the currency system. However, despite these good intentions, Bitcoin has had some malicious consequences. This malignant side

effect, especially in Korea, takes the form of a violent storm of money speculation.

What is more serious is that future generations, which will lead the future of the 4th Industrial Revolution, are being swept away by this speculative storm. Just prior to the Bitcoin speculation, the real estate speculation of the so-called gap investment affected future generations. Speculation is a fatal poison that spoils the national economy. The economy of speculation is a devil's play to push the greatest number of people into bankruptcy while delivering enormous income only to a very small number of investors. The fact that future generations, who will be responsible for the future of our economy in the process the 4th Industrial Revolution, are falling into this kind of demonic play amounts to a serious national crisis. But is this the fault of future generations? Are they the mutant generations destined to become addicted to speculation?

## 2. The Inhumane Economy and the Fourth Industrial Revolution

The Bitcoin speculative storm makes us realize: No matter how technology itself is designed technically to embody goodwill, technology alone does not result in goodwill. Rather, the good or bad will of technology is determined by the social-economic structure in which it is accepted and used. Therefore, the speculative storm that we are witnessing now reveals the pathology of the economic structure of Korea built by the old generation. Especially, the fact that the Bitcoin speculation storm is so extreme in Korea exposes how we educate our young and into what environment we put them. First of all, younger people are confined within the unfavorable polarization structure called Hell Korea. It is hard for them to find a job, and even if they do find one, they usually only receive a low wage. Recently, the new government has raised the minimum wage. But this measure also brought about the terrible consequences of taking away even jobs paid on an hourly basis from the economy. This reveals how bad and inhumane the economic system our country really is.

The skyrocketing rents are also another factor contributing to Korea's inhumane economic structure. Small self-employed people are forced to lease their own premises (business space), but high rents eventually force small businessmen to choose ways to reducing costs by paying low wages. Therefore, the economic structure of Korea works in such a way that the policy to protect the weak working class will eventually come back to the working class as the damage to lose even their low paid job. The more serious problem, however, is that even those who claim to be experts in the economy are not finding the cause of this bizarre side effect in our economic structure. Rather they allege that social policy itself is based on a fatal mistake. They maintain instead that the overflowing surplus of the wealthy will be transferred to the poor based on the logic of the free market. However, that there is no such trickle-down effect and in fact, sometimes even, rather a bubbling up, was clear in 2009 financial crisis.

Now we have to change our perspective on the problem. Adverse reactions The fact that the policy of protecting the weak, such as a rise in the minimum wage, results in the damage to the

weak, remind us that there is something wrong in our economic structure. In order for social policy to protect the weak, it is natural for higher income groups to bear the material and financial burden. However, a kind of predatory structure that takes away the income of the weak by transferring them back to the rich is at the heart of the Korean economy. And this inhumane economic structure drives everyone to speculation. "If you do not become a top income earner in society, this bizarre economic structure will continue to plunder you in the long run even if your income increases numerically." This painful experience encourages the delusion to want to become part of the upper-income bracket at once through speculation. And most of these delusions are connected with the obsession with real estate. We now see the owner of rental properties enjoys a more transcendent status than the creator of the earth, thus creating an economy in which the goal of life is to become an owner of building to rent.

## 3. Obsession with Real estate, Fear of Old Age Poverty, and the Delusion of Future Generations to Win an Astronomical Jackpot

The obsession with the real state is getting more and more intense due to the fear that lies behind the obsession. Most people in the South Korea suffer from the fear that they will be poor in old age. Korea has a very weak social safety net. Thus, if the elderly losing their labor power, they inevitably become poor. In order not experience such a tragedy in old age, individuals aspire to obtain a source of income that guarantees stable income without labor. The real estate leasing is an ideal fit. Therefore, everyone in the Republic of Korea tries to buy real estate despite the fact that this means taking out high loans, which in turn result in the rise of real estate prices, which again are responsible for rising rents. However, those who are already enjoying considerable wealth as a real estate owner are the top beneficiaries of this situation and accumulate more wealth by increasing the value of the properties they own as well as the rent income that they get from these properties.

On the other hand, people who are forced to be economically in the position of tenants must pay more and more of their income for rent. As a result, tenants fall into a vicious circle of poverty, where real income continues to decline even if nominal income increases. The only solution to overcome this kind of poverty is not hard work. Even if people borrow loans at high rates, they have to become involved in real estate speculation. Recently, however, a new means to break the cycle has emerged: people can dream of cracking an astronomical jackpot even if they are not involved in real estate. This is where virtual crypto currency comes in. In order to a building that can be rented out, people need to invest an astronomical amount of capital, an amount that young people who are just beginning their economic life cannot even dream of. Virtual crypto currency, on the other hand, is still at an early phase of its development, in which it is still possible to acquire holdings with a small investment. If people invest quickly in virtual crypto currency, they accumulate wealth at once.

In this way, young people living in the inhumanely functioning economic structure of Korea are captured in a situation from which it is difficult to escape. Even if they get a job and work diligently, they cannot afford housing. The government of the past, of course, presented young people with a solution to escape from this problem. That is, "do not work for a company, but instead crack the big jackpot through a start-up based on innovative technology." Then the former government admonished young people to live like the next Zuckerberg and gave them the delusion that such a jackpot would be the only way to have a pleasant life.

However, the development of innovative technologies is an achievement resulting from long-term efforts such as the continuous passion for the development of technology and the detailed study of the problem that the respective technology is trying to solve. The innovative development of technology can never happen like a lottery in a short time. Therefore, in the avaricious delusion of desiring to win the jackpot, the passion to develop innovative technology along with authenticity involved in finding meaning and value in life is lost; only the obsession with winning a jackpot remains. Anyone who dreams of a big jackpot will go mad looking for a way to make this happen. If the big jackpot is real estate, he will try his luck in real estate, and if it is in cryptocurrencies, he will try his luck there.

But people are not interested in how real estate and cryptocurrencies speculation will cause inevitable social side effects. Once you win the speculative game, the life of speculative capitalism is justified. In this way, many young people have become part of a new generation that considers their whole future to be merely about winning the jackpot.

But does the economy have to operate only in this way? We must ask this question in light of the 4th Industrial Revolution. Otherwise, the 4th Industrial Revolution will only exacerbate Korea's inhumane economy with cutting edge technologies. In this context, it is necessary to look at Germany, the country which is the actual epicenter of the 4th Industrial Revolution. In fact, the mecca of the development of the technology related to cryptocurrency is said to be Berlin, Germany. While, however, the investment in the technology in Germany is even higher than in Korea, the speculation on Bitcoin is much lower. Moreover, younger people in Germany are not faling into the Bitcoin trap as Koreans are. Why? This is because the economy structure there is different.

The economy of Germany is based on a philosophy that understands a human being not as a homo economicus, but as a homo culturalis, that is, as a being that creates meaning and value. According to Wilhelm Roepfke, one of the economists who established the theoretical foundation of the German economy after the Second World War, Germany's economy is aimed at creating a humane economy, in which human beings are cultural beings, i. e homo culturalis. From this point of view, it is necessary to look at the deep structure of the German economy, which has recently been recognized as a leading country in the 4th Industrial Revolution. This will help us determine how also the Korean economy should be transformed. But before turning to the situation in Germany, we should ask: Is man really a homo culturalis, not an economic animal?

Needless to say, medicine, brain science, and physiology have human beings as their research object. And today, these disciplines are showing a tendency to monopolize the truth about what humans are. However, in order to claim scientific objectivity, these sciences see human beings from a physical point of view, from the point of view of engineering or of evolution.

If the government, while relying on such sciences, plans a 4th Industrial Revolution from a physical point of view that regards humans as physical matter or physical bodies, what will happen? Perhaps that revolution will be a revolution treating humans as physical objects. Or what if the 4th Industrial Revolution is planned from the point of view of engineering, treating human being as machines? Such a revolution would mechanize man so that the world in which humans live is manufactured just like a factory. Or what if we pursue the 4th Industrial Revolution from the evolutionary perspective of human beings like animals? Then that revolution will manipulate the world of human beings, turning them into higher animals that exist only in order to survive while being driven by impulses. Accordingly, we must look back at the human being and ask again: What is a human being?

Unfortunately, even though we ourselves are human, we still do not know what a human being is. Accordingly, we see ourselves as physical objects, machines, or animals. However, as the philosopher Nietzsche observes, human beings live in unique way of life that cannot be found in other beings:

"If human beings have a clear sense of meaning to live, they endure any hardship." Is there any human who doubts this fact? In fact, humans do not eat, unlike animals, if the meaning of the life that they pursue can be achieved through starvation. Humans who endure such suffering sometimes fast to call attention to for the value of their own or others' freedom and to the protection of human rights. Or sometimes humans fast because of personal preference, for instance, to have, what they consider to be, a more beautiful body. Perhaps Nietzsche's words, if being transformed into the negative, will therefore dramatically shed light on the way human beings exist. Accordingly, we can transform Nietzsche's words as follows. "No matter how materially rich conditions of life are, if the meaning to live is not clear to man, he will die by himself." But is it really true? Maybe that sentences would seem to be no more than the logical wordplay of philosophers who are educated to utter such outrageous nonsense without sincerely deliberating the reality, in which human beings really live. Surprisingly, however, the real-world implications of this wordplay are corroborated by statistical indicators in some countries. Korea is the country which proves the Nietzschean words by statistical facts.

Among the statistical indicators describing the recent situation in Korea, there are some that deserve careful attention. For instance, the economy of Korea is today 300 times larger than 50 years ago. At that time, the per capita income was only $ 100, but this year it is close to $ 30,000. In addition, the average life expectancy in Korea is the highest in the OECD. But something un-

understandable is happening in in Korea as well. We can now eat much better and live much better than 50 years ago. At that time, we were materially very poor and the average life expectancy was less than 40% of that of the present time. But what is going on? Our country has more people who are taking their own life than ever; the number of suicide has exploded in comparison to the number 50 years ago. In fact, Korea is notorious for being the number one place in the OECD countries when it comes to suicide, and the number of annual suicides is reported to be around 15,000. Not only that. According to a survey conducted by a leading hospital in Korea, 7 million people are dreaming of suicide.

