2018 UNESCO Strategy Research Project

The Republic of Korea's Vision in Relation to UNESCO in a Changing World Order

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Preamble of Constitution of the UNESCO

The Constitution of UNESCO, signed on 16 November 1945, came into force on 4 November 1946 after ratification by twenty countries: Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, France, Greece, India, Lebanon, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.

Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

Adopted in London on 16 November 1945 and amended by the General Conference at its 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 12th, 15th, 17th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 24th, 25th, 26th, 27th, 28th, 29th and 31st sessions.

The Governments of the States Parties to this Constitution on behalf of their peoples declare:

That since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed;

That ignorance of each other's ways and lives has been a common cause, throughout the history of mankind, of that suspicion and mistrust between the peoples of the world through which their differences have all too often broken into war;

That the great and terrible war which has now ended was a war made possible by the denial of the democratic principles of the dignity, equality and mutual respect of men, and by the propagation, in their place, through ignorance and prejudice, of the doctrine of the inequality of men and races;

That the wide diffusion of culture, and the education of humanity for justice and liberty and peace are indispensable to the dignity of man and constitute a sacred duty which all the nations must fulfil in a spirit of mutual assistance and concern;

That a peace based exclusively upon the political and economic arrangements of governments would not be a peace which could secure the unanimous, lasting and sincere support of the peoples of the world, and that the peace must therefore be founded, if it is not to fail, upon the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind.

For these reasons, the States Parties to this Constitution, believing in full and equal opportunities for education for all, in the unrestricted pursuit of objective truth, and in the free exchange of ideas and knowledge, are agreed and determined to develop and to increase the means of communication between their peoples and to employ these means for the purposes of mutual understanding and a truer and more perfect knowledge of each other's lives;

In consequence whereof they do hereby create the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization for the purpose of advancing, through the educational and scientific and cultural relations of the peoples of the world, the objectives of international peace and of the common welfare of mankind for which the United Nations Organization was established and which its Charter proclaims.

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PART I. The Republic of Korea's Vision in Relation to UNESCO

Korea's Vision In Relation To UNESCO

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I. Introduction

After two devastating world wars, UNESCO was founded to prevent the outbreak of another such war and to build peace through international cooperation in education, the sciences and culture. High expectations were placed on this new international organization. Since the Enlightenment, humans had dreamed of using cooperation and exchange to work towards the common goals of humankind, even amid the harsh reality of international politics, where each country ruthlessly pursued its own national interests. UNESCO, an international organization and part of the UN system, was a product of that dream, in that UNESCO seeks to build global peace through education, science and culture, not through politics, economics or military force. Its foundation was significant since it involved nation-states, by their own consensus, taking steps to go beyond the concept of the nation-state.

From shortly after its founding, however, UNESCO's activities were hampered by the Cold War. The organization was confronted with a difficult and complicated situation as non-aligned countries emerged and conflict between the North and the South intensified. Meanwhile, UNESCO's composition diversified. Over time, the rise in the number of the member states led to an increase in the number of the members with situations and aims that were different from those of the original members. The international political environment also underwent drastic changes with the occurrence of, among other things, détente, the fall of the socialist bloc, and globalization. Amid many difficulties, including its own organizational ups and downs, UNESCO has nonetheless achieved significant results,

and made its mark on the world through a variety of programs.

Despite such achivements and progress, UNESCO has been criticized over a long period of time for its politicization, inefficiency and a number of crises. The United States took the lead in the founding of UNESCO and has been one of its biggest contributors. Yet, in 1984, the U.S. left UNESCO, citing the organization's political bias and lax management. Even though the U.S rejoined in 2002, it ceased funding the organization again in 2011 in protest of UNESCO's admission of Palestine as a full member, which put a strain on UNESCO's finances. In 2017, the U.S declared its decision to withdraw from UNESCO, citing politicization and the need for fundamental reform as the reasons. UNESCO's members discussed reform and the organization took various measures while Irina Bokova was in office as Director-General, including reorganization and downsizing. However, it is not clear that the members had a common understanding of the direction of the reform, and it will take longer to solve UNESCO's ongoing financial problems, despite a rise in China's share of contributions to UNESCO's budget.

Some experts cautiously predict that while the current fluid situation is difficult for UNESCO, it offers an opportunity for the Republic of Korea (referred to as 'Korea' in the rest of this article). Korea's UNESCO activities have, so far, been aimed primarily at enhancing its national image. In conducting such activities, Korea has acted reservedly, showing itself as passive, reactive and inconsistent. The current situation not only offers a chance for Korea to change this, by actively presenting a vision in relation to UNESCO and following it consistently, but also requires Korea to do so.

Korea is a major member state of UNESCO in terms of the size of its economy, the contributions it makes to UNESCO's regular budget and by way of voluntary contributions to UNESCO, and the fact that it has one of the largest and most active national commissions for UNESCO. Korea has shown its commitment to promoting education through its sponsorship of the UNESCO King Sejong Literacy Prize, its establishment of the Asia Pacific Centre of

Education for International Understanding (APCEIU), which promotes global citizenship education, and its hosting of the World Education Forum. Korea also sponsors the Jikji Memory of the World Prize and participates in a wide range of UNESCO programs, including the Man and Biosphere program, (Biosphere Reserves), the Global Geoparks program, the World Heritage program, the Intangible Cultural Heritage program, the Memory of the World (documentary heritage) and the UNESCO Creative Cities Network. Korea also operates five UNESCO category 2 centers, comprising APCEIU, the International Information and Networking Centre for Intangible Cultural Heritage in the Asia-Pacific Region (ICHCAP), the International Centre of Martial Arts for Youth Development and Engagement (ICM), the International Centre for Water Security and Sustainable Management (i-WSSM), and the International Centre for Documentary Heritage (ICDH), and was most recently elected to the UNESCO Executive Board in 2015.

Despite such active participation and contributions, Korea does not seem to have a vision for the future with UNESCO, nor has it shown evidence of consistent, active efforts to set the agenda or lead discussions on various issues within UNESCO. The term 'UNESCO Strategy' appeared in the UNESCO Strategy Forum, hosted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, together with the Korean National Commission for UNESCO, during the period from May 28 to August 31 in 2007. Four sessions of the forum were held, with the aim of actively utilizing UNESCO's ability to enlist international cooperation in the fields of education, the sciences and culture to expand Korea's soft power. Discussions were held with local experts on UNESCO, seeking to strengthen Korea's activities as a UNESCO member through re-entry to the Executive Board and re-establishment of the Permanent Delegation of the Republic of Korea to UNESCO. At the fourth meeting, on August 31, 2007, Um Sanghyun, then deputy superintendent of schools at the South Gyeongsang provincial office of education, said that a strategy had to be outlined at the national level to enable Korea to engage actively in UNESCO activities and that Korea had to take systematic and consistent action within the framework of the strategy.

Thanks to such efforts, Korea was newly elected to the UNESCO Executive Board, together with another 31 member states, at the UNESCO General Conference in Paris, France, on October 24, 2007. Although the Permanent Delegation of the Republic of Korea to UNESCO was temporarily unable to function as a result of opposition from the Ministry of Economy and Finance, an ambassador was appointed again in 2009 and the Permanent Delegation started work once more. After the forum, strategy in relation to UNESCO was not actively discussed again until 2011, when a study entitled 'UNESCO and the Republic of Korea: Basic Research on the ROK's Strategy towards UNESCO', was conducted and in 2012, when a paper titled 'Korea's Diplomatic Strategy towards UNESCO' was published by Sookmyung Institute of Global Governance.

In 2013, the results of another piece of research, titled 'UNESCO in Crisis: Where to Go?', were published. This research, which was carried out by the Korean National Commission for UNESCO and funded by the Ministry of Education, analyzed the crisis facing UNESCO and made eight suggestions for the reform of UNESCO, in addition to recommending that national commissions be reformed and their role expanded. Yet no real efforts appear to have been made to share these suggestions on the global stage or to put them into practice. There have been times, such as in 2007, when Korea has discussed the establishment of a policy in relation to UNESCO, but for most of the 68 years since Korea joined UNESCO, Korea has had no clear vision nor a consistent policy in relation to the organization, other than a broad aim of enhancing its national image. Other than the Korean National Commission for UNESCO, governmental bodies appear to engage in UNESCO activities when the opportunity arises and that body is interested in taking the opportunity, but there is no regular, systematic sharing of views or coordination among ministries. Experts at the 2007 UNESCO Strategy Forum pointed out that Korea had in the past only been interested in issues concerning its national interest, when it came to strategy toward and participation in UNESCO. Some experts also asked why Korea's diplomacy towards UNESCO could be said to be lacking as a whole, in spite of the exceptional capability of the Korean National Commission for UNESCO.

A stark example is the inconsistent behavior Korea displayed in relation to the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. In the process of promoting the convention, UNESCO's secretariat and many member states praised Korea's movement against the abolition of the screen quota system as exemplary. Some even said that the movement played a role as a driving force behind the adoption of the convention. The Korean government voted in favor of the convention in October, 2005, but immediately afterwards issued a joint statement with Japan, Mexico and New Zealand, reaffirming the U.S. argument that the convention should not affect rights and obligations under other international agreements, and delayed ratifying the convention until April, 2010, when it became the 114th country to do so.

Nevertheless, Korea has become an increasingly active participant in a broad range of UNESCO activities and has become a larger contributor to UNESCO's budget. In December 2017 the country held another UNESCO Strategy Forum, the first since 2007. In March 2018, a government reshuffle saw the Multilateral Cultural Affairs and Tourism Division become the UNESCO Division, which demonstrates increasing interest from the Korean government in UNESCO. It is under such circumstances that the research covered in this article has been conducted.

II. Korea's Vision in relation to UNESCO

This study was conducted by staff members of the Korean National Commission for UNESCO together with academics, and was sponsored by Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is part of an effort to think about the effects of the increasing changes in the world order, the crisis facing UNESCO and consequent calls for reform, and Korea's growing contribution and role within UNESCO, and to seek measures to address these issues. Lim Hyun Mook (2018, UNESCO in a Changing World Order) summarizes the issues to be addressed as follows. The world order is undergoing increasing change, with China fast emerging as a powerhouse,

though the U.S. remains the most powerful nation, while rage and resistance towards neoliberal economic globalization are being expressed in a variety of ways. What is the meaning of such momentous changes for UNESCO? Are the vision and goals of UNESCO, which was established shortly after the Second World War to promote mutual understanding between countries and to build peace in the world, still valid? How should East Asian countries, including Korea, which have experienced the Cold War and the post-Cold War era in a different way from the West, view UNESCO? What goals should Korea pursue in its rapidly expanding cooperation with UNESCO?

Lim Hyun Mook (2018) takes note of three points in particular. First, the recent U.S. re-withdrawal from UNESCO came in the context of the Trump administration's 'America First' foreign policy, though the direct cause was stated to be the significant arrears which the U.S. had amassed since ceasing to pay its contributions to UNESCO's regular budget in 2011. Second, following the U.S. withdrawal, China will become the largest contributor to UNESCO's regular budget. Chances are that China will try to use UNESCO as a forum to spread new values based on traditional Chinese concepts. Third, efforts by the current Director-General of UNESCO, Audrey Azoulay, to effect reform of the organization will be hugely affected by whether China decides to act in a nationalistic fashion or not. As a result, Lim Hyun Mook insists that Korea should devise measures aimed at limiting nation-centric action by UNESCO member states. He suggests that one such measure would be to actively support international exchanges and cooperation among intellectuals, scientists and artists pursuing peace in East Asia.

The terms 'vision' and 'goals' are used, but what action, exactly, should Korea take? Is it desirable, as Um Sanghyun suggested at the 2007 UNESCO Strategy Forum, that a strategy be set at the national level with a clear system of overall control through which the statements and activities of all government departments and agencies are led, coordinated and controlled so that UNESCO activities are carried out with efficiency and strict consistency?

In the face of calls for a national policy, some have argued that it would be difficult for Korea to maintain a clear stance and act consistently in all the various fields that UNESCO encompasses, given that Korea is not a very powerful nation, is highly dependent on international trade, and as a divided country has many considerations to bear in mind, not least national security considerations. As such, Korea is not in a position to act freely, and could not maintain a consistent policy. Such arguments insist that, while it may not be ideal, it is more realistic and advisable to continue the present system, under which each government ministry or agency proposes and takes part in a variety of projects as occasion arises, with a focus on enhancing Korea's national image. This is a reasonable view.

However, it is worrying that this approach is likely to cause inefficiency in practice. Sohn Hyuk Sang (2018), whose research for the present study examined Korea's support for UNESCO in the context of its overall support for international organizations, summarized the features of this support and its associated problems as follows. First, he noted the lack of a coordination mechanism for the various Korean governmental bodies who act as donors to international organizations. Second, he noted that overlapping contributions regularly occur within a particular field. Third, he noted that the sciences and communications fields account for a relatively small proportion of the budget, compared to the education field. This, he noted, is because the Korean government does not have an organized and consistent strategy towards UNESCO. Without a pan-governmental strategy, he suggests, simply increasing the budget for a department will only lead to further inefficiency, with the fragmentation of operations and projects. Since it would be absurd to accept an increase in inefficiency as the price of expanding Korea's UNESCO activities, consideration of an overall vision and goals is inevitable. Sohn Hyuk Sang therefore points out the need to set a pan-governmental strategy in relation to UNESCO and to coordinate the allocation of contributions to UNESCO between government departments (Sohn Hyuk Sang 2018).

The argument that only powerful nations are in a position to maintain a vision and goals does not make sense on close examination. Precisely because they have more power, more entangled interests, more responsibilities and more promises to keep, great powers are not

necessarily freer to take action than middle or lesser powers. The size and power of a country are not the deciding factors in the ability to maintain a vision and goals.

One point to note here is that establishing a vision and goals does not necessarily mean setting a clear integrated strategy at the national level and establishing a control tower system to coordinate and manage all functions systematically so that all statements and actions are consistent. The consideration of a vision and goals does not mean that a 'powerful' vision and control at the national level are possible or needed. It may simply be about embracing a variety of opinions and views and loosely coordinating the action of each department and agency. In this case, a control mechanism may seek to orchestrate various opinions, rather than to ensure complete control and consistency.

This study does not ask whether or not a powerful vision at the national level is desirable, necessary or possible. The research is designed, rather, to stress the need to step up efforts to devise a long-term vision, to coordinate statements and actions, and to be more consistent. Now, Korea has a greater say in UNESCO and engages in more activities, in line with the increase in its presence and status on the global stage. The world order is changing and UNESCO is facing a financial crisis and implementing organizational reforms. This study does not determine whether Korea should pursue thorough and consistent policies, or adopt a more flexible approach that embraces various perspectives and options while contemplating its vision and goals. Either way, Korea should be an active participant in setting UNESCO's vision and agenda for the future, propose plans for reform, and be more consistent in its attitude and actions in relation to UNESCO issues. Besides Korea's special historical relationship with UNESCO, UNESCO's fundamental values and goals give Korea many good reasons to take an active role in the organization.

The researchers involved in this study did not focus on forming policies, values and conclusions that could be simply and easily summarized. Following the selection of the researchers by the Korean National Commission for UNESCO through discussion with

experts, a first meeting was held among the researchers, the Secretary-General of the Korean National Commission for UNESCO, Kim Kwangho, other staff members of the Korean National Commission for UNESCO, and the Deputy Director of the Multilateral Cultural Affairs and Tourism Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Baek Minji. Several further meetings were then held, during which the researchers shared their opinions on the study, and decided the topics on which they would focus, based on their interests and expertise. Early discussions involved examining the current situation, drawing up a list of tasks and issues, and deciding on the basic direction and approach for the research. The discussions were led by members of the Korean National Commission for UNESCO, together with Lew Seok-jin, a political scientist at Sogang University who conducted research on Korea's UNESCO strategy in 2011 and investigated possible measures to reform a crisis-ridden UNESCO in 2013, and Han Kyung-Koo, a specialist in cultural anthropology at Seoul National University, who has experience in various UNESCO activities related to culture. The research discussions are summarized below.

Lew Seok-jin (2018, The Direction of Korea's Involvement with UNESCO) suggested the following approaches to setting its vision in relation to UNESCO. First, Korea needs to decide whether it sees UNESCO primarily as an organization pursuing values like peace, or as an organization for development. Second, Korea should review what value and meaning UNESCO has for itself. In the process of considering these questions, Korea will discover what kind of vision it wants to pursue and where it should focus. Lew Seok-jin noted that in 2014, in celebration of the 60th anniversary of its foundation, the Korean National Commission for UNESCO had already declared two visions for its own work: "Building Peace with the People of Korea" and "Sharing Dreams with the World through Education." It had also announced three areas of work that it would promote: supporting education in underdeveloped countries, fostering the next generation of global talent, and contributing to peace on the Korean peninsula and in East Asia. He also emphasized that Korea's very effective use of UNESCO's cultural programs and its contribution, as a nation with advanced IT, to UNESCO's New World Information and Communication Order should be borne in mind

when setting the national strategy in relation to UNESCO (Lew Seok-jin 2018).

Going further, Lew Seok-jin stressed that Korea's vision and role in relation to UNESCO need to be considered from a recipient's perspective, not from a donor's perspective. He said that focusing on the question of what values should be realized through UNESCO reflects only the donor's perspective. Consideration should also be given to how to help recipients effectively obtain what they need. This, he said, is because countless suggestions have already been made about UNESCO's values, and the current debate is about setting priorities. Seen from this perspective, he said, the current discussion about the efficiency of UNESCO's projects only reflects donors' views, without considering the recipients' viewpoint (Lew Seok-jin 2018). When recipients' views are considered, Korea's experience of changing from an aid recipient into a donor is globally significant. Korea's vision for its future projects with UNESCO should therefore, he suggested, be based on an analysis of the factors that made it a success story among recipient countries (Lew Seok-jin 2018).

Han Kyung-Koo has participated in UNESCO activities in a variety of capacities. As a cultural anthropologist, he saw it as necessary not to take the current reality as a matter of course, and to raise some fundamental questions. First, in response to arguments that politicization is a problem for UNESCO, he suggested that UNESCO had been political from its very foundation and that the argument that an organization dealing with education, the sciences and culture should not be political was itself a form of political view. Rather than considering politicization to be a problem in and of itself, he said the question should rather be about what kind of politicization was taking place within UNESCO. Second, he noted that some have insisted on the need for reform of the organization and its governance, citing inefficiency as the reason, but he questioned whether it was proper to evaluate UNESCO and its activities on the terms used to evaluate business organizations. Third, he asked whether certain recent activities and debates concerning UNESCO ignore the nature and mission of UNESCO. He suggested that careless use of the word "strategy" may be problematic in the context of the activities of an organization established to pursue peace.

After raising such fundamental questions, Han Kyung-Koo offered three suggestions as to what Korea should focus on in its UNESCO-related activities. First, he suggested that the international community should actively engage with the issue of UNESCO's identity, calling attention to the nature of UNESCO and emphasizing its uniqueness whenever opportunity offers. Second, to help tackle the crisis that UNESCO is currently facing, Korea should expand the role of its national commission and the exchanges it undertakes, to support capacity development within other national commissions. Third, Korea should use its rich, striking, and sometimes painful historical experiences in terms of cultural diversity, and its experience of a variety of UNESCO's activities in the cultural field, to support and lead research and discussion on cultural diversity.

From this starting point, discussing the basic approach and direction for the research, further presentations and discussions were held among the experts and staff from the Korean National Commission for UNESCO, during which opinions were shared and revised. The opportunity was also taken to hold a mid-term review during the 2018 Jeju Forum for Peace and Prosperity. On the morning of June 28, 2018, a meeting was held to discuss the research, with Chung Utak (Director of APCEIU), Choi Dongju (Sookmyung University), Bae Yeongja (Konkuk University), and Chang Jae-bok (Korea's ambassador to the Organization Internationale de la Francophonie) acting as discussants.

A session on UNESCO was also held as part of a symposium on the 60th anniversary of the Korean Society for Cultural Anthropology, held in Seoul National University. The session was chaired by Im Donhee (Dongguk University), the Chairperson of the Korean Intangible Heritage Association. Kwon Heonik (University of Cambridge), Lee Taeju (Hansung University), and Han Geonsu (Kangwon National University) participated as presenters, while Han Kyung-Koo (Seoul National University) and Lim Hyun Mook (Korean National Commission for UNESCO) acted as presenters and discussants. A number of other anthropologists and staff members from the Korean National Commission for UNESCO also participated. To allow for more in-depth discussions, the joint research team held a

roundtable on August 23, 2018 with the relevant staff at the Korean National Commission for UNESCO and the presenters from the UNESCO session that had been held during the Korean Society for Cultural Anthropology's symposium.

The joint study was completed through another round of presentations and discussions with experts at the 2018 UNESCO Strategy Forum held in Seoul on November 13, 2018. The researchers made final revisions and additions to their papers reflecting the discussions at the Strategy Forum. The results of the study reflect the common basis produced through its discussions, but they nevertheless embrace a range of perspectives with no forced efforts to come to a single, clear and consistent conclusion.

Most of the researchers on this study are political science experts with significant experience in research on UNESCO and other international organizations. Thus, as the sole cultural anthropologist on the study, the author of this paper believes his contribution may be to raise questions and make suggestions from a cultural perspective. In the remainder of this paper, the author has given additional explanation of the issues that he raised as a member of the research team, and bearing in mind those questions, what he believes is important to include in Korea's UNESCO strategy.

III. Several Questions for Korea's Vision in relation to UNESCO

In order for Korea to be able to engage in the process of establishing a vision for UNESCO's future and make suggestions for reform of the organization, it needs to consider how it should view UNESCO, and consider its understanding of the criticisms aimed at UNESCO and issues that are seen as 'problematic'. Above all, fundamental questions need to be asked about the premises and presumptions on which these existing criticisms and problem points have been raised.

1. The Politicization Problem

UNESCO has been criticized for its politicization for a long time. According to Jeon Jinsung (2013), Nicholas Burnet, a former Assistant Director-General for Education at UNESCO, called politicization a serious problem for the organization, as it meant that UNESCO spent more time on political discussions, such as the dispute between the Arab world and Israel, than on its major program agenda. Jeon Jinsung notes that recruitment of those in the secretariat, especially for high level positions, involves lobbying, the wielding of political influence, political dealings, and fierce competition. Political dealings in the establishment and operations of the UNESCO's 52 field offices and 12 affiliated research centers can, he said, also be problematic, and the World Heritage and Intangible Cultural Heritage Programs have also been criticized for their politicization.

It is true that Israel's withdrawal from UNESCO in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal was a political decision. It is true that, besides any consideration of the program's original purpose, or the evaluation of outstanding universal value, the political concerns of the countries involved were a key factor in Japan's controversial push to have Gunkanjima registered as UNESCO World Heritage, and in UNESCO's decision to delay a decision on whether a nomination by a multinational coalition of civic groups to register documents related to the 'Comfort Women' (Japan's wartime sexual enslavement of women) on the Memory of the World. There is no question that UNESCO is a venue where political differences and conflicts are often expressed.

But is politicization really a problem? The belief that it is a problem is based on the premise that UNESCO should have nothing to do with politics. Many people think that education, the sciences and culture should transcend politics, and therefore that UNESCO should also transcend politics. This, however, is misguided.

It is impossible for all UNESCO's activities to be irrelevant to politics, to the extent that education, the sciences and culture are affected by issues of discrimination and exclusion

that arise from differences in class, power, race and gender. Some argue that UNESCO became too involved in political issues beyond the scope of its activities in its promotion of the New World Information & Communication Order. Hong Seungmok (2013), as part of research on reforming UNESCO, commented that the decision was not the product of a deviation by UNESCO from its path, but the result of its being an inherently political organization.

Seeing the "politicization" of UNESCO as problematic is to deny the political nature of UNESCO's work. The argument for depoliticizing UNESCO is merely the expression of a certain political view of the nature of its tasks and solutions. In other words, de-politicization is not a solution, but a denial of the problem. Politicization is not, in and of itself, the issue for UNESCO. Rather, what needs to be discussed is whether the form and style of politicization is problematic, and how to pursue a "better" or "less bad" politicization.

UNESCO is a product of the intellectual legacy of the Enlightenment. The intellectuals, scholars and artists of that period hoped to pursue a cosmopolitan ideal, beyond conflicting interests and prejudice, through education, study and culture. The founders of UNESCO hoped that bias, hatred, ignorance could be overcome through education and the sciences, that human life could be improved through the preservation and enjoyment of culture, and that peace could be built through mutual understanding.

As Claude Lévi-Strauss argued, bias and hatred can grow from misunderstanding and ignorance, but are also caused by power struggles and fierce and unequal competition for resources resulting from, among other things, explosive population growth. Questions about what should be taught, how it should be taught, who should be teaching whom are highly political.

Culture also has a political nature. While arts and literature are not always political, in international relations, when there are tensions in a complicated political or economic

situation, the parties involved often try to use cultural exchanges as a catalyst in their relations. Such actions seem to be based on the idea that culture and the arts are nonpolitical or even transcend politics.

This idea that culture not political is, however, clearly a political opinion in itself. Such cultural exchanges are carefully calculated political efforts. Culture and the arts may occupy a place beyond the inequality, oppression, conflict and tensions of reality, and it may be that they are expected to do so, but, the idea that culture and the arts in reality should be nonpolitical tends to suppress and undermine freedom of expression and creativity. In addition, if the concept of culture is seen as encompassing everything about the way in which humans lead their lives, in line with the adoption of an anthropological concept of culture as seen in the Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies adopted by UNESCO in 1982, during the *Mundiacult* World Conference on Cultural Policies, it is an obvious corollary that culture must be political in nature.

With the development of the historiography and philosophy of science, it has also become difficult to argue that the development and use of scientific knowledge are value neutral, objective, and nonpolitical. The idea that science and technology are embedded in culture and society is no longer controversial or subject to dispute.

The above demonstrates why efforts to build peace through education, the sciences and culture are naturally and necessarily political. Such efforts are simply attempts to overcome problems that are difficult to solve through realpolitik, and do not constitute a denial or rejection of the political characteristics of such problems or the political aspects of measures to solve them. What is more troubling is the kind of 'bad' politicization, or short-sighted and narrow-minded politics, which make UNESCO a venue for constant competition between nations over short-term national interests. UNESCO, though founded by consensus among nation-states, was, after all, intended to transcend the boundaries of nation-states and realpolitik in the international community to pursue peace, or the

common interest of humankind.

The problem of UNESCO's so-called politicization arises because discussions within UNESCO are used by member states as a competitive forum for their own realpolitik. The solution to the problem is therefore not de-politicization, but rather a heightened form of 'international politicization', or pursuit of an 'enlightened national interest', transcending the power politics of individual states, which pursue short-sighted national interests with tunnel vision, to search instead for more active and diverse forms of solidarity in global civil society.

Jo Dong-Joon (2018, The Politicization of UNESCO) who focused his research for the joint study on the politicization of UNESCO, also thinks that politicization within UNESCO began as soon as it was established. Education, he notes, is not politically neutral, but rather a key issue in politics, and UNESCO has covered this key area in politics from the beginning of its existence.

He also points out that a new wave of politicization was triggered by changes in the international environment in the 1960s when many newly-independent countries joined UNESCO.

According to Jo Dong-Joon (2018), many of these newly-independent member states made efforts to put anti-colonialism, of relevance to their own countries, on UNESCO's agenda, connecting it with UNESCO's efforts to combat racism. Certain of UNESCO's major founding member states, who were outnumbered, criticized these activities of the newly-independent countries as being political, creating the myth that UNESCO was established originally as a nonpolitical organization. UNESCO has always been in a state of change. It began with a focus only on its original purpose, but later sought to benefit developing countries. Now, it promotes an environment where the international community can pursue education, culture, mass communication and intellectual cooperation in the future. In this regard, the

U.S. withdrawal is a painful hindrance for the process of transformation of UNESCO.

2. The Reform of UNESCO and the So-called Inefficiency Issue

UNESCO has been accused of inefficient and lax operations, even compared to other international organizations. This criticism is reasonable to a degree and the problem does clearly need to be tackled. Jeon Jinsung (2013) gives an overview of the criticisms and negative assessments of UNESCO's inefficiency and lax operations and its efforts to address these problems. Yet, the outlook for implementation of such reforms is not promising.

On the other hand, most of the criticisms and the plans to reform UNESCO appear to be based on ignorance or misunderstanding of the organization and its fundamental purpose. UNESCO has a unique mission that is very wide in scope, and needs to evolve and change in a unique way to respond to global changes. However, critics appear to ignore this and judge the organization by standards suited to organizations with relatively small and short-term missions.

It is undeniable that there are problems and points requiring improvement within UNESCO. UNESCO is, however, an organization with a massive remit, covering education, the sciences and culture. A large number of countries, communities, and individuals, with a vast variety of different cultures and historical backgrounds, participate in UNESCO's agenda setting and project implementation. It is problematic to use modern business concepts and terminology, such as 'efficiency', to analyze and evaluate such an organization, or to suggest plans for its reform.

Efficiency is just one element of the concept of rationality as proposed by Max Weber, and while it is given great weight by commercial organizations, it is merely one of several major considerations for non-profit organizations. Rationality in method is important, but not as much as rationality of purpose. Moreover, in the field of education, effectiveness is as important as efficiency. It is a serious problem that business terminology such as

'management by objectives', 'results-oriented' and 'performance standards,' which were designed for the analysis and evaluation of the performance of large companies in a capitalist society, are being applied to UNESCO simply because concepts, methods and theoretical frameworks for analyzing and evaluating non-profit organizations that serve the public interest have not been sufficiently developed.

UNESCO has a massive open-ended remit and is therefore unlike so-called 'successful' organizations that have clear and far narrower missions and goals. The more successful its efforts to achieve its goals, the less the organization and its systems of operation may be needed for these goals. They may even become an obstacle. In addition, UNESCO constantly needs to adapt itself and its work, in response to changes in the current situation, including changes resulting from its own achievements and failures. Methods to evaluate UNESCO and plans for its reform need to take account of the particular nature of the organization. The evaluation methods and practices used in ordinary organizations are not appropriate and should be rejected.

Cho HanSeung (2018), who concentrated his research for this study on UNESCO's governance reforms and financial difficulties, agreed with Hong Seungmok (2013) and suggested that reform of UNESCO's unique governance structure should seek to manage its distinct form of politicization, rather than remove it. Following a review of UNESCO's project management and organizational culture, he noted that it there was no real prospect of a massive shake-up at the moment. He predicted that a reduction in the authority of UNESCO's Executive Board, which is often mentioned as a potential reform measure, would not be a solution in practice. Instead, he proposed improving the efficiency of the General Conference and the coordination of the tasks among the organization's three core administrative bodies (Cho HanSeung 2018).

In particular, he warned that UNESCO's noble ideals should not be disregarded in the name of efficiency, and that measures to tackle UNESCO's problems should be within the spirit of

the organization and take a long-term view, on the basis that education, the sciences and culture should be evaluated not by the standard of short-term, tangible, quantitative performance, but in terms of long-term, intrinsic and fundamental progress (Cho HanSeung 2018).

His concerns and comments imply that there is the need to ask whether the original mission and nature of UNESCO has been forgotten in the process of identifying UNESCO's problems and discussing reform.

3. The Nature of UNESCO

UNESCO has a unique character, as an international organization pursuing peace through education, the sciences and culture. Its fundamental purpose goes beyond the short-term interests of nation-states, though it was founded by the consensus of nation-states. It is a serious problem that this unique character and fundamental purpose have been disregarded in discussions of a vision for UNESCO, and plans to reform the organization. Evidence of this problem can be seen in the statements and actions of UNESCO, related agencies and individuals, as well as in evaluations and criticism of UNESCO and in suggested plans for reform of the organization.

For example, military terms like 'strategy' are overused in connection with UNESCO. One example is the document titled 'Sweden's UNESCO Strategy 2014-2017' that was drawn up by the Swedish National Committee for UNESCO, a major contributor to peace in the world. Korea is no exception to this trend. One of the reasons for this is the substantial influence of business consulting, but another basic reason is a shortage of sensitivity and reflection and on UNESCO's fundamental purpose and nature. In the case of Korea, when commemorative group photos are taken at events, including UNESCO events, it is common for everyone to raise their fists and shout 'Fighting!' This is perhaps because Koreans became accustomed to a 'just get it done' spirit that was promoted during the country's rapid economic growth under ex-military presidents, or it may perhaps be because Koreans had to fight for

democracy. There is no doubt that building and maintaining peace oftentimes requires great courage and sacrifice. Nevertheless, shouting 'Fighting!' in such situations is not something to be proud of.

One of the things that distinguishes UNESCO from other international organizations is the existence of its system of national commissions and the intellectuals and experts who have taken a deep interest in, and constantly worked towards, peace and exchanges through education and culture since before the foundation of UNESCO. The forerunner of UNESCO is said to be International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation, which acted as an advisory institution to the League of Nations, and consisted of celebrated European intellectuals, such as Henri Bergson, Paul Valéry, Thomas Mann, Albert Einstein and Marie Curie, acting in their personal capacity, rather than as representatives of their countries. Even after the founding of UNESCO in 1946, the members of its Executive Board seem to have acted in a private capacity to some degree. After UNESCO's Constitution was revised in November 1954, the 22 members of the Executive Board became representatives of their countries.[1] This change in UNESCO's governance laid the groundwork for cooperation of member states in the fields of its competence and helped member states to recognize the purpose and duties of UNESCO.

For a new international organization, involvement of the delegates of the member states is required to encourage the participation of member states and their recognition of the organization, to promote international cooperation, but for UNESCO the presence of the national commissions, and the intellectuals and experts who directly or indirectly engage in UNESCO and national commission activities, are crucial, and contribute something very

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[1] Amendments to Article V concerning the Composition of the Executive Board. (a) Article V, paragraph 1 is replaced by the following '1. The Executive Board shall be elected by the General Conference from among the delegates appointed by the Member States and shall consist of 22 mem -bers , each of whom shall represent the government of the State of which he is a national. The President of the General Conference shall sit ex officio in an advisory capacity on the Executive Board.' (UNESCO 1954, 12)

particular to the organization. The national commissions, as well as individual academics and experts, operate differently and under different conditions, but they all have the potential to pursue the common interests of humankind, interpreting national interests in a broad sense and from a long term perspective, contrary to the permanent delegations sent by member states' ministries of foreign affairs, which are bound to pursue more shortsighted national interests. It is unfortunate, however, that cooperation and exchanges among the national commissions for UNESCO are currently limited and that the national commissions are not very vocal in UNESCO's activities or efforts to reform the organization.

4. What Should Korea Do?

According to Cho Yun Young (2018), whose research for this study considered how UN reform plans and global governance issues affect Korea's vision for UNESCO, the legitimacy and efficiency issues facing UNESCO are wider global governance issues faced by the UN international organizations as a whole, for two reasons. First, countries that are not satisfied that their national interests are being served by international organizations are challenging the legitimacy of these organizations. Second, NGOs and domestic lobbyists are also raising issues of both legitimacy and efficiency. Cho Yun Young also argues that as most global issues involve complex security, economic and social issues, the vast UN system ends up performing overlapping functions within its various independent bodies.

Cho Yun Young expresses worry that, amid an atmosphere of growing uncertainty, there is a trend for many countries to prioritize state-centric diplomatic policies over the seeking of a cooperative international system. Reinforcement of global governance, which involves securing investment and continued interest so that improvements can be made in the system for each area, is no simple task. She argues, however, that, in the context of such a situation, efforts must be made to find an international system that can bolster the currently weakening international cooperation and assist the renaissance of an improved global governance system.

IV. Korea's Vision in respect of UNESCO in the Field of Culture

If Korea pushes ahead with more systematic and consistent policies and activities relating to UNESCO, aimed at harmonizing UNESCO'S founding purpose and goals with Korea's long-term foreign policies, even if such policies are not necessarily clear and simple and not universally agreed, its efforts must necessarily be based on the resources Korea can muster and invest, as well as popular opinion and the consensus of local society within Korea. Nonetheless, in the process, Korea's vision for UNESCO should involve comprehensive consideration of all relevant issues, including the criticisms and complaints levelled at UNESCO, the calls for reform, the organization's financial difficulties and governance issues, Korea's standing in the international community and its national image, Korea's contributions to international society, such as its international development cooperation, and its contributions to world peace, which have a direct connection to the easing of tensions and establishment of peace on the Korean Peninsula.

1. Emphasis on the Distinctive Nature of UNESCO

As already noted, UNESCO headquarters, the Swedish National Commission for UNESCO and others use the word 'strategy' in their plans and reports with no recognition that this could be problematic. This research project also began with the title of 'Korea's Strategy in relation to UNESCO', while a preceding study was titled 'UNESCO and the Republic of Korea: Basic Research for the ROK's Strategy in relation to UNESCO'. The word strategy was originally a military term, but is often heard in discussions on peace or culture, as it is widely used in the business field and the private sector.

The term 'strategy' tends to have a significant influence on our attitudes, thinking and behavior as we try to understand the current reality and change the future. The word 'strategy' originated from the ancient Greek word *strategos*, which means general, and the compound word for strategy used in several East Asian countries contains a word the means war. When education takes a strategic approach, students are likely to be treated as the

objects of tactics, instead of being considered as human beings with independent thoughts, feelings and behaviors. A strategic approach to culture tends to reduce room for respect for various perspectives and creativity. No matter how well intended, it is unlikely that many people would want to be subject to such strategies.

Korea could take the lead in refraining from using the word strategy, instead using alternative words such as vision, plan, direction or scheme. The international community needs to emphasize UNESCO's distinctive nature and use words with care and caution to create greater awareness in relation to peace. Some people might say that language does not necessarily affect people's way of thinking, and that content outweighs the words used to convey it. However, this kind of meticulous change in sensitivity is necessary if we hope to be able to see the world from the perspective of others and build a culture of peace.

In 1948, the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea was sent to Korea to supervise its elections. In the UN General Assembly, the Korean government was recognized as a legitimate government with dominion and jurisdiction over the Korean peninsula, where most Koreans lived. Yet, the Republic of Korea was unable to become a member of the UN until 1991. This 40 year period from 1950, when Korea was not a member of the UN, but was a member of UNESCO, is one reason why the relationship between Korea and UNESCO is special. UNESCO played the role of a bridge, connecting Korea's educational, scientific and cultural activities to those of the international community, and providing a venue for exchanges and development.

This special relationship and history with UNESCO is a significant moral and cultural resource in terms of Korea's vision and activities towards UNESCO. Given the history of UNESCO's particular interest in and support for Korea's development, it is natural that Korea should wish to show particular interest in and support for UNESCO. As a result, mere participation in and contributions to UNESCO's projects and debates are not enough. Korea should be conducting research in various fields, and leading discussions aimed at making

suggestions on the long-term direction that UNESCO should be taking, and changes that the organization should be making, helping to set a new and meaningful agenda for the organization.

2. Initiatives relating to National Commissions

National commissions are a feature particular to UNESCO. UNESCO alone has a global network of national commissions. The reason for this might be that, while the role of government is undoubtedly important in education, the sciences, and culture, the roles of civil society, intellectuals and experts are also significant. When the system of national commissions was first devised, they were only expected to act as advisory bodies and contact points. In 1976, their role was expanded to include the distribution of information and the planning, implementation and assessment of programs. Later still, the role was expanded to include the building of partnerships at the national level (Senechal et al 2011).

Choi Dongju (2013), following research that explored possible measures for the reform of UNESCO, proposed further expansion of the role of national commissions. He suggested that if, in trying to address the crisis it faces, UNESCO places top priority on its organizational efficiency and the decentralization of its decision-making, and if decentralization based on voluntary participation by member states is central to the process of reform, then the first thing to be investigated is the possibility of decentralization through the national commissions. Choi Dongju noted that each national commission is different in terms of its size and composition, its capacity and its budget. He also stated, however, that by developing and strengthening national commissions' capacities and the relationships between them, member states can better understand each other's different environments and promote the voluntary and autonomous participation of national commissions. He argued that by, for instance, narrowing gaps between policy and the actual situation in each member state, national commissions can take on more responsibility and become more functionally effective.

The Korean National Commission for UNESCO is one of the largest and most active of the national commissions. In partnership with other major national commissions, and with the support of the Permanent Delegation of the Republic of Korea to UNESCO, the Korean National Commission should conduct research into potential ways to enhance communication, exchanges and cooperation between the UNESCO Secretariat and the national commissions, and among the national commissions, as well as researching various models for the composition and activities of national commissions and ways in which these can best be put into practice. Such research should lead to concrete suggestions for implementation. In particular, it is important that, during this process, the Korean National Commission use its own experience to help other member states strengthen the capacities of their national commissions.

3. Support for the Development of Studies and Discourse on Cultural Diversity

One of the most important areas for Korea to examine and promote is research, discourse and action on the meaning, practice, protection and improvement of cultural diversity. On the surface, Korea has relatively little experience in dealing with considerations of cultural diversity, since it was until very recently ethnically homogenous and never had an empire, so it may be thought that its population did not contain groups of ethnic minorities and did not have to live alongside other peoples.

However, Korea is no stranger to the cultural diversity issue. As neighboring China, a political, economic, military and cultural powerhouse, thought of itself as the center of the world, until recently Korea persistently had to deal with tensions and conflicts between the Korean way of life, the teachings of the Chinese sages and the changing situation in China over time. Korea acknowledged universal Chinese values and institutions, though it also revered Dangun and Gija, the founders of ancient kingdoms in Korea, following its local customs and proprieties. Korea tried to internalize the Chinese view of the world order, called *Tianxia,* or 'All-Under-Heaven', and its view of civilization, so, for example, even wedding ceremonies were held in accordance with Confucian customary formalities. In

addition, Korea considered the Japanese, and the Manchus, who while not Chinese had in fact ruled China for some time, as barbarians. In the late Joseon Dynasty era, those in the ruling class, with their supreme love of learning, hoped that what they considered 'western barbarians' would come to understand the teachings of the Chinese sages, even after facing the Westerners' highly developed industry and military technology. However, their sense of civilization was soon shattered. While some, such as Shin Chaeho, worked to arouse national consciousness by glorifying the brilliance and splendor of ancient Korea, many Koreans, as well as the Japanese colonizers of Korea, considered Korean history and cultural heritage an obstacle that hampered the country's modernization and development. There were a variety of movements aimed at national reform, and not only among pro-Japanese collaborators.

This trend continued even after Korea's liberation from Japan. Korea's push for economic development and its rapid industrialization and urbanization had to take place amid the bloodshed and destruction caused by the Korean War, and later the tensions of the Cold War and continued confrontations with North Korea. Even as its national culture was worshipped, emphasis was placed on the need to build a modern state, so Koreans' mental outlook and actions underwent a remodeling. The unique characteristics and the diversity within Korean culture have sometimes been distorted in the process. The fact that universal values like human rights and democracy were adopted in a divided Korea mainly through the influence of the U.S. meant that their adoption was accompanied by considerable tensions. Oppression and discrimination have, at times, been justified as being 'Korean style'.

National self-esteem and the confidence regained through the country's economic growth were hit hard by the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s. The pressure to conform to global standards was a shock to the Korean economy but also was a chance to reform particular features that, while characteristic of the economy, were also entrenched problems. While globalization and the opening of markets provoked an identity crisis and anxieties, they

raised hopes for the growth of the cultural industry, which appear to have been borne out by the success of the Korean Wave.

Meanwhile, as universal values and norms such as human rights took root following the peaceful transition of power and the development of democracy, there was increasing recognition of the need for inclusive attitudes towards marriage migrants and foreign workers, and policies to support these. Ethnocentrism with its base in cultural superiority was as powerful as ever but ethnic nationalism emphasizing blood ties began to be dismissed as a legacy of the past by the mainstream media, including the conservative Chosun Ilbo. North Korean slogans like 'our people alone' or 'national pride' no longer impressed or appealed to young South Koreans.

In this respect, Korea has direct historical experience of the major points at issue in current discussions on cultural diversity. Prior to the modern era China served as an important 'Other' in Korea's thinking about many aspects in its society, while in the modern era Japan and the U.S. have served the same role. This has been the case in Korea's consideration of universal values and norms, its own cultural traditions and practices, modernization and the development of science and technology, opening and reform in response to globalization and changing circumstances, the attendant dangers of national identity crises and subordination to other, more powerful countries, and the ambivalence of its cultural industry, among other things. This thinking can be seen clearly in the process of Korea's ratification of the Convention for the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions and the Korean government's attitude after the ratification.

Korea has experience of the major issues in cultural discourse and the cultural industry from the perspective of both a developing country and a developed country, which gives Korea a greater ability than many countries to study and reflect on such issues in depth, as well as to lead and advance the wider debate on cultural diversity. The way forward should involve research and reflection on Korea's experience and practices to tease out the various points

at issue in debates on cultural diversity to strike a balance between the arguments for culture and arguments for economic and industrial interests.

The importance of research and discourse on cultural diversity is becomes even clearer if we consider events after the establishment of UNESCO. The organization was created immediately after the Second World War, at a time when many people saw a need to push the spread of democracy throughout the world and help poor peoples in Asian and African countries to reach a minimum standard of living. Peter Mandler (Mandler 2013) has said that this era was dominated by 'democratic universalism'. In this atmosphere, efforts to find common ground to achieve democracy and modernization held greater sway than attention to and respect for cultural differences, while international organizations and governments in advanced countries turned their attention to what they called universal values. While Marxists had a different perspective, they too took a universalistic view.

Anthropologists such as Margaret Mead had been idealistic, and hopeful that the international order after the War would be based on "the orchestration of cultural diversities" (Mandler 2013). However, the international community, and even UNESCO, were primarily interested in modernization and development in the post-war period, and cultural differences received comparatively little attention. UNESCO focused its development cooperation activities in the field of education on literacy rather than on cultural traditions. This was education for survival in the modern world, and little attention was given to culture in the list of priorities.

The Cold War was another early hit to UNESCO's internationalist hopes and ideals. As the Cold War heated up, partisanship overwhelmed other considerations. In such circumstances, visions of intercultural understanding and development, based on cultural relativism, were regarded as nonsense or an unrealistic ideal. At times, they may even have been subject to suspicion and attack, as being unhelpful to the fight, or a dangerous idea beneficial to the enemy.

It is worth noting that another important reason why cultural diversity may have been ignored was that UNESCO's perception of it was not very clear. At that time, UNESCO thought of culture in terms of the highest achievements of humankind or in the narrow sense of literature and the arts. Even when culture was seen as indicating the whole lifestyle of a group of people, no distinction was made between cultural boundaries and the borders of nation states. In such cases, cultural diversity was only seen as meaning the diversity where several different cultures met and combined. There was no recognition of issues relating to diversity within a culture.

When putting together a manual for UNESCO's development projects, Margaret Mead drew attention to issues such as the various shocks visited on indigenous cultures, the gap between the majority of indigenous peoples and westernized local elites, people's aspirations for development, and their fear of and resistance to change. Rather than Margaret Mead's cautious and long-term approach, however, most development assistance departments preferred the approaches of economists and advocates for modernization who argued that quick and clear results could be produced using their methods (Mandler 1963).

It took considerable time for UNESCO to pay real attention to the concept of cultural diversity. Although the UN and UNESCO claimed that they valued culture, they did not officially recognize culture, in the sense of a whole lifestyle, as a fundamental human right until the 1960s. The concept of cultural diversity has its roots in UNESCO's discussions in the cultural sphere, but the right to culture in the sense of the right to maintain one's own lifestyle, was not included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. It was only in 2015 that the right to culture in this sense was even partly included in Sustainable Development Goal 4.7 through a reference to "education for…appreciation of cultural diversity and of culture's contribution to sustainable development". Discussions on cultural diversity started in earnest after the World Trade Organization was established and powerful nation-states such as France began to support discussions to protect their own cultural industries and markets.

For a long time, the right to culture was seen in a narrow sense, in which an individual had a right to enjoy culture as understood to be 'the arts', for instance as mentioned in a list alongside politics, the economy, society, etc. The UN Commission on Human Rights, which was responsible for drafting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights simply ignored a written response, sent in 1947 by the executive committee of the American Anthropological Association that argued that the UN Declaration of human rights should contain respect for an individual's personality, the right for him or her to fully develop as a member of their community, and respect for the cultures of different human groups. Instead, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights merely mentions the right to culture as an individual's right. It was not until 1966 that the cultural rights of a group, beyond individual rights, can be found, in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Since then, the right to culture has been further developed through the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities in 1992, the Vienna Declaration in 1993, the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity in 2001 and the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions in 2005. Still, further challenges can be expected in terms of its interpretation and practice (Kim Namguk 2010).

Cultural diversity can be categorized into two types. One is the diversity of cultures or diversity through multiple cultures, in other words diversity created by different cultures. The second type is diversity within a culture. In this respect, UNESCO's declarations and conventions on cultural diversity all have a problem in that they give the impression that culture centers around nations, identifying national boundaries with cultural boundaries, and in that, instead of preserving cultural diversity, they preserve existing cultural boundaries and practices. There is, therefore, a need to revisit and develop the concept of culture used in UNESCO's cultural programs such as the World Heritage, Intangible Cultural Heritage, and Memory of the World programs, and the UNESCO Creative Cities Network.

V. Conclusions

UNESCO's recent difficulties result not only from external factors like the U.S. ceasing to pay financial contributions, but also from internal factors. It could be said that, for an organization that specializes in the cultural field, UNESCO has not been sufficiently focused on culture. Some critics say that UNESCO is trapped in bureaucracy and is not future-oriented, nor creative or energetic. While UNESCO has recruited high-level officials with excellent skills from outside the organization, doubts have been expressed as to whether such people have a sufficient understanding of UNESCO and the sort of educational and cultural issues that the organization must address. Some fear that in pursuing formal rationality, UNESCO might neglect its own nature and actual circumstances.

In particular, in the field of culture, despite various studies conducted through UNESCO, with the exception of a few examples dealing with cultural diversity such as that by F. Bernard, there appears to be a lack of conscious and introspective efforts to define, expand and revitalize the concept of culture to keep up with changes in today's society. Of course, since the foundation of UNESCO, there have been some examples of examination of the activities that UNESCO has undertaken in respect of cultural diversity and efforts to seek strategies. A prime example is the series of research reports published by Katerina Stenou in her role as the director of the Division of Cultural Policies and Intercultural Dialogue. It is, nonetheless difficult to say that these resulted from new and active efforts at self-examination, since they were based on official documents. This acts as another major factor limiting UNESCO's ability to engage in its proper, core activities, along with its bureaucracy, its indiscriminate use of military terms such as 'strategy' and the employment of business terms and techniques to analyze, evaluate and try to improve this nonprofit organization and its activities.

The suggestions outlined in this paper result from a consideration of the founding spirit and the activities of UNESCO, but also from a consideration of the areas of UNESCO's

wide-ranging remit to which Korea can most effectively contribute to in practice, and to what extent any such contribution will be in line with current international norms (Sohn Hyuk Sang 2018). It is hoped that this process will clarify how exactly Korea can best help to strengthen UNESCO.

In conclusion, Korea's vision in relation to UNESCO is not only about contribution to building peace in the international community and supporting other countries, but also about the benefit to Korea itself. Korea's vision will only be meaningful if its creation and development are subject to vigorous debate within Korea, and when the direction of the vision has widespread support and consensus within Korean society. As such a debate is, in effect, a facet of the efforts to realize the values of UNESCO within Korea, the country's international contributions and activities are also advantageous to Korea itself.

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UNESCO in a Changing World Order

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About one hundred years ago, the League of Nations was formed in the wake of World War I. Its advisory bodies, the International Committee of Intellectual Cooperation (CICI) and the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation (IIIC) later offered models for UNESCO, which was born immediately after World War II.

UNESCO's primary goal was peace. Soon after its establishment, however, the world plunged into the Cold War. Paradoxically, peace of a kind arrived with this balance of fear. But this was true only for Europe and North America. The non-Western world had to face a series of hot wars, not a cold war. The Cold War at the global level was backed by hot wars fought at the regional level (Kim, Myongsob 2005, 266).

The collapse of the socialist bloc of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe heralded a post-Cold War era, but nominally socialist states persist in East Asia, no matter what their realities are. Consequently, East Asia will likely take a different path in its own post-Cold War era. Take, for instance, the East Asian Paradox, a term indicating a recent phenomenon of worsening territorial and historical disputes in spite of widening economic cooperation in the region.

It can be said that the world order is undergoing a great change. While it is doubtless that the United States remains the world's sole superpower, one can hardly deny that China is rising fast. Meanwhile, citizens in many countries have voiced anger at the neo-liberal economic globalization that has upheld the freedom of markets for decades. Trump's winning of the U.S. presidential election, Brexit in the UK, and the recent rise of exclusive

nationalism and far-right populism all had much to do with such anger. The world order that has prevailed since the end of World War II is shaking.

What does this great change in the world order imply for UNESCO? Are UNESCO's vision and goals, created to contribute to peace through the promotion of mutual understanding between nations, still valid? How should South Korea, and East Asia, whose path to a post-Cold War world has been different from that of the Western world, see UNESCO? What goal is South Korea pursuing in its fast growing cooperation with UNESCO?

With these questions in mind, I will explore the meanings of some important changes occurring within and without UNESCO, such as the recent U.S. withdrawal, the rising influence of China, and the inauguration of a new Director-General, both in general terms and from the standpoint of South Korea in particular. In the following, I suggest, first, that the U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO came in the context of the Trump administration's "America First" foreign policy, and was directly caused by the issue of U.S. arrears, which have been amassing since 2011. Second, with the United States leaving UNESCO, China will become the largest contributor to its regular budget and may attempt to spread new values around the world through UNESCO based on its own traditional concepts. Third, while the new Director-General is pushing for reform, its course may depend to a considerable degree on how far China will be able to go beyond nationalistic concerns and demonstrate new ways of behavior. Fourth, I suggest that South Korea should explore ways for UNESCO's member states to properly restrain their nationalistic tendencies and, as part of such efforts, should support international exchanges and cooperation among peace-loving intellectuals, scientists, writers and artists in East Asia and beyond.

I. U.S. withdrawals from UNESCO

1. The first withdrawal and return

In 1983, the Reagan administration decided to quit UNESCO on the grounds that it was biased in favor of an anti-Western ideology such as in the New World Information Order.[2] The Reagan administration's foreign policy, which put an end to the détente diplomacy of the preceding administration and sought to use its superiority in power to break up the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc, saw little value in UNESCO, which it considered to be contaminated by anti-US sentiment. Since the United States had regarded the free flow of information as essential work for UNESCO from the beginning, it could never accept UNESCO's rejection of this important task nor its conception and dissemination of something like the New World Information Order.

Besides the controversy over the New World Information Order, the issue of World Heritage sites in Jerusalem was another reason for the U.S. withdrawal. In 1981, Jordan requested the inscription of the old city of Jerusalem and its walls on the World Heritage list. The U.S. and Israel strongly opposed this proposal, pointing out that Jordan had no jurisdiction over

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[2] After Amadou Mahtar M'Bow, a Senegalese educator, was elected Director-General in 1974, UNESCO joined the trend of Third World countries protesting against the existing international order. Director-General M'Bow set up the International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems, chaired by Seán MacBride, a famous Irish politician and Nobel Peace Prize winner. In 1980, the Commission submitted the so-called "MacBride Report." The report criticized the monopolization of information by Western news agencies and put forth the idea of the New World Information and Communication Order to tackle it. The Order provoked a fierce controversy. The United States and others had been stressing the importance of a free flow of information, whereas the New World Information Order suggested a "free and balanced flow of information" as an alternative (Chung, Utak 2011, 14-15).

Jerusalem. However, the UNESCO World Heritage Committee ended up voting in favor of the motion after a heated debate. This was a vivid demonstration of the confrontation between the U.S. and the Third World surrounding Israel since the 1970s.

Fundamentally, the Reagan administration's withdrawal from UNESCO was part of its strategy to defeat the socialist bloc. With its view of UNESCO as an anti-Western and pro-Soviet organization, the Reagan administration may have expected to see the organization dismantled after the U.S. withdrawal, and in fact, the question of UNESCO's future did hold the world's keen attention during this period. However, UNESCO survived, with certain European countries, such as France and Germany, and Japan playing a leading role in that survival (Chung, Utak 2011, 16).

In particular, Japan became the largest contributor to UNESCO's regular budget after the U.S. departure. It took the initiative in terms of reforming the organization, and, in 1991, proposed that the membership of the Executive Board, which at that time comprised individuals acting in their own capacity, be replaced with government representatives. In its proposal, Japan stated that because of UNESCO's inefficiency and faulty decision-making structure, three member states had left, and there was no prospect of their return. It said that enhancing the efficiency of the Executive Board was the most urgent issue for UNESCO, and submitted the above-mentioned proposal to address this. Unlike similar ideas that had previously failed, this proposal was approved at the 27th General Conference in 1993, thanks to Japan's sponsorship (Chung, Utak 2011, 18).

Throughout the 1990s, UNESCO urged the U.S. to return, but it was only after the tragic 9/11 terrorist attacks that this came about. One year after the attacks, the U.S. announced its return to UNESCO at the UN General Assembly in 2002. After going through such an unprecedented tragedy, America was prompted to expand its traditional military-centered notion of national security into one embracing sociocultural aspects in order to stop anti-US sentiment from spreading further. As a result, the importance of public diplomacy started to

be recognized in U.S. foreign policy. The need to transform radical anti-US fundamentalists into moderate forces grew more important, and it was understood that an essential way to accomplish this was via education. It was deemed necessary to approach people distrustful of the U.S. in Islamic regions through UNESCO, an organization that was trusted by them (Cho, Hanseung 2007, 55).

At that moment, Director-General Koichiro Matsuura paved the way for the U.S. return by pushing for bold reform. He also made efforts to draw U.S. attention to UNESCO by highlighting educational and cultural actions in Islamic regions, including Afghanistan. His efforts bore fruit and the U.S. finally rejoined UNESCO. However, not long afterwards the U.S. suffered frustration once again at another incident in which it felt isolated within the organization. In October 2005, after debates between the U.S. and many other states in which the U.S. was resisting the adoption of a convention on cultural diversity, a vote was taken but the U.S. was badly defeated.

2. The second withdrawal

President Trump announced the second U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO in October 2017. The direct trigger was UNESCO's decision on a Palestinian nomination to the World Heritage list. In July 2017, the World Heritage Committee approved Palestine's proposal for the old city of Hebron to be recognized as World Heritage, with twelve votes in favor, three against, and six abstentions. The result led to immediate outrage from the Israeli delegate and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu later denounced it as "another delusional UNESCO decision." The U.S. and Israel tried hard to block the Palestinian proposal but failed, with only three votes cast against it.

This was not the first time that an anti-Israel decision was taken at UNESCO. Arab countries have repeatedly brought agenda items relating to World Heritage sites in Jerusalem to the table at UNESCO's General Conferences and Executive Board meetings, and have had a series of resolutions passed with the support of developing countries. Although the content

of these resolutions has changed slightly, their basic line has been to press the Israeli authorities to take necessary measures to preserve World Heritage sites in Jerusalem.

Moreover, a Palestinian application for membership of UNESCO was passed at the General Conference in 2011, by 107 to 14 votes, with 52 abstentions. The U.S., Britain, and Canada voted against, while Japan, South Korea and some other countries abstained. The U.S. had warned that if Palestine was accepted, it would stop all funding to UNESCO in accordance with its national law prohibiting any financial support for international organizations recognizing Palestine as a state. This warning has become reality, and the U.S. has not paid its dues since 2011, amassing arrears of more than US$ 500 million.

Just as the Reagan administration's withdrawal decision had to do with its foreign policy aimed at the collapse of the socialist bloc, the second withdrawal should not be seen as resulting solely from UNESCO's anti-Israel sentiment, but also from the Trump administration's foreign policy, that is, the America First doctrine. In essence, this policy emphasizes the reclamation of legitimate U.S. interests which are seen as having been unfairly sacrificed, particularly in the areas of security and trade. On this note, the Trump administration is demanding that its allies, such as NATO, Japan, and South Korea, spend more on defense. The Trump administration is also showing no hesitation to enter a trade war with China, or to impose tariffs on major exports of other trade surplus countries, while also trying to cancel or amend existing free trade agreements.

By extension, a series of measures have been taken such as pulling out of international organizations and treaties, and reducing funding for international organizations. In January 2017, President Trump considered issuing an executive order which would call for an audit and reduction of U.S. funding for international bodies. In September 2017, President Trump argued in his speech at the UN General Assembly that it was unfair for the U.S. to pay for 22% of the UN's regular budget. He also said that as president of the United States, he would always put America first, just as any other leader of a country puts his or hers first.

Afterwards, the U.S. announced its withdrawal from the UN Human Rights Council and its halt of funding for the council and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.[3] Earlier, it had announced its exit from the Paris Agreement on Climate Change.

All this suggests that the America First policy is geared towards enriching the U.S. and strengthening its armed forces.[4] With this foreign policy, however, the U.S. is creating increasing uncertainty and instability in the international order that it has laid out and

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[3] National Security Advisor John Bolton said on a radio talk show that "the real issue here, I think, is American sovereignty," and that the U.S. decision is "a rejection of the notion that multilateral organizations are in a position to judge representative governments like the United States." This is a statement that reveals a certain aspect of the 'America First' policy. Around 40% of the budget of the Human Rights Council and the High Commissioner's Office comes from the UN regular budget, while voluntary contributions of UN member states account for the remaining amount. The U.S. pays for 22% of the UN regular budget and, in voluntary contributions to the UN's human rights mechanisms (the Human Rights Council, the High Commissioner's Office, etc.), provided additional funding of US$ 17 million in 2016 and US$ 20 million in 2017. "Bolton: U.S. Will Also Stop Funding U.N. Human Rights Council." Retrieved August 3, 2018 from
https://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/patrick-goodenough/bolton-uswill-also-stop-funding-un-human-rights-council.

[4] In his UN speech in 2017, President Trump used the words "sovereign" or "sovereignty" 31 times altogether. Showing his determination to protect U.S. sovereignty, he stressed that "If we are to embrace the opportunities of the future and overcome the present dangers together, there can be no substitute for strong, sovereign, and independent nations." "Remarks by President Trump to the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly" Retrieved August 3, 2018 from
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-72nd-session-united-nations-general-assembly/.

maintained since the end of World War II. Some commentators on international politics interpret this as an outcome of a hegemonic state's strategy to slow down its decline. A hegemonic state, backed by its overwhelming military and economic power, provides public benefits such as international security, a free economic system, and international currency, in order to establish and maintain a world order which guarantees its interests. When it starts declining for one or another reason, however, a hegemon tends to make use of a delaying strategy of decreasing the role of a provider of public benefits and passing the costs on to other states. In other words, a declining hegemon tends to wield 'malevolent hegemony' and attempt to pass the buck on the burden of stabilizing the international system (Kim, Kwanok 2017, 81-83).

Time will tell whether the America First policy is an expression of a U.S. delaying strategy. What is clear at the moment is that the U.S. referred to its financial contributions when it withdrew from UNESCO, the UN Human Rights Council, and the Paris Climate Change Agreement. The first thing the U.S. Department of State mentioned in its statement on its withdrawal from UNESCO was "mounting arrears."[5] Whereas the intention of the U.S. return to UNESCO in 2003 was to de-radicalize anti-American sentiment through the promotion of education in Islamic regions, the Trump administration's re-withdrawal is no less than an announcement that it will stop such cost bearing. Instead, it has chosen to counter anti-American forces through a policy of strengthening its sovereignty, including increasing military power and tightening immigration controls.

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[5] The U.S. Department of State's statement mentioned firstly mounting arrears, secondly the need for fundamental reform, and thirdly continuing anti-Israel bias as the reasons for its withdrawal from UNESCO. It said, however, that the U.S. would continue, as an observer state, to provide its perspectives and expertise on such important issues as the protection of World Heritage, advocacy for press freedom, and the promotion of scientific collaboration and education. "The United States Withdraws From UNESCO," Retrieved August 5, 2018 from https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/10/274748.htm.

In the aftermath of the first U.S. withdrawal, UNESCO suffered severe financial difficulties and had to make large cuts to its staff numbers. The negative impact of the second withdrawal will be less serious. As mentioned earlier, the U.S. has not paid its dues, which account for 22% of UNESCO's regular budget, since 2011. This has already forced the organization to undertake structural adjustments, reducing programs and staff, over the past several years, with the result that it is now in a relatively stable condition. So the important questions concerning the U.S. withdrawal will rather be which member state will have the biggest influence in a UNESCO without the U.S., and in which direction UNESCO will go under that influence.

II. UNESCO and the Rise of China

Last July, Chinese President Xi Jinping said in a meeting with Director-General Audrey Azoulay in Beijing that "In the new era, China adheres to cultural self-confidence, vigorously develops educational, scientific, technological and cultural undertakings, and improves the quality of civility." He also emphasized that "China also upholds the concept of 'a world of great harmony' and harmonious coexistence, and advocates mutual respect, greater exchange and stronger mutual understanding for different cultures." President Xi stated that China's Belt and Road Initiative promoted common development and communication among nations, and that it would make a greater contribution to dialogue among civilizations and the prosperity of humankind. Particularly, he underlined that as the world's largest organization for cooperation in education, science, and culture, UNESCO could play an important role in building "a community with a shared future for humanity," and said that through the stable development of its relations with UNESCO, China would contribute to global peace and development.[6]

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[6] "Chinese president meets UNESCO Director-General Audrey Azoulay," China Daily, July 17, 2018.

It is significant that President Xi mentioned "a world of great harmony" and stressed the building of "a community with a shared future for humanity." Such statements are not simple political rhetoric but rather expressions epitomizing China's foreign policy, suggesting the goal of its cooperation with UNESCO.

Entering the 21st century, China has set out on a civilizational mission of presenting new values to lead the world. China's foreign policy as reported at the 13th National People's Congress in 2018 has the goal of putting forward new norms and standards in the world order through the Belt and Road Initiative. Earlier, in October 2017, at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, President Xi proclaimed that the international order in the new era should be based on a "new type of international relations" respecting norms proposed by China, and stressed that China's initiative in relation to the world order aims ultimately to build a "community with a shared future for humanity." President Xi has long called for a "Chinese solution" to build that community. The solution, according to him, is born within the historical experiences and ways of thinking of the Chinese people, and therefore must be different from the Western paradigm (Jeon, In Gap 2018, 115-116).

Under these circumstances, Chinese intellectuals have churned out a variety of discourses on the world order, including the *tianxia* system, the tribute system, the Confucian civilization-state, and Confucian constitutionalism. All of these are different discourses, based on different logical grounds and arguments, but what is common to them is that, within the scope of traditional concepts and thought, they seek a world of great unity (大同) and harmony through the way of the king (王道), not the way of the hegemon (覇道) (Jeon, In Gap 2018, 122-123).

Great unity, the way of the king, and harmony are all core concepts in Confucianism. In light of this, it is no exaggeration to say that the Chinese intellectual world is being restructured around Confucianism in the 21st century. New Confucians, the new left, and liberals in Mainland China are all grounding their thoughts in Confucianism. The renaissance of

Confucianism has emerged from China's aim of building a new civilization, pushed forward with the self-confidence that China has won through economic growth. In other words, Confucianism has been rediscovered and chosen as an ideology for national integration (Cho, Keong Ran 2013, 78-79).

This is the context in which President Xi mentioned cultural self-confidence together with "a world of great harmony" in his meeting with UNESCO Director-General Azoulay.[7] It may be that China is maintaining and further strengthening its cooperation with UNESCO in the expectation that UNESCO will play a certain role in building the new civilization that China dreams of.

Currently, China is the second largest contributor to the regular budget of UNESCO, following Japan. In the fiscal years 2018-2019, China is responsible for paying 7.920% of UNESCO's regular budget, while Japan is responsible for about two percent more, 9.679%. This will, however, change from 2020. UNESCO member states' contributions to its regular budget are determined in accordance with the UN formula. The UN is planning to raise China's share from 7.921% to 10.808%, while decreasing Japan's from 9.680% to 8.718%.[8]

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[7] Linking cultural self-confidence and a world of great harmony was first suggested by a sociologist and anthropologist, Fei Xiaotong (費孝通, 1910-2005) in his lecture at the Department of Anthropology at Peking University in 1997. In this lecture, he described cultural self-confidence as "cultural self-awareness" and said that "by taking pride in one's own beauty and respecting others' beauty, beauties co-exist and this is the very world of great harmony" (Song, In Jae 2015, 487).

[8] The contributions to the UN regular budget are determined in accordance with the UN Committee on Contributions' calculation of each state's gross income, debt, exchange rate, and other items. UNESCO applies the same formula, but because UNESCO has more member states than the UN, there is a slight difference between the percentage contributions for UNESCO and those for the UN.

UNESCO will apply this changed formula from the next fiscal year, 2020, which will make China the largest contributor to UNESCO's regular budget, overtaking Japan.[9]

As mentioned above, Japan led the reform of the Executive Board, a core decision-making body of UNESCO, while it was UNESCO's largest sponsor after the first U.S. withdrawal. What will China do when it becomes the number one contributor in the wake of the second U.S. withdrawal? Considering what President Xi mentioned in his meeting with Director-General Azoulay, we may suppose that China will use UNESCO as a forum through which to attempt to propose new values, based on traditional Chinese concepts, to international society. In this case, 'great harmony/unity' may be the leading candidate for a new value.

In Confucianism, great harmony indicates an ideal world.[10] Great harmony implies a world where the great way (大道) is practiced, and there the whole world is considered to be public. The benevolent and the able are chosen for office. People overcome distinctions between themselves and others and seek mutual trust and harmony, while leaders chosen on the basis of their benevolence and ability work for the common good of humanity, going beyond individual or national interests. Thus, all live a stable life, and special care is given

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[9] Aside from their contributions to the UNESCO regular budget, Japan and China funded US$ 20 million and US$ 4 million respectively in voluntary contributions in 2017. South Korea's voluntary contributions amounted to US$ 17 million. See the UNESCO Transparency Portal (opendata.unesco.org).

[10] The concept of great harmony is described in *Liji* (禮記, The Book of Rites). "When the great way (大道) was practiced, the world was shared by all alike. The worthy and the able were promoted to office and men practiced good faith and lived in affection. Therefore they did not regard as parents only their own parents, or as sons only their own sons. The aged found a fitting close to their lives, [. . .] the widow and widower, the orphaned and the sick with proper care. [. . .] thieves and rebels did not arise, so that people could leave their outer gates unbolted. This was the age of great harmony" (Kwon and Bok 2018, 361).

particularly to those in difficult situations. No one plots evil for their selfish interests, or harms others, or causes unrest. In the world of great harmony, the whole of humanity enjoys a humane and peaceful life (Kwon and Bok 2018).

Apparently, this concept of great harmony is linked with the concept of "community with a shared future for humanity" mentioned by President Xi to Director-General Azoulay. Great harmony is a world where the common interests of all humanity are pursued beyond national boundaries. However, what matters is the real substance of such ideal concepts. The question is what political and economic institutions are backing these concepts, and also what are realities of President Xi's "new type of international relations."

The world is watching China's rise with differing eyes. Some view it as a relatively positive phenomenon, thinking that it could offer a solution to various negative aspects of the modernization led by the Western world. Others take a Sinophobic view, recalling Sinocentrism and the premodern tribute system. The direction China will go of course depends on the choice of the Chinese people. As a neighboring country with inseparable historical ties to China, however, South Korea must pay keen attention to this question. It must also pay attention to the intention and content of China's deepening cooperation with UNESCO.

III. Reform of UNESCO

In November 2009, with the election of Irina Bokova as Director-General, the UNESCO General Conference decided to order an external evaluation of the organization. Accordingly, an external evaluation team was set up and, over the course of several months, undertook an investigation into UNESCO's programs and its organizational structures and processes. On the basis of this evaluation, the external evaluation team recommended that UNESCO (1) concentrate on fewer programs with a greater impact; (2) get closer to the field; (3)

strengthen cooperation with the UN; (4) improve its governance structure; and (5) reinforce cooperation with civil society and the private sector. [11] Following the review, Director-General Bokova took a range of reform measures to implement these recommendations until her retirement in 2017.

The changes that were made as a result included the introduction of results-based program planning and evaluation, and the strengthening UNESCO's identity as a UN body. In the reform of field offices and the improvement of the governance structure, however, not much progress was made, since states that hosted field offices, as well as members of UNESCO's core decision-making organs such as the Executive Board and other subsidiary committees refused to make any concessions on their vested interests. In addition, measures aimed at concentrating the organization's resources on fewer, more effective programs, which could be seen as the most important reform, were also thwarted in the face of strong opposition from some member states with regard to proposals to close down certain existing programs or merge them with other programs. Such contradictory behavior by member states, demanding reform while at the same time clinging to their own shortsighted interests, prevented Director-General Bokova's reform policies from bearing significant fruit.

In fact, reform has been on every Director-General's agenda. Director-General Matsuura, Bokova's predecessor, also carried out major reforms to downsize the organization, including reducing the number of director-level staff from about 200 to about 100. The current Director-General, Audrey Azoulay, appointed in November, 2017, is also keen on reform, outlining transformation plans in June, 2018.[12] These plans include enhancing efficiency, strengthening external communication, and increasing the relevance and effectiveness of programs. By and large, these are no different from former Directors-General's reform agendas.

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[11] 185 EX/18, "Report on the Independent External Evaluation of UNESCO," 2010.

[12] 205 EX/5 Part III.D, "UNESCO's Strategic Transformation," 2018.

It is premature to guess what results Director-General Azoulay will achieve through her reform policy. What and how should UNESCO reform? UNESCO's mission is clear. It is to contribute to world peace through the promotion of mutual understanding between states. This is idealistic, but at the same time realistic. It is idealistic in that it dreams of peace achieved via no other means but 'mutual understanding,' and realistic in that it speaks of understanding between states. It is idealistic in that it believes in a solid peace made possible fundamentally by understanding others rather than by achievements in political, economic, and security negotiations and the keeping of promises. It is realistic in that it recognizes the important role of states, by stressing understanding among states rather than seeking mutual understanding of all by all.

The mutual understanding that UNESCO aims to achieve is not limited to understanding between states. It encompasses understanding between cultures, peoples, and religions. However, as revealed in the name of its long-lasting program concerning Education for International Understanding, UNESCO has in fact put more weight on mutual understanding between nation states. We could thus say that UNESCO has in its history been walking a tightrope, trying to find a delicate balance between idealism and realism. In other words, while recognizing the actual influence of states, it has nevertheless within this structure attempted to go beyond their boundaries.

Looking back on UNESCO's history in 2005, Roger-Pol Droit, a French philosopher, found the birth of UNESCO itself surprising. He said that all other international organizations deal with material concerns, such as trade, labor, and finance, or the mediation of conflicts of interest, or responding to humanitarian crises, whereas only UNESCO has the goal of advocating ethical values and abstract principles. He stressed that no organization other than UNESCO has ever brought together states for continued and regular meetings with the aim of promoting mutual understanding between cultures for world peace (Droit 2005, 11).
However, the unique and distinct mission of UNESCO was destined to confront challenges from the outset, since building a peaceful world through mutual understanding is not

possible without greatly changing the nature of states themselves. After all, are not UNESCO's members modern sovereign states which regard the pursuit of national interests as a top priority and the ensuring of their survival as a categorical imperative? Although it is said that we are today in a post-modern era, there is little evidence of any change to this aspect of the nature of modern states.[13] As such, Droit's statement that it is surprising that the world's nation states have come together for the sake of mutual understanding between cultures, and that the very existence of UNESCO, as an organization dedicated to achieving it, is unique, may be read not as praise for UNESCO, but rather as suggestive of the enormous difficulties inherent in such a mission.