What do these indicators mean? The increase in life expectancy means that conditions for survival are dramatically improving. The fact that the economy has grown 300 times means that Korea enjoys material richness 300 times greater than it was 50 years ago. But why the explosive increase in suicides in spite of the dramatic improvement of the conditions of survival and the enormous growth of material abundance? If human beings are living beings like animals that just survive by living the life given to them, an increased number of suicides in times characterized by improved survival conditions and material abundance cannot be explained.

What comes to light here is that the way in which humans exist cannot be explained by the ingestion of necessary nutrients needed for survival or by the enjoyment of rich commodities. Human beings do not live like this, just keen on survival or material abundance. Then how do they live? The most obvious answer is that human beings, unlike physical objects and animals, create meaning and a value of life that always makes them live. When the life of a human cannot create meaning, and when it realizes that it is meaningless to live, human beings do not continue to live as human beings, even if they are biologically alive. For humans, cultural phenomena such as meaning, value, and achievement of purpose are crucial factors for living a human life. The human life is a cultural phenomenon of existence that creates meaning and value. Culture is what creates humans as humans. In one word, human is homo culturalis.

## Ⅱ. Tale of Germany

### 5. Germany's 4th Industrial Revolution: Homo Cuturalis and Social Market Economy

Now, given that we saw that a human being is a homo culturalis, let us take a closer look at the German economy relating to the 4th Industrial Revolution. To do so, we need to begin with some preliminary observations.

As already mentioned, Germany is the epicenter of the 4th Industrial Revolution. Unfortunately, however, the true purpose pursued by the Germans in articulating the vision of the 4th Industrial Revolution was concealed in the course of the market-oriented reception of it at the Davos Forum organized in 2016 by World Economic Forum, a marketing consulting company based in Switzerland. And Korea, which imported the 4th Industrial Revolution Declaration of the World

Economic Forum from the standpoint of an impatient, fast follower, viewed the revolution from the perspective of the market capital accumulation only. This leads to an understanding of the 4th Industrial Revolution shaped predominantly by benchmarking only the surface of the policies that Germany is carrying out. At the heart of the future vision of the 4th Industrial Revolution that Germany pursues, there is, in fact, the purpose of sustaining the social market economy. This is a humane cultural economy system that has been achieved through continuous efforts for over 60 years to rectify the painful mistakes of World War II that Germany made.

The social market economy is an ideology shared by most members of the German society. Its basic ideas were established by the alliance of the German Rightist Parties, CDU and CSU after the Second World War, and then it was approved by the leftist Social Democratic Party in 1959. The reason why the public support for the social market economy is so high is that its basic concept is not buried in a functional materialist economy view that sees man as an element attached to the economic system. Rather, the philosophical basis upon which it is based is humanitarianism, not material economism. In this economic philosophy, the economy must liberate humans from material poverty in order to promote their individual freedom as cultural beings and to realize social solidarity and peace. The founders of the social market economy make this point clear.

The people who created the concept of a social market economy are three: Alexander Rüstow, Wilhelm Röpke, and Alfred Müller-Armack. In his book "The Crisis of Modern Society," Röpke criticized the definition of "homo economicus" as "the wrong way of rationalism." (Wilhelm Röpke, Die Gesellschaftskrisis der Gegenwart, Eugen Rentsch, 1942; The Social Crisis of Our Time, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1950, p.53) Human image of homo economicus promotes a purely material and egoistic pursuit of profit and does not do justice to the complex motivational structure and multivariate anthropological basic structures. In addition, Röpke criticizes closely related scientism and technicism: He opposes quantitative and scientific thinking, the mathematization of economic and social policy, and an orientation towards the methods of the natural sciences. Man or society cannot be compared to a machine; there cannot be any natural scientific laws in relation to society. Röpke focuses his criticism on attempts to predict people's behavior mathematically in order to base their decisions on reliable economic models. Such an image of man is too mechanistic for him and thus not adequate for the nature of man. For Röpke, the measure of the economy was always man. The economy should, therefore, serve the people, not the other way around.

The social market economy attaches importance to the freedom of individuals as cultural individuals. This is the reason why the social market economy recognizes the free competitive market. Individuals as cultural beings have the right to choose their own material goods to be freed from poverty and to procure their livelihood through their own actions. And when this right is exercised, one of the conditions under which human freedom can be practiced as a cultural being, as homo culturalis is satisfied. The free competitive market is an effective mechanism for securing the rights of individuals. But it should be always stressed that Germany's social market economy prioritizes the human right of individual freedom in light of the fact that human beings are cultural

beings rather than in light of the goal of accumulating wealth through free competition. This is the reason why Walter Euken who also commited himself to the establishment of the social market economy emphasized: "Without freedom, without spontaneous self-activity, man is not 'man'". (Eucken 1948a, p. 73). Freedom is also closely linked to humanity, human dignity, and social justice, and there is a direct link between freedom and responsibility and the idea of liability (i.e., a unity of decision, responsibility and liability). For the most part, a three-dimensional form of responsibility is assumed: the responsibility of the individual for himself (personal responsibility), for the social environment (social responsibility for society) and for the natural environment.)

Germany, in particular, experienced trauma as a result of the totalitarian tyranny of Nazi-era fascism and the suppression of the centrally controlled economy of army capitalism (Rüstungskapitalismus). This painful historical experience led to an awareness of the structural social ills that lurk in German society. And this awareness developed into the pursuit of the common good: postwar German citizens should transform Germany into a country where human rights and individual freedoms are respected. Germany cannot allow a state-led planned economy or a socialist economy even if it is effective to distribute the national wealth evenly or to accumulate wealth if it undermines individual freedom or infringes on human rights. The procurement of material goods that can guarantee the freedom of individuals is a market economy in which the production and consumption of goods are achieved by freely participating and competing individuals.

However, on the other hand, the free competitive market has the inherent danger of undermining social cohesion through monopolization and the exploitation of the weak, which threatens another dimension of the human condition. If the market is left only to competition, not only will free economic competition fail due to the formation of monopolies of economic power, but the socio-cultural environment surrounding the market will also be polluted. Especially the monopoly of capital results in  dictatorial power. Therefore, the market order should be controlled by a socio-cultural policy besides the economic policy. It is necessary for the government to introduce a policy to institute the conditions to preserve all the advantages of the free competitive market in order for the advantages not to be eroded by its shortcomings. And these conditions act as devices to secure human social solidarity. One of the founders of the social market economy, Röpfke asserts: "The market is based on social solidarity, but social solidarity is not formed in the market." Such a device for securing social solidarity sets up a kind of seismic design device for the intrinsic catastrophic factors that can destroy the positive function of the free competitive market. The catastrophic factor of the free competitive market is that as the competition continues, there is a conflict between the group occupying the dominant position of the market through competition and the group suffering through the domination. And this conflict will escalate to the extent of a social rupture, which increases the risk of a trust collapse among the members of the society. When such conflicts are sharpened by bipolar confrontation, the crisis of the social culminates in a rupture. Unfortunately, the two groups, in which conflicts can collectively come to a head in modern society, are capital and labor, the two pillars that support the market economy. Capitalists and workers struggle with each

other in the market while they both adopt the market economy goal of making the market function. However, in the civil society that surrounds the market, especially in the democratic civil society, capitalists and workers are equal in that they are all citizens. And they have equal responsibilities and rights as citizens and must take responsibility for social solidarity and maintain and develop society from a democratic perspective.

However, this kind of civic solidarity can be transformed into a hostile relationship if the conflict of interests is not well coordinated in the free competitive market. In this case, the efficient operation of the free competitive market is hampered. In addition, if the conflict is transferred to society, this undermines social solidarity and eventually destroys societal capital like the trust among individuals who constitute society. The social market economy that is very sensitive to these problems recognizes the relationship between capital and labor as a key area of building societal capital. And it understands the importance of establishing trust in society as a whole by focusing on the formation of a culture in which the relationship between capital and labor can function as a social partnership.

## 6. Deeper Potential of the Fourth Industrial Revolution in Germany: Democratization of the Workplace

The place where capital and labor directly meet and conduct economic activities is the workplace. Therefore, the social market economy establishes the meaning of work based on humanism, thereby creating a social partnership culture in which capitalists and workers can trust each other as human beings. The social partnership created through the work culture of humanism is firmly practiced through a joint decision system that legally guarantees the participation of workers in business management in Germany. Social partnerships pervade into each company through this joint decision-making process. Almost all companies in Germany jointly decide on important matters related to business management, in particular on working conditions, based on this legal system. It should be emphasized that in the United States and the United Kingdom, the term social partnership is not only unfamiliar, but a matter between individuals, whereas it is legally institutionalized as a mechanism for producing social trust in Germany. Michael Fichter Ian Greer, "Sozialpartnerschaft als Gewerkschaftsstrategie - Beispiele aus 5 Ländern", WSI Mitteilungen 9/2003, 541.)

The humanistic workplace culture and joint decision-making system that practically implements it are closely related to the economic success of Germany while making a decisive contribution to maintaining the social confidence and peace of German civil society. This is evidenced by Germany's low level of labor-management conflicts in the international comparison. According to a recent survey of managers who are leading German companies, 80% of executives said that the joint decision-making system is contributing positively to the management of a company. Especially, in the time of economic crisis where economic growth slows down or grows backward,

the joint decision system becomes the mother of social resilience that overcomes the crisis by compromising mutual interests of capital and labor as partners of economic activity.