UNESCO's dilemma becomes even clearer when we track the behavioral patterns of member states. Enrico Bertacchini and his colleagues analyzed the decision-making processes of the UNESCO World Heritage Committee from 2003 to 2012. They focused on cases where the opinions of expert advisory bodies to refer, defer, or not to inscribe were not taken, and instead decisions were taken at a higher level, one or two stages further along the process. The researchers measured statistically how Committee members' political and economic relationships with countries requesting inscription influenced their statements at the plenary sessions of the World Heritage Committee and found a strong correlation between them (Bertacchini et al. 2016, 114-124). This correlation showed that Committee members were more likely to prioritize national interests, viewed in the light of their relationships with requesting countries, over their duties as members of the World

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[13] Of course, there is the case of the EU, where states partially surrender their sovereignty and pursue common interests. It seems premature, however, to say that there has been a great change in the nature of states, when we look at the way in which most EU countries addressed the recent issue of the massive influx of refugees to Europe. Nevertheless, we should note that the EU has made important attempts at change, such as its use of the qualified majority system and, going further, the double majority system requiring 55% of the number of member states and 65% of the total population. See Jeong (2011) for the EU's decision-making systems.

Heritage Committee, which is supposed to assess the value of common heritage of humankind from a scientific or global human community perspective.

UNESCO will not likely overcome the above-mentioned dilemma, unless there is a change in the behavioral pattern of member states which puts their national interests first. The reform of UNESCO is unlikely to be profound unless the focus is placed on the resolution of this dilemma. Serious reform, then, will have to tackle the behavioral patterns of member states, which are the parties with the right to make decisions within UNESCO and the ones obligated to fund it. Is such reform possible?

It is necessary, although not easy, to motivate member states to change their behavior by reforming as the organization's governance structure. We should also be cognizant that today's world is undergoing a great transformation. One scholar says that the Western-led modern world is ending and shifting toward a late modern era in which unipolar Western civilization becomes a multipolar world. He goes on to stress that it is time to find ways for multiple civilizations and states to co-exist and prosper peacefully (Kim, Sangjun 2016, 280).

If our world is indeed being transformed from unipolar Western civilization to a multipolar world, we would do well to contemplate the implications for UNESCO of both the U.S. withdrawal and the rise of China in such a macroscopic context. At the moment, however, it does not seem that China is presenting a blueprint for new civilization. Rather, what it is currently showing to the world is no more than the portrait of an aggressive sovereign state that responds sensitively to any provocation to its interests. If this mode of behavior lasts, the hypothesis of transformation to a multipolar world should be dismissed. This will have a negative influence on UNESCO's reform, as the dilemma facing UNESCO will persist.

If, on the contrary, China proves to be different from other hegemonic states through its project of building a new civilization, the world will see the dawn of a multipolar era for civilization. Furthermore, if China displays new ways of behavior which are consistent with

the "great harmony" and "shared future for humanity" mentioned by President Xi, there will necessarily be a great change in the world order. This could offer UNESCO a good opportunity to escape from its dilemma.

IV. Conclusion

The environment surrounding UNESCO is changing profoundly. Technological advances are giving rise to tremendous effects, and the way people think and behave is also being significantly affected. Simultaneously, the world order is shifting, and it is almost certain that greater changes will come in the future. It is necessary to ask what vision and goals UNESCO should aspire to in this situation.

What role should UNESCO play in East Asia, which experienced the history of the Cold War differently to the West and took a different path towards the post-Cold War era? For parts of East Asia, the Cold War was, ironically, experienced as hot war, and the region is now encountering another irony, of intensifying territorial disputes in the post-Cold War era. The scars of hot war are still vivid, and the weight of history is growing heavier. What should UNESCO aim to do in the face of these realities in East Asia?

This question is critical for South Korea, which was the site of a fierce hot war that inflicted major direct damage upon the people of Korea, and its lingering legacy continues to obstruct peace and co-prosperity in East Asia today. From the standpoint of South Korea, it is critical that East Asian countries should refrain from insisting on their own interests and hegemonic action, and instead work toward common interests. UNESCO's help in this respect is highly desirable.

South Korea should cooperate with UNESCO and encourage it to play such a role in East Asia, a role that role coheres well with UNESCO's mission to promote world peace through intellectual cooperation and moral solidarity. As we have seen, however, this mission of

UNESCO's was destined to meet with difficulty from the beginning. UNESCO's identity as an organization for the promotion of international cooperation in the fields of education, science, and culture immediately clashed with the reality that it is a gathering of government representatives responsible for protecting national interests. To alleviate this dilemma, the founders of UNESCO introduced the unique institution of the National Commission, which is absent in other UN agencies.

The National Commissions for UNESCO came into existence thanks to the unrelenting persuasiveness of the organization's founders, who were concerned that UNESCO might be paralyzed by member states' pursuit of narrow self-interest. As such, the National Commissions were intended to encourage intellectuals, educators, scientists, writers, artists, and journalists to get involved in UNESCO activities, and to facilitate international exchanges and cooperation among these people. The National Commissions were given a pivotal role in building international intellectual cooperation and moral solidarity.

South Korea should actively search for ways to realize the potential of National Commissions so that they can help East Asian states refrain from pursuing exclusive national interests and promote their common interests. South Korea should promote international exchanges and cooperation between peace-loving intellectuals, scientists, educators, writers, artists, and journalists through the institution of the National Commission, thus playing a leading role in widening and deepening mutual understanding between East Asian countries.

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PART II. The Republic of Korea and the Reform of UNESCO

1. Politicization of UNESCO

   Dong-Joon Jo (Seoul National University)

2. UNESCO's Governance Reform and Financial Difficulties

   HanSeung Cho (Dankook University)

3. UNESCO's Organizational Reform

   Jinsung Jeon (Korean National Commission for UNESCO)

4. Global Governance and International Organizations: Reforms and Challenges for the United Nations

   Yun Young Cho (Chung-Ang University))

Politicization of the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization

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Ⅰ. Introduction

The politicization of the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has become the talk of the town in the international community. The talks are diverse: some critics say that pressure from States Parties of the World Heritage Convention, along with the expert evaluation of the heritage's value, plays an unnecessary part in inscription of UNESCO World Heritage (e.g. Bertacchini 2016; Meskell et al. 2014). Some criticize that UNESCO activities go beyond its mandate (e.g. Davis 1975, 6-20; El-Din 2018). Still others point out that UNESCO membership has received excessive attention (e.g., Hagedorn 2017; Interfax 2015). Such different criticisms all have different implications, but they have one thing in common: the premise that the establishment of UNESCO has nothing to do with politics (Sherhan 2017). Was UNESCO truly apolitical when it started?

This chapter argues that the politicization of UNESCO already began when the Organization was first launched, and the changes in the international environment during the 1960s brought about a new phase of politicization. To this end, this chapter reviews the process by which the United Nations, a remnant of the wartime alliance during the Second World War, transformed into an international organization that prepares for a postwar confrontation between the victors and the defeated. Second, the connection between the establishment

of UNESCO and the elimination of Nazism and fascism is to be explained. Amid the Second World War, the Allied powers designed an international organization that promotes a unified curriculum to erase Nazism and fascism from the Axis powers' sphere of influence. This shows that the education was not politically neutral, but rather a key political issue. Moreover, cultural diversity and preservation of culture was included so as to overcome the sense of cultural supremacy innate in Nazism and fascism. Third, this chapter further examines the phenomenon in which UNESCO deals with certain issues that are not aligned with its founding purposes. In the early stage of UNESCO, Members States of the United Nations, all wartime allies, shared a common purpose and pursued similar social and political goals. When newly independent countries joined the Organization in the 1960s, however, this sense of a common purposes started to fade. As these new members began to project their national agenda onto UNESCO activities, the Organization started to drift away from the initial purpose.

II. Emergence of the United Nations System

This part studies the process by which the United Nations system came to be. As challengers to the international order built after the First World War, Japan, Italy, and Germany formed the Axis alliance in 1940. After losing the war, Germany objected to the punitive measures imposed on itself, and Italy became involved in a strategic conflict with the U.K. and France over the colonies in North Africa. Japan was at odds with the U.S. over the sphere of influence in Asia. The three countries came to an agreement in which Japan recognized the interests of Germany and Italy in Europe and vice versa in Asia. Also, the agreement stipulated that when one of them was attacked, the others would offer support. This turned out to be the coalescence of one side of the warring parties in the Second World War. The countries that these three challenged formed a wartime alliance represented by the United Nations, which continued as an international organization after the war.

1. United Nations as a Wartime Alliance

The term, the United Nations, first appeared on January 1, 1942 when representatives from 26 countries gathered in Washington, D.C., called themselves the United Nations and reached the following historical agreement[14]:

(1) (The 26 signatories) Having subscribed to a common program of purposes and principles embodied in the Joint Declaration of the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of Great Britain dated August 14, 1941, known as the Atlantic Charter,[15]

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[14] The countries that were at war with the three Axis powers were named the Allied Countries, or the Allied Powers. The moniker used the passive tense ("allied") to indicate that the Allied Powers were formed in response to an attack initiated by the Axis powers. However, the alliance that the word "allied" originally implies did not accurately represent the *status quo,* in which the 26 countries, though at war with the Axis powers, never really formed an official military alliance. Hence, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt suggested to the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill the name "The United Nations," which Churchill accepted (Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, 2005).

[15] On August 14, 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill met in Argentia Harbor, Newfoundland, and proclaimed the following Charter on common objectives and principles:

First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other;

Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned;

Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them;

Fourth, they will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic

(2) Being convinced that complete victory over their enemies is essential to defend life, liberty, independence and religious freedom, and to preserve human rights and justice in their own lands as well as in other lands, and that they are now engaged in a common struggle against savage and brutal forces seeking to subjugate the world,

Declare:

First, each Government pledges itself to employ its full resources, military or economic, against those members of the Tripartite Pact and its adherents with which such government is at war.

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prosperity;

Fifth, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement and social security;

Sixth, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want;

Seventh, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance;

Eighth, they believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measure which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments.

Second, each Government pledges itself to cooperate with the Governments signatory hereto and not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies. The foregoing declaration may be adhered to by other nations which are, or which may be, rendering material assistance and contributions in the struggle for victory over Hitlerism.

The United Nations as a wartime alliance included the group of powerful nations comprising the U.S., Britain, Soviet Union, and China, countries under the umbrella of the British Empire, such as Australia, Canada, India, and New Zealand, eight governments in exile, including South Africa[16], Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland and Yugoslavia, and South American countries such as Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama. These countries either had already declared a war against the members of the Triple Alliance, or were at war with them. The countries standing opposed to the Triple Alliance during the Second World War thus constituted the United Nations.

2. Creation of the United Nations as an International Organization

At the height of the Second World War in 1942, the Allies started to predict their victory, and set out to find a way to transform the United Nations, a wartime alliance, into a permanent international organization. The search for an international organization that would manage the postwar international order essentially began in January 1930, but it was only in 1942 that the victor countries agreed to model the permanent organization after their wartime alliance nicknamed the United Nations. In October 1943, in Moscow, foreign ministers from the U.S., Britain, Soviet Union and China reached a consensus that they recognize the "necessity of establishing, at the earliest practicable date, a general international

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[16] When Britain declared war on Germany on September 3, 1939, India, which was a protectorate of Britain, automatically became involved in the war. On the same day, Australia and New Zealand also declared war on Germany, and South Africa on September 6, and Canada on September 10. Ireland remained neutral.

organization, based on the principle of sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security" (para.4, Joint Four-Nation Declaration). It was the first time that the foundation of a permanent international organization was publicly declared, hitherto only discussed behind the scenes. When Roosevelt, Churchill, and Joseph Stalin, then the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, met in Teheran from November 28 to December 1 in 1943, they also discussed the permanent establishment of the United Nations as the guardian of peace.

The Dumbarton Oaks Conference, held in Washington, D.C. from August 21 to October 7, 1944, marked the half-way point for transforming the wartime alliance into a permanent organization. After the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in October 1943, delegations from the Foreign Ministries of Britain and the Soviet Union participated in the U.S-led discussion on this transformation. Various ideas were exchanged until the summer of 1944, after which a 40-day negotiation took place at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference with the addition of China's participation. This four-nation negotiation led to the Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization, finally embodying a tentative agreement on the purposes, character, membership, principal organs and authority of the United Nations as an international organization (Kelsen 1945, 45-58; Walters 1945, 143-154).[17]

Differences over the UN as an international organizations were settled at the Yalta

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[17] Two issues were not resolved at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference. The first and the most divisive was the issue of voting methods in the Security Council. While the Soviet Union argued for granting permanent members vetoes on all issues, the U.S. and Britain hoped to harmonize the principle of sovereign equality and vetoes. Second, the Soviet Union insisted that the 15 republics constituting the Soviet Union had to be recognized as separate members of the UN respectively. However, other countries maintained that they all had to be considered a single member.

Conference in February 1945. First, compromises were made about voting in the Security Council. In accordance with the principle of sovereign equality, vetoes of permanent members were not recognized on procedural matters of the Council. In addition, the exclusion principle was agreed on to prevent permanent members from engaging in the decision-making process on disputes they are involved in. Second, the qualifications for "peace-loving states" were specified. Those who declared war on the Axis powers by March 1, 1945 qualified to join the United Nations as a founding member nation. Third, an agreement was reached on the participation of Soviet republics in the UN. The compromise gave membership only to the Soviet Union, Ukraine and White Russian (Belarus). Fourth, a trusteeship system was devised as a replacement for the mandate system of the League of Nations. The Trusteeship Council started to have jurisdiction over the territories under the mandate system, colonies under the rule of the Axis powers and non-self-governing territories. Fifth, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) was established as a judicial organ to adjudicate international conflicts (Park Heungsun 2013, 30-32).

The failure of the League of Nations left several lessons to consider in transforming the United Nations into an international organization. First, the peace treaty ending the Second World War remained separate from the judicial organ of the UN. After the First World War, the world order and the League of Nations were inextricably linked because the Treaty of Versailles, the peace treaty that ended the war, included a clause that established the League of Nations. Therefore, any attempts to reshape the international order automatically translated into a challenge to the League of Nations. The UN Charter was kept separate from the peace treaties ending the Second World War, so as to prevent this drawback. Second, the roles of the Security Council and the General Assembly were differentiated, so that the Security Council was charged with the primary responsibility for maintenance of peace and security, while the General Assembly was given the responsibility of deliberating on other various issues. The League of Nations did not clearly demarcate between the duties of the Assembly and the Council, which caused confusion whenever the two agencies took on the same issues. Third, the principle of sovereign equality was undermined for the sake of

efficiency in the Council's rules of procedure. The Council under the League of Nations adhered to unanimity, but this led to inefficiency as this meant that each member essentially had a veto. To tackle this, the Security Council under the UN adopted the exclusion clause, veto right for the permanent members, and super majority for decision-making. For procedural matters, the Council adopted majority rule. Fourth, specific procedures for a military response against threats to peace were included in the UN Charter, including the rules and procedures for the United Nations Military Staff committee—comprising the chiefs of staff of the permanent members of the Security Council—peace enforcement, or a military response to an act of aggression, and the command authority of the UN forces. The League of Nations in contrast operated under the concept of collective security, in which an attack against one meant an attack against all, but had no procedures that materialized this concept into action. Fifth, compared to the League of Nations, the United Nations put relatively more emphasis on economic issues. This is because it acknowledged that economic issues and security and peace issues were closely intertwined, as the rift of the Second World War adhered to the boundaries of the economic communities led by developed countries. Such lessons from the Second World War led the Economic and Social Council to be considered one of the key organs of the UN (Goodrich 1947, 5-20; Sweetser 1945, 2-5).

When the United Nations was established, there were two groups of organs that were directly concerned with the Second World War. First, the six principal organs were created. The General Assembly deliberated on all issues except security, with the participation of all of the members; the Security Council was given the primary jurisdiction over international peace and security; and the Economic and Social Council was to deliberate on economic, social and human rights issues. The Trusteeship Council supervised the Trust Territories as designated by the UN; International Court of Justice adjudicated international disputes; and the Secretariat was put in charge of administrative continuity in the UN (Colombus 1947, 23-33). Second, four specialized agencies were created to deal with the factors acknowledged as the causes of the Second World War, or to manage the postwar

international order. International Monetary Fund was to tackle the economic factors behind the Second World War, while the World Bank led the postwar recovery efforts. UNESCO addressed education that had been affected by fascism and Nazism, and the Food and Agriculture Organization coped with food shortages in UN Member States.[18] In short, the initial United Nations mirrored the experiences of the Second World War.[19]

III. Establishment of UNESCO and Its Transformation

This part reviews the birth and transformation of UNESCO. UNESCO started as an embodiment of the experiences of the Second World War, but suffered an identity crisis as newly-independent nations and some former enemy countries of the wartime alliance joined the Organization. The new members tried to project their national interests onto UNESCO, which gave rise to a new phase of politicization.

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[18] International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) was to instate the aviation order as led by the UN, a wartime alliance, joined by its Member States, neutral nations, and other relevant countries. Additionally, in the process of transforming the wartime alliance into a permanent international organizations, some Member States led the efforts to give the World Health Organization (WHO) the sole responsibility for health issues.

[19] A total of nine specialized agencies emerged with no relevance to the war. International Telecommunications Union (1865), the Universal Postal Union (1874) and the International Labor Organization (1919) existed before the UN, and became its specialized agencies through special agreements with the UN. The rest—World Meteorological Organization (1950), The World Intellectual Property Organization (1967), the World Tourism Organization (1975), the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (1977), the International Maritime Organization (an intergovernmental consultative organization in 1984; officially launched in 1982) and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (1986)—were formed with UN resolutions.

1. From a Common Curriculum for the United Nations the Wartime Alliance, to Anti-Nazism-Fascism Activities

Many factors contributed to the birth of UNESCO, but the Conference of Allied Ministers of Education on November 16, 1942 was a key trigger.[20] London was the assembly are for the United Nations allies in the summer of 1942 when Germany had dominated Western Europe and was advancing towards the Soviet Union. Even though the United Nations was formed in Washington, D.C. in January 1942, London housed the headquarters for the alliance because it was where the exile governments of Western Europe were clustered together, and the U.S. was focused on ending the war in Europe first. A meeting of the Ministers of Education of the Allies was designed by R. A. Butler, Chairman of the British Board of Education and a member of the House of Commons, and Malcolm Robertson, Chairman of the British Committee for Relations with Other Countries, established in 1934 and renamed the British Council after 1936. This meeting was intended to foster collaboration on educational issues that affected the Allies of Europe and Britain, both during and after the war. After Britain sent out the invitations to all UN Member States in October, the first meeting was held on November 16, 1942 (Intrator 2015, 56-57).[21]

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[20] The forerunner of UNESCO is the Committee on Intellectual Co-operation (1926-1946), which was launched by the League of Nations to seek advice on peace education. The committee lasted until 1939 and the records of its activities were transferred to UNESCO after the war. The International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation (1926-1940 and 1945-1946) was a French branch of the Committee, and acted as an executive organ. Peace education as advocated by the founders of UNESCO may be traced back to the various attempts by educators in the late 19th century (Leland 1946, 295-299; Wooton 1946, 488-489).

[21] The ministers who participated in the first meeting were from Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, Greece, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Yugoslavia and Britain. Except for Britain, all countries were under German occupation. Luxembourg began to take part from the fourth meeting on May 23, 1943. The U.S and the Soviet Union joined as observers. With the

At the time, a shared problem of education ministers of the UN was the education offered by Germany in the occupied territories within the UN Member States. They needed to work together to educate students who had been exposed to Germany's racist and violent education and to recreate the curricula that Germany had destroyed. At the same time, they felt the need to mutually educate their own citizens living in Britain on anti-Nazism. The ministers thus decided to meet whenever needed, as they recognized such common goals of providing education confronting Nazi propaganda, and devising denazification education after the war.

The Conference of Allied Ministers of Education resulted in a long-term plan to create an educational environment that will prevent Nazism and fascism from re-emerging. Though education could not be singled out as the sole cause of the rise of Nazism and fascism, it was recognized that education had at least acted as a linking factor in spreading Nazi propaganda to the public and turning it socially acceptable. Therefore, it was deemed crucial that educational curricula be designed to prevent totalitarianism from becoming acceptable ever again. More specifically, the curriculum had to contain values and systems such as freedom of speech, democracy and the free market system, which are on the opposite side of totalitarianism. Furthermore, the Conference of Allied Ministers of Education agreed to set up a regular consultative body or an international organization to achieve these goals.

Starting from February 1944, the U.S began to pitch ideas for an international organization that would be solely responsible for culture and education issues. Despite different views on the fields the new organization would cover,[22] the Conference of Allied Ministers of

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participation of Australia, Canada, China, India, New Zealand and South Africa, the Conference came to include de-fascist education in its agenda.

[22] France focused on intellectual cooperation based on the experience of operating the International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation during the interwar period, whereas the U.S. and the U.K. concentrated on education and mass communication, or propaganda. Also,

Education came to a final compromise. First, the UNESCO headquarters was to be located in Paris, France, reflecting France's stance. Second, Julian Huxley, a British scientist, was appointed as the first UNESCO Director-General, in recognition of the need for science. Third, reflecting the views of the U.S., who was entrusted with the financial aspects, UNESCO's main fields of competence were focused on education and public communication, particularly in the long-term. Additionally, short-term relief work was assigned to the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, completing the consensus on inter-organizational division of labor.

In November 1945, UN Member States launched the negotiations for founding an international organization that would be solely responsible for education issues. Ridding educational curricula of Nazism was such a critical issue in the launch of UNESCO that the representatives mentioned Nazism and denazification as many as nine times. Furthermore, many representatives also raised the point that the values related to liberal democracy had to be emphasized to prevent other forms of totalitarianism. The atmosphere at that time is indicated by the quotation below.

> Freedom and democracy, passively stipulated, are not valuable without oppression and dictatorship. Nazism and fascism are one of the symptoms of serious diseases threatening the world. Under Nazism and fascism, all of the ideas become an empty shell and the sense of a better world disappears.[23]

As the Second World War had already come to an end, the U.S. and Britain hoped to establish an international organization that focused on creating an environment where Nazism and fascism will never emerge, rather than on denazification. Some countries like

there were different ideas over whether the new international organization would have jurisdiction over science.

[23] Speech of Luis Perez, a delegate from Cuba (Conference for the Establishment of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 1945, 50).

Yugoslavia wanted to include specific language reflecting the experiences of the Second World War in the preamble of the UNESCO Constitution. In the end, however, the Constitution came to contain oblique expressions, instead of specifying Nazism and fascism. The Constitution illustrates that the war was made possible by the "denial of the democratic principles of the dignity, equality and mutual respect of men, and by the propagation, in their place, through ignorance and prejudice, of the doctrine of the inequality of men and races." Instead, forward-looking expressions were fortified, where the founders promulgate that they hereby "create the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization for the purpose of advancing, through the educational and scientific and cultural relations of the peoples of the world, the objectives of international peace and of the common welfare of mankind."

2. Collapse of a Wartime Alliance and Growing Heterogeneity

Unfortunately, UNESCO began to face an identity crisis from the moment it was established as an international organization. Though the Organization was designed to prevent another tragedy such as that of the Second World War, the wartime rift between the Axis and the United Nations collapsed only three years later. The transformation of the UN from a wartime alliance to a permanent international organization was based on the expectation that the wartime rift would last at least for another 50 years. However, after the ideological competition began in 1947, the alliance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union broke down and was divided into two blocs. This division among the major Member States paralyzed the UN system just after two years since its establishment.

In Europe, the two blocs clashed over three issues. The first issue was the future of Eastern Europe. The U.S. thought that the Soviet Union violated the promise to let Eastern European nations decide on their government with free elections. The Soviet Union's Red Army troops, stationed in Eastern Europe, implicitly affected each Eastern European nation's decisions on the form of government and got involved in the overthrow of the Czech government in February 1948. The fall of Eastern Europe to Communism further deepened the U.S. distrust

of the Soviet Union. Second, in 1946, Communist Party of Greece rose up against the government, supported by Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania in the socialist bloc. This led the U.S. to believe that the Communist bloc was disregarding the right to self-determination, forcibly pushing ahead with communization. The third issue was Germany. The Allies' plan for occupying Germany stipulated that the four allies—U.S., Britain, the Soviet Union, and France—would divide Germany into four zones to occupy and disarm their respective regions, and rule Germany as one administrative unit via the Allied Control Council. Yet, France did not follow the plan and pursued an independent administrative system, while the Soviet Union tried to establish a Communist regime. Confrontation between the victor countries over these three issues thus posed a threat to their plan to manage the postwar international order through cooperation.

The Berlin Blockade of 1948 was a sign that the confrontation between the victor countries would become serious. Although Berlin fell within the Soviet Zone, it was divided into four sections as a political symbol. As a result, the zones occupied by the U.S., Britain, and France were connected with the three countries' occupied zones in the west via land and air routes. In March 1948, the U.S., Britain, and France took the lead in reunifying the occupied territories in Germany with a single currency, and ultimately planned to introduce a political system similar to a federal government. This led to backlash from the Soviet Union, which announced that freight from the occupied territories in Berlin would be searched before being transported westward, starting on April 1, 1948. In response, the three powers opted for air transportation, giving up overland routes. They used air transportation to connect their occupied territories in Berlin to others from June 24, 1948 to May 12, 1949. Rivalry in Berlin between the two camps was so fierce that it even entailed a risk of a military collision.

The Korean War in 1950 clearly showed that the alliance of victorious countries of the Second World War had completely broken down to the point where they resorted to armed force against each other. During the Korean War, the Free World, centering on the U.S., formed the UN forces to fight, labeling the North Korean People's Army and the Chinese

People's Volunteer Army as aggressors (UNGA RES/498 [V], 1915.2.1). The Soviet Union was directly involved in air war over the rear areas controlled by the North Korean army, not to speak of providing war supplies for North Korea and China. Even though the victor nations did not clash with each other on a large scale, they had an actual combat in limited territories. The Cold War, which had begun in Europe, reached a fierce battle in East Asia.

A change in the membership of UNESCO is another factor behind its internal conflicts. As Figure 1 indicates, with a rise in the membership of UNESCO, heterogeneity of the membership grew. Except for some countries in the Communist bloc, initial Member States of UNESCO were liberal democracies, whereas most of the newly-independent states were under an authoritarian system. Therefore, an increase in the membership downgraded the average democracy index of UNESCO members until the mid-1970s and widened the differences in their degrees of democratization. In addition, as most of the newly-independent countries were less developed, the economic gap among the members also broadened. They attempted to project their national issues onto UNESCO, going against the intention of the founding Member States.[24]

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[24] UNESCO's self-evaluation of its activities from 1946 to 1971 symbolically exhibits the changes it underwent after its foundation. Intellectual cooperation, culture, education, science and peace account for 105 pages but development and human rights take up 118 pages in terms of description of the whole activities (UNESCO 1972).

Picture 1. The Membership of UNESCO and Democracy of the Members

Sources: Marshall, Gurr, and Jagger 2018.

3. Rift within UNESCO

UNESCO's internal conflicts stand out in a few ways. First, racism seems to be a factor that divide the Member States. Not only was racism a key issue from the birth of the organization, but the increase in its significance in the mid-1950s furthered the divide among the Member States. 1950s was when newly-independent states joined UNESCO in large numbers and tried to project anti-colonialism agenda onto UNESCO. Apartheid in South Africa became a key issue, for it was a mix of racism and colonialism. In the end, South Africa decided to leave from UNESCO in 1956 under the pressure of anti-racism. It had to choose between abolition of the racist policy and the withdrawal, since it could not ask for the approval of the international community for racism.

The second issue was the rift over Israel's independence. After three wars, Arab states became aware that the odds of defeating Israel in war were slim. Consequently, they tried a soft balancing strategy against Israel in the international community. They won the support

of newly-independent nations by framing the Israeli-Palestinian issue as an issue of colonialism and racism. More and more people sided with the argument that Israel's policy of Occupied Palestine Territories was in line with colonialism and racism. This gave rise to a resolution that Zionism, the founding principle of Israel, had morphed into racism (Manor 1996, 14-86). As a result, Palestine gained support from newly-independent nations, while for Israel, its deprivation of the membership was discussed in UNESCO.

Third, divisions exist over the Organization's unique mandate. The founding countries presumed that peace could be achieved through anti-totalitarian education, mass communication and intellectual cooperation. However, newly-independent countries, without the shared experiences of the Second World War, attempted to project different views. Even though they all talked about the same issues—education, culture and science—they had different goals and different views on how to achieve them. The founders regarded such differences as political.

For example, the controversy over education in the 1960s and the 1970s demonstrates the difficulties UNESCO had. In the1960s, UNESCO underwent an internal dispute over whether literacy education in developing countries fell under the Organization's jurisdiction. While developing countries tried to link literacy education with economic growth, the U.S. cast a doubt on the literacy education the Communist camp advocated. The U.S. voiced reservations about UNESCO's core programmes, out of the suspicion that it could lead to the spread of Communism. The U.S. supported programmes on literacy education so long as they contributed to economic growth, and such efforts resulted in the Experimental World Literacy Program from 1966 to 1974. UNESCO's education programmes were at a standstill until an agreement was reached on a new causal link between education, human resource development and economic growth, rather than peace (Dorn and Ghodsee 2012, 389-395). In other words, UNESCO was able to start its work in the field of education only after it came to an agreement over a new causal link regarding a ripple effect of education.

The debates surrounding the politicization of UNESCO can also be demonstrated through the trends in research. In the beginning, UNESCO conducted research mainly in the field of education. Topic included the possibilities of incorporating anti-totalitarian curricula in different countries, and comparisons of educational contents among countries. Political analyses of the phenomena related to UNESCO were relatively fewer. This changed in the 1970s, when an increasing number of studies focused on the political aspects of UNESCO as the Organization became mired in controversy and lost sight of its goals. More and more people tried to assess educational work of UNESCO for their political characteristics, rather than assessing their functional aspects. In the 1980s, the withdrawal of the the U.S and the UK took public attention away from the Organization, only to be revived when the two rejoined.

Table 1. Change in Researches

Period	Education	Percentage	Politics	Percentage	International Law	Others	Total
1940	11	50.0%	5	22.7%		6	22
1950	6	60.0%	2	20.0%		2	10
1960	10	76.9%	3	23.1%			13
1970	6	50.0%	5	41.7%		1	12
1980	8	72.7%	3	27.3%			11
1990	1	100.0%		0.0%			1
2000	4	40.0%	1	10.0%	5		10
2010	1	33.3%	2	66.7%			3
Total	47	57.3%	21	25.6%			82

IV. Conclusion

While UNESCO seems nonpolitical on the surface, it belonged to the arena of politics from the beginning. It aimed to achieve the short-term goal of eliminating totalitarian education associated with the Second World War, and the long-term goal of protecting education, culture and communication from totalitarianism. First formed by the United Nations, a wartime alliance amid the Second World War, UNESCO aimed officially to maintain peace through education. At the same time, its hidden intention was to eradicate the culture and intellectual climate borne out of racist supremacy. Therefore, UNESCO covered a key area of politics from its very inception.

Since the establishment of UNESCO, its politicization has been linked to the rise in the membership and many changes in the international situation. After the Second World War, the Cold War disrupted the wartime alliances, and the internal unity within UNESCO also dissipated. In the 1950s, a large number of newly independent countries joind the Organization and began to project onto the Organization goals that differed from those agreed upon in the context of the Second World War. They hoped to address anti-colonial agenda in UNESCO, and the anti-racist spirit of the Organization was an easy point of agreement for them. This combination caused the Organization to become distant from its original goals and programmes. Ironically, the success of UNESCO's anti-totalitarianism led to the Organization's stalemate.

The newly-independent nations, who hoped to project their own agendas to UNESCO, transformed the Organization easily, using their large number as a leverage in the one-country-one-vote simple majority system. Unfortunately, their inability to translate such success into meaningful action led to the phenomena of turning many UNESCO resolutions into declarative documents.   In contrast, the founding Member States, unable to overcome the numerical disadvantage, created somewhat of a myth about the apolitical inception of the Organization, and criticized these new members as politicization.

Additionally, they created further conflict with UNESCO by using their financial contribution as leverage.

UNESCO was faced with new challenges after the Cold War. Democracy spread to many corners of the world to reduce the gaps in Member States' political ideology, and cooperation among powerful countries was also reinstated, albeit partially. There remain some negative factors such as economic inequality, liberalization, democratization, and globalization can act as positive reinforcements in the process of the Organization's search for a new set of objectives and fields of action. In other words, while there are signs that UNESCO will once again be able to promote education, culture, communication, and intellectual cooperation in the international community in a favorable environment, there are also jarring possibilities that UNESCO's transformation may entail conflicts like the withdrawal of the U.S.

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UNESCO's Governance Reform
and Financial Difficulties

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I. Introduction

UNESCO has often been called humanity's "conscience." This is because people recognize that the fields of education, science, culture, and communication and information, which comprise UNESCO's mandate, are of common benefit, contributing to global peace and prosperity. The noble aspirations of UNESCO are reflected in the preamble to the UNESCO Constitution: "That since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed." It could be said that these aspirations have so far been met, in that no further world war has yet occurred to threaten the survival of humanity.

Behind these aspirations, however, UNESCO has suffered damage as a political actor. Many international organizations within the UN system share the goals of peace and prosperity for humanity, but views about how effectively they are achieving this goal differ. An evaluation of the efficiency of international organizations conducted by the UK Department for International Development, ranked UNESCO as the fourth least efficient organization out of 43 organizations surveyed (DFID, 2011). The U.S., which is the largest financial contributor to the organizations within the UN system, has withdrawn from UNESCO twice, citing the lack of reforms to address inefficiency as one of their reasons for withdrawal. The U.S. has raised questions about the efficiency of international organizations, including the United Nations,

on many occasions in the past (Cho, 2013). However, demands for the reform of UNESCO appear to represent a more serious case, given that the U.S. was prepared actually to leave the organization.

Discussions about the reform of UNESCO have covered various aspects. The key issues have been governance reforms, which in practice determine the organization's strategic direction and scope of work, and financial problems, which have deepened following the most recent U.S. withdrawal. Discussions about the reform of UNESCO involve some similar aspects as the reform discussions taking place in relation to other organizations in the UN system. However, along with problems arising from its unique governance structure, UNESCO faces particularly serious financial troubles as a result of the U.S. withdrawal. These are the two types of issue that all Member States need to work together to address, with help from experts around the world.

To assist such efforts, this article will discuss the unique structure of UNESCO's governance and examine which aspects of this structure are problematic. The article will also discuss UNESCO governance reform efforts in relation to these issues. In addition, the article will examine UNESCO's financial difficulties and their consequences for UNESCO programmes. In particular, it will discuss UNESCO's efforts to overcome the financial difficulties caused by the U.S. withdrawal, the outcomes of these efforts and problems relating to them. Finally, the article will suggest possible directions for future governance reforms and efforts to address the organization's financial difficulties, and discuss what role South Korea can play.

II. UNESCO Governance Reform

1. Organizational issues
(1) Debate over the Rules of Procedure of the General Conference
The General Conference, UNESCO's highest decision-making body, reviews and determines

the organization's major policies and main lines of work. In particular, the General Conference determines UNESCO's medium-term strategy (C/4) and its programme and budget, appoints the Director-General, and elects the members of the Executive Board. Members of the UN automatically have the right to join UNESCO and each Member State has one vote at the General Conference, which is a biennial meeting.[25]

The principle of one vote per country has consistently been pointed out as an issue for consideration in any governance reform. The General Conference's decisions are made by a simple majority except in cases where a two-thirds majority is required by the provisions of UNESCO's Constitution or Rules of Procedure. This method of decision-making in accordance with democratic principles has, however, been criticized in debates about UNESCO governance reform.

It has been consistently argued that the General Conference should be restructured to perform its functions more efficiently. The main point at issue regarding the functioning of the General Conference is the "one vote per country" voting system used . Decisions, as noted above, are made by a simple majority except in relation to certain issues for which a two-thirds majority is required (for example, membership, revision of the constitution, changes to the rules of procedure). In other words, decisions are made by a majority of the members present and voting in favor.

These principles appear democratic and are followed by many other international organizations. However, the "one vote per country" principle involves considerable problems in reality. First, no consideration is given to the relative size of a Member State's population. Although UNESCO is an intergovernmental organization made up of sovereign states, it is unlike other such organizations in the sense that its remit, covering culture, education, and science, emphasizes the commonality of humanity. As such, it is difficult to ignore opinions that the projects chosen by UNESCO for implementation should be those

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[25] UNESCO has 195 Member States and 11 Associate Members, as of May 2018.

that are wanted by the greatest number of people. The question arises whether the "one vote per country" principle reflects the true sense of "democracy" since the size of each country's population is ignored.