From the mid-2000s on, Germany pursued a plan to further develop its social market economy through advanced technologies. It then matured to become "Industrie 4.0" and kick-start today's 4th Industrial Revolution. The primary purpose of this 4th Industrial Revolution is to provide a smart facility that closely interacts with the highly skilled field knowledge as well as wisdom of German workers in order to enable the so-called "mass customization production system" with low manufacturing cost and quick production times. This new innovative production strategy "mass customization system" to generate a huge new demand is enough to draw the attention of the whole world. Especially China and Korea, which are still hungry for economic growth, are also keen to adapt this system by rapidly appropriating it. However, the intrinsic condition for implementing the system to function is overlooked. One should note that the system is able to be carried out only on the bedrock of a socio-culture, in which the individual consumer's tastes are freely expressed, as well as of a labor culture, in which the worker's wisdom that matured in the workplace is respected. And these two conditions may be only dreams that cannot be realized unless the social market economy, which promotes the democratization of civil society and the democratization of the workplace, is also adopted.

For this reason, Germany endeavors continuously to figure out how the introduction of smart facilities can evolve into the succession of the social market economy without undermining it in the current process of implementing the 4th Industrial Revolution. In particular, Germany is in the middle of the process of setting up policies through extensive citizen dialogue to prevent the smart facilities from betraying the intent of the original 4th Industrial Revolution. The result of this is the policy report published at the end of 2016.

## 7. Conclusion

Now, let's conclude. Through our discussion to compare the two countries, Korea and Germany, the following facts became clear. The deeper motivation behind Germany's Fourth Industrial Revolution is to promote the democratization of society and the workplace, making the relationship between human beings as working cultural beings a societal partnership for the purpose of succeeding and developing their social market economy based on democratic cooperation. This is the reason why Germany is now leading the 4th Industrial Revolution. In Germany, the liberty, creativity, and quality of human beings' life as homo culturalis are mutually promoted through participation and cooperation based on the humane relations of social members.

What we have to learn from Germany for the success of the Fourth Industrial Revolution is the necessity of adopting a humane backdrop to these technologies, not just this equipment manufacturing technology of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. As long as this humane backdrop is not adopted, the technology of the Fourth Industrial Revolution may still be copied, but this

copy cannot generate deeper power and persistence that is also inherent to the Fourth Industrial Revolution. If we understand the actual subject of the revolution only technically or economically, the Fourth Industrial Revolution will amount to an anti-humanistic revolution, in which human beings as homo culturalis fade away. Therefore, the Fourth Industrial Revolution should be redesigned from a cultural and humanistic point of view, based on the existential philosophy of humanity which understands human beings in their pursuing meaning and value as unique and ingenious beings.

Because each human beings as homo culturalis who is the subject of the Fourth Industrial Revolution is unique and miraculous as Hanna Arendt expressed, or each human being is the purpose in himself as Kant expressed, a culture should be formed in which each is respected by others as a partner. In Korea, however, the relationship between humans is structured unequally in every part of society. In this social structure, creativity cannot be expected to emerge through partnership, which is the actual driving force of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. Therefore, a cultural innovation to clean up the unequal human relationship is urgently needed in order for our society to become a place where different opinions are respected and acknowledged.

Especially in the capitalist economy, managers and workers are the main axes of conflict. However, the long-term interests of corporations are secured from mutual cooperation and mutual understanding rather than conflict. In this sense, it is urgent to plan a policy to reestablish the relationship between workers and managers through the social partnership by introducing cooperative decision system like those in place in Germany, and to pursue policies from a long-term perspective.

Now, let's discuss what companies, the real leaders of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, should do to lead the Fourth Industrial Revolution toward a humanitarian economy. First, companies should share the vision that the 4th Industrial Revolution should not be a top priority for the rapid development of technology, but a means for human and societal evolution. And businesses will have to re-interpret their current business strategy through this vision: Does the company truly understand the user and consumer as a human being? In regard to economic management, the word consumer is taken for granted, but unfortunately, it is often forgotten that the consumer is a culturally existing human being. Therefore, in order for a corporation to act as a true driving force for the Fourth Industrial Revolution that develops on the basis of the human-centered economy, it is necessary to seriously consider the following issues on its own. 'Is the product we are producing really for a human being whose life is based on cultural activities?' If the product we make used by a human being as a cultural being, it should be a cultural asset with a cultural meaning, not simply a consumed product. In other words, we have to evaluate whether we are making goods for homo economics or homo culturalis, that is, making products for humans who seek the meaning in their lives. Again, it is because humans are cultural beings that they utilize the cultural value of goods; they are not just consumers that simply consume things. Only those who understand human beings who utilize these cultural values can be the subjects of labor that produce products with such

cultural values.

Therefore, managers should encourage the sense of responsibility of workers as the actual subject of organizational development, while at the same time promoting workers' pride as craftsmen embodying the aesthetics of maturing skill rather than of obedience. In addition, the introduction of cutting-edge technology should be pursued not only for reasons of cost reduction or production efficiency but also for "activation of collaborative creativity among employees" and "for the purpose of sublimating work into happiness instead of becoming draining labor". In this context, the attempt to introduce an innovation to the concept of robot by turning it into a Cobot is worth noting. A Cobot does not perform unattended operations in factory facilities that are fully automated. Rather, it functions as an aid to human beings who are the subjects of work and as a means of harmonizing the relationship between human beings and work so that human works become accomplishments rather than merely one way of making human lives more tired.

The introduction of smart facility, for instance, with Cobots, offers another benefit. The working hours of human beings can be shortened and more spare time can be secured. Likewise, there is more choice in job selection due to a more flexible working environment. In order to actively cope with such changes in the overall situation and in the workplace, companies should support and develop various skills of workers. It is now necessary for companies to innovate themselves to a field learning space where the diverse abilities of workers as cultural human beings are constantly developed and fulfilled. The company should not be a space that consumes and depletes workers' labor. Education is not just the business done only by the school. In the Fourth Industrial Revolution, which aims at establishing a humane economy, the workplace where the workers work to actualize themselves as cultural beings, should become a learning site that substantially enhances human life. Therefore, companies should provide a learning and educational environment with an organization to act as such an institution in cooperation with the government. In this case, the capacity of the workers can be continuously improved and developed and the capacity of the whole society can be secured.

# Advanced Imaging Technologies Reveal New Insights into the Human Image

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## Introduction

Advanced digital imaging technologies are used to support humanities studies of human images, including those rendered in mummy mask cartonnage, sketches by Michelangelo and African explorer Dr. David Livingstone, as well as texts from medical philosopher Galen of Pergamon. These technologies now offer new insights into these and other depictions and descriptions of the human image over the centuries. Yet preserving the ephemeral digital bits and bytes of data poses additional challenges so that these important digital records will be available for study by future generations of humanities scholars.

Egyptian mummy masks of the Ptolemaic Dynasty (305 to 30 BCE) depicted the image of the human they encased. They were often made with a papier-mâché method using layers of papyrus, including manuscript scraps with text on them. Features painted on the mummy image often depicted the wearer's status with different colors, decorations and artwork. Of equal or potentially greater importance are writings on the layers of papyrus used to make the masks, but not visible under the surface layers. Modern imaging of mummy masks with multiple technologies now offers potential to provide unique insights into ancient Egyptian culture by allowing visualization of both the decorations visible on the masks and the texts within the papyrus cartonnage that are not visible.

Greek medical philosopher Galen of Pergamon's original writings on papyrus and other fragile materials from the Roman Empire have been lost. With changing interests and media for writing, many were transcribed and translated onto parchment codices that have survived. One key 6th Century translation into Syriac of his *On Simple Drugs* offers unique insights into early perceptions and treatments of the human body. These were subsequently scrubbed off and overwritten with a religious text – a book of psalms. As scholarly interest and technologies changed, technical specialists are digitally recovering these overwritten texts with multispectral imaging for interdisciplinary humanities studies. Follow-on imaging with high-powered x-ray fluorescence is providing additional new insights into key folios for further study.

When Michelangelo di Lodovico Buonarroti Simoni painted the Sistine Chapel in the Vatican,

he used his expertise and knowledge gained from working with the human image in sculpture. "The Last Judgement" created in 1536-1541 as an approximately 14 × 12 meter plaster fresco over the altar included detailed depictions of the human image that have survived for almost five centuries. Yet his initial drawings of the human image that he transformed into permanent works of art on plaster are but sketches on less permanent paper that are now being revealed with multispectral imaging.

During the Victorian reign, Dr. David Livingstone took copious notes with a few sketches on old and fragile newspaper while stranded in Central Africa. In his 1871 Diary written on newspaper in a red ink he produced in Africa, his rudimentary sketches of human heads offer his perspective of the local people, their hairstyles and features. His diary, with these sketches, survived the tropical conditions in Africa and was transported back to England to be revealed and digitally archived with advanced digitization technologies over a century later.

Modern imaging technology and digital processing now offer new insights into the human image rendered centuries ago. With advanced multispectral imaging using optical cameras and various wavelengths of light, researchers can now clearly see some of these images and gain new insights into their creation. This is complemented by imaging with other energy levels, as well as advanced digital processing and machine learning to empower researchers to create enhanced images that best meet their unique abilities to visualize and perceive the human image in its many forms. Preserving the data that makes up these human images requires effective data planning, management and standards to ensure their preservation for future generations of humanities researchers.



Multispectral imaging with Phase One cameras and integrated Equipoise Imaging narrowband LED illumination in ultraviolet-visible-infrared wavelengths by Michael B. Toth of R.B. Toth Associates LLC.

### Advanced Imaging

Advanced digitization and imaging is now an important tool for the study of unseen texts, sketches and other features for humanities studies. While humanities scholars have used single wavelengths of non-visible light to examine manuscripts and paintings, now multispectral imaging

with multiple wavelengths of lights captures data across a significant part of the electromagnetic spectrum – including light from frequencies beyond the light ranges visible to the human eye. Building on pioneering development of narrowband multispectral imaging and digital processing to reveal the scraped off early mathematical works in the Archimedes Palimpsest,[1] this type of advanced imaging enables the perception of additional information that the human eye fails to see. Originally developed for aerial and space-based imaging and surveillance to penetrate foliage, clouds and camouflage, and for astronomy to study celestial objects, it has proven to be a useful tool for imaging in support of the humanities.[2] This technology enhances unseen features and reveals not only human images like those drawn by Michelangelo and Livingstone and created by ancient Egyptians, but also early medical, scientific and literary texts that offer new insights into early perceptions of the human image.