Second, although UNESCO is an organization comprising sovereign nations, no differences in the national power of each member is taken into consideration in the voting system. This issue not unique to UNESCO, and has been pointed out in relation to other organizations, such as the UN General Assembly. The system allows weaker countries potentially to benefit by collaborating with others to select their preferred projects and block or denounce the wishes of specific strong nations. This was one reason given by the U.S. for its two withdrawals from UNESCO. The U.S. complained that, despite the fact that it was the largest financial contributor to UNESCO, its wishes were blocked by the collective voting of other countries that disagreed with the U.S. position. Although the voting system was based on democratic principles that ignored differences in national power, it eventually resulted in a hugely increased burden on all the remaining Member States following the withdrawal of the U.S. from the organization.

A third issue is the non-binding nature of its decisions in practical terms. If a decision is made by a majority of countries, even ignoring differences in national power, it is reasonable to think that the decision should have sufficient binding power to overcome power gaps between countries. However, since the decisions of the UNESCO General Conference have barely any real binding power, they are only declarative in reality which undermines the authority and status of the General Conference.

The fourth and greatest problem is the lack of a concrete alternative that would solve the problems of the existing system of decision making. Although the "one vote per country" system has problems, it is practically impossible for UNESCO to adopt the kind of weighted voting system that is implemented in some international financial organizations. Any improvements to the decision-making process must seek a balance between democratic

principles, political concerns and economic power, but this is by no means an easy task. One possible way forward would be to expand the method of consensus that is currently used for policy decisions in UNESCO. However, this method can lead to endless arguments if there are conflicts of interest between countries. To avoid this, the existence of a strong and reliable leadership within UNESCO is very important. As such, it is unsurprising that problems have also arisen in relation to UNESCO's leadership, including the Executive Board and the Director-General.

(2) Dispute over Consecutive Terms of Members of the Executive Board

The Executive Board, which determines, implements, and supervises UNESCO's overall programme, plays a crucial management role in between the biennial sessions of the General Conference. The board originally consisted of 18 people, acting in an individual capacity, but several changes have since been made to its structure. The largest recent changes were made in 1991, when the number of board members was increased dramatically, to 58 members, each representing the government of their Member State rather than acting in their personal capacity as had previously been the case. The results of this change led to an ongoing debate connected to the ability of members of the Executive Board to serve consecutive terms.[26]

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[26] The Executive Board comprises 58 Member States. Its members are divided across six regional electoral groups and are elected by the General Conference every four years. The regional groups are as follows: Group I (Western Europe and North American States) with 9 seats; Group II (Eastern European States) 7 seats; Group III (Latin-American and Caribbean States) 10 seats; Group IV (Asian and Pacific States) 12 seats; Group V (V(a) African States + V(b) Arab States) 20 seats. Under the Board, there are five subsidiary bodies: the Programme and External Relations Commission (PX, all members of the Board); the Finance and Administrative Commission (FA, all members of the Board); the Special Committee (SP, 18 members); the Committee on Conventions and Recommendations (CR, 30 members); and the Committee on Non-Governmental Partners (NGP, 24 members).

Originally, UNESCO was an organization that emphasized the role and participation of academic experts in their private, individual capacity. The International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation and the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, which were predecessors to UNESCO, were established by European intellectuals in the 1920s. When UNESCO was founded as an international organization in 1946, it followed in this tradition, with Julian Huxley, a British scientist, being elected as the first UNESCO Director-General. UNESCO's emphasis on the role of individual intellectuals, following in the tradition of the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, was distinct from the nature of other international organizations (Chung 2015).

However, when the U.S. withdrew from UNESCO in 1984, citing UNESCO's lax management and pro-Palestine stance, the organization ended up in severe financial difficulties. As one of the measures aimed at addressing these issues, UNESCO made changes to the Executive Board as mentioned above, so that members acted in a state capacity. It was expected that a Board centered on Member States would be more effective and professional in the implementation of budget and administrative functions. However, the changes created a concentration of power capable of overwhelming UNESCO's other governance bodies, and it has been constantly pointed out that the resulting influence of specific Member States on UNESCO's programme is far too great, particularly because members of the Executive Board can serve consecutive terms.

Issues concerning re-election of the Executive Board also lead to conflict with the General Conference. As mentioned above, the General Conference takes place every two years. Since the Executive Border makes practical decisions on the overall work of UNESCO in between sessions of the General Conference, the leading countries on the board exert a major influence over UNESCO's work.

To deal with such concerns, the General Conference established the "Working Group on governance, procedures, and working methods of the governing bodies of UNESCO" at its

38th session in 2015. The Working Group examined recommendations on governance reform over the next two years before reporting its results. The Working Group proposed a large number of governance reforms, but could not reach an agreement on the issue of term limitations for the Executive Board, which was the major point at issue in the reform efforts. The Working Group discussed recommendations that said "To promote more equitable geographic rotation and opportunities for smaller counters, a general rule for all Member States should be pursued; specifically, amending the Constitution and Rules of Procedure. Possible term limits could be for two or three consecutive terms, with a gap of two or four years before being eligible for re-election." (Recommendation 20) and "Alternately, voluntary self-restraint in putting forward candidatures after two or three consecutive terms should be encouraged" (Recommendation 21). The group could not, however, agree on a single recommendation in the report that was submitted to the 39th session of the General Conference in 2017. On the other hand, agreement was easily reached by the Working Group to maintain the number of members of the Executive Board at 58 Member States.

There was a heated dispute at the 2017 General Conference over the reform recommendations submitted by the Working Group. The issue of term limitations for the Executive Board was put to the vote and Recommendation 20 was adopted. Therefore, it is expected that further discussions will take place concerning term limitations for the Executive Board. It is, however, unclear what will be decided in this respect, so a close watch should be kept on the progress of these discussions within UNESCO.

(3) Issues concerning the Lax Management of the Secretariat and Appointment of the Director-General

UNESCO's Secretariat is responsible for preparing UNESCO's programme and budget plans, implementing the scheduled programmes within the allocated budget, and administering UNESCO's various budgets. It has its headquarters in France and has 65 field offices around

the world.[27] The fact that UNESCO headquarters is located in France gives French-speaking countries greater influence, while the influence of the U.S. has declined following its withdrawal. UNESCO in any case has a history of adopting decisions opposed by the U.S., such as the recognition of Palestine as a full Member State, and the adoption of the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions.

The Working Group's recommendations on governance reforms included recommendations regarding the appointment of the Director-General. The Director-General, the head of the Secretariat, is elected every four years and is eligible for re-election. The Working Group had no problem agreeing to recommend increasing the transparency of the appointment process through open recruitment of the candidates, but failed to reach agreement on recommendations that "Following a thorough assessment of the candidates, it is recommended that the Executive Board propose a short list of a minimum of two and up to three nominees to the post of Director-General for appointment by the General Conference." (Recommendation 52) and "It is recommended to review Rule 56 of the Rules of Procedure of the Executive Board, in order to avoid the possibility of the drawing of lots in the case that two or more candidates receive the same number of votes" (Recommendation 53).

In the discussion as to whether to adopt the recommendations by the Working Group at the 39th session of the General Conference in 2017, the debate on term limitations of the Executive Board was heated and highly controversial but the issue of the election of the Director-General was hardly mentioned. It appears that Member States did not see a need for further discussion of this issue following the election of France's Audrey Azoulay as the new Director-General of UNESCO at the General Conference in 2017. Therefore, it seems

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[27] There are five programme sectors within the Secretariat: Education (ED), Natural Sciences (SC) and One Planet, One Ocean (the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission or IOC), Social and Human Sciences (SHS), Culture (CLT), and Fostering Freedom of Expression and Building Knowledge Societies (CI). There are also agencies that take charge of various other administrative tasks.

likely that there will be no in-depth discussions on the election process for the Director-General in the near future.

2. Operational Issues

(1) Scope and Politicization of UNESCO's Purpose and Functions

The purposes of UNESCO, as defined in its Constitution are: 1) to promote collaboration among nations through education, science and culture; 2) to further universal respect for justice, for the rule of law and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms; and 3) to contribute to peace and sustainable development. The organization is intended to function as: 1) a laboratory of ideas, predicting future issues and developing related strategies and policies; 2) a standard-setter, establishing standards on major ethical, normative and intellectual issues; 3) a clearing house for the collection and sharing of knowledge and information, and the development and testing of innovative projects; 4) a capacity-builder, helping Member States to build their human and institutional capacities; and 5) a catalyst for international development cooperation.

These purposes and functions of the organization are more wide-ranging than other specialized agencies within the UN system. For example, the purposes of the UN organizations covering health, finance, the environment, agriculture, and energy focus on managing transnational issues in a specific field and since their functions are very specialized, they usually employ skilled people with high-level professional expertise. However, UNESCO's mandate is more general, so issues that should be addressed at the UN General Assembly are often addressed at UNESCO.

In terms of function, since decisions made by UNESCO are declarative and normative, lacking legally binding force, their practical power is weak. These organizational characteristics can lead the representatives of Member States to take the approach of "speaking first" and then seeing what happens

In the case of an organization such as the World Health Organization (WHO), which deals with issues requiring specialist expertise and where actions by the organization can directly affect a Member State's national interests or even the survival of its citizens, Member States tend to collaborate to make quick decisions and actively seek practical solutions. For example, when SARS broke out in 2003, China initially refused to divulge information about it, insisting on its sovereign rights, but soon recognized the seriousness of the situation and bowed to pressure from the international community, and eventually not only released the relevant health information but also agreed to accept Taiwan's associate membership of the WHO. However, since the issues covered at UNESCO tend to be broader, involving a variety of aspects at the same time, they are harder to regulate. As a result, Member States tend to consider their national political interests first.

There is no obvious solution that would avoid this politicization of UNESCO, as the very purpose and functions of UNESCO are bound up with its political nature. Although there were ideological confrontations and politicization in some international organizations during the Cold War era, the reason politicization continues within UNESCO in the absence of Cold War-era ideological confrontations is that the organization is inherently political (Hong 2013). Therefore, UNESCO's governance reform should be approached from the perspective of "managing" the politicization, which is particular to the organization, rather than seeking to "solve" the issue.

(2) Confusion in Programme Management and Lax Organizational Culture

The authority of the Executive Board was greatly strengthened following the changes made in 1991 to increase the number of its members to 58 national representatives of Member States. As the members of the Executive Board now represent approximately 30% of UNESCO's total membership, including the organization's leading members, the Executive Board has essentially become the body that determines the overall direction of UNESCO's work. The role of the General Conference, UNESCO's highest decision-making body, has correspondingly diminished. The General Conference is held over the course of fifteen days

only once every two years, while the Executive Board leads the organization in between, dealing with programme and budget issues. As a result, there is a potential for tensions and conflicts between the General Conference and the Executive Board in many areas, including policy making, the setting of programme priorities, programme design, and follow-up monitoring. The strengthened role of the Executive Board can also cause tensions with the Secretariat. While the Executive Board exercises a significant influence on the selection and implementation of UNESCO's programmes, issues can occur such as the overlapping of duties and unclear responsibilities between the Executive Board and the Secretariat, which manages the programmes.

The confusion caused by this governance structure makes it difficult to prevent political dealings or mutual back-scratching in determining the priority of programmes. Countries often seek to wield influence over adjustments to the priority of programmes, or changes or cancellation of programmes, by strongly opposing changes, scaling-down, and cancellations, or by lobbying the Executive Board to keep or select programmes that will benefit their national interests. In selecting and designing programmes, considerations such as 1) whether clear and detailed criteria for the programme and its budget can be established, 2) whether a programme serves the ultimate/strategic purpose of UNESCO, and 3) how far it contributes to the practical comparative advantage of UNESCO have been suggested. In practice, however, it is hard to apply these considerations thoroughly. In particular, it is difficult to ignore the financial contributions of countries involved in the programme amid current budgetary shortfalls.

UNESCO's inefficient organizational culture also makes it difficult to set strategic guidelines for managing its various programmes. In addition to the three main governing bodies noted above, there are 49 lesser governing bodies, and 15 intergovernmental committees and councils under the General Conference with a total of 344 participating states (Lee 2018). A considerable workforce and resources are needed to run such a complicated organization, and yet another body or committee is needed to manage those resources. Such inefficient

organizational culture makes it difficult to carry out strict monitoring and evaluation of programme implementation and the running of the organization eventually becomes mired in so-called "micro-management."

However, it is unlikely that large scale reform of the organization can be implemented immediately. For instance, it is impossible to go back to the situation before 1991 in which the Executive Board held less power. Even if this were possible, there is no guarantee that this would solve current problems. An easier option would be to improve the effectiveness of the General Conference and improve coordination between UNESCO's three main bodies. In particular, in the absence of financial contributions from the U.S., it is ever more important that 1) UNESCO's Director General offer leadership that highlights both the necessity and importance of governance reform within UNESCO and raises awareness of the cost and value of UNESCO's programmes, and that 2) leading countries have the will to effect reform.

III. UNESCO's Financial Difficulties

1. The U.S. Withdrawal and the UNESCO Financial Crisis

(1) UNESCO's Budget and the U.S. Withdrawal

The UNESCO budget is divided into two parts. One part is the regular programme budget, which is funded through assessed contributions from Member States, and the other is the extra-budgetary funds, which consist of voluntary extra contributions from Member States. As with most of the UN organizations, the proportion of each Member State's contribution to the regular budget is determined by the size of that country's economy (Gross National Income) and is approved every two years (beginning with an even-numbered year). However, upper and lower limits are set to avoid excessive burdens on any particular country and to encourage participation from least developed countries. Therefore, whatever the size of a

Member State's economy, the percentage shares range from a minimum of 0.001% to a maximum of 22% of UNESCO's total regular budget, and a maximum of 0.01% for any nation designated as a "least developed country." Figure 1 shows the assessed contributions of the top 20 countries to the regular budget for 2018.

Figure 1. Top 20 countries contributing to the regular budget

Source: Korean National Commission for UNESCO (KNCU)

As can be seen in Fig. 1, most of the regular budget is made up of contributions from a handful of countries. Assuming that Member States pay their assessed contributions, the contributions of the top ten countries account for 68.9% of the overall regular budget and the top 20 countries contribute 83.8% of the total regular budget. Some countries complain that this imposes a heavy burden on them, including the U.S., whose contribution is set at the maximum level of 22%. Such countries have called for greater influence over the selection and implementation of UNESCO's programmes. However, as mentioned above, the system of decision-making at the General Conference is one vote per county, with no regard for differences in national strength, and some developed countries, including the U.S., have been the targets of collective denunciation from anti-American, anti-Western countries, despite the fact that they make the largest contributions to UNESCO.

It is impossible to ignore the connection between the above issues and the reasons that the U.S. gave for its two withdrawals from UNESCO, in 1984 and 2017. The U.S. recognized that, despite making the largest financial contributions to UNESCO, its national interests were being undermined in various decision-making processes. In 1984, the U.S. contributed 25% of the regular budget. However, at that time, the role of Director-General, with its great influence over budget implementation, was filled by Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow from Senegal, who was fostering political solidarity with the Asian and African Third World countries that made up the majority of the organization's Member States, in order to win re-election. This solidarity, joined by the Communist bloc countries, meant that anti-American sentiment reached a climax. Under these circumstances, the New International Information Order (NIIO) opposing the monopoly status of the Western news media was passed with overwhelming support from Soviet and Third World countries. In addition, the U.S. came into conflict with the Arab world over anti-Israel and pro-Palestine policies but could do little under the "one vote per country" system. This situation led to the decision by the U.S., UNESCO's largest contributor, to withdraw from the organization (Cho 2008).

The U.S. decision in 2017 to withdraw for a second time proceeded along similar lines. The United States had rejoined UNESCO in 2002. At that time, the U.S. had, in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, decided that it was necessary to expand its social and cultural influence on the Middle East. After the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions was adopted in 2001, the U.S. decided to rejoin on the basis that it was necessary to limit the normative influence of the Convention, fearing that it could lead to a downturn in the export of cultural goods. However, a decade after rejoining the U.S. once again began refusing to pay its regular contributions, citing UNESCO's lax management and its admission of Palestine as a full member as the reasons for this,[28] and finally decided to withdraw from UNESCO in 2017.[29]

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[28] The U.S. government is obligated under U.S. law to cut off American funding for any organization accepting the Palestinians as full members.

[29] The withdrawal took effect on December 31, 2018.

(2) Financial Pressure on UNESCO

Notice of the 1984 U.S. withdrawal was given immediately after the General Conference in 1983, only about two months before the withdrawal became effective, at midnight on December 31 1983. However, after ceasing to pay its dues in 2011, the U.S. did not immediately announce any intention to leave UNESCO, and exercised its voting rights up until 2013. Although there was much more time for the U.S. to reconsider its position, compared to 1984, calls to reform the organization reform had grown even louder during this time and the sense of crisis within UNESCO after the U.S. stopped paying their contributions was even worse than in 1984 (Eckhard et al. 2016).

The U.S. lost its voting rights at UNESCO from 2013, two years after ceasing to pay its contributions, in accordance with UNESCO's rules, but it did not renounce its membership until the withdrawal declaration in 2017, and was even elected as a member of the Executive Board during this period. However, its refusal to pay contributions immediately affected UNESCO's financial situation. The U.S. had been paying annual contributions ranging from US$75 million to US$80 million, accounting for 22% of the regular budget, as mentioned above. The UNESCO budget was accordingly reduced by about 25% compared to the budget up to 2011 and UNESCO activities were scaled back by about 30%.

There was an immediate plummet in the budget for the 2012- 2013 biennium (See Fig. 2). The available budget for 2012-2013 was reduced by close to US$190 million, a drop of about 21% in real terms compared to the year 2000. Such financial difficulties were challenging to solve without unprecedented changes to UNESCO's financing, and as prices increased, the budget in real terms gradually shrank further. As a result, the budget in real terms for 2014 was little more than half the budget for 2000.

Figure 2. The sharp drop in UNESCO's regular budget following the U.S. refusal to pay (unit: 1 million U.S. dollars)

Source: UNESCO (2013).

2. UNESCO's Efforts to Overcome its Financial Crisis

(1) Efforts to Cut the Budget

After the United States cut off funds to UNESCO in 2011, the organization put in place austerity measures. The Director-General ordered a review of the budget for 2012-2013, with the aim of reducing it by 30%, while also requesting Member States to make voluntary contributions to the Emergency Multi-Donor Fund for UNESCO Priority Programmes and Reform Initiatives. A number of countries donated to the Emergency Fund, which raised US$75 million by the end of 2015, including donations of US$20 million each by Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Some of the Scandinavian countries also helped to alleviate UNESCO's financial stress by increasing their voluntary contributions.[30]

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[30] The EU countries did not contribute to the Emergency Fund (Hüfner 2017).

Notwithstanding these additional funds, UNESCO also sought to overcome its financial problems in the first instance by reducing outgoings such as expenditure on travel costs, purchasing costs, and consulting fees, and establishing a restructuring plan to reduce job positions and staff. As a result, the number of jobs in the organization decreased significantly, from 2,114 in 2011 to 1,467 as of December 2015. The Executive Board also made active efforts to address the financial crisis, for instance by ending travel allowances for the Board representatives in Paris.[31] In addition, consideration was also given to whether to reduce the frequency and length of the Executive Board meetings. The Executive Board had been meeting two or three times a year for two to three weeks at a time, which was more than most other UN organizations. The Executive Board also took action to reduce the number of Member States on the council of the International Bureau of Education, a UNESCO category 1 center, from 28 to 12 states, and requested the restructuring and merger of certain sectors within the Secretariat, but failed to achieve actual changes.

Although the U.S. stopped paying its regular contributions, it announced an intention to continue its voluntary contributions to the programmes that the U.S. supported. The Director-General visited the U.S. to clarify this and ask for continued support of programmes for the maintenance of competition-oriented media in Iraq, Tunisia and Egypt; the implementation of literacy programmes in Afghanistan and Iraq; and the promotion of Holocaust education worldwide.

(2) Budget Reform

Measures such as budget cuts and restructuring were not enough on their own to overcome the financial crisis. UNESCO had to change the very way in which it put together its budget in order to address the fundamental problem. As a result, UNESCO introduced the concept of so-called "zero nominal growth." This approach, applied since the budget for 2010-2011,

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[31] With the exception of allowances for 10 least developed countries and 7 small island developing states.

does not adjust for inflation, so that even if the nominal amount allocated is the same as in the past, the actual effect is to reduce the budget. In addition, UNESCO introduced a results-based management approach to increase cost-effectiveness, by adjusting priorities and budget allocation according to the outcome of existing programmes. However, the focus of these methods on reducing the budget led to a decline in programme quality.

The dramatic reduction in the regular budget as a result of the suspension of U.S. contributions led to an increasing tendency to rely on extra-budgetary funds. In 2012, UNESCO sought to resolve its lack of budget by attempting to greatly expand the scale of voluntary contributions, and to a degree it was successful in doing so. For example, voluntary contributions in 2012 amounted to US$440 million, exceeding the budgeted US$350 million. However, reliance on extra-budgetary funds meant more dependence on the countries or organizations that make large contributions. Programmes involving countries that had made large contributions became higher priority than ongoing regular programmes, and job positions related to programmes financed through extra-budgetary funds increased from 492 in 2000 to 775 in 2015.

As UNESCO became excessively dependent on extra-budgetary funds, some Member States' responses to the survey for the Programme and Budget for 2018-2019 (39 C/5) stressed the need for the organization to maintain a balance between normative work and operational work (UNESCO Executive Board 2016). For this reason, the Executive Board in 2016 proposed the Structured Financing Dialogue and replaced the existing bilateral dialogues with donor countries with collective donor consultations aimed at improving the quality and sustainability of resources for UNESCO's programmes and budget.

To integrate and manage all available resources together, UNESCO also introduced the Integrated Budget Framework, covering the management plans for both the regular budget and extra-budgetary funds. As approved under the Integrated Budget Framework, UNESCO has an itemized budget for the 2018-2019 biennium of US$1,224.7 million, of which the

regular budget accounts for approximately US$595.2 million and voluntary contributions account for approximately US$629.5 million..

The introduction of this approach is expected to improve the comprehensiveness of budget management and increase the transparency of programme implementation. However, since extra-budgetary funds, unlike the regular budget, are dependent on voluntary contributions from Member States that are earmarked for their chosen projects, the stability of these funds is relatively low. In this respect, reliance on such funds makes it harder for UNESCO to plan and implement its programmes on a stable long-term basis and to overcome the fundamental problem of the lack of funds caused by the U.S. withdrawal. It is, therefore, hard for UNESCO to ignore calls for a fundamental review and reassessment of overall programme priorities and operations.

IV. Conclusions and Recommendations

'Homo sapiens', the biological term for modern humans, means "wise man." UNESCO is symbolic of the application of human intellect to the goals of peace and prosperity. In this regard, UNESCO is the institutional mechanism that best manifests humanity's creativity, its orientation towards peace, and its ability to solve problems through dialogue. It is ironic that such an institution has been unable to solve its own deep-rooted troubles. This forum for building a better world through intellectual exchange faces challenges in terms of efficiency, politicization and finance. Humankind must gather its intellectual resources to address these challenges.

"We need a UNESCO with the ability to act. But it will only be able to act if the member states are willing to cooperate and provide the necessary financial support." So said Germany's Maria Böhmer, the former Head of the UNESCO World Heritage Committee. As she noted, money is the primary requirement for UNESCO to be able to implement its

programmes on a sustainable basis. UNESCO also needs to cut programmes and the number of its staff to help balance its budget. Ultimately, however, the active support of Member States is needed. To do this, the issue of Member States' conflicts of interest in relation to UNESCO's governance need to be addressed. Since UNESCO is an international organization made up of sovereign states and subject to the needs of sovereign states, it seems inevitable that conflicts of interest will arise between its members.

UNESCO's organizational culture was designed to place great weight on the value of consensus, and to address issues without the expression of conflicts of interest, to the extent possible. However, reaching consensus takes great time and patience, and this approach can often hinder the reaching of a firm decision. Although a given situation may be getting worse as uncertainty about the future increases, usually nobody is willing to take the first step in making concessions. This is the current situation in which UNESCO finds itself.

As an intergovernmental organization, it is important for UNESCO to improve its efficiency. To accomplish this, governance reform and budget cuts are critical. However, governance reform is not a new issue for UNESCO and its financial difficulties are not something that can be fixed in the short-term. UNESCO's noble ideals must not be forgotten in the name of improving efficiency. Solutions to these issues must be sought from a long-term perspective and within the spirit of the organization. Ultimately, education, science, and culture should be assessed in terms of long-term, intrinsic, fundamental progress made, rather than through short-term, tangible, and quantitative results.

Although the U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO has caused many difficulties, UNESCO fulfilled its role in the 1980s and 1990s without the United States, and eventually, in 2002, the U.S. returned to UNESCO. UNESCO's history shows well enough that the best way to overcome difficulties is to continue to fulfill its role. Just as it has always done, UNESCO, a symbol of human intellect, is expected to bring together humanity's intellectual resources and gradually solve its issues, while South Korea should be able to continue to play a

constructive role in the process.

What is South Korea's role within UNESCO? The answer is likely to be found in examining how UNESCO has helped South Korea's educational and cultural development. UNESCO's support helped South Korea to produce school textbooks to educate the younger generation after the Korean War, which contributed to South Korea's rapid development. In tribute to UNESCO's noble goals, South Korea also established the Korean National Commission for UNESCO, which has been a very active National Commission. In addition to its assessed contributions, South Korea has also contributed a considerable amount to numerous UNESCO programmes by way of voluntary funds.

South Korea has not, however, expressed any clear opinion on UNESCO's governance reform and financial issues and has taken a similar stance to other developed countries. Of course, there is no need for South Korea to set itself at odds with other countries. However, within the arena of efforts to help normalize UNESCO's governance and address its financial difficulties, South Korea needs to establish goals that benefit both UNESCO's development and South Korea's international status and national interests, and develop strategies to persuade other Member States to promote these goals. In this regard, the news that South Korea's government will set up a division within the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to deal exclusively with UNESCO affairs is hopeful, if rather too little, too late. Rather than simply establishing a new division, South Korea should develop a policy toward UNESCO that takes advantage of our strong points as a middle power.

For example, in a UNESCO without the U.S., South Korea could play a crucial role in encouraging the active participation of China and Japan, and avoiding excessive political conflicts between them. The contribution of the three major Northeast Asian countries to UNESCO, and their role in the organization is far from small. However, the continuance of deep-rooted political and historical conflicts is beneficial neither to UNESCO nor to any of the three countries involved. In an atmosphere of confrontation, policies proposed by the

other countries are often viewed with suspicion and subject to misunderstanding. Rather, it is necessary to create an environment where civil society, academia and the media take the lead in seeking solutions to issues concerning UNESCO, bypassing the government. Such an approach would help to get around the issue of excessive politicization that has arisen within the UNESCO heritage programmes, and will attract financial support by increasing attention from the media and the public. To do this, it is essential to have regular interaction and conversation between academics, other experts and NGOs from South Korea, China and Japan, in order to develop UNESCO programmes in Northeast Asian countries at the non-governmental level. It is desirable that the Korean National Commission for UNESCO play a role in coordinating this.

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UNESCO's Organizational Reform

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Since its establishment in October 1945, the UN has held lengthy discussions concerning organizational reform whenever a new Secretary-General takes office. From the first UN Secretary-General, Trygve Halvdan Lie, who aimed to strengthen the role of the UN Secretary-General, and the second UN Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld, who tried to increase the UN's role in peacemaking and ending international disputes, to the seventh UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, who worked to revitalize global cooperation by reforming the lax management of the UN and adopting the Millennium Development Goals, heads of the UN have striven to improve organizational management and operations through organizational reform.

Like the UN, UNESCO has a history of organizational reform and change when its leadership changes. Koichiro Matsuura, who took office as the ninth Director-General of UNESCO in 1999, when large-scale reforms were taking place at the UN, stressed the need for prompt structural reform and transparent organizational management in his inaugural address[32]. Irina Bokova, the tenth Director-General, who took office in November 2009, argued that UNESCO needed to recover its identity and strengths as an intellectual organization so that it could live up to the expectations set on it and deal with the challenges of the time. Most recently, Audrey Azoulay, the eleventh Director-General, who took office in November 2017, used her inaugural speech to stress her intention to prioritize Africa and gender equality, and

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[32] Inaugural address given by Koichiro Matsuura on the occasion of his installation as Director-General of UNESCO, November 15, 1999.

to say that she would make efforts to improve cooperation between member states and undertake governance reform, despite the political and financial challenges facing UNESCO.

It is common to witness organizational reform following leadership changes. The same word 'reform,' however, may have different objectives or different implications depending on how it is used. There may also be gaps between the reform goals announced by the head of an organization and the level of actual effort to achieve these goals. Such gaps may be due to a leader's lack of commitment to pursue the goals but may also be due to external factors that have nothing to do with a leader's will, but which have a negative impact on reform efforts. This article will examine the achievements, limitations, and challenges of the reform efforts made by the most recent three UNESCO Directors-General, those who took office after the beginning of the UN reform in 1997.

I. The Beginnings of UNESCO's 21st Century Reforms

UN reform efforts have had a large influence over UNESCO's organizational reforms. The most salient example is the UN reform initiated by the seventh UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. From his inauguration in January 1997, Annan emphasized the necessity of organizational reform of the UN, and carried out reforms in three main areas. First, he streamlined the structure of the UN system by eliminating approximately 1,000 positions and merging subsidiary organizations. Second, he carried out programme reforms, represented by the initiative 'Delivering as One,' to avoid overlaps between the different UN organizations and to enhance mutual cooperation. Last but not least, he tried to improve the UN governance structure by reforming the UN Security Council, the members of which were mainly members of the Allies of World War II. However, his efforts in this area did not lead to tangible changes owing to opposition from the existing permanent members of the Security Council.

While these efforts to reform the UN were only a partial success, they had a great impact on UNESCO, an organization that had been accused of lax organizational management and inefficiency despite its noble goal of bringing peace to humanity. At the 156th session of the UNESCO Executive Board, held in June 1999, it was decided to form a special working group to explore ways to modernize the organization and run its programmes more effectively.[33] These efforts were further intensified after the inauguration of the ninth Director-General, Koichiro Matsuura.

In an interview with Nature, the English science journal, Matsuura said that UNESCO was like a house with leaky plumbing and faulty wiring, in need of immediate repair. He added that "the real situation turned out to be much worse than I imagined," and that "The culture of UNESCO as a whole needs to be changed."[34] Based on these observations, he pushed for a series of reforms in the areas of human resources policy, organizational management, and decentralization of the organization, with the goal of making UNESCO more relevant, more efficient, and more visible during his ten-year term.[35]

The 2002-2007 UNESCO Medium-Term Strategy (31 C/4) and 2002-2003 Programme and

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[33] UNESCO, 156EX/Decision 10.2, "Reflection on UNESCO in the Twenty-First Century," 1999.

[34] Loder, Natasha, 2000. "UNESCO 'worse than I imagined,' says new director." Nature 404.6774(9 March): 113.

[35] Director-General Matsuura was reelected at the 32nd session of the UNESCO General Conference in October 2005. The term of Director-General was shortened from six years to four years in accordance with an amendment adopted at the 29th session of the General Conference in 1997, which took effect at the 32nd session of the General Conference. Thus, Matsuura remained Director-General until October 2009.

Budget (31 C/5)[36] adopted at the 31st session of the UNESCO General Conference in 2001 were the first policy documents reflecting Matsuura's desire for reform. The documents contributed to strengthening UNESCO's programme capability by setting priorities in each sector and allocating more resources to the priority programmes. The documents also set the direction for reform in the areas of human resources policy, organizational management, and decentralization of the organization. The reform efforts specified in these policy documents and implemented during Matsuura's ten-year term resulted in many achievements but also left unsolved problems.

1. Human Resources Policies

The issue of human resources, closely related to organizational structure, was the area where Matsuura's reform efforts began. UNESCO had had a series of problems in the area of human resource management before Matsuura's organizational reform, such as severe mismatch between manpower distribution and actual need, expedient employment practices that ignored the organization's open recruitment policy, an excessive number of divisions (over 50), too many directors (over 10% of the total staff), a distorted inverted-pyramid staff structure, and unchecked employment of special advisors. In order to change the situation, Matsuura chose to streamline the human resource structure as a whole, which resulted in savings of US$26 million in labor costs. He allocated the amount saved to priority programmes, allowing UNESCO to focus on its primary functions.

In particular, Matsuura alleviated the distortion of the inverted-pyramid staff structure by reclassifying job positions with overly-high grades as lower-graded positions and greatly reducing the number of senior staff positions (director or above). Prior to 1997 there had been over 200 senior staff positions, which had been portrayed as a prime example of the lax management of UNESCO's human resources, but by 2007 Matsuura had reduced the number to 89. He streamlined the organizational structure by halving the number of divisions from

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[36] UNESCO, 31 C/5, "2002-2003 Approved Programme and Budget," March 2002.

over 50, and improved systems for internal communication. He also made efforts to improve human resources policy by introducing a competitive recruitment process to aid in hiring competent staff, and introducing results-based task assessment, career development programmes, capacity building programmes, and a staff rotation system to enhance staff mobility.[37]

The biggest achievements of Matsuura's reforms in the human resources arena were the redeployment of human resources to focus on priority programmes, and the reduction in personnel, with its consequent labor cost savings. Matsuura, however, received fierce criticism for his human resources policy after his reelection in 2005. In particular, he was heavily criticized for deploying more than half of UNESCO's senior staff (director level and above) to central administrative service sectors rather than programme sectors, which led to a lack of human resources in the programme sectors and excessive bureaucracy within UNESCO.[38] According to the report by the Director-General on the reform process (180EX6 Part I Add) at the 180th session of UNESCO Executive Board, performance evaluation of approximately 40 percent of staff members at the Secretariat had not been completed even though Matsuura had placed great emphasis on results-based performance evaluation.[39] Some staff members within the Secretariat even denounced the Director-General in an internal report, saying he was intervening excessively in the process of recruitment and promotion, and even violating rules.[40] Nicholas Burnett, a former Assistant Director-General

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[37] UNESCO, 34C/28, "Report by the Director-General on the Implementation of the Reform Process," 2007 / UNESCO, 177EX/6, "Report by the Director-General on the Implementation of the Reform Process," 2007.

[38] UNESCO in Danger Report Unit, "Matsuura and His Clique: From Cover-up to Take-over," *UNESCO in Danger Report*, no. 1, pt. 1, 2008.

[39] UNESCO, 180EX/6 Part I, "Report by the Director-General on the Reform Process," 2008.

[40] UNESCO in Danger Report Unit, "Matsuura and His Clique: From Cover-up to Take-over,"

for Education, strongly criticized the political dealings witnessed in the process of recruitment within UNESCO's Secretariat, especially for high-level positions, in the *Journal of International Cooperation in Education* (Burnett 2010). Such dealings were a serious problem, causing deterioration in staff expertise and operational capabilities by making it very hard for UNESCO to employ people based on individual capacities. These issues mar the achievements of Matsuura's reform efforts in the area of human resource management, which are otherwise known to be the biggest success of his term as Director-General of UNESCO.

2. Organizational Management Policies and the Adoption of New Management Tools

As another part of his reform efforts, Matsuura introduced a series of institutional frameworks for results-based management (RBM). He established, for instance, the Internal Oversight Service (IOS) in 2001 to assess the activities carried out by each unit. The IOS still exists, despite numerous subsequent changes in leadership and organizational structure. Matsuura also adopted new management tools, such as the System of Information on Strategies, Tasks and Evaluation of Results (SISTER), the Finance and Budget System (FABS), and the System to Enhance Personnel Services (STEPS). SISTER was developed as a core RBM tool that would monitor the preparation process for UNESCO programmes and budget, and their subsequent implementation. FABS was intended to provide information necessary for financial records, accounts management, and budget and finance reports. STEPS was created to modernize the existing human resources management system and improve the personnel support system. Matsuura also proposed that the expected results per programme be specified in UNESCO's medium-term strategies and biennial programme plans, and had the achievements of programmes evaluated based on these. These measures greatly helped UNESCO to adopt the culture of results-based management.

UNESCO in Danger Report, no. 1, pt. 1, 2008. pp. 21-22.

(1) SISTER

Since its introduction in 1998, SISTER has been UNESCO's main tool for RBM. However, in the process of developing the initial version, opinions of UNESCO staff members at headquarters and field offices, who were the end-users of the system, were not sufficiently taken into account. As a result, the system failed to reflect the actual needs of the field. Moreover, training on the use of the system was not provided to staff members. For these reasons, the initial version of SISTER was not effectively utilized and the information in it soon deteriorated, leading to fierce criticism from member states at successive sessions of the UNESCO Executive Board. With the lessons learned from this experience, a wide range of opinions from staff members were collected and reflected in the SISTER II development process. As a result, the system better reflected end-users' needs, in addition to being technically upgraded.

(2) FABS

The FABS system was launched at UNESCO headquarters in 2002 to record all financial transactions on the central accounting system, to maintain accounts and provide up-to-date information on these processes. Field offices also use this system now, but some modules with particular functions were only adopted gradually over time owing to budget and staffing constraints. These included the Financial Management (FM) module, the Finance (FI) module, the Travel (TV) module, and the Material Management (MM) module. In a survey of field offices equipped with FABS, the system was evaluated as having contributed significantly to increased transparency and accuracy, and a reduction and simplification of work.[41]

(3) STEPS

The development of STEPS began on 31 January 2006 but, because of financial limitations, it

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[41] UNESCO, 176EX/6, "Report by the Director-General on the Implementation of the Reform Process," 2007.

focused initially on the system's core functions, including payroll, personnel administration, organizational management, time management, and budget control of travel and job posts. Modules for online recruitment, performance assessment, staff capacity-building and training, online self-service, and work flow were developed during the second phase, and are currently in use at field level.

The introduction of RBM had some positive impacts on UNESCO's organizational culture by instilling healthy tension, but there was also criticism of the newly adopted systems. The Internal Oversight Service, which was created to provide an independent consolidated oversight mechanism that would support results-based programming and organizational reform, was not fulfilling all of its purposes, as the scope of its actions was often narrowly focused on the auditing of accounts.

It is fair to recognize that various systems newly introduced in connection with RBM, such as SISTER, FABS, and STEPS, did produce effective improvements. However, the amateurishness witnessed during the system development process cannot be ignored. The cost of their development and operation greatly exceeded initial estimations.[42] Since actual needs in the field were not sufficiently reflected during the system development process, extra work for modifying functions and systems was repeatedly carried out over a long period of time. Furthermore, by the time the long development process was completed the system was already outdated due to rapid changes in the environment, and so the vicious circle continued, with more funds spent on system upgrades. This is an example of wasted funds and efforts owing to the absence of a system development strategy based on sufficient internal review of needs across the organization.

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[42] The 30th session of the General Conference in 1999 budgeted US$19 million for the adoption of a new management system for budget, finance and personnel management. However, the actual cost of system development and management from 2000 to 2006 was US$28 million (US$17.5 million for system development, US$10.5 million for management).

3. Decentralization Policies

Organizational decentralization (30C/resolution 83)[43] was launched in 1999 to resolve chronic problems with UNESCO's centralized management system, and the poor response capabilities of its field offices to the needs of member states and regions, which were caused mainly by a lack of financial and human resources. Together with the human resource management policy and results-based management, decentralization has been a major pillar of UNESCO's organizational reform, but remains incomplete.

Following a thorough review of over 70 field and liaison offices, Matsuura reorganized the UNESCO field network by merging field offices in the same region, centering on cluster offices, while closing down nominal offices. He made repeated efforts to provide the field network with more human and financial resources to help the offices respond more effectively to the needs of member states. He also broadened the authority of directors within the field network to allow more autonomous operation of the field offices. Furthermore, he reinforced the communication channels between headquarters and the field network by setting up telecommunication networks and computer systems in almost all field offices. The number of staff working at field offices was increased by 46 persons between the 2000-2001 fiscal year and the 2004-2005 fiscal year, and a staff rotation policy, which was introduced in February 2004, helped circulation of personnel between headquarters and field offices.

Matsuura also made efforts to join the UN-wide reform process, which stressed the importance of cooperation among UN agencies under the slogan of "One UN." He created and managed a special task force on decentralization in order to prepare a UNESCO decentralization plan that considered the possible impact of UN reforms at the regional and national level. By highlighting the list of sectoral priority actions based on the consideration of UNESCO's comparative strengths, potential opportunities, and linkages between the

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[43] UNESCO, "Records of the General Conference (30th session)," October 1999.

organization's standard-setting function and its programme implementation function, the special task force helped staff members at UNESCO field offices to participate in the UN's project planning processes at national level, such as the Common Country Assessment (CCA) and the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF).[44]

UNESCO's organizational decentralization was undertaken in good faith in order to respond more effectively to the needs of member states and of regions, as well as to improve the existing working mechanisms, which had been excessively headquarters-centered. However, there were still some doubts about whether the organizational decentralization carried out during Mr. Matsuura's leadership was based on adequate review and organization-wide consultations on roles and responsibilities of different field units. In practice, roles and responsibilities of the various categories of UNESCO field office, such as regional bureau, cluster office, national office, and liaison office, were not as clearly distinguished as originally envisaged, and often overlapped regardless of the level of the office. In some regions, unclear division of roles between field offices and national commissions became an issue, while poor internal collaboration and lack of information sharing between programme units at headquarters and field offices was often the object of criticism. Some staff members of the UNESCO Secretariat criticized Matsuura's decentralization initiative as "a very costly gimmick."[45] More than US$73.5 million, 11.6 percent of UNESCO's total regular budget for 2008-2009 (US$653 million), were earmarked exclusively for decentralization "management

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[44] The CCA is a document that analyzes the national development situation and identifies key development challenges in each country with a focus on international goals such as the Millennium Development Goals. The UNDAF is a country-specific medium-term plan for UN activities to meet the requests of each country, through an integrated and comprehensive UN system response.

[45] UNESCO in Danger Report Unit, "Matsuura and His Clique: From Cover-up to Take-over," *UNESCO in Danger Report,* no. 1, pt. 1, 2008, p. 27.

purposes."[46] This meant that the amount did not include any budget for programme activities. Even though there were demands from the field, the financial resources available to programme activities of the UNESCO field network did not increase much even after Mr. Matsuura's decentralization initiative.

II. Irina Bokova and Organizational Reform Version 2.0

Irina Bokova was elected as the 10th Director-General of UNESCO at the 35th session of the General Conference in 2009. At the 184th session of the UNESCO Executive Board, held in April of the following year, Bokova for the first time revealed her plans for organizational reform and programme implementation in each field. She announced her strong desire to restore UNESCO's unique character and strength as the sole intellectual agency in the UN system, to make the organization more responsive to the needs and challenges of the times, to enhance transparency and accountability of the organization, and to improve the effectiveness and visibility of UNESCO's programmes through organizational reform.[47]

At the 35th session of the General Conference, which marked the beginning of Bokova's term, it was decided to carry out an Independent External Evaluation (IEE) in order to set the future direction for the organization based on a careful analysis of the challenges facing UNESCO in the 21st Century. The results of the evaluation provided the basis for Bokova's reform initiatives.

Between January and July 2010, the evaluation team, consisting of eleven members from different regions, carefully reviewed UNESCO's governance structure, the relationships among its headquarters, field offices, and affiliated UNESCO institutes, the consultation

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[46] UNESCO, 34C/5 Approved, "Approved Programme and Budget 2008-2009," 2008.

[47] UNESCO, 184EX/SR.1-9, "Summary Records," July 2010, pp. 5-19.

process for programme planning and budgeting, and the relevance of UNESCO's programmes. The results were reported to the 185th session of the Executive Board, held in October 2010.[48] The IEE's recommendations, described as "actionable and timely" were summarized as follows:

- Increasing UNESCO's focus
- Positioning UNESCO closer to the field
- Strengthening participation in the UN
- Strengthening governance
- Developing a partnership strategy

First of all, the IEE emphasized the need for UNESCO to further focus its efforts to prioritize its programmes, based on its constitution, and in accordance with its strategic goals and five functions. [49] The IEE stressed that, when deciding on the continuation of existing programmes or the introduction of new programmes, elements such as alignment with strategic objectives, the availability of financial and human resources, and the possibility of cooperation or duplication with programmes of other UN agencies must be considered. The IEE also listed some measures necessary to improve programmes' focus, such as results-based management, enhanced programme evaluation, the introduction of sunset clauses, extension of the programme cycle from two to four years, and improvement of the consultation processes for medium-term strategy and programme planning.

Secondly, the IEE recommended that UNESCO should position itself closer to the field in order to ensure its relevance, effectiveness and impact. The IEE stressed that UNESCO

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[48] UNESCO, September 2010, Report on the Independent External Evaluation of UNESCO (185EX/18), UNESCO

[49] UNESCO has the functions of i) a laboratory of ideas, ii) a clearing house, iii) a standard-setter, iv) a capacity-builder in member states, and v) a catalyst for international cooperation

should ensure the coherence of its policy for the field network while clearly defining roles, responsibilities, and actions expected of UNESCO's headquarters and its field units. In this respect the IEE also underlined the need to establish clear instruction and reporting procedures, the need to enhance coordination and synergies between headquarters and field offices, the need to improve the field network's capacities in management and programme operation, the need to develop new strategies for human resources management, and the need for continuous monitoring of the reform of the field network.

Thirdly, the IEE highlighted the need to strengthen UNESCO's participation in relevant discussions within the UN system in order to enhance its cooperation with other UN agencies, while stressing the need for more systematic and continuous reporting on UNESCO's involvement in the UN.

Fourthly, in terms of strengthening UNESCO's governance, it was pointed out that there should be a clearer division of labor between UNESCO's three major organs, namely the General Conference, the Executive Board, and the Secretariat, in order to avoid duplication of work and responsibilities, communication gaps, and the passing of responsibilities among themselves. The IEE also underlined the need to develop a clear accountability framework to stabilize and reduce the politicization of relationships between the Secretariat and the other governing bodies. In addition, the IEE stressed the need to improve the working methods of the governing bodies by making meeting documents more concise, analytical, and action-oriented, as well as through active use of projection screens during meetings in the process of finalizing decision or resolution texts.

Finally, regarding strategic cooperation with UNESCO's various partners, the IEE stressed the importance of applying coherent criteria when choosing partners and agreeing on cooperation, while emphasizing the need to develop a systematic, regular reporting system on cooperation activities. In particular, it proposed that, prior to the signing of any cooperation agreement, a clear purpose for the cooperation be established, as well as the

method of cooperation, lines of authority and responsibility, and the method and timing for reporting. The IEE also recommended that the role of national commissions in such partnerships be reviewed and revitalized given the importance of national commissions in connecting UNESCO with civil society.

In response to the IEE's recommendations, an ad-hoc working group, composed of 18 countries, with representatives from all regions, prepared a plan with 87 proposed actions for the implementation of the recommendations. The action plan was first presented to the 186th session of the Executive Board, and was finally approved at the 36th General Conference, in November 2011. During Bokova's term of office, this action plan served as a key document for the management of the organization while providing a basis for discussions on organizational reform.

1. Increasing UNESCO's Focus

Given UNESCO's limited financial and human resources, prioritizing its programmes was an inevitable choice. At the beginning of her term, Bokova announced plans to increase the focus of UNESCO's programme in line with the IEE's recommendations. She began with an organizational restructuring and a simplification of administrative processes, so as to improve the efficiency of staffing, reduce administrative costs, and clarify roles and responsibilities.[50] There were also signs of efforts to prioritize UNESCO programmes in the UNESCO programme and budget for 2012-2013 (36C/5), which was the first programme and budget plan Bokova prepared after she took office. She substantially reduced the number of main lines of action in each field. She also reduced the number of intersectoral platforms from 12 to 6, while allocating, for the first time, a separate budget for the intersectoral platforms, in order to ensure practical implementation of the programmes.[51] In the field of

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[50] UNESCO, 36C/28, "Independent External Evaluation of UNESCO," September 2011.

[51] Concerning the draft UNESCO Programme and Budget for 2012-2013, at the 185th session of UNESCO Executive Board Bokova proposed a reduction in the number of priority

education, she made improving the quality of education and reinforcing UNESCO's global leadership the sector's main pillars. In the field of natural science, she placed emphasis on the empowerment of member states' basic science capacity and the protection of the oceans, under the overarching objectives of natural disaster risk reduction, and the promotion of innovation in science and technology. In the field of social and human sciences, she focused on policy development in bioethics and support for the management of social transformation in member states. In the field of culture, priority was given to the protection and promotion of heritage and the diversity of cultural expressions through efforts to ensure the effective implementation and monitoring of UNESCO's international standard-setting instruments. In the field of communication and information, priority was given to freedom of expression and bridging the digital divide.[52]

However, Bokova's efforts to implement the UNESCO programme and budget for 2012-2013, which reflected her vision, faced difficulties from the beginning. Palestine's admission to UNESCO in October 2011 resulted in immediate cessation of funding support from the United States, which was the organization's largest donor country, responsible for paying 22 percent of UNESCO's total regular budget.[53] This situation forced her to prepare a separate

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programmes while expanding programmes for Africa, gender equality, and the building of a culture of peace. In particular, she proposed the reduction of the number of UNESCO's intersectoral platforms to six areas, comprising the culture of peace, climate change, HIV/AIDS, SIDS, Africa, and support for conflict and disaster areas, while proposing to reallocate 10% of each programme sector's budget to the intersectoral platforms.

[52] Korean National Commission for UNESCO (KNCU), 2011, Report on Participation in the 36th Session of the UNESCO General Conference, KNCU, Preface.

[53] The total amount of overdue U.S contributions amounts to US$550 million from the year 2011 to the end of year 2017, the year US declared its withdrawal of membership from UNESCO.

expenditure plan for US$456 million, US$188 million short of the US$653 million budget initially approved by the UNESCO General Conference for the year 2012-2013. In this process, she implemented a massive reduction in programme budget and staffing. While most member states had a positive view of the Secretariat's efforts to respond to the crisis, they expressed concern over the reduction of programme budget ahead of labor costs, and requested a better balance between cuts to programme and labor costs, as well as a more fundamental restructuring.

Bokova had a hard time running the organization in the face of such financial difficulties. The situation did not provide an environment in which UNESCO's programmes could be prioritized from a medium- and long-term perspective and meant that, throughout her term, Bokova had to wrestle with how to manage the organization with a limited budget, while making cost reductions and increasing efficiency. She secured and used extra-budgetary resources to cover the lack of regular funds, but this led to increased reliance on extra-budgetary resources for UNESCO programmes making it difficult to develop stable medium- to long-term projects. It must also be remembered that neither Bokova nor the Secretariat can be solely blamed for all problems in the prioritization of UNESCO programmes, as it has always been difficult for UNESCO to reach agreement on priorities, given the differences in opinion between developed and developing countries and between regional groups.

2.   Reform of Field Offices

Concerning the reform of UNESCO's field network, Bokova proposed a plan to simplify the existing three-tier system (comprising regional bureaus, cluster offices, and national offices)[54] into a two-tier system (comprising multi-sectoral regional offices, and national

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[54] The three-tier system comprises i) regional bureaus, which have expertise in each field, and support an entire region; ii) cluster offices, which cover a sub-region, consisting of 4 to 5 member states; and iii) national offices, which are established in member states in need of special attention and help.

offices or project teams/desks).[55] Bokova gave several reasons why the UNESCO field network needed to be reformed, including the need to address the problems found in the existing three-tier system of overlapping roles and functions between regional bureaus and cluster offices, the need to improve the inefficient reporting and monitoring system between headquarters and field offices, the need to improve conditions in field offices where manpower shortages meant that projects were only being carried out in certain sectors, the need to participate more actively in the "Delivering as One" initiative being implemented by the UN, and the need to respond more effectively to the needs of the field. The majority of member states expressed support for the plan, agreeing with the aim of enhancing the relevance, effectiveness and impact of UNESCO programmes through field network reform.

Bokova expressed her intention to reform the UNESCO field network in phases, taking into account the overall situation of UNESCO. However, this ambitious attempt at reform did not make much progress throughout her term. Bokova's intention was that the first phase of the initiative would see the reform of the field network in Africa and the Arab region, but in the event, reforms only took place in the Africa region. Even after these reforms, many problems were pointed out, including unclear systems for command and reporting between multi-sectoral regional offices and national offices in the new two-tier system, excessive administrative staff ratios and high operating costs, high vacancy rates, poor management and a lack of training programmes for staff members after relocation. Despite Bokova's efforts to simplify the UNESCO field network into a two-tier system, ambiguous roles and overlapping functions between field offices at different levels remained unsolved, and the overall number of field offices did not change much. It is regrettable to note that a large number of field offices are still operating without fully fulfilling their functions.

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[55] UNESCO, September 2010, Report by the Director-General on the reform of the field network (185EX/29), UNESCO

3. Strengthening Cooperation with the UN System

Following her inauguration, Bokova stated that she considered the opinion of certain member states that UNESCO should act as a think-tank to be somewhat unrealistic. Instead, she expressed the view that, in addition to UNESCO's unique ideological and philosophical role, the organization should be carrying out more substantial activities in the field of development cooperation in response to global needs.[56] This view was fully reflected in the UNESCO programme and budget for 2012-2013 (36C/5). Under 36C/5, one of the main pillars of UNESCO's activities was active participation in UN-level efforts represented by the Internationally Agreed Development Goals (IADGs) and "Delivering as One." Based on this, Bokova took a full part in UN-level consultations and also engaged in UN-level cooperation projects through direct talks with other UN agencies. In particular, UNESCO joined international relief activities in Haiti after the devastating earthquake in 2010, where its work included reconstruction of educational facilities, provision of training programmes, management of water resources, protection and restoration of cultural properties, encouragement of sporting activities to prevent violence, collection of various statistics, and the building of databases. As a result of Bokova's efforts to strengthen UNESCO's cooperation with the overall UN system, UNESCO also participated in the UN humanitarian aid project for the first time in its history in 2010.

Bokova also worked hard to achieve the UNESCO goal of 'Education for All' during her term, emphasizing that investment in education was a prerequisite for sustainable development. She played a crucial role in including a balanced and inclusive education as one of main agenda items in the process of setting the UN Sustainable Development Goals. In addition, she was credited with helping to increase international interest and awareness in relation to a number of key issues, including the signing of the Paris Agreement on responses to climate change, the adoption of the UN Security Council resolution on the protection of cultural properties in the event of armed conflict, promoting gender equality, promoting interest in

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[56] Remarks at the plenary of the 185th session of the UNESCO Executive Board.

Africa, preventing violent extremism through education, ensuring the safety of journalists, and highlighting the importance of the oceans,.

From the beginning of her term, Bokova also made efforts to strengthen UNESCO's public relations activities through a restructuring of the Department of Public Information, and sought to improve communication with EU countries, which account for more than 60 percent of global ODA support, by opening an EU liaison office in Brussels, increasing the number of liaison offices to three, following UNESCO's liaison offices in New York and Geneva.

In 2016, while she still the Director-General of UNESCO, Bokova ran for the office of United Nations Secretary-General. In the wake of this event, doubts were cast on the motivation for her moves to strengthen cooperation with the UN system. Bokova, who had frequently travelled abroad in the name of strengthening cooperation with UN agencies, was suspected of having spent UNESCO's budget on her campaign to become UN Secretary-General, even as she was implementing large-scale cuts to UNESCO's programme budget and labor force following the financial crisis that had begun in 2011.

In particular, at the 200th session of the UNESCO Executive Board, in October 2016, members of the board strongly criticized the fact that a staff member from the Information and Communication sector at UNESCO's headquarters had been stationed for the past four years at the UNESCO office in New York, where the UN is located. It was noted that this member of staff was conducting external relations work for the New York office, a task which was unrelated to the work of the Information and Communication sector, despite the fact that the employee's remuneration was being paid from the budget for the Information and Communication sector.

Some people gave a very negative assessment of Bokova, suggesting that she was not only responsible for putting the organization into its worst financial crisis but also for poor

management of the organization after her re-election in 2013, focusing more on preparing to run in the election for UN Secretary-General than on managing UNESCO.

4. Strengthening UNESCO's Governance

In its assessment of UNESCO in 2010, the IEE team concluded that the strengthening of UNESCO's governance would require efforts to resolve the issues of overlapping roles and responsibilities, and communication gaps among UNESCO's General Conference, its Executive Board, and its Secretariat. The IEE team presented a series of recommendations, the first of which was the establishment of an accountability framework that more clearly defined the responsibility and authority of each organ. The IEE also proposed the introduction of a monitoring mechanism to check for areas where the division of roles between the major three governing bodies was ambiguous. It also recommended that documents for the meetings of the General Conference and Executive Board be more concise, analytical and action-oriented, to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the governing bodies' decision-making processes. The IEE called for the active use of large screens and projectors in the process of adopting a decision, in order to ensure that decisions accurately reflected the opinions of the governing body as a whole.

Meanwhile, members of the Executive Board noted the inefficiency found in the complexity of the UNESCO governance system, which involved not just the General Conference and Executive Board, but also numerous intergovernmental committees in various fields. The board members stressed that efforts should be made to reduce redundancy among the various bodies, and to enhance synergy and efficiency.

Bokova sought to improve the organization and operation of the General Conference and Executive Board based on the recommendations of the IEE and the opinions of the Executive Board. She also made efforts to reduce the number of agenda items to be dealt with by the governing bodies so that critical decisions could be made effectively during a limited period of time, and so that the costs of organizing the meetings could be reduced. In particular, she

proposed that night and weekend sessions not be held, to reduce interpretation costs, which account for a large portion of the costs of organizing the meetings, and encouraged the use of online soft copies of documents instead of hard copies, to save on printing costs. She also discouraged the purchase of equipment for conferences, encouraging the recycling of existing equipment, and promoted the early booking of flight tickets, reducing the amount spent to support the attendance at meetings by the representatives of the Executive Board. Through these efforts, she saved approximately US$300,000 in hosting the 36th session of the UNESCO General Conference in 2011.

However, the poor quality of the meeting documents was often criticized by the members of the Executive Board, and the meeting documents were not provided to the member states in time, causing major disruptions. More problematic was the fact that discussions on improving governance of the organization made little progress until 2017, the last year of Bokova's eight-year term, even though these discussions started with her inauguration. In the end, a report on the progress of the discussions was not completed during her term, and was postponed to the 41st session of the UNESCO General Conference, to be held in 2021.

Since it is member states that make the decisions on governance reform, the primary responsibility for the unsolved issue lies with the member states. Nonetheless, we can at least evaluate the role played by Bokova in resolving this complex problem. The issues of overlapping roles and responsibilities, and communication gaps among UNESCO's key governance bodies remain unresolved. It is regrettable to note that, during Bokova's term, there were no noticeable improvements in critical areas of the governance structure even after her governance improvement efforts.

5. Developing a Partnership Strategy

The 187th session of the Executive Board, held in September 2011, requested Bokova to refine the comprehensive guidelines for partnerships, in light of the discussions at the Executive Board, and to expand and complement these guidelines with separate strategies

for engagement with the private sector, media companies, civil society and NGOs, parliamentarians, UNESCO Associated Schools, UNESCO Clubs, UNESCO Chairs, and other partners.[57] At the recommendation of the IEE and the request of the Executive Board, the UNESCO Secretariat sought to establish a consistent cooperation strategy for partners of various categories. In the process of finalizing a comprehensive partnership strategy, the Secretariat added UNESCO goodwill ambassadors and UNESCO Category 2 Centers to its cooperation list. The strategy does not have a separate chapter for cooperation with national commissions, which are an integral part of UNESCO, but the important role of the national commissions is noted throughout the cooperation strategy.[58]

Given the previous circumstances, in which UNESCO had worked with various partners in various fields without any consistent strategy or systematic management system, the new vision for such cooperation can be considered a big step forward. It is particularly positive that UNESCO tried to take a comprehensive view of partnerships as an important asset, that it sought to establish a cooperative strategy in an overall framework consistent with the direction of UNESCO's medium-term strategy and programme plan, that it made more specific distinctions between each partner's responsibilities, roles and contributions, and that the purpose and modalities of cooperation were based on an understanding of the complementary characteristics of UNESCO's various partners.

However, some problems remained unsolved. These included the long, and rapidly growing list of partners in various fields, and the absence of a central control system capable of systematically managing and monitoring all partnerships being undertaken simultaneously in various areas. Bokova also pledged to strengthen cooperation with various partners in the process of planning and implementing the UNESCO programme, but was not active in

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[57] UNESCO, November 2011, Decisions adopted by the Executive Board at its 187th session (187EX/Decision 17 Part IV), UNESCO

[58] UNESCO, September 2013, Comprehensive Partnership Strategy(192EX/5.INF), UNESCO

creating an appropriate environment to ensure their substantial participation. In particular, cooperation and solidarity with the private sector were limited in many respects, as the focus was almost entirely on securing funds. If UNESCO's ultimate goal is to build peace based on the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind, its cooperation with its various partners should have been done in a way that matched this goal, but it was not.

The IEE team's recommendation to strengthen cooperation with various partners noted the important role of national commissions in mediating cooperation between governmental bodies and civil society, and stressed the need for cooperation between the Secretariat and the national commissions. However, the position of the national commissions, which had held a special status and role since the founding of UNESCO, was dramatically weakened during Bokova's term. She abolished the separate, independent section within the Secretariat that had been in charge of cooperation with the network of national commissions.[59] In addition, she abolished the Director-General's Consultation with National Commissions for UNESCO, which had been a key element in the process of preparing UNESCO's draft programme and budget, as well as the training seminar that had been held every two years in each region for new secretaries-general and staff members of national commissions. While the financial crisis that had been a drag on UNESCO since 2011 was the ostensible reason for these actions, it is hard to ignore the feeling that Bokova's stance, which had consistently been to prioritize cooperation with member governments during her term, greatly contributed to the weakening of the status of national commissions, and UNESCO's efforts to cooperate with them.

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[59] At the 191st Executive Board Meeting, in April 2013, Bokova announced a restructuring plan for the External Relations and Public Information (ERI) and Management of Support Services (MSS) sectors, to rationalize UNESCO's administrative functions. Within ERI, the ERI/MSO division and the ERI/NCS division were merged to become ERI/MSP.

III. Audrey Azoulay's Plans for a Strategic Transformation of UNESCO

Audrey Azoulay was elected UNESCO's 11th Director-General at the 39th UNESCO General Conference in 2017. Azoulay first revealed her thoughts on the principles of managing UNESCO and the future direction for reform of the organization at the 204th Executive Board in April 2018. She emphasized unity and collective responsibility to deal with the challenges facing humanity and to strengthen multilateralism. She also said she would avoid politicization of the organization, contribute to improvements in ethics and equality within the organization, and seek to enhance cooperation with the UN system. She presented her vision of a "Strategic Transformation" to allow UNESCO to pursue projects that serve its mission, based on the four following principles:

● To prioritize programmes based on strategic thinking and core tasks;

● To strengthen UNESCO's role in implementing UNESCO's ethical/moral functions and the 2030 development agenda in the era of the Fourth Industrial Revolution;

● To pursue a more open UNESCO by opening the Secretariat to the private sector and strengthening its public relations activities; and

● To strengthen communication among member states, the Secretariat, field offices, and the UN by establishing an 'Administration and Management' sector.

Although the plan, called a "Strategic Transformation" rather than reform, presented the overall direction of the organizational overhaul, the new Director General has not yet offered more specific details. Most member states welcomed her desire to reform UNESCO, while stressing that the major principles of the reform should be to improve the organization's prioritization, transparency, inclusiveness, accountability, moral authority, and performance-based management.

Whatever the goal of Azoulay's reform, substantive results will only be possible with the willing support and participation of all members of the organization. To that end, working

principles and ethics for the entire organization must first be restored, and then the high level management of the organization must actively take the lead in spearheading the reform in accordance with these principles. Given the diversity of the social and cultural backgrounds of the Secretariat staff and the complex internal dynamics of an organization with 195 member states and 11 associate member states, each with their own political interests, UNESCO needs to make active efforts to ensure that an organizational culture with sound ethics takes root.

In addition, efforts need to be made to reduce the size of the organization and reorganize the allocation of personnel based on a clear understanding of the human resources required to implement priority projects effectively. UNESCO needs first to clarify what it has to accomplish, in that the form of an organization should be set by its function. To do this, UNESCO must calculate the minimum structure and resources needed to implement a project. In other words, the organization should be structured to fit its projects rather than developing projects to maintain the organization. The integration of regional offices and decentralization of the organization need to be performed in line with this concept.

Given UNESCO's limited financial and human resources, projects with a focus on its essential missions must be prioritized. Nonetheless, in the process of selecting key projects, UNESCO needs to think critically about the demands of international society, and focus on areas where UNESCO can contribute most effectively, making best use of its comparative advantages within the UN system. To choose the most appropriate projects, UNESCO needs to place more focus on working closely with other UN bodies and ensure that projects are implemented in accordance with plans.

Today, many international organizations of all sizes are encouraging non-state actors such as academics, civil society organizations, and the private sector to take an active part in their governance and decision-making. UNESCO, however, has failed to rid itself of the characteristics of a traditional intergovernmental organization and to act fully as an

intellectual body. To help resolve this, UNESCO needs to create an institutional framework in which it can build intellectual solidarity with a variety of stakeholders, including the types of non-state actors mentioned above. Furthermore, UNESCO needs to consider a fundamental change in the ways it makes key decisions, and set up projects in such a way as to facilitate the participation of a variety of entities. UNESCO already has various networks, comprising National Commissions, NGOs, experts and others, and can therefore tap into a more extensive network of people than any other UN agency can. As the organization's financial difficulties undermine its activities, effective collaboration with these networks would be an excellent way to boost UNESCO's visibility and activities.

At UNESCO's 200th Executive Board meeting, held in October 2016, a number of board members chose the organization's function as a "laboratory of ideas" as a significant function that needed to be strengthened. For UNESCO to be able to propose important new ideas and promote new discussions in the international community it needs to be able to invest significant time in new initiatives, without fear of failure. This is why UNESCO's projects and activities cannot all be judged simply in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, and results-based standards. Of course, results-based management and project management are necessary. However, it is to be hoped that the new Director General remembers the fundamental values of the organization and that not all of the projects that UNESCO pursues can be evaluated solely by visible performance.

At a time when the US, previously the organization's largest donor, has withdrawn from UNESCO and the organization's financial crisis continues, it is pertinent to wonder what kind of reform plan Director General Audrey Azoulay is preparing. Whether her plan is called a "Strategic Transformation" or simply a "reform", what matters is not how ambitious the plan is, but how committed she is to implementing it.

In an interview with the New York Times, Anthony Banbury, a former assistant secretary general at the United Nations, stated that, "If we want to keep our position as a protector of

peace and human rights, we need a leader who is truly committed to reform. The United Nations has too many people who do not have moral and professional competence. We should make sure that those who do not take doing what is right for granted lead the UN, not politicians or public officers who made a decision based on political judgment."[60] His remarks are worthy of attention for the present crisis-ridden UNESCO. The most urgent task for Audrey Azoulay, as UNESCO's new leader, will not so much be to overcome its financial crisis, as to create an organizational culture where employees who do the right thing are supported, and to take the lead in recovering UNESCO's moral authority. If she sets a personal example, letting her actions speak louder than her words, positive change may well come.

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[60] Anthony Banbury, 18 March 2016, "I love the UN, but It Is Failing", The New York Times

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Global Governance and International Organizations: Reforms and Challenges for the United Nations

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I. Introduction

The United Nations (UN) is the only inter-governmental organization with a global scope and is the highest-level body for shaping global governance. The UN emerged from a liberalism that emphasized the possibility of peace and cooperation among all countries, and further expanded its role and scope under neoliberal institutionalism in the post-Cold War era. Neoliberal institutionalism argues that cooperation among nations is possible through the continuous repetition among them of similar interactions, which improves their rationality and ability to predict each other's actions over the long-term. In particular, neoliberal institutionalism supports the roles of the various UN bodies as it stresses that cooperation between all countries is possible in many different fields through the existence of institutions that can improve international cooperation and the tendency of countries to prioritize their absolute gain.

The role and expectations of UN agencies have increased following the post-Cold war emergence of new threats such as poverty, economic inequality, mass migration, organized terror and environmental destruction. Consequently, the UN's agenda encompasses the widest scope of global issues. At the same time, it maintains a decentralized and independent system of committees and programmes through which to discuss global issues

and governance.

The UN has accomplished much to secure global peace and security, sustainable development and human rights through rigorous activities in various fields such as peacekeeping operations, especially during the first decade after the collapse of the Cold War system. Nonetheless, the UN, despite its unique legitimacy, has not been able to overcome the limitations of the current international order in which sovereign states are the main actors, and now faces many challenges with regard to its readiness, effectiveness and appropriateness in responding to global issues. Particularly problematic, from the perspective of global governance, is the UN's inability to coordinate and manage major global issues in an integrated manner. Recent discourse on global governance thus emphasizes the need for global cooperation and effectiveness to overcome such shortcomings. This paper examines the roles and reform of UN bodies, the challenges facing them and their potential for improvement, focusing on global governance.

Global governance explores the possibility of cooperation in the absence of a world government, so that countries facing common global challenges can pursue common interests, transcending nationality. It is an attempt to explain and encourage global cooperation, in recognition that new global issues cannot be addressed by a single country or small group of countries on their own. In the context of current efforts to build a new global governance model, this paper examines current discourse on the topic, including in relation to reform of global capital, refusal of hegemonic authority and criticism of multilateralism and transnationalism based on national interests, especially that of superpowers.

II. UN Agencies and the Rise of Global Governance

Global governance does not limit the actors addressing various global issues and challenges

to traditional actors in international politics such as sovereign states and the United Nations. Instead it suggests a new paradigm that includes other transnational actors such as various agencies and programmes under the UN, global NGOs, and epistemic communities. The concept has also been expanded to include, for instance, security governance, economic governance, environmental governance, and human rights governance, depending on current themes and agendas. In the context of the apparent expansion of a system that controls the role and the actions of international organizations, this Section examines the relationship between global governance and international organizations.

The emergence of global governance has led to changes in international organizations such as the UN. The end of the Cold War heralded a new era for such organizations, and a rapid expansion of their roles with the globalization of the international economy and greater attention paid by the superpowers to human security. Examples can be seen in the role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) during the global financial crisis in the late 1980s and the expanded role of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the agriculture and service sectors in the mid-1990s. With the growth of civil society worldwide, the emergence of global governance became useful as a conceptual tool for reforming international organizations. A report from the Commission on Global Governance said that the end of the Cold War not only considerably strengthened the position of international organizations, but also greatly increased the relevance of global governance owing to the growth of global civil society. In other words, institutional space has been created for nongovernmental organizations to take an active part in international affairs. According to Groom and Powell, global governance concerns the identification and management of issues in all parts of the globe. These issues include ecological issues, human rights, and development, as well as refugees, migration, drugs and epidemics. They claim that although awareness of such issues started in the 1960s, the actual management of them has been amorphous and partial, and global governance calls for a more targeted management of those issues (Groom and Powell, 1994, 81-182).

The concept of global governance started to attract more attention in the mid-1990s, with

the creation of the UN Commission on Global Governance, the launch of the academic journal *Global Governance,* and the establishment of research centers on global governance in many countries, facilitating academic activities. The term "global governance" and the concept behind it gained considerable ground, at least in the academic field of world politics. This phenomenon also influenced government policies, leading to global governance becoming a key concept in foreign policy decisions.

However, conceptual confusion and debate over the concept of global governance continues among experts (Cho and Kim 2014, 10). The term "global," is seen as different from the terms "international, " "interstate," "intergovernmental," or "transnational." It implies the meaning of a global holistic response to a global holistic phenomenon. The term "governance" is more difficult to understand. According to Waltz (1979), who defines the international system as anarchy, "anarchy" simply means the absence of a world government. He argues that self-interested states in anarchy will create a self-help system. The term "governance" implies that even in the absence of a world government, it is possible to establish a system that controls the behavior of countries in accordance with norms. That means it is possible to strengthen global cooperation through various political mechanisms and spheres of authority, even in the absence of hierarchy.

The confusion over the term global governance has been amplified by comments from academics and conflicting views. For example, Finkelstein (1995) mentions, "We say 'governance' because we don't really know what to call what is going on." The implication of this is that finding a suitable term for this new system is difficult. The idea of Rosenau and Czempiel (1992) that, "[g]lobal governance is the sum of myriad—literally millions of—control mechanisms" has added to the conceptual confusion. A conceptual difference can be seen in the definitions of global governance among developed countries and developing countries. Developed countries try to define global governance as a political feature of neoliberalism from the perspective of the advent of laissez-faire. On the other hand, developing countries consider global governance a hegemonic feature of liberalization,

privatization, and the globalization of capital. It is not even clear how global governance is different from the "international society" that Bull (1977) discusses.

Despite the conceptual confusion, there are many reasons for the growing attention to and research on global governance in the 1990s. First, there was an increasing impact from globalization that began in the 1980s. The deepening and widening of globalization, characterized by the opening up of markets, deregulation, and privatization, redefined international relations and led countries to redesign their diplomatic strategies. New principles and standards came into being in many different sectors, and national strategies to accept or reject them had the potential to determine countries' futures. Thus, there has been growing national interest in how these powerful principles and standards are created, which is related to interest in global governance.

In addition, the expansion of transactions in the world economy as a result of globalization created a variety of problems, as well as economic benefits, which also raised interest in global governance. The problems included increases in imbalances and divisions in the economy, the increasing role of non-state actors and regulatory issues in the management of the economy, and interference with non-economic benefits. Countries looked for solutions to these problems through common discussion and policies, thus raising interest in global governance.

III. A Critical Juncture for Global Governance and UN Agencies

Following a period of increased interest in the post-Cold War era, global governance reached a turning point at the beginning of the 21st century. Following this decline in global governance, a question has arisen whether the role of UN agencies is diminishing or if it is instead becoming more advanced. This confusion arises because the situation is different from case to case. However, the international systemic environment has changed dramatically since the mid-1990s. With these changes, it can be said that global governance

is in retreat, for various reasons (Cho and Kim 2014, 18-20).

First, it can be seen that the pace and scope of globalization have declined following the prevailing of capitalism over communism in the 1980s and 1990s, and the implementation of policies for deregulation and liberalization. The impact of globalization has been felt by many countries, but 20 years after its expansion, the number of places influenced by globalization is gradually decreasing. There has been a growing backlash against globalization. Anxieties, frustration and disappointment due to increasing income inequality at home and abroad, widening socio-economic gaps, exclusion, and demonstration effects have grown exponentially. Global governance and the role of the UN and other international organizations, which grew together with the expansion of globalization, have undergone something of a contraction partly as a result of the retreat of globalization .

This phenomenon began in the early 21st century and is closely related to the global economic crisis that peaked in 2008, with the global economy remaining in a slump over the past ten years. Many economic problems have occurred over this time period, including slow growth rates, frequent financial crises, falls in trade and investment, rising unemployment, and increased budget deficits. The most serious issue here is that no proper policies exist at the global level to solve these problems. The global economic downturn has forced countries to adopt self-help policies. Companies and individuals without a suitable exit strategy have required their governments to adopt protective policies (Hirschman 1970).