Current state-of-the-technology multispectral imaging systems offer new opportunities for research into perceptions of the human image as they are now being used for humanities studies of objects, media, inks and colorants. Institutions around the globe are using narrowband multispectral imaging systems for digital image capture and study of the human image and texts. This builds upon over a decade of system integration and development of not only the technology, but also the work processes and operational skills. These systems use a commercial-off-the-shelf medium-format, high-pixel-count camera to take a series of high-quality digital images, each illuminated by a specific narrow wavelength of light from the ultraviolet through the visible and into the infrared wavelengths with light emitting diodes (LEDs). The resulting digital "stack" of captured images in all these wavelengths can reveal features that are not visible to the human eye in natural light.

A stack of registered images of the Birmingham Qur'an captured with a 100 megapixel Phase One color camera and Equipoise Imaging narrowband illumination in multiple spectral bands of light from ultraviolet through visible and into infrared bands.

1. Noel, W., "Introduction", The Archimedes Palimpsest, I. Catalogue and Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 1-15.
2. Christens-Barry, W. A, et.al., "Camera system for multispectral imaging of documents" San Jose, California, *Proceedings of SPIE*, (2009) vol. 724908

The resulting image stack is then digitally processed and combined with open source software to reveal artifacts and features in the object that are not visible to the eye in natural light. These processed images generated from those captured in multiple wavelengths support research into sketches and texts by enhancing specific characteristics of the object. These digitally processed images can reveal faint traces of erased under-text and sketches, as well as erasures and changes, and residues and areas of concern for preservation. This is particularly useful to reveal scraped off texts or drawings on parchment palimpsests. Narrowband multispectral imaging and digital processing of manuscripts, palimpsests, printed works and other objects has provided humanities researchers with a wealth of information about features that are no longer visible to the human eye. These processed images, generated from the captured images, clarify and support humanities research and scholarly goals. In addition to imaging and digital processing, application of management, operation, training and information technology skills and technologies also support interdisciplinary humanities studies of the image products from the spectral imaging system. With standardized data and metadata, standard digital images can be integrated with data collected from other scientific equipment.[3]

Other advanced imaging technologies also support studies of the human image. Different energy levels – including in the x-ray and terahertz bands – have been used for advanced imaging. This includes use of x-ray fluorescence (XRF) for humanities studies of medical texts in the Syriac Galen Palimpsest that had been scrubbed off and overwritten with a book of psalms. It also includes use of infrared optical coherence tomography, different types of x-ray imaging and terahertz imaging to study mummy masks and the texts contained within them.

## Mummy Mask Cartonnage Imaging

European researchers conducted extensive excavation of papyri in Egypt between the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, and their research dramatically increased knowledge of the ancient world. Papyri manuscripts can be found in what scholars broadly define as "cartonnage." In the past, papyrologists would destroy mummy masks created in the human image to retrieve their contents from layers of papyri. Dealers and collectors also employed this practice of pulling apart mummy masks and cartonnage to retrieve papyri to try to increase their earnings or without recognition of the issues associated with the destruction of these depictions of human images. These destructive studies – especially without documentation of the mummy cartonnage before destruction – prevented further humanities studies into the original human image.[4]

With the development of advanced imaging techniques, humanities scholars now can potentially

3. Emery, D. , et.al., "The convergence of information technology and data management for digital imaging in museums", Museum Management and Curatorship, (2009) 24: 4, pp 337- 356

4. Mazza, R., "Mummy masks, papyri and the Gospel of Mark" *Faces & Voices: People, Artefacts, Ancient History*, 21 Jan (2015). Accessed 4 Sept. 2018 https://facesandvoices.wordpress.com/2015/01/21/mummy-masks-papyri-and-the-gospel-of-mark/

study both the mummy cartonnage itself with the human image, as well as the text on the papyri layers. Effective imaging tools could eliminate the need for invasive, destructive research into mummy masks and the remains of Egypt's ancient past. An exploratory pilot project sponsored by the Arcadia Fund across 16 international institutions and collections between November 2015 and July 2016 tested the feasibility of imaging of multi-layered papyri in Egyptian mummy cartonnages without destroying the early human images on the masks. An international team imaged Egyptian Ptolemaic mummy cartonnage and fragments in collections in the United States and the United Kingdom, using multiple nondestructive systems at multiple institutions for analysis and imaging of the papyrus. These included optical spectroscopy and multispectral narrow-band light, Synchrotron Rapid-Scanning X-ray Fluorescence (SRS-XRF), micro-Computed Tomography (microCT) and phase contrast x-ray, Optical Coherence Tomography (OCT) and Terahertz (THz) imaging.[5]

## R.B. TOTH ASSOCIATES

## Primary Imaging Technologies & Institutions

| Imaging Technology | Imaging Institutions | Illumination/ Energy | Contributing Objects |
|---|---|---|---|
| Multispectral | UCL, Manchester; Duke, Berkeley, RBToth Assoc. Equipoise Imaging | UV/VIS/IR 360-940 nm | Petrie, Berkeley, Duke, UCL |
| Spectral Domain OCT | Duke | IR 800 nm | Duke, UCL* |
| Scanning SDOCT | Duke | IR 740-920 nm | Duke, UCL* |
| XRF Scan | Stanford Light Source | X-ray 13.5 keV | Berkeley, UCL* |
| XRF Analysis | Bruker Analyzer | X-ray 40 keV | Petrie, Duke, UCL*, Berkeley |
| X-ray Microtomography | Berkeley Advanced Light Source | X-ray 8-45 keV | Berkeley, UCL* |
| X-ray Planar Phase Contrast | Berkeley UCL | X-ray 10-40 keV | Petrie, UCL* |
| TeraHertz | University of Western Australia | 300 GHz- 10 THz | UCL* |

www.rbtoth.com        * Modern surrogates from UCL

Imaging technologies and organizations contributing to research into imaging papyrus mummy mask cartonnage as part of the multi-institutional international study sponsored by Arcadia Fund.

The team started its imaging research began with optical narrowband multispectral imaging, followed by OCT used in ophthalmological research. They then performed experimental

5. Toth, M.B. & C.A., et. al., "Integrating Optical Imaging of Mummy Mask Cartonnage", *Proceedings of the Society for Imaging Science and Technology Archiving 2018 Conference*, pp 157-162 (2018). Accessed 4 Sept 2018 https://www.ucl.ac.uk/dh/projects/deepimaging/pubs/ISTMummy_OCT_MSI.pdf

imaging with the higher energy levels of x-rays and finally the addition of THz imaging. In addition to this imaging, the team also analyzed the chemical and elemental makeup of the papyrus cartonnage spectrally and with x-rays. This research indicated that none of the individual techniques alone yielded complete images of features in the papyrus layers of sufficient quality for all types of humanities studies. Multispectral imaging could penetrate up to three layers of papyrus with narrowband light to detect text, but could not penetrate thick layers of gesso and paint used to depict the human image on the surface. X-rays could penetrate all the materials, but not detect the lighter carbon ink used to write the Ptolemaic text. Terahertz energy could reveal some inks in multiple layers and offers potential for further research. These preliminary studies indicate that integration of data from multiple imaging technologies and techniques could offer improved results over those from just a single individual technology and technique.



Multispectral imaging with an integrated system of a mummy mask from the Petrie Museum in University College London.

All the data produced from this study are now available online for free access to support humanities and technical studies.[6] This was only possible since all participating institutions agreed to all data freely available with sharing of their intellectual property under Creative Commons CC-BY 4.0 International.[7] This allowed the free exchange of all data for digital processing, analysis and research with it hosted online for public access. This digital humanities research highlights the destructive techniques associated with mummy mask studies and illicit sales, and provides the impetus and basis for at least documenting the original state of objects and the human image they depict for future humanities research and analysis.

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6. UCL "Deep Imaging Mummy Cases, The Data". Accessed 4 Sept 2018 https://www.ucl.ac.uk/dh/projects/deepimaging/data
7. Creative Commons, "Licensing Types". Accessed 4 Sept 2018 https://creativecommons.org/share-your-work/licensing-types-examples/

## Galen Medical Texts

In addition to revealing depictions of human images across time and space, advanced technologies have also been used to reveal descriptions of the human body and its functions. Multispectral imaging revealed a 6th-Century translation of Galen's critical medical treatise *On the Mixtures and Powers of Simple Drugs* was erased and overwritten with an 11th-Century Syriac religious text.[8] This and additional imaging of the Syriac Galen Palimpsest (SGP) with a more advanced multispectral system and with x-ray fluorescence[9] combined with global access on the internet enabled interdisciplinary humanities studies of these previously unseen texts about the human body. International teams of scholars studied the open access multispectral images with advanced software tools to gain new insights into the transmission of Western ideas on the human body's functions into the Middle East during the medieval period.[10] They cited the SGP as an extremely important Syriac text. As Dr. Peter Pormann noted: "It's likely to be a central text once it's fully deciphered. We might discover things we really can't dream of yet."[11]

Humanities scholars worked with technical specialists to develop new tools not only for imaging, but also for identifying and reading the previously unseen medieval texts of Galen in Syriac. This included not only the more traditional image processing tools, but also computational machine learning tools "trained" by the scholars. These tools and methodologies offer potential for the study of a variety of medieval text beyond just advanced imaging of complex texts.



Digital processing toolbox use to reveal the unseen in stacks of multispectral images – in this screen capture the Syriac Galen Palimpsest – developed by Dr. William Christens-Barry of Equipoise Imaging with open-source ImageJ software.

8. Bhayro, S. and Brock, S. "The Syriac Galen Palimpsest and the Role of Syriac in the Transmission of Greek Medicine in the Orient", Bulletin of the John Rylands University Library of Manchester 89 Supplement, Ancient Medical and Healing Systems: Their Legacy to Western Medicine (ed. R. David), (2012/2013) pp. 25-43

9. Bergmann, U, et.al., "Chemical mapping of paleontological and archeological artifacts with synchrotron X-rays", *Annual Review of Analytical Chemistry*, 5, 361-389 (2012).