The second phenomenon related to this is the redefinition of the role of the state. The market-centered economic system that grew in the 1980s has faced a crisis. Calls for nations to redefine the role they play have grown following the growth of socio-economic issues such as increased budget deficits, growing demands for welfare, financial crises, lack of regulatory capacity, and rising unemployment. For example, Bremmer (2011) argues that the era of the free market has ended and that countries need to increase the roles that they play. Anatole Kaletsky (2010) points out that the role of the state has changed since the financial

crisis in 2008 and that a new kind of capitalism has emerged. If the role of the state is strengthened and politics and the economy are managed according to its national interests, global governance and the role of the UN's economic agencies will be weakened.

Third, there have been rapid and dramatic changes in the international order. The most outstanding feature is the emergence of China. China's growing strength, coupled with a decline in U.S. hegemony, is creating systemic instability at the global level. There have been arguments, and various empirical analyses, suggesting that power transitions between countries amplify disputes (Organski 2000). Conflict and confrontation between countries seeking to acquire or keep hegemony can occur. Such systemic changes lower the possibility of cooperation between nations. The system of global governance is also weakening. The United States has tried to block China through the Obama administration's rebalancing policy and the Trump administration's Indo-Pacific Strategy. China, in return, has adopted policies such as the Belt and Road Initiative (One Belt One Road), the Rise of the Great Powers and the New Type of Great Power Relations. China established the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in response to the World Bank, and has worked to create the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership in response to the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Recently, China adopted the Qingdao Declaration at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in 2018. The declaration calls for improvements in global economic governance and strongly warns against unilateralism and the trade protectionism of the U.S. Such changes in international order, amid rivalry and conflict between the global hegemonic power and its challenger, inevitably place limits on the operation of global governance. In the place of global governance, it seems highly likely that there will be growth in regional governance.

Fourthly, attention and support for UN agencies have also decreased because of differences in countries' concerns. Above all, cooperation among countries formed in response to terrorism after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001 has been weakening, reflecting the differences in the level of ongoing concern generated by this issue in various countries. The

U.S. and European countries, which are the main targets of international terrorists, want the international community to react more strongly and effectively to international terrorism. On the other hand, countries that have not been affected by terrorism are now much less interested in this issue. This weakening of global governance in relation to terrorism has become even more pronounced as the forces of both ISIS and al Qaeda have weakened.

Similar trends can be seen with the issue of refugees. While concern over the issue of international refugees and migrants has grown in recent years, there are huge differences in the level of interest shown by countries and the policies that they adopt in relation to it. Even within the European Union, the members of which cooperate on political, economic and social issues, conflicts have broken out over the issue of refugees. The issue is a complex one, since accepting refugees is not only directly linked to national security, but is also closely related to the management of economic and social policy in each country. For example, the acceptance of refugees involves consideration of various economic issues, such as welfare benefits for refugees, tax collection, health and education benefits, housing and employment. Political issues such as citizenship and voting rights are also involved, as are social issues such as possible effects on the environment, the safety of residents, and racial conflicts. Each country has its own concerns and it is therefore very difficult to reach agreement between countries.

One sector where some agreement has been possible among countries is the issue of the global environment. Various efforts have been made through different mechanisms to respond collectively to environmental issues. In particular, collective concern has been shown and common understandings reached in relation to carbon emissions, global warming, and wildlife protection. However, the issue of the environment is also a matter that causes considerable conflict among countries. There are disagreements between developed and developing countries as to who is responsible for environment pollution. Concerns also depend on a country's geographical location and the nature of its agriculture. In addition to these complex problems, there is also disagreement over the technical and scientific basis

for concern. Many confrontations have arisen over the controversial issue of the appropriate balance between development and environmental protection, and there is great conflict over how the environment can be protected and who will pay for this. As a result, global governance in this area cannot function effectively. Trump's recent withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord is a prime example of the conflict. Stating that the Paris Accord would put the U.S. at a permanent disadvantage, Trump announced that "In order to fulfill my solemn duty to protect America and its citizens, the U.S. will withdraw from the Paris Climate Accord."

Tensions also exist in the economic field, with conflict between multilateral economic institutions and global civil society movements. The multilateral trade negotiations begun after the launch of the WTO in 1995 have failed. Agreements between countries on issues such as agriculture or services are very difficult to achieve because of the obvious differences in position between, for example, developed and developing countries, and between agricultural exporting countries and importing countries. There has also been a severe backlash in underdeveloped countries about claims made by developed countries for the importance of intellectual property rights protection, investment protection and government procurement rules. On the other hand, calls made by low-income nations for liberalization of the textile industry, labor markets and immigration rules are difficult for developed nations to accept. There is also a weariness of the trade liberalization that has been in progress since 1945, with increasing political resistance towards further trade liberalization, and the downturn in the global economy adding to the difficulty of trade agreements between countries.

Agreements on foreign investment are even more difficult owing to the differences of opinion between countries on the benefits and costs of foreign investment and differences between the preferences of foreign investors and investees. No progress has been made in discussions about corporate social responsibility and creating shared values, which try to regulate the behavior of multinational corporations. As with other areas, attempts to create a multilateral economic system for foreign investment have failed owing to the complexities of

national interests.

Agreements between countries in financial matters are almost impossible. Although countries that have faced repeated financial crises and overheated international financial markets have attempted to introduce controls such as transaction taxes and the creation of transparent and regulated markets, in practice such policies have proved ineffective. There is pessimism about whether countries have the capability to manage and regulate international financial markets effectively. The power of any one country is limited and effective global governance is difficult because of the enormous scale of unregulated financial dealings, enabled by different types of financial engineering. In effect, financial dealings are controlled by the market, not by nations or through a system of global governance.

In addition to such issues, several intergovernmental organizations that have worked well in the past are also failing. One example is the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). While this organization was not designed to protect the interests of the international community or to tackle common problems, it still offers a good example of how international cooperation can be greatly damaged by changing circumstances. The weakening of OPEC has numerous causes, including the global economic downturn, an oversupply of oil, conflicts between regional powers, religious conflicts, development of new energy sources, and competition between member and non-member countries.

As shown above, various causes are contributing to a weakening in global governance and the role of international organizations. Multilateral cooperation based on common concerns and interests is weakening, and if international relations is considered to be a system that comprises all types of cooperation and conflict among nations, the weakening of cooperation means the amplification of conflict. If countries all continue to have different visions, concerns, interests, and policies, international cooperation through systems of global governance are bound to weaken further.

IV. Improving Global Governance in the UN System

What is the desirable governance model for the UN international organizations for the 21st century? An ideal form of governance or the idea of governance is generally understood to mean the most effective form of management. In a narrow sense, governance means providing a policy and systemic framework, and controlling the role of the state. In this case, systems contribute to eliminating uncertainty and creating public good. In a broad sense, governance emphasizes autonomy, efficiency, rationality and strengthening the institutional capacity of a state or agency through training. This section of the article examines the common problems of global governance by the international organizations in the UN system and the problems of legitimacy and efficiency in each sector.

The legitimacy and efficiency of international organizations have recently been subject to two forms of challenge. First, the legitimacy of international institutions has been challenged by countries that do not believe their interests are served within such institutions. The UN has a superior symbolic legitimacy compared to other international organizations, given that its member states include almost all the world's countries, but its structure is decentralized. Although most global issues are discussed by the UN's General Assembly and Economic and Social Council, delays in decision-making due to the decentralized nature of participation by numerous actors are becoming a major problem. There are now calls for the Economic and Social Council to create a global economic council at a similar level to the UN's Security Council

In addition to challenges relating to legitimacy, nongovernmental organizations and domestic lobbyists are questioning the efficiency of international organizations. Small states are raising the issue of hierarchies among countries within international organizations and questioning the legitimacy and efficiency of the multilateral system. . UN agencies have

shown limitations in their ability to respond effectively to unforeseen changes in global governance, such as new global issues, transnational issues that require joint actions by Member States, and regulation and coordination of multinational corporations and nongovernmental international organizations. Problems with efficiency arise because most global issues are complex, with facets involving security, economic and social issues, which can result in various separate parts of the UN carrying out overlapping functions. To overcome such problems, global conferences, such as summits, are used as an alternative to the general functioning of the UN. Even these global meetings are criticized for redundancy and impractical results, but they have resulted in outcomes such as the Kyoto Protocol (1997), the Millennium Development Goals (2000) and the UN Arms Trade Treaty (2013). These alternative meetings have the merit of more rapid and effective agreement and implementation of norms than the UN's usual functioning, but still have problems such as the political will of member states, and maintaining momentum and follow-up action at the level of the UN. The UN still has a long way to go to ensure full participation, responsibility, fairness, efficiency, and democracy in its global governance.

1. Global Security Governance

Most of the UN's reform efforts on global governance concern the legitimacy of the UN Security Council, the UN's main body for security governance. Behind the desire for this reform lie issues concerning the structure and operations of the Council (Kim Won-soo 2002, 219-258).

First, the low level of representation of member states on the Council hinders its legitimacy in the international community. When the UN was founded, it had approximately 50 members, but now its membership stands at 193 nations. However, there are still only five permanent members of the UN Security Council, while the number of non-permanent members has only increased from six to ten, following a resolution of the General Assembly in 1963. With countries such as Japan and Germany arguing strongly that they should be able to join the Security Council on the basis of their economic power, and other middle

power countries also urging to join to increase regional representation, it seems inevitable that the Council will eventually be reformed.

Second, as the number of issues to be decided by the permanent members of the Council has sharply increased after the Cold War, member countries have started complaining about the frequency of meetings, the secrecy of procedures, and lack of transparency in decision-making. Complaints about transparency have risen in particular because even non-permanent members of the Council have been excluded from decision making.

Third, there have been debates about when the Council should actively intervene in a conflict. It has been pointed out that the Security Council has not intervened effectively in various types of conflicts that have occurred repeatedly during the post-Cold War era. After the failure of the Security Council's intervention in the Somalia conflict, many countries called for the Council to be more careful in its interventions, while later ineffective interventions in the Rwandan genocide and the Bosnian conflict aroused global criticism.

The crux of the debate about reform of the Security Council is the question of whether and how the number of permanent members should be expanded. The debate can be narrowed down to the "quick fix" and the "Razali formula" [61] proposals. The quick fix was a proposal to make Japan and Germany permanent members and increase the number of non-permanent members by three. It was supported by developed countries but vigorously opposed by China and developing countries. In particular, countries such as India and Brazil argued that the proposal would worsen the already low representation of developing countries within the Security Council. The Razali formula was widely popular among both developed and developing countries, but was strongly criticized by countries in the Coffee

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[61] The Razali formula was a proposal made by the then Malaysian Ambassador to the UN, who served as president of the 51st UN General Assembly. The proposal called for an additional five permanent members of the Security Council, comprising two developed countries, one Asian country, one country in Central/South America and one African country, and an additional four non-permanent members.

Club[62].

Countries in Africa and the Middle East have argued for a system of permanent regional rotating seats. Under this system, seats on the Security Council would rotate among the countries in a given region, with countries taking turns to act as permanent members of the Security Council for that region.[63] The countries proposing this system plan to make it their official position and have appealed for support from other countries.

In the meantime, the Commission on Global Governance has strongly encouraged NGOs to participate in the work of the Security Council, arguing that an NGO expert panel should be created to advise on regional conflicts, preventative diplomacy, prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, financial and diplomatic sanctions, humanitarian work and peacekeeping operations.[64] In addition, as the number of conflicts has gradually increased, the Commission has examined the possibility of creating an international peacekeeping force, proposing to maintain a force of 5,000 to 10,000 for deployment in emergencies (Joo 2001, 249). On the other hand, the U.S. has been lukewarm about reform debate, insisting that the scope and scale of any reform should be the minimum necessary (Cho 2013, 69).

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[62] The Coffee Club has no fixed membership, but is in general a group of middle-power countries, with core members including the Republic of Korea, Canada, Italy, Spain and Mexico.

[63] The Africa region would be allocated two new permanent seats on the Security Council under this proposal. These seats would rotate among the five sub-regional groups in Africa, with the same veto rights as those of the existing permanent members. The Middle Eastern countries involved are arguing for two new permanent seats, for rotation in Asia, with the same veto rights as existing permanent members.

[64] Commission on Global Governance, "The Millennium Year and the Reform Process," http://www.globgov.collegium.edu"

There appears to be no easy solution to the question of whether the number of permanent members of the Security Council should be expanded, given the complex web of international sensitivities and issues involved. However, in the sense that resolutions of the UN Security Council directly or indirectly affect states that are not members and non-state actors, a platform for such parties to be able to give their opinions is needed in some form, to secure the Council's democratic legitimacy.

With the eruption of civil war in various forms after the end of the Cold War, a multidimensional solution is required to maintain global peace in today's world, including peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and development strategies. However, as the UN has become increasingly fatigued with humanitarian interventions, the normative basis of UN-centered peacekeeping operations is being eroded. Even in the case of military interventions, other actors such as non-state private military companies are gradually becoming involved, and in the case of non-military intervention, larger numbers of actors, including the World Bank and NGOs, are increasingly involved. The UN Security Council and other parts of the system of global security governance need to become more effective, given the increasing multiplicity of new actors, their decentralized independence, and the greater possibility of overlap in their roles.

2. Global Finance and Trade Governance

UN agencies concerned with finance and trade, such as the IMF and WTO, helped lead the expansion of globalization, acting as key players in global governance. Their efforts and improvements have been vital in responding to the rapidly changing world economy and establishing the international finance and trade order. The WTO, which is regarded as achieving the greatest innovations in the international trade system during the post-Cold War era, adopted procedures for decision-making and conflict resolution by consensus and implemented global governance that dealt with tariff issues through appropriate adjustments to create a free trade environment. Nonetheless, it is argued that the benefits and value of the huge expansion in free trade have not been fairly shared by all member

states and that the WTO is influenced by the interests of developed countries.

The IMF's role in international currency and financial stabilization assists the international balance of payments. Recently, the IMF has been a major player in global governance for the supervision of overall global economic policy, including the management of financial crises in developing countries and negotiations relating to debt settlements with developed countries. However, the IMF has faced criticism that its policies reflect the national interests of hegemonic powers and developed countries and that it has weakened, rather than bolstered, countries' economic bases by insisting on compliance with the IMF's general principles without considering an indebted nation's political or economic situation or its particular loan conditions.

The 2008 global financial and economic crisis showed the weaknesses of the IMF-centered Bretton Woods system. Mechanisms for finance and trade governance such as the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank, focused on building and implementing the so-called "Washington Consensus," which prioritizes market liberalization based on neoliberalism. However, the severe financial crisis of 2008 aggravated distrust of the global financial governance system.

In particular, in addition to the criticism that the IMF did not function effectively as an early warning system for the world financial crisis, there has been skepticism about the feasibility of fundamental reform of the IMF's quota and voting rights because of the influence of those who want to maintain the status quo. Recently, there has been discussion about creating a "UN World Economic Commission" as a new high-level governance authority for the global economy but this has gone no further than the proposal stage, and no concrete actions have been taken.

3. Global Environmental and Development Governance

Global environmental issues, regarded as the greatest threat of the 21st century, have become such a difficult issue to solve that they can be categorized as a new type of security

threat, a common or global threat affecting the security of the whole world. Concern for the environment is relevant to the issue of sustainable development, which is concerned with finding an appropriate balance between conservation of limited global resources and unlimited human desire for development. Among the various environmental concerns, the seriousness of climate change has emerged as a global-level security threat, with the potential to affect many areas of human concern, including economic activity, health and food supply.

The biggest cause of climate change are greenhouse gases, such as carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from burning fossil fuels. Therefore, the focus of global environmental governance is the reduction of greenhouse gases. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was signed in 1992 to address this issue, followed by the legally binding Kyoto Protocol in 1997. The protocol mandated 37 industrialized countries to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by an average of 5.2 percent below 1990 levels by the period between 2008-2012 and stated the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities" as the basis for the sharing of the costs between countries. In November 2015, following the expiry of the Kyoto Protocol at the end of 2012, the Paris Agreement on Climate Change was adopted by 195 countries at the 21st Session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 21) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The Paris Agreement aims to limit global temperature increases to 1.5 degrees Celsius with progress on implementation to be reviewed every five years. Although President Trump's decision to prioritize U.S. national interests and withdraw from the Paris Agreement left most countries at a loss, in a joint declaration at the Hamburg G20 Summit in 2017 he expressed a strong commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The G20 leaders agreed to maintain strong support for implementation of the Paris Agreement, which reflected the differences in the capacities of each country, stressing that developed countries, in particular, needed to support the agreement and fulfil their duties under it in order to ensure that adaptions could be made and greenhouse gas emissions reduced, and that investment was needed to facilitate responses to climate change and sustainable economic development.

The environmental sector is not the only area where international cooperation needs to be strengthened. In the field of international development, consensus about the need for diversification of development goals and the establishment of global development governance, began to grow in earnest from the 2000s. Goals that were discussed for development cooperation included growth that was aimed at reducing poverty, the development of basic economic and social infrastructure, participatory development, and sustainable development.

Global development governance has involved not just sovereign states but also various non-state actors, such as the UN, the OECD, the G8, the G20, multinational corporations, and NGOs. In September 2000, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were adopted at the Millennium Summit, with pledges made to reduce extreme poverty rates by half before 2015. The UN adopted the Monterrey Consensus, a joint agreement between developed and developing countries to discuss ways of raising funds for various development initiatives and to achieve the MDGs. However, various streams of active debate about how to improve global development governance continue, from criticism that the amount of aid to developing countries and least developed countries is wholly insufficient, to claims that it is more urgent to increase the efficiency of aid, such as through strong partnerships with multilateral development banks, bilateral development organizations and private sector.

Compared to other sectors, global governance in the environment and development sectors involves a significantly higher participation by non-governmental actors, such as the G20, multinational corporations, and global civil society. More than a thousand nongovernmental organizations from over 100 countries participated in the Millennium Forum, and contributed to the adoption of the MDGs. However, effective coordination of appropriate representation, transparency and accountability of all these parties is another challenge for the UN system.

V. Conclusion

This article examined the changing fortunes and major debates concerning global governance. In addition, it analyzed the possible direction in which global governance is headed, looking at current issues and initiatives for improvement in different sectors of global governance. In the twenty years since the emergence of discourse on global governance, various issues have arisen in relation to the current global governance system. At the same time, as the international systemic environment that engendered the discussion of global governance has undergone changes, views on global governance and understanding of the concept underpinning it are changing greatly.

With growing uncertainty about the current international system, many countries are turning to state-oriented foreign policy rather than seeking collaborative international systems. The various facets of Trump's foreign policy emphasize an 'America First' approach, including increasing the share of defense costs for which its allies are responsible, the reexamination of existing free trade agreements, changes in the international environmental regime, trade policy focused on the U.S., and control of immigration. As the resulting backlash by China and European countries has grown, the chaos in the international community is clear. Britain's exit from the EU after differences of opinion on welfare and refugee issues has the potential to undermine the foundation of European cooperation. Xi Jinping's ambition to surpass Mao Zedong is leading China to use its hegemonic position to exert military and economic pressure on neighboring countries and seek policies that maximize national interests while ignoring international regulations and principles.

In the current situation, with the international order becoming more tumultuous and competitive, it is hard to strengthen global governance, implement institutional reform, and maintain levels of investment and interest. However, finding an international institution that

can strengthen the weakening international cooperation and revitalize global governance is therefore more important than ever. Both states and non-state actors must work harder together to reinforce global governance as a mechanism for cooperation.

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PART III. The Republic of Korea's Cooperation with UNESCO

1. The Direction of Korea's Involvement with UNESCO

   Seok-Jin Lew (Sogang University)

2. Korea's Voluntary Contributions: Current Status, Major Issues and Goals

   Hyuk-Sang Sohn (Kyung Hee University)

3. Cooperation between Korea and UNESCO on Education

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The Direction of Korea's Involvement with UNESCO

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I. Introduction

This article is intended to explore the direction of the Republic of Korea's involvement with UNESCO. It takes a high-level view, focusing on overarching issues such as how we should understand UNESCO, what UNESCO means to the Republic of Korea (hereafter "Korea"), and what kind of vision Korea should pursue in relation to UNESCO, rather than looking at issues such as how Korea should handle specific UNESCO activities or how much Korea should contribute to UNESCO.

UNESCO has two inherent and conflicting characteristics. On the one hand, it is a global organization with a legacy of modern enlightenment, seeking to overcome prejudice and ignorance through education, science and culture, and pursuing the ideals of world citizenship and peace by encouraging mutual understanding. On the other hand, as an intergovernmental organization composed of sovereign states, it is a forum for the pursuit of national interests. However, UNESCO is different from other international organizations in that it pursues soft power rather than hard power, such as economic or military power.

Such dual characteristics give two different values to Korea's diplomacy towards UNESCO. One aim is the realization of the enlightened value of promoting peace among the citizens of the world and the other is the realization of the more pragmatic value of pursuing national interests. These two values conflict with and complement each other at various times. When

the two values collide, a question arises concerning which value should take precedence over the other. In other words, does national interest take priority over the more enlightened value or the other way around? These kinds of dilemmas are less pressing when the two values are complementary. From an intrinsic point of view, it may be important to search for ways to reduce the chance of conflict and enhance harmony between the two. For this reason, this article aims to suggest a way to begin working towards a complementary relationship between the two values.

The article is structured as follows. Part II summarizes the major visions in relation to UNESCO that have been presented so far by Korea and the Korean National Commission for UNESCO (KNCU) for the 21st century. Part III looks into the relations between UNESCO and Korea, focusing on the contributions each has made to the other. The fourth chapter reviews what the United States and the United Kingdom lost after their withdrawal from UNESCO, and what was gained by their rejoining of UNESCO, introducing the respective debates about UNESCO in both these countries. These debates will serve as a starting point for analyzing the meaning of UNESCO to Korea. The final section will look at issues that need to be considered when looking at the future direction of Korea's involvement with UNESCO.

II. Major Visions of Korea and KNCU for UNESCO in the 21st Century

Because of UNESCO's two conflicting characteristics, discussion about Korea's visions in relation to UNESCO take place at both the government level and with civil society, often driven by KNCU. At the government level, departments with remits that specifically relate to UNESCO include the International Education Cooperation Division of the Ministry of Education, the International Cultural Affairs Division of the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, and the International Coordination Division of the International Cooperation Bureau under the First Vice Minister of the Ministry of Science and ICT, in addition to the UNESCO Division within the Public Diplomacy and Cultural Affairs Bureau, which was

founded under the Second Vice Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

With the exception of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, government departments do not separately subdivide and categorize tasks related to UNESCO. According to the organization chart of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the UNESCO Division is responsible for the following: UNESCO heritage, local government cooperation, management of textbooks and other records, UNESCO General Conference, UNTWO/tourism, cooperation with KNCU, UNESCO voluntary contributions, UNESCO's culture programmes, cooperation with Korea Foundation, Korean food, Quiz on Korea, budgeting, sponsorship, education, cultural cooperation with the Americas, and other administrative support. Though it is hard to talk about visions and strategies at the division level, it can be said that the division's focus is too micro. Visions and strategies should be reviewed from a broader perspective, at the level of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Public Diplomacy and Cultural Affairs Bureau, to which the UNESCO Division belongs, and at the level of Korea's overall diplomatic strategy. A detailed discussion of this issue can, be found in two existing studies (KNCU 2011, 2013). Thus, this article simply quotes the description of "UNESCO Diplomacy" given by the Permanent Delegation of the Republic of Korea to UNESCO. This description reflects the Permanent Delegation's pursuit of national interests as a government organization.

> "The Foreign Ministry has actively participated in the activities of UNESCO, engaging in various Intergovernmental Committees and the General Conference of UNESCO to reflect our position by conducting cultural and diplomatic activities. Furthermore, we have been making efforts to promote Korean culture to the world by registering our cultural and/or natural heritage of outstanding universal value as World Heritage, worthy of preservation and transmission."[65]

In contrast to the Foreign Ministry, in 2014 KNCU declared its new vision as "Building Peace with the People of Korea, Sharing Dreams with the World through Education." This vision

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[65] http://mcms.mofa.go.kr/trade/cultural/unesco/index.jsp?menu=m_30_170_20#print, accessed September 30, 2018.

was declared in celebration of KNCU's 60th anniversary and can be seen to be both very specific, and also centered on values. KNCU also established three major areas of work for itself: educational support to developing countries, cultivation of global talent among the next generation, and contribution to peace on the Korean Peninsula and in East Asia (KNCU 2015, 47).

In addition, KNCU established the development of a "culture of peace" as a critical value, saying that "In the late twentieth century when confrontation between cultural protectionism and cultural liberalism culminated with the phenomenal growth of the cultural industry, UNESCO endeavored to build a culture of peace in the minds of men, based on its founding principle of 'world peace and development,' and underscored the power of culture to lead global development through a culture of peace. Today, UNESCO has firmly established itself as the leader for the protection and development of cultures of all peoples and nations, while Korea is largely viewed as a Member State that has achieved remarkable results in UNESCO's culture programmes" (KNCU 2015, 114-115).

In addition to suggesting various and specific fields of work, KNCU proposed as Korea's unique programme "cooperation projects in developing countries in the field of information and communication since the mid-2000s, in the wake of Korea's emergence as the world's IT powerhouse" (KNCU 2015, 122-3). As a result, "[a]s a follow-up action for the New World Information and Communication Order, UNESCO established the International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems and launched the Information Society for All programme." (KNCU 2015, 124).

This shows that KNCU sheds light on areas in which Korea has a comparative advantage, which are not necessarily restricted to Korea's national interest, based on reflections on values. This is in contrast to the Korean government, which focuses more on micro issues to respond to them based on national interests in intergovernmental organizations.

III. UNESCO and Korea: a History of Mutual Contributions

1. UNESCO's Major Contributions to Korea

An examination of UNESCO's major contributions to Korea offers a springboard for a discussion of the focus of Korea's UNESCO-related activities. Analysis of how UNESCO's support helped Korea, a former recipient country, to achieve its current status of a donor country provides a starting point in considering how Korea can now best contribute to UNESCO, and by doing so, how Korea can pay back the support it received from UNESCO. First, this article will look at how UNESCO has influenced Korea and then it will examine in further detail the influence that UNESCO has had on Korea specifically in the fields of education, science, and culture.

UNESCO's influence in Korea can be divided into four types. First, UNESCO has given Korean direct financial support, for instance for the construction of a printing facility to produce school textbooks, and through the UNESCO Coupons Programme. Second, Korea has actively embraced and helped to disseminate UNESCO's visions and programmes, work in which KNCU has played a major intermediary role. Third, the Korean government has made changes to the country's legal system to align with UNESCO's vision. Forth, Korea's national image has been enhanced through various UNESCO-related activities (including designation of World Heritage).

(1) Education Programmes[66]

First, UNESCO helped Korea to nurture the future leaders of its economic growth and democratic development by supporting postwar reconstruction projects in education. In particular, following the Korean War UNESCO donated US$100,000 to Korea. This donation,

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[66] Korean National Commission for UNESCO (2015, 167).

estimated to be equivalent to 45.4 billion Korean won as of 2015, allowed the Korean government to build a textbook printing factory, which was completed in 1954. The textbooks produced by the factory contributed to the sharp decrease in Korea's illiteracy rate, from 77.7% of the population in 1930, to 22.1% in 1959, to 7% in 1970.

Second, UNESCO helped Korea to expand its international exchanges and enhance its international status as a Mecca for education for international understanding (EIU). UNESCO promoted EIU through the UNESCO Associated Schools Project, which started in the 1960s. It also expanded opportunities for cultural exchange between Korean school students and foreign residents in Korea by launching the Cross-Cultural Awareness Programme (CCAP) in 1998. The number of member schools joining the CCAP increased dramatically from 35 when the programme began in 1998, to 301 in 2013.

Third, UNESCO has helped induce an educational paradigm shift, from the school-based education system to lifelong education, through the introduction of the concept of lifelong education and the promotion of related legislation.

(2) Science and Technology Programmes[67]

First, UNESCO contributed to the development of Korea's science and technology sector by providing scientific and technological equipment and supporting the establishment of scientific and technological institutions in the 1950s and 1960s. It donated US$500,000 (approximately 14 trillion Korean won at current values) for the construction of the Vocational Training Center at Inha Institute of Technology in 1961, as well as publishing a directory of 1,300 periodicals in science and technology and catalogues of foreign patents. UNESCO also helped Korea to purchase scientific books, equipment and materials from foreign countries through the UNESCO Coupons Programme.

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[67] Korean National Commission for UNESCO (2015, 184).

Second, through its Biosphere Reserves and Global Geoparks programmes, UNESCO has raised awareness of the need to improve the system of biosphere reserves and geoparks and has promoted the introduction of relevant legislation. In particular, it contributed to the introduction of subsidiary ordinances pursuant to the Directive of the Ministry of the Environment and the Enforcement Decree of the Natural Parks Act, including the Regulations on the Operation of the Geopark Committee, Detailed Guidelines on the Certification of Geoparks, and the Regulations on the Operation of the Korean MAB (Man and Biosphere Programme) National Committee.

Third, UNESCO has given Korea the opportunity to help to enhance international capacities in biodiversity preservation and maintenance of a sustainable environment. It has also allowed Korea to strengthen its national prestige through Korea's lead role in the establishment of the Northeast Asia Biosphere Reserve Network (1995) and the Global Network of Island and Coastal Biosphere Reserves (2009), and its role as a hub of regional cooperation in Northeast Asia.

 (3) Cultural Programmes[68]
The UNESCO World Heritage programme has contributed to raising public interest in the importance and value of Korean heritage and encouraged the Korean government to make efforts to protect national heritage. UNESCO has contributed to promoting awareness of the value of heritage and improving cultural heritage policy through the inscription of Korea's heritage as UNESCO-designated heritage (13 World Heritage Sites, 19 items of Intangible Cultural Heritage, and 16 items of documentary heritage on the Memory of the World registers). UNESCO has also helped Korea vitalize its creative industries and boost its global image through the designation of 8 Korean cities as UNESCO Creative Cities.

In summary, UNESCO's contribution has extended beyond the support it provided to Korea

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[68] Korean National Commission for UNESCO (2015, 195).

in the fields of education, science and culture during the process of Korea's development and transformation from a poor country into a Development Assistance Committee (DAC) member. Even after Korea achieved economic growth, UNESCO has continually contributed to the raising of awareness within Korea of the importance of culture and the environment, and influenced the improvement of laws and systems in these fields.

2. Korea's Contribution to UNESCO

Korea's assessed contribution to the UNESCO budget for 2016 was US$6.3 million, representing 2.039 percent of the total regular budget, the 13th largest assessed contribution in that year. Its voluntary contributions, including funds-in-trust, amounted to US$35 million, which was the sixth largest voluntary contribution in 2016, and which helped to fund a total of 24 projects. Korea contributed 1% of the total regular budget earmarked for the World Heritage Fund and 1% of the total regular budget earmarked for the Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage in 2016. In addition, Korea runs the UNESCO/Republic of Korea Co-Sponsored Fellowships Programme and also donated US$50,000 for the holding of an extraordinary session of the General Assembly of the State Parties to the World Heritage Convention.

Korea currently participates in a variety of UNESCO committees, including the Executive Board (term of office: 2015-2019), the World Heritage Committee (WHC), the Intergovernmental Committee for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage (ICH), the Council of the UNESCO International Bureau of Education (IBE), the Executive Council of the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC), the International Co-ordinating Council of the Man and the Biosphere Programme (MAB), the Intergovernmental Council of the International Hydrological Programme (IHP), the Intergovernmental Bioethics Committee (IGBC), and the Intergovernmental Committee for Promoting the Return of Cultural Property to its Countries of Origin or its Restitution in case of Illicit Appropriation (ICPRCP).

The Korean government established and operates the UNESCO King Sejong Literacy Prize (an annual award) and the UNESCO/Jikji Memory of the World Prize (a biennial award). In addition, ten Korean citizens are currently employed at UNESCO Headquarters as regular employees (1 person at D2 level, 1 person at D1 level, 1 person at P4 level, 4 persons at P3 level, and 3 persons at P2), and five Korean citizens are serving at UNESCO as officials dispatched by the Korean government (4 persons at Headquarters, and 1 person at the Bangkok Office).

In addition to these official activities, Korea has also worked to share its experiences in development, economic growth, literacy education and democratization. Utilizing its comparative advantage, it promotes new values and programmes, and plays an active role in areas such as Global Citizenship Education (GCED) and Cultural Heritage.

The ambassador of the Permanent Delegation of the Republic of Korea to UNESCO summarizes Korea's activities to UNESCO on the Permanent Delegation's website as follows:

> First, in the field of education, we are actively committed to promoting international cooperation through education based on UNESCO's major programmes such as Global Citizenship Education (GCED) and Sustainable Development Goal 4–Education 2030, and supporting education for Africa through Funds-in-Trust projects. Our delegation has made efforts towards inscription of Korea's heritage as World Heritage (13 sites), Intangible Cultural Heritage (19 items), and Documentary Heritage on the Memory of the World (16 items), and for designation of MAB Biosphere Reserves (6 sites), Geoparks (2 sites), and UNESCO Creative Cities (8 cities). We are also fully committed to enhancing the visibility of the Republic of Korea through the successful operation of Category 2 Centers (5 centers) and by establishing and awarding two UNESCO prizes: the King Sejong Literacy Prize and the Jikji / Memory of the World Prize.

This year will see the launch of water resource management projects in developing countries that are vulnerable to climate change. Korea will also establish an International Centre for Documentary Heritage as a Category 2 Center under the auspices of UNESCO, which was approved by the 39th session of the UNESCO General Conference (2017). Korea will cooperate with many organizations to ensure that the center operates effectively and is worthy of its status as the first Category 2 Center in the field of documentary heritage.[69]

IV. What Did the United States and Britain Lose after Leaving UNESCO?

This section introduces and analyzes the debates surrounding the return to UNESCO in 2002 of the United States after its withdrawal in 1984 (the US withdrew from UNESCO for a second time in 2017), and the return in 1997 of the United Kingdom to UNESCO following its withdrawal in 1986. Although Korea's status and position in international politics are different from these two nations, this article seeks to use these debates to examine the meaning and value of UNESCO for Korea.

In his article "U.S. and U.K. Re-entry into UNESCO (October 1995): A Reportorial Description and a Theoretical Analysis," Shelton Gunaratne (1994) introduces and analyzes arguments that took place in the United States in 1992-3 and in Britain in 1993 about their respective potential return to UNESCO. In this article, he presents the context and the logic of the controversies over the re-accession. By looking into the losses suffered by the US and the UK after leaving UNESCO as well as regrets expressed what losses the two countries suffered after withdrawing from UNESCO, we can identify what symbolic and practical value UNESCO

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[69] http://overseas.mofa.go.kr/unesco-ko/wpge/m_8640/contents.do, accessed October 4, 2018.

held for those countries. Though Korea has never withdrawn from the Organization, Korea can learn from the American and the British cases, and infer what tangible and intangible values UNESCO presents to Korea.

When the Clinton administration was launched in 1993, Douglas Bennet, then Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, said that the US's rejoining UNESCO was "definitely a possibility."[70] This was in stark contrast to the negative comments made by John Bolton of the State Department under the Bush administration just one year prior. In his article, Lee Edwards, the Vice Chair of the U.S. National Commission on Libraries and Information Science then, concluded that "it was premature for the US to make any definite decision at the time, but predicted that the US would rejoin if the organization returned to its roots and concentrated on "practical achievable projects," not "pretentious unrealistic goals."[71]

Behind the Bennet report were campaigns carried out among congressional leaders, Clinton administration officials, and academics seeking the return of the US to UNESCO. Also significant was the conclusion of a 1992 report by the General Accounting Office (GAO) that a number of improvements had been made in UNESCO's management, personnel systems and budgeting. Bennet said, "The GAO report made the controversy over the efficiency and operation of UNESCO come to an end," adding that the US was studying what specific benefits the US return could bring to the nation.
An example of an issue that might det
ermine US reentry was the value of UNESCO in serving as a focal point for the networking of scientists from around the world. Bennet said that network building through UNESCO had

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[70] https://www.the-scientist.com/news/us-return-to-unesco-upgraded-to-definite-possibility-59633, accessed October 3, 2018.

[71] Lee Edwards, "The US and UNESCO: Is It Time to Rejoin?" *International Library Review* vol. 22 issue 2 (1990), 105.

become even more important now in the sense that communication environments were changing due to advanced communication devices after faxes and modems.[72]

The United States, which had left UNESCO because of the political aspects of the New World Information and Communication Order and the Organization's lax management, concluded that its withdrawal could harm its national interests. The GAO report had signaled a resolution of the issues of lax management, and, considering the significance of UNESCO's values in building networks in the new communication environments, the U.S. decided that it could no longer afford to stay out.

Esteban Torres, a Democrat member of the US House of Representatives from California, criticized the US decision to leave UNESCO as a political decision by the administration, a decision that went against the recommendations of federal and private organizations related to UNESCO. He argued, "Of all the UN agencies, UNESCO was the best positioned for stimulating the partnership for promoting collaborative action on intercultural respect and peace, and for directly addressing issues such as multi-ethnic tolerance. . . . Quibbling over details of UNESCO's management was an inefficient basis for a national policy" (Gunaratne 1994, 109). In May 1993, Torres submitted Concurrent Resolution 103, which called for the United States to return to UNESCO. The resolution required the US president to submit a report to Congress by September 30; the Bennet report was a response to this.[73]

In addition to the movement within Congress, civic groups joined efforts for the US to return to UNESCO. Along with the American Council on Education, the National Education Association and the American Chemical Society, 37 Nobel laureates sent a letter to the

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[72] https://www.the-scientist.com/news/us-return-to-unesco-upgraded-to-definite-possibility-59633, accessed October 3, 2018.

[73] This resolution also included Howard Berman, George Brown, Tom Lantos, and George Miller from the Democratic Party and Jim Leach, the Republican representative from Indiana.

president demanding the US re-entry into UNESCO. In particular, the American Physical Society published an open letter that stated that UNESCO had been very helpful in building networks with scientists from developing countries as well as from the former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries.

Voices calling for the US re-entry into UNESCO increased as the issue of lax management had been resolved according to the GAO report. In addition, the New World Information and Communication Order, which was initially the direct cause of the US withdrawal, as it provoked controversy over the political nature of UNESCO, was now no longer on the UNESCO agenda. Aside from this, there were parts of civil society that strongly advocated for US re-entry into UNESCO on the basis that the US national interest had been damaged in a broad sense by its withdrawal from UNESCO.

In 1992, John Bolton, a Bush administration official, said that the US had maintained a presence at UNESCO through its Observer Mission of two professional staff members, had attended every meeting of the organization's governing bodies, and made voluntary contributions of about USD 2.5 million per year in support of programmes aligned with U.S. interests.[74] Though it was no longer a UNESCO member, the U.S. continued to provide voluntary contributions to five programmatic areas (the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, the World Heritage Convention, the Man and the Biosphere Programme, the Universal Copyright Convention, and the International Hydrological and Natural Hazards Programmes) (Gunaratne 1994, 104). It is possible that, however, these limited contributions, added with the U.S. having no right to vote in issues relating to programmes and budgetary allocations, caused harm to U.S. national interests. It is also logical to conjecture that, in addition to the arguments from the civil society, the U.S. had to rejoin UNESCO so as to pursue its national interests in the five aforementioned programmatic areas and prevent the Organization from adopting policies that undermine its interests.

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[74] As reported by NSC, Interagency Working Group (IWG)

Based on various discussions noted above, the U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO caused damage to its national interests in the following areas:

- Loss of a forum for network building in a new communication environment
- Loss of a forum for the promotion of mutual respect and peace among different cultures and tolerance in multiracial societies
- Loss of a forum for building networks with scientists from developing countries, the former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries

The 1993 Bennet report pinpointed these aspects. Provided that UNESCO implemented some reform, even if it was not sufficient, "UNESCO provided a constitutional mandate and existing worldwide infrastructures and networks in education, science, culture and communications that could be utilized effectively to promote a wide range of social and political values of central importance to U.S.," and "membership in UNESCO would benefit the U.S. national interest because it would provide to U.S. public sector and private sector specialist access to global networks and infrastructures—not available elsewhere—for intergovernmental and NGO cooperation in key areas of education, science, culture and communications" (Gunaratne 1994, 102). Furthermore, the US re-entry could further its national interests as the US could participate in programmes of high priority to the US.[75] Referring to these points, the report said that although the United States had seen tangible benefits of saving about US$400 million in contributions since 1985, the US national interest had been damaged because it was no longer a Member State. In other words, aside from the issue of the degree of reform that UNESCO had made, the report clearly stated many

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[75] ". . . high priority programs such as Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, the World Heritage Convention, the Convention on the Illicit Import, Export or Transfer of Cultural Property, the International Institute of Educational Planning and the International Program for the Development of Commutations" (Gunaratne 1994, 102)

important aspects of national interest that the United States should pursue through UNESCO.

The question of why, despite the Bennet report, the U.S. did not immediately rejoin UNESCO requires further research. Some view the eventual US re-entry in 2002 as a response to the September 11 attacks. The *Washington Post* argued,

> Sept. 11 and its aftermath underline the need to join a UN agency that is the world leading forum for policy-making on ideas of culture and communication. America is under attack with specious arguments about its cultural and intellectual influence. Military security is not enough to guard against seriously poisoned minds that commit terrorist acts. UNESCO can become a major force for restoring rationality to this ideological struggle.[76]

Elizabeth Pryor, a senior diplomat, said, "UNESCO offers an ideal forum in which to promote a realistic and positive image of the US. Its program of cross-cultural dialogue can diffuse the anger engendered by misunderstanding."[77] She stressed the importance of UNESCO's pursuit of ideological interests in the establishment of an international anti-terrorism alliance, and strongly advocated the return of the United States to UNESCO.

Around the same time, debate was also heated within the UK Parliament over the issue of the UK's return to UNESCO. In its report released on July 21, 1993, the House of Commons' Foreign Affairs Committee recommended that the United Kingdom should form its own judgment, decide its own priorities and not make its policy hanging on the coat-tails of the

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[76] "The New UNESCO," July 17, 2002,

https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2002/07/17/the-new-unesco/efb85715-1b97-483f-b7c5-eb685be4d7d2/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.7cb6e7b3fe9a.

[77] Ibid.

US It pointed out that a speedy return to UNESCO was in the best national interest. In the House of Lords, Lord Judd condemned President Reagan's decision to withdraw, stating that it owed more to blinkered right-wing ideology than to anything else, and that the UK withdrawal was more about the close Thatcher-Reagan relationship. He added, "The resurgence of xenophobic nationalism, racial and religious persecution and the horrors of ethnic cleansing were directly relevant to the purpose of UNESCO and Britain's part within it" (Gunaratne 1994, 114). He stressed that rejoining was not about mere contributions, but about the value of promoting peace, which was the goal of UNESCO, and suggested that this value was a reason for reentry into UNESO.

Lord Renfrew, another member of the House of Lords, stated that the United Kingdom had three reasons for rejoining. First, the UK could offer its own scientific tradition, its tradition of liberal thought, its educational tradition, and its expertise in publication. Second, the UK's place in the world as a permanent member of the UN Security Council would not be secure when the UK absented itself from one of the major UN agencies. Third, the UK benefited economically from UNESCO—a consideration that significantly outweighed its contribution (Gunaratne 1994, 111). Lord Ennals, also a member of the House of Lords, claimed, "in 1985, the United Kingdom had put £6.4 million into UNESCO and received an estimated £50 million in consultancy fees, books, etc., in return" (Gunaratne 1994, 115).

In addition, the importance of UNESCO as an organization that could promote the value of free speech in developing countries and countries undergoing democratization, as well as the value of UNESCO as a unique venue for global scientific forum were presented.

In summary, the UK parliamentary debates discussed above suggested that, after leaving UNESCO, the United Kingdom had:

- Lost a forum for solving ever increasing racial conflicts
- Lost a forum in which the United Kingdom's tradition of liberal thought could be

projected

- Undermined the stability of its status in the world as a permanent member of the UN Security Council (Germany and Japan were mentioned as waiting in the wings)
- Incurred economic losses
- Lost the value of UNESCO in promoting a free press
- Lost a venue for global scientific forum

The arguments by the US and the UK for returning to UNESCO encompassed two different aspects of the discussion. On the one hand, some said they should rejoin UNESCO as improvements had been made to the organization and that the excessively political nature of the organization had been resolved. On the other hand, others took the position that they should return to redeem the damage done to their national interests as a result of their withdrawal, sometimes on the basis that such problems within the organization had been addressed, but at other times irrespective of this.

V. Closing Remarks: Some Questions to Think About

What does it mean that UNESCO operates well or not? In terms of the political limits of the organization, there is currently debate over the operation of its general conference and governance, as well as concerns over its inefficient programmes and lax management. Some are also concerned that UNESCO has become a forum for excessive competition among countries, contrary to the initial purpose of the organization. Questions are also being raised about the financial pressure posed by the US withdrawal in 2017 and increasing politicization of the organization. Under these circumstances, assuming that such a thing is possible, what would a successful strategy for Korea's involvement in UNESCO look like? Should Korea place a high value on the reputation it has among other countries and within UNESCO in return for its contributions and support of UNESCO's operations and

programmes? Or should it serve as an investigator or a mediator in UNESCO's internal operational disputes and by extension in governance reform?

In 2018 "UNESCO without the United States" remains a major topic of conversation, but conversely we should also think about "the US without UNESCO," and what the US has lost since it chose to leave. To examine what has been lost we can set aside the controversy over whether not UNESCO's reforms have been sufficient. As we examined in part IV, the 1993 discussions in both the US and UK indicated the benefits lost from various perspectives by each country. These discussions suggested a loss of normative infrastructure, including a global-level network where racial and religious conflicts could be discussed. This loss also included a network of experts from various fields as well as a place where liberal values could be circulated.

From the perspective of structural power, the US lost some of its agenda-setting power. The US was defensive about the failure to protect its national interests as well as the reduction in its ability to set a preemptive agenda. From a realist perspective, the loss of hard power is not clear, but aggressive/defensive soft power was lost. From a constructivist perspective, the US had less power to block new ideas from emerging and spreading against their hegemonic ideas. From a liberalist perspective, the US had lost influence in defining and identifying systems and organizations. The US had also lost influence in the domination of systems and organizations.

We should also, then, imagine an extreme case and think about what "UNESCO without Korea" and "Korea without UNESCO" would mean. This will help us imagine the potential issues involved and provide us with a starting point for the consideration of our vision, goals and policies in relation to UNESCO. Imagining "Korea without UNESCO" will help us define Korea's unique contribution.

First, Korea's contributions to UNESCO's regular budget are the 13th largest among Member

States. Financial contributions, however, are not its only role. Korea is the only country that has transformed itself from a recipient country to a donor country, and is now a member of the DAC, a club of donor countries. Having this unique history, Korea is in a unique position to share its experience of economic development and offer advice to current recipient countries about the pros and cons of development. This advice could help countries to design their development model and minimize the negative consequences. The *Saemaul Undong* (New Village Movement) is a good example. This could offer a good project model if presented with both its positive and negative effects, not simply emphasizing the positive contribution of this movement to Korea's development.

Second, Korea can share its experience with education. Korea could create its own brand of project showing the fruits of Korean education achieved in only a few decades. The information society, Education for All (EFA) and Education for International Understanding (EIU), are all important project areas for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals, and our experience can offer good models in the areas of science, technology, and information and communications.

Third, Korea has experience with democratization. We can provide useful information about Korea's successes and failures not only in relation to political democratization, but also gender and socio-economic democratization.

Fourth, Korea can share its experience with the Korean Wave ("*Hallyu*"), which has made an impact in many areas globally. We can share the experience that this cultural phenomenon has given us as a means of cultural communication at the global level, cultural exchange and fusion, beyond the perspective of a national brand for use only in the national interest.

At the other extreme, we should imagine "Korea without UNESCO." What would we lose? In general Korea would see similar results to the US and UK, even though Korea has a different status in the international community. It is predictable that Korea would be excluded from

trophy competitions and various heritage projects. Indirectly, it would also be likely to experience categorical losses of soft power, and exclusion from system infrastructure as well as network and cultural communications.

Korea seemingly has a few options when it comes to the mode of its diplomacy vis-à-vis UNESCO. These include bandwagoning, balancing, acting as an initiator, moderator or facilitator for governance reform, and the role as norm entrepreneur, norm diffuser or the presenter of model cases.

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Korea's Voluntary Contributions: Current Status, Major Issues and Goals

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I. The Current Status of the International Community's Contributions to Multilateral Organizations

Donor countries' voluntary contributions to international organizations can be categorized into several types: assessed contributions, project contributions, capital subscriptions, and grants (See Table 1). The budget of a multilateral organization is divided into regular and other budgets. The regular budget is composed of unearmarked contributions, which can be used independently by the organization for its long-term plans, because the contributions are not reserved by donors for specific projects. Contributions to the regular budget are usually called "core contributions" when the unearmarked contributions are independently used by the organization for its mid- to long-term plans. Other types of budget consist of non-core contributions, in relation to which the donors may designate the purpose, period, recipient countries and other conditions.

It is notable that the use of Multi-bi Aid, such as trust funds, has been growing over the last ten years. Multi-bi Aid is a type of earmarked contribution under which multilateral ODA is given to an international organization for use in designated regions, sectors and/or for designated purposes. As the funding goes through a multilateral organization, it is conceptually thought to be part of the finances of the multilateral system. It is officially

labeled as bilateral aid in the statistics because the donors' political will and judgment determine where the funds are used.[78]

Table 1. Types of Multilateral Contributions and Their Characteristics

Type of Multilateral Organization	Type of Funding		Characteristics of Funding	Type of Aid
UN and other international organizations	Assessed contributions		A country's share of contributions is decided according to its income (e.g. UN regular assessed contributions)	Pure multilateral aid (Multilateral ODA)
	Project contributions	Core contributions	The international organization decides the use of the funds (e.g. UNDP regular contributions)	
		Non-core contributions	The donor decides the use of the funds in advance (e.g. Republic of Korea-UNDP MDG Trust Fund)	Multi-bi aid (Bilateral ODA)
International financial organizations	Capital subscriptions		Voting rights are given to the subscribing organization in proportion to the amount of its subscriptions (e.g. the initial capital subscriptions to a multilateral development bank)	Pure multilateral aid (Multilateral ODA)
	Grants	Concessional funds	This is designed to offer low-interest long-term funding to least developed countries	
		Funds-in-trust	Funds are entrusted by a donor to an international organization to	Multi-bi Aid (Bilateral

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[78] In the case of the UN system, UN multilateral agencies have five types of budget: Assessed Contributions, Core Contributions, Negotiated Pledges, Earmarked Funding/Non-core Contributions, and Fees. See Jenks and Topping (2016).

			support a specific development project (e.g. World Bank ICT trust fund)	ODA)

Source: EDCF (2016, 134).

According to OECD DAC CRS statistics, in 2016, the total ODA of OECD DAC members amounted to 144.9 billion U.S. dollars. Multilateral aid accounted for 41.8 billion U.S. dollars of this amount, 29% of the total ODA. Major donor countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan and Germany accounted for approximately half the contributions of the entire international community to major multilateral organizations other than the EU. The top 32 donor countries made up 95% of the total contributions of all 220 countries in the world.[79] When the assessed contributions of the EU as a group were included in calculations, France surpassed Japan in terms of the size of contributions to multilateral organizations.

In terms of the proportion of the total ODA that comprised multilateral aid, including EU assessed contributions, Italy was the top contributor, followed by Spain, Finland and Austria. The Republic of Korea ('Korea') took 15th place with 27%. When EU assessed contributions were excluded from the calculation, Japan took first place with 34%, followed by Canada with 28%, Finland with 28%, the United Kingdom with 28%. In this case, Korea moved up to fifth place with 27%.[80]

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[79] See the research of McArthur & Rasmussen (2017) studying the status of multilateral cooperation contributions targeting 34 UN organizations and 19 non-UN organizations. The organizations covered were DPKO, FAO, IAEA, ICAO, IFAD, ILO, IMO, IOM, ITC, ITU, PAHO, UN, UN Women, UNAIDS, UNDP, UNEP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UN-Habitat, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNIDO, UNITAR, UNODC, UNOPS, UNRWA, UNU, UNWTO, UPU, WFP, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO (UN multilateral organizations), AfDF, AsDF, CFF, CGIAR, CoEurope, CTF, OIF, GAFSP, GAVI, GCF, GEF, GEF-Climate, GFATM, GPE, IDA, OAS, OSCE, SCF, WB-TF (non-UN multilateral organizations).

[80] Calculated by the author based on "OECD. Stat". Net expenditure. Constant prices, base year 2016.

Funders' preferences in terms of multilateral organizations, as shown in Fig. 1, indicate two types of contribution pattern: a concentrated type and a distributed type. For example, the World Bank, DPKO, WFP, UN and UNDP account for a large share of the contributions of many donor countries, while Peru and Columbia focus their contributions on the IOM as a result of their concern with migrant issues. The share of each multilateral organization's direct funding provided by each funder can be seen in Fig. 2. Most of the organizations have a particular donor that serves as their primary contributor. In particular, the U.S. and the U.K. have a strong presence as major contributors, being the largest contributor to 19 and 7 organizations respectively. Interestingly, Brazil provides 82% of PAHO finances. Other than the U.S., the U.K, Japan (UNDP and GCF), Sweden (UNFPA), France (CoEurope), and Brazil (PAHO) there are no top contributors to any multilateral organization.

For UNESCO, the largest donor was the U.S. until it withdrew in 2018. As of 2016, Japan and Italy each accounted for about 8% of the financial contributions; Brazil for around 7%, Sweden and Germany for around 5% each, France and China for around 4% each, and Korea and Norway for around 3% each.

Figure 1. Funders' preference for multilateral organizations and the importance

Source: McArthur and Rasmussen (2017).

Figure 4: How important is each funder to each organization?

|	IDA	DPKO	WFP	UN	WB-TF	UNDP	GFATM	UNICEF	UNHCR	AfDF	Gavi	WHO	IOM	AsDF	UNRWA	FAO	GEF	PAHO	UNFPA	IAEA	ILO	UNESCO	GCF	CGIAR	GPE	CTF	UNEP	IFAD	SCF	CoEurope	UN Women	UNODC	CFF	UNAIDS	19 other orgs.
Total contributions ($B)	8.6	8.4	4.9	4.4	3.5	3.3	3.3	3.1	3.0	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.0	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.2	1.7
USA	15	28	41	17	12	11	34	24	46	10	11	24	35	7	33	19	15	11	10	31	21	13	16	34	8	48	12	8	25	*	4	21	10	26	15
UK	17	6	8	8	25	7	13	15	7	16	31	5	*	7	8	8	9	*	12	5	4	3	*	13	25	47	6	13	70	10	9	3	16	9	4
Japan	13	10	4	8	8	11	7	6	6	8	*	5	4	42	3	8	16		5	11	8	8	15	1	*		9	5		8	7	22	*		7
Germany	8	7	12	7	5	6	8	7	7	11	4	4	3	4	6	5	12		4	6	7	5	6		2		9	5	11	2	2	8	1		12
France	7	7	*	3	*	*	11	*	1	10	7	2	*	3	*	3	8	*	*	5	4	4	12	*	*		6	4		12	*	1		*	5
Canada	5	3	7	3	4	2	5	5	4	6	2	4	5	4	*	2	6	2	7	3	4	2	8	2	5		3	6		3	3	6	2		4
EU / EC			6	1	10	9	4	10	6		*	3		10		15	13		*	2	2	4	3		*	14	6	10		3	14	2	*		4
Sweden	5	*	2	4	4	4	3	6	4	5	3	3	2	2	3	2	5	*	12	*	3	5	6	3	10		4	3		2	13	4	14	15	2
Norway	2	*	1	3	9	5	2	6	3	5	11	3	2	1	3	3	2	*	10	*	3	3	6	2	13		9	4	4	2	8	2	5	10	2
Netherlands	4	2	2	4	4	3	2	4	2	4	3	2	2	2	3		*	7	1	3	4	1	8		3	10	3	4	2	11	11	2		2	
Australia	2	2	2	2	6	2	2	1	*		2	3	5	13	2	1	2	*	2	2	3	2	6	5	7		1				7	2		2	*
Italy	3	4	*	3	*	2	1	*	*	5	5	1	1	2	*	4	3	*	3	3	8	4	*		4	6		11	1	*		*			3
Switzerland	3	1	2	2	4	4	*	1	2	3	*	1	1	1	2	2	4		2	*	3	2	4	3	2		4	4		3	9	*		5	3
China	1	7	*	5	*	*	*	*	*	*	2	*	2	*	*	*	3	*	*	4	3	4	*		1	3		*	*		*	*		*	3
Brazil	*	*	*	2		*		*	*		*	*		*	*	*	2	*	2	3	7		*		*		*	*		*	*	*			1
Denmark	1	*	2	2	3	2	*	1	2	2		*	*	*	*	1	*	2	6	*	2	*	2	1	8		3	2	*	1	4	1	6	3	*
Gates Fdn.		*	*	*	*	5	*	*		17	14			*		*		*	*	*	*		19				*	*			*	*			2
Saudi Arabia	*	*	3	5	*	1	*	*	2	*	*	*		10	1		*	*	*	1			*		*		*	2			*	2	*		2
Korea	1	2	*	2	2	*	*	1	*	2	*	1	*	3	*	1	*	*	*	2	2	3	2	*	*		1	*		*	2	*		3	2
Belgium	2	*	*	2	*	*	*	*	2	*	*	*	*	1	2	3		*	*	2	1	5	2	2		2	2		2	3	*		3	2
Spain	1	3	*	2	*	*		*	*		*	*	*	1	2	2	1	*	*	2	2	2	*		4	2		6	1	*				2
Russia	*	3	*	2	*	*		*	*		*	1			*		1	*		*	2	2	2		*		2	*		10		1		2	2
Finland	1	*	*	*	1	1		*	*	3		*	*	*	*	*	2		6	*	1	*	2	*	*		2	2		1	9	*		3	1
Austria	2	*	*	*	1	*		*	*	2		*	*	*	*	2		*	2	*	1	1	*		1	*		*	1		2	*			*
Argentina	*	*	*	*		6		*	*			*	1		*	*		*	*	*	*	*			*	*		*	*		*				2
Kuwait	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	3	*		*	*		2	*		*	*	*	*	*			*	1		*	*			*			*
Ireland	*	*	*	*	*	*		*	*	*	*	*		*	*	*		*	*	*	*	*			*	*		*	1		*	1		1	*
Peru		*	*	*		1		*			*		13			*			*	*	*	2			*	*		*	*		*				*
Mexico	*	*	*	1	*	*		*	*		*	*		*	*	2		1	*	1	1	1	*		*	*		*	*		*	2			1
Colombia		*	*	*	1	*		*			*	3		*	*		1	*	*	*	*				*	*		*	*		*	18			*
UAE	*	*	*	*		*	*		*	*		*	*	1	*			*	*	*	*	*			*	*		*	*		2	*			*
Turkey	*	*	*	*		*			*	*	*	*		*	*			*	*	*	*	*			*	*		6	*			*			*
188 other funders	1	8	3	8	*	16	*	6	1	2	*	9	3	3	1	10	1	*	9	8	8	10	2	3	*		5	7		14	4	15		3	15

Percentage of each organization's total

| Legend: | 0% | * = <1% | 1-5% | 5-10% | 10-20% | >20% |

of organization's total

Figure 2. Multilateral organizations' preference and importance for funders

Source: McArthur and Rasmussen (2017).

II. Current Status of Korea's Contributions to UNESCO[81]

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[81] This information is based mainly on the five-year implementation plan (2014-2018) of the Office for Government Policy Coordination's Committee for International Development Cooperation (CIDC) and *UNESCO Financial structure and the status of Korea's voluntary contributions.* From the 2017 Implementation Plan, the Korean government classified the types of aid in the budget into bilateral, multilateral and multi-bi aid. Before 2017, aid was classified only as bilateral or multilateral aid. Details of the contributions by ministries were given from 2016, while previous data included only the scale of the contributions by ministries without the details. The ministries' budgets for UNESCO were studied for this article. When the types of the aid projects were not clear, research into the budget was conducted by telephone enquiry to those responsible at the relevant ministries, such as the

In 2017, 36 government agencies in Korea, including the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MOEF) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), paid assessed contributions worth 735.3 billion won to 406 international organizations, which represents an increase of about 5%, compared to 699.2 billion won in 2016. MOFA donated 441.6 billion won to 111 multilateral organizations, while MOEF paid 132 billion won, and the remaining 34 ministries in total paid 161.7 billion won. Other than MOFA, the ministries that paid contributions to the largest number of multilateral organizations were the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries, followed by the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (44 organizations), the Ministry of Science and ICT (22 organizations), and the Ministry of Education (20 organizations).[82] Funding given to UNESCO was divided into assessed contributions and voluntary earmarked contributions. Data regarding contributions to UNESCO from 2010 to 2016 demonstrated that contributions gradually increased, except in 2013. Fluctuations in the different types of contribution showed that in the late 2010s, the amount of assessed contributions gradually decreased while voluntary earmarked contributions increased dramatically compared to the early 2010s.[83]

1. Level of Korea's Assessed Contributions

UNESCO's budget for the 2016-2017 biennium amounted to a total of 667 million U.S. dollars, including regular program budget, voluntary contributions, multilateral grant special funds, multilateral contributions, corporate sponsorship, and UN contributions. The largest assessed contributions were those of the U.S., which accounted for 22% of the regular budget, followed by Japan at 9.679%, China at 7.920 % and Germany at 6.389%, though as of

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Office for Government Policy Coordination's Committee for International Development Cooperation, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism.

[82] "Overlapping Assessed Contributions to International Organizations, 'Easy Money' Worth 700 Million Won a Year," *Kyunghyang Shinmun,* November 2, 2017.

[83] Results of analysis of the CEB Database (https://www.unsceb.org/content/un-system-financial-statistics).

2018 the U.S. is no longer a member of UNESCO. Korea's assessed contribution made up 2.039% of the total assessed contributions, with 13.6 million dollars, making Korea the 13th largest contributor.

2. Government Ministries' Voluntary Earmarked Contributions

The annual average rate of increase in Korea's earmarked contributions to UNESCO's budget over the last few years is approximately 21%, with about 9.8 billion won being contributed in 2014, about 12 billion won in 2015, about 15.4 billion won in 2016, and about 21.1 billion won in 2017. Approximately 23.8 billion won is expected to have been contributed in 2018. In terms of individual ministries, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are major contributors to UNESCO. The largest contributor was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2014, 2017 and 2018, and the Ministry of Education in 2015 and 2016. Other major contributors were the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism and its affiliated agency, the Cultural Heritage Administration, with contributions of around 10.3 billion won in total over the course of 2014 to 2018; the Ministry of the Environment with contributions of about 224 million won in the same period; and the Ministry of the Interior and Safety with contributions of around 100 million won in 2018. The latter two ministries' contributions are relatively smaller than other ministries' even though the Ministry of the Environment funded research related to UNESCO, and the Ministry of the Interior and Safety carried out a project to set up an administrative archive in 2018 (see Fig. 3).

Figure 3. Status of Korean ministries' contributions to UNESCO

Source: Data from the annual ODA implementation plans of the Committee for International Development Cooperation, Office of Government Policy Coordination, reconstituted by the author (based on the finalized amount).

In terms of the proportions of the total earmarked funding provided by each ministry (see Fig. 4), contributions by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to UNESCO constituted 52.09% of the total in 2014, 49.65% in 2015, and 57.52% in 2018, close to or more than half of the total budget. Contributions to UNESCO by the Ministry of Education accounted for over half the total in 2016 at 50.38%, making the Ministry one of the top contributors among Korea's government ministries following the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism was found to account for a smaller proportion of the budget for UNESCO. It provided about 2 to 3% of the total Korean government contributions to UNESCO from 2015 to 2017 and about 0.5% in 2018. However, if contributions made by the Cultural Heritage Administration (an independent agency under the aegis of the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, pursuant to Article 35 of the

Government Organization Act) are taken into account, the proportion rises to 10 to 15% during the same period, with an average of about 11.7% during the period from 2014 to 2018.


Figure 4. Percentage of Korean ministries' contributions to UNESCO by year

Source: Data from the annual ODA implementation plans of the Committee for International Development Cooperation, Office of Government Policy Coordination, reconstituted by the author (based on the finalized amount).

The education/literacy sector received about 70% of the total government funding to UNESCO programmes, while about 17% was allocated to the cultural sector. The STI and C&I sectors, on the other hand, each received less than 10% (see Table 2). 42 of the 91 UNESCO programmes to which the government ministries contributed were programmes in the education/literacy sector, while 35 were in the cultural sector. The STI and C&I sectors had fewer than ten programmes each (see Table 3). (see Table 3).[84]

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[84] As mentioned previously, starting from the 2017 budget planning announcement, the

Table 2. Number of Programmes by Ministry

Sector/Ministry	Ministry of Education	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Ministry of the Environ-ment	Ministry of the Interior and Safety	Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism	Cultural Heritage Admin-istration	Total
Education/literacy	22 (260.92)	16 (157.71)			4 (4.81)		42 (423.44)
STI		4 (18.42)	4 (2.24)				8 (20.66)
Culture		2 (5.15)		1 (1)	3 (12.51)	29 (84.66)	35 (103.32)
C&I	6 (60.69)						6 (60.69)
Total	28 (321.61)	22 (181.28)	4 (2.24)	1 (1)	7 (17.32)	29 (66.15)	91 (608.11)

Source: Data from the annual ODA implementation plans of the Committee for International Development Cooperation, Office of Government Policy Coordination, reconstituted by the author (based on the finalized amount).

Note: Numbers in parentheses indicate the total amount of contributions between 2014 and 2018 (unit: 100 million won), excluding the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' assessed contributions.

Korean government's multilateral aid budget was classified into multilateral, bilateral and multi-bi aid. The documents using this classification that were available at the time this article was written comprise the data in the annual ODA implementation plans of the Committee for International Development Cooperation for two years (2017-2018). The data from and before 2016 often does not use this classification. In such cases, the data was analyzed by referring to the classification after 2017 of the same programme names or confirming it with officials at the relevant ministries.

Table 3. Number of Programmes by Year

Sector/Year	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Total
Education/Literacy	2 (37.8)	4 (66.9)	8 (61.01)	11 (110.95)	17 (146.77)	42 (423.44)
STI	2 (11.58)	2 (3.99)	1 (0.56)	2 (1.14)	1 (3.39)	8 (20.66)
Culture	3 (15.2)	4 (4.85)	9 (19.21)	9 (34.41)	10 (29.65)	35 (103.32)
C&I			2 (26.44)	2 (19.55)	2 (14.7)	6 (60.69)
Total	7 (64.58)	10 (75.74)	20 (107.22)	24 (166.05)	30 (194.51)	91 (608.11)

Source: Data from the annual ODA implementation plans of the Committee for International Development Cooperation, Office of Government Policy Coordination, reconstituted by the author (based on the finalized amount).

Note: Numbers in parentheses indicate the total amount of contributions between 2014 and 2018 (unit: 100 million won), excluding the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' assessed contributions.

## III. Key Issues Concerning Contributions to UNESCO

Analysis of the current situation regarding the Korean government's contributions to UNESCO indicates the following points. First, there are a number of different donor ministries but a mechanism for the coordination of contributions is lacking. Second, there is a trend of overlapping contributions to a particular sector. Third, the science and communication sectors account for a relatively small proportion of the budget, compared to the education sector.

1. Lack of a Coordination Mechanism for Diverse Donors

A notable problem in terms of the Korean government's voluntary contributions to UNESCO is that responsibility for management of each type of assessed contribution and earmarked contribution is not clearly designated. In principle, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs manages all assessed contributions. However, six ministries operate as many as 60 trust funds, which are categorized as multi-bi programmes. The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport is also regarded as a contributor but data on the status of its contributions is not available. The Cultural Heritage Administration manages assessed contributions, or negotiated contributions, for the Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage and the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. This diffuse management is based on each ministry's expertise in the sector but hinders strategic and efficient budgeting, and can undermine the government's overall strategy in respect of UNESCO, as each ministry's budget is not set on the basis of a coherent strategy in relation to UNESCO at the national level.

Table 4. Status of the Korean Government's Contributions to UNESCO by Type of Aid (2016-2018)

	2016	2017	2018
Bilateral	38.625	91.93	130.42
Multilateral	47.43	46.86	44.78
Multi-bi	67.8	72.58	63.28
Bilateral + multi-bi	106.425	164.51	193.7
Total	153.855	211.37	238.48

Status of Korean Government's Contributions to UNESCO by Type of Aid

(Year 16 ~ 18, Unit: 100)

| | Bilateral | Multilateral | Muti-bi | Bilateral + Mutilpbi | TOTAL |

Source: Data from the annual ODA implementation plans of the Committee for International Development Cooperation, Office of Government Policy Coordination, reconstituted by the author (based on the finalized amount).

As Table 4 indicates, contributions to UNESCO are categorized into bilateral aid, pure multilateral aid and multi-bi aid. Bilateral and multi-bi aid is increasing in comparison to pure multilateral aid, something that urgently requires a mechanism for coordination between agencies.

2. Overlapping Contributions to a Sector

The absence of a pan-governmental coordination mechanism leads to problems with the coordination of each project, as well as problems with the management of funding. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' projects in the education sector have included a number of separate UNESCO projects concerning primary teacher education, including projects for Asian and African teachers' education, an East Timor/UNESCO programme for math and science materials development and teacher training, and a Mali/UNESCO project for empowerment of female teenagers through education. These projects seem to have been implemented independently by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, without sharing responsibility

with the Ministry of Education. Contributions to a sector are more likely to overlap if ministries do not coordinate their specialized projects in a given sector.

The same is true for sectors other than education. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has, for instance, participated in projects called "Science Park and Technology Business Incubators in Indonesia and Namibia", and "Sustainable Development of Tourism at UNESCO Buddhist Sites in South Asia". Considering the nature of these projects, coordination with the Cultural Heritage Administration; the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism; and the Ministry of the Environment, as appropriate, is necessary to prevent possible overlap with their projects. Also, there should be a systematic coordination mechanism to prevent such issues among Korea's UNESCO projects.

3. Imbalance between the Field of Education and the Fields of Science and Communication

UNESCO's mandate covers education, science and culture. Recently, in addition to these traditional areas, freedom of expression, and the field of communication and information have also been given focus, meaning that education, the sciences, culture, and communication and information are all recognized as core areas for UNESCO's activities.

In practice, however, the Korean government's budget for UNESCO is mostly channeled into education and culture. Areas where the Korean government's support for UNESCO is barely significant include not just the newly emerging communication and information sector, but also the sciences. The Ministry of the Environment has funded UNESCO's research on international cooperation for the conservation of nature, and the Ministry of Education has supported innovative education through the use of ICT in Africa. Such projects can be categorized as falling under the science and technology field, but essentially they are education projects. Korea's earmarked contributions are concentrated on the education and culture sectors.

In summary, the main challenges for Korea's contribution to UNESCO are 1) the absence of a systematic and consistent strategy, 2) the fragmented nature of Korea's assessed contributions and the dispersed management of these funds, 3) problems with coordination between ministries and project areas, and 4) the small contributions to the science and communication sectors. It is desirable that governmental ministries are involved in multilateral contributions based on their expertise. However, increases in a ministry's budget for UNESCO without a pan-governmental strategy can bring about inefficiencies caused by a lack of overall coordination of the operation and content of projects. Therefore, the government should ensure that each ministry sets its strategy in relation to UNESCO in accordance with overall government strategy in respect of multilateral organizations and designate an agency that would ensure appropriate overall coordination and allocation of voluntary contributions.

IV. The Main Goals of Korea's Voluntary Contributions

1. The Strategic Goals of Korea's Cooperation with Multilateral Organizations

The Framework Act on International Development Cooperation sets out the core values pertaining to Korea's development cooperation, the concept of multilateral development cooperation, and details about the supervising agency, but does not include detailed strategy and goals for cooperation with multilateral organizations. [85] Multilateral development cooperation is defined in the Act as indirect cooperation provided to developing countries through contributions to, or investments in, international organizations and concessional loans. The Ministry of Economy and Finance supervises contributions to international financial organizations and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs takes charge of international development cooperation with international organizations such as

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[85] The Framework Act on International Development Cooperation, Article 2, Section 4 and Section 7.

the UN. The Korean government's development cooperation goals and strategy are separately presented, in the data periodically issued by the Office of Government Policy Coordination's Committee for International Development Cooperation (CIDC), and in documents published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This chapter will introduce the government's Strategic Plans for International Development Cooperation and its recent implementation plans, and will review existing research in order to analyze Korea's goals in relation to cooperation with multilateral organizations.

(1) First Strategic Plan for International Development Cooperation (2011-2015)[86]

Voluntary contributions covered by this plan focused on multilateral aid projects carried out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and grant aid implementation agencies other than the Korea International Cooperation Agency through the UN and other international organizations, rather than through international financial organizations. The Korean government said that contributions to international organizations such as the UN was vital to the support and implementation of international norms such as the Millennium Development Goals ('MDGs'), and emphasized the importance of multilateral aid not only for the MDGs, but also for universal values such as global development, humanitarian assistance, efforts to build peace, and women's rights. Major cooperation partners under this plan included UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, the Global Fund and UN Women.

The First Strategic Plan concentrated on support for achieving the MDGs, in the fields relating to public health, education and women's issues. First of all, the plan mentions the Global Strategy for Women's and Children's Health, led by the UN Secretary-General, to achieve the MDGs relating to women and children, and the commitment to the Muskoka Initiative.

Korea's detailed plan in relation to its assessed contributions to the UN and other

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[86] CIDC (2010).

international organizations indicated a plan for contributions aimed at achieving the MDGs generally, and contributions to specific areas including gender equality, public health and food security. Contributions were made to UNDP for general achievement of the MDGs, to the WHO and UNAIDS for public health-related goals, and to the WFP for food security. UNESCO was not mentioned in the strategy for pursuing the MDGs in the First Strategic Plan. As Table 5 suggests, the plan did not consider UNESCO to be among the international organizations that were Korea's main partners for international or regional cooperation in relation to the MDGs.

Table 5. International Organizations that were Major Partners for Cooperation on the MDGs

Field of Cooperation			Ratio of total funding*	Organizations **
MDGs as a whole			30-35	UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNIDO
MDG Sector	Gender equality		3-5	UN Women
	Global issues	Public health	15-20	Global Fund, GAVI, UNAIDS, WHO, IVI, INITAID
		Food security	10-15	WFP, IFAD, CGIAR, APFIC, CIFOR
		Environment (e.g. climate change)	3-5	UNEP, GEF, UN Habitat, Biodiversity International, IPCC, ITTO
		Migration, Anti-corruption, etc.	10-12	IOM, UNODC, UNOHCHR
		Humanitarian crises and fragile states	2-3	OCHA, PBF, ICRC, UNHCR, UNRWA, UNMAS
Africa/Asia			3-5	AU
Others				UNV, UNITAR

*Excerpt of the First Strategic Plan for International Development Cooperation (2011-2015).

(2) Second Strategic Plan for International Development Cooperation (2016-2020)[87]

The Second Strategic Plan for International Development Cooperation was announced after the adoption of Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development (the Sustainable Development Goals or 'SDGs') at the UN summit in September 2015. The plan revolves around three key words: integrated ODA, enriched ODA and inclusive ODA, each of which is designed to help implement the SDGs.