10. Das, A. , et.al., "The Syriac Galen Palimpsest: Digital Recovery of a Missing Link between Greek and Islamic Science". *Mizan Project*, March 3, (2016) Accessed 4 Sept 2018. http://www.mizanproject.org/the-syriac-galen-palimpsest/

11. Schrope, M, "Medicine's Ancient Roots", *New York Times*, 2 June (2015) p D1. Accessed 4 Sept 2018 https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/02/science/medicines-hidden-roots-in-an-ancient-manuscript.html

The success of the Syriac Galen Palimpsest imaging program highlighted not only the need for integrated imaging systems with advanced cameras and illumination panels, but also the need for effective program and data management. Efficiently and quickly providing useful results for humanities scholars and preservation of the data for future generations of scholars required new management techniques and work processes. Management of the SGP imaging and processing focused on integration of the people, processes and technology into an efficient imaging system. This included planning and managing the data flow, data replication, image processing and production of the image products with efficient and standardized work processes. Good communication with the humanities scholars and effective feedback from them proved critical to interdisciplinary success. This ensured the images were optimized to meet scholars' abilities to perceive the texts when they were rendered digitally on a screen for their viewing and humanities research.

The methodology and interplay of scholarship and science studies of the SGP serves as model for best practices in interdisciplinary research into new methodologies and tools for humanities studies. This manuscript has been fully imaged and digitally reconstituted with folios scattered in multiple libraries, with all images and metadata now hosted in simple flat files for free access on digitalgalen.net. With over 300 GB of data hosted for open access online, this data set provides opportunities for further study and collaboration based on advanced imaging technologies and work processes.[12]

## Michelangelo's Human Anatomy Sketch

Modern technologies and conservation techniques offer new insights into the human image, including Michelangelo's anatomical studies drawn during the Renaissance. Early in 2018, an advanced multispectral system was brought to the Huntington Library in San Marino, California, USA, to image Shakespeare and Ben Franklin manuscripts in their collection. While the imaging system was available, it was used to try to gain more insight into mss HM 36088, a draft of a madrigal poem by Michelangelo believed to be "gli sguardi che mi strazji" that included a study of a section of human anatomy and what proved to be two additional sketches.

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12. University of Pennsylvania Libraries, Pennsylvania, "Openn, The Galen Syriac Palimpsest". Last modified 29 April (2016). Accessed 4 Sept 2018. http://digitalgalen.net

Multispectral imaging of mss HM 36088 (left) and a grey-scale digitally processed image (right) of the section of human anatomy sketched on Michelanglo's draft madrigal poem's paper. *The Huntington Library, San Marino, California.*

Multispectral imaging of Michelanglo's poem enhanced visibility into two sketches that were not readily seen by the human eye: detail of an architectural arch and an object that may be a dove. It also yielded higher resolution and more detailed images of the anatomy study of a human image by Michalengelo. The anatomy sketch is attributed to the left leg of a male figure rendered in the "Resurrection of the Dead" section in the lower left area of his enormous plaster fresco "The Last Judgement" over the altar of the Sistine Chapel in the Vatican.[13]



Digitally processed multispectral image of mss HM 36088 revealing architectural sketches to the left, and more details in the Michelangelo human anatomy study attributed to "The Last Judgement". *The Huntington Library, San Marino, California.*

Additional details in the anatomical figure were revealed with automated software tools that digitally processed the resulting stack of multispectral images to provide scholars and curators with digitally processed images in greyscale as well as pseudocolor to meet the needs different levels of

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13. Huntington Digital Library, "[Drawing of left leg and 15 lines of verse] : [graphic, manuscript]" Accessed 15 Sept. 2018 http://hdl.huntington.org/cdm/ref/collection/p15150coll7/id/30539

human perception. Ph.D. candidate Cerys Jones then manually registered the processed image with an image of "The Last Judgement" to highlight the accurate correlation of the original sketch with the completed fresco.[14]

This imaging and digital correlation of the Michelangelo anatomical study with his depiction of the human figure in his final fresco provides opportunities for further conservation assessment and preservation of the fresco. It also offers potential to support historical research into his documentation and the relationship among his various works. Ultimately, it offers humanities scholars, art historians and conservators new insights into Michelangelo's creative techniques and his detailed understanding of the human figure that proved central to his paintings and sculpture.



Resurrection of the Dead in the lower left section of "The Last Judgement", 1537-1541, *(Sistine Chapel, Vatican)* with superimposed Michelangelo anatomical study in mss HM 36088 *(The Huntington Library, San Marino, California)*



Manually registered overlay of Michelangelo anatomy study from mss HM 36088 in the Huntington Library *(San Marino, California)* on a cropped Resurrection of the Dead figure in "The Last Judgement" in the Sistine Chapel *(Vatican)*[15]

## David Livingstone Sketches

British explorer and missionary Dr. David Livingstone spent 5 months in 1871 in the eastern

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14. Jones, C., "SEAHA Registration Study", University College London Ph.D. Thesis research (preprint), UCL, 24 Sept. 2018
15. Ibid.

Congo village of Nyangwe. At this point on his travels Livingstone had depleted most of his supplies, so he made ink from the seeds of a native plant to write on sheets of paper from the 1869 *The Standard* newspaper. His text and drawings in his field diary written on top of the printed newspaper text faded to the point of illegibility over the years. His records of this period are of significant value for humanities studies, because he describes a violent massacre of the African people by Arab slave traders.[16] In addition to his descriptions of the humans he encountered in Nyangwe, his diaries included three crude sketches of human figures, as well as a sketch of a structure, several maps and calculations.

As with many depictions of human images, the presence of these sketches enhanced interest in the many other pages of diary text, and played a key role in advancing the technology for the multispectral imaging project. Because of their distinctive form and unique record, these sketches were the first examples of Dr. Livingstone's work studied during October 2009 tests of the utility of multispectral imaging technology to support humanities studies of the diaries at the David Livingstone Center in Blantyre, Scotland. During an initial review, these sketches stood out from the pages of text, offering a quick and compelling case study of the ink, imaging and processing techniques, as well as fading. An initial small team quickly mounted them on a table for a rudimentary multispectral imaging experiment with a small consumer camera taped to the arm of a projector and a small LED light panel.



Technology testing of imaging of David Livingstone's 1871 Field Diary at the David Livingstone Center (left) and initial test color camera images of Folio 160 (right), with his hand-drawn sketches of human heads in the right margin. *David Livingstone Centre, Blantyre. Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported.*

Despite the limited data available from the low-resolution color camera and jury-rigged mounting hardware, these initial images of the human figures and associated text with the entry for 2 August 1871 demonstrated the suitability of multispectral imaging and digital processing to fully reveal Dr. Livingstone's original records from 1871 on the newsprint.

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16. Wisnicki, A. and Toth, M. B., The David Livingstone Spectral Imaging Project. In S. Worden (Ed. ), "David Livingston, Man, Myth and Legacy" Edinburgh, Scotland: National Museums Scotland (2012) (pp. 154-168). Edinburgh, Scotland: National Museums Scotland

Digitally processed test images of Folio 160 of David Livingstone's 1871 Field Diary with his hand-drawn sketches of human heads in the right margin. *David Livingstone Centre, Blantyre. Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported.*

With these preliminary images, a team of scholars and technical experts developed a full program for digital humanities studies of Dr. Livingstone's entire 1871 Diary. All the newspaper pages were imaged in Scotland and the resulting stacks of images processed to enhance the legibility of Livingstone's writings and sketches, as well as suppress the original newsprint under the diary. These images and diary transcriptions are all available online, where they served as the foundation for online access to additional Livingstone writings in support of digital humanities research under Creative Commons license.[17] This includes the four sketches on page 160 of the diary (871f:CLX) now available online:



A color image (left) and processed spectral ratio image with newsprint suppressed (right) of Folio 160 of David Livingstone's 1871 Field Diary (Livingstone 1871f:CLX), with his hand-drawn sketches of human heads in the right margin. *David Livingstone Centre, Blantyre. Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported.*

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17. Livingstone Online, "Digital Catalogue Record: Spectral" University of Maryland Libraries (2017). Accessed 5 Sept. 2018. http://www.livingstoneonline.org/in-his-own-words/catalogue?access=view_spectral

These few sketches of the human image amidst the many pages of text by Dr. Livingstone highlight a challenge faced in integrating and encoding non-textual elements in humanities studies of primary works. In his textual transcription encoded under the guidelines of the Text Encoding Initiative, Dr. Adrian Wisnicki, the digital humanities scholar leading the Livingstone research project, describes each sketch in its appropriate location with the note "[Drawing of the head of an African individual.]"[18]

[...][J]ournal CLX 2 August 1871
Left Mangala's and came through 25
a great many villages all deserted at
our approach in consequence of the
vengeance taken by Dugumbes party
for the murder of some of his
**[Drawing of the head of an African individual.]**
followers = Kasongo's men
eager plunderers of other Manyema
had to scold and threaten ~~them~~
and will set some to watch their
deeds tomorrow = Plantains
**[Drawing of the head of an African individual.]**
very abundant and good =
came to Kitette and lodged in a
village of Loembo = about thirty
smithy ies or rather foundr~~dies~~ in
**[Drawing of the head of an African individual.]** the
villages we passed = they are
very high in the roof to avoid fires
and
[Drawing of an African hut.] thatched with a sort of wild
plan-tain leaf from which sparks
and rain run off equally well -

Transcription of Folio 160 of David Livingstone's 1871 Field Diary (Livingstone 1871f:CLX)

Realizing the inability to fully describe these drawings of the human image, in a separate paper describing "additional textual elements", Wisnicki describes the sketches in some detail as follows:

"The first three, of the heads of three African individuals, appear in a vertical column along the upper right-hand side of the page. The first two heads are in profile, the third looks straight ahead. Livingstone makes no textual reference to these sketches, but it appears that he is trying to illustrate two to three distinct local hairstyles. The last sketch on this page, which appears in the middle of the left-hand side of the page, represents a local foundry, as the accompanying text indicates: 'about thirty smithies or rather foundries in the villages we passed' (2 Aug. 1871)."[19]

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18. Livingstone Online, "Fragment of 1871 Field Diary (CII-CLXIII), 23 March 1871-11 August 1871" University of Maryland Libraries (2017). Accessed 5 Sept. 2018. http://livingstoneonline.org/in-his-own-words/catalogue?access=all&limit=catalogue&f%5B3%5D=genre_ms%3A%22diaries%22&f%5B4%5D=dateRangeYear_mi%3A1871&view_pid=liv%3A000095&view_page=0

19. Livingstone Online, "Livingstone's Manuscript Structure, Livingstone's 1871 Field Diary" University of Maryland Libraries (2017). Accessed 5 Sept. 2018. http://livingstoneonline.org/spectral-imaging/livingstones-manuscript-structure

## Visualization and Perception

Visualizing the human figure over time has been dependent not just on its representation by its creator, the medium of its rendering or the technology used to recover it, but the ability to perceive it with the human eye. Perception and research into sketches, paintings and descriptions of the human image has evolved with natural deterioration, man-made alterations, and lighting and enhancement tools used to capture the image for the human eye. Natural deterioration limits our ability to perceive images and text on papyrus, paper, parchment and plaster that fade from or become obscured by environmental factors. These include exposure to light and oxidation, water and mold damage, chemical corrosion and changes in relative humidity. Man-made alterations can range from inadvertent damage due to mishandling and transportation to smoke and candle wax buildup, as well as conscious efforts to alter an image or text and/or obscure and even censure the prior work.

Advances in lighting and viewing technology over the years have changed perceptions of the human image – from illumination with the sooty flames of early candles and lamps to today's LED illumination and x-rays. These have been complemented by visualization tools from early magnifying glasses to today's high-resolutions screens displaying images from 150 megapixel cameras. Ultimately – whether viewed with a handheld magnifier or in digital form on screen – perception of the human image is dependent on the ability of nerves in the human eye to change photons of light into nervous impulses that are perceived by the brain. Given that many people have different perceptions due to differences in color vision, visual acuity and ocular issues, with our current technologies a digital image that can be changed and adjusted by the viewer may offer the best opportunity to perceive new insights into objects. Machine learning tools, including application of Canonical Variates Analysis (CVA), offer potential to allow humans to each train their own digital processing tools to produce images that best meet their needs, instead of having to rely on scientific formulas in a trial-and-error method.[20]



Machine learning tool used to read scrubbed off translated Galen undertext in stacks of multispectral images of the Syriac Galen Palimpsest, developed by University of Manchester using Canonical Variates Analysis (CVA)

20. Arsene, C., et. al. "High Performance Software in Multidimensional Reduction Methods for Image Processing with Application to Ancient Manuscripts" *Manuscript Cultures*, ARXIV, December 2016. Accessed 4 Sept 2018 https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1612/1612.06457.pdf

The ability of digital imaging equipment to produce a standard image output for a viewer and/or humanities researcher offers important advances in the visualization, storage of and access to the human image. Standardized procedures and image output now allow independent imaging of the same object with multiple technologies, with subsequent integration of images to leverage the strengths of each technology and technique. Digital image processing software now empowers the viewer and/or researcher to use their own computer(s) to produce refined images that meet their visual acuity and research needs, without technical or scientific support. This is particularly true with multispectral imaging, where a stack of images taken with narrow bands of colored light can be combined and manipulated with digital processing software to yield images in a myriad of colors (or greyscales for those with limited color perception) that offer new insights to the image based on the spectral response of the original inks, colorants and media.[21]

## Data Preservation

Although the human image and textual descriptions have survived on various media – including papyrus, paper and parchment – over the centuries, continued preservation on digital media is at higher risk. All digital storage media, even the most robust, must be considered vulnerable to data loss. This requires a systems approach to digital storage, in which the digital storage media is but one component of the overall storage system. Other factors that must be addressed for digital storage media preservation include the storage environment, data formats, standards, access and hardware, storage system management, operation and maintenance, and data migration (and conversion when appropriate).[22]

With a systems approach to digital data storage and preservation, institutions can identify risks and look at the full range of data preservation issues. A broader systems approach needs to include the digital storage media in the context of the data formatting, migration and conversion, data and systems management, continuity of storage, and other risk factors. These should be based on industry best practices and standards, both for quality and technical robustness. In addition to considering systems performance and processes, the system operations also must be considered in the context of its integration into the organizational work environment and cultures. What works well for fast-paced and well-resourced Google may not work at the pace and resources of a humanities research institution. In addition to addressing technology issues, this approach also needs to take into account needed work processes and personnel skills. As key users of digital data, humanities researchers need to play a role in regular reviews of risk status.

21. Easton, R.L. Jr., et. al., "Standardized system for multispectral imaging of palimpsests", *Proceedings of SPIE*, 7531-12 (2010).
22. Toth, M. B., "How do we preserve and share our digital library information?" What do we lose when we lose a library? Proceedings of the Conference held at KU Leuven 9-11 September 2015 (ed. Collier, M.), (2016) pp 207-213. Accessed 4 Sept 2018 http://depot.lias.be/delivery/DeliveryManagerServlet?dps_pid=IE7828796

Institutions with collections on digital media need to apply effective risk management to their digital preservation planning and capabilities. This would include development of a risk management plan for digital data, and actively managing risk and incorporating risk responses into budgets, schedules and performance plans. The institution would then need to analyze and manage risks to the storage of digital data with a standardized approach to rapid identification and mitigation of risks.

As digitization and digital storage programs have matured and grown in duration and the amounts of data collected, standard work processes have become critical to the ability to store, preserve and access digital image data. In the commercial sector, influential industry standards and certification programs, such as ISO9000 quality standards, have propelled organizations to standardize work processes for improved quality and increased efficiency. Large organizations are defining and using best practices in process and project management for continual technology improvement, including online cloud storage systems. Systems design and management have become as important as the hardware and software used for digital storage and potentially preservation in the cloud.

Only a comprehensive approach to advanced digital imaging storage and access will support the preservation of depictions of the human image that survived much of the last millennium on papyrus, parchment and paper digital objects for 21st Century humanities scholars to study in digital form.[23]

## Acknowledgements

The successes of the advanced imaging programs cited in this paper rely on the expertise and dedication of multidisciplinary teams of professionals. All have contributed to advancing humanities studies of the human image and texts: scholars, engineers, conservators, data administrators and managers, librarians, digitization professionals, curators, owners, scientists, interns and many others.

## Biography

Mr. Michael B. Toth is an Honorary Research Associate at University College London and President of R.B. Toth Associates. He and his teams provide the research tools and images needed for humanities research and access around the globe. Mr. Toth has provided programmatic and technical support for numerous cultural heritage projects. From the Sinai Desert and Vatican to the Library of Congress and UK National Archives, he and his teams

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23. Emery, R.D, et.al., "The Palimpsest Data Set", The Archimedes Palimpsest, I. Catalogue and Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 222-239.

support institutions across the United States, Europe and the Middle East as they try to reveal the previously unseen. With them, Mr. Toth provides the planning, integration and systems engineering needed for advanced digital imaging research and access. More information at rbtoth.com

# Ressentiment and Overman in the Posthuman Age

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## 1. Introduction

Who is posthuman and what will be the posthuman society? There are two prospects for posthuman society: the pessimistic view and the optimistic view. According to the pessimistic view, as the fourth industrial revolution progresses a new species (transhuman and posthuman) will emerge. The new species called as posthuman will have super intelligence, highly enhanced physical power, and extremely long lives will dominate humans (*Homo sapiens*) who do not have them. On the other hand, according to the optimistic view, which is especially noticeable in transhumanism, the development of science and technology benefits humans and, as a result, human evolve into posthuman with smart machines. There are complex issues tangled together in the dispute between the views, especially such as the natural vs. artificial beings, human dignity and equality, and meaning of life.

The aim of this paper is to examine the subject of ressentiment and overman in the posthuman age, which is related to the nature of transhuman and posthuman and their society. My starting point is that Nietzsche's philosophy can help us to deal with the subject. Nietzsche's ideas have affected the rise of posthumanism, as can be seen from direct or indirect confessions of the pioneers of transhumanism and posthumanism, though there are debates about whether it is real or superficial and how much Nietzsche's ideas affected transhumanism and posthumanism. By paying particular attention to Nietzsche's ideas of Master and Slave, ressentiment, and Overman (*Übermensch*), I contend that (i) new classes will emerge in posthuman society, which correspond to Master and the Slave, (ii) there will be a new type of ressentiment for different reason from Nietzsche's, and (iii) the Overman as a new value creator will be required in order to solve posthuman problems.

## 2. Transhuman

In this paper, I mean 'future' is not a 'vague future' that will come after present, but the period where posthuman live his life. In other words, the future is a world in which new beings defined by

## e. We support the well-being of all sentience, including humans, non-human animals, and any future artificial intellects, modified life forms, or other intelligences to which technological and scientific advance may give rise.

Let us see transhumanism in more detail. First of all, transhumanism basically opposes the principle of dignity (a.). To transhumanism, the human is not something special; it is just an organism that has evolved by chance according to the principle of natural selection, just like any other organism. Thus, humanism is nothing more than an illusion of a dignified human that was fabricated by humans themselves. We are nothing but biological machines made of blood and bones. While transhumanism opposes dignity, it accepts rationality (b.) and autonomy (c.). In the transhumanist's view, while humans are organisms, they are exceptionally outstanding ones that, unlike other organisms, have achieved rationality and autonomy. These two principles are what enable human enhancement. Since humans are rational, they have developed science and technology. And with free will, humans can decide their own destiny.