The Second Strategic Plan concerns the designation of major partners for cooperation, targeting multilateral development banks and UN agencies, and the allocation of budget to these organizations. The plan focuses resources on regions where bilateral cooperation is difficult and on specific fields and sectors in which multilateral organizations have expertise. The plan also aims to expand Korea's influence in the international community by expanding its engagement with multilateral agencies.

The plan sets out four goals for Korea's strategy for multilateral cooperation: achieving the SDGs, tackling global issues, stepping up humanitarian assistance and efforts to build peace, and broadening the horizons of Korea's diplomacy through active participation in the establishment of international norms and the policies of international organizations. As with the first plan, the second plan does not specifically contain a comprehensive strategy for UNESCO. It deals mainly with bilateral and multilateral aid (maintaining a ratio of about 70:30 in favor of bilateral aid), establishment of an integrated aid system (including bilateral-multilateral aid, grants, and loans), reinforcement of management of multilateral cooperation (such as by accepting the presidency of ECOSOC and participating in MOPAN and accepting its presidency). The second plan also does not include details about the sectors to which Korea's multilateral aid budget will be allocated, the proportions in which aid will be allocated, the organizations involved or the government ministries that will manage it.

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[87] CIDC (2015c).

(3) 2016 Multilateral Cooperation Strategy, and 2017 and 2018 Implementation Plans for International Development Cooperation

In 2016, the Committee for International Development Cooperation established a vision for Korea's multilateral cooperation strategy, under which Korea would be "A responsible major donor country contributing to achieving common goals in the international community and world peace." It suggested three goals for the strategy: contributing to achieving the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, increasing the effectiveness of development through empowerment of multilateral organizations, and increasing Korea's role and influence (CIDC 2016a). In accordance with policies such as designation of the organizations that would be the major partners for cooperation, reinforcement of performance management and trust fund management, and encouragement of cooperation among ministries, various issues were discussed, including adjustment of the budget ratio between multilateral and bilateral contributions, designation of the major partners for cooperation, reinforcement of MOPAN (the Multilateral Organization Performance Assessment Network), strengthening of self-evaluation, and reinforcement of preliminary coordination among the government ministries involved. The major partners for cooperation still did not include UNESCO.

The 2017 and 2018 implementation plans deal with the direction of annual multilateral cooperation policies, highlighting strategic aid, based on a multilateral strategy for achieving integrated ODA. The plans include tasks such as the expansion of funding to major partners for cooperation and reinforcement of performance management (CIDC 2017). One goal of the 2017 plan was the donation by a total of 16 government ministries of about 144 billion won to around 50 agencies. This included a plan to donate around 7.7 billion won to UNESCO (CIDC 2016b). However, the 2018 plan did not contain any contribution to UNESCO among its planned contributions by 15 ministries of approximately 149.8 billion won to 45 agencies (CIDC 2016b).

2. Korea's Strategic Goals in relation to UNESCO

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs introduces Korea's policies in relation to UNESCO on its website. It says that Korea engages in cultural diplomacy to represent its points of view by participating in numerous UNESCO inter-governmental committees as well as UNESCO's general conference. In addition, Korea promotes the designation of Korean cultural heritage of notable universal value by UNESCO. The website notes that Korea contributes 2.039% of UNESCO's regular budget, making it the 13th largest contributor, and that Korea established and sponsors the UNESCO King Sejong Literacy Prize (awarded annually) and the Jikji Memory of the World Prize (awarded every two years).[88]

The Permanent Delegation of the Republic of Korea to UNESCO also introduces its activities on its website. The website notes that the Permanent Delegation pursues UNESCO's ideals and founding purpose through close cooperation with the UNESCO secretariat, and effectively representing Korea through participation in the activities of UNESCO. As examples of its work, the website notes that in the field of education, the Permanent Delegation promotes and monitors the implementation of SDG 4, literacy education, and global citizenship education, while in the field of sciences, it promotes the MAB programme, and the fields of culture & communication it promotes the inscription of World Heritage. It also notes that the Delegation cooperates with other Permanent Delegations, and organizes events promoting Korean culture.[89]

In this context, the article will now look at some of the existing research on how Korea sets its strategic goals in relation to UNESCO. Chung Utak (in Chung et al. 2015) points out the lack of a pan-governmental diplomatic strategy in relation to UNESCO: insufficiency of

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[88] Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

http://mcms.mofa.go.kr/trade/cultural/unesco/index.jsp?menu=m_30_170_20.

[89] The Permanent Delegation of the Republic of Korea to UNESCO,

http://overseas.mofa.go.kr/unesco-ko/index.do.

human resources despite the significance of UNESCO in diplomatic activities, limited expertise in respect of the organization and a lack of research institutions carrying out relevant research. To address these issues, he suggests that Korea should establish a division for UNESCO in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to foster experts on UNESCO to implement comprehensive policies. He also suggests that Korea should improve Korea's capacity for activities within UNESCO by fostering experts within the Permanent Delegation of Korea to UNESCO. In particular, he notes that the rotation of staff at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs prevents the accumulation of expertise. Therefore, he suggests that the rotation should at least be done between multilateral agencies so that Korean diplomats can accumulate expertise in multilateral diplomacy. In addition, he emphasizes the need to provide appropriate budget for research and for agencies that can nurture experts on UNESCO. He also emphasizes the importance of utilizing the expertise within the Korean National Commission for UNESCO and category 2 centers in Korea such as APCEIU and ICHCAP (Chung et al 2015).

Lew Seok Jin underscores Korea's UNESCO diplomatic strategy as contribution diplomacy. He says that hegemonic and realistic discourse on international politics stresses diplomatic relations centering on material power of state actors in anarchy. He suggests, however, that Korea could contribute to the pursuit of UNESCO's ideals of the promotion and maintenance of peace, the eradication of poverty, and education for all, through democratic and voluntary networks rather than hierarchical power relations. In this regard, UNESCO can be a venue for accumulated global social capital based on trust, norms and morality rather than "power". (Lew et al. 2013). In this context, Lew Seok Jin (2016) insists that the Korean government should set a sophisticated strategy for public diplomacy. Lew suggests that complex issues such as the internal reform of UNESCO are not suitable for inclusion in Korea's UNESCO strategy since even the United States had difficulty with such efforts to reform UNESCO. Korea's UNESCO strategy should, he suggests, be an agenda-setting platform embracing intellectuals, civil society and government and working to find the fields where Korea can pursue its strategy with a competitive advantage.

Lim Hyun Mook (2017) criticizes Korea's activities in UNESCO for concentrating on awareness-raising about Korea. In that sense, activities such as efforts to inscribe documents related to 'Comfort Women' to the Memory of the World Register and to register UNESCO World Heritage are significant. Yet, he says, there is some ambiguity about what values Korea wishes to promote within UNESCO and the international community. There is no integrated effect from the budget of 13 billion won, as it is managed separately by several ministries, with no coordinated Korean strategy in respect of UNESCO. Korea, he suggests, needs to build a national consensus to increase its global social capital.

3. Conclusion

Maintaining a greater proportion of bilateral aid than that of multilateral aid is not exclusive to Korea. Many other OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members, which are major donor countries, also give more bilateral aid than multilateral aid. However, increasing the effectiveness of multilateral aid is seen as important, since many believe that donors' national development cooperation strategies should align with the SDGs. Furthermore, the growing need for cooperation with UN agencies that have gained expertise and have established an efficient system of implementation gives more weight to the argument that multilateral aid should be given more importance. (Sohn et al. 2013). In this regard, UNESCO should be one of the main UN partners for donor countries to allow for the implementation of development cooperation policies in line with international norms, given the organization's broad mandate in education, science, technology, communication, and information.

The UNESCO strategies of Norway and Sweden, known as well-respected donor countries, are meaningful in this context. Norway has stated that its UNESCO strategy is to prioritize human rights, sustainable development, democratization, culture for development, gender equality, conflict prevention, and reduction of poverty within the framework of the MDGs.[90]

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[90] Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011, "Norway's policy towards UNESCO, https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/upload/ud/vedlegg/fn/profilark2011/e886_e_unes

The details of the strategy include education for all, an information society for all, support for UNESCO's science policy development and empowerment of developing countries, culture for development, gender equality and an Africa-focused strategy. Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs serves as the chief agency for UNESCO policies and budgeted 4.7 million krone (about 650 million won) for UNESCO in 2011. The strategy took into account the international norms at the time, such as the MDGs. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs took the lead, focusing on UNESCO's comparative advantages and the Norwegian government's chosen fields.

Sweden's strategy is similar. The Swedish government has issued a special booklet about its UNESCO cooperation strategy, which is exceptional even among major donors. The government emphasizes the development of a strategy for cooperation with a variety of stakeholders in Sweden, with the aim of strengthening its contribution to UNESCO activities. It defines the purpose of UNESCO as peace and security through cooperation with its members in the fields of education, the sciences, culture, and communication and information. It clearly states that Sweden will implement UNESCO policies in line with the 2030 SDGs, and it focuses on the safety of journalists, and sexual and reproductive health and rights. The strategy covers UNESCO activities concerning human rights and freedom of expression, sustainable, democratic and inclusive societies, gender equality, the environment, climate and oceans, and activities for an effective and modern UNESCO. It also analyzes the current situation in respect of each of these areas, within UNESCO and the international community, and introduces a specific support strategy in Sweden for UNESCO activities in each of the areas (Swedish Ministry of Education and Research 2018).

The UNESCO strategies of Norway and Sweden have strong points in three respects. Above all, the strategies include specific measures for the support of UNESCO activities. They state the founding purpose and main activities of UNESCO in detail and show that their

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contribution focuses on capacity building within the fields in which UNESCO works. The two countries refer to the MDGs prior to the adoption of the SDGs in 2015, and to the SDGs after 2015, demonstrating their desire to implement policies in accordance with international norms. Finally, the detailed strategy of Sweden is very specific. It states, for instance, that it will support female researchers and journalists to promote gender equality, and develop human resources policies and support a structured, qualitative staff rotation system to facilitate reform in the UNESCO system. The specific nature of the strategy means that it is clear which areas of UNESCO's work Sweden's strategy is intended to contribute to.

Korea's strategy towards UNESCO should, in a similar vein, be aligned with international norms and should indicate clearly how the strategy contributes to improvement of UNESCO's capacity. To this end, when developing its strategy, Korea should consider the founding spirit and main activities of UNESCO, select the fields where Korea can best contribute, and include measures to ensure systematic support within Korea.

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Cooperation between Korea and UNESCO on Education

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I. Introduction

When asked what the biggest education-related problem in South Korean society is, many will answer that it is the university entrance examination. A system is a way to realize ideals, and an educational system such as that of university entrance examination is a way to realize educational ideals. The Republic of Korea (hereafter Korea) does not currently have an educational system in place that can be considered to achieve its educational ideals. In the process of creating an education system, the main focus is generally on the efficiency of knowledge transfer, but such efficiency does not carry enough weight to be considered "educational ideals". Ironically, Korea already has impressive educational ideals and standards within its current system (See Article 2 (Principle of Education) of the Framework Act on Education in the Republic of Korea).[91] However, educational interests themselves are not at the center of any major debate in Korea, including the university entrance examination system. The educational perspective is considered as an afterthought and the

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[91] Article 2 (Principle of Education): Education shall aim at enabling every citizen to lead a life worthy of humankind and to contribute to the development of a democratic state and the realization of the ideal of human co-prosperity, by ensuring cultivation of character, development of abilities for independent life, and necessary qualities as a democratic citizen under the humanitarian ideal.

conclusions of any such discussion are often arrived at in consideration of other perspectives (mainly economic perspectives) that are not related to education (Lee Tae Soo 2014). The educational ideals that should be reflected in the education system disappear in the process.

R.S. Peters suggests the following three criteria for the concept of education: 1) the normative criterion, under which education implies the transmission of what is worthwhile to make the educated commit themselves to it; 2) the cognitive criterion, under which education fosters knowledge, understanding and some kind of cognitive perspective; and 3) the procedural criterion, under which education rules out some procedures of transmission due to the lack willingness and interest on the part of the learner (Peters 1980).

Korea must consider the following in its cooperation with UNESCO in the field of education. What are UNESCO's ideals and what is the purpose of education relating to these ideals? What is the purpose of Korea's educational cooperation with UNESCO? Considering the fundamental functions of education, what should the outcome of educational cooperation between Korea and UNESCO be on the individual, national and international (global community) levels? These questions are not easy to answer, but efforts must be made to do so.

With these questions in mind, in this article I will outline the educational philosophy of UNESCO and the educational programmes that have been promoted since the foundation of the UNESCO. I will also explore possible directions for Korea's educational cooperation with UNESCO today.

II. Purpose of UNESCO's Education Programmes

1. Peace Education

In 2018, UNESCO's website answered the question "What is UNESCO?" as follows: "UNESCO

is the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. It seeks to build peace through international cooperation in Education, the Sciences and Culture. UNESCO's programmes contribute to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals defined in Agenda 2030, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2015."[92]

UNESCO inherited its spiritual and institutional legacy from the International Committee of Intellectual Cooperation, founded in 1922 as an advisory body to the League of Nations, and the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, the committee's executing agency founded in 1926. However, it is well known that the event leading directly to the creation of UNESCO was the Conference of Allied Ministers of Education held in London in 1942. The ministers at this conference, which took place in the middle of the World War II, were looking for ways and means to rebuild their countries' educational systems after the war. In 1945, after many further meetings, they finally arrived at an agreement to establish an international organization for postwar educational cooperation (KNCU 2004).

Against this historical background, the preamble to the UNESCO Constitution includes the following words clarifying UNESCO's founding philosophy:

> "That the wide diffusion of culture, and the education of humanity for justice and liberty and peace are indispensable to the dignity of man and constitute a sacred duty which all the nations must fulfil in a spirit of mutual assistance and concern;

> That a peace based exclusively upon the political and economic arrangements of governments would not be a peace which could secure the unanimous, lasting and sincere support of the peoples of the world, and that the peace must therefore be founded, if it is not to fail, upon the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind.

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[92] UNESCO, accessed October 26, 2018, https://en.unesco.org/about-us/introducing-Unesco.

For these reasons, the States Parties to this Constitution, believing in full and equal opportunities for education for all, in the unrestricted pursuit of objective truth, and in the free exchange of ideas and knowledge, are agreed and determined to develop and to increase the means of communication between their peoples and to employ these means for the purposes of mutual understanding and a truer and more perfect knowledge of each other's lives;

In consequence whereof they do hereby create the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization for the purpose of advancing, through the educational and scientific and cultural relations of the peoples of the world, the objectives of international peace and of the common welfare of mankind for which the United Nations Organization was established and which its Charter proclaims."

UNESCO's Constitution, which reflects the process leading up to the establishment of the organization, states that UNESCO's founding purpose is international peace and the common welfare of mankind[93] based on the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind. Its Member States commit to "full and equal opportunities for education for all, the unrestricted pursuit of objective truth, the free exchange of ideas and knowledge, the increased means of communication and employment of these means for the purposes of mutual understanding." Regarding education in particular, UNESCO's Constitution states that the education of humanity for justice, liberty and peace are indispensable to the dignity of man, and so full and equal opportunities for education should be provided.

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[93] Article 1, Paragraph 1 of UNESCO's Constitution explains UNESCO's purpose as follows: 1. The purpose of the Organization is to contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and culture in order to further universal respect for justice, for the rule of law and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms which are affirmed for the peoples of the world, without distinction of race, sex, language or religion, by the Charter of the United Nations.

When serving misguided political ideals, education can drive humanity towards war, but conversely can pave the way to peace when it fosters a healthy political environment. Germany has proved this empirically. The German education system prior to and during the Second World War had a great role in pushing schools to serve the Nazi regime and spread Nazi ideology. Under the German education system at this time, many books were destroyed and censored, and new textbooks were created which promoted love for Hitler, obedience to the state, militarism, racism and antisemitism. As a result, many teenaged students joined the 'Hitlerjugend' organization, only to become tools in the tragic war.

However, one of the main discourses that emerged in postwar West Germany related to 'critical peace education.' This discourse criticized structural violence and injustice, with the understanding that during the Cold War period the characteristics of the confrontation between the East and the West were based upon fear. As a result, this discourse emphasized the need to overcome fear and hostility. Lee and Song (2014, 51-54) points out that it was peace education, rather than democratic political education, that fulfilled the role of reunification education in West Germany. Researchers in peace studies and peace education emphasized the importance of eradication of hostile images of others for reconciliation with communist countries. This example has significant implications for Korea in terms of its cooperation with UNESCO, as well as in regard to peace education for North and South Korea.

2. Sustainable Development Goal 4

In addition to international peace, another founding purpose that UNESCO has striven for since its establishment is 'the common welfare of mankind.' However, with the spread of the concept of 'development' in the international community, particularly the United Nations system, UNESCO's education activities have gradually become 'education for development'. The agenda with the greatest influence on UNESCO's current educational

activities is Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 4, adopted by the UN in 2015.[94]   UNESCO, as the leading international agency in the field of education, has adopted the Education 2030 Agenda, which is the implementation plan for SDG 4, as its first priority until 2030.

In UNESCO's programme and budget for 2018-2019, the budget for programmes is shown as US$969,863,000, out of the total budget of US$1,224,746,700. The budget for education is US$396,815,900, which represents over 40% of the total programme budget. The strategic objectives and main lines of action (MLAs) for the education programme, which show this programme's overall direction, are focused on SDG 4. There are three strategic objectives: 1) supporting Member States to develop education systems that foster high quality and inclusive lifelong learning for all; 2)   empowering learners to be creative and responsible global citizens; and 3) leading and coordinating the Education 2030 Agenda. In addition, the programme and budget document sets out two MLAs for the education sector: 1) support Member States in the implementation of SDG 4 and 2) lead SDG 4-Education 2030 coordination and reviewing /monitoring. In short, the main activity of UNESCO's education programme is the implementation and evaluation of SDG 4 (UNESCO 2018).

The seven targets of SDG 4, however, do not discuss the education of humanity for justice, liberty and peace as referred to in UNESCO's Constitution. Only target 4.7 touches on the social, humanistic and moral purposes of education, such as education for sustainable development, human rights, a culture of peace culture and nonviolence, global citizenship, cultural diversity, and so on.

Instead, SDG 4 focuses on the right to education. Whether the right to education is considered a basic right in and of itself, or considered a means to enjoy other rights, the provision of "full and equal opportunities for education for all" is the core of SDG 4. This is in line with UNESCO's initiatives of Education for International Understanding (EIU) and

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[94] SDG 4 is to ¢¢¢®¨¡Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all.¢¢¢®¨ú

global Education for All (EFA), as well as the educational goals of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the SDGs, as symbolized by the spirit of "leaving no one behind."

III. Changes in UNESCO's Representative Education Programmes

1. Education for International Understanding

In earlier times, Education for International Understanding (EIU) was UNESCO's core education programme, fostered mainly by the Western nations that had emerged victorious from the Second World War. Pedagogists sometimes call EIU the 'traditional' peace education programme, or 'UNESCO-style' peace education, to distinguish it from critical peace education. At the first UNESCO General Conference in 1946, UNESCO's then Director-General, Julian Huxley, argued that the purpose of UNESCO was to contribute to peace and security and to enhance the common welfare of mankind, and that the overall purpose of UNESCO's education programmes was to promote international understanding (Chiba 1999).

In the early 1950s, the expressions 'Education in World Citizenship' and 'Education for Living in a World Community' were also used for the concept, but eventually the name 'Education for International Understanding' was settled on. From 1953, EIU was put into practice in the field through UNESCO's Associated Schools Project (ASP), which continues today. In the 1960s, however, new trends developed in the international community, complicating the picture of post-war hopefulness. After many newly-independent countries joined the UN, there were new political confrontations pitting the "Southeast" against the "Northwest". Also, as the UN declared a Decade of Development, both developing countries and industrialized countries set the priority on economic development. With these new trends, UNESCO's educational programme focused more upon literacy education, science education,

and innovation in educational technology, resulting in a relatively weakened EIU.

Third World countries that gained political independence were fierce critics of the existing world order, noting the disadvantageous aspects of development, and that their economies were subordinated to those of industrialized countries. In this context, the UN General Assembly in 1974 adopted the New International Economic Order, and UNESCO suggested the concept of 'endogenous development.' Finally, in the critical atmosphere surrounding the topic of development in the international community, the 1974 Recommendation on International Education [95] was born. This is still considered a highly significant recommendation. However, Western countries that had experienced antiestablishment civic and student movements in the late 1960s were concerned about these trends, and criticized the Third World and the Eastern Bloc for politicizing UNESCO. During this time, interest in environmental issues also grew within the EIU field, following the publication of the Club of Rome report, *The Limits to Growth*, in 1972 and the UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm.

In the 1980s, UNESCO strengthened its position against the existing economic and political order by concerning itself with the North-South divide, poverty and inequality. Subjects such as human rights and tolerance were also addressed in an effort to help the Eastern Bloc join the democratic system during those countries' political changes. During this period, both the United States (in 1984) and the United Kingdom (in 1985) withdrew from UNESCO, following sustained criticism from the Third World and the promotion of the New World Information and Communication Order. Meanwhile, Third World nations suffered because of a global economic recession at this time, which developmentalists refer to as "the lost decade."

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[95] The 18th session of the UNESCO General Conference in 1974 adopted the Recommendation concerning Education for International Understanding, Co-operation and Peace and Education relating to Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The recommendation suggested the shorter name 'International Education' for the concept.

Globalization in the 1990s increased interest in EIU. In response to the UN's request for it to help solve increasing international disputes, UNESCO started a Culture of Peace programme in 1992. Furthermore, UNESCO conducted education programmes on democracy and human rights, which were necessary for the process of transfer to a market economy in Eastern European countries and the former Soviet Union. The 44th session of the International Conference on Education in 1994 approved the Integrated Framework of Action on Education for Peace, Human Rights and Democracy. The report *Learning: The Treasure Within* was published by the International Commission on Education for the Twenty-First Century in 1996, drawing attention to four pillars of learning: "learning to know," "learning to do," "learning to be," and "learning to live together."

In the new millennium, interest in global issues remained high, but the international community placed more importance upon the UN's MDGs, so the importance of UNESCO's EIU decreased. During this time the UN proclaimed the Decade of Education for Sustainable Development (2005-2014). After UNESCO took the leading role in promoting education for sustainable development (ESD), this became the preferred comprehensive educational concept, covering peace, development and the environment. The Global Education First Initiative (GEFI) announced by the UN Secretary-General in September 2012 emphasized three priorities: to put every child in school, to improve the quality of learning, and to foster global citizenship. However, after 2015, UNESCO's education activities can basically be summarized as the content of SDG 4. The term EIU is now barely used, though its influence can still be seen in the fact that SDG 4.7 refers to the need for education on peace, human rights, cultural diversity, global citizenship and sustainable development.

2. Literacy Education

If EIU was a form of education aimed at building peace, literacy education can be seen as aiming to ensure that people can exercise their right to education, regarded as a fundamental human right. It can be seen as an effort to realize the "full and equal

opportunities for education for all" referred to in the UNESCO Constitution. It is also thought that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights had a large influence on UNESCO's early education activities. Article 26 of the Declaration reads as follows:

"(1) Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.

(2) Education shall be directed to the full development of the human person- ality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.

(3) Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children."

In the early 1950s, UNESCO's literacy education programme was centered on the expansion of primary education and the eradication of illiteracy among adults, but later grew into an international education movement, through measures such as the Convention against Discrimination in Education (1960), the Karachi Plan (1960) and the Addis Ababa Plan (1961). In 1965, the idea of 'functional literacy'[96] was introduced in discussions at the World Conference on the Eradication of Illiteracy in Tehran. As most UNESCO Member States had at the time made national economic development their first priority, this concept of functional literacy gained great momentum.

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[96] Functional literacy refers to the level of knowledge and skills in reading, writing and arithmetic that are required to engage effectively in all activities of one's community.

In the 1970s, UNESCO introduced the concepts of 'lifelong education' and a 'learning society' through the International Commission on the Development of Education. During this period, a number of similar educational concepts focusing on economic development emerged, including the ILO's 'continuing education' and the OECD's 'recurrent education' and were soon integrated into UNESCO's lifelong education. Lee Seung-hwan (2009) criticized this trend of education biased towards economic development, for several reasons, saying that: 1) the extension of the time for education to an unlimited period weakened the importance of education as a human right; 2) the responsibility for education tended to be transferred from the state to the individual; and 3) the trend strengthened the view of humans as resources. In fact, since the 1980s the relationship between education and economic development has grown to the extent that the concept of 'human capital development' or 'human resource development' became influential enough to replace the term 'education'.[97]

During the 1990s, literacy education for adults, universalization of primary education and lifelong education were integrated into UNESCO's Education for All (EFA). The UN designated 1990 as International Literacy Year, and UNESCO, as the lead organization for the initiative, held a World Conference on EFA in Jomtien, Thailand, in cooperation with the UNDP, UNICEF and the World Bank. Meanwhile, in 1992, the UN Conference on the Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil greatly increased awareness of the concept of 'sustainable development.' Following this, in 2000, the World Education Forum in Dakar, Senegal reaffirmed the importance of literacy education and lifelong education, and the universalization of primary education was included as a goal in the UN MDGs, and later, in 2015, in SDG 4.

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[97] The Republic of Korea also had a Ministry of Education and Human Resources from 2001 to 2008, before it became Ministry of Education, Science and Technology.

IV. Reflections on the Concepts of 'Peace' and 'Development' for the Purpose of Educational Cooperation

1. The Concept of 'Peace'

70 years passed between the establishment of UNESCO in 1945 after the Second World War, and the adoption of the SDGs as the common agenda for the international community in 2015. Peace in the international community and the promotion of the common welfare of humanity are still the goals and aspirations of the global community. The international community, however, does not appear to maintain the same understanding of the concepts of peace and welfare that it had 70 years ago.

EIU, reflecting the educational goals of UNESCO in the organization's early stages, had the clear purpose of preventing war through education focused on intellectual and moral aspects. The meaning of peace was the absence of war, as the term 'peace' is used traditionally in international relations and politics. War, however, is just one form of violence. Peace studies, which developed from the early 1960s, defined peace not simply as the absence of war but as the absence of any type of violence. That is, in addition to physical violence (including war), economic, social and cultural violence must also be eradicated. The former definition of peace is referred to as 'negative peace,' while the latter is referred to as 'positive peace.'

Johan Galtung, a renowned scholar in peace studies, classifies violence into three categories. First, personal or direct violence is defined as "avoidable insults to basic human needs," with such needs being classified into four types, survival needs, well-being needs, identity needs and freedom needs. Second, structural or indirect violence is defined as the "cause of the difference between the potential and the actual, between what could have been and what is." This type of violence includes exploitation such as unequal distribution, infringement of the autonomy of a subordinated class, and fragmentation and

marginalization of the subordinated class. Third, cultural or symbolic violence is defined as "any aspect of a culture that can be used to legitimize violence in its direct or structural form," and it includes violent aspects of religion, ideology, language, art, and science.[98]

Peace discourse and peace education is now addressed at multiple levels of society, encompassing not just the national level but also the racial, ethnic, religious, small group, commercial and individual dimensions. In relation to ecological crises and natural disasters, such education takes place in a context that goes beyond relationships between humans, to the relationships between humanity and nature.

2. The Concept of "Development"

As discussed above, 'education for development' has been one of the two main pillars of UNESCO's educational activities, along with 'education for peace.' Development can be defined in many different ways, but this paper examines the term as it is used within the UN system. The Charter of the UN and the Constitution of UNESCO barely refer to the term 'development.' This is strange considering it is so widely used as an ideology to be pursued in the humanities as a whole, including politics, the economy, society and culture. The lack of reference may be due to the ambiguous meaning of the term, one dictionary definition of which is "the process in which someone or something grows or changes and becomes more advanced."

The editor of the *Development Dictionary*, Wolfgang Sachs, noted that most countries in the Southern hemisphere that gained independence after the Second World War adopted 'development' as their first priority, whether they chose a democratic system or dictatorship. For over 50 years since then, development has been a common vision and goal of the

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[98] Lee, Jae-Bong, "On Peace Studies", http://m.blog.daum.net/pbpm21/256?categoryId=9, accessed September 30, 2018.

international community. Sachs sees the 'age of development' as beginning with US President Harry S. Truman, who defined the Southern hemisphere as the "underdeveloped areas" in his inaugural speech on January 20, 1949. However, Sachs says that this concept of development later became problematic and a target for criticism and controversy (Sachs, 1992). After the Cold War gained traction in the 1950s, 'development' became a core concept in the UN system.

In the 1960s, the United States took the lead in adopting the UN Development Decade, which supported economic growth of developing countries through the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. However, over the course of this decade, the economies of developing countries became further subordinated in the world order and domestic rich-poor gaps became ever bigger. In 1966, the founding of the UNDP led to a reflection on the existing narrow definition of the term 'development', and an expansion of the concept to an understanding that development should be based on the improvement of the quality of people's lives and the satisfaction of their basic needs. In the late 1970s, the UNDP began to place importance on the concept of 'human development,' which referred to the full flourishing of all human capabilities. Later the concept of the 'right to development' began to be examined and in 1986 the UN adopted the Declaration on the Right to Development. The right is defined as "an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized." Its basic elements include a healthy life, securing a standard of living, gaining knowledge and culture, acquiring resources for living, and ensuring self-esteem and human rights (Ozeki et al. 2007).

The concept of 'sustainable development'[99] defined in a report by the World Commission on

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[99] Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs (WCED 2005, 87).

Environment and Development (WCED) in 1987, can be seen as a form of 'alternative development,' aimed at addressing the problems caused by development, particularly economic, social and environmental problems. While generally known as a strategy for reconciling economic development with environmental preservation, the two key concepts of 'sustainable development' presented in the WCED report are also significant as they prompt a level of ethical reflection in relation to both the current and future generations, in addition to being linked to the concept of 'positive peace' discussed earlier in this paper. The two key concepts in the report (WCED 2005, 87) are:

- the concept of 'needs,' in particular the essential needs of the world's poor, to which overriding priority should be given;
- the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organization on the environment's ability to meet present and future needs.

V. Educational Cooperation with UNESCO

To find a desirable direction for Korea's educational cooperation with UNESCO, I have so far examined the changes in the purposes of UNESCO's education programmes. I have also pointed out a need for reflection on and reinterpretation of the concepts of 'peace' and 'development.' I will now suggest two routes that Korea could consider in respect of its educational cooperation with UNESCO. Specific programmes are not suggested here because of the need for discussion of these among policy makers, experts, and other stakeholders.

1. Educational Cooperation for Peace

The first route that Korea could consider is educational cooperation for peace. Even though Education for International Understanding (EIU) is not a popular term these days, this does

not change the fact that UNESCO's education programmes should contribute to peace, as UNESCO's ultimate ideal. In this sense, Korea should pay attention to peace and peace education in considering the manner of its cooperation with UNESCO. Moreover, interest has been growing recently in driving forward peace in South and North Korea, and in East Asia more generally, and Korea will have to play a leading role in maintaining this kind of atmosphere. Therefore, Korea's efforts to cooperate with the United Nations system and to promote peace will have a great impact both domestically and internationally.

As discussed above, the traditional concept of peace as the absence of war has evolved to become 'positive peace.' This is a desirable evolution. The rapid spread of globalization and neoliberalism seemed poised to break down national borders and differences between countries, but as of 2018 it is clear that such boundaries and differences remain firmly in place. In this respect, there are arguments that the concept of peace required by modern society is not simply 'positive peace', but also a 'just peace' and 'liberal democratic peace.' As such, Korea needs to participate more actively in refining the agenda for international peace and peace education, through UNESCO activities based on Korea's own experiences, and building on UNESCO's existing traditions of peace building and peace education.

In recent years, research has been conducted actively on the role of education in conflict and post-conflict areas, while international organizations and NGOs have conducted conflict-sensitive education, emergency education and post-conflict education activities in disputed regions. These experiences have led to the conclusion that post-conflict education can play an important role in leading to truth, reconciliation and transitional justice, and may ultimately have a direct effect upon the eradication of legacies from long-lasting disputes (Yu et al. 2017).

As an example of how Korea can contribute, it may be possible to envisage a project to establish norms such as an international recommendation or convention on peace education. Since 1961, Korea has participated in the UNESCO Associated Schools Project

network, and has steadily expanded its EIU activities under the leadership of the Korean National Commission for UNESCO. In 2000, Korea founded the Asia-Pacific Center of Education for International Understanding (APCEIU) as a UNESCO category II center, which continues to be successfully operated. In addition, Korea contributed to the inclusion of 'Global Citizenship Education' in SDG 4.7 through the hosting of the 2015 World Education Forum. Since then, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Korean National Commission for UNESCO and APCEIU have worked together to spread Global Citizenship Education in collaboration with UNESCO. In particular, Korea has accumulated various experiences related to peace over time, through the tragic history of its colonial era and the Korean war, and through the process of its rapid economic and social development.

There will be many challenges for Korea in ensuring international support and cooperation but successful outcomes can still be expected if we strive for peace and peace education in cooperation with UNESCO's various programmes. The work of consulting, persuading and coordinating the views of Member States and experts to establish a normative educational agenda for peace through the UNESCO network will also have many domestic implications. Ultimately, beyond the agenda setting and discussion, it would be a very meaningful achievement in the international community if international norms (whether through a recommendation, declaration, convention, or other form) could be established in the field of education that aims for a positive form of peace appropriate to the needs of the times.

2. Cooperation to Ensure and Promote the Right to Education

The second suggested route for Korea's educational cooperation with UNESCO is educational cooperation to secure and promote the right to education. This should not, however, be intended simply to develop human resources as a means of economic development. Such cooperation should be aimed at the humanization of education, peace and sustainable development. Education is a human right. The right to education is a basic human right, in and of itself, and is additionally meaningful as a base for other human rights.

Literacy, in particular, is a starting point for education. Thus, more active cooperation is required on basic education, particularly literacy education. UNESCO can contribute to developing and disseminating efficient teaching and learning methods. However, what is more important in the UNESCO educational programme is whether the teaching and learning process is oriented towards peace based on human dignity, and whether it promotes human rights. In this sense, literacy is not simply a competence to educate oneself, but also an essential condition to exercise one's human rights. Literacy is also the basis of how one perceives the world through the symbolic system of language.[100]

Korea has many reasons to cooperate on literacy education with UNESCO. First, literacy is relevant to most of SDG 4's targets, which follow in the footsteps of UNESCO's EFA programme, as well as the slogan of the SDGs as a whole, "leaving no one behind." Second, cooperation in respect of literacy education has been requested of Korea by least developed and developing countries in the international community. In particular, the success model of basic education in Korea is very attractive to countries that have experienced a colonial period or war, and that aspire to industrialization and democratization. Korea has already sponsored the King Sejong Literacy Prize since 1990, and UNESCO has carried out various projects to promote the right to education through voluntary contributions funded by Korea. These projects could be linked to create a representative educational cooperation project between Korea and UNESCO. For example, under a project titled "Sejong Project: Literacy for Life, Literacy for Peace" (tentative title), all related projects could be linked and the ministries and agencies could work more closely together, which would be more desirable. Lastly, educational cooperation programmes between Korea and UNESCO could be extended to cover a more comprehensive concept of literacy. The definition of literacy is constantly expanding, to include not simply literacy as a basic ability to read, or numeracy, but also various functional literacies such as health literacy and financial literacy. In addition, it includes literacies in fields relevant to UNESCO, such as science literacy, media literacy,

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[100] For more about the relationship between literacy and life, see UNESCO (2006).

digital literacy, cultural literacy, eco-literacy, and peace literacy, which allows Korea to engage in long-term cooperation with UNESCO to ensure the right to education, which has the potential for many positive effects on Korea.

To end, I would like to offer one additional thought on the goal of education. The human act of education cannot exist simply to serve only one goal or one specific purpose. Instead, education serves many functions, from various perspectives, which may be opposing or complementary, but are integrated

One function of education is to preserve the existing order or the current system. Another, opposite function is the recognition of problems within a community or society and the associated pursuit of social innovation. Education helps to foster individuals' abilities and desirable character traits, and at the group or community level, it promotes the transfer and development of cultural heritage. These functions are not separate but work in a dialectical relationship (Kim and Kang 1998). Therefore, discussions on the goals and purposes of education should be conducted from a comprehensive and long-term perspective. It will be necessary to continue discussions on how Korea should cooperate with UNESCO in the field of education, and I hope that such discussions will take into account the lessons learned from existing UNESCO activities.

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SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT GOALS

1 NO POVERTY
End poverty in all its forms everywhere

2 ZERO HUNGER
End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture

3 GOOD HEALTH AND WELL-BEING
Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages

4 QUALITY EDUCATION
Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all

5 GENDER EQUALITY
Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls

6 CLEAN WATER AND SANITATION
Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all

7 AFFORDABLE AND CLEAN ENERGY
Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all

8 DECENT WORK AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all

9 INDUSTRY, INNOVATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation

10 REDUCED INEQUALITIES
Reduce inequality within and among countries

11 SUSTAINABLE CITIES AND COMMUNITIES
Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable

12 RESPONSIBLE CONSUMPTION AND PRODUCTION
Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns

13 CLIMATE ACTION
Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts

14 LIFE BELOW WATER
Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development

15 LIFE ON LAND
Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss

16 PEACE, JUSTICE AND STRONG INSTITUTIONS
Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels

17 PARTNERSHIPS FOR THE GOALS
Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development

외교부
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

UNESCO

United Nations
Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization

Korean
National Commission
for UNESCO