In the transhumanist's view, both the human and human civilization are still incomplete and imperfect and thus need to evolve to the next level. Science and technology provide the means to achieve this aim. Humanity will be able to break its biological limitations by means of the power of science and technology. According to transhumanism, there have been three stages in the evolution of the universe and humanity. The first stage was cosmic evolution, in which, after the Big Bang, stars, galaxies, planets, and the solar system were created, and the Earth became a planet where life could exist. The second stage was biological evolution, in which life was created on Earth and humans evolved from lower-level organisms through natural selection. Transhumanists pay special attention to a critical moment in the history of biological evolution; namely, the birth of intelligence (especially human intelligence). With the advent of human intelligence, nature was now able to design and control evolution itself, whereas, before, it had been subjected to the blind and aimless process of evolution. Based on intelligence, humanity has now

e. Reduction of existential risks, and development of means for the preservation of life and health, the alleviation of grave suffering, and the improvement of human foresight and wisdom should be pursued as urgent priorities, and heavily funded.

f. Policymaking ought to be guided by responsible and inclusive moral vision, taking seriously both opportunities and risks, respecting autonomy and individual rights, and showing solidarity with and concern for the interests and dignity of all people around the globe. We must also consider our moral responsibilities towards generations that will exist in the future.

g. We advocate the well-being of all sentience, including humans, non-human animals, and any future artificial intellects, modified life forms, or other intelligences to which technological and scientific advance may give rise.

h. We favor allowing individuals wide personal choice over how they enable their lives. This includes use of techniques that may be developed to assist memory, concentration, and mental energy; life extension therapies; reproductive choice technologies; cryonics procedures; and many other possible human modification and enhancement technologies.

More's definition and the declaration of the WTA reveal the utopian and idealistic characteristic of transhumanism as well as its ambiguous duality. Transhumanism, on one hand, takes science and technology very seriously as a means of transforming human nature through cognitive, emotional, and physical enhancements such as health promotion, extension of lifespan, improvement of intellectual ability and emotional control ability. It is anti-humanism in that it permits de-humanization such as cyborg or mind uploading. On the other hand, transhumanism inherits humanism by accepting enlightenment based on human reason and rationality. Hence, transnationalism is wandering between naturalism and humanism. It is after two rabbits by embracing humanistic values such as health, longevity, and talent and adhering the purpose of human improvement through science and technology while by encouraging humans to regard them as candidates of transhuman or posthuman to be constructed technically.

The double nature of transhumance leads the double nature of transhuman. Transhuman is an 'intermediary transition' in that they overcome the biological conditions given to them as Homo sapiens and the boundaries of life based on it, but still respects humanistic ideals and values. From Nietzsche's point of view, transhuman is a middle between human and Overman. How can transhuman as enhanced human accept and respect humanistic values such as dignity and equality? The standard response to this question is that human evolves through transhuman to posthuman who is thought of as ideal being such as Overman, and as a result, the double nature of transhuman disappears.

But this answer is not sufficient to ensure that posthuman will be Overman in the sense of Nietzsche. In transhumanism posthuman is future being whose basic capacities so radically exceed those of present humans as to be no longer unambiguously human by our current standards. From now on, I adopt the term of T-posthuman in order refer posthuman evolved from transhuman.

What is the relation between transhumanism and Nietzsche's philosophy? There has been a debate between Nick Bostrom and Stefan Sorgner on this issue, mainly in the *Journal of Evolution & Technology*. Bostrom (2005) denies the positive relation between transhumanism and Nietzsche's ideas.

What Nietzsche had in mind, however, was not technological transformation but rather a kind of soaring personal growth and cultural refinement in exceptional individuals (who he thought would have to overcome the life-sapping "slave-morality" of Christianity). Despite some surface-level similarities with the Nietzschean vision, transhumanism – with its Enlightenment roots, its emphasis on individual liberties, and its humanistic concern for the welfare of all humans (and other sentient beings) – probably has as much or more in common with Nietzsche's contemporary J.S. Mill, the English liberal thinker and utilitarian.

Sorgner (2009), contrary to Bostrom, emphasizes that there are many fundamental similarities between transhumanism and Nietzsche's philosophy at a fundamental level, especially concerning posthuman and Nietzsche's overman. For example, he proposes a counter-argument against the technological transformation.

Courage is a significant virtue within Nietzsche's favored morality. In addition, he stresses the importance of science for the forthcoming centuries, and does not reject that development. Given these two premises, I cannot exclude the possibility that Nietzsche would have been in favor of genetic engineering, even though he mainly stresses the importance of education for the occurrence of the evolutionary step towards the overhuman. If genetic engineering, or liberal eugenics, can actually be seen as a special type of education, which is what transhumanists seem to hold, then it is possible that this position would have been held by Nietzsche, too, as education played a significant role in his ethics. He affirmed science, and he was in favor of enhancement, and the bringing about of the overhuman.

In this debate, I support the position of Sorgner without adding extra arguments and discuss my subject, ressentiment, and overman in the posthuman age.

## 3. Posthumanism: From human to posthuman

I pointed out that transhuman has a double nature through transhumanism and T-posthuman, who is supposed to evolve from transhuman, will have such nature too. Posthuman is a totally different being with characteristic distinct from the T-posthuman, which is defined by posthumanism. Posthumanism is distinct from transhumanism and T-posthumanism in that it is oriented towards overcoming humanism. Katherine Hayles offers the following characteristics of post-humanism.[2]

a. The posthuman view privileges informational pattern over material instantiation, so that embodiment in a biological substrate is seen as an accident of history rather than an inevitability of life.

b. The posthuman view considers consciousness, regarded as the seat of human identity in the Western tradition long before Descartes thought he was a mind thinking, as an epiphenomenon, as an evolutionary upstart trying to claim that it is the whole show when in actuality it is only a minor sideshow.

c. The posthuman view thinks of the body as the original prosthesis we all learn to manipulate, so that extending or replacing the body with other prostheses becomes a continuation of a process that began before we were born.

d. By these and other means, the posthuman view configures human being so that it can be seamlessly articulated with intelligent machines. In the posthuman, there are no essential differences or absolute demarcations between bodily existence and computer simulation, cybernetic mechanism and biological organism, robot teleology, and human goals.

From the above, we can see the nature of posthumanism. (i) Posthumanism criticizes humanism which has the humanistic tenets: *human* dignity, *human* rationality, and *human* autonomy, which are accepted as enlightenment goals in transhumanism. Posthumanism denies specifically those goals that have been regarded as inherent attributes of human beings and aims to overcome the limits of human-centered humanism. (ii) Posthumanism denies strongly the dichotomy between humans and other beings. As Hales emphasizes, it does not recognize the distinction between humans and animals, between humans and machines. In particular, it advocates co-evolution of human and machine by contending that humans evolve into cyborgs. However, it should be noted that posthumanism does not claim de-humanization or de-embodiment as opposed to transhumanism. It acknowledges the bodily basis of existence because it is based on reductive physicalism in the sense of strongly denying the existence of mind independent of matter. (iii) Posthumanism adopts a less teleological stance than transhumanism. In other words, it does not stick to the goal of scientific human enhancement and seeks various ways in which humans can reach a true posthuman.

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2. K. Hayles (1999), pp. 2-3.

Finally, (iv) posthumanism differs from transhumanism through its diagnosis on the present age. According to transhumanism, the twentieth century 21, where present humans live, is the entrance to the transhuman age, which T-posthuman age follows. On the other hand, according to posthumanism, the posthuman age is independent of a chronological division. In other words, the posthuman age can be implemented at any time in human history. For example, the ancient people who did not recognize the distinction between humans and animals and thought that machines could think was posthuman in a sense. Wolfgang von Kempelen (1734-1804), who invented a chess-playing automaton called 'The Turk' and surprised the world at the time and said that "machines can be thought of as human beings", was a posthuman. Hales emphasizes that humans have already entered the posthuman age and that we are already posthuman.

As is shown, the basic tenets of posthumanism are to overcome humanism and to deny the various dichotomies drawn by humanism such as dichotomy between humans and animals, between humans and machines, between man and women, between the white and the black, between the rich and the poor, etc.

## 4. Dignity and Personality

Let's now examine the matters with the notion of dignity of new beings (transhuman, T-posthuman, posthuman) examined above. Should they all be dignified as owners of dignity? The reason these questions are important is that maintenance or deterioration of dignity is the most fundamental problem in case of humans. Is it so in the case of new beings? First of all, according to humanism defined above, dignity has the following characteristics.

a. Uniqueness: Dignity is owned solely by humans.
b. Intrinsic property: Dignity is an intrinsic property given to humans.
c. Equality: Dignity is equally given to all humans.

The notion of dignity as defined above has been criticized as anthropocentrism for from the beginning it blocks the possibility that non-human being can be an owner of dignity. Posthumanists, in particular, argue that uniqueness and equality should be open to non-human beings even though we acknowledge the intrinsic property of dignity. If such a posthuman view is accepted, the new notion of dignity will be established as follows.

d. Universality: Dignity is owned by a being of *a specific nature*.
e. Intrinsic property: Dignity is an intrinsic property given to a being of a *specific* nature.
f. Equality (in a broad sense): Dignity is equally given to all beings with a *specific* nature.

If the above notion of dignity is embraced in the transhuman or posthuman age, beings possessing

such specific nature should be treated as *dignified beings*. The content of the specific nature can be defined in various ways. For example, it can be ownership of self-consciousness. In the case, beings with self-consciousness such as dogs and dolphins should be recognized as the dignified. Transhuman, T-posthuman, and posthuman, which are supposed to be conscious of themselves, should be recognized as dignified beings. But here is a problem. Someone can say that it is meaningless to give the status of dignity to new humans supposed to be totally different from humans. If humans are dignified, animals are dignified, robots are dignified, and new humans are dignified, the connotation of dignity is likely to be empty or with no special meaning. Therefore, there is no reason to apply the notion already sufficiently contaminated by humanism to new humans.

Taking this into account, it is necessary to establish a new standard or notion that replace the notion of dignity. In doing this we can get help from Peter Singer's theory. In *Practical Ethics* (1979) Singer argues persuasively that we should not distinguish humans from other beings and humans and animals should be treated on the same basis. Singer first distinguishes between human and *person* in order to discard the human-centered notion of dignity. The character of a person is rationality and self-consciousness.[3] A person is rational and self-conscious. The marks of personhood for determining whether an animal is rational and self-conscious is as follows.[4]

> a. A rational and self-conscious being is aware of itself as an extended body existing over an extended period of time.
> b. It is a desiring and plan-making being.
> c. It contains as a necessary condition for the right to life that it desires to continue living.
> d. It is an autonomous being.

According to Singer, a being with those marks is a person, so deserves moral consideration. By linking singer's argument with the previous discussion of dignity, it follows that person is dignified. According to the principle that a person has dignity, not only humans but also chimpanzees or dolphins should be treated as a moral agent. On the other hand, a fish that does not possess self-consciousness is not a person and a human embryo lacking sensory power is not a person. To summarize the above discussion we have the following table.

| person | sensible and self-conscious | human, chimpanzee, dolphin transhuman, posthuman |
|---|---|---|
| Non-person | sensible but not self-conscious | fish, human in a persistent vegetative state |
| | neither sensible nor self-conscious | human embryo |

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3. P. Singer (1979), p. 87.
4. Ibid, pp. 78-84.

it will be a too radical change. In the whole, resentment of the unenhanced toward the enhanced are intensified in a transhuman society. But such resentment may be dissolved in a T-posthuman society because T-posthuman can be a moral agent who care about the unenhanced.

Now let's examine whether the transhuman has the ideal life that the transhumanists dream of. The transhuman is a being which is cognitively, emotionally and physically enhanced but still has human values. However, transhuman will undergo confusion about his identity. It is because transhuman feels a sense of heterogeneity between the enhanced target and the unenhanced part. Let's take an example of a person whose cognitive abilities have been improved by inserting a chip into the brain. The unenhanced parts except for the cognitive ability remain human. Because there is a difference between the target to be improved and the non-target, there arises a conflict between the enhanced and unenhanced inside the transhuman. For example, when a person's cognitive ability is improved but his morality is not, the person's unenhanced morality brings about confusion in the improved cognitive system. The conflict between the enhanced and unenhanced inside the transhuman is a factor that hinders the transhuman from living the ideal life that transhumanists dream of. This sense of heterogeneity may be dissolved in the T-posthuman which has been improved in all respects including cognition, emotion and morality. In this sense, transhuman is a transitional stage to move to T-posthuman.

Then, is the life of the T-posthuman the ideal life that transhumanists dream of? T-posthuman is a being that has been enhanced in all respects including cognition, emotion and morality. There is no sense of heterogeneity in T-posthuman because it is wholly enhanced. However, the T-posthuman also does not have the ideal life for the following reasons. First, the fact that T-posthuman is a being wholly enhanced means paradoxically that there is no part that can be a basis for self-identity. The continuity of self-identity is possible on the basis of the unenhanced part. Because there is no unenhanced part in the T-posthuman, the identity that connects the T-posthuman before and after enhancement disappears. So, the T-posthuman loses its self-identity because it is totally different being from the human before enhancement.

> in considering they are no longer humans it seems that non-humans do not need to respect the humanistic moral values and to take care of humans as the unenhanced.

> Even if the inequality, artificial as well as primitive, is solved, it does not the end because the real problem of inequality still remains to be unsolved. The various distinctions that correspond to that between the enhanced and the unenhanced in the T-posthuman society (although there are semantic differences a little) are presented.

The enhanced = the strong = the wired = lonely eagle = master
The unenhanced = the weak = the disconnected = sitting duck = slave

The distinction between master and slave is Nietzsche's. In *On the Genealogy of Morality* (1887), Nietzsche describes the origin of mater morality and slave morality. A minor but superior group and a majority but inferior group are disputed, and the superior group conquers the inferior group and, as a result, the former became masters and the latter became slaves. The two classes have different moral system respectively. The criteria of master morality are 'good and bad' (*Gut und Schlecht*). The good comes from the attitude of a master that proudly affirming himself, whereas the bad is derived from the attitude of slaves. On the other hand, the standard of slave morality is *'Gut und Böse'*. Here, the good is revealed in the attitude of slaves, and the evil is derived from the attitude of the master. In sum, the good and the bad are distinguished in master moral, and the good and the evil are distributed in slave morality.[6] Slaves have deep-seated resentment, frustration, and hostility accompanied by a sense of their being powerless to express these feelings directly envy and hate toward their masters. Nietzsche uses the notion of *ressentiment* in order to refer to feelings of slaves with their masters.[7] However, slaves succeeded in evangelizing the values system through a mental revolt to construct a world dominated by their morality, and, as a result, everything related to their weaknesses, which were judged to be 'bad', were classified as 'good', and everything related to 'good' is classified as 'evil'. This slave revolt is a value evangelism driven by ressentiment.

In posthuman age, there will be a class differentiation corresponding to the Nietzschean class of master-slave. T-posthuman become the new master and humans become the new slaves. As Nietzsche grasps, the virtue of master is composed of affirmation stemming from superior power, while the virtue of slaves is negativity of ressentiment, which is derived from their inferior abilities. The new slaves, who have not improved cognitively, emotionally, physically, and morally in the T-posthuman age, will have ressentiment to new masters. The slave revolt was possible in the Nietzschean society of master-slave, but it is unlikely to be in T-posthuman

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6. F. Nietzsche (2006 / 1887), §I, 11.
7. F. Nietzsche (2006), §I, 10, §I, 13-15, §III, 19, §III, 26-27.

society. According to Nietzsche, slave revolt reversed the value standards and, as a result, the overall level of humans has been equalized downwardly and humans gradually began to fall. From the Nietzschean point of view, new masters do not have any moral responsibility to care about or heal the ressentiment of slaves and slave revolt is not necessary. Since humans and T-posthuman are totally different, they will be given different moral status, so they will have different moralities, like master and slave of Nietzsche. What is important is that in T-posthuman society, equality is possible only between humans or between T-posthuman, not possible between human and T-posthuman. If slave revolt is impossible in the T-posthuman society, who will care about the ressentiment of slaves?

## 6. Overman

So far, I examined the nature of transhuman and T-transhuman that are defined in transhumanism, and ressentiment of slaves that is supposed to occur in T-posthuman society. How about the posthuman society that is defined by posthumanism? As already mentioned before, humans are already living in a posthuman society. However, in order for a particular society to be called a posthuman society, at least one of the following conditions must be met. (i) The majority of citizens live in posthuman life and (ii) there are few posthuman as a central force of the society. Contemporary society does not satisfy them and even if we live in a posthuman society, it should be regarded as a very early stage of posthuman society. In posthuman societies, in the sense of (i) and (ii)), two groups will occur as in T-posthuman society, but there will be considerable differences in detail between them. It is because it is difficult to think that such a distinction will necessarily lead to the division of the strong and the weak, given the fact that the motto of posthumanism is to overcome humanism and its dichotomy, though there will be the distinction between humans and posthuman. Here, the problem occurs about how to understand posthuman.

What is posthuman? For me the question is not about posthuman's enhanced cognitive, emotive, physical, and moral abilities, but about their values and moral orientation. Is posthuman a good super-human or a bad super-human? Often there are people who identify posthuman with Nietzschean Overman (*Übermensch*). This is wrong because even if posthuman is super-human with good will, other conditions must be met for the super-human to be Overman. According to Nietzsche, Overman is a being that is required as a creator of a new value system to correct the value evangelism brought about by the slave revolt. Likewise, posthuman must have the ability to create new values for posthuman age in order to be Overman.

When Nietzsche declared that "God is dead" (*Gott ist tot*), what he really meant was that the metaphysical dichotomy that distinguished between God and humans, which had been taken for granted so far, was over. Nietzsche saw that such a dichotomy posed a tragedy

that affirmed only the world of existence and denied the world of life. Overman is the creator of the value system for a new world in which God is not present. In this sense, Nietzsche's idea of Overman is consistent with the basic spirit of posthumanism. When we approach Nietzsche's philosophy centering on notions of ressentiment and Overman, it looks like a powerful hammer that breaks ramparts surrounding humanism and, in this sense, we can see Nietzsche as a posthumanist. On the other hand, Nietzsche is still a supporter of enlightenment in that he is aroused by an awakening of immature humans, an unfounded taboo, and the shackles of unjust repression. In that sense, Nietzsche's Overman is basically closer to T-posthuman than posthuman.

What will be new values for posthuman age? I guess it will be *openness*. The more humans approach to posthuman society, the more they will be connected to humans, transhuman, T-posthuman, and posthuman as well as smart machines and inanimate objects. The interconnectivity between humans and objects requires its components to have an openness to others and, as result, all kinds of dichotomy will be collapsed. The dramatic reduction in difference such as personality, uniqueness, heterogeneity, and unfamiliarity will result in openness. Life in posthuman age will be classified into two types as follows.

CD-Life; Creative and dynamic life

CM-Life: Comfortable and monotonous life

In posthuman age, a large number of humans will live a comfortable but monotonous lives (CD-Life), and a few will pursue creative and dynamic lives with novelty and openness (CM-Life), and only a few actually live creative and dynamic lives.

How can Overman heal humans in CM-Life? What is required in the posthuman age is virtue or strength that challenges or pursue new things. Socrates reminded us that life to be pursued is not a 'comfortable life' but a 'good life'. The good life in posthuman age becomes synonymous with creative life. Costs will be required to pursue and achieve it. This suggests that in posthuman age, the difference of creativity and richness work still as fundamental obstacles for pursuing a good life. Here, we find another request for Overman. In posthuman society, there is a need for Overman who can eliminate such obstacles and liberate human from the network of ressentiment. Overman can heal posthuman society by real openness necessary to transform the society into a world in which both humans and posthuman can live good lives.

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# Proceedings of
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